ABSTRACT

PORFIRIO DÍAZ: SAVIOR OR TYRANT OF MEXICO?

Porfirio Díaz was the Mexican president who dominated the nation’s politics for a period spanning just a little over three decades. He was president of the nation from 1876 until 1911 when the Mexican Revolution removed him from the presidency. During that period he oversaw the development and renovation of the nation. As an officer in the military, Díaz defended the nation against the conservative-imposed emperor Maximilian of Hapsburg and the invading French forces. He was instrumental in the victory of the republican forces, and at the triumph of the republic he rose to the level of national hero. Having lived through a transformative period of the nation, there is a vast amount of scholarly work around his persona. The current historiography on Porfirio Díaz can be divided into three categories: Porfirismo, anti-Porfirismo and neo-Porfirismo, each with its own origins and historical context. This study addresses how select scholars from these three historiographical traditions have interpreted Díaz as a soldier and statesman, explaining why and how their interpretations differ. By examining select moments in the life of Porfirio Díaz, this study will demonstrate why Díaz produced a dichotomy of love and hatred that remains present with the people of Mexico today. The ultimate goal, however, is to point out the need for a more balanced and objective treatment of Porfirio Díaz and his presidency.

Armando Hernández August 2011

PORFIRIO DÍAZ: SAVIOR OR TYRANT OF MEXICO?

by Armando Hernández

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the College of Social Sciences California State University, Fresno August 2011

APPROVED

For the Department of History:

We, the undersigned, certify that the thesis of the following student meets the required standards of scholarship, format, and style of the university and the student's graduate degree program for the awarding of the master's degree.

Armando Hernández Thesis Author

William E. Skuban (Chair) History

Blain Roberts History

Maria-Aparecida Lopes Chicano and Latin American Studies

For the University Graduate Committee:

Dean, Division of Graduate Studies

AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRODUCTION OF MASTER’S THESIS

X I grant permission for the reproduction of this thesis in part or in its entirety without further authorization from me, on the condition that the person or agency requesting reproduction absorbs the cost and provides proper acknowledgment of authorship.

Permission to reproduce this thesis in part or in its entirety must be obtained from me.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge and extend my gratitude to all the people who contributed to making this a reality. I would like to start by thanking the entire faculty who prepared me for this project, as well as my fellow graduate students with whom I had numerous discussions that helped guide this project into a more specific work than I had originally intended. Needless to say, this project would have never become a reality without the support, guidance, and encouragement of my committee members. Dr. William Skuban who guided me to the proper sources and the structure for this project; Dr. Blain Roberts who meticulously helped fine tune this work; and finally, Dr. Maria-Aparecida Lopes who helped me give the proper direction to my argument and helped me refine my comments and historical narrative as accurately as possible. The time they spent discussing themes, structure, organization, grammar and other minute details truly showed their support and dedication to helping me complete this work. I can truly say that without our weekly discussions this project would have been nothing but scattered ideas without the proper direction and an un-discernable structure. For their help and support, I will be forever grateful. I would also like to thank my friends and family members who always encouraged me to continue my work and research even when I felt the task was more than I could handle. In this respect, I would like to thank my parents and brothers whose encouragement and support was unconditional. Their support and interest in seeing the completed work motivated me continue a thesis that seemed to never have a completion date. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Ana Lucia who provided love, encouragement, support, motivation and patience, while never v protesting the vast amount of time that this project took me away from her and our daughter Sarah. I cannot express my gratitude for all that she has done. This project is for them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Historical Background to Mexico ...... 7

Porfirio Díaz: Road to Liberalism ...... 8

About the Authors ...... 9

Organization ...... 12

CHAPTER 2: DÍAZ: SOLDIER AND PATRIOT ...... 14

CHAPTER 3: DÍAZ: REBEL AND SUPPRESSOR ...... 29

CHAPTER 4: DÍAZ: SUPREME AND AUTOCRAT? ...... 47

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ...... 63

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 70

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Porfirio Díaz is probably one of the most polemical figures in Mexican history. He was the president of Mexico from 1876 to 1880 and subsequently, without interruption, from 1884 until his forced resignation in 1911. He was the head of the Mexican state for a little over three decades, making him the person who occupied the presidency of Mexico the longest. In order to understand the significance of Díaz and his tenure in office, one must understand the background that led to the rise of Díaz as the sole representative of power in Mexico. Since its independence in 1821 and up to Porfirio Díaz’s ascent to power, Mexico was torn by civil conflict. During his early military career, Díaz was known as a proud liberal who defied one of the most despised presidents of the Mexican nation, Antonio López de Santa Anna. Díaz also fought alongside Benito Juárez, one of Mexico’s most beloved presidents. Díaz defended the Mexican nation during the French Intervention and became one of the heroes of the celebrated Battle of Puebla on May 5, 1862. As president of Mexico, Díaz managed to modernize the country and was praised for his actions by the United States and European nations. However, popular masses remember Díaz for being a dictator who abused Mexican citizens and their rights in order to favor the interests of foreigners. Some of Díaz’s actions are remembered by the popular saying: “Mexico was the mother of foreigners, and the stepmother of Mexicans.” Because of his actions, Díaz to this day is either hated or loved by the Mexican people. There are very few who stand in the middle ground of these two extremes. The question then becomes, how does one man provoke this dichotomy of love and hatred? A possible answer to this question lies within the historiography on 2

Porfirio Díaz, which can be divided into three different categories, each a direct result of historical events in Mexico. Porfirian historiography can be divided into three categories, each of which has a specific chronology and approach to its subject: Porfirismo, anti-Porfirismo and neo-Porfirismo. The first of these historiographies, Porfirismo, presents a positive portrayal of the Mexican head of state. These works range from his early days in the Oaxacan seminary and end right before the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Anti-Porfirismo historiography is not the direct result of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, which incidentally sought to destroy the old cult of Porfirismo; however, it is most forcefully expressed after 1911. The push behind anti-Porfirismo historiography is mainly the popularization of the revolution and its leaders, who were made into the heroes and later the martyrs of the revolution. It was also necessary to create a villain, a position occupied by Porfirio Díaz, since the revolution was rooted in removing him from power. According to anti- Porfirismo historiography, the Díaz regime was the supreme example of tyranny, dictatorship and oppression, and Díaz himself was condemned for his corruption, his authoritarianism, and his betrayal of national interests. Since the 1990s, however, there have been strong indications that the image of Díaz and the interpretation of his regime have undergone a distinct transformation. As a result, the Díaz regime has been interpreted in a more positive light under neo-Porfirismo historiography, and this reevaluation has shown new trends in social, regional, and cultural history that have profoundly altered the traditional depiction of Porfirio 1 Díaz’s Mexico. Understanding how these three different historiographical

1 Paul Garner, Porfirio Díaz: Profiles in Power (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 2-3. 3

traditions interpret the events of Mexico during the reign of Porfirio Díaz is fundamental to recognizing that both extremes, Porfirismo and anti- Porfirismo, are probably too generous or too judgmental in some respects; a more objective story may be found in neo-Porfirismo historiography. A distinct element of Porfirismo historiography is the glorification of Porfirio Díaz. One main focus consists of the president’s ability to pacify and bring order to Mexico, and, of course, his military campaigns that distinguished him throughout the Mexican nation. Some of these scholars believe that early Mexican statesmen put the principals of the nation’s government through a terrible ordeal, and without a proper understanding of this failed experimentation of early Mexican government, it is almost impossible to understand the importance of Díaz’s work. Porfirismo scholars argue that Díaz was “summoned to power by the necessities of a divided and disheartened Mexican nation, and that he is the creation of the weakness of the Mexican people. Moreover, the progressive Mexican nation that evolved during his administration was a result of Díaz’s 2 strength and common sense.” Since Porfirismo historians seek to glorify the accomplishments of Díaz, their work tends to underscore Díaz’s military accomplishments and his success in bringing order and modernity to Mexico. One of the key elements of anti-Porfirismo historiography is that it gains strength after 1911, even though it is not a direct result of the Mexican Revolution. The main arguments of anti-porfiristas lie in the mistreatment of Mexican citizens, abuses by the executive, and how the Díaz administration favored foreigners and their interests. These historians also focus on the poor distribution of wealth

2 James Creelman, Díaz: Master of Mexico (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1911), v. 4

within Mexico. They contend that the wealth that Mexico was acquiring under Díaz never trickled down to the lower classes. From these arguments comes the belief that under Díaz “Mexico was the mother of foreigners, and the stepmother of Mexicans.” Another favorite argument utilized by anti-Porfirismo scholars is the quickness of Porfirio Díaz to utilize force to suppress those who opposed him or disrupted national peace. Anti-Porfirismo historiography, then, addresses the mistreatment of Mexican citizens and the use of force to pacify the rebels who dared oppose Díaz and the peace of the nation. The vilification of Porfirio Díaz as president of Mexico has proved to be persistent throughout the twentieth century, even when there have been some indications that these negative concepts have been relaxing in academic circles. For example, Mexican President Manuel Ávila Camacho allowed Díaz’s second wife, Carmen Romero Rubio de Díaz, to return to Mexico; however, despite the efforts of the family, President Díaz remains buried in Paris, in the cemetery at Montparnasse. Some scholars like Paul Garner contend that this is a clear “demonstration of the failure of the post-Revolutionary Mexican state to come to 3 terms with the Díaz regime and his legacy”. The roots of neo-Porfirismo can be found in the twentieth-century Mexican political and economic crisis, as well as the re-evaluation of the Díaz tenure by a new and younger generation of Mexican historians. As Paul Garner states, this form of revisionism is not a new phenomenon in Mexican historiography; it owes a good deal to the biographies of Díaz by Francisco Bulnes, Ángel Taracena and 4 Jorge Fernando Iturribarria.

3 Garner, 12.

4 Ibid., 13. 5

In his contribution to the making of neo-Porfirismo possible, Francisco Bulnes provided the following assessment of the regime:

Whatever the enemies of Porfirismo may say, the dictatorship was welcomed as a tremendous benefit by all social classes. Peace was a novel and attractive development for the country, and [the regime] inspired loyalty and 5 gratitude amongst the people for the caudillo who had pacified his patria, in 6 the belief that peace would be ever-lasting. Angel Taracena’s biography of Díaz also contributes to making neo- Porfirismo possible:

The Mexican people in general, and Mexican youth in particular…ought to be familiar with all of the details of the life of Porfirio Díaz, in order to be able to appreciate both his failures and successes, of which the latter were of 7 significant benefit to the patria. These biographers planted the seeds that would later be harvested by neo- Porfirismo historians in their revisionist interpretation of historical events in Mexico. In 1984, Fernando Orozco Linares, a neo-Porfirismo scholar, made the following assessment:

Since 1930 the campaign to defame Porfirio Díaz increased in intensity. There is no historical account or textbook in which the author has failed to revile his memory. This is not only a travesty of truth; it has also distorted the education of thousands of students, who are absolutely certain that Díaz 8 was a tyrant, a murderer, a traitor, and a thief.

5 A caudillo is a military strongman.

6 Garner, 13.

7 Ibid.

8 Fernando Orozco Linares, Porfirio Díaz y Su Tiempo (Mexico: Panorama Editorial, 1984), 8. 6

Neo-Porfirismo historians have argued that while Díaz possessed the attributes and adopted the practices of a caudillo, this does not mean that he should be seen as another authoritarian military leader like so many others in Latin America (as anti-porfiristas would argue). Neo- Porfirismo historians have argued that during his tenure, Díaz was the only nineteenth-century Mexican president who was able both to control the military and remove the constant threat of military intervention in Mexican politics, as had frequently been the case following the independence wars. Díaz supported the positivist view that the practice of politics should not concentrate on liberal demands; instead, politics should concentrate on the protection of social order and the promotion of material progress. Neo-Porfirismo historians also contend that, unlike what anti- Porfirismo historians would argue, the Díaz regime was a collective endeavor and 9 never the work of a single individual. Although there are distinct interpretations of Porfirio Díaz and his tenure as president of Mexico, there is one very important fact historians, regardless of how they interpret Díaz, cannot deny: under Porfirio Díaz, Mexico saw political stability, modernization, and economic growth like it had never seen since the country gained its independence in 1821. This fact demonstrates that the historical discourse has had an influence on the perception of Porfirio Díaz by the Mexican masses by focusing on the merits of these accomplishments alone or by vilifying the process through which these advancements were achieved. Currently, the most influential historiographical tradition is still that of anti-Porfirismo. My goal is to contribute to the Porfirian historiography by analyzing the different

9 Garner, 224-227. Also, see Jaime E. Rodríguez, ed. The Revolutionary Process in Mexico: Essays on Political and Social Change, 1880-1940 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1990). 7

interpretations and contradictions within the historiography to demonstrate its disparity and to advocate for a proper and balanced evaluation. The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that in the case of Porfirio Díaz, placing historiography into the context in which it was written is critical to understanding Porfirio Díaz and his rule in Mexico.

