Burt, G 2016 Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 5(1): 14, stability pp. 1–16, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.473

RESEARCH ARTICLE Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance Geoff Burt*,†

Haiti’s long and difficult security sector reform (SSR) process has entered a new phase. The reinstatement of the Haitian armed forces, nearly 20 years after for- mer President Jean-Bertrand Aristide disbanded them, adds a new set of actors and more complexity to a process already struggling to deliver results amidst a seemingly endless series of political crises. The armed forces must be an impartial and apolitical institution if they are to contribute to stability in Haiti – an uncer- tain proposition given their past inability to stay out of the political arena. Build- ing on a summary of the latest developments in the reinstatement process, this paper discusses its implications for Haiti’s prolonged international engagement. In particular, the paper focuses on the process to develop a new White Paper on Defence and National Security in Haiti. This process has the potential to contrib- ute to two of the most significant shortcomings of SSR in Haiti, a limited focus on security sector governance and a lack of local ownership. The reinstatement process has been an interesting test case of the international donor community’s commitment to the concept of local ownership, long held to be a moral and practical pillar of international engagement. Though reinstate- ment has been driven by Haitian authorities, the process has struggled to make progress without donor support, raising questions about the appropriate role of international actors in strategic decision-making at the national level. Regardless of their initial reaction to reinstatement, Haiti’s international donors risk missing an opportunity to influence the development of an important pillar of Haiti’s post- MINUSTAH security sector by choosing to remain on the sidelines.

Introduction transitions threaten to spiral out of control, Haiti is suffering through yet another politi- with the potential for widespread violence. In cal crisis. While observers hope for a peaceful this context, the continued development of electoral transition, recent events highlight both the Haitian National Police (HNP) and uncomfortable realities about contemporary the newly reconstituted Haitian army will be Haiti. Without the continued presence of the a key factor in determining how much sta- UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) bility MINUSTAH will leave behind. Critically, and its armed contingent, periods of insecu- it remains to be seen whether Haiti’s army rity and instability centered around political will reinforce or undermine the country’s efforts to establish and enforce the rule of * Centre for Security Governance, CA law. In presenting the latest developments † Security Governance Group, CA in the process of reinstating Haiti’s armed [email protected] forces, this paper examines the related issues Art. 14, page 2 of 16 Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance of security sector governance, local owner- criticized for a lack of local ownership and ship and international intervention in Haiti. commitment. SSR in Haiti has for the most As the long-awaited post-MINUSTAH transi- part been an internationally driven process, tion approaches, the failures of domestic suffering from limited national ownership governance after such a prolonged inter- on the part of the country’s political elites, national engagement threaten the legacy and even less participation from the coun- of the UN-led intervention. For better or try’s marginalized majority (see, for instance, worse, Haiti’s armed forces will play a signifi- CIGI 2009: 4; CIGI 2010: 4). The process to cant role in the country’s post-MINUSTAH reinstate the armed forces, by contrast, has future, and a failure by international donors been wholly driven by Haitian authorities, to engage in the reinstatement process may with the Ministry of Defence having received end up being a missed opportunity to influ- virtually no support from Haiti’s traditional ence its development. In a related sense, the SSR donors to date. recent political upheaval suggests that the This paper will provide both a survey of governance of Haiti’s security sector should the latest developments in the process to be as important a priority as the develop- reconstitute the Haitian armed forces since ment of any particular capabilities on the 2011, as well as an analysis of what progress part of the security forces. Moments of acute in this area means for Haiti’s security sector political crisis like what Haiti is now expe- reform process. In doing so, this article sur- riencing will test whether the armed forces veys various policy and academic reports, in will protect the state, as intended; or become addition to the author’s own field work with embroiled in political conflicts, as many fear. the Haitian security sector and interviews Indeed, it was the country’s political volatil- with relevant experts. The first section of the ity and the threat of authoritarian responses paper outlines the politics and process of that caused trepidation among domestic and the disbanding and reinstatement of Haiti’s international actors when former President armed forces, beginning with a discussion of Martelly announced his plan to reinstate the Haiti’s military history and the initial concern armed forces in 2011. around the army’s reinstatement. It then pro- The reinstatement of Haiti’s armed forces vides an update on how the process to revive is best viewed in the context of a lengthy and the army has unfolded. The paper situates the internationally-led period of stabilization. army’s reinstatement in the context of Haiti’s Between 1991 and 2004, eight UN peace- failure to develop an effective system of secu- keeping missions were deployed to Haiti, all rity sector governance, and with the inability with the mandate to build, stabilize or con- of Haiti’s leaders to effectively plan, lead and solidate Haiti’s democratic institutions (CIGI own their country’s SSR process. The paper, in 2009: 2). The present mission, MINUSTAH, turn, focuses on the promise of the develop- has operated in Haiti since 2004, and is ment of Haiti’s White Paper on Defence and joined by a variety of bilateral donors, notably National Security to improve both local own- the United States, Canada, France and Brazil, ership and security sector governance. It con- in supporting various security sector reform cludes with an analysis of what the Haitian (SSR) activities targeting the Haitian police, army’s reinstatement means for the future of justice and corrections sectors. In spite of SSR in the country, and the challenges facing this longstanding commitment, the interna- Haiti’s future leaders. tional community’s engagement in Haiti has generated relatively few notable successes, The Haitian Army’s Past and suffering from a number of familiar chal- Controversial Reinstatement lenges including a failure to advance reforms To understand the significance of Haiti’s new focused on governance of the security sector. armed forces, it is important to understand Above all else, Haiti’s SSR process has been the circumstances under which they were Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance Art. 14, page 3 of 16 disbanded and the controversy surrounding commission to study the same issue. This their reinstatement. Former President Jean- report, published in November 2008, simi- Bertrand Aristide disbanded the army, as one larly to the previous report, recommended a of his first acts of office in 1995, following a his- second armed force of 4,000 to 5,000 mem- tory of human rights abuses and involvement bers (Boutellis 2011: 3).3 Both commissions in coups against the country’s elected gov- held public consultations, founding that ernments (Le Chavallier 2011: 118). Aristide’s “the majority of the population believed a decision to disband the armed forces came as second armed force or military was needed a relief to many, considering Haiti had experi- to complete the security architecture of the enced some 34 military coups since gaining state” (CIGI 2010: 6). Additionally, the Latin its independence (Heine and Thompson 2011: American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP),4 16).1 The disarmament, demobilization and in both 2008 and 2012, asked Haitians reintegration (DDR) process, initially focusing whether they agreed that ‘another force is on former members of the Armed Forces of needed in the country,’ or that ‘the police Haiti (Forces Armées d’Haiti – FAd’H), is widely is enough to provide security.’ In 2008, considered to have been a failure, with many 75 percent of Haitians agreed that a second soldiers maintaining access to their weapons force was needed, compared to 72 percent and few participating in the limited rein- in 2012, with the report’s authors attribut- tegration programming made available to ing these support levels ‘in part to the fact them (see, for instance, Kolbe 2015: 66, 74; that a national army is strongly linked with Camilien 2012). Haitians’ sense of national identity’ (Smith, Twenty years later, the Haitian armed Gélineau and Seligson 2012: 124).5 For many forces were officially remobilized on Haitians, particularly younger Haitians who October 9, 2015 by decree of the country’s did not live through the Duvalier dictator- Council of Ministers.2 The announcement ship,6 the reinstatement of the armed forces was no surprise given former President is an issue of sovereignty and a matter of Michel Martelly’s 2011 campaign prom- national pride (ICG 2012: 5). Both leading ises, including the creation of a commis- candidates for the presidency in Haiti’s 2011 sion to study reinstatement, the subsequent election—eventual President Michel Martelly establishment of the Ministry of Defence and his opponent, Mirlande Minigat—favored and initial steps toward training a corps of reinstatement. Reinstatement, in some form, military engineers. Even before Martelly’s had clearly become politically inevitable. presidency, the movement to re-establish The international donor community has a military force had adherents from across however been less prepared to embrace the Haiti’s political spectrum. In 2004, Haiti’s return of Haiti’s armed forces. A presidential interim government established a commis- plan for the reconstitution of Haiti’s armed sion to study the issue. Their report, pub- forces, leaked in October 2011, sparked lished in February 2006, recommended the an outcry from critics who opposed the reinstatement of a military force without institution’s reinstatement. International policing functions (Commission Citoyenne de analysts largely stressed the risks of rein- Réflexion sur les Forces Armées 2006: 4, 22). statement, with initial critiques stressing The first commission cited the army’s pivotal several common economic, security and role in the nation’s heritage, its continued political concerns (see for instance Wilentz constitutional basis, and the presence of a 2011, Washington Post 2011, Sprague multi-national armed force in Haiti as jus- 2012a). An International Crisis Group (ICG) tifications for reinstatement (Commission report suggested that reinstatement should Citoyenne de Réflexion sur les Forces Armées wait until a greater national consensus was 2006: 26). The subsequent government of found, the HNP reached full strength, and President René Préval established a second tax revenues rose to manageable levels (ICG Art. 14, page 4 of 16 Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance

