Ltft> # 7 »/"7 W O fin BRIAND AND THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR SECURITY by Ottowell Blake Elliot A .Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Department Of HISTORY The University of British Columbia April, 1940 BRIAND AND THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR SECURITY TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction. Chapter I. The Treaty of Versailles. Page Chapter II. The French Search for Alliances, 1920-1925 * page 17. Chapter III. France and the Making of Locarno. page 35. Chapter IV. Briand's Work and influenoe, 1926-1932. Page 61, Chapter V, France and the Years of Crisis, 1929-1932. Page 98. Chapter Vii Briand and the Struggle for Disarmament, 1921-1932. Page 115, Chapter VII. Epilogue. Page 153, Bibliography, Pages i-LVI. INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION From the catastrophe of 1914-1918 France as one of the major Allied Powers emerged victorious. Her statesmen were determined that one of the basic fruits of victory must be the permanent guarantee of national seourity. The nonrrealization of the Anglo-American Guarantee was a serious blow to the French security structure and was fraught with illimitable consequences. This first breach in the system of collective seourity which the French people were so anxious to see established on a firm basis, resulted temporarily in the French reversion to a policy of force un• der Poincare'* The failure of this method to promote security led to the emergence of Aristide Briand to a position of prominence on the French political stage. The polioy of rapprochement which he advocated largely dominated the French security picture from 1925 until his death in 1932. Because of this fact the name of Briand is inevitably linked with this problem whioh is so important in the national life of Franoe. An introduction to this study would not be complete with• out a word of thanks to Professor Frederic H. Spward for his invaluable assistance cheerfully extended at all times. Ap• preciation must be also be given to Miss Anne M. Smith and Miss M. L. Lanning of the University of British Columbia Lib• rary Staff for their guidance in the selection of materials. CHAPTER I. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES BRIAND AND THE FRENCH SEARCH FOR SECURITY CHAPTER I. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES Tlie treaty which marked the end of the Great War of 1914-1918 was ratified in the beautiful Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. It was in this same place that the articles of peace were signed by the French and German plenipotentiaries after the War of 1870. "It is a moot question if in human history there ever has been a swifter and more tremendous 1 reversal." Everything in the peace and in the circumstanoes surrounding it emphasize this rapid ohange and for France this was one of the most significant factors. Each of the Allied nations represented at the Conference had certain national aspirations which desired satisfaction. The French felt that however important these needs might be the question which required prior consideration was their national security. There were two approaches to this problem advocated by groups of comparative importance* M. Henri de Jouvenel, a strong figure in one group, urged that both the government and people of France give their support to the League and work through it for enduring peace and also for the satis• faction of their needs. There were others in France who called M. de tiouvenel and his friends idealists and theorists :1. Anon., The Signing of the Peace, Manchester Guardian Weekly, yol. 1, July 4, 1919, p. 2. 1 2 and maintained that security for France lay in the complete disarmament of Germany coupled with a heavy indemnity. Both of these solutions to the problem of security were probably put forward by their advocates in all honesty of purpose and both, in greater or less degree, influenced the making of the treaty. The Treaty of Versailles contains several articles dir- 1 ectly concerned with the problem of security. President Wilson's ideal was to establish a League of nations which would introduce a spirit of trust and mutual understanding between nations, it was natural that in the months immed• iately after the war when peoples throughout the world were receptive to such ideas that the League of Nations idea should take hold. Wilson's power which was on the ascen• dant at this period enabled him to have the League of iMations Covenant placed at the beginning of the Treaty text. Although the Articles of the Treaty of Versailles mentioned above have an important bearing on the problem of security the main artiole around which the problem resolves is Article 10 of the League Covenant. It reads: The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the ter• ritorial integrity and existing political indepen• dence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. 1. Text of the Treaty of Versailles, Articles 42, 45, 44, 428, 429, 431, 432. 2i ibid., Article 10. 3 President Yvilson maintained that this Article was the Monroe 1 Doctrine of the world yet his insistence upon the insertion of this Article in the League of Nations section alienated the support of many of his friends who, although opposing the Peace Treaty, were in favor.of the idea of a League. Robert Lansing says of this situation, "The President's un• alterable determination to have his form of guarantee in the Covenants . .and his firm refusal to modify it, in any sub• stantial way, resulted in the strengthening of the opponents of the League to such an extent that they were able to pre• vent the Treaty from obtaining the necessary consent of two- 2 thirds of the Senators." This refusal of the Senate to con• sider Article 10 was a very serious blow to the plan of se• curity which the French leaders were trying to build up and would mean that France would probably be less receptive to overtures of friendship which the German statesmen might make to her. Europe had been assured by President Wilson with a sincerity which it never occurred to the common man to doubt, that he was morally and constitutionally the pleni• potentiary of his country, and that in future the French might count without reserve upon the United States. Failure to win support from the United States was a very serious blow to proponents of the League of Nations who, not realizing 1. Stannard- Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Double day-irage and Company, 1923, vol. 1, p* 326. 2. Lansing, Robert, The Peace Negotiations, London, Constable and Company, 1921, p. 112. 4 the power of the Senate to nullify the work of a ^resident at will, took it for granted that the United states would endorse the completed treaty. The Reparations problem loomed very large in the French security picture. When the Conference at Paris began its study of the problem of Reparations, there were several attitudes at once apparent. In the case of the Allied (count• ries it was the general feeling that Germany must be made to pay for all the damage done to the destroyed portions of Prance and Belgium as well as any additional payments which the Allies through the Peace Conference should see fit to impose. This additional clause was contained in Article 19 which went much farther in scope than did Article 8 of the Fourteen joints which merely provided that all French ter• ritory should be freed and the invaded portions restored. That this would be the extent of the financial demands on Germany was the belief before the end of the War but at the .feace Conference this view underwent a decided change. The word "Reparations" was given the broadest interpretation; English and French alike put forward, what from the German 1 standpoint were considered impossible demands. The Germans urged that a fixed sum be set, otherwise they declared that it would be impossible for them to organize their internal financial affairs in order to prevent financial chaos. The 1* Bergmantjf Carl, History of Reparation^ London, E. Benn Limited, 1927, p. 3. 5 1 Americans supported the Germans in. this stand. However, as Congress refused ratification of the Treaty, their objection did not carry as much weight as it might have under other circumstances * The French stand on this issue was the real stumbling-block. They felt that fixing a total sum might have a serious effect on their financial security in the future, if a fixed sum was agreed upon at this juncture, improvement in the German financial situation would mean a decided loss in indemnity payments to France. The French preferred to leave the matter indefinite and were successful in having it placed in the hands of a Reparations Commission. "The future/" said Foch, "can only be assured in any lasting manner, by making the Rhine our military frontier 2 and holding it with Allied forces." Marshal Foch was very insistent that in order to guarantee the security of France in the future the Rhine must be considered as the boundary between France and Germany. There were many people in France who were of a like opinion. Some of the arguments used by the French in support of this thesis were the fact that France had a population of approximately one-half that of Germany, and her birth-rate was not increasing at anything near the rate of her neighbor across the Rhine.