Rilus A. Kinseng Class and Con ict in the Fishers’ Community in

Buku OBOR Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia Rilus A. Kinseng

Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia Rilus A. Kinseng OBOR Jakarta, Indonesia

ISBN 978-981-15-0985-8 ISBN 978-981-15-0986-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0986-5

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This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Foreword

It was a pleasure for me to accept the writer’s request to pen a foreword to his book Fisherman Conflicts. Despite my previous involvement in the early process of the book writing during its preparation as a doctoral dissertation at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia (FISIP UI), in 2007, I think it is still necessary for me to read the book for several reasons. Firstly, with the rewriting of the dissertation, in addition to the fact that the book was written during a sabbatical leave in Canada, there must be new insights to be learned, especially in the perspective of theoretical framework with regard to theory of conflict in sociology. Secondly, I believe in the writer’s conviction when he said, “Although the research for the dissertation was conducted in 2006, most of charac- teristics of fisherman classes and conflicts, as well as the arguments and theoretical implication and policies presented in the dissertation are still valid to date and even for sometime in the future.” (Introduction) The conviction turned out to be right, as shown in the following evidence: 1. Kompas, 6 January 2012, reported that: “Trawlers often collided with traditional fishermen’s fixed nets. At least ten traditional fishermen’s nets are hit by the trawlers. Such incidents have been going on since 1978. Fishermen have been reporting them to the marine security officers; however their cases were dismissed on the grounds of lack of evidence. They then decided to take matters into their own hands by punishing the boat crew by themselves and burned down the trawler vessels. On 18 and 26 December 2011, seven trawler vessels were set on fire in Asahan District, North Sumatra.” The incident became a concern for the writer and is described well in this book. However, I would like to reiterate several points of thought that may sound boring, but in emancipatory efforts, the word “bored” does not exist. Why? (1) To be bored in defending the interests of traditional fishermen means letting the capitalists win the rowdy battles without a hitch, not to mention that the battles are taking place in a widely open arena. In the current legal condition of the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI), which is more in favor of the upper classes (see the case of flip-flops theft case in Mesuji, Bima, in late

v vi Foreword

2011 and early 2012), taking the attitude of being fed up of defending the interests of the lower class simply means giving way to the upper class to raise the flag of triumph. Thus, simply waiting for the destruction of tradi- tional fishermen would not take a very long time given the current state of affairs. (2) The unequal struggles had been going on for more than 33 years (since 1978). Hence, the history of traditional fishermen is a history of defeat, a history of life with little or no protection, a history that consciously let all of the ocean’s resources be taken away from their reach, and a history which the main players are the upper social classes. (3) The burning of trawlers incident in North Sumatra taking place on 18 and 26 December showed us all that the lower class had been totally defeated. Therefore, they would do anything to assert their existence and their entitle- ment to live in the NKRI, although in the end they realized that in the strug- gle the lower class would not only have to face a huge power that was not only set free by the State, while six of them were still in prison (Kompas, 7 January 2012), but also the domestic power. When there was no one left tak- ing their side, a social conflict was the only logical resolution for them. It was within such context that class conflicts within the marine social struc- ture would be explained. Their hope was that a structural change could enable them to transform their pessimism into optimism of life. (4) Our (the society’s and State’s) failure to stop the trawlers from operating around the Indonesian waters has not only rapidly destroyed the lives of small fishermen but also the breeding grounds for the fish to spawn. What is tragic about this class struggle is that in the long run, it would not simply become the triumph of the upper class in monopolizing the richness of the fish resources in the seas but also means the extinction of the marine biodi- versity as the ultimate “victory.” An empty sea, and every party lost. 2. Kompas, 7 January 2012, ran a report on the process of destruction, without pro- viding the exact information about the total cost of the damage. However, the “head of the Center for Coastal and Marine Studies at Bung Hatta University said the damage to the mangrove ecosystem along the 1,200km-long coast of West Sumatra had resulted in a 60% decrease in the fishermen’s catch in the past 20 years. In the 1990s fishermen around the region of Nagari Mandiangin were able to catch 6 tons of mangrove crabs every month, whereas these days they could only catch 600 kgs every month.” This book explains in detail the small fishermen’s dependence on the coastal waters after being thrown out from the open waters by the owners of the trawlers. However, it was really twice as unfor- tunate for them that after being thrown out from the open sea back to the shores by the trawler and the purse seine vessels, another sophisticated fishing gear. On the shores, they were hit by the destruction of the mangroves. Fish could no lon- ger breed. Foreword vii

3. There is no report yet of what damage climate change has caused to the ocean; however, even without including that factor into the picture, the portrait of and explanation on the tragic fate of the fishermen are already glaringly obvious. However, the question is as follows: Who owns the trawlers? As for the owners of the purse seine fishing boats, the readers will easily find out about who they are in this book. Allow me to add some information to what Dr. Rilus A. Kinseng has written. 1. Obviously, the owners of the trawlers are some rich people from overseas. In the case of the purse seine fishermen mentioned in this book, the owners of the purse seine are not local fishermen either. Trawling is a fishing method technology more than 100% effective since it does not only catch fish but also everything else that gets into the net. Make notes that this is a normal technological develop- ment. So, it is not surprising that Indonesian fishermen also want it. None of them wants to be outdone by the foreign trawler owners. Just look at the sense- less cases in this book. If there is no prohibition by law, undoubtedly, Indonesian fishermen will fall into the (destructive) trend. 2. The fact that there has been no report on fish stolen from the open waters of Indonesia for so long may lead to several hypotheses that could be further proven: (1) Our security system has totally failed and been defeated in dealing with border violations happening in our waters. The assumption is that there is still a significant amount of fish in the sea. (2) Our surveillance system works perfectly (something that is highly unlikely), but the capitalists (which is the writer’s concept) are working in cooperation with the Indonesian fishermen through modifying the mode of production that remains within the limits permitted by law. Or perhaps the mode of production has not changed, but the techniques to camouflage the exploita- tion have been maximized that it is capable of escaping from the law enforce- ment instruments’ surveillance. The assumption stays the same: there is a lot of fish, and everything works well with the law enforcement. (3) If the number of fish is no longer significant, it will be irrelevant to discuss the laws and the trawl fishing method. In such conditions, the good ideas in this book will become rather irrelevant as well. The book explores issues around description and analysis of class conflict at one particular time in the (almost past) marine history of Indonesia. Indeed, fish are still available in the market. However, where it comes from remains unclear. A news story in Kompas in 2011 reported the remaining large number of imported fish sold in our markets. Terrible. This is an interesting book to read, especially for university lecturers and stu- dents of sociology on the following grounds: 1. Class conflicts started with Karl Marx. Marx’s main concern was the fate of the factory workers who were suffering amidst the growth of capitalism that emerged viii Foreword

after the Industrial Revolution. Poverty, workers losing their humanity as they became merely robots in the production processes with no future development, convinced Marx that a change of mindset and way of working was in need in every aspect relating to production processes. Such change was called revolu- tion. Since it would certainly be challenged by the capitalists, the change could only succeed through coercion by the power of the proletariat (even the poor with children as their only possession ended up having them exploited in the highly exploitative production process), with the support of the State. 2. During the processes of researching for the dissertation, lively discussions had taken place. Departing from Marx’s sociology of knowledge alone will lead us to the problem of the material basis of the theory of social conflict. In Marx’s lifetime, the material base existed in exploitative relationships between employ- ers and laborers on land (see, e.g., Engels’ observations in Manchester on the life of the poor workers). The material base during the research for the book is dif- ferent. There are many different categories described in the book. The various categories described in the book (see the diagrams) illustrate the difficulties to conclude that the class conflicts as depicted in this book are similar to what Marx intends them to be. I personally cannot adequately explain/describe Mr. Rilus A. Kinseng’s defense during the discussion, but the examiners were totally mes- merized by his eloquence in countering their arguments or explaining in other ways when he felt that he was in a difficult position to explain his own argu- ments. But that’s Rilus (his nickname). 3. For students, this book is really interesting to read. It is comparable to the expla- nation given by Bung Karno, our first president, on the concept ofmarhaenism , which was analogous to proletarianism. Marhaenisme refers to an ideology that the position of the poor farmers in Indonesia is signified by a limited plot of land and their dependency on the rich people in the cities, whereas proletarianism refers to an ideology that describes the position of laborers who are all suffering, oppressed, and living an inhuman life in relation to production process. Regardless of Marx’s, or perhaps Bung Karno’s failure, such analysis is neces- sary to encourage a basis for developing Indonesian sociology. What is appreci- ated about the author of this book is his courage not only to look at reality but also to be criticized. 4. For students or lecturers who have previously studied theories of sociology at the Sociology Department of FISIP UI, this book will remind them of the whole teaching-learning processes that are productively (or reproductively) represented by the writer in his arguments. I learned a lot from this book. I hope other readers will get even more lessons from it.

Rural Sociology, FISIP Universitas Indonesia Robert M. Z. Lawang, Depok, Indonesia 8 January 2011 Preface

This book is a dissertation that I rewrote with some revision and minor changes. The dissertation itself was examined in an open examination at the Sociology Department, University of Indonesia, in January 2007. Despite the fact that research for the dissertation had been conducted in 2006, I am convinced that most of the characteristics of the class conflict of the fishermen, in addition to the arguments and the impacts on theory and policies presented in the book, are still valid. Context of this study may remain applicable for some time to come. Therefore, I think it is necessary to present the dissertation in a book form, albeit a little bit late. For that reason, more people can have access to the issues at hand. The re-writing of the dissertation to produce this book was carried out when I was undertaking the Academic Recharging Program (PAR-B), which was run and funded by the Directorate General of Higher Education (DIKTI), of the Ministry of National Education in 2010. I did the PAR-B at the University of Guelph, Canada, from Oktober 2010 until Desember 2010. I would like to thank DIKTI that had given me the opportunity to undertake the PAR-B program at the University of Guelph for 4 months. I would also like to thank the Yayasan Pustaka Obor Indonesia publisher that had agreed to publish this book. I hope this cooperation will continue in the future. My sincerest thanks also to my wife (Elisina) and children (Elizka, Eliani, and Natanael), who have provided me the full support both for the research for and writ- ing of the book, which included being away from home for months. I hope all of our sacrifices are not in vain. Finally, the book has a few shortcomings and weaknesses. Yet, it is my hope that this manuscript can trigger various parties to deepen our understanding of the “fish- ermen’s world” so that all of us may participate together in the efforts to improve their livelihood, particularly the “small” or “traditional” fishermen and the laborer fishermen.

Guelph, Canada Rilus A. Kinseng November 2010

ix Preface to the Second Edition

The first edition of this book was published in a very limited number of copies by the IPB Press in 2011. Due to the limited number, many parties who needed it at the time, particularly the graduate students, could not find it. Then, Dr. Ivanovich Agusta also encouraged the book to be published by Yayasan Obor Indonesia as the second edition, hence, the publication of the second edition. There are some significant changes in this second edition compared to the first one. This second edition includes the research methodology and theoretical review since they are considered important for graduate student readers or for researchers interested in conducting studies on social conflict, especially among fishermen. This part was not included in the first edition. I would like to thank Yayasan Obor Indonesia for agreeing to publish this book. I hope this cooperation will continue in the future. I would also like to express my special thanks to my colleague, Dr. Ivanovich Agusta, for his great efforts for this second edition of the book to be published by the Indonesian Obor Foundation. Finally, it is obvious that this book has a few shortcomings and weaknesses. My hope is that it can contribute to the joint attempts to improve the living standards of fishermen, especially the “small” or “traditional” fishermen and laborer fishermen in Indonesia.

Bogor, Jakarta, Indonesia Rilus A. Kinseng October 2014

xi Contents

1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Background...... 1 1.2 Research Methodology...... 4 1.2.1 Type of Data...... 4 1.2.2 Data Collection Technique...... 4 1.2.3 Data Analysis...... 5 1.2.4 Time and Place...... 6 Bibliography...... 7 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia...... 9 2.1 Understanding Social Conflict...... 9 2.2 Understanding Social Class...... 10 2.3 Class Consciousness...... 13 2.4 Class and Class Conflict...... 15 2.5 Fishermen Communities’ Social Class...... 19 2.5.1 Class Structure...... 19 2.5.2 Class Formation and Struggle...... 20 2.6 Typology of Fishermen’s Social Conflict...... 21 2.7 Fishermen in Indonesia and Their Problems...... 22 2.8 Directional Hypothesis...... 26 Bibliography...... 29 3 General Description of the Research Location...... 33 3.1 The City of ...... 33 3.1.1 A Brief History...... 33 3.1.2 Accessability...... 34 3.1.3 Geographical Condition and Location...... 34 3.1.4 Climate...... 35 3.1.5 Government Administration...... 35 3.1.6 Population...... 35

xiii xiv Contents

3.2 Manggar...... 36 3.2.1 Development of Manggar...... 36 3.2.2 Accessibility...... 37 3.2.3 Population...... 37 3.3 Capture Fisheries in Balikpapan...... 38 3.3.1 Types, Production, and Value of Catch...... 39 3.3.2 Number of Fishermen and Types of Fishing Gear...... 39 3.3.3 Balikpapan fishermen’s Ethnicity...... 40 3.3.4 Pattern of Fisherman Settlements...... 40 3.3.5 The Development of Capture Technology...... 42 3.3.6 Fishing Gear Types and Methods of Operation...... 46 Bibliography...... 52 4 Fisherman Class Structure and Class Relations...... 55 4.1 Class Base...... 55 4.2 Fisherman Class Structure in Balikpapan...... 55 4.2.1 Fisherman Laborer (sawi)...... 56 4.2.2 Small-Scale Fishermen...... 58 4.2.3 Medium-Scale Fishermen (Intermediate)...... 58 4.2.4 Large-Scale Fishermen (the Financiers)...... 59 4.2.5 The Merchant Class...... 60 4.3 Class Relations...... 61 4.3.1 Relations Between the Working Class and the Merchant Class...... 61 4.3.2 Relations Between the Owner Class and the Merchant Class...... 64 Bibliography...... 68 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen...... 69 5.1 Laborer vs Owner...... 70 5.2 Medium-Scale Fishermen vs Capitalist Fishermen...... 73 5.2.1 The Case of FAD Fishermen and the Boat-Operated Lift Net Fishermen...... 73 5.2.2 The Case Between Traditional Fishermen and Blast Fishermen...... 74 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java...... 75 5.3.1 Chronology of the 16 January 2006 Incident...... 76 5.4 Discussion...... 92 5.4.1 Main Problem: Class Domination...... 92 5.4.2 Level of Conflict Violence...... 99 5.4.3 Class Alliance...... 101 Bibliography...... 103 Contents xv

6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan...... 105 6.1 Fisherman Laborer...... 105 6.1.1 Fragmentation...... 106 6.1.2 Class Permeability...... 108 6.1.3 Dependence on the Employer...... 110 6.1.4 Absence of Leader...... 110 6.1.5 Absence of Common Problem or Common Enemy...... 111 6.1.6 Payment System...... 112 6.2 Small Fishermen...... 112 6.2.1 Cases of Fishing Vessel and Fishing Gear Collisions...... 112 6.2.2 The Case of PT Thiess’s Dock Construction Project...... 114 6.2.3 Kerosene Case...... 115 6.2.4 Beach Tourism Development Case...... 119 6.3 Intermediate Fisherman...... 119 6.3.1 Unocal Seismic Survey Activity Case...... 119 6.3.2 Purse Seine Fishermen Case...... 121 6.4 Big Fisherman (Capitalist)...... 121 6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy”...... 122 6.5.1 Role of Fishermen Organization...... 124 6.5.2 The Fishermen Community Alliance or Aliansi Masyarakat Nelayan (AMN)...... 125 6.5.3 Balikpapan Fisherman Union or Serikat Nelayan Balikpapan (SNB)...... 127 6.5.4 Relationship with Mass Media...... 128 6.5.5 Government Factor...... 129 6.5.6 Fishermen and Politics...... 135 6.5.7 Class Fraction and Intra-class Conflict...... 137 Bibliography...... 139 7 Conclusion ...... 141 7.1 General Conclusion...... 141 7.2 Theory Implication...... 143 7.2.1 Patterns of Fisher Class Conflict...... 143 7.2.2 Factors of Fish-Capture Unit and Type of Fishing Gear in Class Analysis...... 146 7.2.3 Distinction Between Ownership of the Means of Production and Ownership of Financial Capital...... 147 7.2.4 Concept of “Domination Distance” in the Fisherman Class Analysis...... 147 7.2.5 Level of “Violence” in Conflict...... 148 7.2.6 Importance of Common Problem or Common Enemy...... 148 xvi Contents

7.3 Policy Implication...... 151 7.3.1 Domination in Fish-Capture Process...... 151 7.3.2 “Traditional Right” of the Fishing Ground...... 152 7.3.3 Fishing Lanes...... 153 7.3.4 Comprehensive Conflict Prevention and Resolution...... 154 7.3.5 The Supervisory Agency for Fish-Capture Business (BPUP)...... 154 7.3.6 Fisherman Laborer Organization...... 155 7.3.7 Fisherman Cooperative...... 155 Bibliography...... 156

Glossary...... 157

Bibliography...... 159

Index...... 165 About the Author

Rilus A. Kinseng is a lecturer of Sociology at the Department of Communication and Community Development Sciences, Faculty of Human Ecology, and at the Rural Sociology Study Program, Faculty of Postgraduate, Bogor of Agricultural University or IPB University. Before the changes of several departments in IPB University, he taught as a lecturer at the Department of Fishery Social Economy, Faculty of Fisheries and Marine Sciences, IPB University. He finished hissarjana (BA, Hon.) degree at the Department of Social Economy, Faculty of Agriculture (Sosek Faperta), IPB University, concentrating on the field of Agricultural Extension. He received his Master of Arts (MA) degree in Sociology from Guelph University, Canada, and his doctoral degree in Sociology from the University of Indonesia. Among his published articles are “Konflik Sosial Nelayan dan Pengelolaannya” in Riris K. Toha Sarumpaet, Apsanti Djokosujanto, and R.Z. Leirissa (editors) Pembangunan Perdesaan dan Daerah Pesisir pada Era Milenium III (UI-Press, 2007) and “Konflik Kelas di Kalangan Kaum Nelayan di Indonesia (Sebuah Catatan Awal)” in Prosiding Workshop Nasional Riset Sosial Ekonomi Kelautan dan Perikanan (2006). His popular articles have been published in several Indonesian newspapers, namely, Sinar Harapan, Suara Pembaruan, Republika, and Kompas.

xvii Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Empirical facts have shown that social conflicts are part of life for humans in their interaction between one another. Conflicts are found in any social system1 from the smallest level such as ones between close friends or a dating couple, between family members, between members of different groups, to the macrointernational level, such as those between nations. Lulofs and Cahn (2000), for instance, say that con- flict is “a fact of life”. The sociologist Dahrendorf says, “Every society displays at every point dissesnsus and conflict; social conflict is ubiquitous” (Dahrendorf 1963:162). In a similar line of thought, the sociologist Georg Simmel states: “An absolutely centripetal and harmonious group, a pure ‘unification’, not only is empir- ically unreal, it could show no real life process” (Simmel 1966:15). He then contin- ues to say, “Just as the universe needs ‘love and hate’, that is, attractive and repulsive forces, in order to have any form at all, so society, too, in order to attain a determi- nate shape, needs some quantitative ratio of harmony and disharmony, of associa- tion and competition, of favorable and unfavorable tendencies”. The sociologiest Karl Marx also shares a similar view. As quoted by Vago, “For Marx, conflict is a normal condition of social life whose nature and variation are some of the most important things to be described and analyzed by social science” (Vago 1989:37). Recently, control over and access to natural resources have increasingly become a major issue in social conflicts,2 such as conflicts between fishermen, conflicts between local communities, mining and companies, oil palm, conflicts between

1 According to Parsons, a social system consists of a plurality of individual actors who interact with each other. Plurarity itself may refer to one or two, whereas the actor can be a person or a collectiv- ity (Wallace and Wolf 2006: 27). 2 Social conflicts which main issues are problems in relation to natural resources are often recog- nized as “natural resources conflicts”.

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 1 R. A. Kinseng, Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0986-5_1 2 1 Introduction local communities and conservation area management authorities. A few years ago MacNeill et al had predicted that conflicts concerning resources and the environ- ment would get worse in the future. Or, as they put it, “Conflict based on climate change, environmental disruption, water and other resources.” (MacNeil et al. 1991: 20). Even graver, Homer-Dixon estimates that the future will not only see an increas- ing number of conflicts with respect to the limitations of natural resources, but also violent conflicts. Homer-Dixon 1999( : 4) says: “… in coming decades the world will probably see a steady increase in the incidences of violent conflict that are caused, at least in part, by environmental scarcity”. Accordingly, conflicts concern- ing the utilization of marine resources are likely to increase in the future; and they will tend to become more violent if an effective conflict management system is not put in place. Indonesia, with approximately 17,500 islands, is known as the largest archipe- lagic state in the world. In addition, Indonesia is categorized as a maritime state by reason that 75% of its territory (5.8 million km2) comprises sea territories. Meanwhile, Indonesia has a coastline that stretches appoximately 95,181 kilome- ters (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 2009). It also lies on a highly strategic location on the equatorial line and between to oceans, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Given such a strategic position, it is not surprising that Indonesia has the richest marine biodiversity or megadiversity in the world (Dewan Hankamnas dan BPP Teknologi, 1996). Furthermore, it is also natural that the livelihoods of many Indonesians depend on the sea. One group of people who rely heavily on marine resources is the fishermen. The number of fishermen in Indonesia fluctuates from year to year, but remains significant, namely about 2,752,490 people in 2009 (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 2009).3 There are two main reasons why it is very interesting and important to have in- depth discussion on the topic of class and conflict within the fisherman com- munity of Indonesia. The first reason concerns issues of conflict among fellow fishermen themselves. Social conflict among fellow fishermen in Indonesia has occurred for some time and has been extended widely throughout Indonesia [see Adhuri 2002; Adhuri (editor) 2004; Adhuri and Wahyono (editors) 2004; Yamin 2005; Kusnadi 2002; Bailey 1988; Betke 1988, etc.]. Furthermore, the potential of marine resources for capture fisheries in Indonesia tends to decrease over time. For example, some fishing grounds in Indonesia, especially the northern coasts of Java Island, have long suffered from excessive overfishing. That is not unrelated to the nature of marine fisheries resources itself, the fact that it is a common property that tends to trigger the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1970). Consequently, it is to be expected that social conflicts among fishermen in the future will con- tinue to increase. This is actually consistent with the general trend in the world, as

3 Law No. 45/2009 defines that “a fisherman is a person whose source of revenue comes from ca fish”. However, in this book I use the concept that a fisherman is a person whose source of liveli- hood is from fishing activities. Thus, even if the person does not participate directly in catching the fish, but if the source of revenue is from fishing activities, such as by hiring someone else to catch fish, then the person falls into the fisherman category. 1.1 Background 3

MacNeill et alw says, “Conflict based on climate change, environmental disrup- tion, water and other resource scarcities could well become endemic in the world of the future” (MacNeil et al. 1991:20). What is more, social conflicts between fishermen in Indonesia have often been destructive and violent. In many conflict cases the fishermen have armed themselves with sharp weapons, including bows and arrows, and even Molotov cocktails. They also set fire to their adversaries’ fishing vessels and gear. Consequently, to date conflicts between fishermen in Indonesia have resulted in great losses and even claimed a significant number of fishermen’s lives (see Hidayat2006 ; Yamin 2005; Shaliza 2004; Kusnadi 2002; Bailey 1988; Betke 1988, Etc.). As Homer-Dixon (1999) argues, the scarcity of resources tend to lead to brutal conflicts. While in fact, as previously mentioned, the potential resource of capture fisheries in Indonesia tends to decrease every year. Thus, Homer-Dixon 1999( : 4) have predicted, that: “… in coming decades the world will probably see a steady increase in the incidence of violent conflict that is caused, at least in part, by envi- ronmental scarcity”, is very likely to occur among Indonesian fishermen. Therefore, I tend to agree with LIPI researcher Dedi S. Adhuri, who says that, “… judging from the increasingly high intensity of conflicts in fisheries, it seems that studies on the topic shoud be initiated intensively” (Adhuri 2004). The second reason that makes this topic important to discuss relates to the defini- tion of social class itself in the fishing community. To date hardly any study on class analysis of Indonesian fishermen has ever been conducted. In parallel, studies on fisher conflicts in Indonesia by various parties have yet to explicitly use theories or class analysis. This is understandable, given that, as Stavenhagen (1975: 40) puts it, class analysis was born and developed in modern-day industrial- capitalist societies in the West. In Indonesia the use of concept and analysis of class in general is very rare (Farid 2006). Whereas in fact, with reference to class concepts developed by the Neo-Marxists such as Erik Olin Wright (1987), Clement (1986), and Fairley (1990), for example, the quite “serious” and violent conflicts between fishermen are none other than class conflicts. The prolonged brutal conflicts between “traditional” fish- ermen and trawler fishermen in the years before 1980, which had compelled the New Order government to take drastic action by issuing Presidential Decree (Keppres) no. 39/1980 that bans the use of trawlers in various waters of Indonesia, is an example of of a class conflict. In the same way, the prolonged brutal conflicts between fishermen using longline and stone fishing net gear in Bengkalis, Riau, are also class conflicts. The repeated conflicts between “traditional” fishermen and purse seine fishermen from Central Java in Kota Baru, South Kalimantan and in Balikpapan, , are also class conflicts. However, the absence of open and violent conflicts between the laborer fishermen’ class (proletarian) and the own- ers’ class (capitalist) is also very interesting to study. What makes the laborer fisher- men silent and “crippled” when they are supposed to be Marx’s pillars of hope as the agents for revolutionary reform to radically and fundamentally change the social-economic order? Have they been hegemonized? Such issues are highly inter- esting and necessary to examine further. 4 1 Introduction

Thus, the problems of class and class conflicts concerning fishermen in Indonesia are very important and interesting to be studied in depth. That is the topic to be discussed in this book. In more detail, the main issues to be addressed include two major questions: 1. What do the structure, formation, level of consciousness, and class struggle of the fishermen in Indonesia look like? This aspect includes a study on whether or not there are different levels of consciousness and patterns of class struggle between laborer fishermen and owner fishermen, for example, as well as various aspects of class conflict itself; 2. What are the factors that influence the fishermen’s class formation, consious- ness, and forms of struggle? One of the aspects that will be studied is the role or influence of external factors, such as the government, corporations, and NGOs. As mentioned earlier, this book is a re-write of my dissertation with some minor changes. The dissertation was written based on research conducted in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan. Therefore, to provide a more in-depth understanding for the read- ers, it is necessary to present the research methodology used in the research.