2012: iii, 6), noting that reinstatement was recruitment, among other serious issues, all not advisable for ‘budgetary, security and of which are compounded by the significant political reasons’ (ICG 2012: 5). On the issue downsizing of MINUSTAH ahead of its full of cost, a number of critics argued that the withdrawal (for a complete discussion of the price tag for reconstituting the armed forces state of the HNP, see Baranyi and Sainsiné (then pegged at US$95 million) was unjus- 2015). A recent progress report issued by the tifiable, given the other urgent priorities Haitian Government cites progress in com- facing the country. Some felt that reinstate- mand and control, training, administration ment was just an empty gesture given to and operations, while lamenting the under- supporters of the army by the Martelly gov- funding of current programs and highlighting ernment—in this view, without the funds and future risks arising from a loss of donor inter- the international support for reinstatement, est in the HNP (République d’Haïti 2016: 6–8). the plan would inevitably stall.7 According to Of the 70 targets set in the 2012–2016 HNP a member of the presidential commission, Development Plan, the report’s authors noted a representative speaking on behalf of the that six have been fully achieved, while 38 United States and Canada told the commis- have seen significant progress and 25 remain sion that ‘neither country would fund a rein- in their initial phases (République d’Haïti 2016: stated military’ (CIGI 2010: 7). The outgoing 38). In spite of this progress, some researchers US ambassador to Haiti, Kenneth Merten, now discuss the need to retain MINUSTAH’s reportedly said at the time that Washington police presence to maintain a minimum level ‘had no plans to help fund the army but of stability and ensure the withdrawal of the would not interfere with Haiti’s rights to set MINUSTAH armed contingent does not cause it up’ (Buenos Aires Herald 2012). anarchy (Binetti 2016).9 As a matter of public policy, the two There is no reason that the HNP is neces- camps disagreed about the most appropriate sarily incapable of developing the security model for Haiti’s security architecture, with capacities currently provided by MINUSTAH, one side viewing the HNP as capable (with or those envisaged for the armed forces (for additional support and training) of ensur- instance a special forces unit, an air support ing stability throughout the country. From wing or a parks conservation service). Instead, this perspective, a second armed force was supporters of reinstatement who doubt the unnecessary and potentially dangerously suitability of a ‘police-only’ model for Haiti counterproductive. Consequently, domes- are more likely to cite the police force’s tic and international human rights groups, poor historical performance, for instance Haiti’s development partners and parts of during the instability of the 2000 to 2004 the UN mission all argued that the focus period. Ministry officials are quick to point should remain on the reinforcement of the out that in 2003 and 2004, when faced with HNP, rather than the creation of a second an armed threat from paramilitary groups, armed force. While among the Haitian popu- police stations ‘fell like dominos.’10 They lation, the more satisfied respondents to one argue that whatever its mandated role, the poll were with the performance of the police, police proved incapable of protecting itself; the less likely they were to argue that a sec- consequently one of the core mandates of ond force was needed (Gélineau and Seligson the armed forces is to protect the police and 2012: 124). the state.11 This is a role, supporters argue, The HNP’s ability to safeguard the country’s that is currently being played by MINUSTAH’s stability remains an open question. While armed contingent; and when the UN leaves, the HNP has made important progress (for a Haitian armed force capable of protecting instance raising force levels to approximately the country must replace it. The concept of 15,000),8 there remain significant capacity a post-MINUSTAH security vacuum leading shortfalls, financial issues and problems with to widespread instability has thus become a Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance Art. 14, page 5 of 16 central justification for the reinstatement of proposal was leaked in October 2011. Most the armed forces. important to note is that in part due to the Practical questions aside, the main criticism reluctance of the international donor com- leveled against the armed forces was politi- munity to contribute to the government’s cal—namely that it was reckless to ignore the efforts, the reinstatement process has moved institution’s history and it’s potential to be more slowly than originally envisaged and used as a tool of repression. Given the army’s remains in its very early stages. Perhaps track record, it was hardly surprising that the owing to the limited involvement of its tra- Haitian human rights community and most ditional donors, the Haitian government of Haiti’s international donors were initially has taken a lead role from the outset. The against reinstatement. The chief concern was reinstatement process has gone through that the army would become a parallel armed several phases, beginning with the establish- force that would report directly to the execu- ment of a civilian-led commission which was tive and operate outside of civilian and par- given 40 days to finalize a plan determin- liamentary control.12 Many privately feared ing the form the reconstituted armed forces that the armed forces would become a kind of should take (Boutellis 2011: 1). This com- Praetorian Guard for the presidency. President mission, like its two predecessors, also rec- Martelly’s association with the Duvaliers, ommended the reinstatement of the armed and key military figures heightened fears of forces (Commission d’État d’Organisation de a return to Haiti’s authoritarian past (Parker la Composante Militaire de la Force Publique 2015). Even the Brazilian Minister of Defence, d’Haiti 2012). Following the commission’s whose government has supported reinstate- recommendation, the Ministry of National ment, reportedly sought assurances that Defence was established, followed by the troops trained by Brazil would not be used as creation of a 2013–2016 Development Plan ‘a personal militia’ (The Economist 2013). for the ministry. The Development Plan lays The security crisis prompted by the occupa- out five strategic aims for Haiti’s defence tion of public spaces by approximately 400 forces and calls for a public-service oriented armed former members of the FAd’H (Forces armed force made up of five components.13 Armées d’Haiti), demanding reinstatement The Presidential Decree of 26 October 2015 and the honoring of their military pensions, further elaborated on the structure of the did little to allay these fears (see ICG 2012: 6). Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Undeniably, paramilitarism in Haiti remains Forces (Le Moniteur 2015). a reality (see Sprague 2012b). In the days After the reinstatement plan was finalized leading up to Martelly’s exit, Guy Philippe, and the ministry established, the process of a former leader of the anti-Aristide coup in recruiting the first members of the armed 2004 threated to ‘divide the country’ should forces began. Faced with limited resources, a transitional government be installed that the Haitian government started with did not represent the provinces, saying ‘we the modest goal of accepting assistance are ready for war’ (Delva 2016). Philippe’s from non-traditional SSR donors, includ- threats were a reminder that Haiti’s politics ing Ecuador and Brazil, to train the first remain marred by the potential for armed cohorts of a new army corps of engineers. violence, as political interests continue to As a result, recruitment and training has use affiliated armed groups, including gangs, moved at a far slower pace than the original to interfere with political processes. Martelly plan of October 2011, which called for 3,500 troops to replace the MINUSTAH The New Haitian Armed Forces armed contingent by the time of their with- This section of the paper progresses to drawal. By 2012, then Minister of Defence provide an overview of the reinstatement Rodolphe Joazile noted that due to financial process since President Martelly’s initial constraints, ‘the army would be re-launched Art. 14, page 6 of 16 Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance with only about 1,500 troops’ (Buenos Aires Defence’s budget has been growing steadily Herald 2012). To date, even that more mod- since the 2012–2013 fiscal year, when its total est goal has not been reached. Although the budget was 180 million Haitian Gourdes (or 2013–2016 Development Plan calls for the US$ 2.91 million at current exchange rates). creation of a number of specialized units, By the 2015–16 fiscal year, this number had the period from 2013 to 2015 saw limited grown to 420.35 million Haitian Gourdes progress, except with respect to the army (or US$6.79 million), more than doubling its corps of engineers and the development budget in three years.15 At the same time, as of the Ministry of National Defence. Both Table 1 shows, the budgets of the Ministry Brazil and Ecuador have pledged to sup- of Justice and Public Security and the Haitian port the development of the Haitian Armed National Police have grown also grown since Forces, chiefly by providing training to the 2012–2013. Indeed, the level of spending on corps of engineers.14 The Ecuador-trained the Department of National Defence and the engineers are currently stationed at Petite size of its staff is tiny compared to both the Rivière de l’Artibonite; and after taking over MOJ and the HNP. In spite of the fact that the a base formerly occupied by Ecuadorian Ministry of National Defence’s budget nearly peacekeepers, they have begun to under- doubled in 2015–16, it is fair to say that fears take civil engineering projects such as the of the cost of reinstating the armed forces construction of roads. marginalizing the HNP’s development have One of the chief concerns of the interna- not yet been realized. The current level of tional donor community was that any invest- funding has allowed the establishment and ment in the Haitian armed forces would draw staffing of the ministry and the operation of attention and resources away from the HNP, a small corps of engineers, but little more. As which they considered the more important one report noted, ‘State Department officials priority. Indeed, the Department of National have said that there has been virtually no

