The Turning Point in the Slovenians' Perception of the War Occurred

Home , Treaty of London (1915)

CHAPTER TWO

ITALY “ANTE PORTAS”

The turning point in the Slovenians’ perception of the war occurred – after the initial enthusiasm that slowly faded away in the face of the fĳirst Austro-Hungarian defeats on the Russian and Serbian fronts and growing economic difffĳiculties in the rear – when Italy was brought into the conflict on the side of the Entente by the Treaty of London’s promises of Habsburg territory. For the Slovenians of the dual monarchy, this meant that the war might afffect their national territory, bringing the reality of warfare dangerously close to their everyday lives. In the eyes of the Catholic Church, the soldiers confronted an impor- tant dilemma. They marched to war against troops whose beliefs were predominantly Catholic. What attempts did the Church make to resolve this dilemma? The essential themes, which will be addressed in this chapter, are therefore fĳirstly centred around the questions of the interpretive tools – and imagery – that the Church seized upon to explain the nature of the Italian foe in 1915, given that he threatened to encroach directly upon the Slovenian lands. Secondly, can we trace any distinguishing fea- tures in the Slovenian soldiers’ and civilians’ perceptions of the adversary “arising” in the west? May we assume that there existed an “anatomy” of hatred? This chapter will be divided into three parts. In order to gain an insight into the political background to the conflict, the fĳirst section will be devoted to a short outline of the diplomatic preludes to Italy’s decision to wage war against the Habsburg monarchy. The second will examine the Catholic Church’s engagement to transmit patriotic zeal to Slovenians, to urge them on in defence of their homeland. The third part will address the Slovenian soldiers and their attitudes towards the Italians, as recorded in their personal accounts in the period immediately after the proclamation of war on Austria-Hungary in the so called “Radiant May” of 1915. Do these perceptions also reveal their view of faith?

“Our former ally has shamefully betrayed us, and in a perfĳidious manner attacked us”, announced Slovenec on 5 June 1915. The (desperate) hopes of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires that Italy’s territorial demands 46 chapter two could be satisfĳied by yielding to it parts of the Habsburg land on the western frontier, along with other concessions in the Adriatic and in Albania, hesitatingly offfered by Austria-Hungary, were gone. When on 3 August 1914 Italy declared its neutrality, the most that the Central Powers – and the contracting partners in the Triple Alliance, last renewed in 1912 – could anticipate was that the Italian Cabinet would not forsake its posture of non-involvement; at worst, Italy could seize the opportunity created by the war to deliver a “stab in the back” so as to acquire areas of the Habsburg monarchy inhabited by the Italian-speaking population – the Trentino or south Tyrol region, Trieste and its environs, to establish supremacy over the Adriatic Sea, and to advance national ambitions in the western Balkans, in the Ottoman empire, and in Africa. 1 The Italian irredentist dream of the late 19th century had never lost its attractions for its more zealous advocates, who invoked their “divine and human right” to claim the “unredeemed towns” across the border in the Habsburg monarchy, even where the Italian population2 was substan- tially outnumbered by Slovenians or Croats and Serbs. The inhabitants of Dalmatia were overwhelmingly Serbo-Croat; as a later Italian statesman, Count Ciano, put it, only “the stones” there were Italian.3 Yet the July crisis and Italy’s omission from any foreknowledge of the crucial events (includ- ing the drafting of the German-backed Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, about which Marchese Antonio di San Giuliano had not been offfĳi- cially informed, so as to prevent the – presumably “Slavophile” – Italian foreign minister from leaking any information to St. Petersburg or from pressing for peace) exposed the feebleness of the country’s claim to be a great power.4 Neither its military merit nor its economic development warranted Italy that status. After a brief, triumphant war against Turkey in 1911–12, Italy fought to regain its breath, and large contingents of troops

1 A. J. May, The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy 1914–1918, Vol. I, University of Penn- sylvania Press, Philadelphia 1966, 171; cf. W. A. Renzi, In the Shadow of the Sword: Italy’s Neutrality and Entrance Into the Great War, 1914–1915, Peter Lang Publishing, New York 1987, 82–97. 2 In 1910 the Italians numbered under 800,000 in a total of population of 51 million. According to the Austro-Hungarian census of that year, which classifĳied the population by “habitual language”, percentages of the Italian population were as follows: Trentino 97%, South Tyrol 9%, Trieste and district 62%, Gorica-Gradiška 36%, Istria 38%, Dalmatia 2,8%, and Rijeka (Fiume) 49%. The total percentage in Austria (excluding Rijeka) was 2,7%. In addition to the 119,000 Austrian Italians in Trieste, 30,000 of the 38,000 “foreigners” who appear in the census were Italians from the Kingdom. 3 A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918, Penguin Books, London 1990, 255. 4 Cf. R. J. B. Bosworth, Italy and the Approach of the First World War, Macmillan, London 1983, 121.