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A Fire Waiting to Be Lit: the Origins of World War I

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A Fire Waiting to Be Lit: the Origins of World War I Bill of Rights Constitutional Rights in Action Foundation FALL 2014 Volume 30 N o 1 cc A FIRE WAITING TO BE LIT: THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR I ON JUNE 28, 1914, AN ANGRY YOUNG MAN OPENED FIRE ON A CAR GOING THROUGH THE STREETS OF SARA - JEVO, THE CAPITAL OF BOSNIA. HIS TARGETS WERE TWO PASSENGERS IN THE OPEN CAR: FRANZ FERDINAND, HEIR TO THE THRONE OF AUSTRIA- HUNGARY, AND HIS WIFE, SOPHIE. THE ATTACKER SUCCEEDED IN KILLING THEM. THE MURDERS SPARKED A CON - FLICT THAT EXPLODED INTO A WAR ENVELOPING MUCH OF THE WORLD, CAUSING MORE THAN 16 MILLION DEATHS, AND LEAVING 20 MILLION PEOPLE WOUNDED OR MISSING. s WORLD WAR I LASTED FOUR YEARS n o AND BROUGHT DESTRUCTION ON A m m o SCALE THAT NO ONE HAD IMAGINED. C a i WHY AND HOW DID THE WORLD GO TO d e m i WAR IN 1914? k i W For about 100 years, from The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, as depicted in a drawing on the 1815 to 1914, the great powers of front page of a 1914 Italian newspaper. Europe had managed to avert a in economic power. In 1870, Britain himself to making Germany into full-scale Europe-wide war. The had 32 percent of the world ’s man - a global power through aggres - British Empire dominated the ufacturing capacity, but by 1910 sive diplomacy and the acquisi - world. With its dominions and Germany had 15.9 percent and tion of overseas colonies. colonies, the empire held sway Britain had only 14.7 percent. (The over about 450 million people and Actions in Morocco U.S. had also boomed, with 35.3 almost a quarter of the Earth ’s One instance of the kaiser ’s percent.) And Germany, now in - land area. In 1850, Britain led the aggressive diplomacy was in dustrialized, began to develop colo - world in industrial manufacturing. North Africa. In 1905, he disem - nial ambitions, which caused Britain was producing about two- barked from a German warship in conflicts with Britain, France, and thirds of the world ’s coal and more the Moroccan port of Tangier and other European countries. than half of its iron and cloth. spoke in favor of Moroccan inde - In an 1897 debate in the Ger - The brief Franco-Prussian War, pendence. Germany had no real man Reichstag, its parliament, which ended in 1871, led to a shift interest in Morocco, but France the foreign secretary stated, “In in Europe ’s balance of power. Prus - did. The kaiser ’s goal was to sup - one word: We wish to throw no sia, along with other German port the sultan of Morocco and to one into the shade, but we de - states, quickly defeated France. The impress others with Germany ’s mand our own place in the sun.” German states formally united as power and prestige. The head of the German Empire, the nation of Germany, and Ger - Germany called for an inter - Kaiser Wilhelm II, committed many began to catch up to Britain national conference to consider ©2014 Constitutional Rights Foundation / www.crf-usa.org / A Fire Waiting to Be Lit: The Origins of World War I Page 1 All Constitutional Rights Foundation materials and publications, including Bill of Rights in Action , are protected by copyright. However, we hereby grant to all recipients a license to reproduce all material contained herein for distribution to students, other school site personnel, and district administrators. (ISSN: 1534-9799) W i k i m e d i a C o m m o n s The first of its kind, the British navy’s powerful Dreadnought became the standard for battleships of the era. whether France ’s actions in Mo - meddle with its colonies, Britain which long had enjoyed naval su - rocco had violated an interna - drew closer to France, leading the premacy, became alarmed at Ger - tional treaty. A conference took two cou ntries to make a naval many ’s intentions. place the next year in the Spanish agreement. Britain ’s Royal Navy Those intentions were clearly town of Algeciras to discuss is - promised to protect the northern stated in the naval laws, which sues of international law in the coast of France from German at - the German Reichstag passed be - African colonies. But the outcome tack, and France promised that ginning in 1898. The first Naval was not particularly positive for her fleet in the western Mediter - Law set a large number of ships Germany, because Britain voted ranean would protect British in - to be constructed by 1904. A sec - with France, as did Italy, and only terests there. ond Naval Law, passed in 1900, Austria backed the kaiser. Control of the Se as doubled the size of the fleet and The kaiser made a second try Rivalry among the great pow - made clear that the German navy at demonstrating