Budget MOJ Budget HNP Budget MOD Budget HNP MOD Year (Gourdes) (Gourdes) Personnel Personnel 2012–13 7.18 billion 5.98 billion 180.0 million 11 859 NA (USD 115.97 (USD96.58 (USD 2.91 million) million) million) 2013–14 10.34 billion 6.81 billion 240.0 million 11 814 41 (USD 167.01 (USD 109.99 (USD 3.88 million) million) million) 2014–15 9.77 billion 7.55 billion 244.42 million 13 321 63 (USD 157.80 (USD 121.94 (USD 3.95 million) million) million) 2015–16 10.86 billion 8.48 billion 420.35 million 14 385 120 (USD 175.41 (USD 136.96 (USD 6.79 million) million) million)

Table 1: Budgets and Personnel, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of National Defence. Sources: Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (2012). Projet de Loi et de Finances, 2012–2013. Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (2013). Projet de Loi et de Finances, 2013–2014. Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (2014). Projet de Loi et de Finances, 2014–2015. Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (2015). Projet de Loi et de Finances, 2015–2016. Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance Art. 14, page 7 of 16 funding of the Defense Ministry to carry out (Donais 2011: 104). While the intense focus larger plans’ (Taft-Morales 2015: 40). on increasing the operational capacity of the police force has led to progress in that area, The Army and Haiti’s Failures of there has been much less attention paid to Security Sector Governance security sector governance issues of parlia- In spite of its holistic and governance- mentary engagement, oversight, account- focused ideals, SSR practice has often ability and transparency. Most critically, the resembled more traditional security sec- SSR process in Haiti has failed to address tor assistance focused on improving the fundamental questions of security sector effectiveness of the state’s armed forces. governance—instead remaining an executive- In particular, when faced with challeng- driven process at the strategic level. By virtue ing reform contexts, there has been a ten- of the sheer length of international engage- dency to revert to train-and-equip models ment in Haiti, projects with all manner of when faced with short-term security crises. actors, approaches, partners and donors In Haiti, international security sector assis- have been attempted, sometimes more than tance has, since 2004, been dominated by once. Community policing, for instance, has the massive undertaking of building up the reappeared as a key component of the HNP HNP, which has received by far the most development plan, after being a focus of attention and stands as a relative success international police reform efforts follow- compared to programs in other key areas ing the restoration of Haitian democracy in such justice and corrections (Boutellis 1994 (Donais and Burt 2015: 14). What has 2011: 3). Reflecting the HNP’s stature in been lacking, however, are improvements in the country, polling data from 2014 indi- the political and strategic processes by which cates that Haitians have among the high- policies are developed, priorities weighed est levels of trust in their national police and performance accounted for. in the Americas (Gélineau and Zechmeister In a general sense, SSR in Haiti has tradi- 2016: 176). However, even though inter- tionally been a top-down, non-consultative national support has focused intensely on exercise, which sidelined communities in one pillar of the security and justice sector, favor of political elites, whose performance recent research by Baranyi and Sainsiné has largely been dismal. In particular, the (2015) indicates that the HNP remains most recent parliament has been beset by plagued by insufficient growth, weak ter- political infighting, constitutional paraly- ritorial decentralization, excessive use of sis and general dysfunction. For the next force, and an inability to institutionalize phase of SSR to have any chance of success, community policing and counter violence Haiti’s incoming parliament and leadership against women. Regardless, successes in will have to perform better. How Haiti’s police reform have been undermined by politicians manage the early stages of devel- dysfunctional courts and overcrowded and opment of the armed forces will be an impor- inhumane prisons—the result of uneven tant test. The initial impulse to restore the progress amongst the various pillars of SSR. armed forces was driven by the personal will More importantly, notwithstanding the of the President, but it has since seen the successes and failures of the HNP, the UN establishment of a civilian commission in has not yet managed to support a successful 2011 and, more recently, consultative work- SSR process.16 Regarding the HNP, Timothy shops relating to the Defence White Paper. Donais states that ‘to date in Haiti, the pre- The challenge today is to build on these ini- occupation with achieving a basic level of tiatives in order to reorient the development operational effectiveness within the HNP of the armed forces into a broader SSR dis- has come largely at the expense of building cussion based on a strategic vision for Haiti’s mechanisms of democratic accountability’ justice and security sector as a whole. Art. 14, page 8 of 16 Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance

