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Jevons, Marshall and the Imaginaries of Free Trade Empire

David L. Blaney Macalester College, USA

Today’s invoke a free trade “tradition” built on the seemingly unassailable case against protectionism.1 Starting with the familiar abstractions of Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, free trade orthodoxy is reinforced, refurbished, and ostensibly made watertight with the application of marginalist analysis developed by late-Victorian economists, like W. Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) and (1842-1924).2 As precursors of neoclassical , the marginalists began to formalize models of gains from trade that were developed into recognizable form in the first half of the 20th century (Aldrich 2000; Mirowski

1984; Kindleberger 1968, chapter 3, 262-64; Hirschman 1969, 20-4, 43-4). Bhagwati and

Srinivasan (1983, 1) warn that these formal economic models treat countries as parallel units: national facing each other as if they are isolated individuals with given production possibilities and demand curves (see also Dunkley 2004, 34-40). In this fashion, today’s economists seem to presume the states-system and territorially contained national economies as a trans-historical backdrop, all the time ignoring that “empires and colonies were [and perhaps remain] the predominant unit types” (phrasing from Framing Paper).3

1See Magnussion (2004) on the “invention” of the free trade tradition alongside its constitutive other: . Aistleitner and Puehringer (2020) document economists nearly unquestioned faith in free trade despite years of concerns about the impacts of ‘globalization.’ 2Jevons’ and Marshall’s precise role in establishing economic science as a distinct discipline is generally recognized, though the details are much debated (see Maloney 1985; Mirowski 1990; Steedman 1997; Mosselmans 2007). Other key figures in the rise of modern economics include Léon Walras and . 3Open trade has ridden on the back of great power, as Kindleberger (1970) and Krasner (1976) suggest. That the actors involved are empires is not always made clear in that literature (Blaney and Inayatullah 2018). Yet the “world of the free traders” emerged out of British military victories that allowed it to subsume earlier mercantile economies into a system with its industrial production at the center; “forcible conquest” more than the seductions of mutual gains secured by Britain’s institutional commitments explain the free trade regime of the 19th century (Skidelsky, 1976, p. 150-7), though this empire was both formal and inform as Gallagher and Robinson (1953) note. And though formal empire may be all but finished, “imperialism remains embedded in the structures and ideology of

1 The historical blindness of seems hard-wired. By axiom, neoclassical economists begin with a “fixed” and “homogenous” picture of economic actors as reasoning or calculating units abstracted from any additional differentiating traits, apart from varying initial endowments of assets (Caporaso and Levine 1992, chapter 4). These unequally endowed, though otherwise interchangeable, units enter into exchanges in markets assumed to have certain minimal features: property rights; a sufficient number of units seeking exchange so that none are makers; and some mechanism, perhaps a (fictive) auctioneer, organizing so that no exchange takes place except at a market-clearing price (Walsh and Gram 1980,

407; Currie and Steedman 1990, 35; Klein 1997, 209-11). In this account of ‘social life,’ there is no power. There are no institutional relationships beyond property. There are no imperial or colonial relationships that vitiate the independence or separateness of actors. And there are no social relations of domination of class, gender or race.

There also is no stream of social processes in neoclassical economics. As Walsh and

Gram (1980, 404-5, 407) explain, neoclassical economics centers on a “static allocation model.”

An equilibrium price is produced as a “balance of forces affecting ,” where the supply of is set as a parameter, not the result of a production process. Likewise, preferences and endowments are fixed, not emerging through social processes. Economists do little more than “generalize” their framework “to a finite (or infinite) number of timeless allocations,” where supposed “multi-period” activity appears, more precisely, “as a sequence of timeless allocations” (Walsh and Gram 1980, 408-9) -- static moments extended notionally into a series that can be compared. Economists rarely look into the actual chronology of events or processes of unfolding (Weeks 2012, 41-2; Klein 1996, 251). Their object of inquiry is not

the current liberal global order, for which the US provides a bulwark (see Bell, 2016, p. 107, 196-203; and Go, 2008).

2 properly a social process at all, but a “summation” or aggregation of “irreducibly independent” and always voluntary exchanges among “self-seeking” individuals (Levine 1977, 171).

This lack of temporal duration or history impairs economists’ capacity to take institutions seriously. Though institutions might be thought important in socializing actors or shaping individual preferences and endowments, to recognize the role of such processes would foreclose identifying any point of equilibrium. The condition for locating an equilibrium is fixing a set of parameters, as if they are simply given. If institutions “change” (or, more precisely, are different at different notional time points), these changes are treated as “new” parameters, fixed once again in a timeless bargaining situation. In this way, gaining mathematical “precision” via equilibrium models systematically trades away more adequate accounts of institutional creation and change (Currie and Steedman, 1990, 10-11). Contemporary economics appears constituted precisely in its opposition to thicker descriptions of cultural or social life, the attribution of power to actors, or the analysis of structures/processes of domination and subordination (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010a, 18-21; Blaney and Inayatullah 2018).

