CHAPTER 2 7 THE PURSUIT TO MADAN G

HE Australian operations along the Rai Coast and in the Finisterre T Mountains in the early part of 1944 were being undertaken as a resul t of a policy directive for the summer of 1943-1944 issued by Genera l Blarney on 23rd December . Blarney had warned that "the operational rol e of the Australian Military Forces engaged in forward operations in Ne w Guinea will be taken over by U .S.A. forces in accordance with plans now being prepared . Aggressive operations will be continued and reliefs neces- sary to maintain the initiative will be made by G .O.C. New Guinea Force until Commander, U .S.A. Forces, takes over responsibility ." The reliefs would be effected gradually, first on the Huon Peninsula and second in the Ramu Valley . "As relieved, and subject to operational or emergency requirements," the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions would be allocated to I Aus- tralian Corps and would return to the mainland for training and rehabilita- tion. Three militia divisions—3rd, 5th and 11th—would be allocated to II Australian Corps for garrison duties, training and rehabilitation in Ne w Guinea and on the mainland. The already depleted III Australian Corps in Western Australia would be further reduced by one infantry brigad e which would be transferred to the 3rd . Division at Atherton . Blarney in- structed that movement of units to the mainland should begin immediatel y "in accordance with the principle of earliest relief for longest service in New Guinea", and that "the force remaining at the conclusion of th e relief will be an Army Corps of approximately two full jungle division s plus base troops required for maintenance" . Thus the role of the Australian Army in 1944 would be small in com- parison with the one it had played in the previous two years when it ha d carried the main burden of the fight against the Japanese in the South - West Pacific. At this stage, on 22nd January 1944, the War Cabinet decided to present to General MacArthur a revised statement of the combat force s to be assigned to him—the first such statement since the original one of 18th April 1942. The new statement set out the forces assigned i n greater detail than hitherto, specifying individual brigades ; as far as the army was concerned, it again gave control of all mobile operationa l formations to MacArthur, but provided that future assignments should b e specifically made by the Government . Thus, if a new brigade or division was formed it would be necessary to assign it individually to MacArthur .

In New Guinea the main body of the retreating Japanese division s was marching westward along the coastal route, and a smaller column con- sisting principally of the III/238th Battalion was using an exhausting inland route from Nambariwa to Nokopo. From Gali 2 the route woul d lead round the American beach-head at Saidor through Nokopo and

764 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG Jan-Feb Tarikngan . Here, as mentioned, was a covering force of about 2,000 me n under Major-General Nakai, comprising the III/239th Battalion and five companies of the 78th Regiment. For the Rai Coast advance Major-General Ramsay of the 5th Division would have in the forward area only the 8th Brigade (4th, 30th an d 35th Battalions) ; the 4th and 29th Brigades were to remain in rear areas. The commander of the 8th Brigade, Brigadier Cameron, was the only officer now commanding a brigade who had not served in the Middl e East. He had returned from the war of 1914-18 as an infantry lieutenant , and had led the 8th Brigade since May 1940. Ramsay's intention was to "advance to make contact with the U .S. forces at Saidor". He estimated that an enemy force of not more tha n 3,000 troops was in the area between Sio and Saidor, that their moral e and health were low, and that organised resistance was unlikely . Behind his statement that "U .S. forces have established a bridgehead at Saidor extending approx five miles in the direction of Sio, but are not expecte d to extend further in this direction", there may have been a suggestion that the 32nd American Division was losing a golden opportunity b y letting the retreating 20th and 51st Japanese Divisions bypass them. And on 17th February General Morshead wrote in a letter to Blarney that the Saidor force appeared not to have made "any appreciable effort " to cut off the retreating Japanese . Besides the 8th Brigade the main units taking part in the advance wer e the veteran company of Papuans, the 23rd Battery (short 25-pounders ) from the 2/12th Field Regiment, the 2/13th and 8th Field Companies , and a detachment of the 2/8th Field Ambulance . Because of the difficul- ties of supply not more than one battalion group would be used forward of Kelanoa and the remainder of the brigade would occupy "healthy areas " at Kelanoa. The maximum use would be made of the Papuans to preced e the forward battalion, and, as subsequent maintenance of the strikin g force would depend on the selection of suitable beaches, land reconnais- sance parties from the American 2nd Engineer Special Brigade woul d accompany it. On 19th January Cameron's headquarters and the 4th Battalion (Lieut - Colonel Crosky l ) began to arrive at Sio and Nambariwa . In the 4th, as in many more-experienced units before it, there was a certain amoun t of nervousness known colloquially as "itchy finger" on the first few nights . On the night of the 21st-22nd January the forward platoon imagine d that they saw some Japanese and opened fire . The "Japanese " were thei r own men, two of whom were killed and two wounded . The raw 8th Brigade, however, had the benefit of tlae skill and experience of th e Papuan company . The Papuans were in their element as hunters and were busy looking for scattered bands of Japanese . They would have been dis- appointed had they been recalled (as was intended at one stage) and , as events turned out, two companies of Papuans could probably hav e

1 Lt-Col P. W. Croaky, ED, NX112661 . CO 4 Bn 1942-44. Managing law clerk ; of Arncliffe , NSW ; b . Rozelle, NSW, 29 Jun 1908. Died 7 Jan 1957 .

22-25 Jan EXPERT PAPUAN PATROLS 765 advanced to Saidor quicker and with less effort than any brigade o f Australians . On the 22nd a native reported that there were about seven Japanese in the hills south-west of Sio Mission . A small patrol of Papuans, unde r Corporal Bengari, whose reputation was similar to that of the best of Gurkhas, immediately set out and arrived on the outskirts of the villag e of Lembangando on the night of the 24th. He sent forward a local native who said on his return that another 22 Japanese had now arrived . Next morning Bengari and his five companions ambushed the enemy force and killed every one without the Japanese firing a shot . Another Papuan patrol to Vincke Point found 20 dead Japanese on the track an d killed one other on their return journey to Sio . Thus, even before the advance began, the Papuans had cleared the way as far as the end o f the first bound planned by Cameron ; he had ordered that the 4th Bat- talion, preceded by the Papuans, would begin on 25th January a serie s of daily bounds, designed to take them to the Timbe River in six days . It was planned that the 4th Battalion would advance to Malasanga, th e 30th thence to Gali, and the 35th would then take over and link wit h the Americans in Saidor. General Berryman signalled to Ramsay o n the 25th: "Consider brigade rather over cautious but do not propose to push them yet."2

•Sigawa J MILES 5 0 / ` 5 ! A 10~ j 15 MILES

The 8th Brigade's pursuit along the Rai Coast

It would be difficult to find sheltered beach-heads because the north - west monsoon would blow until the middle of February, causing sudde n flooding of the rivers and rough seas which would limit barge landin g points to areas protected from the north-west . The terrain of the Rai Coas t

2 The following table shows the planned daily progress of the advance between Sio and Saidor : Bound Day Date Bound Day Dat e 1 Kwama River 1 25 Jan 8 Butubutu 9 2 Feb 2 Romba River 2 26 Jan 9 Roinji 2 10 3 Feb 3 Peel River 3 27 Jan 10 Weber Point 11 4 Feb 4 Soa River 4 28 Jan 11 Malalamai 12 5 Fe b 5 Hawkesbury Rive r 5 29 Jan 12 Yagomai 13 6 Fe b 6 Crossingtown 6 30 Jan 13 Seure 14 7 Fe b 7 Nemau 8 1 Feb 14 Sel 15 8 Feb

766 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG 25-29 Ja n consisted of a coastal belt whose width varied from about a mile to almost nothing, cut by many rivers and swamps. The whole operation woul d obviously be governed by supplies moved by sea . The Australians would thus, once again, depend upon their well-tried friends, the American boatmen of the 532nd E.B .S.R., of whom only one company remained with them . Because of the terrain the advance could be at most on a compan y front, probably mainly on a platoon front with Papuans scouting ahead . Behind these forward troops was an imposing array of headquarters : behind the one leading battalion a brigade commander, behind him a divisional commander, behind him a corps commander, and behind hi m a force commander. Two of these might well have been removed fro m the chain of command and the task allotted to a brigade group directly under the command of New Guinea Force—an arrangement that was , in effect, adopted later with regard to this very brigade . The advance began on the 25th when the Papuans in the van arrive d at the Kwama River soon after midday . Near a possible ford was the heap of dead bodies previously discovered . As they tried to cross the river a Japanese hiding among these bodies began to fire at them and was dealt with. When the battalion arrived the river was neck-deep and running at about 10 knots, and although one platoon crossed on a n improvised bridge the river then washed the bridge away and furthe r attempts to cross were unsuccessful . The airmen of No . 4 Squadron, flying low in their Boomerangs an d Wirraways, were scouring the area ahead of the advance so thoroughl y that they often counted the number of corpses and reported the expression s on the faces of retreating Japanese . A typical example of the work o f the pilots during the pursuit is contained in a reconnaissance report o f 26th January. Skimming over the Kwama the pilots waved to the Aus- tralians below and were answered. The information from their aerial reconnaissance gave the Australians, when they finally crossed the river, almost an assurance that there would be no opposition and that they could press on quickly to make up for lost time . The airmen saw no Japanese although they did see a group of natives at a river-mouth wearin g red lap-laps. They reported empty villages, five parachutes hanging i n trees—an indication that the Japanese may have tried, in desperation, to supply their retreating army from the air—"very slight recent usage " along the main tracks, possibly because of the heavy rain, several clearing s where Japanese might have been about to set up camp and then decide d otherwise, and caves in the area from Kiari to Sigawa where the defeated 51st Japanese Division had come to rest after escaping from Lae an d Salamaua. The battalion crossed the falling Kwama on the afternoon of the 26th . Next day it moved rapidly to the Asiwa River, and reached the Kiari area on the 28th, and on the 29th Singor. Each day at this stage the Papuans were killing 12 to 15 Japanese, and finding similar numbers of corpses . Supply difficulties caused delay, and the advance was slowed because of