Local Ownership in Theory and aspects of the reinstatement process, such as Practice the appropriate form, size and mandate of The fact that reforms will not be successful if the armed forces. imposed by external actors is a cornerstone of Among the most interesting questions SSR theory and practice.17 National authorities arising from the army’s reinstatement is why, must be accorded the right to lead SSR pro- after two decades of hoping Haitian authori- cesses. By contrast, SSR in Haiti has tended to ties would take the lead on SSR, Haiti’s tra- be driven by donor agendas, with limited local ditional donors have shown so little interest ownership and political will, particularly in in the armed forces. One explanation is that specific areas such as justice and corrections. there is a legitimate difference of opinion Indeed, local ownership has been cited as a about whether a ‘police-only’ model can critical concern dating back to 1994, when the work for Haiti. Donors who believe it can, process to abolish the armed forces and cre- such as Canada, have preferred to stay on ate the Haitian National Police was conducted the sidelines, viewing the armed forces as with ‘minimal consultation’ with the public, a distraction to the more important task of leading to its eventual unraveling and the bolstering the police force. Another expla- creation of a new UN-led stabilization mission nation for the lack of interest from Haiti’s (MINUSTAH) (Mobekk 2005: 414–415). Some traditional donors is that these donors are have argued that a lack of sovereignty, partially not used to Haitians articulating their own stemming from the presence of missions such strategic priorities. One ministry official told as MINUSTAH, is at the root of Haiti’s present a story of a meeting where donors debating problems (Podur 2012). the merits of reinstating the armed forces The army’s reinstatement raises interesting were taken aback when he exclaimed: ‘This questions about the nature and definition is my country and I will not allow foreign- of local ownership in SSR. Reinstatement ers to think for me.’20 The traditional donor has thus far been driven by Haitian authori- community seems torn between a sincere ties and realized without the assistance of conceptual attachment to the importance of Haiti’s traditional donors, whose strategy has ownership, and a legitimate belief that the been to ignore the armed forces and remain government is making a mistake in reinstat- focused on providing support to the police ing the army. and justice sectors, perhaps hoping that without the financial means to reconstitute The White Paper: From Ownership to the armed forces, the project would stagnate Governance or stall entirely.18 If the benchmark for local Given its origins as a Haitian-led initiative, ownership is merely the absence of interna- the White Paper process—undertaken with tional involvement, the reinstatement pro- the support of the Organization of American cess certainly qualifies. For more maximalist States (OAS) Inter-American Defense Board definitions of ownership requiring a broader (IADB)—may be a particularly important and more inclusive consultative process, the opportunity to address both local owner- picture is mixed.19 What began as a process ship and security sector governance. After a associated with a single political figure, later visit by the IADB Chairman in January 2012, expanded to encompass an expert commis- Haiti’s government made a formal request sion and eventually public consultations. that the IADB participate in the commission On the other hand, these activities for the on the reinstatement of the armed forces, most part remained limited to Port-au-Prince with the Chairman noting at the time that elites. Beyond the few polls noted in this arti- ‘it is clear that this is a controversial topic cle, which focused on the overall desirability given the difficult recent history of civil- of a second armed force, there is little availa- military relations’ (OAS 2012). It was dur- ble data on Haitian attitudes towards specific ing this time that Martelly’s government Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance Art. 14, page 9 of 16 discussed with the IADB its plans for rein- and Canadian defence officials, in the pro- troducing the army. In a report to the IADB, cess.21 In partnership with the IADB, Haiti’s the chairman noted that President Martelly Ministry of Defence held a series of four ‘acknowledged that this is a very unpopular workshops to develop the White Paper on issue for many in the international com- Defence and Security of Haiti, the first of munity’ (IADB 2012: 2), while noting that which was held in September 2014. On June ‘re-creating a Haitian Defence Force was a 25, 2015, a ceremony was held to launch the very popular idea with the vast majority of White Paper. While it has not been released Haitians’ (IADB 2012: 2). Martelly reportedly publically, remarks by the Director General connected the issue of the army’s reinstate- of the IADB at this event provided some hints ment with Haiti’s ‘need to plan and have the as to its content. The Director General of the eventual capacity to assume responsibilities IADB Secretariat, Vice Admiral Bento Costa from the international community with the Lima Leite de Albuquerque Junior, called the inevitable withdrawal of MINUSTAH’ (IADB White Paper, ‘a document that goes beyond 2012: 2). Moreover, Martelly told IADB rep- only security and defense, it incorporates the resentatives that he wants the government variable of economic development and social ‘to be able to respond to natural disasters sustainability, all in one text’ (IADB 2015). and help its reconstruction activities,’ which The White Paper process is significant on would require engineering, medical, com- several levels. First, one of its most important munications and logistics abilities. Martelly contributions will be to transition the rein- also ‘highlighted the need for protecting statement of the armed forces from an execu- borders and specifically mentioned capa- tive-led process to one grounded in a National bilities to counter threats from transnational Security Strategy. The new armed forces have crime and drug trafficking’ (IADB 2012: 2). been associated with the personal politics of Representatives of the IADB recommended former President Martelly from the begin- in 2012 that Haiti ask for advice on the devel- ning, not least because of his well-known opment of a national security strategy (IADB associations with former military figures (see, 2012: 2). The IADB at the time felt that ‘real for instance, Delva and Fletcher 2011).22 The measurable progress is impeded by the lack White Paper process has the potential to de- of clear strategic direction and effective coor- personalize the development of the armed dination...’, making it ‘important to under- forces. As one Senior Official in the Ministry stand the Government’s overall National of Defence noted in 2015, ‘the Ministry is full Security Strategy, and have a complete secu- of good ideas, good people, competent peo- rity sector evaluation and needs assessment’ ple, who are waiting for the green light of the (IADB 2012: 3). president; the minister refuses to act without Following these meetings, Haiti’s govern- the green light from the president.’23 In his ment launched a White Paper process with view, one of the challenges was that President the support of the IADB, which included Martelly ‘has a lot of interests; you have to public consultations, albeit with a small wait for him to turn his attention to your and unrepresentative group of Port-au- area,’ with the effect being that ‘they are los- Prince based experts. Participants included ing and have lost precious time that could be ‘experts from the IADB, the Organization of used to move forward.’24 While this dynamic American States (OAS), the Commission of explains the slow development of the armed Development of the White Paper, univer- forces outside of the Ministry and the mili- sity professors and members of civil society’ tary engineers, it also highlights an important (Haiti Libre 2014). The role of the IADB in the issue for the army’s next phase of develop- White Paper process was described as help- ment. If Martelly