1.2 Research Methodology

This research was conducted using qualitative methods known as field researh (Babbie 1989; Rose 1983), or field studies (Marshall and Rossman1989 ), or field- work (Rose 1983). However, to support the qualitative data, a “small survey” was conducted using a questionnaire.

1.2.1 Type of Data

The data collected comprise both primary and secondary qualitative data. Quantitative data is also collected and includes population size, number of fisher- men, fishermens’ opinion, as well as other information.

1.2.2 Data Collection Technique

Qualitative-primary data is collected using two main ways: interviews and observa- tions. As Marshall & Rossman state, “The fundamental techniques relied on by qualitative researchers for gathering information are (1) observation and (2) in-­ depth interviewing. These two techniques form the core, the staple of the diet” (Marshall and Rossman 1989: 79). These interviews include in-depth interviews 1.2 Research Methodology 5 with several informants, as well as more free and informal interviews with fishermen­ and other community members. Observational data is documented in the form of photographs. In collecting the qualitative data I was helped by some assistants who spent time with me in the field for more than 2 months. Meanwhile, the “small survey” was conducted on 100 fisher laborers and 101 fisher boat owners, and 17 financers/merchants (punggawa). Samples were taken by a “quota sampling” technique, namely by taking a number of respondents for each type of the dominant fishing gear in Balikpapan. The survey respondents for each type of fishing gear were fishermen who were found both at home and elsewhere for interview. The interviews were conducted by two local enumerators. The number of respondents interviewed is presented in detail within Table 1.1. Secondary data was collected from various relevant agencies or organizations, such as the administrative offices of the Village Kelurahan( ) Sub- District, Balikpapan City Government, and the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Office, Bureau of Statistics Office of the City of Balikpapan, civil society organizations Ormas( ), and individuals. Data in the form of documents, such as letters from the Fisheries and Marine Affairs Agency of Balikpapan, Letters of Agreement, and newspaper articles, were also collected.

1.2.3 Data Analysis

Qualitative data was analyzed using methods called inductive analysis and logical analysis (Marshall and Rossman 1989: 126). This qualitative data analysis proce- dure contains two main elements, namely data reduction and interpretation (Marshall and Rossman 1989: 114). Using Neuman’s categorization, the qualitative data is analyzed using a combination of methods, particularly the successive approxima- tion and illustrative methods (Neuman 1997: 427–428). Meanwhile, the quantitative data was analyzed using simple statistical technique, ie percentage (%).

Table 1.1 Number of respondents based on type of fishing gear (Person) Type of fishing gear Laborer (sawi) Owner Number Jala rumpon 55 21 76 Dogol 5 25 30 Rengge 5 25 30 Pancing 13 14 27 Bagan perahu 10 5 15 Bagan tancap 8 5 13 Perangkap siput 4 6 10 Total number 100 101 201 6 1 Introduction

1.2.4 Time and Place

Field research was conducted for more than 3 months, between January and September 2006. The research was conducted in the City of Balikpapan, in East Kalimantan Province. The location was selected based on the fact that on 16 January 2006 a violent conflict occurred between the “traditional” fishermen in Balikpapan and the fishermen from Juwana, Central Java. During the incident, the Juwana fish- ermen’s fishing boat (KM Mutiara Sakti) was set on fire by a mob of Balikpapan “traditional” fishermen (Picture 1.1).

Picture 1.1 Map of research locations Bibliography 7

Bibliography

Books

Babbie, Earl. 1989. The Practice of Social Research. 5th ed. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont. Clement, Wallace. 1986. The Struggle to Organize. In Resistance in Canada’s Fishery. Ontario/ Toronto: McClelland and Steward/The Canadian Publishers. Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1963. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Fairley, Bryant. 1990. The Crisis, the State and Class Formation in the Newfoundland Fishery. In Restructuring and Resistance: Perspectives from Atlantic Canada, ed. Fairley Bryant, Colin Leys, and James Sacouman. Toronto: Garamond. Farid, Hilmar. 2006. Masalah Kelas Dalam Ilmu Sosial Indonesia. In Ilmu Sosial dan Kekuasaan di Indonesia, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae. Jakarta, Singapore: Equinox Publishing. Hardin, Garrett. 1970. The Tragedy of the Commons. In The Environmental Handbook. Prepared for the First National Environmental Teach-In, ed. Garret de Bell. New York: Ballantine Books Inc., Intext Publisher. Hidayat, M. Taufik. 2006. Tak kan pernah putus asa. Nelayan Bengkalis melawan jaring batu. In Meninggalkan Titik Nol. Nelayan Melawan Perlakuan Buruk, ed. M. Imron Amin, Edy Suhartono, Nina Dwisasanti, and Marthen Welly. Bogor: Jaring Pela & CBCRM-RC. Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1999. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kusnadi. 2002. Konflik Sosial Nelayan. Kemiskinan dan Perebutan Sumber daya Perikanan. Yogyakarta: LKIS. Lulofs, Roxane S., and Dudley D. Cahn. 2000. Conflict. From Theory to Action. 2nd ed. Needham heights: Allyn and Bacon. MacNeil, Jim, Pieter Winsemius, and Taizo Yakushiji. 1991. Beyond Interdependence. The Meshing of the World’s Economy and the Earth’s Ecology. New York: Oxford University Press. Marshall, Catherine, and Gretchen B. Rossman. 1989. Designing Qualitative Research. Newbury Park: Sage. Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. 2009. Marine and Fisheries in Figure 2009. Jakarta, Indonesia. Neuman, W. Lawrence. 1997. Social Research Methods. Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. 3rd ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Rose, Gerry. 1983. Deciphering Sociological Research. Beverly Hills/London/New Delhi: Sage. Simmel, Georg. 1966. Conflict. Trans. Kurt H. Wolff. The Web of Group-Affiliations. Trans. Reinhard Bendix. New York: The Free Press. Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 1975. Social Classes in Agrarian Societies. Trans. Judy Alder Hellman. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday. Vago, Steven. 1989. Social Change. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs. Wallace, Ruth A., and Alison Wolf. 2006. Contemporary Sociological Theory. In Expanding the Classical Tradition, 6th ed. Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, New Jersey. Wright, Erik Olin. 1987. Classes. London-New York: Verso. Yamin, Muhammad dan Dhe. 2005. Sisi Gelap Kehidupan Nelayan Deli Serdang. In Potret Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Petani dan Nelayan, ed. Nur Hafsah (Penyunting). Jakarta: Sekretariat Bina desa. 8 1 Introduction

Journals

Bailey, Conner. 1988. “The Political Economy of Marine Fisheries Development in Indonesia”. Indonesia No. 46 (Oct). Cornell Southeast Asia Program.

Dissertations and Thesis

Adhuri, Dedi Supriadi. 2002. Selling the Sea, Fishing for Power: A Study of Conflict Over Marine Tenure in the Kei Islands, Eastern Indonesia. PhD Dissertation, The Australian National University. Betke, Friedhelm. 1988. Prospect of a “Blue Revolution” in Indonesian Fisheries: A Bureaucratic Dream or Grim Reality?. Disertasi, Bielefeld University, Jerman. Shaliza, Fara. 2004. Dinamika Konflik Antar Komunitas dan Transformasi Modal Sosial (Studi Kasus Konflik antara Komunitas Nelayan Parit III dan Melati di Kabupaten Bengkalis, Provinsi Riau). Tesis Magister Sains pada Program Studi Sosiologi Pedesaan, Sekolah Pascasarjana, Institut Pertanian Bogor.

Documents

Dewan Hankamnas dan BPP Teknologi. 1996. Benua Maritim Indonesia. Kantor Perikanan dan Kelautan Kota Balikpapan. 2006. Laporan Tahunan 2005.

Papers

Adhuri, Dedi Supriadi. 2004. “Setelah Reformasi: Pelajaran dari Konflik-konflik Perikanan Kontemporer”. Makalah disampaikan pada Seminar Nasional Sehari, “Membangun Politik Kelautan: Memadukan Dimensi Teknis, Manajerial, dan Sosial Budaya, Jakarta 8 September 2004. Chapter 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia

This chapter will briefly explain several basic concepts to use in conducting class analysis. Next, it will explain class and social conflicts among fishermen in Indonesia in general. However, before discussing the class analysis, the following is an expla- nation in relation to conflict itself.

2.1 Understanding Social Conflict

Many social scientists have provided a definition for social conflict. Some of them will be presented here. According to Lewis Coser, “Social conflict… to mean a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the proponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals” (Coser 1977: 8). In the meantime, Broom & Selznick explains, “When the clash of interests is so keen that groups not merely compete for the same scarce goals but to seek to injure or even destroy each other, there is conflict…” (Broom and Selznick1975 : 48). Furthermore, according to Boulding, conflict “is a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other” (quoted by Oberschall 1978: 291), whereas Fisher et al. say that, “Conflict is a relationship between two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have, or who feel that they don’t have the same goals (Fisher et al. 2001). In addi- tion, Kriesberg says, “a social conflict arises when two or more persons or groups manifest the belief that they have incompatible objectives” (Kriesberg 2003: 2). Meanwhile, Charon puts more emphasis on the struggle to get something of value. He says, “Conflict means the struggle by actors over something of value” (Charon 2001: 79). Emphasizing aspects of perception in their definition, social psycholo- gists Pruitt & Rubin say, “For us, conflict means perception of perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the aspirations of the conflicting parties can not be achieved simultaneously” (Pruitt and Rubin 2004).

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 9 R. A. Kinseng, Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0986-5_2 10 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia

I myself would argue that, “conflict is a social relation between social actors characterized by an opposition, or discord, and anger, whether or not it is expressed openly, in order to achieve their own desires or goals” (Kinseng 2013). I further explain that if the opposition or dispute and anger are open, then it is an open con- flict. Meanwhile, if the opposition or disagreement and anger are concealed or closed, it falls into the category of latent conflict. In addition to the presence of anger, such social relations are generally also marked by a sense of dislike and even hatred between opposing sides.

2.2 Understanding Social Class

Karl Marx (1818–1883) is the most responsible sociologist to popularize the con- cept of social class and its relationship with social changes. As Hamilton & Hirszowicz say, “It was Karl Marx, of course, who was largely responsible for intro- ducing and giving currency to the notion of class in sociological theory” (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987: 5). Therefore, we have no choice but to return to Marx’s views to understand the theory of social class. Although Marx himself never really provided a strict definition of what a class denotes (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987: 5), it has become commonly accepted that according to Marx a social class is essentially a social group formed on the basis of their relation to the means of production, or based on the ownership of the means of production. Ralf Dahrendorf, for example, says that, “For Marx, the determinant of social classes was effective private property in the means of production” (Dahrendorf 1963: 136). Or, as Hamilton & Hirszowicz put it, “For Marx, class is fundamentally a question of relationship to the means of production and the place a person occu- pies in the social organization of production” (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987: 5).” Wallace & Wolf also give the same explanation. They say that, “A class is made up of people who are alike in their relationship to property: they have none, or they have the same type” (Wallace and Wolf 1999: 82). Similarly, Lewis Coser says that, “Classes are aggregates of persons who perform the same function in the organiza- tion of production” (Coser 1977: 49). And correspondingly, Lenin explains the con- cept of social class as follows: Classes are large groups of people which differ from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labor, and, consequently, by the dimension and mode of acquiring the share of social wealth of which they dispose. Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labor of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy” (Cited in Stavenhagen 1975: 28). It is clear from the above explanation that for Marx social class is a group of people who are in the same position in their relation to the control over means of production, namely the class of owners and of non-owners (the workers). Thus, in a capitalist society there are two main classes that are considered the most important, 2.2 Understanding Social Class 11 namely the capitalist class (bourgeoisie) and the working class (proletariat). The capitalists are people that own the means of production, and the workers are those who do not own the means of production and as a consequence have to “sell” their labor power to get wages. In the meantime, Max Weber gives a different meaning for the concept of class. Weber puts more emphasize on the position of an individual or a group of individu- als in a market to the extent that this position determines the “life chances” as class determinant. As Hamilton & Hirszowics say, “Weber defines classes in terms of market position in so far as this determines ‘life-chances’” (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987: 12). Weber says that, “But always this is the generic connotation of the con- cept of class: that kind of chance in the market is the decisive moment which pres- ents a common condition for the individual’s life fate. Class situation is, in this sense, ultimately market situation” (Weber 1978: 928). Weber does recognize that property is very important in determining class, but it is just one of the many factors that determines a person’s position in the market. The type of goods/resources owned as well as the skills of a person also determines the person’s “class situation”. Along with the development of capitalist society, in the West in particular, the concept of class has experienced further changes and modification. Such changes and modification were made by scholars in their attempts to maintain the relevance of theory of class in the development of society. Marx’s concept that relies on the ownership of the means of production as the basis for the formation of a social class is considered inadequate to explain contemporary social phenomena. One scholar who for quite a long time has expressed criticism and modified Marx’s concept of class is Ralf Dahrendorf. According to Dahrendorf, the foundation of social class is authority. He says, “The authority structure of entire societies as well as particular institutional orders within societies (such as industry) … is the structural determi- nant of class formation and class conflict” (Dahrendorf1963 : 136). For Dahrendorf, control of the means of production as Marx proposed is only one form of authority; so it is not the only form of authority. Control over or ownership of the means of production is a special form of the more general determinant, namely authority. “Authority is the more general social relation”, Dahrendorf says (Dahrendorf 1963: 137). Despite establishing a different class base, Dahrendorf’s social class model is still as “bipolar” as Marx’s model, a class that has an authority and a class that has no authority. He explains, “… classes are social conflict groups the determinant… of which can be found in the participation in or exclusion from the exercise of authority within any imperatively coordinated association” (Dahrendorf 1963: 138). In recent times some scholars have also considered the bipolar concept of class inadequate. As Kohn et al. says, “The classic bourgeoisie-proletariat distinction is generally recognized to be insufficient as a depiction of the class structure of a mod- ern capitalist society” (Kohn et al. 1990: 969). They understand social class as a complex and multidimentional phenomenon. “… social class is a multidimensional typology rather than a unidimensional rank ordering…”, says Kohn et al. (1990: 966). Kohn et al. proposes three bases of social class formation, namely first, the class of ownership of the means of production, second the class based on control 12 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia over the means of production, and the third class based on the control of the people (Kohn et al. 1990: 966). Meanwhile, for Goldthorpe, the base of the class formation in a modern society is employment relation. According to Goldthorpe, “…in mod- ern societies class positions are best understood as being defined by differences in employment relations” (Goldthorpe 2000: 1573). Based on that, therefore, there are three main classes that are formed, namely “employers, self-employed workers, and employees” (Goldthorpe 2000: 1578). Furthermore, employees themselves are divided into two categories, namely the “blue-collar workers” and the professionals, such as managers, and the like. Furthermore, Wright & Cho divide class based on three dimensions, namely property, authority, and expertise (Wright and Cho 1992: 89). Whereas Wright (1987) describes that, based on the ownership of assets in the means of production, there are two main classes in capitalism, namely the worker and the capitalist. However, Wright adds, the two categories that are a “polarization of the traditional class” have not covered all of the class positions formed as a result of an unequal distribution of ownership of the means of production. There are three other catego- ries that are equally important, namely the ‘petty bourgeoisie’, ‘semi worker’, and “small employer”. Wright defines each of the class categories as follows. Workerss are people who don’t have the asset of the means of production so that that have to sell their “labor power” to work, whereas the capitalists are people who have a num- ber of means of production that enable them to pay workers to use the means of production while they themselves may not have to work at all. On the other hand, what is meant by the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ are people who have enough means of production for themselves, but not enough for them to pay workers; semi workers are people who have only a small number of means of production that they still have to work as workers; and the last one, small employers, are people who have quite a small number of the means of production to enable them to pay workers, but they themselves still have to work. Another scholar, Bourdieau, defines social classes based on “capital”. In his opinion, there are four types of capital, namely economic capital, social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital (see Turner 1998: 512). Going from there, Bourdieau divides social class into three categories, namely the dominant class, the middle class, and the lower class. In Marxist theory, social class is actually divided into two types or stages. The first type or stage is the class that refers to people who are in the same position in their relations with the ownership of the means of production; or a group of people who are under the same material conditions of existence or “common situation”. Marx says, “In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions which separate their way of life, their interest, and their education from those of other classes and oppose them to these, they constitute a class” (quoted by Dahrendorf 1963: 13). The social class as such is known as “class position or “class situation” or “class in itself”. Wright calls it class structure (Wright 1987: 9). According to Wright, “Class structure refers to the structure of social relations into which indi- viduals (or, in some cases, families) enter which determine their class interests” 2.3 Class Consciousness 13

(Wright 1987: 9). Nevertheless, Marxists tend to consider the first type of social class insignificant. As Dahrendorf explains, “However, these economic conditions of existence are not in themselves sufficient for the formation of classes” (Dahrendorf 1963: 13). Even Marx himself says that, “in so far the identity of their interests does not produce a community, a national association, and political organization – they do not constitute a class” (quoted by Dahrendorf 1963: 13). The second type or second stage of social class is the social class that has already had class consciousess, class interest, and the purpose of a class struggle. This class is considered to be the “real social class”, or, as Stavenhagen puts it, the “class in the truest sense of the word” (Stavenhagen 1975: 31). This type of class is the one that is known as “class for itself”, or what Wright calls “class formation” (Wright 1987: 10). This second type of social class seems to be what Marx meant when he said, “The separate individuals form a class in the same way as they have to carry on the common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors” (cited by Coser 1977: 48). The two types or stages of this social class are described by Stavenhagen as follows: “There are, then, two consecutive phrases in the development of class. In the first phase, a class constitutes a class only with respect to other classes, as a function of its position in the socio-economic structure, and the specific relations that grow out of this position. In the second phase, a class has gained consciousness of itself, its interests, and of its historical ‘mission’, and constitutes a class ‘in the truest sense of the word’. It is a political action group… (Stavenhagen 1975:31). According to Erik O Wright, the distinction between the two types of classes, namely between class structure and class formation, is a fundamental distinction in an analysis of social class. Wright himself defines class formation as “the formation of classes into collectively organized actors” (Wright 1991: 18), or “the formation of organized collectivities within the class structure” (Wright 1987: 10). Furthermore Wright says that class structure is determined by social relationships between dif- ferent social classes, whereas class formation is determined by social relations within the social class itself (Wright 1987: 10).

2.3 Class Consciousness

Furthermore, some aspects that have been much discussed by sociologists in rela- tion to social class are the traits or characteristics of each of the social classes. This is not surprising, given that Marx himself actually indicates the difference in nature or character of each class. As noted earlier, Marx mentions the differences or “way of life”, interest, and education of people of different class positions (see Dahrendorf 1963: 13). Meanwhile, in discussing the issues of social class in agricultural society (in a broader sense), Stinchombe also analyzed some characteristics of each social class. Some of the features discussed include: legal privileges, lifestyle, technologi- cal mastery, as well as political and organizational liveliness (Stincombe 1961: 14 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia

167). The problem of lifestyle as a characteristic of social class is also mentioned by Wright and Cho (1992). In the meantime, Kohn et al. (1990) discuss some of the psychological characteristics of people who are different classes, such as the flexi- bility of thinking, an assessment of a child’s self- reliance, and independence of work. One of the most important characteristics of class is class consciousness. Class consciousness is a highly important concept in theory of class. As Wright (1991) says, in addition to class structure, class analysis also includes other elements, such as class formation, class struggle, and class consciousness. Wright (1987) explains that class consciousness is a concrete aspect of individual subjectivity. Therefore, he says, “to study ‘consciousness’ is to study a particular aspect of the mental life of individuals”. According to Wright, these elements of consciousness consist of beliefs, ideas, observations, theories, and preference. Elsewhere, Wright defines this consciousness as “the actors’ understanding of their class interests” (Wright 1991: 18). Such class consciousness is the deciding factor that changes or transforms the “class in itself” into becoming a “class for itself”. This is apparently what Dahrendorf means when he says, “… the force that effects class formation is class interest. In a sense, class interests precede the formation of classes” (Dahrendorf 1963: 14). Meanwhile, Stavenhagen explains the role of class consciousness in transforming “class in itself” into “class for itself” as follows: “Class consciousness is the link that allows the transformation of a class ‘in itself’, a group- ing with objective, ‘latent’ interests, into a class ‘for itself’, or a power group which tends to organize itself for political conflict or struggle and whose interests at some point become ‘manifest’” (Stavenhagen 1975: 30). This class consciousness does not arise automatically from the existence of the class itself (Stavenhagen 1975: 31; Coser 1977: 48). Coser says that these “class interests” arise from and are shaped through the “exposure” of those who occupy certain social positions against particular social conditions. Coser says: “… poten- tiality is transformed into actuality, Klasse an sich (class in itself) into Klasse fuer sich (class for itself), only when individuals occupying similar positions become involved in common struggles; a network of communication develops, and then thereby becomes conscious of their common fate” (Coser 1977: 48–49). In more detail and systematically Turner explains that according to Marx, there are four fac- tors that encourage the growth of class consciousness or the “true collective inter- ests of the subordinate groups” (Turner 1998: 157). The four factors are: 1. The disruptions to the life or social conditions of the subordinate class due to changes caused by the dominant class; 2. Practices by the dominant classes that alienate the subordinate class; 3. Members of the subordinate class can communicate their difficulties and griev- ances with each other. The communication itself is influenced by the ecological concentration of the members and the expansion of educational opportunities for them; 2.4 Class and Class Conflict 15

4. Subordinate classes can build an ideology that unites them. This is facilitated by their ability to recruit or “create” the ideological spokespersons on the one hand, and the inability of the dominant class to organize the process of socialization and communication networks among the subordinate classes on the other. Consistent with Marx, Dahrendorf says conditions that encourage class con- sciousness and “class in itself” to turn into “class for itself” consist of technical, political and social conditions (Dahrendorf 1963: 185–189; Turner 1998: 169). The technical conditions include personnel, norms, and charter; whereas the political conditions include patterns of government, such as authoritarian or liberal; and the social conditions related to inter-group communication, and the pattern of recruit- ment of the group members. A study conducted by Logan (1977) on workers in Spain is quite interesting. Logan found that class consciousness of the workers in Spain was very strong among middle class workers. Logan says: “… these young, high-income middle- class workers are also the most class conscious” (Logan 1977: 399). In the case of the fishermen, it is interesting to conduct a study to identify classes that tend to have strong class consciousness; whether it is the fisherman laborers or the small owner fishermen, for example. In addition, it is also interesting to examine the “influence” of a fisherman’s experience or history and his aspirations toward class conscious- ness. Among the laborers of fishery products processing industry as well as fisher- man laborers in Nova Scotia, Canada, for example, Macdonald & Connelly say that “… the experience of owning a boat, or the aspiration to become a boat owner col- ored their consciousness while they were in a working class position “(Macdonald and Patricia Connelly 1989: 71).

2.4 Class and Class Conflict

Marx’s theory of class is inseparable from his theory of conflict and radicalism. For Marx, the source of conflict and radicalism is a conflict of inter-class interests. An antagonistic social class relationship results in social conflict. Since each social class has a conflicting or antagonistic interest, then the social class itself inherently contains seeds of conflict. Therefore, as long as social class exists, human domina- tion and exploitation of other human beings, as well as social conflicts will always exist. Furthermore, for Marx, class conflict or class struggle is the most important social conflict and determines the history of the development of a society. Marx’s most famous remarks are: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Marx and Engels 1948/1991: 9). Conflict and radicalism are closely related to class consciousness. Marx argues that the more aware the subordinate classes are of their collective interest, the more likely they are to engage in open conflict against the dominant class. This will espe- cially likely to happen when the following three conditions apply, namely (Turner 1998: 157): 16 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia

1. The dominant class cannot clearly articulate their collective interest and actions; 2. Deprivation of subordinate groups changes from absolute to relative, or a rapid escalation of deprivation takes place; 3. The subordinate class is able to build a solid structure of political leadership. According to Marx, the more solid the unifying ideology and the political leader- ship formed in the subordinate classes, the more polarized and difficult to reconcile the dominant and subordinate classes. Furthermore, the more polarized the two classes are, the more violent the conflict is, the more violent the conflict is, the greater the structural changes that occur, and the greater also the redistribution of natural resources in the society (Turner 1998: 156–157). Marxist theory of class and conflict has been used by some experts to analyze rural or agricultural society. One of the most famous is the analysis of the agrarian revolution by Jeffery M. Paige. In constructing a theory of rural class conflict, Paige uses Marx’s concept of class concept by defining classes based on ownership of fac- tors of production. As he puts it, “Thus the theory is based on a strict definition of class in terms of relations to property in land, buildings, machinery, standing crops and financial capital in the form of corporate assets, commodity balances, or agri- cultural credit” (Paige 1975: 10). Furthermore, Paige divides the agricultural com- munity into two main classes, namely the “noncultivator” (upper class) class and the “cultivator” class (lower class). He then divides each of these classes based on their source of income. The noncultivator class consists of the group whose income comes from the land and the group whose income comes from capital, while the cultivator class consists of a group whose income comes from land and the group whose income comes from wages. According to Paige, rural/agricultural social movements are the consequences of the interaction between the two classes. More clearly he says that: “Theory of rural class conflict demonstrates that the social movements associated with various types of agricultural organization are fundamentally a result of interaction between politi- cal behavior associated with the principal source of income of the upper and lower agricultural classes” (Paige 1975: 70). In this case there are two possible combina- tions that tend to encourage a “radical” social movement. Firstly, a combination of cultivators and noncultivators that are equally dependent on land as the main source of income may encourage an “agrarian revolt”. Secondly, a combination of noncul- tivators whose main income depends on land and cultivators whose main income depends on wages may lead to an “agrarian revolution”. Furthermore, from the perspective of the “cultivating class” itself, according to Paige, there is a tendency that the higher their dependence on land, the higher their resistance to radicalism. “The stronger the tie to the land, the greater the resistance to radicalism,” Paige said (p. 29). Conversely, those who depend on wages tend to be more receptive to radical ideas. Paige says: “… cultivators paid in wages tend to be receptive to radical political ideologies” (p. 29). In its entirety Paige’s proposition is as follows: “The greater the importance of land as source of income for cultivators, the greater their avoidance of risk and the greater their resistance to revolutionary political movements. Correspondingly the impor- 2.4 Class and Class Conflict 17 tance of wages in cash or kind, the greater the acceptance of risk and the greater the receptivity to revolutionary appeals” (p. 26). Paige’s opinion is different from the previous view held by Arthur L. Stinchombe (1961). Of the five typologies of the “agricultural enterprise” proposed by Stinchombe, he argues that the type of “family-size tenancy” (a small-scale system of tenancy) is the most politically unstable type of farming. In this system, the two social classes, the owner or landlord class and the farmer working/tenant class tend to be polarized sharply. While the landlord class tends to be exploitative, the working class tends to have heightened political sensitivities and radicalism. Therefore, according to Stinchombe, one of the most prominent features of this system is that it often ends through reform or revolution (Stincombe 1961: 170). It is explained that in this system, “High political affect and political organization of the lower classes, often produces revolutionary populist movement (p. 176). The next group that is also organized and opposed to “urban community” is the “small farmers” (family small- holding). In other words, according to Stinchombe, the more radical group is that of the peasants, not the “small farmers” or the hired farmer laborers. Meanwhile, Logan (1977) found that among workers in Spain, identification with the middle class tends to lead to high militancy among young and high-income workers. As Logan says, “Thus middle-class identification is associated with greater militancy and politiciza- tion for young and high-income workers …” (Logan 1977: 400). Like famers, fishermen also recognize social classes, for example there are capi- talist fishermen, small fishermen, and fisherman laborers. However, the nature of fishery resources that are mobile and cannot be personally owned is different from the nature of agricultural resources (land) that is privately owned. In this context, in relation to the abovementioned opinions of Paige and Stinchombe, it is interesting to learn which fisherman class tends to be more radical? Is it the fisherman laborers that are more prone to be radical (as Paige believes), or is it the small fishermen, who can be likened to the “family small-holding” under Stinchombe’s category that tends to be more radical.1 In terms of political radicalism of the lower classes, Alejandro Portes found that the lower-class radicalism in the suburbs of Santiago, Chile, is not merely a simplis- tic, irrational, abnormal, or emotional reaction. On the contrary, from his studies Portes argues that such radicalism is a normal process of developing attitudes through differences in exposure and the influence of the “significant others” (Portes 1971: 832). Political socialization that also influences the radical attitude of a per- son occurs in the workplace, in the neighborhood of residence, and within the household (parental political preferences). In line with Portes, White (1989) found that the support and involvement of a person in political violence was the result of a conscious decision made by the said person when he felt that a peaceful protest was futile (White 1989: 1297). In addition,­ White found that political violence was committed more because of state repression.