29 Jan-5 Feb BRIDGES WASHED AWAY 767 corps and divisional instructions that artillery support was to be immedi- ately available. This necessitated the permanent allotment of barges t o the artillery and so far there were not enough barges to supply even th e infantry. The engineers were having difficulty in making river crossings , partly because it was so hard to move forward the engineering equipmen t required. For instance, when the Kwama's bridge was washed away the troops beyond the river, but well behind the leading barge point, found supplies very short and there were other difficulties along the suppl y route : the increasing length of signal communications, the uncertainty o f wireless communications, and the marshy country west of Kiari whic h prevented the use of motor transport and placed an additional strain o n the barges . The fifth bound—Malasanga—was reached in the afternoon of th e 30th, and on the 31st the Papuans and Australians advanced to Crossing- town. The men were now on three-quarter rations. More troops were concentrating in the Singor area on the 31st, thus increasing the ratio n shortage. Among the arrivals were the 30th Battalion, a section of th e 2/4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment and the 64th Battery of the 2/14t h Field Regiment (Lieut-Colonel Hone 3), with its regimental headquarters, 4 which arrived to relieve the 23rd Battery of the 2/ 12th Field Regiment . After a confused start the 4th Battalion had reached its objectiv e only one day behind schedule without, however, being able to catch the retreating enemy. The advance obviously could not be continued until rations became available, and early on 1st February Cameron cancelled the advance for that day . Along the coast behind the forward troops floods had washed away bridges over the Mongo, Asiwa and Romb a Rivers. Jeeps and bulldozers were therefore isolated and their crews , like the forward troops, were almost without rations . The Papuans, havin g been without proper food for the last three days, camped and waited . Rough seas, flooded rivers, broken bridges and lack of supplies continue d to delay the advance until 3rd February when Lieut-Colonel Parry - Okeden's 30th Battalion set off from Singor to take over from the 4t h Battalion at Crossingtown . Meanwhile the Papuans reached Nemau . Sup- plies were dropped from the air on the 4th and the recovery was 8 2 per cent. The 30th Battalion on the 4th reached Nemau and on the 5th Butubutu , where the next supply beach was established . Increasing numbers of dead were now being found along the route and the inland trails — 52 on the 4th . On the 5th came orders that all commanders must make every endeavour to capture prisoners, and with this in view Camero n called off the Papuans from leading the advance and sent the leadin g Papuan platoon to reconnoitre the inland trails while the infantry le d the advance on the right. Final arrangements were made on the 5th for *Lt-Col R. B. Hone, ED, VX38996. CO 2/14 Fd Regt 1942-46 (CRA 5 Div Feb-May 1945) . Manager ; of Adelaide ; b . Morphett Vale, SA, 3 Jul 1899 . *The 2/14th Field Regiment was the last fighting unit of the four infantry divisions of the AI F to go into action . It had been at Darwin while other parts of the 8th Division were in action in Malaya and the Indies, and thereafter it had suffered a degree of frustration comparable with that endured by certain units of the 1st Armoured Division .

768 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG 5-7 Fe b linking the Americans and Australians. Major Watch of Ramsay's staff , with a section from the 30th Battalion, was to move to Saidor by barge, go to the American outpost at Yagomai, cross the Yaut River on th e 10th, and meet the 30th Battalion advancing west . Communications be- tween Watch's section and the forward elements of the 30th Battalion would be maintained by wireless or alternatively by Very lights . No. 4 Squadron would report the positions of the advancing Australians .

Saidor

re •Tarikngan 9 Kufuku

G,abutamon .Ruange G

•Bwana Tapen

• Wandilu k

Nokop o

The 8th Brigade's advance to Saidor

The beginning of the next bound on 6th February was temporaril y held up because of the difficulty of moving the artillery forward . Finally Ramsay agreed that the advance should continue without it, and the 30t h Battalion marched along a very muddy track and reached Roinji 1 . There was no contact with the fleeing enemy who were then estimate d to be between 24 and 48 hours ahead. The pursuers began to catch up on the 7th when the 30th Battalion advanced to Roinji 2 along a track littered with 60 enemy dead . In the afternoon the Papuans, now carrying two days' rations, resumed the lead and reached Gall 1 . Twenty-four Japanese were killed that day by the 30th Battalion and the Papuans , and three prisoners were taken.

6-16 Feb MANY JAPANESE KILLED 769 Watch, on the 6th, signalled Ramsay about the locations of the forwar d American posts and also that an American patrol to Yagomai had cap- tured two prisoners on the east bank of the Yaut River on that day . Late on the 7th he signalled that one of the prisoners taken on the Yaut River said that there were no Japanese between Gali and Yagomai . On 8th February, the first opposition from the Japanese rearguar d was met near Weber Point. For the first time in the advance therefore the leading platoon put on a formal attack, killing five Japanese and having two men wounded . During this day 53 Japanese were killed in a running fight and four were taken prisoner. By nightfall on the 9th the leading company was 2,000 yards west of Malalamai and 3,500 yard s from the American outpost at Yagomai . Sixty-one Japanese were killed and 9 prisoners taken in the day . At 10.30 a .m. on 10th February the leading platoon met the section from the 30th Battalion which had been sent into the Saidor area and which had been joined by two Americans at Yagomai . Soon after this junction Cameron and his brigade major, Gregory, 5 arrived at Yagoma i by gunboat and awaited the arrival of the remainder of the 30th . By the end of the day one company of the 30th was at Seure with patrol s already among the Americans in the Sel area .6 Cameron was now instructed to mop up Japanese forces south-east of the Yaut River. It was decided that the 5th Division would not operat e west of the Yaut, which would be the boundary with the Saidor force , but would clear first the Tapen area and then the Nokopo area . The task of patrolling these areas was given to Lieut-Colonel Rae's 7 35th Battalion which would be meeting the enemy for the first time . The country over which the 35th Battalion was to operate was extremel y rugged and little was known of it . The battalion arrived in barges which back-loaded the 30th Battalion to Kelanoa . The advance began on th e 14th when Captain Farmer's$ company, accompanied by a section of Papuans, moved off from Gali 2 towards Ruange . It was deserted but patrols looking for water killed three Japanese, and between Bwana and Ruange next day the Papuans killed 31 . A column under Major Delbridge which set off on the 15th towards Kufuku found 11 dead Japanese an d the Papuans killed 9 . Next day Delbridge reached Kufuku, counting 3 0 dead on the way . Maj E. W. Gregory, NX112720 . BM 8 Bde 1942-44. Chartered accountant ; of Woolwich, NSW ; b . Hunter's Hill, NSW, 28 Jan 1904 . 6 On 10th February an Angau officer and an officer from India had, with the aid of police boys, captured four Japanese in the area south of Sio . From these prisoners and from native sources it was estimated that there were about 100 Japanese living in various villages in the range s south of Sio, about four days' march away for patrols . Natives were therefore sent out wit h pamphlets ordering the Japanese to surrender and it may be that some of the surrenders in the succeeding days were a result of these pamphlets . The surrender pamphlet said in Japanese : "Gentlemen . The Japanese forces in New Guinea have been defeated and have fled from thi s region . You cannot escape . If you surrender now these natives will lead you to us . Whe n you surrender do not carry any arms . You will receive good treatment . You will be sent t o Australia where you will be able to meet hundreds of your comrades . " '+Lt-Col D. F. Rae, MC, NX116990 . BM 8 Bde 1940-41 ; CO 35 Bn 1942-44. Woolbroker ; o f Pymble, NSW; b . Sydney, 21 Oct 1894. 6 Capt F . C . S. Farmer, NX125301 ; 35 Bn . Asst foreman ; of Petersham, NSW; b . St Gallen , Switzerland, 21 Aug 1918 . 6 Maj E. K. Delbridge, NX125284 ; 35 Bn . Woolbuyer ; of Inverell, NSW; b . Inverell, 9 Mar 1910.