was the driving force behind ing to write technical policies, and involv- the army’s development, what should the ing other OAS representatives, including US next government do to make sure it proceeds Art. 14, page 10 of 16 Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance in the right direction? In this sense, it is a posi- system—including both the police and the tive sign that the White Paper process involved armed forces, but also the judiciary, ministerial civil society leaders and Haitian intellectuals, control and parliamentary oversight mecha- rather than being limited to Martelly’s inner nisms—is a crucial bulwark against a return to circle or political party. authoritarianism. There is a Haitian proverb Second, the White Paper establishes a that says ‘konstitisyon se papye, bayonèt se fè: clear outline for the responsibilities and a constitution is made of paper, a bayonet of mandates of the country’s security sector iron’ (Schuller 2015). In other words, laws and actors. As one report noted, the activation regulations do not define political reality in of the Ministry of Defence added ‘another Haiti. While the White Paper and the Ministry body to the confusion of institutions with of Defence’s Development Plan paint a picture often overlapping security responsibilities,’ of a public service oriented military focused recommending that the Conseil Supérieur on natural disasters, medicine and protecting de la Police Nationale (CSPN) ‘must clearly Haiti’s forests, this may not prevent the army define the terms of reference of each, par- from later becoming coercive or politicized. ticularly for the supervision of and relations The international community must help with the HNP’ (ICG 2012: 6). The CSPN plays Haiti’s government build deeper and stronger an advisory role on all major policy matters systems of accountability, oversight and stra- relating to the HNP (Le Moniteur 1994). The tegic policymaking. Rather than withdrawing, White Paper will help to create some concep- the timing is right for the international com- tual clarity surrounding the security forces. munity to further engage with Haiti’s security The fact that the White Paper is associated sector. The Defence White Paper provides that with the OAS and the IADB means that ques- opportunity. tions relating to the armed forces could be The process to reinstate Haiti’s army high- referred back to those bodies. lights some uncomfortable facts about local While de-linking the executive from the ownership and international stabilization armed forces is a sensible policy, and an missions. International donors, of course, empowered parliament may have the ability have the right to choose which projects to tame any authoritarian tendencies Haiti’s they will support financially and politically. new president may have, the White Paper will This must be balanced with the right of ultimately be no more than a piece of paper the host nation to choose its own path. In unless it contributes to genuine changes in Haiti, most donors and international organ- Haiti’s security sector governance. In this izations chose to disengage, largely leaving sense, its greatest potential may lie in its abil- Haiti’s government to pursue reinstatement ity to serve as an entry point for donors who alone. There are two realities here. First, the come to see the need for a second armed Haitian state remains dependant on donor force after the MINUSTAH withdrawal. The largesse to function. The ability of donors White Paper process provides an alternative to effectively stall the process of the army’s outlet for international engagement, which development by withholding financial allows donors to focus on security sector support underscores the power inequality governance, depoliticization, oversight and between the country’s sovereign govern- accountability, rather than rushing to pro- ment and the international community. vide training and equipment. What ownership does the Haitian govern- ment have over its SSR process if it is effec- Conclusion tively unable to pursue programming, or Haiti appears to be at a crossroads. The at least severely constrained in its options, reinstatement of the Haitian armed forces without the active support of its donors? is now a fait accompli. A sound system of Second, once the government demonstrated governance for Haiti’s security and justice that it was determined to move forward Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance Art. 14, page 11 of 16 with reinstatement, the international com- Notes munity’s decision to remain on the sidelines 1 Fatton (2002 and 2007) provides an could constitute a missed opportunity to influential account on Haiti’s political influence the development of a key security history. sector institution in its formative stages. 2 Because the armed forces had been dis- While it is likely that the development of banded by decree, there were no major the HNP will continue to occupy the major- legal hurdles facing the Martelly admin- ity of donor attention, a renewed focus istration in reconstituting the institu- should be placed on the governance, over- tion. It remained authorized by Haiti’s sight and accountability of the security sec- Constitution. tor in general. With the eventual election 3 For an excellent discussion of Haiti’s mili- of a new government, the timing is favour- tary past, and Martelly’s initial plans for able for donors to pursue a security sector reinstatement, see Boutellis (2011). governance agenda. Strengthening the role 4 A regional organization that conducts of Haiti’s parliament in the oversight of the biennial attitudinal surveys. security forces and building the capacity of 5 One report that has been reported to the Ministry of Defence to be an effective demonstrate that over 96 percent of and accountable institution, would be ways Haitians oppose a second force was to contribute to the governance of Haiti’s in fact asking whether former (demo- army without directly supporting the train- bilized) FAd’H members should ide- ing of new recruits. Even if they are training ally be responsible for security (see for non-combat units, countries like Ecuador instance Sprague 2012c). The data in and Brazil, who are actively engaged in train- question came from Kolbe and Muggah ing the security forces, should avoid a nar- 2011: 243. row focus on operational effectiveness. The 6 An estimated 70 percent of Haiti’s popu- training of senior, management personnel lation is under 30, while Haitians aged in human rights, governance and account- 15-to-29 alone make up 50 percent of ability should be a key aspect of any training the country’s population (Muggah and arrangements. Maguire 2010). The risk is that if this opportunity for 7 Interview with Haiti analyst, September engagement is not taken, Haiti’s familiar 2, 2015 by phone. pattern of authoritarianism and repression 8 Experts believe that the Haitian National could repeat itself. While Michel Martelly is Police would need to grow to approxi- not permitted by Haitian law to hold consec- mately 20,000 to maintain stability on its utive terms, there is every reason to believe own (Delva and Fletcher 2011). that he is not finished as a force in Haitian 9 Other analysis has stressed the likelihood politics. Indeed, he told a journalist in 2016, that crime and security will deteriorate that if there is ‘continuity’—in other words, ‘if MINUSTAH withdraws too early’ (IHS if his preferred candidate Jovenel Moïse wins Jane’s 2015). the current round of elections—he could 10 Interview with member of the Ministry of come back. The same journalist asked Moïse Defence cabinet, September 1, 2015, by if he and Martelly had a twenty-year plan of phone. alternating presidencies in mind, Moïse said: 11 Interview with member of the Ministry of ‘Yes. It’s a good plan. We need stability. We Defence cabinet, September 1, 2015, by need it’ (Anderson 2016). phone. 12 Interview with Arthur Boutellis, Director Competing Interests of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace The author declares that they have no com- Operations, International Peace Institute peting interests. (IPI), September 21, 2015, by phone. Art. 14, page 12 of 16 Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance

