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Le Réveil Du Khorassan : La Recomposition D’Un Espace De Circulation Fariba Adelkhah
Le réveil du Khorassan : la recomposition d’un espace de circulation Fariba Adelkhah To cite this version: Fariba Adelkhah. Le réveil du Khorassan : la recomposition d’un espace de circulation. 2006. hal- 01065661 HAL Id: hal-01065661 https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01065661 Preprint submitted on 18 Sep 2014 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Fariba Adelkhah Le réveil du Khorassan. La recomposition d’un espace de circulation Pour qui regarde rouler à tombeau ouvert, à Fariman ou à Torbat Jam, dans le nord-est de l’Iran, les camions sur l’axe routier qui mène à la frontière afghane, il est difficile d’imaginer ce qu’était cette contrée il y a une quarantaine d’années, ou de s’en souvenir : une province au passé prestigieux, mais déshéritée et enclavée entre le Rideau de fer de l’Union soviétique et l’un des pays les plus pauvres du monde. La plupart des agglomérations n’étaient pas électrifiées, le choléra sévissait à l’état endémique, les montagnes infestées de bandits que l’on disait Afghans échappaient au contrôle de l’Etat, et les déplacements locaux avaient Mashhad pour destination quasi exclusive. -
(2): Delivering Public Services in Insurgency-Affected Obeh District of Herat Province
One Land, Two Rules (2): Delivering public services in insurgency-affected Obeh district of Herat province Author : S Reza Kazemi Published: 9 December 2018 Downloaded: 8 December 2018 Download URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-admin/post.php The matter of who governs the district of Obeh in the east of Herat province is complicated: control of the district is divided between the Afghan government and the Taleban, and shifts in unpredictable ways. The inhabitants of the district, usually via the mediation of elders, have had to learn how to deal with both sides. The dual nature of authority in Obeh is exemplified by public service delivery; it is always financed through and administered by the Afghan state but, in areas under Taleban control, it is the insurgents who supervise and monitor delivery. In this, the first of a series of case studies looking at the delivery of services in districts over which the Taleban have control or influence, AAN researcher Said Reza Kazemi investigates the provision of governance and security, education, health, electricity, telecommunications and development projects, and unpacks a dual form of governance. Service Delivery in Insurgent-Affected Areas is a joint research project by the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). For the methodology and literature review, see here. Obeh district: the context 1 / 22 Approximately 100 km to the east of Herat city, linked by mainly non-asphalted roads; mountainous, cut through by fertile Harirud River valley -
Länderinformationen Afghanistan Country
Staatendokumentation Country of Origin Information Afghanistan Country Report Security Situation (EN) from the COI-CMS Country of Origin Information – Content Management System Compiled on: 17.12.2020, version 3 This project was co-financed by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund Disclaimer This product of the Country of Origin Information Department of the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum was prepared in conformity with the standards adopted by the Advisory Council of the COI Department and the methodology developed by the COI Department. A Country of Origin Information - Content Management System (COI-CMS) entry is a COI product drawn up in conformity with COI standards to satisfy the requirements of immigration and asylum procedures (regional directorates, initial reception centres, Federal Administrative Court) based on research of existing, credible and primarily publicly accessible information. The content of the COI-CMS provides a general view of the situation with respect to relevant facts in countries of origin or in EU Member States, independent of any given individual case. The content of the COI-CMS includes working translations of foreign-language sources. The content of the COI-CMS is intended for use by the target audience in the institutions tasked with asylum and immigration matters. Section 5, para 5, last sentence of the Act on the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA-G) applies to them, i.e. it is as such not part of the country of origin information accessible to the general public. However, it becomes accessible to the party in question by being used in proceedings (party’s right to be heard, use in the decision letter) and to the general public by being used in the decision. -
The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns Antonio Giustozzi