770 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG lan-Feb In this way the advance continued along both the main tracks . On the outskirts of Gabutamon, on the 18th, the leading platoon found that i t was occupied and immediately attacked, killing 40 Japanese and finding at least as many dead in the village. Sneaking up to the outskirts of Tapen in the early afternoon of the 18th Farmer discovered that th e enemy had a force of at least 100 there . He decided to gain full advantag e of surprise and concentrated fire by sending in first those of his men wh o had automatic weapons, followed by riflemen, while the Papuans move d round the flanks to mop up in the gardens . With a savage burst of automatic fire the Australians charged Tapen . For the first time the 35th Battalion came under fire. One section was pinned down at first by thi s enemy fire but, for the loss of one man wounded, Farmer's men kille d 52 Japanese . The Papuans on the flanks killed another 51 Japanese , Corporal Bengari and two other Papuans accounting for 43 of them . There were still Japanese round the Tapen area on the 19th when th e Papuans killed 39 more, mainly escapers from the previous day's engage- ment.) A patrol sent out from Gabutamon on the 20th to investigate the track towards Moam and Tapen, was often forced to crawl on hands and knee s along the muddy, slippery tracks winding along the ridges . About 1,500 yards south of Gabutamon the patrol reached the bottom of a 100-foot chasm along which the track wound for a short distance before goin g straight up the slope . Broken rope ladders, swinging from the top o f the cliff, showed how the Japanese had climbed out of the chasm—or tried to. In a macabre heap beneath the swaying ropes were the decom- posing and smashed bodies of about 80 Japanese who had apparently been so weak that they could not haul themselves up . By the 21st Farmer had a fair indication that Wandiluk would b e occupied and was ordered to attack it . The track was now the worst encountered. The mud and water were frequently waist-deep, and the trac k was very narrow . Farmer considered that his estimate of 80 dead alon g the track was conservative . Most of these had probably died of sickness , exhaustion or starvation, but cold may have killed some for, in thes e mountains, the nights were intensely cold and there were heavy frosts . In Wandiluk 40 Japanese were killed, not counting 7 wounded who stag- gered away and jumped to their death into a steep gorge at the lower end of the village, and in the surrounding gardens 10 more were killed . From the 22nd the pursuit was largely carried on by the Papuans . Other than patrolling by the Papuans farther south into the pitiless moun- tains towards Nokopo, the 8th Brigade had now really completed it s task. From 20th January until the end of February, the brigade ha d killed 734 Japanese, had found 1,793 dead and taken 48 prisoners ; the Australians and Papuans had lost 3 killed and 5 wounded . Such casualties, added to those inflicted on the 51st Division in the Salamaua and La e

At Tapen, which was in a filthy condition, the Australians and Papuans found human fles h cooking in a billy . Two corpses had flesh cut from them. There was further evidence of cannibalism at Wandiluk.

Jan-Mar REMNANTS ESCAPE 771 campaigns and in its subsequent retreat over the mountains, and on th e 20th Division in the Huon Peninsula campaign, gave a fair indication o f the plight of the XVIII Japanese Army, which now had only two unscathed regiments of its original nine . In a letter to Blarney on 21st March Berryman wrote : "About 8,000 semi-starved, ill equipped and dispirited Japanese bypassed Saidor . It was disappointing that the fruits of victory were not fully reaped, and tha t once again the remnants of 51st Division escaped our clutches ." By 26th February American observers overlooking Tarikngan, south of Saidor, reported that they had counted 3,469 Japanese passing through there in small disorganised groups . The number which actually did pass throug h must have been far greater. The chase was almost over when Berryman and Ramsay visited Camero n on 26th February. The 532nd E .B.S.R. was to concentrate in the Finsch- hafen area by 1st March for other operations with the Americans and only a few American barges would be available to the 8th Brigade thereafter . The plan was now to withdraw to the Kelanoa area in preparation for a move farther south to Kiligia, to concentrate the Papuans at Webe r Point, and send forward a small patrol to Nokopo . The men of the 8t h Brigade and the Papuan Battalion could not leave the wretched area quickly enough. At the beginning of March the brigade began to con- centrate round Kiligia, and early in March the Papuans were withdraw n to a camp north of the Song River except for small detachments which patrolled the Rai Coast at intervals .

On 18th January Vasey had received a note from Morshead's head- quarters in Port Moresby giving notice of the forthcoming relief of th e 7th Division's headquarters by the 11th Division 's. Vasey flew to Por t Moresby on the 26th to discuss the relief. He had already decided to change over his two brigades and give the 15th the task of patrollin g forward from Kankiryo Saddle, but sickness prevented him from super- vising the change-over . From the 9th to 21st February the relief took place . The 58th/59th Battalion relieved the 2/10th in the right-hand sector from 4100 through Crater Hill and Kankiryo Saddle to Cam's Hill, with the task of patrolling the area east of Cam's Hill, the headwaters of the Mosa River, and forward along the upper Mindjim River Valley to Paipa 2 . The 57th/60th relieved the 2/9th on the left with positions on the 4100 Feature, th e Protheros and Shaggy Ridge, and the task of patrolling forward fro m Canning's Saddle along the high ground west of the Mindjim . The 24th Battalion relieved the 2/12th in reserve . The country facing the Australians beyond Kankiryo Saddle was for- midable. The jagged Finisterre mountains tumbled away towards the sea , about 20 miles away as the crow flies but treble that distance as th e soldier plods, and through the mountains the Japanese motor road was reported to follow the valley of the Mindjim down to the coast at Bogad- jim. "The country in the Finisterre Ranges is rugged, steep, precipitous

772 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG 17 Feb-11 Ma r and covered with dense rain forest. It rains heavily almost every day thus making living conditions uncomfortable. By day it is hot, by night three blankets are necessary . There is, therefore, a constant battle with mud, slush, rain and cold. To allow freedom of movement over this mud it was necessary to corduroy every track in the area ."2 The actual Kan- kiryo Saddle was an ideal holding position as approaches from the north , east and west were precipitous . It formed a link between the high ground of Crater Hill and the 4100 Feature on the right or east, and the Protheros on the left or west ; the whole massive feature was shaped like an H with Kankiryo Saddle the crosspiece . On the right flank Lieutenant Brewster3 with a small patrol from the 58th/59th investigated the valley of the Mosa River as far as Amuson , and returned after four days, on 20th February, to report the area clear. In the central area a patrol from the 57th/60th on the 23rd brushed with an enemy patrol near Saipa 2, which the guns of the 4th Fiel d Regiment then bombarded. On the 28th a patrol from the 57th/60th, le d by Lieutenant Besier, 4 attacked Saipa 2 three times with supporting artil- lery fire, but all attempts to enter the village were repulsed . When there seemed to be no sign of movement on the right flank in the Kabenau Valley, Brigadier Hammer on 26th February instructed Major Newman, temporarily in command of the 58th/59th, to establish a company patrol base at Amuson and send out a "platoon recce patrol " to the coast in the Mindjim-Melamu area . Besides gathering informatio n about the enemy and the country the patrol was to establish observatio n posts overlooking Astrolabe Bay ; these would operate from a forward base at Nangapo. Captain Cuthbertson5 was given the task of establishing these bases which he did early in March . Hammer also secured permission to send the whole of the 57th/60th into the Paipa area in preparatio n for an attack on Saipa 2 . While this was going on two battalions of the 32nd American Divisio n from Saidor landed on 5th March at Yalau Plantation between Saidor an d Bogadjim . It was a full-scale landing with 54 craft unloading 1,34 8 troops in the first nine waves, but there was very little opposition an d the landing was made without incident. Patrolling east and west from Yalau the Americans killed a few Japanese and found many dead . By the 9th they reached the Bau Plantation where they brushed with a smal l party of Japanese. Attempts to cross the Kambara River during the next few days were unsuccessful because of the opposition of a band of about 40 Japanese . On the 11th Hammer was instructed to send a patrol to Yangalum four days later to join an American patrol believed to b e moving forward from the Bau Plantation . To reach Yangalum the Ameri- cans would have to cross two large rivers, the Kambara and the Guabe .

15th Australian Infantry Brigade—Report on Operations in Ramu Valley, Mindjim Valley , Kabenau River, Bogadjim, Madang Area, 1 Jan 44 to 30 Apr 44 . s Capt D. J . Brewster, MC, NX113231 . 3 and 58/59 Bns. Hardware merchant ; of Bowral, NSW ; b . Lithgow, NSW, 12 Oct 1916. ' Lt J . C. Besier, TX4719; 57/60 Bn . Clerk ; of Hobart; b. Hobart, 12 Nov 1910. Capt C. C . Cuthbertson, VX102648 ; 58/59 Bn . Grazier ; of Bylands, Vic ; b . Elstemwick, Vic , 8 Jul 1914 .

•Kamusi '-,- Bauri

i Aminik

Kryo `A rS . TrRR 3orringe aN tiG E "•,Mungo Gurumbu

- 30 Bn -,— 58/59 On 57/60 B n ,, 2 /2 CdoSgn

5 MILES 1 0

Across the Finisterres to Madang

774 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG 12-16 Mar In Vasey's absence Chilton commanded the division. Cummings, tem- porarily commanding the 18th Brigade, now determined to straighten his line by having the 2/ 12th Battalion capture Ward's Village on the lef t to coincide with the 57th/60th's attack on Saipa 2 . When the 2/12th Battalion found Ward's Village unoccupied on 12th March Chilton decided that the 15th Brigade could move a battalion along the Mindjim Valley to Yokopi without becoming involved in a major conflict. By 9 .30 on the night of the 12th the 57th/60th was moving forward, an d next day found Saipa 2 abandoned . There was plenty of evidence of goo d shooting by the artillery, including Major Stevenson's 6 2nd Mountain Bat- tery, now in the Cameron 's Knoll area. By the 14th the 57th/60th Battalion was concentrated at Yokopi, wher e the Japanese road began . It was well formed, with a firm red-gravel surface. To achieve this swift advance the battalion moved by night and , during the day, stores, supplies, and ammunition were carried up an d signal line was laid. The wisdom of a decision by Hammer to maintain seven days' reserve at Kankiryo Saddle was now apparent for, withou t it, the battalion could not have advanced 17 miles without native carriers. On the afternoon of the 14th the leading platoon regained contact wit h the Japanese just north of Daumoina at the junction of the Mindji m with a stream flowing in from the west and also with the suspected mul e track shown on the map . The Japanese were occupying the high groun d overlooking this junction and could easily command the approaches along the road and the river. When leading his platoon straight along the roa d towards the Japanese Lieutenant Sinclair ? was killed. Rather than batter at this formidable position Hammer ordered Colonel Marston to reorganis e round Yokopi, keep contact with the enemy and build up reserves. The Australians were now based in a wide semi-circle round Bogadjim . On 16th March Chilton redefined the division's role "in the light of th e present situation" . While the 18th Brigade was to watch the 15th Brigade's immediate left flank from the high ground between the lowe r Evapia and Mene Rivers, and the commando troop at Faita 8 the far left flank, the 15th Brigade would garrison Kankiryo Saddle, keep contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road and patrol along the Kabenau River towards Astrolabe Bay to join the Americans . Finally, the 15th Brigade would "provide a firm base for patrolling, by employing at th e discretion of the commander, a force not exceeding one battalion forward of Kankiryo up to and inclusive of Yokopi" . The order was splendidly ambiguous as far as the local commanders were concerned, and manage d to overcome the ban placed by higher authority on any advance across the Finisterres to the coast : Hammer could not go beyond Yokopi but , at the same time, he was to maintain contact with the enemy along the Bogadjim Road—and they were already farther back than Yokopi .