1 In my opinion, Stinchombe’s “family-size tenancy” does not have an equivalent or parallel in the system of capture fishery business (fishermen) in Indonesia. 18 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia

Furthermore, the rigidity or the openness and closure of class boundaries which Wright and Cho (1992) call “permeability”, seems to also influence the nature of class conflict and radicalism.2 Similarly, John R. Logan also says that, “the conser- vatism of affluent workers in some advanced industrial societies may depend on continually declining class barriers…” (Logan 1977: 401). It is interesting to exam- ine the extent of the “permeability” of the social classes among the fishermen, and their impact on the fishermen’s class consciousness and radicalism. The role of the state in “provoking” or triggering conflict and radicalism is also important. As previously mentioned, White found that repression by the state proved to stimulate political violence. Meanwhile, Theda Skocpol emphasized the impor- tance of “state breakdown” in determining the success of a social revolution (Skocpol 1989, 1994). As he puts it, “Peasant communities in France, Russia, and China enjoyed (or gained over the course of the revolutionary struggles) a consider- able degree of solidarity and autonomy from direct supervision by landlords follow- ing the breakdown of central administrative and military controls (Skocpol 1994: 5). Moreover, Skocpol emphasizes that “Social revolutions … could not happen with- out a breakdown of the administrative and coercive powers of an old regime …” (Skocpol 1994: 7). Thus, for Skocpol, as Collins puts it, “A revolution thus requires a crisis or breakdown of state power” (Collins 1988: 138). Or, in the language of Jonathan Turner, “Thus although class inequalities provide much of the drive for the mass mobilization of peasants, such mobilization is not likely to be successful unless the state is experiencing a crises of legitimacy…” (Turner 1998: 205). The weakening of government’s role and control as a factor contributing to the emer- gence of conflict and radicalism in agriculture is also noted by Jeffery Paige. He says, “The strength of colonial and imperial political controls have for long pre- vented the political expression of these conflicts, but with the decline of colonial power in the postwar era, the commercial export sectors of the underdeveloped world have become centers of revolutionary social movements” (Paige 1975: 3). In the field of fisheries, David L. Howell1995 ( ), for example, notes the importance of the role of the state in determining the process of development of capitalism and social change in the fisheries sector in Japan. According to him, “… the state is a key variable in understanding how changes in social and economic relations evolved” (Howell 1995: 180). The importance of the role of the state in determining class formation in fishing communities is also put forward by Fairley (1990). Therefore, it is very important and interesting to examine the role of the state in provoking or triggering conflicts and class struggle between fishermen in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the success of a conflict or protest in achieving its goal also depends on several factors. Frey et al. (1992), for example, found that goal factors, such as displacement goals, and factionalism within the social bodies of the conflicting groups themselves greatly influenced the success or failure of the group in achiev- ing its goals.

2 According to Wright & Cho, in addition to class mobility, permeability includes patterns of inti- mate social interaction such as marriage and friendship (Wright and Cho 1992: 85). 2.5 Fishermen Communities’ Social Class 19

2.5 Fishermen Communities’ Social Class

The number of books that discuss social class in fishermen communities is rela- tively small. Most literature on the subject is written by Canadian social scientists discussing fisherman communities in Canada.

2.5.1 Class Structure

In the various analyses on fisherman classes in Canada the capitalist and working classes are always present. In addition, some analyses also mention the “semi- pro- letarian”, “new fishery bourgeoisie” or “small capitalist”, and “big capitalist” classes (Fairley 1990). Meanwhile, Barbara Neis analyzed the relationship between the merchant class with “a class of oppressed and powerless fishermen” (Neis 1981). Furthermore, according to Macdonald and Connelly (1989), there is gener- ally an agreement that the offshore crew is the working class, as well as the workers or crew on inshore and nearshore vessels. The debate, in their opinion, is the posi- tion of the fishermen who own their vessels. Are they the small capitalist (“petty bourgeois”) or are they within a contradictory class location? In his book entitled The Struggle to Organized Resistance in Canada’s Fishery, Clement (1986) does not actually explain the class structure of the fisherman com- munities in Canada explicitly. However, the structure of the fishing class can be found implicitly in the description. Clement divides fishery production in Canada into five patterns, namely: 1. Pattern of subsystem production; Subsystem production is mainly conducted for self-consumption (use value), not for selling purpose (exchange value). 2. Pattern of capitalist production (or proletarian); This pattern of production separates direct producers from the means of pro- duction and forces them to become wage labor, including those with a profit- sharing system. For example, a captain of the trawling fishing gear owned by a processing company is a representation of capital and separated from the worker (labor). Another example, a skipper who owns a “trawler boat” with a crew of four or more people as a small capitalist, while the crew are the laborers (prole- tarian). On the other hand, the medium-sized boat skippers that are being hired or contracted, are more appropriately understood as supervisors in a group work with “ambiguous” class positions. 3. Pattern of independent production; Independent commodity production connects producers with capital through open market mechanisms. These independent producers are “the traditional petite bourgeoisie”. Here there is a unity between the direct producers and the means of production. 20 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia

4. Pattern of dependent production; The pattern of dependent production occurs in the event that there is no open market relationship, and direct producers are forced to enter into a contractual or monopoly relationship with capital. In this pattern, there is direct capital penetra- tion of the production relationship by dominating economic ownership while the direct producer retains the formal ownership of the means of production. 5. Pattern of cooperative production In this pattern, internally there is individual ownership but externally there is a cor- poration relationship. The ownership of this cooperative is both individual and social. From the above description of the patterns of production, four social classes can be identified in Canadian fishing communities, the capitalist class, the small capital- ist class, the petty bourgeoisie class, and the working class. Such is the structure of the fisherman class in Canada according to Clement. Furthermore, Clement argues that in order to understand class relationships in fishery, it is necessary to create a social category of the production unit (boat) itself. In this case, there are four social categories of producers in Canada’s fishery, namely, the workers/laborers, small-scale producers, intermediate-scale producers, and large-scale producers. In regard to the number of workers, small-scale producers consist of one (alone) to three people, mid-scale producers consisting of four to 10 people, and large slake producers consisting of more than 10 people.

2.5.2 Class Formation and Struggle

In his analysis of class formation in fishing communities in Newfoundland, Canada, Fairley emphasizes that, “… class formation and social development are seen as effects of the struggle of concrete actors…” (Fairley 1990: 177). Class formation on the fishermen, according to him, is also influenced by economic and political crises. In other words, the class formation is also influenced by external factors. On the other hand, Muszynski notes that fishermen are more difficult to organize compared to fishery industry workers, for example. He says, “It proved easier to organize shoreworkers than to bring all the fishers into one union” (Muszynski 1986: 100). The fishermen are fragmented either based on “tribe” (racial) or based on fishing gear, said Muzsynski (p. 99). The situation has certainly inhibited the fishermen’s class formation and struggle. Furthermore, drawing from his study on fisherman communities in Newfoundland, Barbara Neis found that the patterns of class struggle were influenced by the power of the fishermen themselves and the “investors” (merchants) who lend money (capital) to the fishermen. If these ­“financiers” are not organized, then the potential for fishermen’s class struggle will increase or get bigger (Neis 1981: 139). 2.6 Typology of Fishermen’s Social Conflict 21

2.6 Typology of Fishermen’s Social Conflict

Charles (1992 and 2001) divides “fishery conflict” into four types, namely: 1. Fishery jurisdiction, concerning who “owns” the fishery resources, who controls the access to these resources, what does the form of optimal management look like, and what role should the government play; 2. Management mechanisms, concerning short-term issues, particularly conflicts between fishermen and the government regarding production levels, consultation processes, and law enforcement; 3. Internal allocation, concerning conflicts that arise within a fishery system, between different user groups and fishing gear, as well as between fishermen, processors and other “players”; 4. External allocation constitutes conflicts between “players” within the fishery industry internally with regard to outsiders, such as foreign fishing fleets, the agriculture industry, and other non-fishery industries such as tourism and forestry. In the typology proposed by Charles there is no specific mention of the types of class conflict; it is possible that this type of conflict belongs to the third type of conflict, namely the internal allocation. In my opinion this is one of the fundamental weaknesses of this typology. In the meantime, Satria et al. (2002: 166–170) group the types of conflict as follows: 1. Class conflicts, namely conflicts that occur between the fishermen’s social classes due to the domination of capital and traditional businesses, such as con- flicts between traditional fishermen and trawl fishermen; 2. Orientation conflict, namely conflicts that occur between fishermen with differ- ent orientation in utilizing resources, such as those between fishermen with short-term orientation and long-term orientation; 3. Agrarian conflict, namely conflicts attributable to dispute over fishing grounds; it could occur both between classes and interclasses and between fishermen and non-fishermen; 4. Primordial conflict, namely conflicts that occur due to differences of identity or social culture, such as ethnicity and place of origin. In my opinion the typology of fisherman conflicts proposed by Satria et al. con- fuse the basis for the establishment of a conflict group, such as types No 1, 2, and 3, with issues that are the core of the matter for a conflict to occur, such as in the No. 3 type of conflict. From the perspective of the basis for the establishment of a conflict group I myself divide internal conflicts between fellow fishermen into three categories3 only, namely:

3 I had set out the fishermen conflict typology in my previous two papers (Kinseng2006a , b). 22 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia

1. Class conflict Class conflicts are conflicts that occur between different classes of fishermen, for instance between the laborers and the owner, or between the small fishermen with the big-capitalist fishermen. 2. Identity conflict Identity conflicts are conflicts that occur between fishermen based on primor- dial identities, such as ethnicity or place of origin, often known also as conflicts between the locals and the settlers. In addition, religion could also become a basis for the occurrence of primodial conflict group. 3. Gear conflict Gear conflicts are conflicts that occur between groups of fishermen using different types of fishing gear, but are within a more or less equivalent “level”, such as between perengge and dogol in Balikpapan, who are both “small fishermen”. This fishing gear conflicts are known as “gear wars”.4 It should be noted that this classification is not mutually exclusive by nature, for example a class conflict can at the same time constitute a gear conflict. Meanwhile, the main issues in these conflicts can include disputes over fishing ground including zoning, profit-sharing (economic), introduction of new technology, and so on. Naturally the fishermen often come into conflict with parties from non-fishing sec- tors also, such as mining, developers, shipping, the state- owned oil company Pertamina, and so on, which I call external conflicts.

2.7 Fishermen in Indonesia and Their Problems

With regard to quantity, most fishermen in Indonesia are small fishermen and fisher- man laborers. This is in line with Bailey’s opinion that most fishermen in Indonesia are “small-scale producers” (Bailey 1988: 25). Friedhelm Betke also says the same thing. According to Betke, “The majority of …marine fishermen in Indonesia, though, may still be categorized as ‘artisanal’ or ‘small-scale’ producers, often also referred to as ‘traditional’…” (Betke 1988: 53). For example, for marine fisheries, based on the business size, in 2004 the number of fishing households/fishing com- panies without boats was 112,010 units, non-motorized boats 233,233 units, boats with outboard motors 152,875 units, while those using motored boats 111,457 pieces (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan, Direktorat Jenderal Perikanan Tangkap 2006). If fishermen without boats, with non-motorized boats, and with outboard motors are categorized as small fishermen, and fishermen with motored

4 In fact, class conflicts such as conflicts between trawlers or purse seine fishermen with traditional fishermen can also be included in the type of fishing gear conflicts, however, since class issues are very important in such cases, I find it more appropriate to discuss it from the perspective of class conflict. In this paper the fishing gear conflicts refer to the types of conflicts that occur between fishermen using different fishing gears, but are within a more or less equivalent “class”. 2.7 Fishermen in Indonesia and Their Problems 23 boats the big fishermen, then 81.72% of fishermen in Indonesia in 2004 were small fishermen. Meanwhile, the data available on “Marine and Fisheries in Figures 2009” is somewhat different from those in 2004. The 2009 data no longer recorded the number of fishing households/fishing companies without boats, nor the fishermen category (full-time and part-time). In 2009, the number of non-motorized boats was 205,460, whereas those with outboard motors and motored boats are 233,530 units and 157,240 units respectively. Further examination of the data shows most of the motored boats are small in size, which is under 5 GT.5 Thus, until now the configu- ration of fishermen in Indonesia is still dominated by small fishermen. Unfortunately there is no data available on the number of fishermen based on the ownership of means of production, hence there is no certain data on the number of fishing laborers. The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries only provides data about fishermen based on three categories, namely full-time fishermen, main part- time, and extra part-time fishermen. For marine fisheries, in 2004 the total number of full-time fishermen was 1,182,604; the number of main part-time fishermen was 826,206; and the number of the extra part-time fishermen was 337,972 (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan, Direktorat Jenderal Perikanan Tangkap 2006). However, if the data on the number of fishermen is linked to data on the number of boats or fish- ing vessels, then we can get a rough idea of the number of fishing laborers in Indonesia. In 2004 the number of fishing vessels for marine fisheries in Indonesia was 549,100 (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan, Direktorat Jenderal Perikanan Tangkap 2006). Assuming that one fisherman owned one boat or fishing vessel, then the number of fishermen laborers in Indonesia in 2004 was 1,685,672 persons (71.83%).6 This is certainly an “optimistic” number, because in reality a great num- ber of fishermen/marine fishing companies own more than one vessel. Many parties associate fishermen with poverty or marginality. Pujo, for instance, says that, “In Asia, where agriculture takes pride of its place as the dominant eco- nomic activity, fishing communities…are marginal” (Semedi 2003: 15). In the meantine, Mubyarto, Soetrisno, and Dove say that, “In general fishermen’s house- holds are poorer than farmers’ or craftsmen’s households” (Mubyarto et al. 1984: 16). On that note, in Kalimantan Barat, according to the region’s Head of Marine and Fisheries Office, approximately 80% of the fishermen in the province were “in the condition of poverty” (Kompas, 12/04/05 p. 28). When examined more deeply, in fact, the poor and the marginalized are mainly the small fishermen and fisherman laborers. Thus, Conner Bailey was right when he says, “most fishers are small-scale producers who are among the poorest of the poor in Indonesian society” (Bailey 1988: 25).

5 The number of the boat under 5 GT is 109,590; 5–10 GT is 30,400; 10–20 GT is 7910; 20–30 GT is 5280; 30–50 GT is 750; 50–100 GT is 1670, 100–200 GT is 1230; larger than 200 GT is 410 (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 2009). 6 The number of fisherman laborers (1,685,672 orang) is the total number of marine fisheries fisher- men, which is 2,346,782 deducte by the number of marine fishing vessels or boats, namely 549,100 and deducted by the number of non-boat owner fisheries household, namely 112,010. 24 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia

The small fishermen and fisherman laborers are indeed in a fragile and marginal position. In terms of capital, for example, they are generally very weak. As a result, most of them heavily rely on the capital of owners (tauke), who are usually fish buy- ers. Due to the lack of assets, these small fishermen often borrow funds from the tauke for the fishing operation cost. In addition, there are also many fishermen who have to borrow money to buy equipment, such as fishing boats and fishing gear. Such debt often continues or accumulates to the point that fishermen are not able to repay. In other words, these small fishermen are “trapped in debt”. As compensation for this capital loan, they must sell their catch to the lender who lent the capital. In this case the small fishermen’s bargaining position is very weak; they are compelled to accept the price set by the tauke, which is usually below market price. For exam- ple, in Banyuasin, South Sumatra, “the price of grouper that reaches Rp 80,000 per kilogram in the market is only valued at Rp 67,000 per kilogram by the tauke (Kompas, 19/04/05 p. 31). To make things worse, in the purchase of means of production, particularly fuel oil, these small fishermen are in a similarly weak position. Oftentimes they have to purchase resources for operation at a more expensive rate than the official selling price in the market. For example, the lowest retail price that fishermen in Pontianak pay to buy diesel fuel was Rp 3000 per liter, whereas the official retail price was Rp 2100 per liter (Kompas, 12/04/05, p. 28). Meanwhile, the struggle to compete for various fishery commodities in the seas is no less harsh. And, as Bailey says, “… the situation in fisheries is even worse than in agriculture because the fishers compete with one another over a finite resource” (Bailey 1988: 26). In the struggle for this resource, obviously it is impossible for the small fishermen to compete with the large/modern-capitalist fishermen. To cite Bailey again, “…fisheries development in Indonesia has become a zero-sum game, where those who control the most powerful technologies have a clear competitive advantage and individually prosper, even as others are swept aside and fish stocks depleted” (Bailey 1988: 26). Those who, according to Bailey, have been “swept aside” in the competition for fishery resources in the seas are primarily small fisher- men. In other words, these small fishermen often become “the losers” (Winson 1992) in this competition or in the struggle to seize fishery resources. The difficulties encountered by these small fishermen did not only come from fellow human beings, but also from nature that is often unfriendly to them. When the winds and storms come, they also experience great life difficulties. Equipped only with simple fishing technology it is particularly difficult for them to fight against nature’s ferocity. These are difficult times known as thepaceklik time, the lean season for fishermen. In times of paceklik, these small fishermen would often have to sell their property or household furniture, sometimes to the point that they have to “sell (their) sarong even” to survive. Recent climate change has also wors- ened the lives of small fishermen. According to some fishermen, climate change has made the weather unpredictable and led to a change in the pattern of seasons, 2.7 Fishermen in Indonesia and Their Problems 25 namely the lean season tends to be longer.7 Surely such conditions make their life worse and even more marginalized. Due to the conditions described above, I once referred to these small fishermen as getting stuck where they cannot move “neither forward nor back” (Kinseng 1995). They seemed to be “attacked” from various directions that get them “trapped”. As a result, their lives became “suffocating” (Mubyarto et al. 1984: 176). The “suf- focating” circumstances tend to continue from one generation to the next. Vertical social mobility becomes increasingly difficult to achieve. As Mubyarto, Soetrisno, & Dove say, “If the parents are able, they will certainly try to send their children to get the highest level of education so they will not have to become fishers like their parents. However, based on the studied fisher families most of them are not able to liberate themselves from the profession of fishermen. They hereditarily become fishermen” (Mubyarto et al. 1984: 174). Hereditarily becoming a fisherman means to suffer a “suffocating” life, being trapped in a vicious circle of poverty that has no end. In Betke’s words the small fishermen are “trapped in an increasingly hopeless situation” (Betke 1988: 59). Such “suffocating” and increasingly “hopeless” life condition often triggers con- flicts between small fishermen and big-capitalist fishermen. In the 1970s, for exam- ple, the ever more marginalized fishermen, due to the heightening competition with big-capitalist fishermen (such as the trawl fishermen), were often caught up in quite violent conflicts. As Betke puts it, “Finding themselves trapped in an increasingly hopeless situation, Indonesian fishermen eventually rebelled and desperately counter-­attacked the representatives of modernization that threatened their sur- vival.” (Betke 1988: 59). The social conflicts were sometimes violent, involving setting fishing boats and gears on fire, physical fights, and even murder. They also used a variety of sharp weapons and even Molotov cocktails (see Bailey 1988; Betke 1988; Shaliza 2004, for example). Theoretically, the socio- economic depri- vation that the small fishermen and fishing laborers experienced could indeed trig- ger radicalism and social conflict. In that context, various questions surrounding fishermen class and class conflicts can be raised, such as: how do class structures and formations occur among fisher- men? What is the current level of class consciousness of the small fishermen and laborer fishermen? Is there a difference in the level of class consciousness between small fishermen and fishing laborers?8 What kind of alliances that are formed

7 Interview with some fishermen in Pamengpeuk, Garut, West Java, September 2010. 8 In the agriculture sector there is a debate with regard to which class is the more radical. According to Arthur L. Stinchome, for instance, the type of “family-size tenancy” (a small-scale system of tenancy) is the most politically unstable type of farming. In this system, the two social classes, the owner or landlord class and the farmer working/tenant class tend to be polarized sharply. While the landlord class tends to be exploitative, the working class tends to have heightened political sensi- tivities and radicalism. Therefore, according to Stinchombe, one of the most prominent features of this system is that it often ends through reform or revolution (Stinchombe 1961: 170). Therefore, according to Stinchombe, one of the most prominent features of this system is that it often ends through reform or revolution (Stinchombe 1961: 170). Meanwhile, according to Jeffery M. Paige, there is a tendency that the higher the cultivator’s dependence on the land, the higher their resis- 26 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia between the two social classes of fishermen? What factors can encourage or hamper the growth of consciousness of this small class of fishermen and fishing laborers? Questions like these are very interesting and important, both academically and in terms of practical importance for policy formulation. However, to date not many answers have been found with regard to these questions for fishermen in Indonesia.

2.8 Directional Hypothesis

From the various cases of fisherman conflicts that have occurred so far, as has been pointed out in the beginning, it can be said there has been no open and brutal conflict between the working class and the owner class. The fishermen working class tends to be passive and “hopeless” in the context of its own class struggle. They only func- tion in alliances with the owner fisherman classes. Thus, my hypothesis is that the level of consciousness of the fisherman working class is still relatively low. This is partly because fisherman laborers are internally fragmented into small, relatively autonomous groups. The grouping of these fisherman workers occurs mainly when they engage in fishing activities at sea, where each group is assembled in a single vessel or fishing unit. Furthermore even, they are actually engaged in tight competi- tion to get that limited fishery resources. In fact, most of their time is spent at sea, so their togetherness in the land is also very limited. In addition, the laborer class seems also to be “cut off” by the group identity based on the type of fishing gear and the “class level” of the fisherman owners they work in, for example the small fisher- men versus the big-capitalist fishermen. Therefore, the union of the fisherman work- ers as a strong social class to face the owner fishermen becomesis not straightforward. To use a “football team analogy” (Man 1973: 35), it is presumed that the workers and the owners who are on board of a vessel, or using the same type of fishing gear, would feel more part of “one team” compared to a gathering of fellow workers as a whole. In other words, it can be assumed that the more dominant of these fishermen workers is a “class in itself”, which has not developed yet into becoming a “class for itself”. The phenomenon that occurs among fisherman laborers also occurs among small fishermen. Small fishermen are also fragmented based on the type of fishing gear. But in dealing with big-capitalist fishermen, they are presumably more solid than the laborers. Therefore, their class consciousness is relatively higher than the labor- ers’. Thus, presumably the small fishermen are more willing to take the initiative and engage in open conflicts with big-capitalist fishermen. They are also more responsive to “radical” ideas from outside. In addition to dealing with big- capitalist tance to radicalism. “The stronger the tie to the land, the greater the resistance to radicalism,” Paige said (1975: 29). Conversely, those who depend on wages tend to be more receptive to radical ideas. Paige says: “… cultivators paid in wages tend to be receptive to radical political ideologies” (p. 29). 2.8 Directional Hypothesis 27

Picture 2.1 “Bipolar Notes: <−--->: shows Class Conflict Scheme” conflict Owner Fisherman Class

Laborer Class

Big Fishermen (Owner)

Small Fishermen (Owner)

Fisherman Laborers

Picture 2.2 The “Triangle” Class Conflict Scheme Notes: <−--->: indicates conflict fishermen, presumably the small fishermen also often have to deal with the “capital owner class” (merchant class), because they are often bound by their loans to the financers. The bonds often entail elements of exploitation, thus they are conflict potentials. Hence, based on the above description, class conflict that is “bipolar” as shown in Picture 2.1, or “triangle” as shown in Picture 2.2 is not dominant or rarely occurs among fishermen in Indonesia. The dominant one is the class conflict as presented schematically in Picture 2.3. The above description constitutes the internal aspect of fisherman communities. In the meantime, the literature review at the beginning shows that the external aspects of a community play a very important role in determining the dynamics of the community. The question in this case is, what is the role of the external factors, or what “influence” do they have on class formation among the fishermen? How do they affect the fishermen’s class consciousness? How do they affect the patterns of class struggle between small fishermen and fisherman laborers? To date the answers to such questions remain few, due to the lack of comprehensive studies on the role 28 2 Class, Conflict, and Fishermans’ Condition in Indonesia

Picture 2.3 Scheme of Fisherman Conflict (Hypothesis Notes: <−--->: shows conflict of the external factors, such as the government, political parties, and non-­ governmental organizations on the formation, consciousness, and struggle of Indonesian fishermen’s classes. With regard to the external factors, it can be hypothesized that there has not been any planned and systematic undertaking carried out by various parties such as the HNSI (Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia – Association of Fishermen of Indonesia), Political Parties, NGOs, as well as intellectuals to raise the class con- sciousness of laborer and small fishermen. The only external factor that plays an important role in generating this class consciousness is the government. The role of the government is mainly in the form of establishing policies that harm or marginal- ize the laborers and small fishermen, such as programs of modernization of fisher- ies, fuel price increase, and various other development programs. In addition, the macro socio-political developments in Indonesia, especially the democratizating processes, including the implementation of the Regional Autonomy and direct regional elections (Pilkada), could also be a factor driving the emergence of class consciousness and social conflict.9 Therefore, the structure, formation, consciousness,­ and pattern of the class struggle of the fishermen can be described schematically as in Picture 2.4.