Germany ’s ers grew during the early years of would become a serious rival to power in Morocco. In July 1911, a the 20th century. France was de - the British Royal Navy. Britain de - German gunboat, the Panther , ar - termined to restore its prestige pended on its navy to shield it rived at Agadir, a large city on the and power and to regain the from invasion. The British be - Moroccan coast. The Germans provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, lieved that the new plans for ex - stated that they had come to pro - which it had lost in the Franco- panding the German navy were tect Morocco from French troops, Prussian War. The kaiser in Ger - designed for a possible conflict which had entered the city of Fez many, jealous of Great Britain ’s with the British fleet. to put down rebels. But Ger - empire, implemented Weltpolitik , From 1902 until war broke out many ’s true goal was to get ac - “world policy. ” The aim of Welt - in 1914, the British and Germans cess to territory in the Congo. politik was to transform Germany engaged in a naval arms race. Negotiations between France and into a global power through ag - Britain designed a powerful new Germany resulted in Germany ’s gressive diplomacy, the acquisi - battleship, the Dreadnought , obtaining a small parcel of terri - tion of overseas colonies, and the which it launched in 1906. The tory in the French Equatorial development of a large navy. The Germans immediately copied the African colony of Middle Congo kaiser believed that Germany ’s Dreadnought , and the British Ad - — a marshy area where sleeping greatness depended on her be - miralty decided to maintain as sickness was widespread. coming a naval power. “We have many ships as Germany plus an The kaiser ’s “gunboat diplo - fought for a place in the sun, ” the additional six. The British also re - macy” damaged Germany ’s relations kaiser said, and won it. “Our fu - distributed their ships so the with Britain. Fearing Germany might ture is on the water. ” And Britain, biggest and most powerful ships ©2014 Constitutional Rights Foundation / www.crf-usa.org / A Fire Waiting to Be Lit: The Origins of World War I Page 2 s n o m were situated to fight the Ger - m o C a mans. The effects of this race put i d e m a huge financial burden on both i k i countries. But the naval race con - W tinued as the two powers strug - gled to dominate the seas. Agreements in Case of War The struggle for imperial power was not confined to North Africa. The Russians and Japanese, com - peting for territory in Korea and Manchuria, went to war in 1904. The Russians also had imperialist goals in Persia and on the border - lands with India, which created tension with Britain. India was part of the British Empire, and the British were also heavily invested in Persia, which they saw as an im - portant source of oil. To address A 1909 cover car - the rivalries for foreign investment toon on the Ameri - and territory, the European powers can magazine Puck began to join together in agree - included two non- European players in ments, or alliances, which would the naval arms race. guarantee them support from other push to acquire new colonies and the older Triple Alliance faced a nations in case of war. secure foreign trade. Britain decided new Triple Entente, composed of Under the guidance of the that it should forge greater ties with France, Russia, and Britain. The German Chancellor Otto von Bis - European powers. Britain and major European powers had di - marck, Germany and Austria- France had previously competed vided into two opposing groups. Hungary formed a military over who would control the Nile alliance in 1879. Three years later, The Balkan Crise s River as well as Egypt and Mo - Italy joined in what became the At the same time as the great rocco. But in 1904, the govern - Triple Alliance. The terms of the powers ’ conflict over Morocco, a se - ments settled their dispute. The alliance were, in brief, that if any ries of crises erupted in the Balkans. French recognized the British occu - member became involved in war Slavic-speaking peoples known as pation of Egypt, and the British rec - with another great power, its al - South Slavs — Bosnians, Bulgari - ognized the French penetration of lies would come to its aid by force ans, Croats, Macedonians, Mon - Morocco. Britain and France did not of arms. The Triple Alliance tenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes — have a specific alliance and did not lasted until the First World War. lived in the Balkan region located state clearly what would happen if In response to the Triple Al - south of Austria-Hungary and north they were attacked, but it was a liance, the French decided to form of Greece.
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