13 The five strategic goals are: 1) The defence 19 For a full discussion of the definition of of Haiti’s territorial integrity through the ownership in SSR, see Donais (2008), control of the country’s land, sea and air Gordon (2014), Nathan (2007) and borders; 2) Fight transnational organized Mobekk (2010). crime; 3) Fight terrorism and cyber terror- 20 Author Interview, Senior Member of ism; 4) Protect the population against all Ministry of Defence, 2015. forms of aggression and against natural 21 Interview with member of the Ministry of disasters; and 5) Protect the environment Defence cabinet, September 1, 2015, by against all risks and threats (monitoring phone. forests, watersheds, mangroves and min- 22 Former president Martelly, who had ing) (Ministry of National Defence 2013: 7). appeared in public with former dicta- The armed forces is to be made up of five tor Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier sev- components: 1) A corps of engineers, 2) A eral times, called him an ‘authentic son mandatory civic service unit, envisaged as a of Haiti’ on Twitter after his death (BBC means to promote employment for Haiti’s News 2014). He is reportedly close to youth, 3) An environmental unit / Forest Duvalier’s son, Francois Nicolas Duvalier Rangers, 4) A medical unit, and 5) A border (Renois 2014). unit (Ministry of National Defence 2013: 8). 23 Interview with member of the Ministry of 14 Ecuador’s training program began in Defence cabinet, September 1, 2015, by October 2012, and by the end of 2013 had phone. trained 41 Haitian engineers (Haiti Libre 24 Interview with member of the Ministry of 2013). The Haitian students graduated Defence cabinet, September 1, 2015, by from the Eloy Alfaro and Los Vencedores phone. del Cenepa military training schools after completing ten months of training References in Ecuador (Caribbean News Now 2014). Anderson, J L 2016 Aftershocks: Is the earth- They received training in repairing and quake-stricken country’s flamboyant constructing buildings, roads and sewer President a savior or a rogue? The New systems, surveying and using heavy con- Yorker.1 February. struction equipment (Diálogo 2014). Baranyi, S and Sainsiné, Y 2015 Le déve- In May 2013, Brazil announced that it loppement de la PNH, la sécurité publique would train up to 500 Haitian students et l’État de droit en Haïti. Projet « Sécu- in Brazil and a further 1,000 in Haiti rité publique et État de droit en Haïti », (Diálogo 2013). financé par l’Agence Universitaire de la 15 Before 2012, the level of military spend- Francophonie (AUF) via le Bureau des ing in Haiti was effectively zero, accord- Caraïbes Rapport de recherche #1. ing to the Stockholm International Peace BBC News 2014 Haiti: Hundreds attend Research Institute (SIPRI 2015). ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier’s funeral. 11 October. 16 Interview with Arthur Boutellis, Director Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/ of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace world-latin-america-29585713 [Last Operations, International Peace Institute accessed 29 April 2016]. (IPI), September 21, 2015, by phone. Binetti, B 2016 Beyond MINUSTAH: What can 17 See, for instance, Nathan (2007), Latin America do for Haiti? The Dialogue. Chesterman (2007), and Schirch and Available at: http://www.thedialogue. Mancini-Griffoli (2015). org/blogs/2016/02/beyond-minustah- 18 Interview with Arthur Boutellis, Director what-can-latin-america-do-for-haiti/ of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace [Last accessed 27 April 2016]. Operations, International Peace Institute Boutellis, A 2011 Issue Brief: What Army (IPI), September 21, 2015, by phone. for Haiti? New York: International Peace Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance Art. 14, page 13 of 16

