A Controversial Coup Attempt

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A Controversial Coup Attempt JULY 15 ERDOĞAN’S COUP TURKEY’S PRESIDENT WITH HIS INTEL AND MILITARY CHIEFS (L) JULY, 2017 stockholm www.stockholmcf.org center for SCF freedom stockholm center for SCF freedom tockholm Center for Freedom (SCF) is an advocacy organization that promotes the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms with a special focus on Turkey, a nation of 80 million Sthat is facing significant backsliding in its parliamentary democracy under its autocratic leaders. SCF, a non-profit organization, was set up by a group of journalists who have been forced to live in self-exile in Sweden against the backdrop of a massive crackdown on press freedom in Turkey. SCF is committed to serving as a reference source by providing a broader picture of rights violations in Turkey, monitoring daily developments on fact-based investigative journalism and documenting individual cases of the infringement of fundamental rights. The founders of SCF are top-notch journalists who had managed national dailies in Turkey and worked for leading media outlets before they were forced to leave. They have the expertise, human resources and network on the ground to track events in Turkey despite serious challenges. 2 stockholm center for SCF freedom EXECUTIVE SUMMARY he July 15th failed coup attempt in Turkey was a false flag operation orchestrated by Erdoğan in partnership with a cadre of military and intelligence officials to Tconsolidate his power, secure an imperial-style presidency, smother all opposition, and pave the way for the launch of a military incursion into Syria. The attempt, doomed to fail from the start, was hailed by Erdoğan as a “gift from God” and should be considered a successful bid from his perspective, judging by the results. A huge gap has emerged between the facts and the government’s narrative on the coup bid despite intense efforts by the Erdoğan regime in the form of censorship, propaganda, pressure, threats, and even torture and ill-treatment. The testimonials from defendants and the evidence uncovered so far have further bolstered the view that the coup attempt was nothing but a set-up. The conflicting public accounts from Erdoğan regarding the chain of events on the day of the coup, his recollections that even differ from the indictments issued by a judiciary that is tightly controlled by his regime, the anti-democratic measures taken in the aftermath of July 15, the shuttering of thousands of institutions, and the arrests of tens of thousands of civilians cast a long shadow over the events of July 15. The fact that the head of the intelligence service, Hakan Fidan, was tipped off about the coup in advance according to his own written statements sent to Parliament, but he informed neither the prime minister nor the president strengthens the claim that the coup bid was totally staged. There is no explanation for why the officials who were, first and foremost, responsible for discovering, thwarting, and halting the coup attempt against the elected government remained unreachable on the day of the coup and why they followed daily routine even after they learned about the attempt. Against the background of intelligence chief Hakan Fidan’s lack of testimony, either as a suspect or witness, in any judicial investigation into the coup attempt, his no-show at the Parliamentary Coup Investigation Commission to give testimony, and the very fact that he has kept his job, Erdoğan apparently demands that everybody believe in his constructed narrative about the coup attempt without even questioning or investigating anything significant. The fact that Hakan Fidan met with the top military officials for hours the day before the coup as well as on the coup day, his trip to the General Staff’s headquarters despite the alleged tip-off that he was going to be whisked away and detained by the military, his leaving the military headquarters without any hindrance, and the launch of the coup attempt right after his departure has not been explained and justified until today. 3 stockholm center for SCF freedom Recep Tayyip It is also important to note that the General Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar made Erdoğan (C), conflicting statements. Testimonials by witnesses and defendants do not confirm the Hulusi Akar account provided by Akar. The military experts that SCF has consulted in preparing this (L) and Hakan report clearly underline that because of the advance tip-off, the coup bid could easily have Fidan, the three been stopped in its tracks and prevented by quick and simple measures. Yet, Akar’s not main figures resorting to such preventive measures fuels deep suspicions about the July 15 events. in Turkey’s controversial It was highly unusual for the top commanders of the military to go on with their coup bid, usual routine, even attending wedding ceremonies at a time when there was credible cheerfully pose and alarming intelligence of a coup attempt. This is against the established traditions, in Samarkand, practices, and rules of the operating procedures in the Turkish military. Uzbekistan, in a trip taken after According to the official account, 8,651 officers took part in the coup, corresponding July 15. to 1.5 percent of the total military personnel in the Turkish Army. Of those 1,761 were private conscripts, 1,214 were military students, and 5,761 were officers and non- commissioned officers. But even these numbers do not reflect the actual mobilization that was seen on the ground during the coup attempt. Given the fact that 168 generals and thousands of officers are now being tried on coup charges, the military experts find it odd that such an insignificant number of troops took part in the coup attempt. It is estimated that there are 200,000 troops under the command of these generals who are charged with the attempt. The strange events such as closing down the Bosporus bridge to the traffic in one direction only, hitting targets that did not serve the aims of the putschists at all, the sparing of politicians who should have been the primary target, killing civilians, and trying to seize institutions with only a handful of troops have not been explained. The limited mobilization of military assets was confined to few cities and the teams that were supposed to detain Erdoğan came to his hotel hours after his departure. All these events make-no sense and this suggests that they were merely staged to give an impression and supply footage and photos of the coup. Even after one full year, the Turkish government has failed to present convincing and solid evidence that proves the Hizmet movement (popularly known as the Gülen movement) was behind the coup attempt, either as mastermind or participant. The 4 stockholm center for SCF freedom fabricated and forced testimonials apparently taken under heavy torture in custody were later refuted by defendants when they appeared in court for trial hearings. As the research published or reported by international institutions has revealed, the officers who are charged with attempting the coup have various ideologies and backgrounds. In most cases, the troops were mobilized over impending terror threats or as part of a military drill, defendants’ statements in the court have shown. Fethullah Gülen, in a written interview given to Stockholm Center for Freedom, states that the coup bid was an “outrageous, heinous scenario constructed by Erdoğan and his accomplices.” He says it was launched to pursue an unprecedented witch hunt against Hizmet. He made it clear that if anyone who is sympathetic to the Hizmet movement took part in this heinous act, they betrayed the very ideals of the movement. Gülen reiterated his call for an international commission to thoroughly investigate the coup, an offer to which Erdoğan failed to respond. The uncertainty about ballistic investigations on the weapons used in the murder of civilians and troops still lingers. The paramilitary groups that took part in clashes, and that later appeared in various videos taken on the coup night have not been identified and how they were organized and mobilized still remains a mystery. There are also reports that Turkish police distributed high-caliber weapons to civilians on the night of the coup. Turkey is no longer a country governed by the rule of law and democratic principles. It is now a state ruled by government decrees under a constant state of emergency. The judiciary is under the full control of the government; freedom of the press and expression are on hold; parliamentary is no longer functioning; and opposition politicians are behind bars. More than 150,000 government employees have been dismissed from their positions on the basis of their critical views without any effective judicial or administrative probes. The purges in the military, judiciary, foreign service, and security apparatus have reached alarming levels. The state has put 51,889 people behind bars, without evidence, trial or conviction, mostly housewives, teachers, students, doctors, merchants, and journalists who were affiliated with Hizmet movement. As confirmed by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, the instances of torture and ill-treatment of detainees, unsolved murders, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and the leveling of charges that have no basis in the criminal code are on the rise in Turkey. The complaints filed by victims fail to receive a response from the authorities. SCF invites all international institutions, primarily the United Nations, NATO, European Union, Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as allies and partners of Turkey, especially the United States, to pay close attention to the preservation of human rights and freedoms in Turkey. SCF strongly believes there is an urgent need to put in place measures and policy actions to put an end to the autocratic Erdoğan regime’s anti-democratic policies.
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