9 Based on his studies on the revolution in France, Russia, and China, Theda Skocpol highly emphasizes the role of the state (Skocpol 1994) or the political struggle of the dominant strata (Skocpol 1989) in determining the success of a social revolution, including peasant revolution. Bibliography 29

Government Political party Financiers NGO HNSI Big Fishermen/ Capitalists and Laborers

Small Fishermen 1 Small Fishermen 2 Small Fishermen n And laborers And laborers And laborers

Picture 2.4 External Factor and Fishermen’s Class Conflict Notes: <−--->: indicates conflict

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Journals

Bailey, Conner. 1988. “The Political Economy of Marine Fisheries Development in Indonesia”. Indonesia No. 46 (Oct). Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Charles, Anthony T. 1992. “Fishery Conflicts. A Unified Framework”. Marine Policy, September 1992. Frey, R. Scott, Thomas Dietz, and Linda Kalof. 1992. Characteristics of Succesful American Protest Groups: Another Look at Gamson’s Strategy of Social Protest. American Journal of Sociology 98 (2): 368–387. Goldthorpe, John H. 2000. Rent, Class Conflict, and Class Structure: A Commentary on Sorensen. American Journal of Sociology 105 (6): 1572–1582. Bibliography 31

Kohn, Melvin L., et al. 1990. Position in the Class Structure and Psychological Functioning in the United States, Japan, and Poland. American Journal of Sociology 95 (4): 964–1008. Logan, John R. 1977. Affluent, Class Structure, and Working-Class Consciousness in Modern Spain. American Journal of Sociology 83 (2): 386–402. Macdonald, Martha, and M. Patricia Connelly. 1989. Class and Gender in Fishing Communities in Nova Scotia. Studies in Political Economy 30 (Autumn): 61–85. Muszynski, Alicja. 1986. Class Formation and Class Consciousness: The Making of Shoreworkers in the BC Fishing Industry. Studies in Political Economy 20 (Summer): 85–116. Neis, Barbara. 1981. Competitive Merchants and Class Struggle in Newfoundland. Studies in Political Economy 5 (Spring): 127–143. Oberschall, Anthony. 1978. Theories of Social Conflict. Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978): 291–315. Portes, Alejandro. 1971. Political Primitivism, Differential Socialization, and Lower-Class Leftist Radicalism. American Sociological Review 36: 820–835. Stincombe, Arthur L. 1961. Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations. American Journal of Sociology LXVII (2): 165–176. White, Robert W. 1989. From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. American Journal of Sociology 94 (6): 1277–1302. Wright, Erik O., and Donmoon Cho. 1992. The Relative Permeability of Class Boundaries to Cross-Class Friendships: A Comparative Study of the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Norway. American Sociological Review 57 (1): 85–102.

Dissertations and Thesis

Betke, Friedhelm. 1988. Prospect of a “Blue Revolution” in Indonesian Fisheries: A Bureaucratic Dream or Grim Reality?. Disertasi, Bielefeld University, Jerman. Shaliza, Fara. 2004. Dinamika Konflik Antar Komunitas dan Transformasi Modal Sosial (Studi Kasus Konflik antara Komunitas Nelayan Parit III dan Melati di Kabupaten Bengkalis, Provinsi Riau). Tesis Magister Sains pada Program Studi Sosiologi Pedesaan, Sekolah Pascasarjana, Institut Pertanian Bogor.

Papers

Kinseng, Rilus A. 2006a. “Konflik Kelas di Kalangan Kaum Nelayan di Indonesia (Sebuah Catatan Awal)”. Makalah disampaikan pada Workshop Nasional Riset Sosial Ekonomi Kelautan dan Perikanan, Bogor 2–3 Agustus 2006. ———. 2006b. “Mengelola Konflik Nelayan: Belajar dari Kasus Balikpapan”. Makalah disam- paikan pada acara “Apresiasi Pengelolaan Sumber daya Ikan”, Bogor 14-16 November 2006.

Newspapers

———. 1995. “Nelayan Kecil: “Maju Kena, Mundur Kena” (Suara Pembaruan, 29/8/95 hal 2). Chapter 3 General Description of the Research Location

3.1 The City of Balikpapan

As mentioned at the beginning, the research study was conducted in the city of Balikpapan, in East Kalimantan Province. A brief description of the city of Balikpapan would be presented in this chapter to provide an illustration of the research location’s condition.

3.1.1 A Brief History

The city of Balikpapan is quite an old city, older than the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia itself. Known as the “oil city”, the history of Balikpapan is closely related to the history of oil discovery and drilling activities conducted around it. The “History Seminar” held on 1 December 1984, which aimed at explor- ing the various stories and history of Balikpapan City, concluded that Balikpapan City was established on 10 February 1897. The date was established based on his- torical records indicating that the first oil drilling activities on the coasts around Balikpapan Bay were conducted on 10 February 1897 (Balikpapan City Government 2006). On 7 January 1953, Balikpapan was named the Capital City of the South Kutai Kawedanan. Then, based on Law No.27/1959, on 21 January 1960 the South Kutai Kawedanan was established as the Municipality of Balikpapan (Balikpapan City Tourism Office Document undated). Meanwhile, the Balikpapan City Government records three historical versions of the origin of the name Balikpapan. One version tells a story that in ancient times, this area of Balikpapan was part of a small kingdom. The king had a baby daughter. One day the king of the little kingdom was attacked by another king and was besieged. In the dire situation he tried to save his daughter by tying her to a board

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 33 R. A. Kinseng, Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0986-5_3 34 3 General Description of the Research Location and let the board float at the beach. A fisherman later found the board upside down, and when he flipped it he found the princess still alive. Hence, the place where a princess was found by a fisherman was named Balikpapan (which literally means flipped board), In the legend it is told that the princess was Princess Petung, the daughter of a king of the Kingdom of Paser or Pasir (Balikpapan City Government 2006; Balikpapan City Tourism Office Document, undated).

3.1.2 Accessability

Balikpapan can be easily reached by air, land, or sea. Known as “the main gateway of East Kalimantan” (Hamid 2006), Balikpapan has an international airfield, Sepinggan. Currently almost all airlines in Indonesia fly to and from Balikpapan, which include Lion Air, Pelita Air, Airasia, Garuda Indonesia, Mandala, Merpati, Kartika Airlines, Adam Air (now non-operational), Sriwijaya Air, Batavia Air, and DAS. In addition, there is one international airline, namely Silk Air, which serves the Balikpapan-Singapore route on a regular basis. Balikpapan also has a large seaport, Port of Semayang. The port also serves domestic and international shipping, accommodating a large number of ships. In 2005, for example, there were 4783 national ships arriving as well as 4735 departing from Balikpapan, with a total of 4201 foreign ships arriving and 4180 leaving. There are also ferries to connetct Balikpapan with Mamuju (West ) and Surabaya (East Java). In addition, the city of Balikpapan is located on the trans-Kalimantan land trans- portation network connecting East Kalimantan and South Kalimantan. Therefore, the city can be easily reached from Samarinda, the capital of East Kalimantan Province, of which the distance is less than 100 km. Public transportation like buses from Balikpapan to Samarinda and vice versa is available daily from morning to night at a cost of Rp 19,500 per person. Other Public transportation by road is also available from Balikpapan to Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan) and several other cities in the province.

3.1.3 Geographical Condition and Location

Geographically the city of Balikpapan lies between 116.5 degrees and 117.0 degrees East Longitude and between 1.0 degrees North latitude and 1.5 degrees south lati- tude. The boundaries of the city of Balikpapan are as follows: North: the District of Kutai Kertanegara South: Makassar Strait East: Makassar Strait West: North Penajam Paser District 3.1 The City of Balikpapan 35

The city of Balikpapan covers an area of 503.30 km2 with varying heights, rang- ing from 0 to 100 m above sea level. In line with the various altitudes, the city area also has varied gradient: 14% of which has 0–2% slope, while the other 42.33% is between 15% and 40%.

3.1.4 Climate

Balikpapan has a tropical climate with two main seasons, namely the dry season that usually runs from May to October, and the monsoon season between November and April. As a region located on the equator, the weather in the city of Balikpapan is also influenced by the monsoon wind, which consists of the East Muson (May– October) and West monsoon (November–April). Balikpapan’s temperature is quite warm, ranging between 22.4 and 34.7 °C with 82–92% humidity. In regard to rainfall, Balikpapan has varying rainfall. In 2005, the highest rainfall occurred in October, with an average of 279.5 mm, while the lowest rainfall occurred in September, which was 35.9 mm (Balikpapan in Figures 2006).

3.1.5 Government Administration

As a municipality, Balikapapan is now headed by a mayor. The original city of Balikpapan consists of three districts. However, since 1996, as stipulated in Government Regulation (PP) no. 38/1996, the city was developed into five sub- dis- tricts and 27 villages. The five sub-districts in Balikpapan are: North Balikpapan, South Balikpapan, , , and Central Balikpapan.

3.1.6 Population

In 2005 the population of Balikpapan was 500,406 or 116,937 households. Hence, the overall city’s density was 994.25 persons per km2. Surrounded by busy mining areas, Balikpapan is home to many foreign nation- als. In 2004, for example, there were 36 foreign permanent residents living in Balikpapan, and 490 permanent foreign households and 490 temporary ones. In terms of ethnicities Balikpapan residents comprise various ethnic groups, such as Bugis, Banjar, Dayak, Java, Batak, and Manado. 36 3 General Description of the Research Location

3.2 Manggar

Manggar is a town center in the sub-district of East Balikpapan. Administratively, Manggar lies on two adjacent villages, namely Manggar Village and Manggar Baru Village. The two villages are separated only by Manggar River and the highway connecting Balikpapan City with Kutai Kertanegara district. Given that most fisher- men in Balikpapan live in these two urban villages, the fishermen communities in Manggar Baru and Manggar are the main focus in this study. In addition, informa- tion is also collected from several fishermen in other locations such as Teritip, Aji Raden, Markoni, and Damai.

3.2.1 Development of Manggar

According to a fisherman in Markoni, Mr. Ambo Rappe, until 1971 Balikpapan was quiet. “The place used to be a swamp”, he said. According to him, Balikpapan expe- rienced rapid development starting in the 1980s. Similarly, pak Azis, another fisher- man from Manggar, said that when he first came to Balikpapan in the 1970s, there were only 20 Bugis people living in Manggar, while there was only one fisherman household in Tanjung Kelor. The road to Balikpapan was also small and transporta- tion was difficult back then; at four o’clock in the afternoon there would be no cars coming into Manggar. According to him, it was the large/industrial projects that had accelerated rapid progress in Balikpapan, which included Manggar area. Pak Azis was quite right. Currently there are many big companies, both domestic and multinational, that are doing business in East Balikpapan areas. The main road that links Balikpapan and Manggar, for example, are lined with dozens of large companies, such as Thiess, PT. MTU Detroit Diesel Indonesia, Leighton Contractors Indonesia, Sclumberger, Halliburton, BOSCH-Diesel Center, Volvo Construction Equipment, EWS Oilfield Services, Coates Hire Indonesia, Liebherr, PROBESCO-­ Heavy Equipment Center, and so on. Near the road is the Batakan Housing Complex, which is a modern residential complex that is generally occupied by foreign nation- als.Now the city of Manggar is one of the busiest places in the district. Various facilities symbolizing modernity, such as mobile phone shops, motorbike shops, VCD/DVD kiosks, stores selling electrical appliances like refrigerators and TVs and photocopy shops are widely available in Manggar. Telecommunication facilities in the form of public telephones (wartel/telephone kiosks) are also largely available. The division of labor within the society in Manggar has become highly complex. Apart from fishing, there are various kinds of work opportunies available for the community, such as trading, motorcycle taxi drivers, public transportation drivers, civil servants, members of the military/ABRI (the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), private company employees, even garbage collectors and scavengers (Picture 3.1). 3.2 Manggar 37

Picture 3.1 Motorcycle shop in Manggar (a symbol of modernity)

3.2.2 Accessibility

Manggar is located about 30 km from Balikpapan City and can be easily reached as the highway that connects the city with the Kutai Kertanegara (Kukar) area passes through it. Public transportation in the form of angkot (minibus) that connects Manggar, Lamaru, Teritip and Mount Tembak with the city of Balikpapan is readily available until night. Access from Manggar and the surrounding areas to Sepinggan airport is also very convenient, since Sepinggan airport is located not far from the highway between Balikpapan City and Manggar. Travel from airport to Manggar by the minibus only takes about 30 min.

3.2.3 Population

Between January and June 2006, the population in Manggar Village was 23,743 people, consisting of 12,793 men and 10,950 women, with 5455 households. In the same period, the population in Manggar Baru Village totaled 13,325 people, con- sisting of 7160 men and 6165 women, with a total number of 3730 households. With regard to citizenship, there are 11 (eleven) foreign nationals living in Manggar vil- lage, which consists of 10 men and 1 woman, while none lived in Manggar Baru. 38 3 General Description of the Research Location

Table 3.1 Number of population of Manggar Manggar Baru urban villages based on source of livelihood, January–June 2006 Village Type of Livelihood Manggar Manggar Baru Number % Number % 1. Employee: 401 2,35 508 9,91 Civil service 503 2,95 620 12,09 ABRI/POLRI 12.711 74,46 763 14,88 Private 2. Business 504 2,95 59 1,15 3. Farming 719 4,21 1.428 27,85 4. Handymen 391 2,29 28 0,55 5. Farm labor 193 1,13 321 6,26 6. Pensionary 99 0,58 16 0,31 7. Fisher 475 2,78 1.384 27,00 8. Scavenger 171 1,00 0 0 9. Service 905 5,30 – – Total 17.072 100.00 5.127 100,00 Sources: Taken from the January–June 2006 monographs of Manggar Village and Manggar Baru Village

In terms of religion, there are five religions embraced by the residents of Manggar Village, namely Islam (20,821), Christian (2436), Catholic (409), Hindu (34), and Buddhism (43). Meanwhile, in Manggar Baru the number of Muslim population is 13,038, Christian 222, Catholic 41, Hindu 8, Buddhist 8, and Agnostic 8. The two urban villages’ sources of livelihood are quite varied. In Manggar Village, the largest proportion is private employment (12,711 people), followed by services (905), and 719 peasants, whereas 475 people are fishers. In Manggar Baru sub-district, the largest proportion of the population are farmers, which is 1428 people, and the second is fishermen, which is 1384 people, followed by private employees which number 763 people and Military/Police 620 people. The total population based on means of production is presented in Table 3.1.

3.3 Capture Fisheries in Balikpapan

Balikpapan Municipality is one of the districts/cities in East Kalimantan Province located in the coastal areas of Makassar Strait. With a 25-kilometer-long coastline (Riva’i 2006) it is therefore natural that the city has huge potential for fisheries.1 The subsequent section will describe some general aspects that illustrate the condition of capture fisheries in the city of Balikpapan.

1 It should be noted that most of the 25-kilometer-long coastline in Balikpapan Municipality is within the areas of the sub-district of East Balikpapan (Riva’i 2006). 3.3 Capture Fisheries in Balikpapan 39

3.3.1 Types, Production, and Value of Catch

True to the promises of the Makassar Strait’s sea wealth, the types of the fisher- men’s catch in Balikpapan are highly diverse. The types of pelagic fish that are extensively caught include long-jawed mackerel, swordfish, mackerel, and others. Meanwhile, the types of demersal fish comprise, among others, Spanish mackerel, shark, snapper, and travelly. The other types are benthic fish that include giant cat- fish, stingray, grouper, shrimp, sea cucumbers, and others. For more details, data on the types of marine captures in Balikpapan City can be seen in Appendix 1. Overall, in 2005, capture fisheries production in Balikpapan was 13,118 tons, which was decreasing compared to the 2004 production figure, which was 13,635 tons. The total production value of the catch in 2005 amounted to IDR 92,498,400,000 or almost IDR 92.5 billion, which showed a substantial decrease compared to the amount in 2004, which was IDR 177,107,700,000 or IDR 177 billion (declined by IDR 84,609,300,000 or more than IDR 84.5 billion). It should also be noted that the fishermen have already felt the declining trend in the amount of their catch. Some notable fishermen say that in the early years of their arrival in Balikpapan, which was in the 1970s, fish and shrimp were pentiful. “At that time (when they were still using boats with paddles) there were still plenty of fish”, a fisherman said. The declining amount of fish around Balikpapan waters started at around 1998. “The decline in the years of 2005/2006 has been severe”, he continued. He later gave an account: “I have been to sea three times, which meant losing IDR 1 million. So, it is better that I don’t go to sea for the time being since there’s no catch, anyway. One fishing trip needs 140 liters (of diesel fuel). My rumpon (Fish Aggregating Device – FAD) is the farthest (from the shore), like Mr. Agus’s, which is 40 miles. Even (with such distance) still there is no catch, let alone for those that only go 20 or 30 miles. Many damaged boats are now being left lying around. Recently a boat and the engine were sold cheaply at IDR 2 million. It was too cheap as the real price should have been 5 million. These days the labor power (the sawi – fisherman laborer) has not been easily available, many of them have moved to construction work. How could you go to sea when you don’t even have money to buy ciga- rettes?” (Interviewed on 5/09/06)

3.3.2 Number of Fishermen and Types of Fishing Gear

With regard to the fishermen, in 2005 there were a total of 5822 fishermen in Balikpapan. The fishermen use various types of fishing gear. The following table shows the types of gear used by fishermen in Balikpapan according to the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Balikpapan City (Table 3.2): 40 3 General Description of the Research Location

Table 3.2 Types and Number Number (in of Fishing Gear in Balikpapan, No Type of fishing gear unit) 2006 1 Seine net 486 2 Purse seine (gae) 7 3 Gill net 4361 4 Lift net 25 5 Hook and lines 284 6 Traps 1.750 7 Others 119 Source: Office of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Balikpapan City 2006 Notes: 1. The fishermen call the seine netdogol , and gill net rengge, whereas lift nets com- prise bagan tancap (fixed lift net) andjar - ing Rambo (boat-operated lift net) 2. Traps consist of bubu (passive trap nor- mally made from bamboo), shellfish trap, etc.

3.3.3 Balikpapan fishermen’s Ethnicity

Almost all of the fishermen in Balikpapan are from Sulawesi, of Bugis ethnic group in particular. They came to Balikpapan in the 1960s and early 1970s. A retired fish- erman, Pak Azis, said that he first came to Balikpapan in the 1970s to avoid the unsafe socio-political conditions in Sulawesi due to the Kahar Muzakar rebellion movement. There was a time when he had as many as 11 fixed lift nets. Feeling confident with his success as a fisherman, he then sent a letter to his friends, calling them to come to Balikpapan to follow his footsteps. In the meantime, most fishermen living in a settlement called Trans, are from Madura, or the Madurese. Many of these fishermen came to the region because they were “sponsored” by a successful Madurese fisherman who had come before them, namely Haj Hunen. There are hundreds of Madurese fishermen living in the Trans settlement areas, thus forming a kind of their own community.

3.3.4 Pattern of Fisherman Settlements

Fishers in Balikpapan generally live in groups in some areas. The largest concentra- tion of fishermen is in East Balikpapan District, especially in Manggar Baru Village. According to data from the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Balikpapan City, in 2005 there were about 660 fishermen located in East Balikpapan District, while in West Balikpapan there were about 227 households and 195 households in South 3.3 Capture Fisheries in Balikpapan 41

Balikpapan (Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Balikpapan City 2006). This is not surprising considering that, as earlier noted, most of Balikpapan City’s coastal areas are in the East Balikpapan Subdistrict. Furthermore, fishermen residing in East Balikpapan also generally live in groups in several settlement or housing loca- tions, namely, BTN, Kampung Nelayan, Tanjung Kelor, Gang Teri, TPI Manggar, Manggar Pantai, and Trans (Manggar Baru Village), Selili (Manggar Village), Aji Raden (Lamaru Village) and Teritip (Teritip Village). Furthermore, each group is usually dominated by fishermen using a certain type of fishing gear. The fishermen who live in BTN area mostly pejala fishermen (nett- ers), in Kampung Nelayan they use hooks and lines, in Tanjung Kelor they use seine net or mini trawl (followed by those using gill net and boat-operated lift nets), whereas in Manggar Pantai they use mini trawl or seine net (and also gill net, and a few of them use boat-operated lift net), in Selili they are netters (and use hooks and lines), in Trans they use gill net, in Aji Raden they use fixed lift net and seine net/ mini trawl, and in Teritip they use gill net (Picture 3.2). In the sub-district of South Balikpapan the fishermen are concentrated around the areas of Sepinggan, Damai, Markoni, Pasar Baru, and Klandasan, whereas those living in the sub-district of West Balikpapan are concentrated in the areas of Baru Ulu, Baru Tengah (Kampung Baru) and Marga Sari. Fishermen around Sepinggan are generally gill net fishermen, whereas those in Damai and Markoni are netters

Picture 3.2 Rough map of the fishermen settlement 42 3 General Description of the Research Location and hooks and lines fishers, while those in Klandasan are netters. In the meantime, fishermen who live around Baru Ulu areas usually use gill net and hooks and line, and those in Kampung Baru use seine net/mini trawls, but their number is very small. One of the most prominent groups in the fishery communities in the Kampung Baru area are the middlemen in the deals relating to fishing produces, who are known as the “penyambang”.2 More in-depth description concerning the penyam- bang is presented in Chap. 4. Like any fishing community in general, the fishermen settlement areas in Balikpapan are on the coast or on the banks of the river that flows into the surround- ing sea. For example, fishermen’s settlements in Trans, Selili, Gang Teri, TPI and Tanjung Kelor areas are located on the banks of the Manggar River, while Manggar Pantai, BTN, Kampung Nelayan, Sepinggan, Markoni, Klandasan and Kampung Baru are on the coast. Some of the fishersmen’s houses on the coast, such as those near the Manggar fish auction market (TPI), Gang Teri, Markoni, and Kampung Baru are even located above the sea. Many of the fishermen’s houses in Balikpapan are stilt houses made from wood. However, there are also many that are permanent concrete houses. It should be noted that the stilt houses are not necessarily “worse” than the concrete houses. A well-designed and well-maintained house made from high quality solid wood like ironwood (ulin) is certainly no less superior than a permanent concrete house. However, most of the stilt houses are not made from very good wooden material, and they tend to be small and the area is dense and the houses are pressed to each other. The spatial lay out of the fishers’ settlement/housing is quite “disordered”, thus turning the area into a slum. However, some of the other settlements, such as in the BTN and Kampung Nelayan (Manggar Baru) areas, the neighborhoods are very neat and orderly like city housing complexes (Picture 3.3).

3.3.5 The Development of Capture Technology

3.3.5.1 The Use of Engine

As in other places, in the past, until the 1960s fishermen in Balikpapan only used paddles and screens in fishing or capture fishing activities. The boat they used was called soppe, which is quite small in size, about 4 m long and 1.5 m wide. Therefore, their fishing ground was limited only to the waters near the seashore. In addition, when the winds were fierce and the waves were high, they would not be able to go to sea because they could not cope with the conditions. Their boat could be thrown back to the shore during strong winds and high waves. In the 1970s the paddles and screens began to be replaced by ketinting, and by 1975 the paddles and screen disappeared entirely, completely replaced by ketinting.

2 Penyambang is the local term/name given to the middlemen traders who buy fish from the fisher- men in the middle of the sea. 3.3 Capture Fisheries in Balikpapan 43

Picture 3.3 Fishermen’s houses in Manggar

Ketinting is the name given to a fisherman boat using a small outer motor with a long shaft mounted on its side. The engine is only of 5-HP or 6-HP so that it is easy to be dismounted and brought home after use. The official name used forketinting is outboard-motored boat. One of the fishermen said that in 1971 he was using 6-HP, Italian-made Lombardine engine for his ketinting. Some of the ketinting were still using the soppe boat, but some others used slightly bigger boats. In 1978 fishermen started using inboard engines such as Yanmar TS 50 and Dong Feng run with diesel fuel. The engine was no longer mounted on the side of the boat, but on the inside. Thus, such fishing boats belong to the category of motorized boats according to the classification used by the government (Department of Fisheries and Marine). In the 1980s Yanmar engine dominated the type of machine used by fisher- men in Balikpapan, and with even greater power, such as the Yanmar TS 80 type. By the 1980s in general only perengge fishers (who use gillnet) were still usingketint- ing. After the 1980s there were only one or two ketinting boats remaining. In the present times fishermen in Balikpapan use inboard engines of various brands, such as Mitsubishi, Dong Feng, and Jiangdong, with even greater power. Fishermen using types of fishing gear such as FAD and boat-operated lift net would normally use two engines on the boat. In addition to the use of engines, some of the other fishing equipment is also changing. One thing that is different is the use of ice when they are at sea. In the past the fishermen would go to sea without using ice to preserve the catch. In those days the fish would be brought home and sold. If no one bought them, then the fish would be preserved traditionally, which was by salting them. Balikpapan fishermen already 44 3 General Description of the Research Location brought ice to sea in the 1980s, which they did not in the old days of sailing and paddling. Nowadays, some of the fishers have also used modern equipment such as GPS (Global Positioning System) to precisely locate the position of the FADs or boats at sea. Even the way they prepare their catch has also changed. In the past they would skewer the fish, “piercing” them on a bamboo skewer. One skewer would consist of 10 long-jawed mackerel, or 12 swordfish. The skewers would then be put together in a bincangan that comprised twenty fish skewers. The current use of basket to keep the fish also began in the 1980s.