Institute. November. Available at: http:// for revival, Reuters. 17 November. Avail- www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/ able at: http://www.reuters.com/article/ publications/ipi_e_pub_haiti_army.pdf us-haiti-army-idUSTRE7AG2EY20111117 [Last accessed 20 April 2016]. [Last accessed 29 April 2016]. Buenos Aires Herald 2012 Ecuador, Brazil Diálogo: Digital Military Magazine 2013 to help set up Haiti new military. 30 July. Brazil to Help Haiti Train New Engineers. Available at: http://www.buenosairesher- 31 May. Available at: http://dialogo- ald.com/article/107574/ecuador-brazil- americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/ to-help-set-up-haiti-new-military [Last features/regional_news/2013/05/31/ accessed 29 April 2016]. feature-ex-4195?change_locale=true Camilien, N M 2012 Reintegration of Former [Last accessed 29 April 2016]. Soldiers of the Haitian Armed Forces. PhD Diálogo, Digital Military Magazine 2014 Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chi- Ecuadorian military engineers help rebuild cago. Available at: https://indigo.uic.edu/ Haitian regions devastated by earthquake, bitstream/handle/10027/9567/Camil- 27 January. Available at: http://dialogo- ien_Nixon.pdf?sequence=1 [Last accessed americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/ 22 August 2016]. features/regional_news/2014/01/27/ Caribbean News Now 2014 Haiti’s new minustah-ecuador [Last accessed 29 April military force launches operations. 2016]. 15 February. Donais, T 2008 Local Ownership and Secu- Chesterman, S 2007 “Ownership in The- rity Sector Reform. Geneva Centre for the ory and in Practice: Transfer of Author- Democratic Control of the Armed Forces ity in UN Statebuilding Operations”, (DCAF). Münster: Lit Verlag. Journal of Intervention and Statebuild- Donais, T 2011 Reforming the Haitian ing, Vol. 1, No. 1. DOI http://dx.doi. National Police: From stabilization to org/10.1080/17502970601075873 consolidation. In Heine J and Thompson Commission Citoyenne de Réflexion sur les A Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and beyond. Forces Armées 2006 Rapport Final de la United Nations University Press. Commission Citoyenne de Réflexion sur Donais, T and Burt, G 2015 “Peace-building les Forces Armées. Available at: http:// in Haiti: the case for vertical integration.” www.moun.com/mail/Rapport%20 Conflict, Security and Development, 15:1. final%20expurg%C3%A9%20des%20 DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1467880 non%20signataires.pdf [Last accessed 2.2015.1008217 22 August 2016]. Fatton, R 2002 Haiti’s predatory republic: Commission d’État d’Organisation de the unending transition to democracy. la Composante Militaire de la Force Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Publique d’Haïti 2012 Deuxième Rap- Fatton, R 2007 The roots of Haitian despotism. port de la Commission d’Etat d’Organisa- Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. tion de la Composante Militaire de la Force Gélineau, F and Zechmeister, E 2016 Political Publique d’Haiti. Copy obtained by author. Culture of Democracy in Haiti and in the Delva, J G 2016 Ex-coup leader threatens Americas: Democratic Governance Across division of Haiti as unrest spreads, Sydney 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer. Latin Morning Herald, 15 January. Available at: American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), http://www.smh.com.au/world/excoup- Vanderbilt University. Available at: http:// leader-threatens-division-of-haiti-as- www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/haiti/AB2014_ unrest-spreads-20160125-gmdds0.html Haiti_Country_Report_English_V3_W.pdf [Last accessed 25 April 2016]. [Last accessed 23 August 2016]. Delva, J G and Fletcher, P 2011 Analysis: Gordon, E 2014 Security Sector Reform, Local Haitian army: ghost of bloody past set Ownership and Community Engagement. Art. 14, page 14 of 16 Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance

Stability: International Journal of Security publication/295561928_Reintegrating_ & Development, 3, no. 1: 1–18. Members_of_Armed_Groups_into_Soci- Haiti Libre 2013 Haiti – Army : Jean ety_An_Evaluation_of_Three_Approaches Rodolphe Joazile in Ecuador, 1 January. [Last accessed 22 August 2016]. Available at: http://www.haitilibre.com/ Kolbe, A and Muggah, R 2011 Securing the en/news-7747-haiti-army-jean-rodolphe- State: Haiti before and after the earth- joazile-in-ecuador.html [Last accessed quake” in Lebrun, E (Ed.) Small Arms Sur- 29 April 2016] vey 2011: States of Security. Cambridge: Haiti Libre 2014 Haiti – Security : Workshop Cambridge University Press. on the Development of White Paper on Le Chavallier, G 2011 The ‘MINUSTAH expe- Defence and National Security, 15 Septem- rience.’ In: Heine J and Thompson A Fix- ber. Available at: http://www.haitilibre. ing Haiti: MINUSTAH and beyond. United com/en/news-12059-haiti-security-work- Nations University Press. shop-on-the-developmentof-white-paper- Le Moniteur 1994 Law on the National on-defence-and-national-security.html Police. 29 November. Available at: [Last accessed 29 April 2016] https://www.oas.org/juridico/MLA/fr/ Heine, J and Thompson, A 2011 Introduc- hti/fr_hti_mla_gen_police.html [Last tion: Haiti’s Security Challenges. In: accessed 7 September 2016]. Heine, J and Thompson, A Fixing Haiti: Le Moniteur 2015 Decree on the organiza- MINUSTAH and beyond. United Nations tion and functioning of the Ministry of University Press. Defence. 9 October. IHS Jane’s 360 2015 Haiti’s security envi- Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances ronment likely to deteriorate over coming 2012 Projet de Loi et de Finances, 2012–2013. year, protests likely around election time. Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances Available at: http://www.janes.com/ 2013 Projet de Loi et de Finances, 2013–2014. article/52771/haiti-s-security-environ- Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances ment-likely-to-deteriorate-over-coming- 2014 Projet de Loi et de Finances, 2014–2015. year-protests-likely-around-election-time Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances [Last accessed 29 April 2016] 2015 Projet de Loi et de Finances, 2015–2016. Inter-American Defence Board (IADB) Ministry of National Defence 2013 Plan 2012 Trip Report: OAS ASG Visit to Haiti d’Action 2013–2016. Port-au-Prince: Min- 18–19 January 2012. istry of National Defence. Inter-American Defence Board (IADB) Mobekk, E 2005 Conference Report. In 2015 IADB took part to the Haitian White Ebnöther A H and P Fluri, After Inter- Paper handing-ceremony, 25 June. vention: Public Security Management in International Crisis Group 2012 Towards Post-Conflict Societies – From Interven- a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an tion to Sustainable Local Ownership. Effective Transition, Crisis Group Latin Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consor- America/Caribbean Report N°44, 2 tium: SSR Working Group. Available August. Available at: http://www.crisis- at: https://www.ciaonet.org/attach- group.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/ ments/297/uploads [Last accessed 29 haiti/044-towards-a-post-minustah-haiti- April 2016]. making-an-effective-transition.pdf [Last Mobekk, E 2010 Security Sector Reform and accessed 29 April 2016] the Challenges of Ownership, In: Sedra Kolbe, A 2015 Reintegrating Mem- M The Future of Security Sector Reform. bers of Armed Groups into Society: An Waterloo: The Centre for International Evaluation of Three Approaches. PhD Governance Innovation. Dissertation, University of Michigan. Avail- Muggah, R and Maguire, R 2010 “To rebuild able at: https://www.researchgate.net/ Haiti, start with its young people,” Los Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance Art. 14, page 15 of 16