° Maf W. R. D. Stevenson, NX12379 . 2/5 Fd Regt, 2 Mtn Bty. Solicitor; of Pymble, NSW ; b. Neutral Bay, NSW, 6 Oct 1915. ° IA S. V. Sinclair, VX108342; 57/60 Bn. Schoolteacher; of Ballarat, Vic ; b . Albert Park, Vic , 14 Oct 1918. Killed in action 14 Mar 1944. ° The other two troops had left for Isariba towards the end of February .

Mar1944 FORWARD TO YAULA 775 The country between the leading company of the 57th/60th and th e Japanese rearguard at the mule track junction was very rough and heavily timbered. About 170 of the 500 native carriers available had bee n allotted to the 58th/59th Battalion in the Nangapo area near the coast , and as the remainder were required to maintain the lines of communicatio n to Kankiryo Saddle, it was necessary for the men of the 57th/60th, othe r than those in the leading company who were patrolling, to help the 24t h Battalion to carry supplies forward. Hammer now decided that, before he could resume the advance, the supply route from the Saddle to th e 57th/60th Battalion must be developed . Thus the sappers of the 15th Field Company were given the task of building Saipa, Yokopi and Dau- moina into staging areas . They corduroyed the track forward from the Saddle to Saipa 2 and began another jeep track from Guy's Post t o Mainstream designed to shorten the native carry to the Saddle and thus enable the natives to carry along the route twice daily instead of once . For almost a fortnight the patrols of the 57th/60th made little impres- sion on the Japanese rearguard. The 3800 Feature, which overlooked the Australian positions at Yokopi and Daumoina, seemed to be the main Japanese position and here they hung on. Hammer anticipated, however , that the constant patrolling and bombardment would have its effect, and, on the 27th, ordered the 57th/60th to patrol vigorously "as it is thought that the enemy has now withdrawn". He was right; when patrols reached the mule track junction on the 28th they found that the enemy had gone . It began to seem that the enemy might now be about to withdraw fro m the Finisterres after their long and determined stand . The two broken Japanese divisions were now no longer in immediate danger of being caught along the Rai Coast or trapped by an advance across the Finisterres . Hammer now ordered Marston to clap on all possible speed and chas e the enemy . He believed that the next line of resistance would be at Yaul a and he wished to get there before the Japanese could dig in . The advance was resumed and by 4 p .m. on the 30th contact was regained when the leading troops came under fire from a bridge (No . 22) over the Kofeb i and from points on the road where it wound steeply up from the rive r towards Yaula, four hours march away . Major Connell,9 commanding the leading company, decided to cross the Kofebi, bypassing the next two bridges (Nos . 22 and 21A), attack the Japanese from the rear and the n press on to Yaula. A small party under Lieutenant Maddisonl was left to protect the native carriers . The bypassing was successful and Lieutenant Berman's2 platoon continued towards Yaula while the remainder of the company proceeded to clear the road behind . At the nearest bridge (21A) , however, these came under heavy fire and four men were hit. Maddison's group then came under fire from the Kofebi bridge and from a gun in

Maj J . W . D . Connell, VX81067 ; 57/60 Bn . Architect ; of Preston, Vic ; b . Brunswick, Vic, 22 Oct 1913 . Capt A. Maddison, VX101817 ; 57/60 Bn . Regular soldier ; b. Seghill, Northumberland, England , 4 May 1911 . s Lt M . E. Berman, MC, NX76217; 57/60 Bn Regular soldier ; of Fairfield, NSW; b. Aberdeen , Scotland, 30 Dec 1913 .

776 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG 17Mar-1 Apr Yaula, with the result that the carriers went bush. One gun of the 2nd Mountain Battery, which had been dragged forward to Daumoina, fire d back into Yaula and Kwato. It was now dark. At 7.45 the line betwee n company and battalion was cut. The Japanese, pinched between Connel l and Maddison, began to make off to Yaula into which the solitary Aus- tralian mountain gun fired all night . At dusk Berman's platoon had been within 600 yards of Yaula with Lieutenant Passlow's 3 400 yards behind and the third platoon and com- pany headquarters a corresponding distance farther back . After dark Berman's platoon was strongly counter-attacked. His communication s severed, Berman nevertheless hung on although he knew nothing of wha t was happening in the rear . Passlow, however, moved his platoon up t o within 200 yards of the forward platoon and himself crept forward to discuss the attack with Berman . While he was there another party of Japanese attacked his platoon. Throughout the night the Japanese con- tinued their attacks but were driven back with probably about 40 casual - ties. With communications severed and with no rations, Berman an d Passlow decided to withdraw intact to Mabelebu, which they did befor e the night was over . It later appeared that the Japanese had not planne d a counter-attack but had merely been withdrawing from the flanks of the advance. Having reached the road where it was occupied by the two leading platoons, they had decided to fight their way out and had don e so, with heavy casualties to themselves. On 1st April the leading company took up a defensive position in the Mabelebu area. Marston, whose headquarters were also at Mabelebu , brought a second company forward. Patrols probed forward during the next few days . Meanwhile patrols from the 2/2nd Commando Squadron had bee n harrying the Japanese from the left flank. Captain Nisbet led out the largest patrol (a troop plus a section) yet sent out by the squadron i n over nine months of continuous patrolling . By 17th March a patrol base was established at Jappa, and next day about eight Japanese coming from the north-east towards Jappa walked into one of Nisbet's booby-trap s and several were hit. On the 19th and again on the 22nd the patrol met opposition from enemy parties along the track towards Oromuge . 4 Farther west Lieutenant Doig's patrols from Faita were scouring the western area round Topopo and Aminik and skirmishing with enemy outposts . Lieu- tenant Adams' patrol through Kesa on the 22nd found the general Matalo i area abandoned, but discovered a strongly held position on the 290 0 Feature behind Mataloi 1 . After making half a dozen attempts in the nex t few days to get into this position the patrol withdrew . The enemy coul d be found nowhere else in this area . On 30th March 12 Bostons bombe d and strafed the position and, after the raid, a patrol reported that Matalo i 1 was empty.

Maj V. Passlow, MC, NX76326 ; 57/60 Bn . Mercer ; of Wagga Wagga, NSW ; b . Wagga Wagga , 11 Jan 1919 . *Corporal A . Stewart (of Manjimup, WA), an original member of the squadron, was killed during patrolling on the 19th .

16Mar-5Apr EQUIPMENT ABANDONED 777 The 2/2nd Squadron exploited this situation rapidly . The 57th/60th Battalion was on its way north, towards Yaula, when a squadron patro l led by Lieutenant Fox5 set out north-east from Mataloi 1 towards th e same objective . On the morning of 4th April, Fox's patrol entered Yaula , and soon the vanguard of the 57th/60th joined him . Thus the evacuation of Yaula by the Japanese was hurried not only b y the pressure of the 57th/60th Battalion along the main road, but by th e patrolling of the 2/2nd Squadron on the left flank (the 2/6th had no w left for home) . Yaula was occupied by the 57th/60th and one compan y immediately took over the advance, reaching Kwato late that night. Along the Bogadjim Road, which wound its way over the range, ofte n forming a ledge with a drop of 300 feet or so on one side, were signs of a hasty Japanese withdrawal . Thirty-seven 3-ton trucks, one 10-horse- power sedan, 14 jungle carts, one rotary engine, one 75-mm mountai n gun, 3 heavy machine-guns, 4 light machine-guns, 3 mortars, 3 flame - throwers and much miscellaneous engineer and ordnance stores were cap- tured in the rapid advance of the battalion. The Yaula area had un- doubtedly been an important Japanese stores depot for it was honeycombe d with tracks showing evidence of heavy use. On the 5th the leading com- pany reached Aiyau and patrols set out towards the Bogadjim Plantation . On the right flank the 58th/59th in the valley of the Kabenau ha d been patrolling from Nangapo. Major Newman was now mainly intereste d in linking up with the American forces from Saidor who were presumabl y patrolling west towards the valley of the Kabenau . The rendezvous was fixed at Arawum but a patrol under Lieutenant Brewster waited there from the 16th to the 18th March without seeing any signs of th e Americans . He was therefore ordered, two days later, to take sufficient rations and patrol from Yangalum to Kul 2 where the Americans were believed to be . An accidental meeting had already taken place between the patrols of the two Allies. An American reconnaissance patrol was being towe d in a rubber boat by a P .T. boat with the object of landing at Male and seeing if the Japanese were at Bogadjim . Off Garagassi Point the to w rope broke and the Americans rowed to shore in their rubber boat whic h they deflated and hid in the bush near Melamu . Moving inland for about a mile they turned west and nearing the Kaliko Track met Lieutenant Norrie's6 patrol of the 58th/59th Battalion and accompanied the Aus- tralians to Barum, where the Americans were given supplies and a guide ; moving via Wenga, they reached Jamjam on the 18th and found no signs of the enemy . On this day at noon about 30 Japanese with three machine - guns and a mortar attacked Norrie's position at Barum . The situatio n would have been serious had it not been for Sergeant Matheson' an d

'Copt J . Fox, SX25427 . 2/2 Indep Coy, 2/2 Cdo Sqn. Regular soldier; of Mount Schank, SA ; b . Mount Gambier, SA, 20 Nov 1912. e Lt F. J. Norrie, MC, NX114337 ; 58/59 Bn . Retail store manager; of Cheltenham, NSW ; b. Plymouth, England, 15 Nov 1912 . v Sgt J . A . Matheson, MM, VX140461 ; 58/59 Bn. Carpenter ; of Trentham, Vic; b. Trentham, 28 Dec 1920 .