Historical Background to Mexico When Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1821, the nation began as a constitutional monarchy under Emperor Agustín de Iturbide. After 300 years of Spanish colonial rule, Mexico became a victim to a system of patriarchal 10 authority represented by the Spanish crown and later caudillos. In the nineteenth century, liberalism sought to destroy the deeply rooted system created by the colonial rule of Spain and caudillismo. Paul Garner contends that the period of 1855-1867 is crucial for the modern history of Mexico and liberalism. The Constitution of 1857 was the pivotal document of the period. The writers of the document firmly believed that the colonial institutions (corporate privileges and colonial restrictions on free circulation of private property) were the primary 11 obstacles to the progress of Mexico. The internal conflicts that began in Mexico shortly after its independence culminated in a civil war known as the War of the Reform, lasting from late 1857 until 1861. It was a conflict between conservatives and liberals, where the former opted to maintain the colonial institutions and the latter seeking their destruction.

10 Garner, 19. Caudillismo represented the exercise of personal, authoritarian and non- institutional power; it was very common in countries of Latin America.

11 Ibid. 8

The War of the Reform concluded with a victory for the liberals and the election of a native from Oaxaca named Benito Juárez as president of Mexico. Due to the expenses of the civil conflict, Juárez decided to temporarily suspend the national debt payments to Mexico’s creditors: Britain, Spain, and France. The European governments responded by sending military forces to occupy Mexico’s customhouse until payments resumed. It soon became evident that France wanted more than to secure payments; the emperor, Napoleon III, hoped to reestablish a French empire on the American continent. This triggered the event known in Mexico as the French Intervention, which lasted from 1862 until 1867. The intervention culminated with the execution of the imposed emperor Ferdinand Maximilian of the House of Habsburg, which also signified the triumph of liberalism in Mexico. Garner argues that the defeat of the empire ensured the prominence of liberalism in Mexican politics; however, presidents Benito Juárez and Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada were unable to secure political stability even with the liberal victory, and at times liberals abandoned their own rules of conduct and adopted anti-liberal practices (electoral manipulation, imposition of candidates, and even military coups) to maintain power and achieve political stability. In fact, these issues would still be unresolved by the time Díaz occupied the presidency of Mexico in 1876. Díaz was neither the first nor the last Mexican president to resort 12 to anti-liberal practices to achieve stability.

Porfirio Díaz: Road to Liberalism In the 1840s there were very few professional opportunities for advancement in Oaxaca. The most prominent were the military, priesthood, and

12 Ibid., 20-21. 9

law. Of these, the young Porfirio Díaz would initially favor priesthood, although not because of his strong religious beliefs, but those of his parents. Díaz entered the seminary of Oaxaca in 1843, but three years later two events pulled him from the seminary. The first was the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Mexico. Díaz along with a group of seminary colleagues joined the Oaxacan National Guard, but he was never called to serve the nation. The second was the opportunity to give private lessons in Latin to the son of Marcos Pérez, who was professor of Public and Constitutional Law at the Institute of Arts and Sciences in Oaxaca. Pérez would become a mentor to the young Porfirio Díaz, and by 1849 Díaz decided to leave the seminary and enroll in the Institute of Arts and Sciences to study law. It would be this move that prompted Díaz to be associated with 13 Oaxacan liberals. In 1853, a military takeover brought Santa Anna back to power. Porfirio Díaz’s first active participation in a civil conflict would be in opposition to Santa Anna, and this action represents the first of many different conflicts that would eventually lead him to the highest office in Mexico.

About the Authors The authors whose work I will analyze throughout this study will be referred to as Porfirismo, anti-Porfirismo, or neo-Porfirismo scholars, depending 14 on which of the three schools of Porfirian historiography they belong to. Porfirismo scholars include both Mexican and foreign nationals. Foreign scholars

13 Ibid., 26-27.

14 For information of authors who use these terms see: Jorge Fernando Iturribarria, Porfirio Díaz ante la Historia (Mexico: Unión Grafica, 1967); Paul Garner, Porfirio Díaz: Profiles in Power (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2001); and Anthony Bryan, “Bibliographical Essay A Research Review,” in The Age of Porfirio Díaz, ed. Carlos B. Gil (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977). 10

are usually American or British, because these two nations heavily invested in Mexico during the Porfiriato. Those Mexican scholars who wrote about Díaz usually held key offices in the Porfirian regime or sometimes abroad. They all speak highly of Díaz in every respect, and as a general theme, they explain the history of Mexico as a result of the numerous qualities possessed by Díaz. Among the authors that I use as Porfirismo scholars are James Creelman, David Hannay, Mrs. Alec Tweedie, José Francisco Godoy, Rafael Zayas Enríquez, Nemesio García Naranjo and Francisco Bulnes. Most of these authors were not historians; in fact, only David Hannay and Nemesio García Naranjo were trained historians. Francisco Bulnes is considered among Mexican scholars as a historian; however, he was never trained in the profession as were Hannay and García Naranjo. His credentials were earned as a key political figure in Mexican politics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Rafael Zayas Enríquez and José Francisco Godoy were both Mexican politicians who held key offices during the Porfiriato. Lastly, James Creelman was an American journalist who interviewed Diaz towards the end of his career, and Mrs. Alec Tweedie was a British traveler and author who befriended Diaz’s wife Carmen Romero Rubio. Anti-Porfirismo scholars are mostly Mexican nationals, though occasionally they have been foreigners, as was the case of the American John Kenneth Turner. Most of their works were written right before the outbreak of the revolution or immediately after. However, since the revolution served as a vehicle for anti- Porfirismo sentiment, their scholarship thrived after the revolution, helping to vilify Díaz and justify the revolution. The authors that I use as anti-Porfirismo scholars are José Lopez Portillo y Rojas, Adolfo Duclos Salinas, Carlo de Fornaro, and John Kenneth Turner. Of these authors, Adolfo Duclos Salinas, Carlo de Fornaro and John Kenneth Turner were all influential journalists of the period. 11

José Lopez Portillo y Rojas was a politician, author and governor of Jalisco towards the end of Diaz’s presidency. He was also the grandfather of Mexico’s future president, José Lopez Portillo y Pacheco. Neo-Porfirismo scholars have a distinct approach to the study of the Porfiriato. Unlike the other two schools, their focus is usually not Díaz. Neo- 15 Porfirismo scholars do not study the Porfiriato with a template approach. Many of their studies are regional, and they understand that their conclusion and findings are not necessarily the same in all areas. Neo-Porfirismo scholars are also significantly detached from the successes and failures of Mexican Revolution of 1910. In fact, Anthony Bryan suggests that the origin of neo-Porfirismo can be rooted in the student riots of 1968 and the depiction of the government as a continuation of the Díaz era, stating that “political monopoly, excessive patronage, political apathy, neglect of the rural sector, inequitable distribution of national income and increasing foreign participation in the nation’s economy” are all 16 similarities that suggest continuity. The authors that I use as neo-Porfirismo scholars are Paul Garner, Enrique Krauze, Laurens Ballard Perry, John Mason Hart, Fernando Orozco Linares, Jorge Fernando Iturribarria, Claude Dumas, Mario Zamudio, Romana Falcón and Carlton Beals; they are all historians.

15 Anti-Porfirismo scholars make broad generalizations about the Porfiriato. They do not distinguish between isolated events in the various regions of the country. Instead, they take few examples and contend that these events were common throughout the nation. These generalizations will be referred to as a template approach.

16 Bryan, 165. 12 Organization This work is divided into five chapters. The Introduction outlines and describes the three distinct historiographies for Porfirio Díaz and why I suggest that they have a more central role in our historical interpretation. It also gives a brief outline to the historical context of the Mexican nation and of Porfirio Díaz. It provides the reader a short and brief history of what is necessary to understand Mexico before Díaz came to power and the role he played in its development. The second chapter is titled “Díaz: Soldier and Patriot” and it details Díaz’s early influences and how they prompted him into the life of a soldier. The focus of this chapter will be how the three historiographies discuss his accomplishments as a soldier, in particular his greatest victory, the siege of Puebla on April 2, 1867. Because Porfirismo scholars stress Díaz’s military days and how they served as a vehicle that helped Díaz develop into a great statesmen, their voice in the chapter will be much heavier. The third chapter is titled “Díaz: Rebel and Suppressor,” and as the title indicates, it will discuss how the three schools of historiography interpret Díaz’s rebellions, specifically the rebellion of La Noria, and his road to the presidency. The second half of the chapter will discuss how the three historiographies evaluate one of the most famous rebellions against Díaz in his early presidency, one that came to be known as the “Massacre of Veracruz.” Included in the discussion is the role played by Díaz in the suppression of the rebellion and the effects that it had for his presidency in the future. The fourth chapter is titled “Díaz: Dictator and Autocrat?” This chapter will discuss the amount of control Díaz was able to exercise throughout the nation 13

17 through his governors and jefes políticos, and the existence and repression of the opposition press during his time as president. The first half discusses the approaches taken by the three schools of Porfirian historiography and their conclusions about the amount of control that Díaz had in the corners of the country, and whether or not local authorities exercised autonomy or simply obeyed the will of Díaz. The second half is an evaluation of the amount of repression or toleration of the opposition press that existed in Mexico, Díaz’s his role in its censorship, and the role the press played in his downfall. Lastly, the Conclusion will summarize the content and points of each of the three chapters and the role that each of the three Porfirian historiographies has played in the overall historical discourse. I will explain new avenues in the study of the Porfiriato and the areas that still need exploring. To conclude, I will discuss some predictions that have been made addressing the return of Diaz’s remains from Paris and whether or not his return can be expected soon, or if Diaz must wait to return and make Mexico his final resting place.

17 Jefes Políticos were district officials who were charged with overseeing municipal affairs.

CHAPTER 2: DÍAZ: SOLDIER AND PATRIOT

The historiography of Porfirio Díaz and his presidency has fluctuated dramatically through time. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Mexican history, particularly events during Diaz’s presidency, was understood through the actions of Díaz himself. As a result, most of the literature involved in explaining the peace, order, and progress (material and economic) experienced during the Porfiriato was credited to Díaz and his skillful abilities as a military officer, leader and politician. In the wake of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Díaz was re-evaluated by historians of Mexico who, in order to legitimize what became of the Mexican Revolution, portrayed Díaz as a villain who favored the interests of foreigners over those of his fellow Mexican citizens. This interpretation has had a profound impact on the Mexican masses since it has embedded an image of Díaz as selling out his country and its citizens to foreigners. In more recent evaluations over the last three decades, historians have removed the focus from Díaz as a tyrannical ruler; instead, the focus turns to the benefits and downfalls that occurred during Díaz’s tenure as president. This chapter will focus on how historians have interpreted and understood Porfirio Díaz and events that led him to become Mexico’s longest standing president. A close analysis of Porfirian historiography in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries reveals many commonalities shared by the authors who wrote about the exploits of Díaz as an officer in the Mexican military and later as president of Mexico. The first and most obvious of these commonalities is that they all speak highly of Díaz as a student, soldier and president. A significant percentage of these authors are foreigners, in particular from the United States and Britain. On the other hand, many of the Mexican authors who wrote about Díaz 15

occupied key political positions in the Díaz machinery and in many cases served abroad in the nations that heavily invested money in Mexico at the end of the nineteenth century. In order to promote serious interest in Mexico and to transform the image of the nation at the international level, it was important that whatever was being published and said about Mexico under Díaz was positive in order to continue investment and development. Lastly, many of these authors 1 were not trained as professional historians. They often wrote about Díaz with passion and admiration for what he was able to achieve in the nation. In Porfirio Díaz, Rafael Zayas Enríquez, a personal friend of Díaz and member of the Mexican Congress, interprets history in a way that was embraced by authors of the time. Zayas contends that one should emphasize the great men in history, not the particular circumstances, as the force behind historical change. As a result, when he and other contemporaries write about Díaz, they focus on his virtues, which they interpret to be many, as well as his defects, which seem harder 2 to ascertain. It is no surprise that during this time there are works produced that have titles such as Díaz: Master of Mexico and Porfirio Díaz, President of Mexico: 3 The Master Builder of a Great Commonwealth. The authors who write about Díaz during this period emphasize two particular traits that make him the central figure in Mexican history: his military genius and his political astuteness.

1 For example: James Creelman, Mrs. Alec Tweedie, José F. Godoy and Rafael Zayas Enríquez.

2 Rafael Zayas Enríquez, Porfirio Díaz (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1908), 2- 6.

3 James Creelman, Díaz: Master of Mexico (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1911); José F. Godoy, Porfirio Díaz, President of Mexico: The Master Builder of a Great Commonwealth (New York: Kinckerbocker Press, 1910). 16

Most of the authors who write about Porfirio Díaz’s early exploits consider his relationship that developed with Marcos Pérez as one of the turning points in 4 the life of the then young seminary student. Prior to meeting Marcos Pérez, Díaz was on track to become a clergyman. While he completed his courses at the seminary, Díaz opted to enroll instead in the local institute of law in Oaxaca. By 1853, Díaz had completed his studies at the institute; however, events in that year prevented him from becoming certified to practice law. As David Hannay states, “in that year events occurred which decided that the future of Porfirio Díaz was to 5 be spent in winning fame, power, and wealth in the saddle and by the sword.” The one incident where Díaz is highly praised for his bold actions and bravery was the rescue of his mentor, Marcos Pérez, imprisoned in the convent of Santo Domingo. In order to understand the affair, a little bit of context is necessary to appreciate the circumstances. In 1853, Mexican president Mariano Arista was forced to resign by a conservative-led revolt that brought back to power the former head of state Antonio López de Santa Anna. According to Díaz himself, the new government began a strong persecution of liberals and it specifically targeted the lawyers. It was thanks to this political harassment, his short participation with the National Guard during the Mexican-American War, and the liberal ideals inculcated by his mentor Marcos Pérez, that Díaz decided to 6 oppose the Santa Anna government.

