CHAPTER 2 7 THE PURSUIT TO MADAN G HE Australian operations along the Rai Coast and in the Finisterre T Mountains in the early part of 1944 were being undertaken as a resul t of a policy directive for the summer of 1943-1944 issued by Genera l Blarney on 23rd December . Blarney had warned that "the operational rol e of the Australian Military Forces engaged in forward operations in Ne w Guinea will be taken over by U .S.A. forces in accordance with plans now being prepared . Aggressive operations will be continued and reliefs neces- sary to maintain the initiative will be made by G .O.C. New Guinea Force until Commander, U .S.A. Forces, takes over responsibility ." The reliefs would be effected gradually, first on the Huon Peninsula and second in the Ramu Valley . "As relieved, and subject to operational or emergency requirements," the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions would be allocated to I Aus- tralian Corps and would return to the mainland for training and rehabilita- tion. Three militia divisions—3rd, 5th and 11th—would be allocated to II Australian Corps for garrison duties, training and rehabilitation in Ne w Guinea and on the mainland. The already depleted III Australian Corps in Western Australia would be further reduced by one infantry brigad e which would be transferred to the 3rd . Division at Atherton . Blarney in- structed that movement of units to the mainland should begin immediatel y "in accordance with the principle of earliest relief for longest service in New Guinea", and that "the force remaining at the conclusion of th e relief will be an Army Corps of approximately two full jungle division s plus base troops required for maintenance" . Thus the role of the Australian Army in 1944 would be small in com- parison with the one it had played in the previous two years when it ha d carried the main burden of the fight against the Japanese in the South - West Pacific. At this stage, on 22nd January 1944, the War Cabinet decided to present to General MacArthur a revised statement of the combat force s to be assigned to him—the first such statement since the original one of 18th April 1942. The new statement set out the forces assigned i n greater detail than hitherto, specifying individual brigades ; as far as the army was concerned, it again gave control of all mobile operationa l formations to MacArthur, but provided that future assignments should b e specifically made by the Government . Thus, if a new brigade or division was formed it would be necessary to assign it individually to MacArthur . In New Guinea the main body of the retreating Japanese division s was marching westward along the coastal route, and a smaller column con- sisting principally of the III/238th Battalion was using an exhausting inland route from Nambariwa to Nokopo. From Gali 2 the route woul d lead round the American beach-head at Saidor through Nokopo and 764 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG Jan-Feb Tarikngan . Here, as mentioned, was a covering force of about 2,000 me n under Major-General Nakai, comprising the III/239th Battalion and five companies of the 78th Regiment. For the Rai Coast advance Major-General Ramsay of the 5th Division would have in the forward area only the 8th Brigade (4th, 30th an d 35th Battalions) ; the 4th and 29th Brigades were to remain in rear areas. The commander of the 8th Brigade, Brigadier Cameron, was the only officer now commanding a brigade who had not served in the Middl e East. He had returned from the war of 1914-18 as an infantry lieutenant , and had led the 8th Brigade since May 1940. Ramsay's intention was to "advance to make contact with the U .S. forces at Saidor". He estimated that an enemy force of not more tha n 3,000 troops was in the area between Sio and Saidor, that their moral e and health were low, and that organised resistance was unlikely . Behind his statement that "U .S. forces have established a bridgehead at Saidor extending approx five miles in the direction of Sio, but are not expecte d to extend further in this direction", there may have been a suggestion that the 32nd American Division was losing a golden opportunity b y letting the retreating 20th and 51st Japanese Divisions bypass them. And on 17th February General Morshead wrote in a letter to Blarney that the Saidor force appeared not to have made "any appreciable effort " to cut off the retreating Japanese . Besides