3.3.5.2 Types of Fishing Gear

In terms of fishing gear, the type of fishing gear used by fishermen in Balikpapan has also undergone changes. As mentioned earlier, almost all of the fishermen in Balikpapan come from South Sulawesi, especially the Bugis. Accordingly, the types of fishing gear they use in Balikpapan is more or less similar to the types that they are familiar with and use in their fishing ground where they come from in South Sulawesi. According to the fishermen in Balikpapan, there are four main types of fishing gear that they are familiar with and have used from the beginning when they migrated to Balikpapan. The four types of fishing gear are fixed lift net, FAD nets, gillnet, and hook and lines. In the following years there are several types of fishing gear that have developed among Balikpapan fishers. One fishing gear that has been considerably dominant to date is the seine net, which started to be used and devel- oped in Balikpapan in the early 1980s. Seine net or dogol is actually a modification of a mini trawler that had been banned. Therefore, it is not surprising that the use and development of dogol fishing gear in Balikpapan started with the beginning of the use of the mini trawler fishing gear in the area itself. The following part will explain the initial entry and develop- ment of mini trawl and dogol in Balikpapan. The use of mini trawl in Balikpapan began by a prominent fisherman who still actively goes to sea until now, namely Pak Te’be. In the 1970s Pak Te’be had tried to use a mini trawl while he was still living in Sulawesi, using a 10Hp-engined ketinting. Meanwhile, in 1978 when Pak Te’be already moved to Balikpapan there was a trawler vessel belonging to a company from Samarinda operating in Balikpapan waters. At some point the vessel was captured and taken to Manggar. As it turned out the vessel had a trawler attached to it that was used for a try-out (“traini” as Pak Te’be called it). Pak Te’be then used the try-out equipment to catch shrimp by using a boat with 8-hp engine. He tried to use it around Manggar area near to the shores (“just around here,” he pointed out). It turned out that the amount of shrimp that was caught was quite large, which was three baskets in total, despite the fact that the trial run was only conducted merely for 3 h from 12 pm to 3 pm. Hence Pak Te’be began to use mini trawl, which was quickly followed by other fishermen. After that Pak Te’be submitted an application to get a license from the Fisheries Office to use the gear. Equipped with the license to use the trawl Pak Te’be then 3.3 Capture Fisheries in Balikpapan 45 built quite a large vessel of 20 × 5 m long, using 60-HP Yanmar boat engine. Unfortunately, only a few months after the vessel was built the government issued a ban on the use of trawler boats (through Presidential Decree No. 39/1980). After operating in the waters around Samarinda and Berau, and arrested several times, the vessel was eventually sold. Thus, the use of mini trawlers in Balikpapan only lasted a little longer than a year. Before the ban on the use of mini trawlers was issued, there had been seven mini trawler boats operating in Manggar, three in Sepinggan, and one in Kampung Baru. In the meantime, after the ban was issued, in around 1981 the Fisheries Office introduced a fishing gear calleddogol . The equipment was brought in from Java. The trial run to use the new gear was conducted by Pak Te’be and Pak Aziz. During the trial run Pak Azis was using a dogol, whereas Pak Te’be was using a trawler boat. Based on this experiment, it was reported that the catch using the dogol was quite good, therefore it was decided that the equipment was allowed in Balikpapan. Actually to operate the dogol one does not need to pull it, however, without pulling it no fish would be caught by the dogol. Therefore, in Balikpapan fishermen oper- ated the dogol by pulling it in a way similar to the way they operate a trawler. Nowadays they no longer use wooden bars, but instead they use boards on the left and right, the same way as a mini trawler. Hundreds of fishermen in Balikpapan now use dogol. The other relatively new fishing gear in Balikpapan is the boat-operated lift net or known locally as jaring Rambo (Rambo net). The first fisherman to use this fish- ing gear was Pak H. Muslimin. He first bought the boat-operated lift net from Sulawesi in 1998. After that, several fishermen in Balikpapan started to use the same gear. Currently there are about 16 or 17 boat-operated lift nets in Balikpapan. The growth in the use of the gear is quite slow due to the fact that it requires a large amount of investment, which is between IDR 200 million and IDR 300 million. Accordingly, only fishermen with large amount of capital could afford them. The newest type of gear developed in Balikpapan is the gae net, or mini purse seine. In Manggar there are only two fishermen using thisgae gear, and one of them is Pak Oleng, who has been using the gear since 3 years ago. Even a larger amount of investment is needed to acquire the fising gear, which is around IDR 1.5 billion. In the past 2 years shellfish traps have begun to be used by Balikpapan fishers. Pak Desama, a fisherman from Manggar was the first to use it. According to him, initially there was someone from Taiwan who came to Manggar and took a walk on the beach where he saw shellfish shells. When he returned to Java, he sent a shellfish trap to a punggawa, who later offered it to Pak Desama. Pak Desama took the offer, and now there are about 70 fishermen in Manggar who catch shellfish, and hundreds in Balikpapan. In addition to using new types of fishing gear, fishermen in Balikpapan also modify the existing gears. For instance, in the past 12 months they have been devel- oping another type of dogol to catch fish. Previously dogol was only used to catch shrimp. The first fishermen using dogol to cath fish were fishermen from South Kalimantan, who were later imitated by the Balikpapan dogol fishermen. The two types of dogol have a few differences, for instance, the mesh size of the net used to 46 3 General Description of the Research Location catch shrimp is smaller (1,5 inches) than the one for fish (between 1,5 and 4 inches). In addition, the rope for the shrimp dogol is shorter (about 7 fathoms or 10.5 m) compared to fishdogol rope (around 15 fathoms or 22.5 m), and the wings of shrimp dogol (8–9 fathoms, or 12–13.5 m, or 9–10 fathoms, or 13.5–15 m) are wider than those of fishdogol . In addition, the shrimp dogol does not use poles, hence the net goes down to the seabed, whereas the fishdogol uses poles and the net does not directly touch the seabed. The material used to make the fishing gear has also undergone changes. For instance, in the past the material used to make rengge in Balikpapan was made from cotton yarn. A parengge fisherman in Trans, in Manggar Baru, namely pak H. Hunen said that after using cotton yarn rengge for 2 years, there were some andon fisher- men (fishermen with a vessel of maximum size of 30 (thirty) gross tonage that oper- ate capture fisheries by following the fish wandering migration in the waters under territorial authorities with an inter-regional government license) from Java who came to Balikpapan and used nylon rengge. When the andon fishermen left to return to Java, he sold the nylon rengge to H. Hunen. Since then H. Hunen – followed by other fishermen in Balikpapan – have been using nylonrengge . The nylon rengge is not as heavy as the cotton-yarn one to pull because the nylon does not absorb water like the cotton yarn. The same thing happens also for the FAD fishing gear. Initially the material used to tie the rumpon with its weights is rattan. With the advancement of technology rattan was replaced with ropes made of nylon. In addition, rattan is also hard to find in the present times. In the early days of the arrival of fishermen to Balikpapan, which was around the 1960s and 1970s, it was relatively easy to get rattan. As for the wood used to build the fixed lift net, nowadays wood is not only difficult to get, but it is also very expensive. Therefore, the use of fixed lift net in Balikpapan has greatly declined.

3.3.6 Fishing Gear Types and Methods of Operation

As mentioned above, there are several types of fishing gear used by fishermen in Balikpapan. The following section will briefly describe the fishing activities that use various types of fishing gear.

3.3.6.1 Fish Aggregating Device (FAD/Rumpon) Net

Fish aggregating device or rumpon net remains one of the most common fishing gears used by fishermen in Balikpapan. In Balikpapan, the common material used to make rumpon is coconut leaf. To make the rumpon, the midrib of coconut leaves was torn into two pieces, then tied to a reasonably long nylon rope, up to 35 fathoms or 52.5 m. One rumpon may use as many as 100–150 coconut leaf midribs and 3.3 Capture Fisheries in Balikpapan 47

15-kg nylon strap. Furthermore, the nylon ropes that have been attached to the ­coconut leaf are tied to a ballast weight that consists of plastic sacks filled with sand. A buoy made of Styrofoam is tied to the top of the rumpon rope. The rumpon is placed in under water with a depth of about 35 fathoms (52.5 m) or more, at a dis- tance of 40 miles or more from the shore. The fishing activities are undertaken around this rumpon. The cast net fishermen will leave from Balikpapan 12 am, or at 01, 02, or at 03 am, depending on the dis- tance of the rumpon from the shore. Once they have caught enough fish, they will come back to the shore in late morning to arrive at the Manggar fish auction market at around 12 pm or later. However, if they have not caught enough fish, they may stay the night at sea and return back the next day. The fish that they catch vary and include mackerel scad, long-jawed mackerel, yellow tail scad, tropical sardine, and pomfret (Picture 3.4). The amount of fish caught does not only depend on whether there is a lot of fish around the rumpon, but also greatly on the surrounding currents. Even though fish are abundant, if currents are strong fishermen will not be able to throw the net to catch them. Also, the talent to know whether or not there are fish around therumpon is a skill in itself that not every fisherman has. They detect the presence of fish by looking at and listening to the water. Usually the person who has the role to detect the presence of the fish is the owner of the boat or the skipper. The skipper is like a commander; “If he says ‘let’s do the catching’, then we do the catching. If he says ‘let’s go home’, then we will go home,” says one fisherman.

3.3.6.2 Dogol

There are hundreds of fishermen usingdogol fishing gear in Balikpapan. Onedogol fisherman says that during a rally against Thiess, the mining company, in 2005, the number of dogol fishermen who took part in it was “one less than 400 people”.

Picture 3.4 A cast net fisherman with his net, and the palm leaves for therumpon 48 3 General Description of the Research Location

Picture 3.5 A dogol boat and a dogol fisheman is pulling thedogol

Nowadays a dogol is usually operated by one fisherman only, without the help of any fisherman laborer (sawi). Dogol fishermen work at night, however there are also some who operate in the morning. To work in the morning morning they usually leave between 05.30 am and 06.15 am and will return at 10 am or 11 am, depending on the presence of shrimp and the result of the catch. As explained earlier, dogol is a modification of a mini trawl. However, at the present time dogol boats in Balikpapan are basically nothing but mini trawlers. The gear is operated by releasing the dogol nets carefully and slowly into the sea, then the dogol is drawn continuously for about 3 h before it is lifted. Since the engine is turned on at all times during the operation, it needs quite a considerable amount of fuel. The operative area of a dogol is at about 3–4 miles from shore. However, in the southwind season (from July to September) the dogol fishermen operate closer to shore due to the big waves. This sometimes creates a “clash” or conflict with the rengge fishermen whose operating areas are on the shores (Picture3.5 ).

3.3.6.3 Rengge

Rengge (gill net) is a simple fishing gear, both in terms of shape and how to use. In Balikpapan, rengge is used to catch shrimp, crabs, and fish (especially barred mack- erel, snapper, and tuna). The operational area of the shrimp rengge fishermen is near the coastline, which is about 1 or 2 miles from the shores, but the area of operation of the fish rengge can be farther than 4 miles. A set of rengge normally has the size of of 40 m length and 5 m width. A fisher- man may have 20–30 sets of rengge. The rengge is made from nylon; the top part is attached to a buoy, whereas the bottom part is attached to a ballast weight so that it is “perpendicular” to the water. Rengge is operated by slowly releasing it into the water starting from one edge, and it will be lifted up after being left in the water for some time (Picture 3.6). 3.3 Capture Fisheries in Balikpapan 49

Picture 3.6 A rengge fishermsn catching some fish

3.3.6.4 Fixed lift net (Bagan Tancap)

At the moment the number of fixed lift net in Balikpapan is very small, and there are almost none operating during the southwind season. Some fishermen who are still using fixed lift net say that in the 1990s there were hundreds of fixed lift nets operat- ing in Balikpapan areas. Lately the number has declined sharply, and one of the reasons for it is the difficulty in getting the wood to build the fishing gear. A fixed lift net is a “construction” made from wood, which is used to attach the net. A fisherman says that the size of his fixed lift net is about 8 × 8 fathoms or 12 × 12 square meters. During its operation, a fixed lift net is equipped with a Petromax lamp (pressurized kerosene lamp) to attract the fish. For example, the said fisherman used between 8 and 10 lamps in his fixed lift net. The area to put the the lift net is not very far from the coastline, which is between 1.5 and 4 miles or between the depth of 5 and 11 fathoms (which is about 7.5 and 16.5 m). A fixed lift net fisher usually goes to his fixed lift net in the afternoon, which is around 5 pm, and will come back the next day. During one night the net may be lifted up to four times, or just once, depending on the amount of fish or the water current. “You cannot pull the net up when the current is strong, despite the large amount of fish there. If you pull it up it may get stuck on the poles”, a fisherman says. Various types of fish may be caught by the lift net, including tembang sardi- nella fimbriata), barracuda, squid and mackerel.

3.3.6.5 Boat-operated lift net or Bagan Perahu

Boat-operated lift net or Rambo net is a relatively new fishing gear in Balikpapan. The gear consists of a large size net which shape is almost like a square. For exam- ple, there is a fisherman who has a lift net which size is 30 m long and 27 m wide 50 3 General Description of the Research Location with a depth of 15 m. Another fisherman has one which size is 29 × 28 square meters. The mesh size of the net is usually very small that it has the capacity to catch small fish like anchovy. The other catch comprises squid, tuna, mackerel and tem- bang (the highest amount). To operate the gear, the large size net is placed under water below a large vessel. The position of the net in the water is like a downturned mostquito net. To keep it straight or “perpendicular”, each of the four edges of the net is attached to a weight. The vessel is equipped with “wings” made from wood on both sides. It is also equipped with floodlights to help attract the fish to get into the net. To lift the net off the water the vessel is equipped with pulleys, normally four of them (two on the left and two on the right, with one on the front part and the other at the back on each side). The net is lifted off by hauling the pulleys. Ideally one pulley is hauled by at least two people. Hence, the number of laborers in the vessel to operate the gear is quite large, between 7 and 9, and some even have as many as 13 workers. In one night the net may be lifted off three times, or even six times. It depends on the condition of the fish, water current, and the agreement between the boss and members of the crew. The operational area of the boat-operated lift net is between 4 and 10 miles from the shore. However, there is a boat-operated lift net fisherman from Manggar, Balikpapan, whose operational areas extend to the waters around Bontang. During capture season the boat-operated lift net is usually left in the water. The fishermen who operate it will leave from the shores at around 4 pm and will return the next morning. During full moon times (from the 10th to the 15th days of the month) the gear is not operational, hence it is pulled back to the shore. In those days necessary repair works is done on the gear (Picture 3.7).

3.3.6.6 Shellfish Trap

Shellfish trap is also a relatively new fishing gear in Balikpapan. The trap is made from an iron and wires in the shape of a square with the size of 30 square centi- meters. The shape of the gear, however, is not like a box, but more like a prism that narrows and opens at the top. They use dried shrimp as bait, which is put inside the trap through the opened top, which is also the way for the shellfish to get into the trap. The shellfish traps are tied to a piece of long string, with a distance of 2 m between each trap. The number of traps tied to the string may reach more than a hundred. The areas to catch the shellfish are limited to the sandy shores where the depth of the water is merely about two fathoms or 3 m. After they are dropped down to the sand the shellfish traps will be lifted off again after 2 h. Shellfish-catching is usually done by two or three fishermen only. Fishermen from Balikpapan may go as far as Samarinda to catch shellfish, which is why it sometimes takes them 1–5 days for a shellfish-catchingtrip (Picture3.8 ). 3.3 Capture Fisheries in Balikpapan 51

Picture 3.7 Boat-operated lift net or Bagan Perahu

Picture 3.8 Shellfish trap, and two fishermen applying baits

3.3.6.7 Hooks and Line

Fishermen who use hooks and line in Balikpapan are also called “penongkol”, because the fish they capture are tongkol (cob tuna) or other tuna types of fish, such as skipjack tuna, and also Spanish mackerel (tenggiri). Their fishing ground is not only limited to the waters around Balikpapan, but also to Sulawesi (for instance, Mamuju), Java, Bali and Lombok. They normally use a small vessel with three people, or big ones with 5–7 people. The gear consists of hooks that are tied to a string of about 20 m long. The num- ber of hooks attached is about twenty. On each hook the fishermen put silk tassels as the “bait”. The strings with hooks attached are released to the school of fish in the water while the boat continues to move or “run”. The capture acitivity is conducted 52 3 General Description of the Research Location during the day. “In capturing the fish we keep on moving during day time and will rest when the night comes,” says a hook-and-line fisherman. However, they catch tuna in a different way. When catching tuna, they don’t pull the string but let it release in water. The strings are attached to buoys to let them remain floating and be easily retrieved. The hook is also applied with real bait, which is a small fish.

3.3.6.8 Capture Season and Activities

Fishermen in Balikpapan recognize two seasons, namely the southwind and north- wind seasons.3 According to the Balikpapan Fisheries Office (1996), the southwind season runs from April to August, whereas the northwind season runs from October to March. However, the fishermen generally mention that the southwind season runs from July to September or October. During the Southwind season the sun lies on the north of the Equator, and the waters around Balikpapan and Makassar Strait experience big waves due to the southwest and southeast winds that are blowing northeast and northwest (Balikpapan Fisheries Office 1996). The strong gales and huge waves make it difficult for the fishermen to go to sea during the southern season. They can only operate at the shore, and even if they do, they cannot do it every day. Hence, the south season is the “paceklik” season for fishermen in Balikpapan. Every change of season always starts with the transition period. During the tran- sition period fishermen will still not able to operate normally like they do in the northwind season. A fisherman says that the southwind season usually runs for 3 months, and the period of transition to the eastern season takes 3 months, whereas the eastern season itself runs for 3 months, which is followed by another transition period of 3 months before the southwind season that also runs for 3 months. Such is the seasonal cycle that the fishermen of Balikpapan experience.

Bibliography

Books

Pemerintah Kota Balikpapan, Kelurahan Manggar Baru. 2006. Monografi Kelurahan. Januari–Juni 2006. Riva’i, Ruslan. 2006. “Menggugat Penabrak di Laut. Nelayan Balikpapan Membangun Gerakan,” dalam M. Imran Amin dkk (Penyunting). Meninggalkan Titik Nol. Nelayan Melawan Perlakukan Buruk. Bogor: Jaring Pela&CBCRM-RC.

3 Some fishermen call them eastwind season. Bibliography 53

Papers

Hamid, Imdaad. 2006. “Makalah Walikota Balikpapan”. Disampaikan pada: Seminar Kesiapan Infrastruktur-Building Capacity Kota Balikpapan Dalam Rangka Menciptakan Daya Saing Perekonomian Daerah. Balikpapan, Selasa 8 Agustus 2006. Chapter 4 Fisherman Class Structure and Class Relations

4.1 Class Base

As previously described, some sociologists such as Kohn, Wright, and Bourdieu, believe that social class is multidimensional by nature. Wright (1987), for example, uses three dimensions to define class structure, namely as an asset to the means of production, an asset to the organization, and an asset to “credentials”, such as for- mal education. In this book, the fishing classes are determined by ownership of the means of production. As explained in Chap. 2, Wright described that based on the ownership of assets in the means of production there are two main social classes in capitalism, namely the laborers and the financiers. Three other class positions form as the outcomes of the uneven distribution of the ownership of assets in the means of production, namely the ‘petty bourgeoisie’, the ‘semi-laborer’, and the “small employer”. In discussing the class structure of fishermen in Balikpapan I am adopting Wright’s class category based on ownership of means of production. However, I combine his class category with the “social category” and the Canadian class structure as devel- oped by Clement, which has been explained in Chap. 2.

4.2 Fisherman Class Structure in Balikpapan

By combining Wright’s “class category” and Clement’s “social category” of fishing business and fisherman classes, and then comparing them with the real condition on the ground, I therefore classify the fishermen in Balikpapan into four classes. In other words, the structure of the fishermen class in Balikpapan is a “four- class structure”. The four classes are: 1. fisherman laborer 2. small-scale fisherman (employing 0–3 laborers)

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 55 R. A. Kinseng, Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0986-5_4 56 4 Fisherman Class Structure and Class Relations

3. medium-scale fisherman (employing 4–10 laborers), and 4. big fisherman or the financier (employing more than 10 people). The similarities and differences between Wright’s class structure, Clement’s social category, and class structure in Balikpapan are further illustrated in Table 4.1. Additionally, it should be emphasized that the number of laborers under each cate- gory is not the only determining factor for a fisherman’s class location. Other indi- cators, such as the level of technology used, amount of capital invested, operational cost, and the size of the vessel need also to be considered when determining a fisher- man’s class location. It is also interesting to mention that on the ground practically the fisherman classes in Balikpapan are related to different types of fishing gear or fishing technol- ogy. Fishermen using a certain type of gear will tend to be part of a certain class category also. This is in line with Clement’s view when he says, “Each category can be identified and operationalized in terms of specific type of fishing” (Clement 1986: 80). Holm, Hersoug, and Arne also share a comparatively similar view on the fishermen class in Norway. According to them, “the class issue in Norwegian fisher- ies has largely revolved around the question of technology” (Holm et al. 2000). Prohibition against the use of trawler vessels in Norway and Danish seine in Lofoten region, they say, is resulted from processes of class struggles. Further explanation will be provided concerning the four social classes of fishermen in Balikpapan.

4.2.1 Fisherman Laborer (sawi)

In Indonesia, a fisherman laborer is generally called the vessel’s crew (ABK). In Balikpapan, however, the term used for fishing laborer is sawi, which signifies the same meaning in Bugis dialect.

Table 4.1 Comparison between Wright’s, Clement’s, and Kinseng’s class/category Erik O. Wright 1987 Wallace Clement 1986 Rilus A. Kinseng 2006 No of No of No of laborers Class laborers Business category laborersa Class (sawi) Bourgeoisie 10 or Large-scale (= 10 or Big fishermen (= More than more capitalist) more capitalist) 10 Small 2–9 Intermediate-scale 3–9 Medium-scale/ 4–10 employers (= small capitalist) intermediate (= small capitalist) Petty 0–1 Small-scale (= petty 0–2 Small-scale fishermen 0–3 bourgeoisie bourgeoisie) Wage-earner – Labour – Laborer – aClement writes in his book, “the number of hands” for each category; which indicates that the owner is included. Hence, under the small-scale category the number of workers is between one to three people, which means the number of laborers is between zero to two people 4.2 Fisherman Class Structure in Balikpapan 57

As previously described, fisherman class category relates to the type of fishing gear used. For example, in Balikpapan the fisherman laborer class is not represented in all of the types of gear. For instance, on the one hand certain fishing gear is gener- ally operated by one fisherman only, which is normally the gear’s owner. On the other hand, there are also those that cannot be operated without the help of laborers. There are three types of fishing gear that absolutely need laborers to operate, namely the boat-operated lift net (bagan Rambo), the Fish-Aggregating Device (FAD/rumpon net), and fixed lift net bagan( tancap). The number of fisherman laborers needed to operate the FAD is normally between 6 and 9 people, whereas a boat-operated lift net usually needs about 8 to 10 people. In the meantime, some other types of fishing gear, such as dogol, rengge, hook and line, and shellfish traps are not always oper- ated with the employment of fisherman laborers. Those types of fishing gear are normally operated by the owner himself, but sometimes they can also be operated with one of more laborers’ help. Normally fishermen using types of gear such as dogol, rengge, and shellfish trap only employ between one to two laborers, while nelayan pancing (fishermen using hook and line) may employ as many as seven workers. Unfortunately data on the number of fisherman laborers for each of the fishing gear in Balikpapan is not available. To give an illustration, a census conducted by the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office in Balikpapan in its attempt to collect data on the number of FAD owned by the pejala (owner) fishermen in Balikpapan shows that the total number of owner fishermen is 53. If a pejala employs between six and eight workers, the total number of fisherman laborers for the FAD type of fishing gear is between 318 and 424 people. In the case that each vessel hires between 8 and 10 laborers, then the total number of fisherman laborers for the type of fishing gear is between 128 and 160. It is obvious that fishermen from Juwana, Central Java, who are operating by using purse seine around the waters of Makassar Strait (which includes Balikpapan region), have absolute need of workers. The motored vessel (KM) Mutiara Sakti, which was set on fire by Balikpapan fishermen on 16 January 2006, for instance, was operated by 30-strong crew, in addition to the skipper. In Balikpapan the sawi (fisherman laborers) are not paid in the form of wages, but instead through a profit sharing system. The profit sharing system varies accord- ing to the different types of fishing gear. Sometimes even for similar types of gear the system may differ. For example, the profit sharing system for fixed lift net fish- ing gear is that the profit gained after deducted by operational cost is divided into two: one part for the owner and the other for the sawi (50%:50%). After that, the sawi’s one part (50%) is divided evenly into their total number, for instance into 3 people. For nelayan pancing, if the number of the sawi is 2, then the profit-sharing system is, after operational costs is divided into 8 parts: two for the vessel, three for the egine, one for the juragan (driver), and one for each of the sawi. For the FAD fishing gear if the number of sawi is nine and the vessel uses 2 engines, then the profit-sharing system after operational cost deduction is that the profit is divided into 18 parts: 3 parts for the main engine, one part for the rear engine, 2 parts for the vessel, two parts for the net, and both the juragan/owner and each of the sawi gets 1 part. 58 4 Fisherman Class Structure and Class Relations

4.2.2 Small-Scale Fishermen

As previously explained, in terms of the number of workers, the small-scale fisher- men are those who work on their own or with one to three workers. The fishermen using types of gear such as dogol, rengge, fixed lift net, and shellfish trap fall into the small-scale fisherman category. The amount of investment required for those types of fishing gear is relatively similar. The number of workers required is also between one and four people. Dogol and rengge, for instance, are mostly operated by the owner himself, or sometimes with one or two workers. In the meatime, the shellfish trap can also be operated by two or three people, whereas fixed lift net is normally operated by 4–5 people. In terms of investment, a rengge and a dogol would require an investment of approximately IDR 10 million and IDR 20 million respectively. A fixed lift net with a vessel and the engine would require an investment of IDR 25 million, whereas around the same amount of investment is also required for shellfish trap fishing gear, which is IDR 25 million. Fishermen using hook and line to catch tuna (tongkol) and the like, which are also known called penongkol by Balikpapan fishermen, can be put under the small-­ scale fisherman category. In terms of the number of workers they normally only employ two workers, and the boat they use is also a small one. A penongkol fisher- man, for example, said that they used a small boat that is 12-meters long and 2.10-meters wide. The engine used is a 24-PK Dong Feng engine. The total invest- ment required for all-new fishing gear is about IDR 25 million.