4 Examples of these authors are: James Creelman, David Hannay, Nemesio García Naranjo and Mrs. Alec Tweedie.

5 David Hannay, Díaz (New York: Kennikat Press, 1917), 5.

6 Porfirio Díaz, Memorias de Porfirio Díaz, prologue by Moisés González Navarro, vol.1 (Mexico: Consejo Nacional Para la Cultura y las Artes, 1994), 44. 17

Soon after taking office, Santa Anna began to incarcerate dissenters, and by 1854 he discovered revolutionary plots against his dictatorship. Implicated in these designs was Marcos Pérez. He was imprisoned in the convent of Santo Domingo in a turret that isolated him from contact with the outside world. Despite the danger of being caught and the reputation of the turret for being impenetrable from the outside without detection, Porfirio Díaz and his brother Félix managed to reach Marcos Pérez and exchange messages. To make the feat more impressive, 7 they infiltrated the turret for three consecutive days. James Creelman, an American journalist who would interview the aging president near the end of his tenure, contends that this adventure saved Marcos Pérez’s life and that this would be the first time that a very young Porfirio Díaz 8 would risk his life for the nation. Nemesio García Naranjo refers to this episode 9 as one that “dragged” Díaz into the life of the revolution. Other authors, such as Mrs. Alec (Ethel) Tweedie, believe that this period was most influential for Díaz, and that the experience began preparing him physically and mentally for the strife 10 and struggle of future years. This event, along with his open defiance against Santa Anna during the sham plebiscite pushed Díaz into fully supporting the liberal cause against the dictatorship and later the invading forces. This decision

7 Hannay, 32-37.

8 James Creelman, Díaz: Master of Mexico (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1911), 53.

9 Nemesio García Naranjo, Porfirio Díaz (San Antonio, TX: Casa Editorial Lozano, 1930), 40.

10 Alec Tweedie, Porfirio Díaz: Seven Times President of Mexico (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1906), 31. 18

prompted Díaz not to pursue his career in law; instead, he opted for serving the nation through military service. Thanks to his involvement and active participation with the Revolution of Ayutla, Porfirio Díaz was linked and immersed with the liberals, their ideals and 11 causes. Shortly after the success of the Ayutla revolutionary forces, the two opposing factions, conservatives and liberals, began a civil war that would be known in Mexican history as the War of the Reform. Unable to accept defeat, conservatives set in motion a plan to bring an emperor to Mexico. In Díaz: Master of Mexico, James Creelman contends that the revolt of Ayutla served to guide Porfirio Díaz into becoming a revolutionary liberal, and the 12 War of the Reform made him into a professional soldier. José Godoy describes the war of the French Intervention (1862-1867) as “the most important and 13 glorious period in the military career of Porfirio Díaz.” This observation is common among Porfirismo historians. Díaz’s service, loyalty, tenacity and leadership elevated the veteran of numerous battles to popular recognition in the country. This popularity allowed Díaz to be a close contender for political power against Juárez once the French were out of the country. Porfirismo scholars tend to narrate and emphasize the audacious feats of Díaz as he escaped from captivity time and again during the French Intervention. These actions affirm their beliefs that Díaz was a brave, uncompromising, patriot and military genius who was

11 Porfirio Díaz actively joined the Revolution of Ayutla after he openly voted against Santa Anna during a plebiscite held by the dictator. This defiance made him an outlaw, he fled Oaxaca to join the small rebel forces of José Maria Herrera. Once Santa Anna resigned, Díaz was appointed as sub-prefect in the town of Ixtlán.

12 Creelman, 70-71.

13 Godoy, 12. 19

instrumental in the victory of the Mexican forces. In fact, they contend that Díaz was tempted to join the emperor Maximilian many times, but consistently 14 refused. As the French Intervention neared its conclusion, two of Díaz’s traits most highlighted by Porfirismo scholars were his selflessness and patriotism. One of the clearest examples used by Porfirismo historians is the taking of Puebla on April 2, 1867. Thanks to this victory, liberal troops drew nearer to Mexico City than ever before, and the fall of the capital meant the fall of Maximilian’s reign in Mexico. In addition, Porfirismo advocates praise the fact that this triumph filled the blood of the victors with glory, but they did not fill their hands with blood; Díaz spared the life of those who surrendered. As a result, he was immediately acclaimed a national hero. This status and his actions were not well received by 15 Benito Juárez. According to Porfirismo scholars the siege of Mexico City following the victory of Puebla demonstrated Díaz’s leadership and concern for human life. They contend that Díaz refused to storm the city in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Instead, he patiently waited for the surrender of the capital. Authors like Nemesio García Naranjo argue that an ambitious and glory-seeking general would have bombed the capital just to boast his fighting skills and infuse fear into those who would dare oppose him in the capital. Instead, his calculated siege and patience demonstrate that Díaz had already harvested enough glory, and the real concern was to stop needless bloodshed. James Creelman shares García Naranjo’s opinion. He asserts that the siege of Mexico was proof that his “humanity and

14 García Naranjo, 161-167; Godoy, 21; Creelman, 256-269.

15 Ibid.; Díaz, Memorias, vol. 2, 69-86. 20 love of country surpassed his soldierly appetite for distinction or political 16 popularity.” His decision not to bombard the capital allowed him to relieve the population of the torment of war. This decision was not well received by people in Juárez’s cabinet. Creelman contends that many denounced him as incompetent or a coward; they charged that Díaz had personal and ambitious reasons for not attacking the city. The constant complaining began to arouse the suspicions of the 17 president as well. Porfirismo historians also point out that when the siege of Mexico was in effect, the forces of General Mariano Escobedo had captured Maximilian in Querétaro. They deem this to be immensely significant because Escobedo offered Díaz his services if he needed them for any purpose. Porfirismo scholars consider the exchange between the generals and affirm that if Díaz did seek any political power or control, this would have been the perfect time to strike because he would be in command of all military forces; the establishment of a military dictatorship would then be extremely easy. Instead, they praise Díaz because he managed to control the affairs of the capital peacefully until the return of President Juárez in July 15, 1867. The victory of the republic made Díaz the utmost hero of the nation, and when it was all over, he did not ask for glory, promotions, or any other form of appreciation. All he asked was to be able to retire since the country was 18 no longer in need of his services.

16 Creelman, 272.

17 Ibid, 171-175; Creelman, 271-283; Godoy, 22-23.

18 Ibid. 21

Nemesio García Naranjo says that Díaz’s and the republican forces’ triumph was due to his “heroism, order and… above all, selflessness.” This is how he describes the soldier who fought for the survival of the republic. José Godoy compares Díaz’s retirement from service at the triumph of the French Intervention to Cincinnatus’ resignation of absolute authority in Rome. His retirement convinced Porfirismo scholars that Díaz possessed qualities of leadership, civic virtue, service to the greater good, and modesty. James Creelman praises his skills as a leader who possessed “administrative faithfulness and foresight.” At the return of Juárez, Díaz turned over to the government a “well fed, well armed, well clothed, and fully paid army.” At the same time, Creelman stressed that many of Juárez’s personal escorts or cabinet members had 19 not been paid for some time. When advocates of Porfirismo historiography discuss the events that led Porfirio Díaz to rise as the most renowned military hero at the end of the French Intervention, the language they use is extremely positive, flowery and generous. The tone and word choice demonstrates the admiration with which authors interpret and understand events. The battles that Díaz and his men fought allowed the republic to endure. Advocates of Porfirismo stress the loyalty that Díaz displayed to Juárez throughout the conflict and suggest that power was not a driving factor for Díaz. More than any other soldier, Díaz exhibited selflessness and relentless struggle that kept the republic alive. He is credited with such claims because it was his Army of the East that was able to recover Puebla and Mexico City. He also delivered a damaging blow to the forces of imperial general Leonardo Márquez. The “compassion” Díaz demonstrated to spare the lives of those who had

19 García Naranjo, 174-175; Godoy, 24; Creelman, 294-299. 22 surrendered in Mexico City, along with his numerous glorious battles, and the loyalty to the republican cause elevated him to national fame and recognition. Porfirismo historians suggest that Juárez’s Secretary of War and Díaz’s old mentor, General Ignacio Mejía, resented and was jealous of the fact that his one- time subordinate had reached such high levels of popularity among the masses, and that he even sought to influence the president’s opinion of Díaz. These scholars further contend that Juárez, too, became jealous of Díaz and saw his figure as threatening. Juárez was content with the triumph of the republic during the French Intervention, but he would have liked that the triumphs would have been with less heroic and brilliant battles. According to Nemesio García Naranjo, this was because “heroes have the inconvenience of becoming the rivals of the 20 Caesars.” It was thanks to his growing popularity that General Porfirio Díaz was able to become a contender for political power against Benito Juárez, especially since both figures began to drift apart from each other. Porfirismo advocates suggest that the experiences of Porfirio Díaz throughout his early campaigns in the Revolution of Ayutla, the War of the Reform, the French Intervention, his education in law, experiences as a sub prefect in Ixtlán, his resourcefulness at securing and governing the isolated region of Tehuantepec, and his quick abilities to raise a well maintained and equipped army were all contributing factors that allowed Mexico to prosper later during his 21 presidency. These authors exemplify an understanding of history through the actions of great men. Consequently, Díaz is often seen to share the great qualities of men like Julius Cesar, Napoleon, Cincinnatus, or Frederick the Great. When

20 Creelman, 299; García Naranjo, 177.

21 Creelman, 296. 23

Porfirismo advocates write about Díaz, they associate him as destined to be the great man of Mexican history because he and the nation that he would lead for three decades share the same birthday. The association is poetic; a nation was born, and, nine years later so was the man that would place the nation in the most stable state it had ever known and modernized it in the eyes of the world. Anti-Porfiristas do not share the same sentiment as the authors mentioned above. Most works by these authors do not focus much attention on the early years or military career of Porfirio Díaz. The majority of these works concentrate on aspects of his time as president of Mexico, what he achieved, and at what cost. A significant percentage of these works are fueled and embraced by the coming of the Mexican Revolution of 1910; however, it should be understood that these anti- Díaz sentiments do not have their origins in the revolution. The anti-Díaz sentiments are developed before the revolution, although the social uprising served as a vehicle for its advancement. The purpose of anti-Porfirismo historiography is to discredit Díaz and his achievements. Of the few authors who write about Díaz’s youth and military career, José López Portillo y Rojas, does so in a very detailed manner. Most of what he writes about Díaz during this period in his life is dedicated to discredit the cult of Porfirismo and Díaz himself. In Elevación Y Caída de Porfirio Díaz, López Portillo y Rojas asserts that Díaz exaggerates most of what is written in his Memorias. López Portillo y Rojas makes a cogent argument when he talks about Díaz’s capture and escape in Puebla and later his capture of the city in April 1867. López Portillo y Rojas affirms that in his Memorias, Díaz describes his escape from the fort of Guadalupe as something out of The Three Musketeers and therefore incredibly unlikely. Instead of believing the story by Díaz, López Portillo y Rojas is convinced that it was impossible for Díaz to escape due to the 24

extreme conditions and a heavily guarded fort. He concludes that the only way that Díaz was able to escape captivity was because the emperor, through some generous gesture, facilitated his release. However, he makes this assertion using Elevación Y Caída de Maximiliano, written by Count Keratry, as his only evidence. López Portillo y Rojas concludes that this was the simplest explanation 22 to his escape. After his getaway, whether through a phenomenal feat or simply by walking right out of captivity through the main door, Díaz quickly resumed his fighting against the empire. López Portillo y Rojas contends that Díaz’s most celebrated victory, the siege of Puebla on April 2, 1867, was not as impressive as the Porfiristas and Díaz would have one believe. Instead, López Portillo y Rojas affirms that Díaz won glory that day by buying off the soldiers that were defending the entrenched positions in Puebla, and once they were captured, he showed his enemies “clemency.” This explains how Díaz was able to capture the city so quickly, a feat that the French failed to do against Zaragoza on the celebrated Battle of Puebla on May 5, 1862. In fact, the only time the city fell before this intervention was when the French cut off all supply lines and starved 23 the defenders into submission, even though this process took them two months. The information acquired by López Portillo y Rojas comes from a native of Puebla, Enrique Gómez Haro. He, in turn, received his information from what he calls the “elder poblanos” that remember the event. Gómez Haro quotes as sources only two people, one was Félix Lamadrid, son of Esteban Lamadrid, who