It is striking, then, that two of the founding fathers of modern economics make empire and colonial relations of domination and subordination central to their thinking on trade and the purview of economic science itself. In the next two sections, I examine in detail the writings of

W. Stanley Jevons and Alfred Marshall, focusing on their understandings of trade, including their preference for free trade. I consider their thinking on trade always in relation to their broader conceptions of economics and social life. Frank Trentmann (1998, 218-9, 233-4; 2008,

1-23; 70) notably identifies Marshall and Jevons as among those who “put the maximizing behavior of ‘rational’ individual consumers at the center of economic analysis,” inspiring “liberal economics as we know it.” As Mirowski (1984) explains, Jevons and Marshall imagined the new

3 discipline of economics on the model of the timeless and abstract laws of physics. In a close reading of their work, we do find that notions of and equilibrium inform their economic analysis and they do assemble comparative advantage as an economic law and policy prescription, but these formal models do not stand alone in their texts. Though Jevons and

Marshall might be read to fit the description of economists who abstract from the complexity of social and political life and the expanse of global political and social relationships,4 a closer reading of their work shows that a colonial imaginary, or what Charles Mills (1997, 19) calls a

“moral ” of “conquest, colonization and enslavement,” lurking all the time in a space of economic science supposed by most historians of economic thought and international theorists

(as we shall see in the conclusion) to have been cleansed of anything but scientific abstraction.

The point is not that Jevons and Marshall invented this imperial ‘moral economy;’ they seem less creators of empire than empire’s creation (see Barkawi and Lawson, 2017, 2-4; Blaney 2017 and

2020). Yet Jevons’ and Marshall’s writings serve as unexpected and persuasive evidence for the prevalence of an empire-system in the late-19th and early 20th centuries, since empire and a colonial division of labor appear as an essential backdrop of their economics.

It is clear that Jevons and Marshall took the connection of free trade, prosperity and the

British empire for granted, reflecting dominant elite and popular views (see Semmel 1993, chapters 1 and 2; Howe 2007; Sylvest 2009). Their discussions of international trade are motivated primarily by perceived threats to Britain’s dominance in manufacturing trade that are raised already in the 1860s when Jevons’ early work appears and which become a focus of serious political debate around the turn of the 20th century when Marshall offers his best developed views on trade (see Trentman 2008; Wood 1980 and 1983). Though both thinkers

4 For example, Hodgson (2001, chapters 16 and 17) tells the story of how the richness of Marshall’s thought was eviscerated in order to secure the foundations of neoclassical economists.

4 grant the possibility of greater spatial dispersion of industry over time, they resort to claims about barriers of culture and race to assure their readers that the main contours of the colonial division of labor and British or Anglo-Saxon preeminence will continue, the latter perhaps reflecting late-Victorian musings on a Greater Britain (Bell 2007). Their accounts of trade are invariably entangled with more-or-less stylized histories – of stages of development, of comparative national and racial character, and of the evolution of the British empire and the global division of labor – that are the stuff of international theory. In deploying the language of civilization, race, settler colonies and home markets, both Jevons and Marshall departed regularly from both the spatial assumption that individuals, firms, or states are the fixed and homogenous units of economics (or trade theory) and the ’s favored time horizon (the short-period equilibrium) to engage the vast expanse of human evolution in which they believe modern empires play a critical role. We might say, then, that their object of inquiry roams from what economists assume to be national economies (i.e. home markets) to colonial relations of production and trade and world historical processes of industrial and moral advance. The line between economics, on one side, and history, politics and culture, on the other, are thereby rather insecure for Jevons and Marshall, though these thinkers are supposed to have inscribed the boundaries of economic life that made a distinct economic science possible. Their economic science and their defenses of free trade policies are intimately and consistently interwoven with the fabric of colonial imaginaries that prevail in an empire system.

[Preview of conclusion goes here]

Jevons on Free Trade, Race and the Colonial Division of Labor

5 W. Stanley Jevons began his career as a geologist and amateur student of meteorology, but eventually settled on economics, which he taught at both University and University

College London until his untimely death in 1882. Jevons is responsible for introducing calculus into the study of economics in Britain, but his major contributions to economics as a discipline include imagining the human mind as a calculating machine, promoting a restless experimental sensibility built on the construction of time-series data (Maas 1999, 2005; Schabas 1984, 1993) and, most importantly, “tracing out the mechanics of self- and utility” (Black 1981, 5).

In his Theory of (1931 [1871, 1879]; hereafter Theory), Jevons drew on Bentham’s doctrine of utility to launch a set of careful reflections that arrive at a subjective theory of .5 By developing Bentham’s “calculus of pain and pleasure” into “accurate quantitative notions concerning Utility, Value, Labour, Capital,” he claims to formulate a “theory of a distinctly mathematical character.” As for today’s neoclassical economists, “Laws of

Exchange” may be seen “to resemble the Laws of Equilibrium of a lever,” in which outcomes might be “explained by the consideration of indefinitely small amounts of pleasure and pain, just as the Theory of Statics is made to rest upon the equality of indefinitely small amounts of energy” (Jevons 1931, vi-vii; see Mirowski 1984). Jevons (1931, 75-6, 145-6) thereby places

“exchange” and the “process of maximizing utility and the of labour” at the center of the science of economics and he was drawn (and drew others) to thinking of economic life as governed by a mechanism allowing resources to be automatically allocated where they would provide the greatest utility, a moral good built into the very fiber of the natural order (Winch

2009, 154, 166-7; Himmelfarb 1994, 13; see Levine 1978, chapter 6).