4.2.3 Medium-Scale Fishermen (Intermediate)

In general, pejala fishermen are part of the medium-scale class of Balikpapan. Normally a pejala may have at least one FAD, however, many of them have more than one, and one of them even has 15. It is true that to install a rumpon for the first time will only cost about IDR 500,000, however, since it will continue to be devel- oped from time to time, its value will eventually increase to between 2 or 3 mil- lion rupiah. Meanwhile, to undertake fishing operation at a rumpon, fishermen would use large vessels that are usually equipped with two inboard engines. The vessel itself may cost up to IDR 20 million, which is the same price as the TS 230 engine. The operational cost per trip is IDR 300,000 at the minimum, but some say that it could reach up to IDR 700,000. Generally, the number of laborers working in a pejala’s vessel is between six and nine people, with some exception, namely in the case of a particular pejala who employs more than ten sawi, such as a young fisherman in the BTN neighborhood who employs 10–13 sawi. 4.2 Fisherman Class Structure in Balikpapan 59

In addition to the pejala, some hook and line fishermen also fall into the medium-­ class category. In Manggar they are called the large-size hook and line fishermen. The vessels they use are usually about 17-meters long and 3.5-meters wide with a weight of more than 7 GT, yet less than 10 GT. They usually use two Mitsubishi engines with an average power of 30 PK. Overall, the required capital is about 45 million rupiah. Normally the number of sawi employed for this type of fishing gear is between 4 and 8 people.

4.2.4 Large-Scale Fishermen (the Financiers)

In Balikpapan fishermen using boat-operated lift net fishing gearRambo ( net) are considered large-scale fishermen or the financiers. Currently there are only about 16 boat-operated lift nets. This type of fishing gear is operated by using a reasonably large vessel, and equipped with quite expensive floodlights. According to a notable fisherman who is the first person to own such fishing gear in Balikpapan the boat-­ operated lift net used between 40-watt and 70,400-watt mercury lamps. The said fisherman himself uses 46 lamps. According to him, the capital required for the lamps alone is more than IDR 40 million. In addition, a boat of quite sizable engines is also required to go to and from the boat-operated lift net itself. The boat is usually equipped with two quite powerful engines, such as 24 PK and 20 PK. According to the said fisherman, the number of people required to operate this set of fishing gear is normally between 9 and 11 people. The total operating cost per night is more or less IDR 800,000. There is another type of fishing gear that is fairly new for the fishermen in Balikpapan, which is called gae. This fishing gear is actually similar to a mini purse seine. Based on the data at the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office, in 2005 there were 7 units of gae fishing gear. The first fisherman to use gae in Balikpapan is a fisherman from Manggar, namely Pak Oleng. Pak Oleng started to usegae three years ago. The vessel used to operate a gae is reasonably large. Pak Oleng’s vessel, for example, is 24-meters long and 4-meters wide, and the weight is 13 GT. The vessel is also provided with twenty 500-Watt floodlights. The lamps are about IDR 1.8 million each. In addition, the engine used to power the vessel is also powered by a 200-PK Mitsubishi engine. It is not surprising that the investment required for the gae fishing gear may reach up to IDR 1.5 billion. In running the operation, normally Pak Oleng would employ between 14 and 15 sawi. The amount of diesel fuel needed for one trip (3 nights) reaches 700 litres, hence the total operational cost per trip is more than IDR 3 million. Another notable fisherman, known by everybody as the “blast fisherman’s boss”, also falls under the category of large-scale fisherman, or the capitalist. He has many 60 4 Fisherman Class Structure and Class Relations vessels and workers to operate them. According to an informant, he owns two gae units. He also has his own wharf to moor his boats. In addition, he also owns a pro- cessing unit for his men’s catch. He employs quite a number of workers at the pro- cessing unit that was built near his wharf. Obviously, the purse seine fishermen operating in Balikpapan region belong to the large-scale fisherman class or the capitalist, or even the “large-scale capitalist”. In terms of boat size, for instance, KM Mutiara Sakti, the vessel that was set on fire by the crowd, carried a weight of 121 GT, and was powered by a 280-HP Nissan RD.8 engine. It had a crew 30 people, in addition to the skipper. The vessel’s opera- tion is under the leadership of the skipper and his deputy, while the owner of the vessel remained onshore and was directly involved in the fishing activities. Compared to the purse seine fishermen, the local Balikpapan large-scale and capi- talist fishermen, particularly the owners of the boat-operated lift net, are much smaller. To borrow the terms used by Fairley (1990), the local Balikpapan capitalists can be categorized as “small capitalists”, whereas the Central Javanese purse seine fishermen are the big capitalists.

4.2.5 The Merchant Class

Normally there is a highly important social class within a fishing community, namely the capitalist class, or, as Barbara Neis (1981) calls it, the merchant class. Such condition also applies to the fishing community in Balikpapan. Typically financiers are given local names, such as bakul or tauke. In Balikpapan, the finan- ciers among fishermen are usually called punggawa or ponggawa, which originates from Bugis dialect. In addition to the punggawa, the fish buyers, who are locally known as the penyambang, are also included in the financier class category. The penyambang usually live around the Telaga Mas and Kampung Baru neighborhoods in the Sub- district of Balikpapan Barat. Out of the approximately 100 fish buyers in Balikpapan, 75% of them live in Telaga Mas, Kampung Baru. The penyambang are the “large-scale financiers”. They have big vessels that have the capacity to carry between 8 and 10 tons of fish. Some penyambang have more than one boat, and there is even one who owns 11 boats. They buy the fisher- men’s catch while they still are in the middle of the sea (hence their name penyam- bang), using their large boats. The fishermen from whom they buy the fish at sea are generally not from Balikpapan areas. Until the past few years (around 2004–2006) the penyambang bought the fish from fishermen around Sulawesi region, such as Mamuju, but these days they buy it mainly from purse seine fishermen from Central Java, whose presence were opposed by the Balikpapan fishermen. Until then the relationship between them had been good and close. It was the good and close rela- tionship that had made the Balikpapan fishermen welcome the arrival of the Javanese purse seine fishermen to settle in Balikpapan (Telaga Mas). One leadingpenyam- 4.3 Class Relations 61 bang confessed that he was the person responsible to bring 23 purse seine vessels to Balikpapan in January 2006, which ended with the burning of the vessel KM Mutiara Sakti (interviewed on 18/7/06). The punggawa in Manggar areas at the Sub-district of East Balikpapan label the penyambang as the “middle-class trader”. According to some punggawa in Manggar, “they have a lot of money”, “their houses are luxurious” and “each of their children has a car”. To a certain extent there is some truth in the statements made by those punggawa, as reflected by the findings on the ground.

4.3 Class Relations

The issues of class relations that will be discussed here are limited to two groups only, namely class relations between the laborer class and the owner class in gen- eral, and between the owner in general and the merchant class. A more detailed explanation concerning the class relations is as follows.

4.3.1 Relations Between the Working Class and the Merchant Class

As often found in fishermen communities in Indonesia, among the fishermen in Balikpapan the laborers and the merchants tend to have a “special” relationship, one that hugely differs from the relationship between the laborers and the company owner (industry) in general. On the one hand the relationship between the merchant and the fisherman laborers contains elements of exploitation and domination. In general the laborers do not have any control on the production activities. They work under the control and command of the owner or the owner’s representative (for example, the skipper). If the merchant tells them to go to sea, the subordinates will obey the command. Workers who are considered lazy can be dismissed by the owner. Some owners mention that they have previously dismissed their laborers for various reasons, and they even also say that they do that often as will be explained in Chap. 5. Moreover, the laborers are often treated “disrespectfully” or even rudely. They can be scolded or yelled at, for example, by the owner. With regard to financial mat- ters, such as matters concerning operating costs as well as proceeds sometimes owners are not very transparent. During the time when profit is distributed the owner does not openly provide details and explanation about the breakdown. Detail of operating costs and how much the total income was is not revealed. The owner only distributes money to each of his subordinates without any further explanation. That is the reason why the operating cost and revenue sharing often become a source of problems between the owner and his subordinates. 62 4 Fisherman Class Structure and Class Relations

On the subject of profit-sharing system, normally the laborers will accept any amount handed to them. They do not seem to have the right to object or question the prevailing profit-sharing system. In fact, the system contains some elements of injustice. For example, as previously mentioned with regard to the FAD fishermen, the existing profit-sharing system is as follows. If the number of the workers is 9 and the vessel uses two engines, therefore the proceeds will be divided into 18 parts with the following breakdown: 3 parts for the main engine, 1 part for the rear engine, two parts for the vessel, two parts for the net, and each of the laborer (sawi) gets 1 part. The split is done after the revenue is deducted by the operational cost. Given that normally the vessel and the engines and the net are owned the owner that means the owner gets 9 parts, while the laborer gets only one part (9:1), yet the laborers work the hardest in the capture processes. Another example is the profit-sharing system of the boat-operated lift net. According to an owner of a boat-operated lift net, in shar- ing the profit after it was deducted by the operational cost he applies a system of 50% for the owner and 50% for the crew. After that, the crew’s 50% share will be divided into two parts; the juragan (owner) gets 2 parts of it, and each of the labor- ers will get 1 part. So, if the number of crew is 10, their 50% share will be divided into 11 parts. With such profit-sharing system in the case that the total net profit is IDR 1,100,000, the owner will get IDR Rp 550,000 as his share, the juragan (driver) IDR 100,000, whereas each of the laborers only gets IDR 50,000. Therefore, the comparison between the amount of revenue that is received by the owner and that of the (sawi) is 11:1. As regards the boat-operated lift net, usually the owner does not go to sea with the crew; it was the crew that did the hard work to gain profits. Hence it is fair to say that the relationship between owner and laborers constitute elements of exploitation, which include economic oppression carried out by the owners against the laborers. On the other hand, the relationship between the owner and the laborer is also that of between the patron and client. As set forth by Scott (1983), in such a relationship the owner party acts as a patron that provides various “help” for his subordinates. The help comes in various forms such as lending money, paying medical expenses, paying for laborers’ expenses when they travel to hometown, paying wedding costs, and so on. Although this patron-client relationship may also contain elements of domination and exploitation, the nature is somewhat different from the exploitation and dominance of non patron-client relationships. Exploitation and dominance in the patron-client relationship pattern are more “subtle”, while the “help” dimension is much greater compared to the pattern of non patron-client employer-worker rela- tionships in the industrial world. Thus, the pattern of relations between laborers and owners has two dimensions, namely the dominative exploitative dimension, in which the laborers experience exploitation and dominance from the owner, and the patron-client dimension, in which the workers get various kinds of “help” from the owner. A visual description of the pattern of labor relations with the owner is shown in Picture 4.1. While dominative exploitative relationships are “common” in the pattern of employer-labor relations, the patron-client relationship seems unique to the agricul- tural world, including fisheries. In the realm of fishery like the one in Balikpapan, 4.3 Class Relations 63

Dominant Owner Class Patron

Dominative patron-client expolitative

Subordinate Laborer Class Proletarian Client

Picture 4.1 Pattern of relations between owner and fisherman laborer patron-client relationships between owners and laborers, among others, are attribut- able to the very volatile nature of the ocean as a source of income. At the time when earnings are less, or even nonexistent, as is often the case in the southern season (July to September), for example, fishermen are usually forced to seek help from the employer (owner). The fisherman’s highly fluctuating income is strongly influenced by the pattern of “production” of the capture fisheries itself. Furthermore, the pattern of “produc- tion” of the capture fisheries is also strongly influenced by the nature of its capture fisheries resources, namely that it is common property by nature and open-access in practice. In addition, the “produced” commodity is not fully under the control of the fishermen. The fish presence is strongly influenced by natural conditions, as well as capture and other related activities conducted by others. In this case, the level of uncertainty or “uncontrollability” of production is very high, that it is even higher than onshore farming such as rice cultivation, plantation crops, livestock, and aquaculture. From the employer’s perspective, they are willing to provide “help” for the fish- ermen because they need their labor, especially when it is quite difficult to find fisherman workers as happened recently in Balikpapan. Other considerations, such as the fact that the fisherman laborers are migrants from Sulawesi and that they have no other job, or perhaps because of family relationships, also lead to the emergence and persistence of this patron-client relationship among Balikpapan fishermen. Moreover, such pattern of patron-client relationship between the owner and the fisherman laborer also illustrates that the link is still affected by personal consider- ations. The relationship is not purely dominated by the businesslike and impersonal pattern of interactionss such as thatbetween laborers and employers in the industrial world. Communication between laborers and employers is still generally main- tained by person-to-person and face-to-face contact. However, that does not entirely 64 4 Fisherman Class Structure and Class Relations eliminate the other side of the labor-employer relation pattern, namely the presence of exploitation and domination exerted by the employer over the labor. However, it should be noted immediately that the dominative exploitative and patron-client relations mainly apply between the fishermen of the medium-scale up to the capitalist level and their fisherman laborers. For small-scale fishermen such as the pedogol and perengge, for instance, the relationship between the sawi and the owner, much of the relationship has turned into one between co-workers or, what is known among the fishermen in Canada as co-adventurers (Clement 1986). That could happen because many of the small-scale fishermen such as thepedogol and perengge work on their own, or if they do “employ” it will consist of one or sawi only. Also, those who work with them are often their own relatives or personal friends. In terms of the profit-sharing system, many fishermen that usedogol and rengge fishing gear apply a fifty-fifty system in which both the owner and thesawi (one person) get the same amount. Some of them also apply a system of dividing the profit into three parts where the owner gets two parts and thesawi gets one. Thus, in terms of the profit-sharing system among the small-scale fishermen, the gap between the amount of share received by the owner and the sawi is also smaller.

4.3.2 Relations Between the Owner Class and the Merchant Class

The above pattern of relationship between the laborers and owners also occurs between most owner fishermen in Balikpapan and the merchant class (punggawa). Most fishermen in Balikpapan are “bound” to a punggawa or, referred to as “mem- bers” of a punggawa. To illustrate, 65.35% of the 98 owner fisherman respondents admit to having been bound to a punggawa. The punggawa has has a large influence over the fishermen in Balikpapan. As the French anthropologist Christian Pelras says, the relationship between the members and the punggawa is a patron-client relationship (Pelras 2006: 383–384). In this connection the function and role of the punggawa encompasses various aspects of the life of the member fishermen and their families. In addition to the uncertainty of catch as described above, the pattern of patron- client relationship between the merchants and the owner fishermen often started with the lack of initial capital for a fisherman to buy some fishing gear. A fisherman may be provided with a loan as the capital to start a capture fisheries business. Purchased items may include previously mentioned items such as boats, engines, and fishing gear. Afterward, in the day-to-day fishing activities, the merchant will further provide the operational costs the fishermen need to go to sea. Onepunggawa mentions that a pejala (owner fisherman) needs an operational cost of about IDR 800,000, whereas a hook and line fisherman needs up to IDR 1.5 million per trip. If there is damage to the engine, nets, boats, FAD, and so on, it is the punggawa who 4.3 Class Relations 65 will bear the repair cost. For example, a fisherman says, “If we don’t go to sea, say, for three days, the punggawa will ask: why don’t you go to sea? If we tell him: the engine is broken, Pak Haji, then will have the engine repaired, or even buy a new engine for us. Not surprisingly, a pejala fisherman can have debt up to 20 million rupiah, while hook and line fisherman’s debt can reach as much as IDR 40 million, as acknowledged by a punggawa (interviewed on 16/8/06). Sometimes a punggawa “helps” his men to fulfill their needs that are not related to fishing business, for example, to cover their medical expenses, wedding costs, or even just to buy some rice or the cost of traveling to their home town. When I asked a punggawa, “how do fishermen make ends meet during the off-season time like this?” His answer was, “they will come to us”. Hence, it is no wonder that a fisher- man says, “the punggawa’s social function is crucial”. All the “help” provided by the punggawa, however, does not come without con- sequences. In reality the “help” comes with a specific calculation; it is considered as debt. As long as a fisherman cannot afford to pay the debt, then he is bound to the punggawa. “All of us fishermen have a punggawa, have some association with punggawa …My neck is tied up… Unless a fishermean pays his debt he will be bound to punggawa”, says a fishermen in a meeting to establish a fishermen group in Gang Kates III, Manggar, on Thursday night 14/9/06 that I attended. When the debts accumulate excessively paying back will become even harder. Usually the punggawa know each of their members through and through. As a punggawa puts it, “We know our members very well, some are productive, some are mediocre, and some are at the bottom”. He then explains further that, “the member’s conduct is not the same, they vary greatly”. Consequently they are treated differ- ently; “some need to be snarled at, while some others have to be treated more gen- tly,” says a punggawa. (interviewed on 6/9/06). Members who are considered to have made serious mistakes can be blacklisted by all of the punggawa. For a fisherman one of the consequences of being bound as a member of apung- gawa is that he will have to sell his catch to that punggawa. In addition to benefit from the certainty of fish supply to sell the punggawa also benefits from two types of mechanism, namely the purchasing price and percentage of total sales. Some punggawa buy the catch at a cheaper price, namely between IDR 500 and IDR 3000 per kilogram less than the normal price. In addition, punggawa can also get 5%–10% profit of the total sales of a member fisherman. On top of that, the member fisher- man’s proceed is also deducted to pay the operational cost and other debts. The deducted amount depends on the punggawa’s decision. If the proceed is small and the punggawa is “kindhearted” the deduction may be small or no deduction is made at all. If a punggawa’s member fisherman sells the result of his catch to a party beyond Balikpapan area, for instance in Java, Sulawesi, etc, he must report first to his punggawa. The sales documents will be submitted to the punggawa afterwards. Some of the punggawa in Balikpapan have their own vessel and fishing gear to be operated by the fishermen. Meanwhile, in terms of social background, some of them are fishermen who have been successfully social mobile and have reached the top. Such kind of punggawa were once fishermen who had actively sailed to sea, and some even had come from the small-scale fisherman class. There are also some 66 4 Fisherman Class Structure and Class Relations punggawa who continue their parents’ business and run their own business as a punggawa. Punggawa enjoy a superior social status. For example, a punggawa in Manggar has a grand, huge, and luxurious house. He also owns an Opel Blazer. This pung- gawa is a true capitalist; he owns a shophouse, shares in a shrimp-processing fac- tory, and a shrimp farm business. Some of them also maintain relationships and closeness with political and government figures. A punggawa who was formerly a perengge fisherman is now a party official (of the Eastern Region Branch) of the Golkar Party. According to him, prominent figures such as Akbar Tanjung, Wiranto, and Alwi Shihab have visited the fishing neighbourhood (Tanjung Kelor) and pro- vided assistance to build a mosque. Does the relationship between the owner fisherman and the merchant contain an element of exploitation? According to Wright (1987), exploitation is more than eco- nomic oppression, but it also includes elements of appropriation of the work of one class by another. Another important element in the concept of exploitation is that the exploiting class’s welfare depends on the work of the exploited class. Wright says, “… the welfare of the exploiting class depends upon the work of the exploited class” (Wright 1987: 75). In reference to Wright’s concept of exploitation, the rela- tionship between the punggawa and the member fishermen clearly contains an ele- ment of exploitation. In this case, there is an “appropriation” of the work of the fishermen by thepunggawa . The “appropriation” occurs both through the forced purchase price and the taking of a percentage of sales. Not to mention the fact that the welfare of the punggawa is clearly highly dependent on the work of the member fishermen. A notable young fisherman repeated a proverb,“punggawa : relax, be extravagant, but very rich; sawi: bone breaking, bone fracture” (interviewed on 10/2/06). However, the fishermen’s opinion of thepunggawa is mostly “positive”. For example, a notable fisherman feels really proud that he has been loyal to his pung- gawa and that he has never turned to other punggawa. “Thank God, I have never changed punggawa. Changing punggawa will only make things difficult for you,” he says (interviewed on 12/2/06). Another fisherman also says, “Changing pung- gawa is not a good thing to do”. In his opinion, it is reasonable for a punggawa to get benefit from the IDR 3000 price difference because after all he is the one who gives the loan as the capital for the fisherman, with no interest. A senior pejala from Markoni is even more dramatic. He used to be a member of punggawa the late H. Cole, and now he is a member of punggawa Herman, who is the late H. Cole’s son. He remains loyal to punggawa Herman considering what the latter’s father has done for him in the past. “Starting from the time when we were still tusing ketinting, then TS Yanmar, Mitsubishi, Cole continued to support me, until the point we now use Jiang Dong 300 punggawa. I’ve been telling Herman that although his father had died his name remains in my heart”, he says. According to him, some of H. Cole’s members once complained about how Herman ran his business as a pung- gawa, to the extent that they wanted to quit as Herman’s members. “But I told them not to. Remember what his father had done. You have to remember that. You should 4.3 Class Relations 67 understand that Herman is still learning. We should help him”, he told his friends. In the end they decided to stay and remain as members of punggawa Herman. Indeed the fishermen feel it is necessary to be a member of apunggawa even when they have enough capital to set up their business. According to a pejala it is necessary for marketing purposes. He says, “without the punggawa, who will buy our catch? What will happen if there is no buyer?” (interviewed on 19/9/06). Hence the earlier statement by the previous fisherman when he said that changingpung- gawa would only make his life difficult. “If you keep changing from one punggawa to another it will be difficult for you to market your catch. If there is no one to buy your fish it will be difficult”, he says (interviewed on 12/2/06). The above accounts generally illustrate punggawa’s practices of hegemony over fishermen. A similar kind of hegemony by the merchant class over fishermen was also found among the fishermen in Newfoundland, Canada (Neis1981 ). Recently there have been fishermen who have attempted to “cut off the punggawa’s domina- tion”, as said by a young fisherman. According to him in recent times the pungga- wa’s grip is starting to loosen, which is also because they could no longer provide all the kinds of “help” that the fishermen need. In addition, in the case that the “contract” between a punggawa and his members is for shrimp catching, and during the fishing operation they happen to catch some fish, then such catch is “not included under the contract”, thus the fishermen are entitled to sell it. This is also consistent with a punggawa’s explanation. In his account, in addition to catch shrimp pedogol fishermen also catch fish now. In that case: “We don’t take it. We let them catch fish rather than having to provide them with money”, he said (interviewed on 6/9/06). Therefore, it can be concluded that the relationship between owner fisherman class and, particularly the small-scale and medium-scale fishermen, with the mer- chant is “two-dimensional” by nature. The first dimension is an oppressive exploit- ative relationship, while the second is a patron-client one (Picture 4.2).

Dominant Financier/ Class merchant Patron

Dominative patron-client exploitative

Subordinate Owner Class fisherman Client

Picture 4.2 Pattern of relationship between the merchant and the owner fishermen 68 4 Fisherman Class Structure and Class Relations

Bibliography

Books

Clement, Wallace. 1986. The Struggle to Organize. In Resistance in Canada’s Fishery. Ontario/ Toronto: McClelland and Steward/The Canadian Publishers. Fairley, Bryant. 1990. The Crisis, the State and Class Formation in the Newfoundland Fishery. In Restructuring and Resistance: Perspectives from Atlantic Canada, ed. Fairley Bryant, Colin Leys, and James Sacouman. Toronto: Garamond. Holm, Petter, Bjorn Hersoug, and Stein Arne Ranes. 2000. Revisiting Lofoten: Co-managing Fish Stocks or Fishing Space? Human Organization 59 (3): 2000. Kinseng, Rilus A. 2006. Konflik Kelas di Kalangan Kaum Nelayan di Indonesia (Sebuah Catatan Awal). Makalah disampaikan pada Workshop Nasional Riset Sosial Ekonomi Kelautan dan Perikanan, Bogor 2–3 Agustus 2006. Pelras, Christian. 2006. Manusia Bugis. Jakarta: Nalar. Scott, James C. 1983. Moral Ekonomi Petani. Pergolakan dan Subsistensi di Asia Tenggara. Ttrans. Hasan Basari. Jakarta, Indonesia: LP3ES. Wright, Erik Olin. 1987. Classes. London-New York: Verso.

Journals

Neis, Barbara. 1981. Competitive Merchants and Class Struggle in Newfoundland. Studies in Political Economy 5 (Spring): 127–143. Chapter 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

From a Marxist perspective the relationship between social classes is always antag- onistic. “…in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an unerupted, now hidden, now open fight,…” Marx and Engels wrote in The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1948/1991: 9). This applies both to feudal and bourgeois/capitalist societies. However, Marx said, within the bourgeois society, there is one distinctive character, that is, with class antagonism becoming more simplified, society as a whole is increasingly divided into two hos- tile camps, namely owners of the means of production (bourgeois/capitalist) and the working clas (proletarian). In the case of fishermen in Balikpapan, what needs to be pointed out first is the tendency of “simplification” of the class structure into two camps; the capitalist class and the working class, has so far not occurred. What had occurred is the reverse, which was the “complication” of the class structure. However, this compli- cation was not as a consequence of the emergence of the “service class” (Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987) or the professional-managerial class (Ehrenreich & Ehrenreich as cited in Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987) as it is in the industrial sec- tor, but more by reason of the diversification that had occurred within the owners of the means of production due to unequal control of assets of the means of production. This newly emerging class is more similar to what Fairley (1990) mentions as the “new bourgeoisie” fisherman class in Newfoundland, Canada. As implied in the description of the history of fishing technology development in the preceding sec- tion, initially the owner fishermen in Balikpapan could be put under one category of class only, namely small fishermen. They all used small boats (soppe) with paddles or sail, and then they changed it to using a boat with a small engine or an outboard motor (katinting). Nowadays, owner fishermen have evolved into small, medium-

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 69 R. A. Kinseng, Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0986-5_5 70 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen scale, and capitalist fisherman classes. This “four-class” structure is likely to remain unchanged for a long time in the future. It is very rare that an owner fisherman gets downgraded to become a sawi, and reversely it is not easy either for small-scale and medium-scale fishermen to rise as highly as becoming a capitalist fisherman. The following will describe the class conflicts that had occurred among the fish- ermen in Balikpapan waters. This class conflict occurred both between fellow Balikpapan fishermen and between them and fishermen from outside Balikpapan, in this case the purse seine fishermen from Central Java.