22 José López Portillo Y Rojas, Elevación Y Caída de Porfirio Díaz (Mexico: Librería Española, 1943), 37.

23 Ibid., 49-53. 25

intervened in the “sale” of the entrenchments. The other was a businessman by the name of José M. Zambrano, who inspected the entrenchments in Belén and 24 San Agustín. In the end, López Portillo y Rojas concludes that Díaz’s Memorias and the biographers are lying about the greatness of that day. The siege of Puebla should not be categorized as a great military accomplishment. Rather, history should remember that feat by Díaz as a testament to his astuteness at best, but not 25 as a triumph of heroism in the field of battle. Francisco Bulnes, who was known to be a strong Lerdista and later a Porfirista, disagrees with the statements made by López Portillo y Rojas and addresses them in an article titled “Rectificaciones y Aclaraciones a las Memorias del general Díaz.” Bulnes affirms that López Portillo y Rojas’ contentions are at best assumptions, and, while he believes that the men who testified to López Portillo y Rojas were well-known, honorable men, none of them present evidence to suggest that the events happened in the manner they describe. Bulnes makes his argument using documents belonging to the imperialist forces as well as General Díaz. On February 12, 1867, Puebla was armed with over 100 canons and huge quantities of munitions. The following day the emperor Maximilian left Mexico City en route to Querétaro, leaving the capital with few arms and ammunition because the capital was not equipped to withstand an attack by even a small force of 7000 men. To prevent tragedy from falling upon the capital, the imperialist general Leonardo Márquez ordered troops stationed in Puebla to fortify the imperial capital. The man who received this order was the Imperial Minister of War, General Nicolás Portilla. Bulnes affirms that it was this man who betrayed

24 Ibid., 49.

25 Ibid., 53. 26

the empire and plotted to surrender Puebla to Díaz because he refused to carry out the orders that were given to him. Portilla did send troops to reinforce Mexico City, but these men did not take the weapons or munitions stored in Puebla with them. After all troop relocations, Puebla remained defended with approximately 26 300 national guardsmen and all of its armament. There is also evidence that suggests that Díaz knew that Puebla would not be defended. Díaz sent 6000 troops and munitions to reinforce general Escobedo in Querétaro prior to the siege of Puebla, while knowing that General Ramón Corona would arrive to Querétaro with 7000 men of his own to support Escobedo. The obvious question that comes to mind is why would Díaz make such a move if he knew he was heading towards a fortress like Puebla? The simplest answer is that he knew he would not find a military presence to defend it. Bulnes, however, believes that the siege of Puebla was not prearranged by Díaz and Portilla. As evidence, he suggests that if that had been the case, Díaz and his entire force would have entered through one of the “purchased” lines, or one that was prearranged. This also would have allowed Díaz to avoid any further bloodshed among men. But Díaz did not. He attacked Puebla from fifteen different 27 locations, and he did so fiercely. In addition, Bulnes explains that if Díaz had prearranged the capture of Puebla, he would have spared the life of those who fell during its “defense.” The fact that he attacked from many locations indicates that he was acting viciously against a declared enemy; as a result, he began executing those captured by firing

26 Francisco Bulnes, ‘Rectificaciones y Aclaraciones a las Memorias del General Díaz’ in González Navarro, Memorias, vol. 2, 282-291.

27 Ibid. 27

squad. He only stopped because a friend warned him that the executions would make him seem like a bloodthirsty savage to the public and thus any chances at 28 public office would be dead. Francisco Bulnes does not agree with the argument set forth by López Portillo y Rojas, but at the same time he does not embrace the glorified version set forth by Porfiristas. To him, the fact that Díaz was able to capture Puebla so quickly was not due to his military prowess as much as it was due to the betrayal of General Nicolás Portilla. The failure to remove the forces and their entire arsenal from Puebla is what cost Maximilian and the imperial forces the defeat at the hands of the republican army. If not for the betrayal of Portilla, Díaz would not have his great victory of April 2; instead, Puebla would have fallen defenseless to a force of liberal forces under Díaz. However, Bulnes does credit Díaz for taking advantage of the situation and knowing how to exploit the conditions in his favor. More recent students of Porfirio Díaz and his tenure as president do not focus sharply on military campaigns outside of those that led him to the presidency. Their focus is not specifically on the person of Díaz but on the period of his presidency. There are a handful of these more recent authors who write about Díaz’s early military days. However, because of the ample range in interpretations between Porfiristas and anti-Porfiristas, they conclude that what 29 we know about the events like the siege of Puebla are clouded by mystery. In Porfirio Díaz: Profiles in Power, Paul Garner suggests that readers should interpret Díaz’s Memorias with extreme caution because they were clearly

28 Ibid.

29 Carlton Beals, Porfirio Díaz (Mexico: Editorial Domes, 1982), 163. 28

intended to “impress readers with his qualities of leadership, wisdom, discipline, self-sacrifice and heroism,” particularly because they were composed nearly 30 years after the restoration of the Republic took place. Garner concludes that the Memorias present, at best, an incomplete picture. Moreover, they are deliberately disingenuous towards the end, as Díaz claims that after the execution of Maximilian and the restoration of the Republic he happily retired to a private life 30 in his hacienda. Porfirismo scholars are extremely positive and generous towards General Díaz, and they focus on his many qualities that made him a great leader in the military and later as president in Mexico. His greatness was unparalleled by any other figure of the nineteenth century in Mexico. These historians focus with great detail on Díaz’s early career and what drove him to fight for the side of the Republican forces. In glorifying his military days, Porfiristas are able to set the stage as to why Mexico needed a man like Díaz for president and how he had earned enough qualifications in the battlefield to be fit for the highest office in Mexico. However, according to Porfiristas, his greatness was yet to be seen; his truly greatest accomplishment would come once he took office as president of Mexico. The following chapter will discuss his road to the presidency. At the same time, the anti-Porfirista’s argument will question in a much stronger voice Díaz and the “greatness” that is attributed to him, and they will see him in a completely different manner.

30 Paul Garner, Porfirio Díaz: Profiles in Power (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 42-43.

CHAPTER 3: DÍAZ: REBEL AND SUPPRESSOR

This chapter will focus on two specific aspects that brought Díaz to the presidency and later helped him solidify his position as the executive of the nation. The first half will examine how the three schools of Porfirian historiography interpret and understand the events that brought Díaz to the presidency, specifically analyzing Díaz’s rebellion of La Noria. The second half of the chapter will examine how Díaz was able to pacify the nation in order to promote development and modernization in Mexico. A particular emphasis will be dedicated to how the three schools of Porfirian historiography interpret the events that became known in Mexico as the “Massacre of Veracruz.” The contents of this chapter will help clarify the opposing views that the first two schools, Porfirismo and anti-Porfirismo, have of the Díaz presidency. With the triumph of the republican forces over the imperialist army, Benito Juárez was finally able to return triumphantly to Mexico City. The capital welcomed him in a glorious celebration on July 15, 1867. Díaz awaited Juárez’s presidential entrance with an army of 35,000 men, a surplus of 300,000 pesos, and a detailed report of all the expenses incurred during his campaigns as commander 1 of the Army of the East. Díaz also delivered his resignation to Juárez. The nature behind his resignation is contested by scholars of Díaz. Some argue that it was a strategic maneuver, while others suggest Díaz wished to retire from his military 2 career and wanted to set the example to subordinate officers. It is important to

1 José F. Godoy, Porfirio Díaz, President of Mexico: The Master Builder of a Great Commonwealth (New York: Kinckerbocker Press, 1910), 23; Enrique Krauze, Místico de la Autoridad: Porfirio Díaz (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987), 29.

2 Among those advocates that Díaz’s resignation was strategic is José López Portillo y Rojas. On the other side, Nemesio García Naranjo would argue otherwise. For more details, see 30

consider that upon Juárez’s return to Mexico City, there were already signs that suggested that the once amiable relations between the two most important political figures in Mexico’s nineteenth century were beginning to erode. Whether Juárez or Díaz was to blame for their declining relationship, in 1867 the two men parted ways and became contenders for the presidency of Mexico. The contest between the two resulted in the rebellion of La Noria in which Díaz challenged Juárez for the presidency. This rebellion is either interpreted as an indication of Díaz’s ambition for ultimate power or simply as a result of a nation in need of summoning their selfless servant once more. The interpretation depends on which extreme of Porfirian historiography one is reading. Porfirismo scholars, like James Creelman, contend that in 1867 Porfirio Díaz had sufficient political experience gained as a military commander and during his tenure in Ixtlán to challenge even Juárez. However, Díaz had no political ambitions at the time, and according to Creelman, Díaz “happily retired 3 from public service to work as a farmer.” José Godoy agrees with Creelman, and suggests that it was events in Mexico that brought him back to the service of the nation because he was “acclaimed by a large portion of his countrymen as a 4 presidential candidate.” In Porfirio Díaz, Nemesio García Naranjo contends that Díaz did in fact retire to work as a farmer, but believes that Díaz had intentions to eventually

José López Portillo Y Rojas, Elevación Y Caída de Porfirio Díaz (Mexico: Librería Española, 1943); and Nemesio García Naranjo, Porfirio Díaz (San Antonio, TX: Casa Editorial Lozano, 1930).

3 James Creelman, Díaz: Master of Mexico (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1911), 296; 302-318.

4 Godoy, 24. 31

return to public office. He qualifies as unjust the position taken by anti-Porfirismo scholars that Díaz was always behind the armed movements until they finally brought him to the National Palace in Mexico. García Naranjo argues that there were many generals and colonels who took arms against Juárez long before Díaz chose to do so. For García Naranjo, Díaz only decided to rebel because of the electoral fraud that re-elected Juárez and because he believed that the nation 5 needed peace, one that he could deliver. With the death of Juárez in July of 1872, the rebellion ended abruptly because it lost any legal grounds to continue since succession was established in the constitution. As a result, Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, who was the President of the Supreme Court, became the lawful president. Lerdo de Tejada offered Díaz and all the rebels an amnesty, which they accepted. Many politicians in Mexico saw this as a victory for Lerdo de Tejada and an end 6 to Díaz’s political future. Anti-Porfirismo scholars, like José López Portillo y Rojas affirm that Díaz had political ambitions all along. As evidence, López Portillo y Rojas submits that the break of relations between Juárez and Díaz was an indication that Díaz wished 7 the presidency for himself. In Elevación Y Caída, López Portillo y Rojas contends that Díaz believed his military credentials would suffice to guarantee him the presidential chair in 1867. However, Díaz lost the elections against Juárez and was forced to retire to his farm in Oaxaca. López Portillo y Rojas was convinced that Díaz only retired to La Noria in order to continue his plan for the presidency.

5 García Naranjo, 177-184.

6 Ibid., 186.

7 López Portillo, 63. 32

After the election results of 1871, Díaz would no longer be willing to wait another four years for his turn to serve as president; power would be his now and not 8 later. According to López Portillo y Rojas, the Porfirista party was outraged with the electoral results of 1871 and complained that fraud had occurred. They could not believe that Juárez obtained as many votes as was claimed. Porfiristas argued that Díaz had obtained the majority of the votes and that the result was a sham. As a result, Díaz launched the Plan de La Noria, listing his grievances and the violations to the constitution. However, López Portillo y Rojas affirms that the plan was not an intellectual creation of Díaz; instead, he credits Justo Benítez, 9 Manuel María de Zamacona, and Ignacio Ramírez as the creators. López Portillo y Rojas asserts that Díaz truly believed that he deserved the presidency and was jealous of Juárez because he had what Díaz had failed twice to achieve. In his ambition, Díaz failed to respect the will of the people who only wanted peace. López Portillo y Rojas concludes by pointing out the irony in the text of the Plan, “that no citizen imposes and perpetuates himself in the exercise of power, and this 10 will be the last revolution.” In addition to pointing out the irony in Díaz’s statement, López Portillo y Rojas maintains that the only thing that drove Díaz was his ambition, because ultimately he failed to keep the promises of the Plan de La Noria. He was not the selfless Cincinnatus as portrayed by many of his biographers.

8 Ibid., 82-84.

9 Ibid., 83. For entire text of Plan de la Noria, see López Portillo Y Rojas, 84-88.

10 Ibid., 88. 33

To properly ascertain what was responsible for the coming of the rebellion against Juárez, neo-Porfirismo historians are much more interested in the details that the other two historiographical extremes leave out. In seeking their answers, most agree that the break up between Juárez and Díaz was critical because it allowed Díaz to openly contest Juárez for the presidency. The reasons behind the estrangement of these two political figures of the nineteenth century are many, 11 ranging from jealousy, defiance, affronts, ambition and local idiosyncrasies. Laurens Ballard Perry, in Juárez and Díaz: Machine Politics in Mexico, suggests that people who opposed Juárez saw the rupture taking place and exploited the situation to their advantage. One of these events was a banquet organized for the president with Díaz as host. The banquet put both men in an uncomfortable position, and as the moment became awkward and silent, Juárez decided to break the silence by toasting the host who organized the event in his honor. This pressured Díaz to respond to the president’s praises, but his indifference was noted by all of those present. The matter was aggravated the following day when Díaz came out publicly and told the Diario Oficial that he did not sponsor the reception for Juárez; this statement was interpreted by the 12 president as an insult. Perry asserts that the dissolution of the wartime coalition could only lead Díaz to an inevitable path in opposition to Benito Juárez. According to Perry,

11 Jorge Fernando Iturribarria does one of the most detailed analysis of the many reasons that led to this rupture. For a complete analysis see; Jorge Fernando Iturribarria, Historia de Oaxaca: La Restauración de la Republica y las Revueltas de la Noria y Tuxtepec, 1867-1877, vol. 4 (Oaxaca: Publicaciones del Gobierno, 1956).