5 See Maas (2005, chapter 1), Schabas (1990, chapters 1 and 3), Winch (2009, chapter 6), and Mosselmans (2007, chapter 3). Jevons (1931, v-vii) draws a sharp contrast with J. S. Mill and Ricardo, who he blames for burdening economic thinking with -fund notions of value that elude any attempt at precise measurement.

6 Jevons applied this new ‘’ of utility maximization to trade in Theory to make the ‘law’ of comparative advantage more amenable to precise specification and quantification. He begins with abstract units he calls “trading bodies,” indicating any “body either of buyers and sellers” of any scale, from a “single individual” to the “whole inhabitants of a continent.” Because “multitudes of individuals [give] rise to the aggregate represented in the transactions of a nation,” he can give “formulae [for gains from trade] as they would apply to an individual, only because they are identical in form with those which apply to a whole nation”

(1931, 15, 88, 183; see also Jha 1973). And, since individuals (or ‘trading bodies’) make choices with “the sole object” of producing “the greatest amount of utility,” they use their resources based on “the comparative degrees of utility of the commodities, and partly on [their] comparative facilities for producing them” (Jevons 1931, 183-4). In this timeless model, international trade appears as a reliable mechanism of mutual gain and, for Jevons (1883, 111),

“Freedom of trade” remains a “fundamental axiom of political economy,” as invulnerable to dispute as the “axioms of Euclid.”

But Jevons’ thinking is less restricted by the abstraction of such static models than might be supposed, since even his defense of free trade is infused with the ‘facts’ of Empire and the colonial division of labor. In The Question (1866 [1865]), which won Jevons early acclaim, the argument centers on Britain’s position in trade and global affairs. Though we can locate the abstract formulations of comparative advantage in Chapter 15, titled “Trading Bodies,” he devotes little attention to specifying formal economic laws, emphasizing instead challenges to

Britain’s “national greatness” (Peart 2001, 263; see also Missemer 2018, 3; and Wood 1983,

105-6). From the outset, Jevons (1866, Preface, 3-5) links Britain’s ability to maintain “so singular a position” in “the world’s trade” to its large domestic supply of coal, but industrial and

7 political “genius and energy” are never far below the surface of his account. Like Marshall, as we see below, he believes British ‘genius and energy’ sufficient to “maintain moderate trade,” but not adequate to preserve “manufacturing and maritime supremacy” in the face of growing challenges from Germany and the U.S. (Jevons 1866, Preface, 9-10, 14). Still, Jevons speaks strongly against protectionist sentiments, but he does not frame the issue as simply about protecting the ‘domestic market;’ he has various socio-spatial configurations in mind, all informed by a colonial imaginary.

Though he worries about Britain’s eventual eclipse by the US (Jevons 1866, chapter 15), his faith in the natural mechanisms of comparative advantage appears undaunted. He ties

Britain’s contemporary and possible future greatness – with “several quarters of the globe our willing tributaries” – to “unfettered commerce” and the workings of comparative advantage.

“Trade between two bodies,” he suggests, “is a case of simple attraction, each naturally attracting and buying the articles which are made with greater comparative facility and cheapness.” Jevons refuses to call this “,” because he wants to suggest a global harmony of . “Commerce,” he writes, “is undoubtedly making its own way by its own subtle force, . . . uniting the parts of the globe into a web of interchanges, in which the peculiar riches of each are made useful to all.” As with any system of free exchange, he assures us that the “sum of human happiness is thus being surely increased” (Jevons 1866, Chapter 16,1-7, my stress).

Almost immediately, Jevons reveals that the abstractions of comparative advantage and

‘simple attraction’ are insufficient. He indicates that “[Britain’s] actual position” should be understood in relation to five “groups” of countries or “trading bodies” (Jevons 1866, Chapter

16, 10-17), assembled in reference to “Britain’s transnational economy” that “focused and

8 sustained the empire” (Doyle 1986, 257). These assemblages or bodies also reflect quite varying political situations, whether as part of a European society of states, as parts of formal or informal empires or as (in some cases) self-governing British settler colonies. For Jevons, the states and economies of western Europe have little coal and specialize only in luxury goods, leaving Great Britain’s manufacturing dominance largely unaffected. By contrast, the US possesses vast quantities of coal and emerging industrial might, but remains focused mostly on its domestic markets, a situation that changes by the time Marshall turns to these issues. Large parts of Asia and Africa offer only tropical products as part of their insertion into British and other colonial relationships and little alteration in their economic position can be expected. But the key trading body for Jevons includes Britain and its settler colonies and his main political worry is that protectionist legislation might turn Britain inward and away from the “modern agricultural nations of our stock.” These settler colonies supply the home market with “food and raw materials” while drawing on British skills and capital, a vital mutual dependence of countries also sharing racial and civilizational character: “Of the same language, manners, and bound together in the same real interests of trade, Britain and her settler colonial offspring must be regarded for the present as a single whole” (Jevons 1866, chapter 10, 23-29, my stress). This

‘single whole’ constitutes what Bell (2014, 649) identifies within liberal colonial ideology as a

“biocultural assemblage” of racial/cultural/political and economic/spatial attributes.