778 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG 18 Mar-11 Ap r his two men who had remained behind at Kaliko and managed to bea r the first brunt of the attack and warn those at Barum . The Australians were forced to withdraw to a feature just north of Nangapo where natives came to them and told them that four of the attacking enemy had been killed and there were some stretcher cases. On the 19th Boomerangs strafed Barum and reported that it was empty, a fact which was confirme d at 2 p.m. by a small patrol from Nangapo. The Americans moved on the 20th to Yangalum and next day se t out for Kul 2, along almost exactly the same route as that taken by Brewster, who had departed on 20th March . Brewster reached Kul 2 on 21st March where he joined the Americans from Saidor and remaine d with them until the 26th . In this period he went to Saidor where he me t Major-General William H . Gill, the commander of the 32nd America n Division, gave him information about the area east of the Kabenau River and learnt of the American intentions and dispositions . Brewster then returned to Yangalum having carried out an important and lengthy linkin g patrol—35 miles each way . As patrolling in the valley of the Kabenau forward from Nangapo was so strenuous, Lieutenant Fraser's8 company took over from Cuthbertson's on 22nd March. Now began a game of hide and seek which lasted from 22 Mar until 11 Apr 4 4 (wrote Hammer in his report) . It became apparent that the Jap force in the Melamu - Bonggu area was a flank protection to his main delaying force in the Mindjim Valley . Thus, when 58/59 Aust Inf Bn appeared in strength patrolling in that area, th e Jap was not sure of our intention. He therefore patrolled vigorously and widely to discover our intentions. 58/59 Aust Inf Bn on the other hand avoided contac t as their task was purely reconnaissance . Several patrols just missed one another in the Wenga, Barum, Damun , Rereo and Redu areas . There were also several clashes . For instance, on 26th March, reports from local natives and police boys indicated that the Japanese were again approaching Barum, which had become the mai n trouble area, from the direction of Damun just to the north . Both sides engaged one another with fire, particularly mortar bombs, but the brus h was a cursory one with neither side gaining any advantage . Exchange of fire and a few sporadic attacks by the Japanese continued for abou t five hours from 5 p.m. While Corporal Tremellen,9 in the leading section , was moving among his weapon-pits, with a Bren gun in his left hand and two magazines in his right, he was attacked but, not being able to bring his Bren into action, he bashed the Japanese over the head wit h the Bren magazines. This Japanese thus had the distinction of probabl y being the only one to be killed by the Bren magazine rather than wha t was inside it . For the remainder of the month Fraser patrolled towards the coast an d the Mindjim Valley. In the Barum area there were almost daily skirmishes

+ Capt R . J . W. Fraser, VX102652 ; 58/59 Bn. Clerk ; of Seymour, Vic ; b . Leongatha, Vic. 1 Jul 1910. + Sgt H . A . Tremellen, MM, VX141681 ; 58/59 Bn . Share farmer ; of Bunbartha, Vic ; b . Shepparton , Vic, 18 Nov 1916 .

1-9 Apr GENERAL BOASE TAKES OVER 779 but by the end of the month the Japanese withdrew north . On 1st April the luluai of Male sent a native to Barum to report that, in the valle y of the Kier River, he had met a Japanese patrol which asked to be shown the track to Barum. The luluai had replied that the only track to Barum was from Kaliko on the coast . The Japanese had therefore returned north along the river. At 2 p.m. Lieutenant Forster' led out a patrol from Barum towards Kaliko but, three-quarters of an hour alon g the track, they ran into an ambush in which Forster and three men were killed, three were wounded and several weapons were lost . Patrols by the 58th/59th Battalion on the right flank as well as the 2/2nd Commando Squadron on the left undoubtedly worried the enem y and helped to speed his withdrawal before the 57th/60th Battalion alon g the Bogadjim Road. By 4th April when Yaula was occupied the Aus- tralians were pointing like an arrow-head at Bogadjim ; the point was the 57th/60th and the sides the 58th/59th Battalion and the 2/2nd Com- mando Squadron.

General Morshead had decided that it was time to rest the 7th Divisional Headquarters. Major-General A. J. Boase and his 11th Divi- sional Headquarters therefore on 8th April assumed responsibility for al l units in the Ramu Valley and the Finisterres .2 Morshead was now sure that there was no need to maintain more tha n one brigade in the area, and suggested on 9th April that it would be possible to withdraw the 18th Brigade, yet not bring the 6th Brigad e forward to relieve it as he had intended in February . On the same day he wrote to Brisbane seeking further definition of his responsibility in regard to the Bogadjim area. Blarney had already in February reminde d Morshead that the 7th Division's tasks remained as defined in the New Guinea Force instruction of 3rd November 1943, and on 3rd April 194 4 L.H.Q. had signalled that these "still appear applicable" . In his letter o n the 9th Morshead gave the present disposition of the two forward bat- talions of the 15th Brigade and continued : GHQ Operational Instruction No. 46 of 28 Mar [for the Hollandia operation] states New Guinea Force will "continue pressure against the Japanese in the Bogadjim area". G.H.Q. communique No. 723 of 2 Apr stated, "bur ground force s advancing towards Bogadjim are nearing Yaula 11 miles to the south-west", an d A.B.C. news reports (presumably emanating from and passed by G .H.Q.) indicate that the objective of Australian troops in the area is Bogadjim, though undue regard need not necessarily be given to these reports . But they do accord with the role specified in G.H.Q. Operation Instruction No. 46. Morshead went on to say that it was planned to establish a strong base at Yaula and push forward from there . "Apart from tactical con- siderations," he wrote, "the breaking of contact would lower the presen t

I Lt J . Forster, VX101386 ; 58/59 Bn. Railway clerk ; of Surrey Hills, Vic ; b. Footscray, Vic, 11 Jan 1922 . Killed in action 1 Apr 1944. Boase, a regular, was now commanding in operations for the first time in this war . He ha d commanded the 16th Brigade in the last part of 1941 and the Australian force in Ceylon in 1942, and for a year until September 1943 had been senior staff officer of the First Army .

780 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG Feb-June high morale of 11 Aust Div units and would deprive them of an oppor- tunity to gain valuable experience in jungle warfare ." Blarney embarked for the United States and England with the Prim e Minister on 5th April and did not return to Australia until 27th June . There is no record of any reply to Morshead ' s request for this redefinition . There was probably no need for one . The 15th Brigade was now close to Bogadjim . Indeed, there was a Nelson touch about the Australians' advance over the Finisterres, for it had been made despite orders that no suc h advance should be made . While I Corps was at Atherton Lieut-General Herring had retire d and, on 10th February, Major-General Savige had been appointed to command I Corps, Major-General Robertson succeeding him in comman d of the 3rd Division. When recommending Savige's appointment Blarne y had written to the Minister for the Army : Two officers have been considered for this vacancy—Major-General S . G . Savige and Major-General G. A. Vasey . Both have been very successful in command i n New Guinea operations, and I have some difficulty in determining the recommenda- tions to be submitted, since each is capable and very worthy of advancement t o higher responsibilities . Having regard to their respective careers, however, I recom- mend that Major-General S . G . Savige be appointed .

The significance of Blarney' s final sentence is a matter for speculation . It could hardly refer to past careers since Vasey's experience in comman d was wider than that of Berryman, a contemporary who had recentl y become a corps commander, and no less than Savige's. 3 The L.H.Q. signal of 3rd April warning of the changeover of corps headquarters was occasioned, as usual, by the Commander-in-Chief's desir e to give as much experience as possible to all his main headquarters, an d also to prevent any of them becoming stale because of too prolonged a spell in the tropics . In accordance with his directive of 23rd December 1943, moreover, I Corps was to consist of the A .I.F. divisions now i n Australia, and II Corps of the 3rd, 5th, and 11th Divisions . Blarney decided that the personnel of I Corps should relieve that of II Corps . Thus Berryman and his staff returned to Atherton and Savige and his staff took over in New Guinea ; but the corps at Atherton was still called I and the corps in New Guinea II. There were other changes in the senior commands in the early month s of 1944. From 1st March Lieut-General Lavarack became Head of th e Military Mission at Washington and Lieut-General V . A. H. Sturdee, who had been in Washington since September 1942, replaced him as com- mander of the First Army . Lieut-General Bennett, commanding th e dwindling III Corps in Western Australia, asked Blarney whether he was

a It was widely believed that Vasey declined the promotion, preferring to remain with his divisio n in the field than to go to a corps in an inactive role . Blamey wrote later that this was not so, but that he had discussed the matter with Vasey who "expressed himself as perfectly contente d with my decision ". (Letter, Blamey to Forde, 28th February 1945 . ) Vasey, however, expressed himself forcibly in a private letter on 3rd February when he wrot e of the "wild scramble now to get into his [Herring's] boots . Presume I'm in the running . I can assure you I 'm doing nothing to help myself in any way . I personally see no use for Corps Headquarters in our war here and when one gets to that giddy height you are too far remove d from the troops . I would only object to not getting up if I were superseded." (Australian War 1fenzorial ) Brigadier C . E . Cameron (commander of the 8th Brigade), Lieut-General S . G . Savig e (G .O .C . II Corps) and Major-General A . H . Ramsay (G .O .C . 5th Division) at Alexishafen, 5th May 1944 .