12 Laurens B. Perry, Juarez and Díaz: Machine Politics in Mexico (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1978), 47. 34

Díaz’s decision to enter politics would be an “unimportant decision to history if 13 Juárez had not acquired an opposition.” However, Perry considers that understanding why the individuals who opposed Juárez chose Díaz as their leader is vitally important, because Díaz did not organize the opposition party that later took his name; he only opted to join and lead them after its organization. The issues between Juárez and Díaz only facilitated the decision, and once Díaz had 14 accepted to lead the opposition, he openly broke relations with the president. Perry concludes that Díaz was chosen to lead the opposition against Juárez because he had a particular appeal. His supporters regarded Díaz as pliable, and they believed this to be an advantage. Opponents of Juárez perceived Díaz as loyal, and when he triumphed they believed that Díaz would support their causes as a way of reciprocating for the support he had received. In this manner, Díaz and his supporters had a peculiar contract. They worked for one another; Díaz was the figurehead but not the designer of the revolution that would bring him to power. At the same time Díaz had an impressive military reputation and an image 15 of an “obedient servant of the nation.” Equally important, Díaz had enjoyed incredible press coverage that was filled with praises for the soldier who had fought so much for his country and asked for nothing in return. The two extremes of historiography, Porfirismo and anti-Porfirismo, interpret Díaz as either being the sole leader of the progress achieved during the Porfiriato or the solitary evil dictator who abused the citizens during the same period; either way, it is he who is

13 Ibid., 49.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid. 35

held responsible. Neo-Porfirismo brings a new approach to the study of Díaz and the Porfiriato, sharing Perry’s conclusion that the tenure of Díaz, good or bad, was 16 a collective endeavor and not the work of any one individual. In 1867 Juárez was still a highly-respected individual because of what he represented to the nation, and as a result, he won re-election. The greatest controversy Juárez faced proved to be the Porfirista party challenge to his administration. The Porfiristas accused Juárez, and later Lerdo, of abusing the Constitution of 1857 by seeking to create a dictatorship through the manipulation of the electoral process and attempting to centralize the federal government’s 17 power in a way that weakened the sovereignty of the states. A huge outcry against Juárez, and an event that helped splinter the liberal party, came during the Convocatoria of August 14, 1867. This decree called for the election of a president, Supreme Court justices, and congressmen. The key element in this decree that elicited a vociferous outcry was an order that asked voters at the time of the election to signal whether or not they supported a measure authorizing Congress to enact five constitutional amendments outside the ordinary constitutional amendment process. The combined effect of these five amendments was to strengthen the executive office at the expense of the legislature. The outcry against the election was immediate within the Mexican press. At the same time, Díaz was getting immense positive coverage throughout the nation; it was simply a matter of time before newspapers began to call for Díaz as a candidate to the 18 presidency.

16 Ibid., 50; Garner, 49; 227.

17 Garner, 49-53.

18 Ibid., 52. 36

Discontent with the Convocatoria continued to grow during the election of 1867; however, even the outcry and the positive press Díaz was getting was not enough to ensure victory. The popularity that Juárez enjoyed during the elections still allowed the president to carry the day. In case his prestige was not sufficient, prearranged electoral manipulation aided Juárez’s victory. According to Laurens Ballard Perry, Juárez replaced political opponents in the governorships of key states; in turn, these men replaced the jefes políticos to ensure that the votes favored the president. Thanks to this “political process”, Juárez was able to obtain 7,422 votes, while Díaz only gathered 2,709. When votes came in for President of the Supreme Court, 3,874 votes came in for Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, 2,841 for Díaz, and 1,238 for Ezequiel Montes. Díaz felt, and in some form he was correct, that the election was stolen from him, and at the very least it was unfair. After the failure of the presidential elections, Díaz retired quietly to his hacienda of La 19 Noria in Oaxaca. Porfirio Díaz rebelled against the Juárez government, under the banner of “the Constitution of 57 and Electoral Freedom,” and the slogan of “less 20 government and more freedom.” It should be noted that while the grievances of the Plan de La Noria addressed the abuse of the constitution and the manipulation of elections, there is significant evidence to suggest that Díaz had been preparing for an armed rebellion for some time prior to the results of the elections. Porfirismo scholars, such as James Creelman, fail to make any mention of prior preparations for armed rebellion, arguing that Díaz only answered the call of a

19 Perry, 51-55; Daniel Cosio Villegas, Historia Moderna de Mexico, vol. 1(Mexico City: Editorial Hermes, 1955), 187.

20 Garner 56; for the complete details of the Plan de La Noria see Iturribarria, 96-100. 37

21 nation in need. Laurens B. Perry finds evidence of a pre-planned rebellion in Díaz’s personal correspondence to friends and allies, where he claims that if “Juárez insists on running…we will have to enter a ‘God is Christ’ (a ‘knock down 22 brawl’).” Perry further states that other anti-Juárez rebellions that took place prior to La Noria allowed Díaz to amass sufficient support to make his attack on the capital while the government’s forces were occupied fighting outside of 23 Mexico City. In Porfirio Díaz: Profiles in Power, Paul Garner points out that during the rebellion of La Noria Díaz was not present at any of the encounters; instead, he was always away trying to gain supporters. Garner concludes that the primary role of Díaz in the rebellion was “as the figurehead of a loose, heterogeneous and 24 ultimately uncoordinated coalition.” The rebellion came to an end not because of defeat on the battlefield or lack of coordinated leadership; it ended with the unexpected death of Benito Juárez in July of 1872. His death put an end to any political justification held by the rebellion and, as mandated by the Constitution, Lerdo became the interim president. Lerdo offered the Porfiristas an amnesty if they ended their rebellion, elections were held in October, and Lerdo practically swept the elections, becoming the constitutionally elected president of Mexico as 25 the Rebellion of La Noria died. Díaz’s failure to be present at any of the military

21 Creelman, 314-318.

22 Perry, 168-172.

23 Ibid.

24 Garner, 57.

25 Ibid., 57-58. 38

campaigns was one of the causes that led to his loss of much political support against Lerdo. Speaking directly to Díaz, a newspaper in Oaxaca stated “you have abandoned the revolution, it has not died nor will it die, but from now on the 26 revolution will abandon you.” One of the best assessments of the rebellion was made by Francisco Bulnes: “it can be said that, the rebellion of La Noria, served to discredit Díaz as a hero, as a daring and bold caudillo, and as a glorious General of 27 the Intervention and the Empire.” When Díaz accepted Lerdo’s amnesty, it seemed that the old caudillo would finally retire any political aspirations. Perry states that many observers saw this move as the first major mistake made by the Lerdo administration and that it eventually led to the Porfiristas striking again during the rebellion of Tuxtepec. Perry disagrees, believing it was a superb move because of the immediate benefits 28 that amnesty brought to the stability of the nation. Amnesty only bought Lerdo four years as president, for the country still had many internal issues that were unresolved. However, most accounts agree that announcing his candidacy for a second term is what brought the eventual demise of Lerdo. Francisco Bulnes, who was an avid Lerdista, describes the problem with Lerdo’s decision to seek a second term in office. As a political party, the

26 Quoted in Francisco Bulnes, ‘Rectificaciones y Aclaraciones a las Memorias del General Díaz’ in González Navarro, Memorias, vol. 2, 310-311.

27 Ibid.

28 Perry, 178-182. The first benefit of the amnesty was that it brought the war to an end. Second, it contributed to the discredit of the Porfiristas. Lastly, it allowed Lerdo to gain the confidence of the incumbent Juaristas who were still in office. This created an alliance between Lerdistas and Juaristas that lasted until the end of his administration. This last benefit is of vast importance because Lerdo did not have enough supporters had he tried to alienate the Juaristas in office throughout the nation. 39

Lerdistas challenged Juárez on his continuous re-elections; to aggravate the issue further, Lerdo had publicly stated that he would neither seek nor accept a 29 nomination for re-election. There is no doubt that the rebellion of Tuxtepec had its roots in personal ambition; after all, Porfirio Díaz had sought the presidency since 1867. Many anti-Porfirismo scholars need no more proof to make this statement than to point out the fact that the original Plan of Tuxtepec was launched in January of 1876, six months before the scheduled elections in July. While personal ambition is irrefutable, one should not be quick to overlook the fact that the Porfirista movement had been associated with anti-re-electionism since before 30 the La Noria rebellion. While the argument can be easily made that Díaz became the major practitioner of re-electionism in Mexican history, in 1876 his movement represented the opposite. What cannot be positively stated is whether he believed in this anti-re-election platform and later changed his politics once he became president, or if the position was simply a means to an end. The Tuxtepec rebellion was better planned and organized than La Noria. Díaz had established a base of operations in Brownsville, Texas and was much 31 more active on the battlefield. Díaz was more involved and actually faced

29 Bulnes, ‘Rectificaciones,’ 311.

30 Garner, 61.

31 Most historians of Mexican history do not mention that Díaz received any kind of support from the United States, at best they simply make the claim that the American government chose to ignore the fact the he was trying to find supporters for his movement. Most accounts by historians also say it was strategic since the campaigns that Díaz fought against the government forces took place in the north east of the country. John Mason Hart is an American historian who contends that Díaz did in fact seek more than refuge in the United States. According to Hart, Díaz secured ‘private American aid’ and was able to maneuver freely for a period of six months in order to conduct guerrilla warfare. Hart asserts that the alliance forged between Díaz and the American would set the stage for the three decades of U.S. economic expansion into Mexico. For 40

Mariano Escobedo in battle. Historians such as Enrique Krauze interpret the campaigns in the northeast as setbacks to the rebellion thanks to the efforts of the government’s forces under General Escobedo. However, Perry asserts that diverting and concentrating the government’s forces in the northern campaigns allowed those in the southeast to flourish by default. In the end it would be a combined effort of the forces of the northeast and southeast that achieved the 32 decisive victories at Tecoac and Puebla in November of 1876. With the triumph at Tecoac, Lerdo exiled himself to New York. As a result, the President of the Supreme Court, José María Iglesias, made his rightful 33 claim to the presidency of Mexico. Iglesias and Díaz met, and the President of the Supreme Court tried to convince Díaz of the legality of his actions. Díaz did not respond positively, instead setting out to suppress whatever few supporters Iglesias still had. It was in this manner that Díaz eventually came to power as the president of Mexico. Anti-Porfiristas like López Portillo y Rojas interpret the manner in which Díaz rose to the presidency as pursuing a personal ambition for power. Díaz failed to respect the legality that assured Iglesias the presidency, and his rebellion was based on false pretexts. Porfirismo scholars have gone as far as to state that the series of events that brought Díaz to the presidency were led by 34 divine providence.

details see; John Mason Hart, Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution, 10th ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 83-84; 105-128.

32 Krauze, 26; Perry, 203-231; Garner, 63.

33 Iglesias had already rebelled against Lerdo under the claim that his reelection of July was a result of electoral manipulation. See Garner, 63.

34 López Portillo y Rojas, 129; García Naranjo, 198-201. 41

Neither divine providence nor personal ambition alone explains Díaz’s rise to power. The success of Díaz in Tuxtepec owes a huge debt to the significant support he received in central and southern Mexico. As Paul Garner states, the Tuxtepec rebellion consisted of a genuinely popular base that challenged the constitutional abuses committed by Juárez and Lerdo since 1867. People like Porfirio Díaz were able to have such a broad base of support because Juárez and Lerdo advanced executive centralism that controlled the political system in its entirety by using and, in cases, abusing presidential powers. This executive centralism alienated men who wished to advance their careers and economic interests; Díaz, Lerdo and Iglesias were all affected in this manner at one point or another. The abuse of executive centralism created instability which was followed by the rebellions under Díaz. As Perry concludes, “the system could not satisfy the aspirations of a large class of potential leaders nor solve the basic social and 35 economic problems in the nation.” With the ascent of Díaz to the presidency came what Enrique Krauze called a “profound change in Mexican lifestyle.” Díaz’s rise to power symbolized the death of the era of political progress 36 represented by Juárez and ushered in the era of material progress. Once he became president of Mexico, Díaz, like his predecessors, was faced with many insurrections that threatened both the pacification of Mexico and his efforts to build friendly and respectable relations with the United States. One of the most celebrated rebellions took place in Veracruz in 1879. It happened when rebels who supported the exiled ex-president Sebastian Lerdo threatened another period of revolution; upon discovering the plot and those implicated,

35 Perry, 200; Garner, 64-65. 36 Krauze, 26. 42

Governor Luis Mier y Terán promptly captured and executed the rebels. In fact, Díaz telegraphed Governor Mier y Terán and delivered what is probably his most notorious utterance: “Mátalos en Caliente” or “kill them on the spot.” Both incident and quotation are stressed by anti-Porfirismo historians, like José López Portillo y Rojas and Adolfo Duclos Salinas, to demonstrate the “cruelty” and “tyranny” of the Mexican head of state, as well as the extent to which he was 37 willing to take matters in order to maintain peace. Porfirismo historians take this same event and justify the president’s actions by arguing that the rebellion was imminent and that time could not be 38 wasted. The peace of the country depended on swift action. Since the governor had already warned Díaz of the plot against the government he sent Díaz the following telegram: “Hay militares complicados en la conspiración. Si se levantan los fusile?” This translates as: “There are soldiers implicated in the conspiracy. If they rise, shall I shoot them?” Díaz had no time to debate; the life of thousands might be sacrificed by an instant’s delay. The president answered governor Terán’s question by telegraphing three words: “En caliente, si.” or “If in 39 the heat of action, yes”. In Porfirio Díaz, Nemesio García Naranjo also addresses the tragedy of Veracruz. In his version, García Naranjo seeks to discredit the man López Portillo y Rojas uses as a source, Rafael Zayas Enríquez,

37 López Portillo y Rojas, 164-175; Adolfo Duclos Salinas, Méjico Pacificado: El Progreso de Mexico y los Hombres que lo Gobiernan (St. Louis: Hughes & Co., 1904), 5-8.