the 8th Brigade the main units taking part in the advance wer e the veteran company of Papuans, the 23rd Battery (short 25-pounders ) from the 2/12th Field Regiment, the 2/13th and 8th Field Companies , and a detachment of the 2/8th Field Ambulance . Because of the difficul- ties of supply not more than one battalion group would be used forward of Kelanoa and the remainder of the brigade would occupy "healthy areas " at Kelanoa. The maximum use would be made of the Papuans to preced e the forward battalion, and, as subsequent maintenance of the strikin g force would depend on the selection of suitable beaches, land reconnais- sance parties from the American 2nd Engineer Special Brigade woul d accompany it. On 19th January Cameron's headquarters and the 4th Battalion (Lieut - Colonel Crosky l ) began to arrive at Sio and Nambariwa . In the 4th, as in many more-experienced units before it, there was a certain amoun t of nervousness known colloquially as "itchy finger" on the first few nights . On the night of the 21st-22nd January the forward platoon imagine d that they saw some Japanese and opened fire . The "Japanese " were thei r own men, two of whom were killed and two wounded . The raw 8th Brigade, however, had the benefit of tlae skill and experience of th e Papuan company . The Papuans were in their element as hunters and were busy looking for scattered bands of Japanese . They would have been dis- appointed had they been recalled (as was intended at one stage) and , as events turned out, two companies of Papuans could probably hav e 1 Lt-Col P. W. Croaky, ED, NX112661 . CO 4 Bn 1942-44. Managing law clerk ; of Arncliffe , NSW ; b . Rozelle, NSW, 29 Jun 1908. Died 7 Jan 1957 . 22-25 Jan EXPERT PAPUAN PATROLS 765 advanced to Saidor quicker and with less effort than any brigade o f Australians . On the 22nd a native reported that there were about seven Japanese in the hills south-west of Sio Mission . A small patrol of Papuans, unde r Corporal Bengari, whose reputation was similar to that of the best of Gurkhas, immediately set out and arrived on the outskirts of the villag e of Lembangando on the night of the 24th. He sent forward a local native who said on his return that another 22 Japanese had now arrived . Next morning Bengari and his five companions ambushed the enemy force and killed every one without the Japanese firing a shot . Another Papuan patrol to Vincke Point found 20 dead Japanese on the track an d killed one other on their return journey to Sio . Thus, even before the advance began, the Papuans had cleared the way as far as the end o f the first bound planned by Cameron ; he had ordered that the 4th Bat- talion, preceded by the Papuans, would begin on 25th January a serie s of daily bounds, designed to take them to the Timbe River in six days . It was planned that the 4th Battalion would advance to Malasanga, th e 30th thence to Gali, and the 35th would then take over and link wit h the Americans in Saidor. General Berryman signalled to Ramsay o n the 25th: "Consider brigade rather over cautious but do not propose to push them yet."2 •Sigawa J MILES 5 0 / ` 5 ! A 10~ j 15 MILES The 8th Brigade's pursuit along the Rai Coast It would be difficult to find sheltered beach-heads because the north - west monsoon would blow until the middle of February, causing sudde n flooding of the rivers and rough seas which would limit barge landin g points to areas protected from the north-west . The terrain of the Rai Coas t 2 The following table shows the planned daily progress of the advance between Sio and Saidor : Bound Day Date Bound Day Dat e 1 Kwama River 1 25 Jan 8 Butubutu 9 2 Feb 2 Romba River 2 26 Jan 9 Roinji 2 10 3 Feb 3 Peel River 3 27 Jan 10 Weber Point 11 4 Feb 4 Soa River 4 28 Jan 11 Malalamai 12 5 Fe b 5 Hawkesbury Rive r 5 29 Jan 12 Yagomai 13 6 Fe b 6 Crossingtown 6 30 Jan 13 Seure 14 7 Fe b 7 Nemau 8 1 Feb 14 Sel 15 8 Feb 766 THE PURSUIT TO MADANG 25-29 Ja n consisted of a coastal belt whose width varied from about a mile to almost nothing, cut by many rivers and swamps. The whole operation woul d obviously be governed by supplies moved by sea . The Australians would thus, once again, depend upon their well-tried friends, the American boatmen of the 532nd E.B .S.R., of whom only one company remained with them . Because of the terrain the advance could be at most on a compan y front, probably mainly on a platoon front with Papuans scouting ahead .