5.1 Laborer vs Owner

As the above citation suggests, from a Marxist point of view the relationship between the laborers and the capitalists is always antagonistic and exploitative, thus triggering conflicts between the two classes. In Balikpapan, so far there had been no open conflict between the owner fisherman class and the working class or laborer class. To date conflicts that had happened between laborers and owners were more personal or individual by nature, and there had been no collective conflict between the two classes. On the laborers’ side, the most violent form of resistance they had ever mounted against the owners was to stop working for one or move to another employer, while on the owners’ side, they would simply dismiss the subordinates that they did not think were very good. There were several problems that often caused disputes or conflicts between fish- erman laborers and owner fishermen. One problem often encountered was that of lazy or “undisciplined” laborers. Such laziness might occur on a vessel; for instance, namely while some laborers are busy working, others might just be “sitting or relax- ing”, says a fisherman labourer. Or, it could also take place on shore, for example when the laborers were asked to gather in order to set up a FAD, some would refused to come by reason that they had something important to do, yet then they were caught doing nothing or having a good time. Or, some of them would just sit doing nothing on the boat, and when they were told to work, they got annoyed. The lazy or undisciplined laborers would cause tension among fellow fishermen in one ves- sel. Those who had been working hard or diligently would feel jealous and think they had been treated unfairly because while they had been working hard, some others were lazy, while they would all get a similar amount of share in the end. Jealousy between fellow laborers was often incited by issues related to the can- coan. By tradition every fisherman in Balikpapan is entitled to take a small amount of fish from the vessel just enough for their own consumption, which is called can- coan. In practice, there is always a laborer who would take a large quantity of the cancoan despite the boat owner’s telling them not to do so. As a result, those who only take a small amount of the cancoan may feel jealous. To overcome the situation among the laborers in a vessel, the owner is often forced to lay off members of the crew who are the source of the problem. Some 5.1 Laborer vs Owner 71 owner fishermen said they would often dismiss a member who behaved in such a manner, “rather than having them arguing in the boat”, an owner fisherman says. According to the owner’s logic it is better to dismiss just one worker only than hav- ing him creating a problem in the boat. A fisherman laborer may also quit working with his free will. The reasons for it may vary; and one of them is an issue of income. A laborer fisherman who had once been an owner fisherman describes that there are fisherman workers who quit work- ing following several failures to catch any fish after two or three attempts of going to sea. A laborer may also quit because of “the heart-breaking” nature of the share, or, in other words he feels that the share is not good or unfair. In relation to this issue, there are also owners who are not transparent regarding financial matters. They would hand an amount money with no detailed information on the total pro- ceeds, the amount spent for the operational cost, the amount deducted for debt pay- ment, and so on. Such an issue may rouse questions among the crew. When the owner is open about financial matters, “the folks are happy”, says a fisherman. Another reason for a laborer fisherman to quit working is when he feels underes- timated by the juragan (owner). This demeaning attitude involves saying things like, “I can run my business without you”, for example. However, when the juragan is treating them as such, according to one fisherman, a laborer could also respond: “as if there’s no other job out there, we get humiliated here,” or “we’ve been treated like an animal”. One notable fisherman calls it a “listening” problem, which includes also the use of rude words or yelling. In addition, a stingy owner may also make his men less happy. For example, not giving enough food or cigarettes to the workers despite their hard work, or not allowing them to take a decent amount of cancoan. Some employers are quite generous with the cancoan, while some others can be really stingy. Problems between the owner and the laborers may also occur concerning the operational cost. A sawi may feel that the cost to go to sea is too high, thus reducing the amount of share he receives. Or, he may also feel it is unfair that he is charged with the operational cost even though he has never gone to sea. “Sometimes we have to give in. The small becomes smaller,” a senior sawi said (interviewed on 8/2/06). Naturally the owner has a significant interest to retain the laborers to keep work- ing for him. Fishermen using FAD, boat-operated lift net, and fixed lift net, for example, would absolutely need workers for his capture operations. For boat- oper- ated lift net, for example, the required number of laborers typically ranges from 9 to 11 people. “You cannot control the gear with only 2 or 3 people,” says a notable owner of a boat-operated lift net. Similarly, FAD net requires at least 7 men to oper- ate, which means 6 fisherman workers. A notable fisherman figure who is also the largest punggawa in Manggar says that sometimes an owner fisherman cannot go to sea because there is no sawi available. “Things get difficult if there is nosawi around,” he says. He admits that finding laborer fishermen has been quite difficult in recent times. In Balikpapan, there is a general view about the good or bad fisherman owner, especially concerning among the pejala fishermen. An owner fisherman (pejala) with only a few men working for him indicates that he is not too good. A notable 72 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen fisherman says that a capture operation using FAD requires at least 7 men. “Employing less than 7 men implies that there is something wrong with the owner or the owner is no good. An owner that employs between 10 and 11 men is a good person”. He also explains that another criterion for a “good” owner is his “listening” capacity. For instance, an owner who regularly uses rude words or yells at his men would make his men feel uncomfortable working for him. “Some owners can also be even cruel”, say a fisherman laborer who was a former owner. Owner fishermen would try many ways to retain their workers, or make them interested to stay working with them. One very common way is to award bonus to the hard-working laborers. Another way is to give good attention to his subordi- nates. An owner fisherman who was considered as the greatest fisherman in Balikpapan and was given a title of “pirate” by a leader of the fisherman community explains as follows: “Owners are different from one another. No one here works in the same way as I do. It is impossible to run our business without any crew. We need to understand each other. We must understand our crew and be aware of what they want. Without understanding, out of the 10 men we have today, only 5 will remain the next day. Solidarity is needed. Some own- ers do not have sense of solidarity with their workers. Then, if the workers received just a little less than their usual shares, they would run amok. Mutual trust is good. We should understand what our men want, understand their situation, visit their homes. If they are sick, send them to hospital. People tend to say that corrupt behaviour can only be found in the government, but it also exists among the small fishermen. Owner fishermen are just like the president and the laborers his ministers. If the owner is corrupt, the subordinates will see it and they will leave him slowly. They will think that the business will not run well without them. But if we are kind, our crew will have some mercy and will not leave us.

It is rude for an owner to say to his men hat he could run his business without them. It’s also mean to yell at them. If there is a problem, I get them to play and make some jokes, so we can be good again together. If there is an argument or fight between the crew, I will call them, ask what their problem is and settle it. The problem could be just because of a single fish. There was a time when my crew protested. Problems usually concern profit-sharing issues and incurred costs. And normally it was merely due to some misunderstanding. Once they are gathered together and were given an explanation they will understand.

Most of the owner fishermen would have to come to or call the crew individually one by one. I don’t. My crew would come to me when it’s time. They know”. Based on the examples provided in the above cases and the informants’ accounts, it is obvious that owner fishermen take pride if the crew likes them. It shows that they have a good name and reputation. Unlike conflicts between laborers and owners, clashes between fellow owner fishermen from different classes are more open and violent. The class conflicts will be described in more detail in the following. 5.2 Medium-Scale Fishermen vs Capitalist Fishermen 73

5.2 Medium-Scale Fishermen vs Capitalist Fishermen

5.2.1 The Case of FAD Fishermen and the Boat-Operated Lift Net Fishermen

An example of conflict between medium-scale and capitalist fishermen is a conflict that had occurred between fishermen that used FAD fishing gear and those using boat-operated lift net. The potential conflict between these fishermen using two different types of gear is great, even though there has been no brutal open conflict between the two classes so far. Tensions and conflicts usually occur because the FAD-using fishermen feel disadvantaged when the boat-operated lift net fishermen are operating near their FAD. With their use of more advanced technology, espe- cially in the use of sophisticated lights, pejala fishermen will not be able to compete with boat-operated lift net fishermen when their fishing gear is put near their FAD. According to the FAD fishermen, the fish will be more attracted to the more powerful light from the boat-operated lift net. Also, even though there will still be fish around the FAD, it will be difficult to catch them because they will become wild as if they are “drunk” when blinded by the floodlights. According to a noteble boat-operated lift net fisherman (the first fisherman to use the gear in Balikpapan), the pejala fishermen were against the use of boat- operated lift net in the past. They rallied to protest against its use first in 2000, and later in 2003. A staff member at Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office also gave the same information. According to him, conflicts between the FAD fishermen and the boat-operated lift net fishermen had occurred even before the conflicts between Balikpapan’s fishermen and purse seine fishermen from Java took place. An agree- ment was then made at that time concerning fishing grounds for fishermen of each type of fishing gear. The same information was also provided by some fixed lift net fishermen. Relationships between FAD fishermen and boat-operated lift net fishermen have become worse in recent times. After the incident with the purse seine fishermen, some boat-operated lift net fishermen from Sulawesi were found operating near the FAD fishermen’s fishing ground. Some of the FAD fishermen “reacted against it angrily and posed a threat; if they do not operate away from our fishing ground, a tougher action will be taken,” says a notable fisherman (interviewed on 10/2/06). The boat-operated lift net fishermen were advised not to operate near the FAD fishermen’s fishing ground, and they obeyed; therefore, there was no conflict. Tension between the same parties also took place around (from before and until after) the Eid al-Fitr in October 2006. The FAD fishermen were aware that some boat-operated lift net fishermen were catching fish in their fishing ground. They realized because of the “types of fish” that the latter group of fishermen had caught was the typical fish that tended to surround their FAD. However, at the time the ten- sion could be defused, so it did not lead to a physical conflict. 74 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

Conflicts between these two classes of fishermen could still be minimized thus far so as not to explode into violent open conflicts. Despite the tensions that built up now and then, they could so far be solved by simply asking the boat-operated lift net fishermen to not operate near the FADs in order to not disturb the FAD fishermen. However, the potential for conflict remains latent and could explode any time.

5.2.2 The Case Between Traditional Fishermen and Blast Fishermen

The second example is the conflict between traditional fishermen and blast fisher- men. It should be noted that the description of the conflict between the traditional fishermen and the blast fishermen below is entirely based on the accounts by tradi- tional fishermen and other informants. There is no information obtained from the blast fishermen given that blast fishing is in fact illegal. In 1997, an open conflict occurred between traditional fishermen and blast fishermen. The conflict started with a blast fisherman throwing a bomb near some hook and line fishermen’s boat without asking for their permission. “Our boat was shaking”, says a fisherman who experienced the incident. As it happened, the blast fishermen also became emotional to the extent that they were about to throw another bomb at them. “He was the one who did wrong, yet he was the one who got mad and wanted to throw a bomb at us”, said the fisherman. The hook and line fishermen then reported the incident to the regional house of representatives, or the DPRD. Knowing this, the blast fishermen got angry and planned to launch an attack against the hook and line fishermen. Crowds of blast fishermen from various places in Balikpapan then gathered at one particular loca- tion, getting ready to launch the attack with explosives. As tension was mounting, children and women were evacuated from the hook and line fishermen’s neighborhoods (BTN and Kampung Nelayan). In the mean- time, five of the fishermen from the two locations forced their way into the blast fishermen’s village, while they were getting ready to launch their attack. The five fishermen’s intention was to beat up the blast fishermen’s group leader. They had also prepared one car to set fire the group leader’s house. Fortunately, when the five traditional fishermen arrived at the location two highly respected fisherman leaders were there. The two leaders’ presence managed to prevent the two fisherman classes from fighting against each other. The police then arrested the five fishermen, while the area where crowds of blast fishermen were gathering was heavily guarded by the security forces. “Sepakat alley and Selili alley were blockaded by the police”, an informant gave his account on the incident. As a consequence of the incident, six fishermen were detained at the Sepinggal police station for one day. 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java 75

5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java

Before discussing the case of class conflict case between the purse seine fishermen from Central Java and the alliance of various fishermen classes in Balikpapan, it is necessary to point out that a similar case had occurred before. During the period of 1977 to 1978 there were about 17 trawlers that belonged to a Japanese company operating in Balikpapan waters. Their presence upset the fishermen operating in the area. In 1978, the Balikpapan fishermen, led by Daeng Polo and Pak Abd Azis, launched a resistance movement. They managed to seize three of the Japanese trawlers, namely Mitra Misaya 1, Mitra Misaya 2, and Arjuna. As a result, the Balikpapan City government immediately intervened to settle the case. Under the terms of the conflict resolution mediated by the government, the Japanese company, Misaya, agreed to provide a vessel for the Balikpapan fishermen, which manage- ment at that time was entrusted to Daeng Polo. This brief description shows that conflict between the upper class and the lower class fishermen in Balikpapan had already occurred in the past, long before their conflicts with purse seine fishermen from Central Java from 2003 to 2006. Furthermore, the fairly violent conflicts that occurred between Balikpapan’s “traditional” fishermen and the “modern” fishermen from Juwana, Central Java will be explained in more detail. The fishermen in Balikpapan call themselves “tradi- tional” fishermen and the purse seine fishermen from Central Java “modern”. In class analysis, the conflict between them is actually a conflict between the “upper” class fishermen, namely the purse seine fishermen, and the “lower” class fishermen, namely the Balikpapan fishermen. The conflict reached its climax when the vessel, KM Mutiara Sakti, which was owned by the fishermen from Juwana, was set on fire on Monday 16 January 2006, which is known as the “16 January Incident”. The fol- lowing section will describe the chronology of burning of the vessel (Picture 5.1).

Picture 5.1 The purse seine vessel was set on fire by Balikpapan Fishermen 76 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

5.3.1 Chronology of the 16 January 2006 Incident

On Friday, 13 January 2006, 19 fishing vessels originating from Juwana entered and anchored at the port of Telaga Emas, Kampung Baru, at the Sub-district of West Balikpapan. Before the arrival, four ships, also originating from Juwana, had already anchored at the same port. Thus, the total number of fishing vessels from Juwana anchoring at the port of Telaga Emas, Kampung Baru, on 13 January 2006 was as many as 23 units. After they entered the port, all documents were taken by the Sea and Coast Guard (KPLP) officers to be processed properly in accordance with the applicable regulation. According to the fishermen from Juwana, their purpose was to add more fishing supplies that had been used up after they had operated at sea for 2–3 months. They also anchored due to the large waves and full moon that were making it difficult to catch fish. On Saturday on 14 January, the additional ­supply-­loading activities were going well. According to the Juwana’s fishermen, everything was fine until that day. Nonetheless, the arrival of the Juwana fishermen’s vessels had actually made the Balikpapan traditional fishermen anxious. Their anxiety or even anger got worse because before that, on 15 December 2005 some purse seine fishermen from Pekalongan had signed a statement letter in which they stated that they would not operate in Makassar Strait. Therefore, the traditional fishermen felt like they had been challenged by the arrival of 23 ships of purse seine fishermen from Juwana. On Sunday 15 January 2006 at around 10:00 am local time, the Fisherman Community Alliance (AMN) took the initiative to contact the Mayor of Balikpapan to pass on the information about the situation in which the fishermen were getting increasingly upset and angry. AMN also suggested that the mayor immediately take concrete steps to avoid any possibility for disorder that could happen due to the fishermen’s anger. At the night on Sunday the 15th, the fishermen held a meeting at Manggar Fish Auction Place (TPI) to discuss their plan to attack the purse seine fishermen from Juwana. They already prepared hundreds of litres of gasoline in drink bottles. “The plan was indeed to set something on fire”, an informant said. Meanwhile, according to the fishermen from Juwana, at around 07.00 am local time on that Sunday, they received information from the Balikpapan local police (Polres Balikpapan) regarding rumors that the fishermen from Manggar and Markoni, Balikpapan, would take rebellious action against the fishermen from Juwana. Accordingly, the police ordered the Juwana fishermen to immediately bring their vessels out of the port. However, because of low tide, the vessels were grounded and could not be immediately taken away to leave the port. In addition, the vessels’ supplies loading process had not been completed, and since it was public holiday the vessels’ documents and paperwork were not ready either. Meanwhile, rumors that the traditional Balikpapan fishermen would launch an attack were getting stron- ger. For that reason, the Balikpapan Police were on guard since the evening on that Sunday. Security was maintained by approximately 15 to 20 personnel from the local police. On the same day at around 17.30, Balikpapan Police Intelligence 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java 77 contacted AMN to inform them that the Balikpapan Police had ordered the purse seine fishermen from Juwana to leave Balikpapan no later than 04.00 local time the next day. On Monday, 16 January 2006, the fishermen from Juwana felt the increasingly gripping tension. They used their vessels that were already afloat to pull the other ones that were still aground to get out of the port as quickly as possible. At around 05:00 local time, they were finally able to start taking ships out of the harbor with the Water Police’s escort. The first group, consisting of nine vessels, managed to get out of Balikpapan safely. At around 5:30 the second group consisting of another nine purse seine vessels also began to move out, escorted by a police speed boat with four personnel, while there were still four other ships remaining at the port. In that second group, KM Mutiara Sakti was at the front. While they were sailing out of the port, not far from it, before passing the red sign at around 06.30, about 10 local fishing boats, each containing 10–15 fishermen, were blockading the group of vessels. Faced with such a situation, the police ordered the skipper of KM Mutiara Sakti to turn back to the harbor to avoid the crowd of fishermen that was increasing in number. The other ships behind KM Mutiara Sakti motor-vessel also turned around to return back to the port, hence KM Mutiara Sakti was behind as the last ship in the group towards the port. The crowd of the local fishermen continued to chase KM Mutiara Sakti and managed to get near it. Ignoring the police’s double warning shot, they threw various objects at the vessel, such as rocks, and gasoline- filled bottles. On the one hand, according to the purse seine fishermen’s version, the objects thrown at their vessel included the Molotov cocktails, which started to set KM Mutiara Sakti on fire. On the other hand, according to the local fishermen’s version, they set the boat on fire after they managed to come aboard and ordered its crew to get off first, then they poured gasoline all over the stern and set it on fire. The crew was escorted by local notable fishermen to be handed over to the police. The KM Mutiara Sakti was intercepted while it was passing Klandasan area. Amidst such condition, the security officers requested additional back-up, thus a larger speedboat containing about 10 personnel arrived shortly after. However, according to the purse seine fisherman’s version, after the second speedboat came, both escorting speedboats made some distance to stay safe. With the vessel being left unescorted, the crew was helpless when the mob of local fishermen climbed up to get onboard KM Mutiara Sakti. The vessel’s deputy master, named Robiu (30 years) was beaten by a local fisherman and got injured on his temple above his right eye. According to his account, “Not long after those fishermen came aboard our ship, one of them came to me and beat me three times” (Post Metro Balikpapan, 20/1/06, p. 1). Furthermore, the mob poured gasoline over various parts of the ves- sel, which included the net, the engine room, the captain’s quarter, and the other parts of the ship and set it on fire. On his part, the Captain of KM Mutiara Sakti ordered all the crew not to fight back and moved to the bow to avoid the fire that had started to blaze at the stern. At around 08:00 local time the fire began to rage the hull. The crew was told to move to the local fishing boats by the crowd of fishermen and was brought ashore, 78 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen where many bystanders had flocked to witness the event. The local fishermen then pulled the blazing vessel towards the direction of Markoni Village; there, they ­surrounded it and continued to pour it with gasoline. Finally, KM Mutiara Sakti sank into the waters of Markoni, in front of Dusit Hotel (Pictures 5.2 and 5.3). Furthermore, from 09.00 to 10.00 local time the 30-strong crew of KM Mutiara Sakti were dragged into a small room, until the police came over and took them all to Balikpapan Police Station. At the station, the members of the crew that were injured were treated and taken to the port to be entrusted to the remaining four purse seine boats from Juwana that were still anchoring at the port, to be brought back home to Java. However, since the ships’ plan was to go to sea first before they went

Picture 5.2 The deputy master was beaten by a Balikpapan fisherman (Source: Post Metro Balikpapan, 19/1/06, p.1) 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java 79

Picture 5.3 The remains of KM Mutiara Sakti purse seine vessel back to Java, they were instead entrusted to the Naval Base and were finally able to return to Java on Thursday 19 January 2006 by Safira motorboat that ferried them from Semayang Port, Balikpapan, to Surabaya (Picture 5.4). Actually, on Monday 16 January, from about 6:00 am to 8:30 local time, the Balikpapan Police Chief, Adjunct Senior Police Commissioner Arifin and his staff went to the Manggar Fish Auction Place, and held a dialogue with about 100 fisher- men there. The aim was to deter the fishermen in Manggar from attacking the purse seine fishermen from Juwana who were anchoring in Kampung Baru. That was why the fishermen from Manggar were not involved in the attack and burning of the purse seine ship from Java. The Police Chief decided visit TPI Manggar because it had the largest concentration of fisherman communities. Also, the fishermen in Manggar were known to be more dynamic and aggressive in defending their rights, which had included engaging in dialogue and starting rallies at the offices of the local house of representatives, the Mayor, and Pertamina. Therefore, the police did not anticipate that it was the fishermen from Markoni that had launched instead, since they were much less in number than the fishermen in Manggar. The police had actually tried to prevent the Manggar fisherman from getting involved in the attack plan by closing off the diesel fuel depot near Manggar (in Trans). Despite the dialogue with the Chief Police at the TPI that morning, in the end, about 150 fishermen from Manggar could finally join their fellow fishermen from Markoni and Klandasan at around 10:00. They arrived in 15 boats. Policemen from the Water Police and some Navy per- sonnel also tried to intercept them by firing several gunshots, but to no avail. When the fishermen from Manggar joined the crowd KM Mutiara Sakti had already been ablaze. They said if the police had not prevented them from getting involved, they would have been able to chase those purse seine ships from Juwana and set at least one more vessel on fire. “If the Markoni fishermen could burn one vessel, we could have burned one also”, said a Manggar fisherman. According to an AMN activist, they also tried to facilitate the meeting between fishermen and some related parties in order to avoid the attack. However, the fisher- men refused since they did not trust such meetings to lead to satisfactory results. “They said that they had had enough of lobbying the local house of representatives and the Fisheries office. With no result”, the AMN activist said. 80 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

Picture 5.4 KM Mutiara Sakti crew were returning home (Source: Post Metro Balikpapan, 20/1/06, p.1)

After the incident, on that Monday afternoon, the security forces, which included the Police Chief of East Kalimantan and the City Administration, namely the Head of Fisheries Office, and the Deputy Mayor went to the scene. They also went to sea to escort the Juwana fishermen’s vessels as they were leaving Balikpapan. “I spent the entire day at sea without food to escort the purse seine fishermen”, says the Head of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of Balikpapan. The case of the burning of the vessel received intense coverage from both the local and national media, including Kompas daily. Kompas published the news under the title: “Fisherman Conflict. Central Java purse seine Ship Was Set On Fire in East Kalimantan” (Kompas, 17/1/06, p. 24). According to an official at the Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office, the case was also broadcasted on a national TV, namely Metro TV, on its “Top 9 News” program on the afternoon of the same day, on 16 January. 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java 81

5.3.1.1 Conflict Resolution

The resolution processes to settle the 16 January 2006 vessel burning conflict was quite tough and lengthy. The owner of KM Mutiara Sakti, H.A. Sariyani, assigned his son-in-law, Bambang Wicaksana, to handle the case. On the day after the inci- dent, on Tuesday 17 January 2006, Bambang Wicaksana left Central Java and arrived in Balikpapan at 14.00 local time. Then on the same day at 19:00, he offi- cially appointed a prominent lawyer in Balikpapan, H. Yusuf Mustafa, SH to be their lawyer. After that, two days later on Thursday 19 January 2006 at 09.00 local time, the owner (Bambang Wicaksana) and the ship captain (Jasiman), accompa- nied by the lawyer (H. Yusuf Mustafa), officially reported the case to Balikpapan Police Station. At the same time, three fishermen from Markoni were questioned by the police as witnesses to the case of KM Mutiara Sakti vessel burning. Meanwhile, the case of “coercion” used by the Balikpapan fishermen to force the purse seine fishermen to sign the previously mentioned statement letter on 15 December 2005 had also caused concern among the Central Java fishermen. To respond to it, the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries had planned to hold a meeting between the two parties on 17 January 2006 in Semarang, Central Java. The meeting was almost canceled because of the KM Mutiara Sakti incident just one day prior; however, in the end the meeting went ahead. It was chaired by the Director General of Fisheries and attended by 50 participants, including officials from the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries from National, Provincial, and District/ City levels, and several fisherman representatives. While in the meeting in Balikpapan on 15 December 2005 the fishermen from Central Java felt that “their safety is under threat”, at the meeting in Semarang it was the fishermen from Balikpapan’s turn to feel worried, and even the Head of Balikpapan Fishery Office felt “unsafe”. They were rather afraid because, “we went straight into their territory during a tense circumstance. It’s like entering a tiger cage”, says a participant from Balikpapan. The Head of the Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office admitted that he did not expect too much from the meeting in Semarang. It was therefore not surprising that the fishermen from Balikpapan later rejected some of the points of the Semarang agreement. Although initially the 17 January meeting in Semarang was not designed to dis- cuss the KM Mutiara Sakti incident case, due to the previous day’s incident the meeting ended up specifically discussing that case. The case was even placed as the first item in the minutes of the “Semarang meeting” with the following statement: “Concerning the incident of the KM Mutiara Sakti purse seine vessel arson attack (not trawl as mentioned in the media), an agreement is made to investigate the case thoroughly subject to applicable rules and regulation, both under criminal and civil laws. For that reason, it is hoped that the National Police Chief will also help to thoroughly investigate the said case”. Thus, the “Semarang meeting” was part of the processes of conflict resolution between the purse seine fishermen from Central Java and the fishermen from Balikpapan as a whole, as well as the Mutiara Sakti arson case itself. 82 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

The first point seemed to be a “victory” for the purse seine fishermen from Central Java. Criminal and civil investigation on the KM Mutiara Sakti arson case was indeed strongly demanded by the purse seine fishermen. Legal settlement was also another demand constantly voiced by both Bambang Wicaksana as the owner of KM Mutiara Sakti and H. Yusuf Mustafa, SH as his lawyer. According to H. Yusuf Mustafa, SH, the act of arson is a criminal offense governed under articles 178, 170, and 55 of the Criminal Code (KUHP). In this case, among the victims were goods or property. Perpetrators of this crime could be sentenced up to 12 years of imprisonment (inter- viewed on 11/2/06). Under the Civil Code, H. Yusuf Mustafa said the unlawful act had clearly caused material loss, which was in the form of a vessel and its equipment. According to Bambang Wicaksana, the amount of claim for material loss had been calculated to reach more than IDR 1.3 billion (Post Metro Balikpapan, 18/1/06). The Central Java fishermen’s determination in demanding a legal settlement of the case was based on their conviction that they were right. From legal perspective, they had been compliant to the rules and regulation with all the required documents, such as the fishing license (SPI-Surat Penangkapan Ikan) and the Fishery Business License (IUP-Izin Usaha Perikanan). In terms of fishing ground, they they did not commit any violation because based on their Fishery Business License Makassar Strait is one of their fishing ground areas. Also, referring to Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, they claimed that they were operating 12 miles and farther, a territory which is under the of the Central Government’s authority. The purse seine fishermen from Central Java’s standpoint to demand legal settle- ment gained support from the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and the Central Board of the HNSI. The HNSI Central Board Chairman Chandra Motik said the handling of the conflict case had to be resolved immediately. According to her, legal settlement was chosen “to give deterrent effect to the perpetrators and other people, so that they will not take the law into their own hands…” (Kompas, 15/2/06, p. 22). In his meeting with the owner of KM Mutiara Sakti (Bambang Wicaksana) and his lawyer as well as 40 fishermen from Central Java that was held at the office of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, the Minister says, “I will give severe sanctions to the law offenders in relation to the fishing vessel arson case” (Post Metro Balikpapan, 8/2/06, p. 1). It was also explained that the statement would be forwarded to the Chief of Police for immediate action. At another place on 19 Thursday January 2006 (when the ship’s owner, ship’s captain, and their lawyer submitted their report to the police), the Balikpapan City Administration invited the fishermen to the office to listen to the results of the Semarang meeting. Hundreds turned up at the Mayor’s office because they were curious to hear about the agreement (see Pictures 5.5 and 5.6). However, after listen- ing to the contents of the agreement, they rejected some of the points, particularly point no. 4 regarding the “technology transfer” from the Javanese fishermen to the Balikpapan fishermen. Point no. 8, which stated that purse seine fishermen should not operate within 5 miles from the FAD, was also rejected as such distance was still considered too close. The local Balikpapan fishermen also maintained resistance against a legal settle- ment for the Mutiara Sakti arson case. According to them, if any of them were imprisoned, they would strike back. “If anyone gets jailed, everything will be 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java 83

Picture 5.5 Fishermen invaded City Hall against Semarang Agreement. (Source: Post Metro Balikpapan, 20/1/06 p.1 and Kaltim Post, 20/1/06, p.25) 84 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

Picture 5.6 Chairman of HNSI: settlement through collective discussion to reach a consensual decision. (Source: Post Metro Balikpapan, 18/1/06, p.1) destroyed … destroyed”, says a fisherman who also came up on board of KM Muriara Sakti at the time. Another fisherman says that continuing the legal process for the arson case would only fuel the fishermen of Balikpapan’s anger. Moreover, if the police dared to arrest and detain any of them, then all fishermen would dem- onstrate against it (interviewed on 20/7/06). Chairman of the HSNI Regional Board of the Balikpapan chapter also mentioned the same thing. According to him, “if they get arrested, the risk will be great”; he also mentioned that, “they have been repeat- edly reminded” (interviewed on 09/29/06). In his capacity as Chairman of the Balikpapan chapter of the HNSI he said he preferred settlement through dialogue. “I really wish that this case could be solved through collective discussion to reach a consensual decision”, he said (Post Metro Balikpapan, 18/1/06, p. 1). Meanwhile, on the purse seine fishermen’s side, attempts to bring the perpetra- tors to court continued. Drs Bambang Wicaksono; the owner of KM Mutiara Sakti, who was also the first secretary of the Managing Board of the Fisheries Association of Indonesia sent a letter to the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries requesting that this case was solved according to applicable laws, both the criminal and civil laws. A copy of the letter was also forwarded directly to the Head of the National Police and other related parties. In addition, in February 2006, the Central Java Conflict Resolution Team also sent the “Central Java Fishermen claim and 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java 85 recommendation on conflict resolution”, addressed to the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Minister of Home Affairs, Police Chief, and Navy Chief. Moreover, Bambang Wicaksana as the owner of KM Mutiara Sakti and his law- yer H. Yusuf Mustafa, SH along with 40 fishermen representatives from Central Java also went directly to Jakarta to meet the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries on Monday 6 February 2006. The meeting that took place at the office of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, was also attended by representatives from the National Police, Director of the Water and Air Police from the Indonesia Police Headquarters, Brigadier General N. Sutisna, and representatives from the Navy Chief of Staff office (Post Metro Balikpapan, 8/2/06, p. 1). On that occasion, the Central Java fishermen requested the Chief of National Police to take firm action in the process of law enforcement dealing with the fishermen in Balikpapan (and also in Kota Baru, South Kalimantan) (Picture 5.7).