The story of empire and settler colonies soon dominates the narrative, but never at the expense of liberal trade. Jevons observes that the “British character” naturally seeks

“independence and adventure across the seas,” thereby increasing the “productive powers” of the settler and other colonies as they fulfill the role of providing raw materials for British industry, a specialized role rooted in colonial “plantations” modeled on those of Spain and the Netherlands

9 (Jevons 1866, Chapter 16, 18, 22). As punchline, Jevons (1866, Chapter 16, 24) places the

British empire at the center of an imperial free trading system structuring these supposed mutually beneficial relations:

When we look either to the trade the colonies carry on with us, to the internal happiness they enjoy, or the benefits which they promise to the world in the future, it is impossible to overvalue the Anglo-Saxon spirit of colonization. But when we follow out a policy of free colonization to its necessary ultimate result, the prospect is more pleasing to a citizen of the world than to a citizen of this small kingdom.

But these beneficial (now clearly imperial) relations depend on sustaining free trade, which will prompt Britain’s industry to turn to finer manufacturers that will sustain its ‘singular position.’

And, in seeming reference to its dominant position in an empire-system, Jevons (1866, Chapter

16, 35-8, 44) suggests finally that Great Britain, being “close to the terrestrial centre of the globe, gives us a claim to the carrying and trading business of the world, which previously belonged to .

. . the Dutch.” In what sense Britain could be considered at the center of the globe, or as a successor to the Dutch, other than in its role as empire is not clear.

Jevons (1866, Chapter 18, 9), ends The Coal Question by noting that “Our empire and race already comprise one-fifth of the world’s population.” And, he emphasizes, “by our plantation of new states, by our guardianship of the seas, by the penetrating commerce, by the example of our just laws and firm constitution, and above all by the dissemination of our new arts, we stimulate the progress of mankind in a degree not to be measured” which says much, given his commitment to precise measurement. The spatiality of the British empire and colonial trade relations together forge the temporal destiny of all peoples.

Jevons’ Theory of Political Economy gives notably less weight to broad historical and cultural factors than The Coal Question or Marshall’s Principles, as we shall see. Yet Jevons saw Theory’s relative neglect of the “historical dimensions” that were “exogenous to his model”

10 as a weakness (Schabas 1984, 145). He may disparage history as “congeries of miscellaneous disconnected facts,” but he predicts that an economics attentive to dynamics “must fall in as one branch of Mr. Spencer’s .” “[T]here must arise,” he says, “a science of the development of economic forms and relations” (Jevons 1931, xvi). Elsewhere, he celebrates

Adam Smith’s capacity to combine rich historical evidence and the elaboration of general economic laws. Of course, any real science of economics must assume that the particularities of time and place “may be investigated algebraically and illustrated geometrically” (Jevons 1876,

620-1, 624-6).

Jevons sees his own contribution to the new science of economics largely on the side of algebra and geometry. Yet he gave substantial attention in Theory and elsewhere to changes in

‘economic forms and relations,’ always understood via the familiar binary of civilized and savage. For example, Jevons 1876 [1875], 20, chapter 4) duplicates ’s “conjectural history” in his stylized distinction between “primitive exchange” or barter, and the systematic role of as a in a “civilized society” (see Meek 1976; Blaney and

Inayatullah 2010a, chapter 1) in order to explore evolving modes of exchange. Here, Jevons uses the conditions existing at different stages of human development to explain the varying character of human beings and differing forms of behavior, rather than relying on trans-historical claims about human . In these moves, Jevons fuses the history of economics and changes in culture into a single system.

More commonly, though, Jevons (1905b [1874], Book IV, section 12; 1931 [1871], 20) follows Spencer’s social evolutionary thinking, using the character of groups or races to explain their relative commercial success and developmental progress (see White 1994; Collini 1985;

Maas 2005, 208). Here culture/race stands inside an economic science that cannot explain

11 distributional outcomes without thickening its description of the actors. For example, “[t]he untutored savage, like the child,” achieves less because the savage “is wholly occupied with the pleasures and the troubles of the moment; . . . the limit of his horizon is a few days off.” “[I]n a state of civilization,” by contrast, “a vague though powerful feeling of the future is the main incentive to industry and saving;” “that class or race of men who have the most foresight will work most for the future” (Jevons 1931, 34-5, 182-3). Refences to race undergird much of

Jevons’ account: variations among groups in orientation to the future reflect not only “the character of the individual,” but also “the intellectual standing of the race.” Races of a more

“energetic disposition” possess the drive to continue to labor for “acquisition,” but a “man of a lower race, a negro for instance, enjoys possession less, and loathes labour more; his exertions, therefore, soon stop” (Jevons 1931, 34; see also Jevons, 1869).

In 1871 correspondence, Jevons (1886, 253) seems to qualify his position: “The comparison of races is no doubt an invidious task,” but he quickly surrenders to the “plain facts” produced by the latest “statistical inquiries.” Very like today’s “orthodox microeconomics” which assumes abstract actors, unmarked by race, economists keep “returning to the position that sustained observed differences in economic outcomes between groups must be due to an induced or inherent deficiency in the group” (Darity and Mason 2007, 196, stress added). Jevons (1881,

582) later confirms the general reliability of this explanatory strategy, embracing Edgeworth’s collection of evidence supporting the “hierarchy of social ranks” and the ascent of “higher races” from the “lower” (Jevons 1881, 582).