Angeles Times, 31 January. Available Sprague, J 2012a Reviving Haiti’s army at: http://articles.latimes.com/2010/ would harm democracy. Available at: jan/31/opinion/la-oe-maguire31- http://www.miamiherald.com/news/ 2010jan31 [Last accessed 22 August 2016]. local/community/article1942504.htmly Nathan, L 2007 No ownership, no commitment: would harm democracy, The Miami Her- a guide to local ownership of Security Sector ald, 26 September. Available at: [Last reform. Technical Report. University of accessed 6 May 2016]. Birmingham, Birmingham, UK. Sprague, J 2012b Paramilitarism and the Organization of American States (OAS) 2012 Assault on Democracy in Haiti. New York: Committee on Hemispheric Security: Sum- Monthly Review Press. mary of the meeting of January 12, 2012. Sprague, J 2012c Haiti’s excluded major- Parker, E 2015 How a Former Fugee Helped ity opposes army’s re-creation. Jamaica Elect the President of Haiti. The New York Observer, 27 October. Available at: http:// Times, 29 November. Available at: http:// www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/ www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/movies/ haiti-s-excluded-majority-opposes-army- how-a-former-fugee-helped-elect-the- s-re-creation [Last accessed 22 August president-of-haiti.html?_r=0 2016]. Podur, J 2012 Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Stockholm International Peace Research Coup, the Earthquake and the UN Occupa- Institute (SIPRI) 2015 SIPRI Military tion. London: Pluto Press. Expenditure Database. Available at: Renois, C 2014 Hundreds at funeral http://www.sipri.org/research/arma- for former Haiti dictator ‘Baby Doc’, ments/milex/milex_database/milex_ AFP,11 October. database [Last accessed 29 April 2016]. Republique d’Haïti 2016 5ème Rapport Taft-Morales, M 2015 Haiti Under President de mise en oeuvre du Plan de Dévelop- Martelly: Current Conditions and Congres- pement de la PNH 2012–2016: Sep- sional Concerns. Washington: Congres- tembre 2014 – Septembre 2015. Haiti: sional Research Service, 23 December. Port-au-Prince. Available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/ Schirch, L and Mancini-Griffoli, D 2015 crs/row/R42559.pdf [Last accessed Local Ownership in Security: Case Studies of 26 April 2016]. Peacebuilding Approaches. The Hague, The The Centre for International Governance Netherlands: Alliance for Peacebuilding, Innovation (CIGI) 2009 The Security Sector GPPAC, Kroc Institute, 2015. Reform Monitor: Haiti, No. 1. Available at: Schuller, M 2015 100 Years of Occupa- https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/ tion in Haiti: Constitution Maybe Paper, files/ssr_monitor_haiti_no1_0.pdf The Huffington Post, 31 July. Available The Centre for International Govern- at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ ance Innovation (CIGI) 2010 The Secu- mark-schuller/100-years-of-occupa- rity Sector Reform Monitor: Haiti, No. 4. tion-c_b_7900460.html [Last accessed Available at: https://www.cigionline. 6 May 2016]. org/sites/default/files/ssrm_haiti_v4_ Smith, A E, Gélineau, F and Seligson, M A april_20_2010.pdf 2012 The Political Culture of Democracy in The Economist 2013 Haiti’s Army: Who Haiti and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Needs Them? 19 October. Available at: Equality of Opportunity. Latin American http://www.economist.com/news/ Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Vander- americas/21588085-michel-martelly- bilt University. Available at: http://www. pushes-ahead-reviving-army-who-needs- vanderbilt.edu/lapop/haiti/Haiti_Coun- them [Last accessed 29 April 2016]. try_Report_2012_English_Cover_V2_W. Washington Post 2011 A new army is not pdf [Last accessed 22 August 2016]. what Haiti needs. 16 October. Available Art. 14, page 16 of 16 Burt: Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance

at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 2 November. Available at: http:// opinions/a-new-army-is-not-what-haiti- www.bloombergview.com/arti- needs/2011/10/14/gIQAvZripL_story.html cles/2011-11-02/why-haiti-does-not- Wilentz, A 2011 Why Haiti Does Not Need need-a-new-95-million-army-amy-wilentz a New $95 Million Army Bloomberg, [Last accessed 20 April 2016].

How to cite this article: Burt, G 2016 Haiti’s Army, Stabilization and Security Sector Governance. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 5(1): 14, pp. 1–10, DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.5334/sta.473

Submitted: 21 June 2016 Accepted: 23 August 2016 Published: 30 September 2016

Copyright: © 2016 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

Stability: International Journal of Security & Development is a OPEN ACCESS peer-reviewed open access journal published by Ubiquity Press.