(Australian War lleinorial ) An aerial picture of Finschhafen Harbour, taken six months after its capture in Octobe r 1943 . The harbour and airfield were rapidly developed, and Finschhafen became a majo r base for future operations .

(R ,1 .A F . ) Hollandia, April 1944 . Allied aircraft systematically attacked airfields at Hollandia before the invasion in April .

asallml ft ...... 101=11ga, ,e .4+.r

- ..err rrrdhr+r raftirrr

The Allied invasion convoy in Humboldt Bay, April 1944 .

Jan-Oct AUSTRALIANS TO INDIA 78 1 to be given a command in the field and, having been informed by Blamey that he would not, applied for return to civil life . The request was granted, and a few months later Bennett published a book about the campaign in Malaya . A visitor to Port Moresby in April was Major-General Dewing o f the United Kingdom Army liaison mission . He had just returned from a tour of certain areas in New Guinea believed to be suitable for trainin g and acclimatising British divisions to jungle warfare. 4 In addition the British Army in India was showing increased interes t in learning from the experiences of the Australians . On 25th June 1944 General Auchinleck wrote to General Blamey thanking him for havin g the officers from India mentioned earlier and forecasting that we shall soon be asking you for a large number of officers for duty with th e Fourteenth Army and in India, if you can spare them . We need them badly — I believe the number is over 600 . As mentioned, a few Australian officers had been sent to India i n 1943 to pass on the lessons of the experiences in New Guinea, amon g them being Brigadier Lloyd. Lieut-Colonel Ford, 0 a leading malariologist , went to India in June 1944, four engineer officers had gone in January 1944, one instructor for a jungle warfare school in April 1944 . But it was not until October 1944 that a substantial group of regimental officers of the sort who should have gone early in 1943 arrived in India . s The plan to send "a large number" of junior officers to the Fourteent h Army in Burma encountered a hitch when on 24th January 1944 Blarney found that his Staff Duties Branch had agreed that no guarantee woul d *Plans for employing British troops in the Pacific after the defeat of Germany will be describe d in the next volume . The United Kingdom liaison and other groups in Australia included (in July 1944) : Lieut- General Lumsden, Mr Churchill's representative at GHQ ; the U .K. Army Liaison Staff le d by Major-General Dewing and including nine other officers ; 17 officers of the Services Recon- naissance Department, the senior being Colonel J . Chapman-Walker ; the Indian Ordnance Missio n (three officers) ; the British members of the Joint Planning Staff (ten officers) not including 1 3 naval and 4 air force officers. In addition 25 other officers were serving with the Australian Army or attending Australian Army schools . Dewing and his staff had been in Australia sinc e January 1943, Lumsden since November 1943 . Looking at the other side of the ledger, in Jul y 1944 there were 75 Australian Army officers serving in Britain and Europe, and 28 in othe r theatres. Col Sir Edward Ford, OBE, NX445 . CO 1 Mobile Bacteriological Laboratory 1940-42 ; Ass t Dir of Pathology I Corps 1942-43 ; Senior Malariologist LHQ 1943-44; Dir of Hygiene, Pathology and Entomology LHQ 1945 . Professor of Preventive Medicine and Director, School of Publi c Health and Tropical Medicine, Sydney University since 1947 ; Director of Army Health sinc e 1950. University lecturer ; of Sydney ; b. Bethanga, Vic, 15 Apr 1902 . e They were : Armoured : Capt C. F . G . McKenzie, 2/2 Commando Sqn Mai K . F . Tye, 2/6 Armd Regt Artillery : Maj M . P . O' Hare, 1 Aust Mtn Bt y Capt N . Tinkler, 2/5 Fd Regt Engineers : Maj S . B . Cann Signals : Maj N . S . Smit h Capt N. C . McDonald Infantry : Maj A . C . Robertson, 2/25 B n Maj R. L. Johnson, 2/27 B n Mal A. L . Vincent, 2/1 MG B n Maj C . W. Hyndman, 2/31 B n Maj D . N. Fairbrother, 2/2 Bn Capt D. E. Williams, 2/3 B n Capt P. Deschamps, 2/13 B n Capt R. G . Jenkinson, 2/15 B n Intelligence : Capt K. Pilcher, 2/6 Armd Regt AASC : Capt C . M. Macartney AAMC : Maj D. W. Macpherson AAOC : Maj W . M . Tolson AEME : Maj C . M . Dimond

782 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG Ian-Apr be given that an officer arriving in India would be accepted and that tw o Indian Army lieut-colonels were in Australia as a selection board . He wired Auchinleck that the proposal that Australian officers should b e subject to selection by a non-Australian authority was "obnoxious an d unacceptable" and the selection board could not function . Auchinleck agreed, employment of officers selected by an Australian board wa s guaranteed, and one Indian Army colonel was attached to the board a s adviser. Before these officers, 168 in all, had been selected, Blarne y received news that the army in Burma would welcome a far larger con- tingent. Air Vice-Marshal Cole7 who was attached to the Air Command , South-East Asia, from the R .A.A.F., wrote that he had met the com- mander of the Fourteenth Army, General Slim, 8 who had said that he required urgently about 400 young Australian officers as company and platoon commanders. Also the head of the Airborne Operations Divisio n had asked for trained airborne troops from Australia . Blarney replied tha t the number of officers already being sent to India had been fixed by th e Government and was the ultimate that could be spared "having regar d to our commitments and the manpower situation generally". As for the airborne troops, all Australian forces had been assigned to the South - West Pacific Area .

Meanwhile, in New Guinea, the 15th Brigade had been pressing on towards Bogadjim . Marston of the 57th/60th sent his leading compan y forward from Yaula on 4th April, and on the 6th contact was regaine d when the Japanese, entrenched near Bridge 6 on the Bogadjim Road , dispersed several Australian patrols . On 8th April—the day the 11th Division took commands—Marston ordered Major McCall, the leadin g company commander, to clear the enemy from Bridge 6 and occupy th e high ground beyond at Bau-ak. About the same time Marston ordere d deep patrols on the right flank into the Bogadjim Plantation and on th e left to Bwai on the Gori River . As Hammer was certain that the Japanese were on the run along the main Bogadjim Road, he found it difficult to understand why they wer e still maintaining a force of more than a company between the Mindji m and Kabenau Rivers . To be on the safe side therefore he ordered th e 57th/60th and 58th/59th Battalions to "make contact" at Alibu 1 in order to guard against the unlikely threat of a Japanese thrust up the Mindjim while the main attack on Bridge 6 went in .

'+ AVM A. T . Cole, CBE, DSO, MC, DFC . (1916-18 : 1 and 2 Sqns AFC .) Comd Southern an d Central Areas 1939-41, 235 Wing RAF 1941-42 ; fwd air controller Dieppe Raid 1942 ; AOC RA F N Ireland 1942-43, North-western Area 1943-44 . Regular air force officer ; of Malvern, Vic ; b . Glen Iris, Vic, 19 Jun 1895 . e Field Marshal Rt Hon Viscount Slim of Yarralumla, KG, GCB, GCMG, GCVO, GBE, DSO, MC . Comd 10 Indian Inf Bde 1939-41 ; GOC 10 Indian Div 194142 ; Comd XV Indian Corps 1942-43 , Fourteenth Army 1943-45 ; C-in-C Allied Land Forces SE Asia 1945-46 . Chief of Imperial General Staff 1948-52 . Governor-General of Australia 1953-60 . Regular soldier; b . Bristol, England, 6 Aug 1891 . 6 The war diarist of 15th Brigade noted : "In 13 months this brigade has changed command nine times. This constant chopping and changing makes continuity in administration difficult as th e methods of the formation under whose command we are have to be adopted . It seems that a s soon as we are settled in one system, we are moved to a new formation ." Before this campaign finished the brigade was to have its tenth change, and in 1945 its eleventh .