In essays collected after his death, Jevons (1883, 119) deploys a similar strategy to understand the “deep and almost hopeless poverty in the mass of the people” of Britain. He links poverty largely to the individual and collective failings of the many: “a large part of the

12 population are too ignorant, careless, improvident, or vicious to appreciate or accumulate the wealth which science brings.” Here, he calls for immediate action, but he rejects any legislation or act of charity that do not find a means, like a commitment to “general education,” to “raise the intelligence and provident habits of the people” (Jevons 1883, 114; see also 90). It is notable that Jevons nowhere suggests anything comparable for the workers in the imperial ‘trading body’ that included Caribbean, African or Asian colonies; these places appear beyond the reach of social reform. In the end, Jevons explains much of the unequal positions of people and ‘trading bodies’ in a global division of labor, not as a function of abstract economic laws, but as more-or- less fixed by racial or civilizational hierarchies. His economic thinking unfolds within the colonial imaginaries integral to empire.

Marshall, the Biological Metaphor and Free Trade Empire

Alfred Marshall also began as a student of the natural sciences, but soon got wrapped up in studies of moral , which he taught at Cambridge for many years.

Widely regarded as the key institution-builder of the nascent British discipline of economics

(Kadish 1993; Maloney 1985; Reisman 1990, chapters 4 and 7), he is credited also with developing “technical tools” that became the backbone of neoclassical economics: the formalization of supply and demand curves and (partial) equilibrium analysis define his legacy for most economists (Reisman 1990, 263; Hart 2012, 5-8). Marshall’s Principles of Economics

(2009 [1920, 1890]) went through 8 editions between 1890 and 1920. It replaced Mill’s

Principles of Political Economy as the standard text and dominated the teaching of economics in

England until displaced by the writings of a notable student: .

13 Marshall does develop the familiar features of contemporary economics in Principles. To uncover “economic laws” comparable to those in the physical sciences, Marshall (2009, 27) directs economists to narrows their focus to those human motives and law-like behaviors that

“can be measured by price.” He also notes that human wants can be understood only in relation to the expansion of human “activities” over time and processes of social comparison that operate across space, formulations that might frustrate contemporary economists who favor a more parsimonious, even empty, and static notion of preferences/utility. But, despite this and soon enough, Marshall (2009, 79-85) does construct a conventional backward sloping demand curve.

Individuals make decisions to buy a good based on “whether it is worth his while to incur the outlay required to obtain it,” a desire that naturally “diminishes with every increase in the amount he already has.” With this reasoning at hand, Marshall produces an individual demand curve for a particular good, a representation he quickly extends to the social whole, aggregating individual curves into society’s demand curve for that good. Marshall believes this abstract formulation is critical for founding an economic science, but he pauses to note that constructing such curves assumes an individual’s “character or tastes” are fixed, “allowing” no “time for any change in his character.”

Marshall’s construction of supply curves involves a similar process of simplification. In a section of Principles titled “General Relations of Demand, Supply and Value,” Marshall (2009,

269) highlights the complex “forces of life and decay” of industry, but suggests that any

“advanced study” of these forces must begin by “first look[ing] at a simpler balancing of forces which corresponds to [a] mechanical equilibrium,” foregoing attention to the myriad complications that make even “temporary” balances unlikely (Marshall 2009, 274-5, 281-9).

Identifying a “stable equilibrium” represented by the conventional picture of intersecting supply

14 and demand curves requires a turn of mind that provisionally accepts that processes of production and need formation that unfold in time can be modelled as static. Yet he begins

Principles with a strong conviction that the static formulations with which economists begin are insufficient for an advanced economic science.

Somewhat unexpectedly, given his efforts to develop the tools of a static analytical system, Marshall (2009, 1, xi) begins Principles not with a list of axioms, but with a broad sociological claim: “Economics is the study of men in the everyday business of life.” For

Marshall, human “character” is “moulded” largely through work, establishing the conscious and unconscious habits that stabilize the “normal conditions” assumed by modern economic science.

Contra Jevons, who more often spoke in terms of “eternal verities” (Reisman 1990, 65), he begins Principles not with an abstract, trans-historical individual but with real individuals with historically formed wants, habits and behaviors. Starting with this evolutionary understanding,

Marshall (2009, xii-xiii) believes the “key-note” for economists is “dynamics rather than statics” and the “Mecca of the economist lies” not in the analogy to physics with which its practice may necessarily begin but in the development of the complexities of “economic biology.”

Marshall fills his dynamic ‘economic biology’ with the language of civilization and race.

He suggests that the “normal conditions” of “industrial life” are of “recent date” and realized only “in the Western World and in Japan” (Marshall 2009, xi-xii1, 4) who have achieved the height of the “stages in social history” through which humankind invariably moves. This historical sweep infuses many parts of Principles, with Book IV on a prime example. Here, Marshall claims to combine Adam Smith’s account of the division of labor and Herbert Spencer’s biological analogy to understand the trajectory of human progress.

For Smith, Marshall (2009, 200) asserts, advances in division of labor allow larger populations to

15 thrive on a limited territory. But he adds, following Spencer perhaps, that “the pressure of population on the means of subsistence tends to weed out those races who through want of organization or for any other cause are unable to turn to the best account the advantages of the place in which they live.” It is this struggle for survival that promotes the “development of the organism, whether social or physical.”