The Afghanistan Papers | No. 5, July 2010 The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns Antonio Giustozzi Addressing International Governance Challenges The Centre for International Governance Innovation The Afghanistan Papers ABSTRACT About The Afghanistan Papers Although the Taliban remain a largely Pashtun movement in terms of their composition, they have started making significant inroads among other ethnic groups. In many The Afghanistan Papers, produced by The Centre cases, the Taliban have co-opted, in addition to bandits, for International Governance Innovation disgruntled militia commanders previously linked to other (CIGI), are a signature product of CIGI’s major organizations, and the relationship between them is far research program on Afghanistan. CIGI is from solid. There is also, however, emerging evidence of an independent, nonpartisan think tank that grassroots recruitment of small groups of ideologically addresses international governance challenges. committed Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik Taliban. While Led by a group of experienced practitioners and even in northern Afghanistan the bulk of the insurgency distinguished academics, CIGI supports research, is still Pashtun, the emerging trend should not be forms networks, advances policy debate, builds underestimated. capacity and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. Conducting an active agenda of research, events and publications, CIGI’s interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, business and academic communities around the world. The Afghanistan Papers are essays authored by prominent academics, policy makers, practitioners and informed observers that seek to challenge existing ideas, contribute to ongoing debates and influence international policy on issues related to Afghanistan’s transition. A forward-looking series, the papers combine analysis of current problems and challenges with explorations of future issues and threats. -
Afghanistan INDIVIDUALS
CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Last Updated:01/02/2021 Status: Asset Freeze Targets REGIME: Afghanistan INDIVIDUALS 1. Name 6: ABBASIN 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: --/--/1969. POB: Sheykhan village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan a.k.a: MAHSUD, Abdul Aziz Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):AFG0121 (UN Ref): TAi.155 (Further Identifiying Information):Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we- work/Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals click here. Listed on: 21/10/2011 Last Updated: 01/02/2021 Group ID: 12156. 2. Name 6: ABDUL AHAD 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. Title: Mr DOB: --/--/1972. POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Nationality: Afghan National Identification no: 44323 (Afghan) (tazkira) Position: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):AFG0094 (UN Ref): TAi.121 (Further Identifiying Information): Belongs to Hotak tribe. Review pursuant to Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) was concluded on 29 Jul. 2010. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/ Notices/View-UN-Notices-Individuals click here. Listed on: 23/02/2001 Last Updated: 01/02/2021 Group ID: 7055. -
Chronology of Events in Afghanistan, December 2003*
Chronology of Events in Afghanistan, December 2003* December 1 Afghans begin registering for first elections. (Reuters) The United Nations has begun registering the first of an estimated 10.5 million Afghans expected to vote in their country's first free elections in 2004. The registration process began in the city of Kandahar on November 30 and was extended to seven other cities, including Kabul on December 1, said Catarina Fabiansson, spokeswoman for the U.N. election office in Afghanistan. All Afghans aged over 18 by June 20, 2004, are qualified to register to elect a national president in the elections, which are due to be held in June 2004. There will be separate registration sites for men and women. Fabiansson said most of those to register initially will be the 19,000 district representatives who have the job of electing a Loya Jirga, or Grand Assembly, due to meet from December 10 to approve a new constitution. Ordinary people would have the chance to register in the towns of Bamiyan and Herat, and general registration would be extended to other cities in December. Fabiansson said the project would be extended to the provinces, then to villages and was expected to be completed by early 2004. Former regional Taliban official arrested in Jalalabad. (Associated Press / AP) A man who served as a regional police commander in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime was arrested for alleged involvement in attacks against Afghan forces, an official said. Maulvi Sahib-ul Haq was arrested in Jalalabad, the capital of the province of Nangarhar, by Afghan security forces, said Ziauddin, an Afghan intelligence official. -