7-12 Apr ON THE BOGADJIM ROAD 783 On the 9th Lieutenant Brookes' returned from a five-day patrol dow n the Mindjim Valley through Jamjam into the Bogadjim Plantation . He had stayed there on the night of the 7th-8th April and found no sign s of the Japanese. The Bogadjim natives, who were not particularly friendly , told Brookes that there were no Japanese in the general area . While at Bogadjim Brookes' patrol was fired on by what he was convinced was American artillery and strafed by an American aircraft . The attack on the 10th on the enemy position at Bridge 6—two stee p heavily-timbered spurs running down from each side of the Ioworo River and making a defile—was described by Hammer as "a textbook operation and in actual fact it developed perfectly " . One platoon advanced down th e road to "fix" the enemy positions while the remain - der of the company en- circled the enemy positio n to come in from the high ground to the north . In the first encounter the leading platoon lost two men kille d and two wounded. While it engaged the enemy with fire the rest of the company with Lieutenant Jackson's 2 platoon in the lead clam- bered into position and , later in the day, clashed 10th-11th April with the enemy in a garde n area on one of the spurs . For a while the Japanese held on, but the pressure of the Australians and the accurate fire from Private Hillberg's 3 Bren in an exposed position in the enemy's rear forced them to withdraw . Towards dusk an Australian patrol moved down a track towards the road where a small Japanese band was found to be still resisting wit h machine-gun fire . The Australians did not attack for they were sure that the enemy would disappear during the night. As expected there wer e no signs of the Japanese next morning at Bridge 6—only bloody bandage s and bloodstains on the tracks to remind the Australians of yesterday's fight. McCall occupied the area and sent patrols forward to Bau-ak, th e last high ground overlooking Bogadjim . On the 12th two patrols from the 57th/60th led by Captain Fox 4 and Lieutenant Atkinson5 set out for the Erima and Bogadjim areas 1 Capt J . D. Brookes, MC, VX81068 ; 57/60 Bn. Science student ; of Woodend, Vic ; b . Melbourne, 29 Jun 1921 . 2 Lt R . S . Jackson, MC, VX56025 ; 57/60 Bn . Clerk ; of Corowa, NSW ; b . Corowa, 12 May 1920. Pte M . Hillberg, MM, V190340 ; 57/60 Bn . Herd tester; of Poowong South, Vic ; b. Melbourne , 15 Mar 1922. ' Capt R. E. Fox, VX81076 ; 57/60 Bn . Farmer ; of Berrigan, NSW ; b . Bcrrigan, 14 Jun 1918 . 5 Lt G. H . Atkinson, MC, VX81112 ; 57/60 Bn . Grazier; of Finley, NSW; b . Berrigan, NSW, 21 Dec 1914.

784 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG 12-30 Apr respectively . At 1 p.m. on the 13th Atkinson entered a deserted Bogadjim and reconnoitred the tracks on both sides of it to the Gori and Mindjim Rivers . There was much evidence that Bogadjim had been an importan t base, for many trucks, an engineer dump and a signals centre were found there . The Angau representative with Atkinson immediately set about hi s task of resuming relations with the local natives, many of whom wer e dressed in Japanese clothes . On the 15th an American patrol of si x men from the east joined forces with Atkinson in Bogadjim . From Bogadjim Marston' s patrols then investigated the line of the Nuru River from Bauri east to Balama ; and the three tracks leading north from the Bogadjim Road were probed . By the 15th Fox's patrol had reached Erima, and reported that there were about 1,000 yards of aban- doned beach defences between there and the mouth of the Gori . On the 17th the B.B.C. and A.B.C. announced that "Bogadjim has been cap- tured by an Australian infantry battalion of an Australian infantry brigad e which had fought with distinction in the Salamaua campaign and whic h had been in New Guinea for 13 months " .6 There was little left for the Australian flanking units to do . The 58th/59th Battalion was gradually withdrawn from the valley of th e Kabenau and returned to Kankiryo Saddle by 28th April, thus releasing their native carriers to help supply the distant 57th/60th Battalion . On the left flank the 2/2nd Commando Squadron returned to the Kesawai area by the end of April, after Lieutenant Curran had led a ten-day patrol into the Jappa-Oromuge-Topopo-Aminik-Kamusi area, from which h e returned with the news from the natives that the Japanese had left th e western area for Madang three weeks previously . During this period also the first battalion of the 18th Brigade—the 2/10th—was flown t o Lae ready to return to Australia . Far behind the spearhead of the 15th Brigade, and as though to empha- sise the lost cause of the XVIII Japanese Army, there was a flurry north - east of Kaiapit. As a result of an Angau report that there were som e enemy in the Wantoat area, a platoon from the 11th Division Carrie r Company (which had relieved the 6th Machine Gun Battalion at Gusap) , accompanied by the company commander, Major Armstrong, 7 was flown

a Acknowledgment of their deeds over the air or in the Press was always valued by Australia n soldiers despite the fact that the deeds were often over-glamorised . In the case of the 15th Brigade, the headlines for their occupation of Bogadjim which had for so long seemed an invulnerable Japanese base, were doubly welcome . Two battalions of this brigade had seen much action in the Salamaua campaign and might have expected home leave after it; instead they and the third battalion had now completed another hard campaign . Rumours, particularly amon g reinforcements, to the effect that the brigade was being "punished" had been so rife tha t Hammer had written to Lieut-Colonel H . M . Hoare of the 1st Advanced Reinforcement Depot near Moresby on 25th March : " Recent reinforcements from the A .R.D . have brought with the m some ridiculous rumours which, whilst being of no consequence in themselves, may possibly have a bad influence on the future of the Bde . The general terms of the rumours are that bot h 24 Aust Inf Bn and 58/59 Aust Inf Bn are serving long terms of field punishment for varyin g reasons, such as running away at Salamaua and refusing to go into action . Of course I realise that these rumours are just idle chatter, but I would appreciate it if you would pass on t o your staff the record of service of the two units concerned, and if the staff there, on hearing these rumours, would tell the reinforcements the true facts . " The record of service of the tw o units, as listed by Hammer, was impressive. The units had indeed had their teething troubles, but it is more likely that they were chosen for the task in the Finisterres because of their experience . 7 Maj A . A . Armstrong, MC, VX111035 . 11 Div Carrier Coy, 19 Bn . Grazier and company director; of Deniliquin, NSW ; b . East Melbourne, 1 Jul 1906 .

13-23 Apr PRISONERS SEIZED 785 to Kaiapit on the 15th and ferried thence by Cub to Wantoat . Advancing along the Ikwap Track the platoon learnt that the Japanese were i n Tabut. Surrounding the village the Australians attacked at dusk. Four Japanese were killed and two escaped . Next day one of the straggler s was speared by a native and on the 16th Armstrong led a patrol to the upper reaches of the Wantoat River where four Japanese were seen wit h about 20 natives, squatting in the river bed . Warrant-Officer Seale o f Angau sent his police boys to mingle with these natives and at a pre - arranged signal the police boys grabbed the Japanese and overpowere d them. Thus Armstrong returned with four times as many prisoners as th e 7th Division had been able to capture in several months . Two of the prisoners were from the 20th Division's engineers and two from the 238th Regiment. Other offensives were now imminent and for one of these the 32nd American Division at Saidor was required . On 13th April MacArthur' s headquarters instructed that a brigade group of the 5th Australian Division would relieve the Americans at Saidor as soon as possible . General Ram- say then warned the 8th Brigade to prepare to move to Saidor whenc e it would maintain contact with the Japanese withdrawing to Hansa Ba y and Wewak. The 15th Brigade would move across from the Ramu and come under Ramsay's command . On the 17th Savige was instructed that the 5th Division should occupy Madang but that the 15th Brigade shoul d be used operationally only in an emergency . On the 22nd the head- quarters of the 8th Brigade, portions of the 30th Battalion and "A" Company of the Papuan Battalion were flown to Saidor . Next day the 32nd American Division made available 12 L .C.M's which carried these 300-odd troops to Bogadjim. The remainder of the 30th Battalion an d part of the 35th arrived at Saidor by air on the 23rd . Although Madang might well be empty, like Salamaua and Lae befor e it, Hammer was anxious to get there first. While the order for the relief at Saidor and the subsequent advance to the west was passing dow n the line from MacArthur's G .H.Q., General Boase, Brigadier Hammer , Colonels Smith and Marston and Major Travers, with Lieutenant Leahy 8 as guide, were marching over the Finisterres to the north coast . When the party reached Bridge 6 on the 20th, Boase, who astonished th e younger men by the fast pace he maintained, received a signal that th e 5th Division would take charge of the Madang operations . The plan wa s that the 30th Battalion would occupy Madang . Hammer immediately secured Boase 's permission to dispatch patrols to Amele and Madang . On the 21st Boase met Lieut-Colonel Kyngdon,9 of Ramsay's staff, a t Bogadjim and discussed Ramsay's tentative plan whereby the 15th Brigade would march over the Finisterres to the north coast. The administrative

s Capt J . L . Leahy, NGX308. NGVR and Angau. Goldminer ; of Watut, NG ; b. Toowoomba, Qld, 24 Jan 1909 . °Col C. W . T . Kyngdon, VX20318. AASC 7 Div 1940-41 ; GSO1 1 Armd Div 1942-43 ; AA & QMG 5 Div 1944; and various staff and training appointments . Regular soldier ; of Melbourne ; b. Bowral, NSW, 8 Mar 1910.

786 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG 20-24 Apr difficulties of such a move were pointed out and it was also suggested that it might be preferable to wait until the 57th/60th crossed the Gogol River and fully reconnoitred the area south of Madang for suitable area s where the 8th Brigade could land . Already on the 20th the 57th/60th was probing north along the coast towards the Gogol River and north-west towards Amele Mission . Dump s of ammunition and all manner of stores and equipment were found i n the swampy Bogadjim area and to the north . A patrol to Balama foun d 16 trucks damaged by air strafing, and on the 21st a patrol to Malag a Hook found six 6-wheeled vehicles . A patrol led by Captain Fox reache d Amele without incident on the 24th and returned through Bili Bili o n the coast. Meanwhile a patrol led by Lieutenant Atkinson was instructed to fin d out if Madang and its airfield were occupied . With 13 men he boarde d an American P .T. boat at 10.45 a.m. on the 22nd. There were several officers and batmen from various headquarters hoping to be there for the kill, and these accompanied the 14 Australians and 14 American s to Malaga Hook where a landing was made soon after noon . Atkinso n found the Gogol a major obstacle . He therefore signalled with a Very pistol to the boat standing off shore . After discussion it was decided that the Americans and a small party from the 8th Brigade which had move d along the coast would rejoin the boat, which would return at noon nex t day with crossing equipment. As the boat did not arrive by noon on the 23rd, and as wireless com- munications had failed Atkinson led half his patrol south and met th e signallers laying telephone line near Erima. Information was passed back to his headquarters and he returned to rendezvous with the boat . On the way back a despondent and sick straggler from the 79th Regimen t was captured . He also had been unable to cross the Gogol which h e had reached five days before and was looking for food when he sa w Atkinson's men. He said that his companions had left the area about a month ago . Returning to the Gogol Atkinson found that the other half of his patrol had unsuccessfully attempted to wade across the river. On returning to the south bank Sergeant Dick' shot two crocodiles betwee n 12 and 15 feet long. The P.T. boat arrived at 5 p.m., landed a smal l party of Americans, took off the prisoner and gave Atkinson a message that over 100 troops would be landing at Bili Bili next day . A dingh y was left for the crossing of the Gogol, which was now urgent . At dawn on the 24th the patrol tried to cross but the current wa s too strong. Twenty minutes later when two P.T. boats were seen near the mouth of the Gogol Atkinson sent out a message in the dinghy asking to be ferried to Bili Bili . By 8 .45 a.m. his patrol was aboard . Just at this time four L.C.M's and a tender on the way north from Bogadjim passe d the two boats. The L.C.M's contained Lieut-Colonel Parry-Okeden's head - quarters and one company of the 30th Battalion, together with the brigade 1 Lt L . S. Dick, MM, VX122339; 57/60 Bn. Motor driver; of Croxton, Vic ; b . Heidelberg, Vic, 23 Mar 1917 .