Marshall (2009, 201-2) says that this “hard truth” of the “[l]aw of the survival of the fittest” is “softened” somewhat “by the fact that those races, whose members render services to one another without exacting direct recompense” are “the most likely to flourish” and “to rear a large number of descendants who inherit their beneficial habits.” Descendants inherit acquired habits, Marshall believes, not simply through passing on culture, but also heredity.6 Since the environment often selects for other-regarding values and behaviors, no population would flourish long without a strong measure of “family and race duty,” as in his account of Anglo-Saxon racial unity below. In all of this, the struggles for individual and group survival produce the collective good of both productive and moral advance – as if by an . Economics appears, then, not simply as a model of the market, but as a broad social theory and a species of moral philosophy (Himmelfarb 1991, 285). But since material and moral advance is uneven across races or nations or civilizations, it appears that some groups with more elevated national character have a world-historical role and others fall prey to the slaughter-bench of history.

Marshall doesn’t use these terms but the resonance of Hegel’s philosophy of history is clear

(Collini, Winch, and Burrow 1983, 321, 326-331; see also Hart 2012, 17-28; Cook 2009, chapter

6).

6 Marshall follows Spencer in favoring Lamarckian views of evolution and sought confirmation in wide correspondence with biologists (Hart 2012: 63-70: Cook 2009, 197, 207-19).

16 International trade likewise appears enmeshed in broad narratives of moral evolution.

Marshall’s attention to international trade waxed and waned, but intensified in the years during and after the Tariff Reform movement early in the 20th century (Trentmann 2008, 27-32; Wood

1980). Like Jevons, Marshall interlinks the statics of a “pure theory of foreign trade” grounded in graphical analysis (see Marshall 1879) with dynamic assessments attentive to historical development, including colonial imaginaries of space and time. His discussion in his last work,

Money, Credit, and Commerce (2003 [1923]), is typical of his approach, reproducing the rhythm of his famous 1908 Memorandum (Marshall 1908),7 discussed in detail below.

Marshall’s formal theory in Money, Credit, and Commerce involves countries E and G

(read England and Germany), exchanging two goods, identified as bales of cotton and linen.

This abstract conception, Marshall (2003, 232-3) notes, has allowed economists -- since Ricardo

-- to treat the “complex problem of world trade” simply as “the exclusive trade between two countries.” Marshall (2003, 234-41, 249) constructs stylized “trading schedules” which suggest the number of bales of the other’s good each country’s traders are willing to buy at a range of prices. Assuming “free competition,” the merchants who conduct the trade will seek the lowest prices to the benefit of themselves and consumers. Here, he treats the nation as an aggregate of actors, the gains from trade flowing to “producers and traders” who are “merged in the collective interests of the population as a whole.” But even the nation appears as a socially evolved condition. Only with Napoleon, Marshall (2003, 198-9) argues, did European countries come to

7In 1903 Marshall signed a letter from prominent economists to The Times opposing tariff-reform proposals designed to raise revenue and favor Britain’s trade with its colonies. Soon after, Marshall was asked by a private secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to draft a memorandum on the fiscal implications of the proposals to impose customs duties. Revised and published only in 1908, the memo is considered a model of analysis (Wood, 1980, p. 482, fn 4).

17 “recognize the superiority of the interests of the nation as a whole,” now giving “national trade” a “high place among the interests of every nation of the Western World.”

Marshall (2003, 245) seems less certain that the benefits of open trade extend to all countries, since he acknowledges the model assumes E and G to be roughly industrial equals. He allows therefore that the protection of “nascent” industries in less advanced countries may be justified, despite initial costs. He also appears to believe that the current concentration of benefits from international commerce will diffuse over time, since the persistent advantage of early starters will gradually diminish as new communications and transportation technologies and global money markets open up new regions. The consequence is that “backward countries will gain on the more advanced,” unless they are blocked, as Jevons also notes, by “barbarous” cultural practices (Marshall 2003, 261, 281, 303-4).

In precise parallel with Jevons, Marshall’s musings on trade center on Britain’s efforts to maintain “industrial leadership” and involve extended historical accounts, incorporating various racial and civilizational factors (Marshall n.d. [1920] I, 6; hereafter IT). He develops this theme most fully in Industry and Trade, a companion volume to Money, Credit, and Commerce (see

Marshall 2003, 5-6). In Industry and Trade, he takes a comparative sociological view, informed by the moto “The many in the one, the one in the many.” The one tends to be Britain, of course, and Marshall, in a form of what Bell (2014, 657-8) calls “racial utopianism,” gives the British

Empire and Anglo-Saxon peoples a special role in historical development.

For Marshall, history shows that the industrial leadership of the one always builds on the earlier efforts of many others. Great Britain inherited mechanical inventions and industrial skills from the Medieval city-states, Holland and France (IT I, 28-29). Still, he weighs heavily

Britain’s unique national spirit, including traits of character like “firm will, self-determination,

18 thoroughness, fidelity and love of freedom,” which allow it to “stand out now as the leading type of continuous development” (IT I, 30; see also Marshall 1890, 630). Marshall also stresses that the one and many co-mingle continually, so that the progress of industry in any country develops only along with an interconnected system of global relations. Britain’s distinctive cultural and natural conditions turned into industrial leadership, he notes, only when profitably expressed in dominance of markets for industrial goods in “the highly civilized parts of the East” and when tied to the extraction of the natural resources of “ignorant people” and the management of colonial “plantations” (IT I, 30-33). The subtext is clear: the British one emerges only when the many are interconnected within the spatiality of colonial relationships.