38 Creelman, 361.

39 Creelman, 358-362. 43

and López Portillo y Rojas himself as men who resented Díaz and therefore unable 40 to make an objective observation on the episode. On the other hand, in Elevación Y Caída, López Portillo y Rojas asserts that many Porfirismo biographers deliberately omit details of the event completely because they find it of very little interest to the greater history of Mexico, or simply to omit the lapse of judgment with which the event was handled by the president. López Portillo y Rojas makes reference to how Salvador Quevedo y Zubieta interprets the event. Quevedo justifies the event because thanks to the suppression, Díaz was able to avoid another civil war. In addition, Quevedo describes Terán as a habitually nervous man, and because of the possibility of insurrection, he was more anxious than usual. When Terán informed the government of the situation, his anxiety made him exaggerate and make his warnings too alarming. As the government responded to these telegrams, Quevedo believes that Terán misunderstood the telegram. According to Quevedo, when someone says “en caliente,” they mean “in the heat of battle.” However, Terán being overexcited did not understand it that way; instead, he executed the 41 implicated plotters immediately. López Portillo y Rojas contends that Quevedo made major factual mistakes in his interpretation, and that impeding another war did not justify the way the situation was handled. López Portillo y Rojas affirms that his interpretation is

40 García Naranjo, 209-213. García Naranjo contends that the pamphlet that López Portillo y Rojas cites as a source for the event was published in 1919 by Enríquez. He questions Enríquez’s version because in the final years of Díaz’s rule in Mexico, Enríquez was accused and imprisoned for fraud. According to García Naranjo, he resented his imprisonment and therefore his testimony should not be taken as fact.

41 López Portillo Y Rojas, 164. 44

correct because he uses a pamphlet published by Rafael Zayas Enríquez, who was present the day the events took place. According to López Portillo y Rojas, in the pamphlet Zayas Enríquez asserts that Terán was as nervous and anxious as described by Quevedo, and more importantly, that Díaz was heavily implicated in ordering the executions. López Portillo y Rojas further argued that Díaz was able to “hypnotize” Terán because he unconditionally idolized and followed the 42 president. However, in Porfirio Díaz, Rafael Zayas Enríquez never directly states that Díaz was as implicated in the executions as stated by López Portillo y Rojas. In fact, Zayas Enríquez confirms what other authors stated about Terán, that he was very nervous and anxious. This led him to exaggerate the dangers to Díaz, to 43 which the president replied, “shoot them red handed.” In Mejico Pacificado, Adolfo Duclos Salinas passionately describes the events of the massacre of Veracruz as a “healthy terror” for the future of Mexico, where innocent, future criminals were executed and their rights violated before they had a chance to commit a crime. Duclos Salinas asserts that this would be the beginning of the 44 president’s plan for Mexico’s regeneration and progress. Neo-Porfirismo historians approach the topic through a different lens, mainly because the occurrences of the “Veracruz Massacre” have been discussed extensively. Their logic seems to focus on concrete evidence, since both extremes have interpreted the events in completely opposing ways. In Porfirio Díaz y Su

42 Ibid., 168.

43 Rafael Zayas Enriquez, Porfirio Díaz (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1908), 144-146.

44 Duclos Salinas, 5-8. 45

Tiempo, Fernando Orozco Linares suggests that it has never been proven that the telegram even existed. Governor Terán told Zayas Enríquez that he had received the message; however, Zayas never saw it. Orozco asserts that the Terán family insisted on blaming Díaz for the incident, and, Díaz complicated the issue by never making any public statements about the events. As a result, Orozco concludes that Díaz accepted responsibility for the actions through his silence, but 45 that should not be understood as him ordering the executions. Paul Garner also agrees that the lack of the actual telegram weakens the validity of Díaz’s detractors. However, Garner contends that the significance of the event was not as publicized in the year that it took place, but rather it was later used to emphasize the authoritarianism towards the end of Díaz’s regime, as overt repression re- 46 emerged in the middle of inner turmoil. Assuming Garner’s contention is true, it surely explains why anti-Porfiristas popularized the “massacre” in order to demonstrate the tyranny and repression exercised under Díaz. The path that led Díaz to the presidential chair was one of conflict and rebellion, and while personal ambitions for the presidency cannot be denied, it should not be dismissed that his predecessors, particularly Juárez, had abused their presidential powers to ensure their victory during elections. Once Díaz became president, he too would be guilty of doing as before him. But as it has been demonstrated, Díaz’s rebellions counted on a broad base support that legitimized his complaints against the abuses of the Juárez government. Therefore, affirming that Díaz’s personal ambitions were the driving force during the rebellions would

45 Fernando Orozco Linares, Porfirio Díaz Y Su Tiempo (Mexico: Panorama Editorial, 1984), 108-109.

46 Garner, 86-87. 46 be disingenuous. As he became president, these internal conflicts did not cease. During his first term, rebellions threatened to throw the country into more conflict, and while they were eventually pacified, through his direct orders or not, they proved harmful in the long term as they helped tarnish his presidency and image within his own country. Díaz gained a reputation as an authoritarian dictator who repressed the nation in many ways. However, as the next chapter will discuss, the extent to which he exercised centralization and authoritarianism will be contested.

CHAPTER 4: DÍAZ: SUPREME AND AUTOCRAT?

Today, Porfirio Díaz’s tenure as president is most often negatively remembered by the Mexican masses. The primary reason behind this sentiment is the successful campaign carried out by anti-Porfirismo scholars. Some of the most remembered aspects of the Porfiriato were the authoritarianism and centralization of power that took place during his three decades of rule, as well as the suppression and censorship of the press. The authoritarianism and centralization mainly took place through the use of various offices and institutions like the governorships and jefaturas políticas. The censorship of the press and the suppression of dissent contained the voices against the government. The first half of this chapter will focus on how Porfirian historiography has discussed the abuses carried out by the jefes políticos and whether or not they had any autonomy to make their own decisions outside of the will of the president. The second half will discuss how the historiography has contested press censorship and persecutions during the Porfiriato, and whether or not the government tolerated the opposition press. I would like to note a distinction between the approaches taken by anti- Porfirismo and neo-Porfirismo scholars. The former generally contend that Díaz’s wishes were law, and that he used the jefes políticos to carry out his will. When they provide evidence for these assertions, using examples from different states or 1 localities, they generalize and affirm that it was the same throughout the nation. The latter contend that every place was different; therefore, their studies are done for specific regions of the nation. Neo-Porfirismo scholars contend that each

1 This generalization is what I will refer to from this point forward as a template approach. 48

region was different. Some were more centralized, and others had much more autonomy. This contention helps reinforce one of their overall themes that the Porfiriato was not a period where the will of one man was law. On the contrary, the Porfiriato was a collective and complex system of politics in which Díaz was president, but his will was not absolute. In El Verdadero Díaz y La Revolución, Francisco Bulnes is one of the very few Porfirismo scholars who address the issue of what he calls “the terror against 2 the popular class.” Bulnes does agree with the anti-Porfirismo scholars about the negative effect that the jefes políticos had on the popular masses; however, he disagrees as to who is to blame for allowing these atrocities to happen. Bulnes suggests that the blame lies ultimately on the Constitution of 1857 which “authorizes political and administrative authorities to impose, as many times as 3 they please, fines up to five hundred pesos and a month in jail.” There was no need to impose such tremendous fines, as most workers never earned such a high salary. Instead, as Bulnes asserts, all that was needed was a fine of two pesos every month on a worker who earned one peso and eighty cents a week to take away their independence. According to Bulnes, it was this law that in the Constitution of 1857 the nation needed to revise. To justify his contention, Bulnes cites as an example the state of Morelos, where a poor citizen was jailed for an entire month, released, and then immediately jailed thereafter by instructions of the jefe político. This process continued for five years until General Pacheco became governor of the state.

2 Francisco Bulnes, El Verdadero Díaz y La Revolución (Mexico: Editora Nacional, 1967), 53.

3 Ibid. 49

After a huge outcry by the press, Pacheco liberated the individual falsely accused 4 and captured the jefe político. The latter faced trial, but, the Mexican Supreme Federal Court dropped all charges because, as it interpreted the situation, the jefe 5 político had acted well within the powers of his office. Bulnes charges that the jefes políticos were able to have this much power thanks in part to the Liberal 6 party that was responsible for the principles of the Constitution of 1857. Anti-Porfirismo scholars have a much different understanding of who was responsible for the abuses committed against the popular masses. In Díaz: Czar of Mexico, Carlo de Fornaro, a journalist, refers to Díaz’s system as a “political 7 mafia.” He further asserts that the jefe político has been the most useful tool of the government by becoming the “most cruel instrument of despotism” and “the 8 most acute public calamity to Mexican society.” Fornaro affirms that the jefes políticos broke all laws, knowing that Díaz would ignore the atrocities committed as long as they did not dare cross him or play against the president’s politics. Fornaro cites an incident where a body was found in a hacienda owned by one of Díaz’s ministers. After it was reported to the local authorities, they did nothing to identify the body or find who was responsible for the murder. However, Fornaro

4 This situation that took place in Morelos can be applied to the latter half of this chapter. General Pacheco arrested the jefe político because of the outcry from the press. If the suppression of the press was so severe, as anti-Porfirismo scholars suggest, Pacheco should have arrested the journalist and allowed the jefe político to continue his exploits.

5 Bulnes, 54.

6 Ibid., 55.

7 Carlo de Fornaro, Díaz: Czar of Mexico (New York: Carlo de Fornaro, 1909), 59.

8 Ibid. 50

contends that it was later discovered, though he never states how, that the man responsible for the murder was the local jefe político who acted by orders of the 9 governor. The latter was a relative of the president. José López Portillo y Rojas, an anti-Porfirismo scholar, agrees with the position taken by Fornaro. López Portillo y Rojas contends that the system maintained by Díaz was one in which one’s loyalty and obedience to the president maintained one in power perpetually. In this system, Díaz picked the governors based on their loyalties; he elevated and maintained them in power if necessary. The governors picked out the jefes políticos, and all of them followed the orders of 10 their “master.” López Portillo y Rojas affirms that these officials had no liberty to act on their own accord, the eyes of the president were always watching their every movement. According to López Portillo y Rojas the best example that exemplifies this unconditional loyalty to the demands of the president was seen in the “Massacre of Veracruz,” in which Díaz gave the order to kill the rebels 11 immediately (Mátalos en Caliente), and governor Terán did as he was asked. As stated earlier, anti-Porfirismo scholars use these isolated events and generalize that they are typical examples of what happened nation-wide. In many cases the governors and jefes políticos acted independently, but what anti- Porfirismo scholars contend is that Díaz tolerated these abuses as long as they did not oppose him. If and when the governors and jefes políticos did act by direct order of the president on other occasions, anti-Porfirismo scholars do not make a

9 Ibid., 62-63. Fornaro never discloses the location of the hacienda or the name of the owner.

10 López Portillo y Rojas, 337-338.

11 Ibid. 51

distinction between their actions when mandated by Díaz and those where they acted alone. However, neo-Porfirismo scholars make that distinction and contend that in many cases, governors and jefes políticos exercised much more autonomy than what is argued by the anti-Porfirismo scholars. Neo-Porfirismo scholars analyze and distinguish the principles behind the politics of the Porfiriato. In Porfirio Díaz: Profiles in Power, Paul Garner outlines five themes that he affirms summarize the principles of Porfirian politics. The first is the distinction between ideology and practice, and how, as Díaz consolidated his power, pragmatism became the stamp of the administration. The second is the system of patronage, where loyalty and deference to the president fueled the Porfiriato. It is this second theme that anti-Porfirismo scholars contend fueled the Porfiriato and maintained him in power for three decades. The third is 12 the strict observance of constitutional practice. The fourth is maintaining a balance between state and federal authority. The last theme is the use of force and 13 intimidation in order to maintain political peace. Historian Romana Falcón contends that the jefaturas políticas have not received adequate scholarly attention considering the powerful role these institutions played in the development of the nation. Falcón affirms that on occasion, as has been asserted by anti-Porfirismo scholars, the jefes políticos acted as centralizing forces for the state or central government. However, on many other instances they took the opposite position and were agents of very powerful

12 This would explain why in the case of the jefe político in Morelos utilized by Bulnes, the Supreme Court exonerated the jefe politico because he acted within the parameters of his power. See footnotes 3-4.