Cas on Station
CAS ON ANSF Focus Tornadoes go operational R & D in action in RC’s STATION A-10s return to Bagram New Hospitals in North, East Securing Sangin In this month’s Mirror June 2007 4 NATO and HQ n Young leaders workshop 6 RC-East n A-10s on watch over battlefield n Chiefs of defense meet 5 Focus on ANSF 8 Mehtar Lam Shura n McNeill tours police training n ANA base built up n Dutch OMLT on the road 9 Forward ops with Afghan National Army n Insurgents engaged in Paktika n Brits get aviation training Eyes in the skies n New Bagram hospital 10 RC-North n Tornadoes go operational 11 COMISAF visit n McNeill tours police training 12 Mixed recce co. n Protection through detection 13 Role 3 hospital n New facility opens at Marmal n Dari literacy classes for Marmal’s Afghan employees The A-10’s 30-milimeter Gatling gun Cover Photo by Sgt. Ruud Mol A-10s return to Bagram ........... A maintainer with the Tornado Wing at Camp Marmal opens the canopy to preapare the air- turn to page 6. craft for a mission. Photo by Sgt. Ruud Mol Tornadoes conduct surveillance ... turn to page 10. 2 ISAF MIRROR June 2007 Contents 14 RC-West n DCOM Stability visits The ISAF Mirror is a HQ ISAF Public PRT at Chaghcharan Information product. Articles, where possible, have been kept in their origi- nal form. Opinions expressed are those 15 Urgent care of the writers and do not necessarily n reflect official NATO, JFC HQ Brunssum PRT Farah treats Taliban’s young or ISAF policy. -
Le Réveil Du Khorassan. La Recomposition D'un Espace De
Fariba Adelkhah Le réveil du Khorassan. La recomposition d’un espace de circulation Pour qui regarde rouler à tombeau ouvert, à Fariman ou à Torbat Jam, dans le nord-est de l’Iran, les camions sur l’axe routier qui mène à la frontière afghane, il est difficile d’imaginer ce qu’était cette contrée il y a une quarantaine d’années, ou de s’en souvenir : une province au passé prestigieux, mais déshéritée et enclavée entre le Rideau de fer de l’Union soviétique et l’un des pays les plus pauvres du monde. La plupart des agglomérations n’étaient pas électrifiées, le choléra sévissait à l’état endémique, les montagnes infestées de bandits que l’on disait Afghans échappaient au contrôle de l’Etat, et les déplacements locaux avaient Mashhad pour destination quasi exclusive. L’essentiel des voyageurs qui circulaient entre cette métropole sainte et Herat étaient soit des routards occidentaux, soit des travailleurs ou des étudiants pakistanais qui se rendaient au Royaume-uni ou en revenaient. En 1970 un guide de voyage ne signalait au départ d’Herat que deux liaisons hebdomadaires par autobus pour Islamghalah, le poste frontière afghan, une seule d’entre elles, celle du mercredi, poussant jusqu’à Youssoufabad, le poste frontière iranien1. Les mouvements régionaux de population étaient limités, même si des travailleurs afghans immigrés, attirés par le boom 1 Afghanistan, Paris, éd. Vilo, 1970, p. 241(Les Guides modernes Fodor). Dans les faits plus de possibilités s’offraient aux voyageurs, mais elles étaient hautement aléatoires, malgré la construction de la route transasiatique Mashhad-Herat- Kandahar-Kaboul par les bailleurs de fonds internationaux. -
AIHRC-UNAMA Joint Monitoring of Political Rights Presidential and Provincial Council Elections Third Report 1 August – 21 October 2009
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission AIHRC AIHRC-UNAMA Joint Monitoring of Political Rights Presidential and Provincial Council Elections Third Report 1 August – 21 October 2009 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMA Table of Contents Summary of Findings i Introduction 1 I. Insecurity and Intimidation 1 Intensified violence and intimidation in the lead up to elections 1 Insecurity on polling day 2 II. Right to Vote 2 Insecurity and voting 3 Relocation or merging of polling centres and polling stations 4 Women’s participation 4 III. Fraud and Irregularities 5 Ballot box stuffing 6 Campaigning at polling stations and instructing voters 8 Multiple voter registration cards 8 Proxy voting 9 Underage voting 9 Deficiencies 9 IV. Freedom of Expression 9 V. Conclusion 10 Endnotes 11 Annex 1 – ECC Policy on Audit and Recount Evaluations 21 Summary of Findings The elections took place in spite of a challenging environment that was characterised by insecurity and logistical and human resource difficulties. These elections were the first to be fully led and organised by the Afghanistan Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) took the lead in providing security for the elections. It was also the first time that arrangements were made for prisoners and hospitalised citizens, to cast their votes. The steady increase of security-related incidents by Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) was a dominant factor in the preparation and holding of the elections. Despite commendable efforts from the ANSF, insecurity had a bearing on the decision of Afghans to participate in the elections Polling day recorded the highest number of attacks and other forms of intimidation for some 15 years. -