Feb-Apr A BATTERED BASE 787 major, Nicholls, 2 who was to reconnoitre the Madang area for 8th Brigade headquarters . Atkinson's patrol was transferred to an L .C.M. and at 9.20 a.m. landed with the 30th Battalion at Ort just south of the Gum River. Parry-Okeden had no objection to Atkinson attaching his patrol to the 30th Battalion. Indeed it was appropriate that representatives of bot h the brigades which had finally cleared the Japanese from the Huon Penin- sula should be together for the last triumph . At 12 .30 p.m. the junction of the Madang and Alexishafen Roads was reached . While a platoo n from the 30th Battalion moved along the road towards the airfield a second platoon accompanied Atkinson in a cautious advance toward s Madang. During the advance a mountain gun fired a dozen shells, an d there was a sudden burst of machine-gun fire and a couple of grenad e explosions from somewhere in the Wagol area. The machine-gun fire did not appear to be directed at the Australians and the shells from the gun landed out to sea . In all probability this was the final defiant gesture by the rearguard of the XVIII Army as it left its great base of Madan g which had been in Japanese hands since 1942. As the Australians con- tinued along the Madang Road they saw about ten figures at a distance of about 1,000 yards running north-west . After investigating all the sid e tracks the patrol from the 57th/60th Battalion and a platoon of the 30th entered a deserted Madang at 4 .20 p.m . on 24th April. At 5 .30 eight L.C.M's nosed into the harbour to land Brigadier Cameron and the van - guard of the 8th Brigade . Madang had been heavily hit by Allied air attacks and possibly som e demolitions had been carried out by the retreating Japanese . The airfield was cratered and temporarily unserviceable ; the harbour was littered with wrecks, but although the two wharves were damaged they could be repaired and Liberty ships could enter the harbour . The occupation of Madang rang down the curtain on the Huon Penin- sula and Ramu Valley campaigns . Quickened planning for the future and further changes in command were pending, ready to meet the changed circumstances in which for six months only a small part of th e Australian Army would be in contact with the enemy. Before his journey to England General Blarney had already decide d to return to the old organisation whereby New Guinea Force and Corp s Headquarters in New Guinea were amalgamated . On 25th February h e had written to Berryman : I have not been able to obtain a final decision in relation to commands, etc ., necessitated by your campaign recently terminated, although the recommendation s were made to the Government prior to the beginning of the campaign . This has been influenced to some extent by the pressure of politicians such as Foil, Page, and particularly Cameron . He informed Morshead on 3rd March, however, that Morshead himsel f would return to the Second Army, personnel of New Guinea Force Head-

9 Col N. A . M . Nicholls, NX334 . 2/4 En, BM 8 Bde and staff and training appointments . Regula r soldier ; b . Wallaroo, SA, 12 Aug 1917 .

788 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG Mar-luly quarters would be sent to other appointments, and II Corps Headquarter s would become N.G.F. Headquarters. Thus, on 6th May Savige's II Corp s Headquarters, which had moved from Finschhafen to Lae in preparatio n for the change, was designated "Headquarters, New Guinea Force " and he became responsible for all Australian activities in New Guinea . In July Morshead was transferred from Second Army to command of the A .I.F. Corps—actually a far more important task—and Berryman became "Chief of Staff, Advanced Land Headquarters ". The build up of the 5th Division (4th, 8th and 15th Brigades) i n the Madang-Bogadjim area continued as fast as limited shipping and air facilities permitted. While the Papuans patrolled to the west from Madang, detachments from the 30th Battalion landed on small islands off the coas t and two companies advanced towards Alexishafen . The enemy had sown many land mines, and before the Pioneers started delousing them th e 30th Battalion lost 5 killed and 3 wounded from mine explosions . The battalion entered a deserted Alexishafen on 26th April. On the 27th Savige informed Ramsay that only one battalion would be needed a t Saidor, and that apart from patrols no major units in the Alexishafe n area would move north of the Murnass River . Ramsay was warned that his planning should take into account New Guinea Force's decision to establish a Base Sub-Area at Madang capable of meeting the requirement s of a force of 35,000 . Next day Ramsay issued orders that the 8th Brigade would be forward in the Alexishafen area, the 4th and 15th Brigades (less the 24th Battalion destined for Saidor) in reserve about Madang. In March and April there had been sweeping changes in the organisation an d policy of the Japanese forces along their southern front. The headquarters of the Japanese Second Area Army under General Korechika Anami had arrived in Davao , Mindanao, from Manchuria in late November 1943 . Anami controlled Lieut-General Fusataro Teshima's newly-arrived II Army based at Manokwari and Lieut-General Kenzo Kitano's XIX Army based at Ambon . The Second Area Army was respon- sible for the area from 140 degrees east longitude west to Macassar Strait and sout h from 5 degrees north latitude. Thus Hollandia and Australian New Guinea remaine d the responsibility of General Imamura's Eighth Area Army . The Admiralties cam- paign (described in the next chapter) caused a sweeping change in command, fo r the Eighth Area Army and XVII Army were then cut off . On 14th March General Imamura was ordered to hold out as best he could, and the XVIII Army and IV Air Army were transferred to the Second Area Army, whose boundary was moved east to 147 degrees east longitude . The Japanese forces facing the Allies in the South-West Pacific Area had bee n augmented in recent months . Thus in April Count Terauchi's Southern Army Head- quarters, then in Manila, controlled the Second Area Army (150,000 men), the XIV Army in the Philippines (45,000 troops), the XXXI Army in the Pacific islands (50,000 troops), and the 14th Division and other troops in the Palau s (30,000) now based on Menado . Under the Second Area Army were the II Army In western New Guinea and the Halmaheras (32nd, 35th, and 36th Divisions, about 50,000 men), the XIX Army in the rest of the Netherlands East Indies (5th, 46th , 48th Divisions, about 50,000 men) and the XVIII Army (20th, 41st, 51st Divisions, 50,000 to 55,000 men) . The isolated Eighth Area Army (140,000 including naval troops) was now directly under Imperial General Headquarters and controlled the XVII Army (6th Division and other troops) and the 17th and 38th Divisions.

Mar-Apr WITHDRAWAL TO WEWAK 78 9

At this time the XVIII Army was reorganising at Madang and beyond, an d General Adachi was hoping to hold the area between Madang and Hansa Bay . He was ordered instead to pull back west as quickly as possible to Wewak, Aitape an d Hollandia, which was to be developed into a major base . The withdrawal as far as Wewak was already under way in March when rearguard companies of the 78t h and 239th Regiments were still delaying the American advance west from Saido r and the Australian advance north over the Finisterres . The general picture during March was that the 51st Division was concentrating in the Wewak area, the 20t h Division in the Hansa Bay-Aitape area and the 41st Division the Madang-Bogadjim area . The 41st Division was deployed with the 237th Regiment north from Madang, the 238th Regiment between the Gum and Gogol Rivers and the 239th Regiment, assisted by elements of the 78th, responsible for the defence of the southern ap- proaches . As the Australians pressed closer to Bogadjim and Madang in April, the XVIII Army began a slow withdrawal . When, on 25th March, General Adachi receive d the orders to withdraw and concentrate at Hollandia, he instructed the 41st Divisio n to hold Madang by rearguard action until the end of April . At the same time he sent the main body of the division to Hansa Bay to relieve the 20th Division , which would then move on to Wewak and Aitape, allowing the 51st to advance to Hollandia in July or August . The next chapter will explain how the 8th Australian Brigade, advancing fro m Madang to the Sepik, met only the stragglers of the trapped army. Even with bette r and more alert planning by Adachi's staff, however, it is doubtful whether the XVIII Army could have reached Hollandia before the invasion of that base. I n April there were still 30,000 men east of the Sepik, and only 770 were being ferrie d across that river each day . The obstacles to its march were the marshes of the Ramu and Sepik River basins, the mud, the swarms of mosquitoes, the fast river current s and the attacks of Allied planes and naval craft.3 At Lae and at Salamaua the elements had aided the Japanese retreat ; thereafter they were pitiless .

3 0n 25th April General Katagiri, the commander of the 20th Division, was killed when a landing barge in which he was travelling from Hansa Bay to Wewak was attacked by an America n torpedo boat. He was succeeded by General Nakai.