13 Paul Garner, Porfirio Díaz: Profiles in Power (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 70. 52

regional interests. Falcón refutes the anti-Porfirismo position and instead concludes that many times the jefes políticos assisted in preserving regional 14 power. Falcón also contends that the method of selecting the jefes políticos was not always through the universal patronage system, as asserted by anti-Porfirismo scholars, although she admits that in due course many of them of them would eventually be appointed and removed at the pleasure of the state governors. Nevertheless, in Puebla, Falcón contends that the governor would chose jefes políticos from candidates presented to him. In Chihuahua they were selected through popular vote; in Coahuila, they were elected by the municipal authorities 15 of the district. Moreover, Falcón asserts that the jefes políticos and the governor actually became an obstacle to the central government. This opposition to central authority forced the president to respond in order to maintain the balance of power between the central government and the state. In 1886, Colonel José María Garza Galán became governor of the state of Coahuila with the support of the president. Falcón affirms that eventually both Garza Galán, but especially his jefes políticos, became more independent from the central government in Mexico. The distancing began to broaden to a point where Garza Galán no longer consulted with the president about who he appointed to the jefaturas políticas. When some of the jefes políticos failed to protect the interests of elites in the state, particularly in the mining industry, Díaz sent General Bernardo Reyes to inform Garza Galán to

14 Romana Falcón, “Force and the Search for Consent: The Role of Jefaturas Políticas of Coahuila in National State Formation,” in Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 108-109.

15 Ibid. 53

replace the individuals. However, the governor resisted and forced Díaz to act in the matter personally. The situation escalated as Garza Galán replaced more jefes políticos with men loyal to him and not to the central government. These new jefes políticos used their positions to financially undercut some of the elite members of the state, and among those affected were the Madero and Carranza 16 families. As Garza Galán was reelected in 1889, there was discontent among the elites of Coahuila. Evaristo Madero, grandfather of future revolutionary Francisco I. Madero, went to speak to the president and warned him about the abuses of Garza Galán and his jefes políticos in the region. Díaz asked General Reyes to investigate the matter, but in the end the president gave Garza Galán the green light to stay in power for another four years. The elites of Coahuila saw this as an affront, and, in August 1893, a rebellion broke out led by the Carranza family. Díaz mobilized his forces to pacify the revolt and granted amnesty and 17 concessions to the affected families in exchange for peace. In the end, Garza Galán was forced to resign and the jefaturas políticas that affected the interests of the elite families were disbanded by order of the president. In this manner, Díaz 18 was able to balance the power once more between state and federal government. Falcón would not call this a triumph for the rebel forces, for although they did gain much autonomy from the government, Díaz managed to balance the

16 Romana Falcón, “La Desaparición de Jefes Políticos en Coahuila. Una Paradoja Porfirista,” Historia Mexicana, vol. 37, no. 3 (Jan.-Mar., 1988), 423-436.

17 Falcón points out the differences of how rebels were treated, if they were peasants from the lower echelons of society they were met with violence and repression, but when it was elite families, Díaz was much more lenient and even conceded many of their requests.

18 Falcón, 437-464. 54

power through other means. In fact, Falcón affirms that after this rebellion was resolved, the Coahuilan elites always struggled to gain further autonomy from the government. This created a tension that only escalated a little at a time, and Falcón concludes that this in part explains why it would be people from Coahuila and their families that would spark the revolution that sought to end the 19 Porfiriato. Neo-Porfirismo scholars refute the contention by anti-Porfirismo scholars that all officers were appointed directly from Mexico City with the approval of the president. While this was the case for many places throughout Mexico, making such generalizations is dangerous because of the diversity that exists in the regions of the country. Neo-Porfirismo scholars propose that each region should be studied individually and not with a template approach as anti-Porfirismo scholars have done. Another aspect of the Porfirian political system that is often criticized was the extent to which freedom of press was allowed in Mexico. Anti-Porfirismo scholars believed all newspapers were on the payroll of the Mexican government with the exception of a few, thus effectively ending free press in the country. If that was not sufficient, the government under Díaz was ready to persecute, 20 intimidate and even murder those who opposed the government. Neo-Porfirismo scholars argue differently; to them the government tolerated a significant amount of opposition. In fact, some would argue that there existed more opposition press 21 than any other period in Mexican history. Only one Porfirismo scholar,

19 Ibid., 463-464.

20 Fornaro, 62, 95-102.

21 Garner, 124. 55

Francisco Bulnes, wrote about this topic. Interestingly enough, his interpretation of how the dissenters in the press were controlled reinforces the neo-Porfirismo contention that in various regions of the country there was much more autonomy from the federal government, as has been suggested by anti-Porfirismo scholars. In El Verdadero Díaz, Francisco Bulnes addresses the accusations that Díaz exterminated journalists. Bulnes affirms that over the three decades that Díaz was in power only five journalists were ever executed: Carrasco, Ordóñez, Valadez, 22 Olmos y Contreras and Rodríguez. However, Bulnes clearly asserts that Díaz never ordered the execution of any journalist. According to Bulnes, Carrasco was assassinated in Mixcoac or Tacubaya because of alcohol intoxication and issues involving women. Ordóñez was murdered in Pachuca by the provisional governor whom he attacked in both his personal and public lives. Valadez was murdered in Sinaloa, by Governor Francisco Cañedo due to local politics and a personal feud. Olmos y Contreras was assassinated in Puebla for personal attacks on Governor Martínez. Rodríguez was murdered in Oaxaca. Bulnes affirms that none of these victims ever attacked or said anything against the president or the federal 23 government. Bulnes also points out that all of these murders took place before 1896. This is significant because after General Manuel González’s death in 1893, the majority of the governors were civilians who opposed these violent measures. Bulnes further suggests that under pressure from the Científicos, Díaz made sure

22 In his writings Bulnes only provides the last names of these individuals. I was unable to find further reference to them.

23 Bulnes, 63. 56 24 that no journalist was ever assassinated in any state of the nation. According to Bulnes, the assassinations of journalists were eliminated by Díaz fourteen years before the revolution. Bulnes summarizes the handling of the press by stating that “General Díaz governed Mexico with a minimum of terror and a maximum of 25 benevolence.” In the end, Bulnes affirms that it was the opposition press who 26 overthrew Díaz in the wake of the revolution. Carlo de Fornaro, a journalist and anti-Porfirismo scholar, calls a free press 27 “the detective of a nation.” However, according to him, in Mexico the detective was non-existent, because as he argued, the press was brought down to the level of the Díaz administration. Fornaro contends that with the exception of three papers, the rest were in the pay of the government. These three papers were La Opinión from Veracruz, La Revista de Mérida in Merida, and El Diario del Hogar in Mexico City. Fornaro affirms that up until Díaz’s first term there was a free press that was constitutionally protected under Article 7 of the Constitution of 1857. This article stated, “the press must respect public life, morality and public peace. Transgression of the law by the press shall be judged by two juries, one to determine the guilt, and another which shall apply the law and indicate the 28 penalty.” These two juries served to protect the press because they were independent from one another.

24 The Científicos were a cabinet of advisors to President Díaz who adopted the “positivist” view of Auguste Comte. They played a critical role in the modernization of Mexico.

25 Ibid., 72.

26 Ibid., 26.

27 Fornaro, 95.

28 Ibid. 57

After Díaz’s first term ended in 1884, the new president, General Manuel González reformed the article. After its reform, the law read: “the crimes committed by the press, shall be judged by competent tribunals of the federation, or of the states, of the federal district and the territory of Lower California, 29 according to their special legislation.” According to Fornaro, this change was significant because now the government could avoid the trials administered by juries and instead replace them with corrupt judges who would execute the will of the president. The loosely defined articles do not specify how a member of the press was able to transgress the law. According to Fornaro, these loose definitions became useful for the government because it was able to bring charges against violators under different titles. Fornaro further contends that at the state level, government officials became more vicious in order to silence the press. Fornaro cites as proof the penal code of Yucatan, which states that “in the offences against the state; to prosecute, it is not necessary that the slandered person should have been mentioned by its full name, it is sufficient to indicate initials, or an incorrect and disfigured allusion of the name, or by certain suggestions of time, place, profession, manner, 30 characteristic signs, etc.” The suppression was so severe that in case of violating the law, anyone involved in the process of producing, printing and delivering newspapers voicing dissent would be jailed and the equipment used trashed in the 31 street.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 97.

31 Ibid. 58

Fornaro contends that Díaz used his machinery of oppression most effectively when elections approached. Fornaro describes Díaz’s men conducting military maneuvers to capture and destroy newspapers. In fact, he claims that in 1902, in order to cleanse the opposition before the coming election, Díaz persecuted or subjected to trial over forty papers in sixteen states. He further claimed that the list is only a partial one. The executor of these persecutions for the most part was General Bernardo Reyes, by order of Porfirio Díaz. In this manner, Fornaro believes that Díaz killed the free press of Mexico at the source; he even suggests that had Díaz allowed free press in Mexico, the president would 32 have lasted three days. The position taken by Fornaro represents only one side of the anti- Porfirismo interpretation of the Porfiriato’s treatment of the press. The other side of this argument is that Díaz used those newspapers that were subsidized by the government to “defend his politics, sanctify his errors, palliate his murder 33 attempts, diminish his enemies and to intone hymns dedicated to his glory.” In Elevación y Caída, José López Portillo y Rojas contends that Díaz managed to bribe the editors of the existing papers of the time, including, Universal, Partido Liberal, Siglo XIX, and La Patria. Eventually Díaz placed his own men, Rafael Reyes Espíndola and Rosendo Pineda, in charge of El Imparcial and subsidized it in order to become the news outlet for the government. López Portillo y Rojas asserts that this newspaper was very effective carrying out the orders of the central government, and as a result it became popular throughout the nation and became the king of newspapers in all Mexico. The content ranged from various articles

32 Ibid., 102-103.

33 López Portillo y Rojas, 341. 59

that attracted the masses to politics and finances that boasted the achievements of the government under Díaz. El Imparcial also played a key role in maintaining public tranquility, allowing Díaz to entrench his dominance throughout the nation. Aside from praising Díaz and his cabinet, El Imparcial was utilized by the government to attack and discredit rival papers and the dissenters behind them. According to López Portillo y Rojas, these attacks allowed the government to keep those unwelcome people in the shadows. López Portillo y Rojas concludes that the suppression of the opposition press was necessary for Díaz to consolidate his 34 power. Neo-Porfirismo scholars contend that the press’s opposition to Díaz clearly originated when the president decided to reelect himself. The opposition press condemned Díaz for disregarding the principles of non-reelection that served as his battle cry during the rebellions of La Noria and Tuxtepec. Many of these dissenters were former Tuxtepecanos who supported Díaz; however, when he ran 35 for reelection, they felt he betrayed the principle that brought him to power. Neo-Porfirismo scholars like Jorge Fernando Iturribarria contend that Díaz recognized the potential problem that the criticism of the press could de-stabilize the country. In Jorge Fernando Iturribarria’s view, it was a difficult choice to make: suppress the dissenting voices, or allow the return of rebellions in the country. In the end, Díaz addressed the problem of opposition press as the lesser

34 Ibid., 341-344.

35 Paul Garner contends that Filomeno Mata, who was one of the most known opposition journalists of the time, had been a loyal tuxtepecano and voiced his discontent when Díaz reelected himself. However, Mata showed a remarkable degree of deference to Díaz even after he had been imprisoned and persecuted for over twenty years. For more details, see: Garner, 126- 127. 60

of two evils. Iturribarria affirms that in this respect, Díaz was able to be 36 “efficient.” However, he argues that the first choice for resolving the issue was not violence. Díaz first tried to convince journalists, then bribe them, then take legal action, and finally to exile them from the nation. However, as the opposition grew and posed a greater threat to the stability of Mexico, Díaz increased the 37 persecutions, intimidations, incarcerations and fines. In Porfirio Díaz y Su Tiempo, Fernando Orozco Linares agrees with Iturribarria. Efficiency was needed, and even though the measures taken by Díaz were what he calls “dictatorial,” these were not done for the benefit of any one person, but for the 38 benefit of the nation. Both anti and neo-Porfirismo scholars agree on the role that the newspaper El Imparcial played for the government. The newspaper was the primary vehicle used by Díaz to promote the pro-government message, and with the financial support it received, it was impossible for other papers to compete. El Imparcial also served to portray a very positive image of Mexico for the nations abroad who 39 wanted to invest money in the country. Paul Garner calls the control of the press “a blend of authoritarianism and 40 conciliation, manipulation and concession.” Garner strongly disagrees with the

36 Jorge Fernando Iturribarria, Porfirio Díaz ante la Historia (Mexico: Unión Grafica, 1967), 109-118.

37 Ibid.

38 Fernando Orozco Linares, Porfirio Díaz y su Tiempo (Mexico: Panorama Editorial, 1984), 127-134.

39 Iturribarria, 109-118.

40 Garner, 123. 61

anti-Porfirismo position and argues that practices associated with other dictatorial regimes in Latin America were never part of Díaz’s strategy. He contends that while the opposition press was silenced, it never was for a long period. Garner makes this claim because the number of newspapers and journals published during the Porfiriato actually increased over time. These numbers ranged from nine 41 major papers when Lerdo was president to 531 by 1898. Historians Claude Dumas and Mario Zamudio Vega affirm that for most part the opposition press represented the thought of conservative Catholics, and while they recognize that it was often silenced, they agree with Garner that the suppression never lasted too 42 long. In fact they refer to it as “un silencio a gritos” or a “screaming silence.” Garner also contradicts the key argument of anti-Porfirismo scholars that 43 under Díaz murder and assassination were used to control dissenters. Garner asserts that murder and assassination were never frequent and certainly not a part of a strategy enacted to control the press. In fact, the absence of any defined strategy is apparent. Garner agrees with Daniel Cosio Villegas’s conclusions in Historia Moderna, that while Díaz tolerated the persecution of the press, he did 44 not initiate it or pursue it. Those responsible were the local judicial authorities. This conclusion supports Bulnes’ contention that those who were assassinating

41 Ibid., 124.

42 Claude Dumas and Mario A. Zamudio Vega, “El discurso de oposición en la prensa clerical conservadora de Mexico en la época de Porfirio Díaz (1876-1910), Historia Mexicana, vol. 39, no.1 (Jul.-Sep., 1989), 243-256.