Sensing that colonial relations require justification beyond their benefits to Britain,

Marshall (IT I, 36) draws loosely on Adam Smith to render a moral evaluation of these interconnected global relations. For Smith progress involves apparent costs, some revalued as advantages, others possibly mitigated, but some simply accepted as necessary (see Blaney 2018).

Marshall applies roughly this strategy, though emphasizing more than Smith the necessary costs.

While acknowledging the high costs to many of the “enclosure of the commons,” he stresses the positive “from a broad national view”: enclosure expanded the land and raw materials open to use by industry and diffused the new opportunities widely (IT I, 36-7). Slavery receives a similar assessment, but now the view is global.8 Marshall claims that “the institution of slavery sometimes came to the aid of progress, by forcibly breaking down the prescriptions of custom” that inhibited “new ideas” in “primitive civilization” (IT I, 137). Colonial , including slavery, brings populations into the competitive conditions that spur civilizational advance. The next sentence draws the general lesson: “progress has owed much to the subordination of the

8 Jevons (1905a, 48), by contrast, held strong anti-slavery views, despite his trade in racial science.

19 masses of the population to the will of a dominant race, whose minds have not been occupied with petty cares.” Eventual redemption for other races and common people only comes later, when the “the masses can pioneer for themselves” (IT I, 137). Again, we find some sacrificed to the imperial slaughter bench of historical progress and apparently for their descendants own good.

Marshall goes on in Industry and Trade, as we see below, to designate an Anglo-Saxon union as the singular agent of the next phase of human progress. He had pondered the relations of Britain and its former and self-governing settler colonies as a possible economic unit since the

1903 draft of his Memorandum (1908) in which he criticized customs duties as a fiscal tool (see

Wood 1980 and Coats 1968). Most strikingly, Marshall crafted his case for rejecting tariffs less in terms of welfare maximization, as we might expect an economist to do, and more as a defense of the Empire as a moral good. After weighing the relative vulnerabilities of Britain and its major competitors, he finds wildly misplaced the idea that protectionism could revive flagging competitiveness (Marshall 1908, 6-13). Britain’s position as “a leader,” though not “the leader,” in industry depends instead on “keeping her markets open,” because openness “increases the alertness of her industrial population in general, and her manufactures in particular” (Marshall,

1908, 21-23). Very like Jevons, he believes industrial leadership might be sustained despite growing manufacturing imports from her settler colonies, since they remain “thirsty for capital” and England maintains a surplus position. Plus, Britain rules the seas, her “battleships” securing shipping routes against “restless nations” in the Pacific and Atlantic (Marshall, 1908, 26).

Marshall ends the Memo with a justification of free trade in the moral and civilizational terms characteristic of late-Victorian liberal imperialism (see Bell 2007, 2016; Howe 2007).

Britain, Marshall suggests, may need to sacrifice “something of material gain for the sake of a

20 high ideal” like “Imperial unity.” He calls for Britain to “promote general intercourse throughout the Empire” because protectionist “schemes appear to me likely to breed more of disappointment and friction between England and her Colonies than of goodwill and the true spirit of Imperial unity” (Marshall 1908, 25-29). But the true goal, the “higher ideal than even

Imperial unity” involves working “towards a federated Anglo-Saxondom” (Marshall, 1908, 29).

Like Jevons, he clearly saw the ties of race extending to a deeper political, moral and cultural unity that would be disrupted by protectionism. For Marshall, free trade, empire, racial unity, and human progress come as a package (Collini, Winch, and Burrow 1983, 326).

We find this same line of thought in Industry and Trade, though now reinforced by wartime Anglo-American cooperation. Looking out at the world of the one and many, he sees the mantle of civilizational/racial leadership passing to the U.S. Its “spirit of youth,” energy, and greater individualism, all traits tested by the “natural selection of singular efficiency,” have made the U.S. the “chief leader” in industrial production (IT I, 97, 105). Marshall believes that the US now shows the future to the world, establishing the base on which additional industrial advance may rise. Britain retains a key role, nonetheless, but only within a globalized Anglo-Saxon racial axis. The US as the one may now be “the parent” of other races, but Britain maintains leadership in relation to her own settler colonies -- Canada, , New Zealand, and South Africa – and the rest of the empire, since no Non-European race can offer comparable world leadership (IT I,

111-2). Though Marshall (IT I, 109, 112) suggests, somewhat more forcefully than Jevons, that there is little basis for believing “that industrial leadership will remain always with the same races,” his punch line foretells continued Anglo-Saxon dominance: “Britain’s industrial leadership is to be measured by the achievements of Britons in their new homes as well as in their old” (IT I, p. 72). The key point is that Marshall’s thought unfolds less against the

21 backdrop of a states-system of free trading nations and more against the imagination of a liberal order centering on a ‘great Anglosaxondom’ as an economic, cultural/racial and political space and as a world-historical force.

Like Jevons, the prejudices of empire inform Marshall’s work: he imagines that economic science in both its static and dynamic versions may contribute to understanding the challenges facing differentially evolved human groups. Though attentive to the rise of the nation as a unit, Marshall consistently blurs both the domestic and the international and political/cultural and economic space. He demarcates his object of analysis in spatial categories inflected by empire, particularly in racial and civilizational units. He often envisions the world as a singular colonial division of labor, rather than a system of national economies, a construct that only later becomes dominant in economics (Breslau 2003). His formal theory of trade may follow and foreshadow conventional accounts of comparative advantage, but, like Jevons, his analysis of Britain’s industry and foreign trade led him directly into broader social evolutionary understandings of civilization and race. Free trade and global economic relations, more generally, could not be thought apart from empire and race.