AFGHANISTAN D Qurghonteppa TAJIKISTAN Kerki (Kurgan-Tyube) Mary
C A m H 64 u 66 68 70 72 Mur 74 H ° D ° ° ° a-ye ° gho ° ar y b INA ya UZBEKISTAN r INA a AFGHANISTAN D Qurghonteppa TAJIKISTAN Kerki (Kurgan-Tyube) Mary Kiroya iz M rm Dusti Khorugh u e BADAKHSHAN r T g a Keleft Rostaq FayzFayzabad Abad b ir Qala-I-Panjeh Andkhvoy Jeyretan am JAWZJAN P Mazar-e-Sharif KUNDUZ TaluqanTaloqan Jorm TURKMENISTAN Shiberghan Kunduz h Eshkashem s Dowlatabad BALKH Kholm Khanabad TAKHAR u T K e d Baghlan Farkhar 36 z ° h Shulgarah e u 36 n Sari Pul Aybak Dowshi ° d y Maymana g BAGHLAN h SAMANGAN n Gilgit s u FARYAB Tokzar i G ISLAMIC Qeysar PANJSHER H AFGHANISTAN r Gushgy a SARI PUL Bazarak n u Jammu BADGHIS Mahmud-e- NURISTAN K Towraghondi Raqi ns Taybad oru KUNAR Mo Chaharikar N P and Qala-e-Naw rghab BAMYAN KAPISA A PARWAN M Asad Abad Mehtarlam Dowlat Bamyan H HiratHerat Chaghcharan Yar G Kashmir H Karokh A ar Owbeh Maydan Kabul ir L Jalalabad ud Shahr KABUL 34 WARDAK Mardan REPUBLIC REPUBLIC ° NANGARHAR 34 GHOR DAY LOGAR K ° HERATHIRAT h y Pul-e-Alam b Peshawar KUNDI Peywar Pass e Islamabad r d P an ass Nili lm Gardez He Ghazni Rawalpindi PAKTYA KHOST Shindand- GHAZNI Qarah Bagh Khost (Matun) Bannu Anar Darreh Khas Uruzgan Sharan PAKISTAN b a URUZGAN d n FARAH a ut gh ar Now Zad Ar H Farah Tirin Kot PAKTIKA OF OF h 32 ra ZABUL h a Kajaki ra ° F u 32 m k L Tank ° a Qalat a -e Delar rn d Ta w Ro h Lashkar Gah IRAN as National capital Kh Kandahar s Zhob u Provincial capital Kadesh d Zabol n I Town, village The boundaries and names shown and the designations HILMAND used on this map do not imply official endorsement or Zaranj Spin Buldak INDI ✈ Airports Chaman acceptance by the United Nations. -
EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Security Situation
European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Security Situation - Update May 2018 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Security Situation - Update May 2018 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN : 978-92-9494-860-1 doi: 10.2847/248967 © European Asylum Support Office 2018 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO COI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION – UPDATE — 3 Acknowledgements This report was largely based on information provided by the Austrian COI Department and EASO would like to acknowledge the Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum for this. Furthermore, the following national asylum and migration departments have contributed by reviewing the report: Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Cedoca - Center for Documentation and Research, Denmark, The Danish Immigration Service, Section Country of Origin Information, France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless persons (OFPRA), Information, Documentation and Research Division, Italy, Ministry of the Interior, National Commission for the Right of Asylum International and EU Affairs, COI unit, Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation, Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Lifos – Centre for Country of Origin Information and Analysis. Reference is made to the Disclaimer regarding the responsibility of reviewers. -
Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018 Cultivation and Production NOVEMBER 2018 MCN/NSD Research Narcotics Survey Directorate Page intentionally left blank Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018 Contents CONTENTS .................................................................................................................................................. 2 LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................... 3 LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................................... 4 KEY FINDINGS .......................................................................................................................................... 5 1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................13 2 OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION ......................................................................................14 2.1 NATIONAL AND REGIONAL OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION TRENDS .................... 14 2.2 PROVINCIAL BREAKDOWN ................................................................................................ 21 3 ERADICATION......................................................................................................................35 3.1 POPPY ERADICATION DECREASED BY 46% IN 2018 ................................................... 35 3.2 QUALITY