43 Fornaro, 62-63.

44 Garner, 125. 62

journalists in Mexico were often the local authorities who acted on their own 45 accord. Authoritarianism and centralization from above, through loyalty and patronage, have been two recurrent themes in the anti-Porfirismo historiography condemning Díaz and leading to his demise. While it has often been argued that Díaz was able to extend his tentacles throughout the nation through the offices of governor and jefaturas políticas, newer regional studies have demonstrated that in many cases these offices sided and worked for regional interests, thus maintaining a significant autonomy from the federal government. For these reasons, generalizations that these jefes políticos were but mere puppets of Díaz are disingenuous and imprecise. At the same time, the suppression of the press has often been used to characterize the extent to which the president took matters to pacify the nation and silence those who challenged his continuous reelections. While censorship of the press did take place, neo-Porfirismo scholars have argued that Díaz did not initiate nor encourage these persecutions, and certainly did not encourage the assassination of journalists. Instead, these scholars contend that in fact centralization from above was not as severe as has been contested by anti- Porfirismo scholars. Local and state governors did exercise a certain degree of autonomy to deal with dissenting journalists, and, overall, the opposition press remained present throughout Díaz’s tenure and even contributed to his demise.

45 Garner, 124; Bulnes, 63.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The historiography of President Díaz has not yet given him a proper evaluation. Porfirismo scholars have overly praised the accomplishments of Díaz, as in the case of his military campaigns throughout the War of the Reform and the French Intervention. They focus on the qualities possessed by Díaz to explain how the president was able to transform the Mexican landscape during his presidency. Once the French were out of the nation and Juarez was able to return to Mexico City, Porfirismo scholars equate Díaz’s retirement from the military service at the triumph of the French Intervention to Cincinnatus’ resignation of absolute authority in Rome. His retirement convinced Porfirismo scholars that Díaz possessed qualities of leadership, civic virtue, service to the greater good, 1 and modesty. As Díaz rebelled against Juárez and Lerdo, Porfirismo scholars justify the rebellions, claiming that Díaz only acted in response to the demands of the nation, and, that his experiences throughout the constant struggles against the invading forces had earned Díaz the necessary experience to occupy the presidency of Mexico. Once he became president, Porfirismo historians justify repression, like in Veracruz, claiming the president could not afford to waste time; a delayed decision could cost more lives than necessary. For Porfirismo scholars the ends 2 justified the means.

1 Jose F. Godoy, Porfirio Díaz, President of Mexico: The Master Builder of a Great Commonwealth (New York: Kinckerbocker Press, 1910), 24.

2 James Creelman, Díaz: Master of Mexico (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1911), 361. 64

When Díaz consolidated his presidency in Mexico, his authority was vast and it reached throughout the country. Whenever injustices were committed against locals or the press, Porfirismo scholars exonerate Díaz and suggest that it was the state and regional leaders who were to blame because they acted alone and 3 not by order or approval of Díaz. Porfirismo scholarship can be summed up as praising Díaz and all his accomplishments, while at the same time absolving or minimizing his role in any events of violence or repression in Mexico. Francisco Bulnes, an avid Porfirismo scholar, summarized their overall approach saying “General Díaz governed Mexico with a minimum of terror and a maximum of 4 benevolence.” On the opposite side of the spectrum, anti-Porfirismo scholars have deliberately sought to tarnish the image of the Mexican president by underplaying the importance of his accomplishments. In the case of the siege of Puebla, anti- Porfirismo scholars contend that Díaz bribed the men defending the fort, 5 essentially buying the glory of his celebrated victory. Anti-Porfirismo scholars asserted that Díaz possessed an ambition for power that he demonstrated during his rebellions against Juárez and Lerdo. As president, they have argued that Díaz was quick to persecute and repress anyone who opposed his power by using the governors and jefes políticos to do his bidding. As a perfect example they most often cite the “massacre of Veracruz” where the governor, Luis Mier y Terán,

3 Francisco Bulnes, El Verdadero Díaz y La Revolución (Mexico: Editora Nacional, 1967), 53-63.

4 Ibid., 72.

5 José López Portillo Y Rojas, Elevación Y Caída de Porfirio Díaz (Mexico: Librería Española, 1943), 49-53. 65

executed rebels without due process; they contend these murders were ordered by Díaz. In the case of the press, anti-Porfirismo scholars contend that Díaz changed and abused the Constitution of 1857 in order to allow him to reprimand and subjugate the opposition press in Mexico. This was especially done quite effectively during the years he re-elected himself. The members of the press that did not oppose him were simply in his pocket, but a free press did not exist in 6 Mexico. In essence, anti-Porfirismo historiography can be summarized as being the exact opposite of Porfirismo scholarship; these scholars sought to vilify Díaz and any accomplishments, while at the same time singling out the president as the man behind the various abuses and exploits against the Mexican masses. Their argument has been highly effective because it served to explain and justify the Revolution of 1910 that removed Díaz from power. Neo-Porfirismo historians have brought forth a more objective evaluation of the period under Díaz’s rule. As a general approach, neo-Porfirismo scholars have taken Díaz outside of the central role that he played in the other two historiographies. By using this approach, they attribute much more autonomy and independence to the various offices and people who were part of the complex system of government under Díaz. Neo-Porfirismo scholars would not deny that Díaz sought the presidency during his rebellions. However, his movements counted on a broad base of supporters who believed he stood for their principles. This base should not be overlooked or minimized, because as neo-Porfirismo scholars suggest, many of

6 Carlo de Fornaro, Díaz: Czar of Mexico (New York: Carlo de Fornaro, 1909), 95-103; López Portillo Y Rojas, 341. 66

the members of the opposition press against Díaz were former Tuxtepecanos who abandoned the president after they believed he discarded the principles of 7 Tuxtepec. As president, Díaz was well aware that repressions existed, but neo- Porfirismo scholars contend that this was never part of a strategy from the 8 government. Neo-Porfirismo scholars have also conducted significant regional studies of the Porfiriato that helps oppose the template approach utilized by anti- Porfirismo scholars. While their work has contributed greatly to Porfirian historiography, there is much work still to be done, because the effective portrayal of the last generations of anti-Porfirismo scholars have embedded an image of Díaz that many Mexicans are not willing to forget. The evidence presented throughout this work demonstrates that Porfirismo and anti-Porfirismo historiography have deliberately exaggerated, diminished, omitted, undermined or exonerated the accurate role played by Porfirio Díaz during his time as president. Neo-Porfirismo scholars have made great pains to correct these issues. Nevertheless, there remains a lack of a significant biography of Porfirio Díaz that has properly evaluated him in the context of his time and outside of the influence of either Porfirismo or anti-Porfirismo historiography. This is important because by not properly weighing all of Díaz’s accomplishments and faults as a person, soldier and statesmen, neo-Porfirismo scholars have passively allowed the image that has been portrayed by anti-Porfirismo scholars to remain. Most of their contributions to Porfirian historiography are an evaluation

7 Garner, 126-127.

8 Jorge Fernando Iturribarria, Porfirio Díaz ante la Historia (Mexico: Unión Grafica, 1967), 109-118; Orozco Linares, 127-134; Garner, 125. 67

of the significances, benefits and disadvantages of the Porfiriato but not directly 9 address Díaz. The resurgence of studying the Porfiriato was rooted in what many scholars 10 have argued was the continuity between the regime of Díaz and the revolution. Laurens Ballard Perry affirms that the outcome of the Revolution of 1910 was a continuation of the nineteenth century politics that solidified Díaz in power. He contends that Madero’s rebellion removed Díaz, while Carranza’s Constitutionalist forces eliminated Díaz’s federal army and bureaucracy. When Carranza sought to organize victory during elections with help of governors, he faced rebellions like Díaz’s Tuxtepec. The Agua Prieta rebellion of 1920 brought to power Álvaro Obregón who found his successor in Plutarco Elías Calles, just as Díaz found Manuel González. Both Calles and González amended the constitution to interpret “no re-election” as “no immediate re-election.” In this manner Díaz and Obregón were re-elected; however, Obregón was assassinated. Calles then created the PNR that became the PRI, a party of executive centralism 11 much like the regime of Porfirio Díaz. Anthony Bryan contends that the student riots of 1968 and this continuity provided the intellectual justification for a rebirth 12 of interest in the Porfiriato.

9 The closest work that resembles such approach is Jorge Fernando Iturribarria’s Porfirio Díaz ante la Historia.

10 See: Laurens B. Perry, Juárez and Díaz: Machine Politics in Mexico (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1978), 346-352; Anthony Bryan, “Bibliographical Essay A Research Review,” in The Age of Porfirio Díaz, ed. Carlos B. Gil (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1977), 165-170; and Paul Garner, Porfirio Díaz: Profiles in Power (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 12-13.

11 Perry, 347-352.

12 Bryan, 165. 68

The resurgence of interest in the Porfiriato is a correct step into properly revising the demonization of Díaz that anti-Porfirismo scholars have embedded in the minds of Mexico’s masses. However, as Paul Garner warns, “the inherent danger of the new revisionism…is that, by transforming the image from diabolical dictator to that of patriot and benign patriarch, Díaz will find his place once again 13 in the pantheon of national heroes.” In the case of Díaz, the balance of historical truth seems long overdue. Carlos Tello Díaz, great-great-grandson of Porfirio Díaz, affirms that during his Parisian exile, the ex-president was plagued and conflicted by two contradictory sentiments: first, his own responsibility for Mexico’s swift return to political instability, and second, his grief and anguish at the ingratitude of his fellow Mexicans in failing to recognize his contribution to Mexico’s prosperity and progress. During his exile, in a confession to Federico Gamboa, Mexico’s Minister to Belgium, the President said he felt wounded because one half of the country rose up in arms to overthrow him, and the other half folded its arms and 14 watched his fall. Among professional historians, the negative image of Díaz seems to have superseded the positive image; moreover, the Mexican government and the masses have not completely forgiven and seem unwilling to change their stance. Fernando Orozco Linares predicted that only in the future, Mexicans free of hate and resentment will be able to objectively weigh Díaz’s accomplishments and

13 Garner, 14.

14 Carlos T. Díaz, El Exilio: Un Relato de Familia (Mexico: Cal y Arena, 1993), 22-30. 69 15 failures and ensure that his remains are returned to the country. Paul Garner seconds Orozco’s prediction by adding that “proof of official acceptance, political reconciliation and historical balance” will become a reality when the remains of the longest serving Mexican president are returned from the Parisian cemetery of 16 Montparnasse to be buried in his beloved Oaxaca. Whether their predictions will take a long time, or if they come true at all, remains yet to be seen.

15 Fernando Orozco Linares, Porfirio Díaz Y Su Tiempo (Mexico: Panorama Editorial, 1984), 8.

16 Garner, 229.

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_____. Porfirio Díaz en la Revuelta de la Noria. Mexico: Editorial Hermes, 1953.

_____. The United States Versus Porfirio Díaz. Translated by Nettie Lee Bensen. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963.

Articles:

Dumas, Claude and Mario A. Zamudio Vega. “El discurso de oposición en la prensa clerical conservadora de México en la época de Porfirio Díaz (1876- 1910).” Historia Mexicana. Vol. 39, no. 1. Jul.-Sep., 1989.

Falcón, Romana. “la desaparición de jefes políticos en Coahuila. Una paradoja Porfirista.” Historia Mexicana. Vol. 37, no.3. Jan.-Mar., 1988.

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