Conclusions

A close reading of Jevons and Marshall reveals a distinctive variant of international theory quite unlike what we now expect from liberal economists. Though committed to identifying the mechanical laws of a proper economic science, they simultaneously embrace a spatial and temporal vision associated with the colonial imaginaries of an Empire system.

Jevons and Marshall appear, then, as participants in debates among late-Victorian and Edwardian

22 liberal thinkers on empire, only recently carefully studied by Duncan Bell (2007, 2016). Yet early economists are given minimal attention in Bell’s account of liberal empire, with the exception of the historical economists, William Cunningham and William Ashley, and the iconoclastic J. A. Hobson, figures increasingly marginalized within the emerging discipline of economics forged by Jevons and Marshall (see Hodgson 2005, 2001; Reisman 1990, chapter 7).

This neglect of early neoclassical economists like Jevons and Marshall seems curious since Bell

(2005, 2007, 2016, 32; also see Howe 2007 and Sylvest 2009) sees challenges to Britain’s dominant economic position and the discussion of settler colonies as crucial backdrops to the debates he (nearly) exhaustively documents.9

As I have argued elsewhere (Blaney 2017, 131-3), Bell’s omission is consistent with most recent work on l9th-century liberal theories of empire. Informed by cultural studies or postcolonial theory, recent scholarship displaces “political economy” from a determining role

(Proudfoot and Roche 2005, 1; see also Wolfe 1997, 406-7), rightly emphasizing as corrective the role of orientalist representation and racialization in place of an earlier exclusive fixation on imperial balance sheets and class or sectional interests as explanations of empire. Still, earlier political economists, including Smith, Bentham, and James and J.S. Mill, remain fixtures in the

IR canon, peppering international theorists’ stories of 19th-century liberalism and empire.

Despite Bell and others extending the discussion of liberal internationalism and empire into the late-19th and early 20th-centuries, the major figures in economics from that period remain absent from the IR canon.

9 In correspondence, Bell reports that Jevons and Marshall are never referenced by the major figures in the debates about the Empire and Greater Britain. But it is clear they were following these debates and lodged their work within these colonial imaginaries.

23 This might seem a puzzle, but not a deep one. I find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that international theorists, even as they have radically expanded the canon of liberal thought, fall into a sorting of thinkers according to contemporary disciplinary boundaries that they inherit from political theorists.10 Though expanded, the liberal canon continues to “divide domains” that generate new “boundary zones” to be explored (Rosenboim 2019, 98, 100), including, in my view, the boundary between early neoclassical economics and liberal political theory. By ignoring the work of figures like Jevons and Marshall, international theory risks inscribing the IR canon according to contemporary disciplinary boundaries anachronistically extended back in time and reinforcing indefensible separations of economics and politics/culture that, following

Trentmann (1998), undercut deeper possibilities of a form of cultural political economy (see

Blaney and Inayatullah 2010b).

Including these late-Victorian economists in the narrative of liberal international theory adds a missing element to the project of documenting “the ideological complexity and internal variability of liberalism” called for by Bell (2016, 5; see also Jahn 2013, 6; and Rosenboim 2019,

98). But to what effect? Guilhot (2019, 8) pointedly asks of the proliferating studies of the historiography of IR. One surprising implication of this work is that key founding fathers of economics did not consistently presume a world of national economies encompassed within the boundaries of a society of states. Instead of formulating the expected apparatus of homogenous units exercising comparative advantage and producing mutual gains, Jevons and Marshall regularly employ shifting vocabularies, invoking heterogeneous ‘trading bodies’ characterized as industries, nations and states or empires, races, and civilizations according to political and

10 Bown (2005, 61) states what she believes is the obvious: “the very existence of political theory depends on contingent designations of what is not political and what is not theoretical.” If international theorists accept this boundary by default, historians of economic thought police the boundary more aggressively on the other side. Bell doesn’t accept my formulation, though he does acknowledge that the IR canon is narrow in the respect I report.

24 cultural context. That is, their spatial imagination suggests a certain kind of realism: it reflects the facts (and ideologies) of the British Empire, a “commercial empire and system of class rule”

(Hill 1975, 384) joined to a racialized ideology, a colonial division of labor and the restriction of the rules of the state system to a narrow swath of humanity. Jevons and Marshall could hardly ignore the presence of empires, even though later economists systematically do so. Their temporal imagination similarly ventures beyond the static equilibrium analytics they invent onto the terrain of broad colonial histories in which successive empires play a pivotal role. Instead of abstracting from the heterogeneity of actors, they connect them all into a social evolutionary schema in which the backward may find their way to civilization via some form of colonial tutelage or the harsh laws of competition. The point is not to embrace this late-Victorian moral economy that took for granted relations of economic, political and social domination and sanctified the costs paid by some races and classes for economic and moral progress. Rather it is to note that the past and present role of these relations and costs are largely erased in contemporary economics and neoliberal and neorealist strands of IR when they adopt the abstract microeconomic models Jevons and Marshall worked to invent (Blaney 2020; Blaney and

Inayatullah 2018; see also Hobson 2012). For good and ill, Jevons and Marshall knew better.

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