Picture 5.7 Lawyer of KM Mutiara Sakti’s owner at the office of the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Department, Jakarta. (Source: Post Metro Balikpapan, 8/2/06, p.1) 86 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

Picture 5.8 News on the announcement of four suspects in the KM Mutiara Sakti arson case. (Source: Post Metro, Balikpapan, 4/2/06, p.1)

The owner of KM Mutiara Sakti motor-vessel has repeatedly urged that the legal process as regards the perpetrators of the arson case against KM Mutiara Sakti should be dealt with immediately. They also expressed their disappointment over what they think is very slow legal process. Finally, in February 2006, the Balikpapan Police announced four suspects in the KM Mutiara Sakti case (Metro Post, 4/2/06). However, the suspects were not taken into custody and during the processes that followed, it turned out that there were only two suspects. The Balikpapan District Prosecutor’s office had returned the two suspect’s documents twice to the Police as it was considered insufficient. At the end of September 2006, the documents were again handed over to the Prosecutor’s office to be thoroughly examined (interviewd with Head of Intelligent of Balikpapan District Prosecutor, 28/9/06) (Picture 5.8).

5.3.1.2 Conflict Management

The process of conflict resolution, specifically in relation to the KM Mutiara Sakti purse seine vessel case, has been described in the previous section. This section will describe the overall conflict management between Central Java purse seine fisher- men and traditional Balikpapan fishermen. Since the incident of KM Mutiara Sakti was part of the conflict between Central Java purse seine fishermen and Balikpapan traditional fishermen as a whole, some repetition will occur in this section. The case of the burning of KM Mutiara Sakti from Java had had a long history. According to the fishermen, the presence of purse seine vessels from Java in Balikpapan waters, which in their opinion was disrupting their own fishing adven- ture, had been a concern for years. This information was supported by an official 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java 87 document in the form of a letter written by Balikpapan Office of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. The letter, written on 21 December 2005 and addressed to the Director General of Capture Fisheries, the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in Jakarta, the Head of Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office, among others mentioned: “Conflicts between Balikpapan local fishermen and purse seine Fishermen from Pekalongan, Central Java have actually been going on for quite a while since 2003…”. Several peaceful and “constitutional” efforts have been attempted by both the fishermen and Balikpapan City Government to resolve the conflicts. On 5 January 2004, the FAD fishermen in Balikpapan made an agreement consisting of three points as follows: 1. Purse seine fishermen from outside Balikpapan are not allowed to operate in Balikpapan and the surrounding water territory, as well as Makassar Strait at all times; 2. Fishermen from outside Balikpapan may operate in Balikpapan if they use FAD fishing gear; 3. In the case that purse seine fishermen are still operating around Balikpapan fish- ermen’s FAD, their vessels will be sent to Balikpapan Fisheries Office for further action. The letter of agreement was signed by fishermen representatives (H. Sakka, Arsyad, H. Ishak, and Moleng), an officer from the Balikpapan Sea and Coast Guard office, and was acknowledged by the Head of Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office (Ir M. Adriani). The meeting was attended by 77 people, most of whom were fishermen. The letter of agreement clearly showed that the tension or latent conflict between Balikpapan fishermen and purse seine fishermen from Java had already existed since 2003. The demands that the Balikpapan fishermen put forward were also very clearly articulated in the agreement. It was made as an offer to avoid conflicts between Balikpapan fishermen and purse seine fishermen from Java. Despite the above agreement, the purse seine fishermen from Java went on oper- ating in Balikpapan and Makassar Strait sea territories. In one AMN document it was mentioned that between mid-2004 and early January 2006 “Fishing vessels using purse seine fishing gear from Central Java continue to operate in Makassar Strait waters about 20–30 miles from Balikpapan, which is considered a Balikpapan traditional fishing ground”. The re-operation of the purse seine fishermen from Central Java was increasingly causing anxiety among the Balikpapan fishermen. On 13 December 2004, again 20 fishermen respresentatives conveyed their aspirations to Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office. In that meeting they stated that if the purse seine vessels keep operating near Balikpapan waters, they would “burn or attack” them. It was reflected in the letter written by the Head of Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office to the Director General of Marine and Fishery Resources Control, at the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in Jakarta, which was a follow-up to the traditional fishermen’s complaints. Point 3 of the letter mentioned that: “Since purse seine fish- 88 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen ing boats have been found around the FAD, the fishermen will plan to attack or set on fire the purse seine fishing boats from Java that are operating around their FAD”. As mentioned above, as a follow-up to the fishermen’s complaints and threats against the purse seine fishermen from Java, the Head of Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office wrote a letter to the Director General of Marine and Fishery Resources Control, at the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in Jakarta on 23 December 2004. The letter said, “Classification: Important. Subject: To All Purse Seine Ships from Pekalongan and Juwana, For The Time Being Please Do Not Operate in the waters of Makassar Strait”. As an attempt to prevent conflicts from occurring, in their letter the Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office clearly stated the following: “Therefore, to prevent undesirable things from happening, we request that no license shall be issued for purse seine ships for operating around Makassar Strait waters, especially around the local fishermen of Balikpapan’s fishing ground, and at the same time also request for assitance to Hiu 007 vessel to operate in that area and it is hoped that there will be no more purse seine vessels from Pekalongan and Juwana operating there soon”. However, as explained by the AMN member earlier, apparently throughout 2005 purse seine vessels from Pekalongan and Juwana continued operating in Makassar Strait waters, close to the fishing ground area of Balikpapan local fishermen. During the period of December 13–15, 2005 there were even five (5) purse seine ships from Pekalongan entering and anchoring at the port of Telaga Emas, Kampung Baru, at the West Balikpapan Sub-district. Based on the fishermen’s account as well as the AMN document, besides uploading supplies, the purse seine fishermen from Central Java were also selling their catch. It caused fish prices to crash in Balikpapan, mak- ing the traditional fishermen even angrier. As a result, on 15 December 2005, about 100 Balikpapan traditional fishermen visited the DPRD, facilitated by the East Kalimantan Board Members of AMN. The meeting was attended by West Balikpapan Police Chief, Head of Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office, several members of the Balikpapan City House of Representative, representatives from AMN, as well as representatives of the Pekalongan fishermen. At that meeting, Balikpapan traditional fishermen asked the Balikpapan City DPRD to help resolve the long-standing problem of the purse seine fishermen from Java. As a result, the fishermen’s representative from Pekalongan made a statement saying, “… we the purse seine fishermen from Pekalongan are willing to not operate in the fishing ground area of Makassar Strait as agreed in this meeting, and if we breach this agreement, we are willing to be processed in a legal manner”. The letter of state- ment was signed by three representatives of purse seine fishermen from Pekalongan, two witnesses (one from the fishermen’s party and the other from AMN manage- ment), and acknowledged by the Head of Commission III of Balikpapan City House of Representative (H. Sappe) as chairman of the meeting. In a document produced by the Indonesian Fisheries Association, it is said that the helmsman of the purse seine ships from Central Java was coerced to sign the statement letter. Feeling that their safety was under threat, they were compelled to sign the statement. 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java 89

The atmostphere in the meeting that went on from 08:30 to 13:30 itself seemed to be quite tense. As one local newspaper reported, “The dialogue seems tense as the fishermen occasionaly shouted in expressing their refusal” (Kaltim Pos 16/12/05, p. 29). H. Sappe as chairman of the meeting gave a similar account, that during the meeting the Balikpapan fishermen were quite emotional. At some point one of them almost threw a chair. Some of them even threatened to set the House of Representative building on fire (interviewed on 13/2/06). After that, based on the results of that meeting, on 21 December 2005, the Head of Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office sent a letter to the Director General of Capture Fisheries, at the the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, in Jakarta. The letter stated: “Subject: Request to Revoke the Permission for Purse Seine Ship to Operate in Makassar Strait Waters”. The letter contains the following: “Conflict between Balikpapan local fishermen and purse seine fishermen from Pekalongan Central Java has actually been going on for a long time since 2003, so in order to anticipate greater conflict that can threaten the safety of both parties, therefore herewith a request to immediately revoke the License for Purse Seine Vessels to Operate in Makassar Strait Waters”. As explained by a staff of the Office of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, they had made many attempts to prevent conflicts from happening. In addition to sending the letters, Balikpapan Office of Marine Affairs and Fisheries had also reminded the purse seine fishermen from Juwana not to enter the port in Balikpapan. They even aired the warning through rthe radio, saying: “Hey, you… don’t come here. It’s dangerous”, the staff says (interviewed on 20/1/06). They did that because they had heard that the local fishermen would launch an attack against those fishermen from Central Java. Besides making “institutional” attempts, fishermen in Balikpapan had once taken the matter into their own hands. According to a highly respected fisherman, H. Taher, once in the past eight (8) purse seine ships anchored in Balikpapan. Mr. Taher him- self went directly to the purse seine fishermen to talk to them. I once dealt with eight purse seine vessels. I forbid them to come and told them not to dis- turb the traditional fishermen here. I gave them time to leave by nine o’clock the next day after the warning was given. If not and if there was still a ship found by that time, I would burn it or there would be a sea of fire. They did leave. They were gone by morning. H. Taher had also engaged in a direct pursuit of a vessel at sea. The pursuit was done “less than a year ago”, according to him. This is in line with information given by the AMN activists, when they mentioned about the pursuit led by H. Taher that was conducted around mid-2005. At that time, some local fishermen gave informa- tion that some purse seine fishermen were operating near the shore. When they heard the information H. Taher, along with hundreds of his men, went to chase them since eight o’clock in the morning. The chase continued until nine o’clock at night, but they did not find the purse seine fishermen. “Maybe someone had informed them”, said H. Taher. Both the local fishermen and staff of the Office of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of the Manggar Fish Auction Place were aware of the pursuit. 90 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

According to a perengge fisherman in Trans, at the Manggar Village, two days before the KM Mutiara Sakti burning incident, he and his friend had once approached a purse seine vessel a sea. He warned the purse seine fishermen not to operate near the Balikpapan fishermen, because the latter would be angry. The purse seine fisher- men thanked him, and gave him cigarettes as a token of gratitude (interviewed on 24/8/06). Potential for conflicts between Central Java purse seine fishermen and Balikpapan fishermen, as well as fishermen in Kota Baru (South Kalimantan) and Sulawesi fishermen after the incident of KM Mutiara Sakti burning remains huge. Accordingly, various efforts to manage fisherman conflict in the Makassar Strait continued to be attempted. The 17 January 2006 Semarang Agreement itself contains several steps suggested to be implemented in order to avoid the outbreak of conflicts between Central Java purse seine fishermen and traditional fishermen in the province of East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. Point 11 of the agreement also sug- gested the need for an intergovernmental coordination meeting between fishermen from various provinces in relation to the utilization of fish resources in Makassar Strait waters. As for the East Kalimantan Provincial Administration, not long ago after the Mutiara Sakti incident, the Governor of East Kalimantan also sent a letter directly to the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries requesting to temporarily stop purs- ing seine vessels from Central Java operating in Makassar Strait. In the letter written on 13 February 2006, the Governor wrote, “Subject: proposal concerning temporary termination of Purse Seine’s operation in Makassar Strait”. It is also mentioned in the letter that, “To avoid the unnecessary things and to minimize conflict between the fishermen, we hereby suggest that the use of purse seine fishing gear and the use of powerful lights in the Strait of Makassar is tempo- rarily terminated until the situation is more favorable and conducive”. Meanwhile, as a follow-up to Semarang meeting, from 24 to 25 January 2006 a meeting was held in Surabaya, East Java. The meeting was chaired by the Directorate General of Capture Fisheries and attended by 40 participants, consisting of officials from the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, West Java, Central Java, East Java, East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi etc. The conclusion of the Surabaya meeting, inter alia, was recognition of the fact that, “many Balikpapan fishermen have not accepted the 17 January 2006 Semarang Agreement”. The meet- ing also decided that Central Java fishermen were temporarily not allowed to oper- ate in Makassar Strait. One interesting point was point no. V regarding the medium and long-term conflict management, consisting of the following: “In order to support the implementation of rapid and effective control of inter- regional conflict, the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries should develop the General Guidelines for Inter-Regional Fishermen Conflict Management”. Furthermore, in agreement with one of the results from the Surabaya meeting, a similar meeting was then held in Makassar, South Sulawesi from 15 to 16 March 2006, to discuss fisherman conflict problems in Makassar Strait. The number of participants attending the meeting this time was 125 people, more than that of the 5.3 “Traditional” Fishermen of Balikpapan vs “Modern” Fishermen from Java 91 meetings in Semarang and Surabaya. The participants included the Governors of Central Java and West Sulawesi, Vice Governor of South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, the Director General of Regional Autonomy, the Navy’s Eastern Fleet Commander, Municipal Government officials, and fishermen’s representatives. According to some AMN activists and representatives of fishermen from Balikpapan who were there, the Makassar meeting ended in deadlock. Moreover, they felt that the Balikpapan and Kota Baru fishermen were blamed and “cornered” by the high-­ rank officials at the meeting. For example, a high-rank official sneered at the fisher- men, saying, “do you really think that those fish belong to your ancestors?”, or “do you think it’s you who feed those fish?”. There were also officials who made an “accusation” that by refusing the Central Java purse seine fisherman meant that Balikpapan and Kota Baru fishermen were “monopolizing the sea”. Hence, the AMN activists responded by maintaining that the businessmen and the authorities were collaborating against and cornering the fishermen in that meeting. Due to the deadlock, the fishermen’s representatives from Central Java, Kota Baru, and Balikpapan submitted their own proposals separately. Judging from the result of the meetings in Semarang, Surabaya and Makassar described above, it seemed that the likelihood of brutal conflicts between Central Java purse seine fishermen and those from Balikpapan and Kota Baru would strongly remain if the purse seine fishermen continued to operate in Makassar Strait, near the traditional fishermen’s fishing ground. In Balikpapan itself, concern was mounting among fishermen over the post-Makassar meeting. On 7 August 2006, several fig- ures and fishermen representatives held a meeting at the Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office to discuss the presence of a purse seine in Makassar Strait. Point 3 of the minutes of the meeting stated, “To follow up points 1 and 2, purse seine fishermen are requested not to be near Makassar Strait until the problems between Balikpapan fishermen and purse seine fishermen are resolved …” whereas point 4 said, “If the purse seine fishermen do not pay attention to point 3, we will not be responsible for any consequence that may arise in the form of conflict between the fishermen.” This was later followed up by the Balikpapan Head of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office by sending a letter to the East Kalimantan Head of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office the next day (8/8/06). Furthermore, on Wednesday 27 September 2006 some fishermen representatives came again to the Government of Balikpapan City to convey the Central Java purse seine fishermen problems. Various alternative solutions to the problems were discussed at the meet- ing, including the possibility of inviting the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries to Balikpapan since it was actually related to the National Government’s policy, so it was not under regional authority. A notable fisherman in Balikpapan said, “As long as they continue to operate in the traditional fishermen’s fishing ground, regardless of where it is, a conflict could occur. Whether it is in East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, Sulawesi, conflict will definitely take place” (interviewed on 8/2/06). I tend to agree with latter’s statement. As will be described in the following chapter, as long as the purse seine fishermen keep maintaining its domination over the “traditional” fishermen, the latter’s resis- tance will continue to emerge. 92 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

5.4 Discussion

5.4.1 Main Problem: Class Domination

The first two conflict cases, namely the conflict between pejala fishermen and boat lift nets fishermen, and the conflict between angler fishermen and blast fishermen are clearly class conflicts. The basic argument for it is that the two conflicting groups in both cases of conflict are both from Bugis ethnic group and both reside in (or are residents of) Manggar, at the district of East Balikpapan. Thus, the possibility of the inclusion of elements of group conflict based on ethnicity and place of origin, as sometimes occurs among fishermen in Indonesia, does not exist in these two cases. However, unlike the above two conflict cases, the conflict between the purse seine fishermen from Central Java and the “traditional” fishermen of Balikpapan may be interpreted as a group conflict based on ethnicity as well as place of origin. From the perspective of ethnicity, this conflict basically happened between Javanese and Bugis fishermen. Meanwhile, in terms of place of origin, the conflict occurred between fishermen from Juwana (Central Java) and fishermen from Balikpapan (East Kalimantan). Thus, the most important question is whether this conflict is purely class conflict or is it a combination of class conflict with group conflict based on ethnicity and place of origin? Based on available data, conflicts between purse seine fishermen and “tradi- tional” fishermen of Balikpapan are dominated more by aspects of class conflict rather than group conflict based on ethnic or place of origin. A very vocal notable figure from the medium-scale class fishermen (middle-class fishermen) who is against the presence of fishermen using purse seine fishing gear and considered as one of the leaders who mobilized the fishermen’s resistance in Manggar against the purse seine fishermen firmly said, “There was no ethnic issue. This is simply a matter of fishing gear”, (interviewed on 21/01/06). In a discus- sion with officials from Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office and some punggawa who were also very vocal against the presence of the purse seine fisher- men, they firmly stated: “The statement that the Javanese fishermen are not allowed to enter Balikpapan is not true! The problem is the fishing gear. For instance, there is no problem with the use of longline or bubu; that’s okay. Again, this is a problem of gear. This is not a problem between different ethnic groups, for example the Bugis against the Javanese, there was no such thing” (discussion at the TPI on 21/01/06). The symbols used did not refer to any ethnicity or place of origin either, but based on the fishing gear, namely the purse seine. Other notable fishermen and activists said that the presence of purse seine fishermen is “very much unwanted by pejala fishermen because of matters regarding different fishing gear” (interviewed on 12/07/06). Even a very vocal activist, who was considered as a “provocateur” by high-rank officials at the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, said, “This is a fishing gear conflict, not a fisherman conflict” (interviewed on 21/01/06). He con- tinued to say that, “If the gear is the same, its okay. This is the policy made by the 5.4 Discussion 93

DKP (Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries), not between fishermen and other fishermen”. Another pejala fishermen: “About korsin (purse seine), we do not ban them as long as the technology used is the same as ours. We don’t accept it because we are not pleased with the gear. While they use lights, we don’t. So, let’s say that if the korsin operation is out there using the light, we’re dead. We are small (poor) people. Those fishermen are big; they have powerful floodlights, while we don’t have any. If we have to compete with them out there, we’re dead. We are not matched. They may operate as long as they do it outside the Makassar Strait. If they are allowed around this area, have pity on us the small people. As for banning them, again it’s the gear that we ban, because our fishing gears are not equal.” (interviewed on 11/07/06). At the Manggar Fish Auction Place (TPI), the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office staff in charge showed to the fishermen some of the boats that were anchor- ing there. He explained that the owners of those boats were fishermen from outside Manggar (from Mandar, Sulawesi), but because they were using the same fishing gear (longline), “it was no problem”, he said. On the contrary, as mentioned in the previous section, if fishermen from Sulawesi using the boat charts operated close to the Balikpapan fishermen’s FAD, they would have reacted violently. Furthermore, even when the boat-operated lift net fishermen from Balikpapan operated near the FAD, as happened before the Eid al-Fitr holiday in October 2006, an open conflict between pejala fishermen and the boat lift nets fishermen almost occurred (Picture 5.9). Chairman of the Branch Executive Board (DPC) of the Indonesian Fishermen Association (HNSI) of Balikpapan, who was also Chairman Golkar Party’s Regional Executive Board of Balikpapan, said that when conflict between purse seine fisher- men and the “traditional” fishermen in Balikpapan occurred, the situation was “highly sensitive” since it took place close to local election time (Pilkada). The conflict was then “associated with the Bugis vs. the Javanese. Whereas it was purely about the stomach (earning a living)”, he said (interviewed on 29/09/06). As leader of the government, the mayor of Balikpapan also mentioned that the conflict was a conflict of technology. He expressed his opinion during a friendly get-together between fishermen and East Kalimantan Police Officers 19 on January 2006. “The case of the Mutiara Sakti vessel burning by Balikpapan fishermen on Monday (16/1) is not a conflict between ethnicities or between fishermen. The incident was a con- flict of technology “, the Mayor said (Tribun Kaltim, 20/01/06, p. 13). It is relevant to note that almost all fishermen that I asked about the “ownership” of the sea in the area of Balikpapan said that the sea was a joint property. Similarly, the result of the interviews also showed the same thing. When asked: “In your opin- ion, do you think the sea around Balikpapan belongs to Balikpapan fishermen, or it is the property of all Indonesians?” It turned out that 91% of the 89 laborer ­fisherman that responded said it belonged to all Indonesians. Meanwhile, of the 96 owner fishermen who responded to the question, 89.60% said it belonged to all Indonesians. According to them, every Indonesian may operate in Balikpapan water area, as long as they use the same fishing gear. This data reinforces the argument that the problem in this conflict is not about the origin of the fishermen, but it is more about the fish- 94 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

Picture 5.9 Dialogue between Head of Public Relations of East Kalimantan Police Office, fisher- men, and AMN activists. (Source: Tribun Kaltim 20/01/06, p. 13) 5.4 Discussion 95 ing technology. Also, the conflict is not a matter of “tenurial system”, although the element is there in the demand by Balikpapan fishermen that every fisherman oper- ating in Balikpapan area should use similar or equivalent fishing gear. In other words, this is a class conflict, not a group conflict based on place of origin, nor was it a “fishing ground dispute”. Another fact that also supports this argument can be seen in the relationship between penyambang fishermen in Kampung Baru and the “traditional” fishermen with their punggawa. The conflict between Central Java’s purse seine fishermen and Balikpapan’s “traditional” fishermen has also led to a conflict between the penyam- bang in Kampung Baru and the “traditional” fishermen in Balikpapan even though both groups are Bugis, and in general still have a family relationship with each other. Some of the “traditional” fishermen, who attacked and burned the purse seine, were formerly the sawi of the penyambang when the latter were fishermen by pro- fession. A penyambang said with an upset tone, “The fishermen in Markoni are my 10 former crew. My former pakaca1 who has become a pejala in Markoni was there” (interviewed on 13/02/06). In the conflict between the purse seine fishermen and the “traditional” fishermen the pengambang are clearly on the purse seine fishermen’s side. Even when an agreement was made between some of the purse seine fishermen from Pekalongan on 15 December 2005 in the Balikpapan City House of Representative building, for instance, these penyambang, together with the Pekalongan fishermen were oppos- ing the “traditional” fishermen of Balikpapan. Also during the same event, the penyambang fishermen and the “traditional” fishermen’s leaders from Manggar were engaged in a “war of words”. The incident of Mutiara Sakti purse seine vessel burning itself has further sharpened the conflict. There was even a concern that there would be a “civil war” between the penyambang community in Kampung Baru and the fishermen in Markoni and Manggar. On the case of the purse seine vessel burning on 16 January 2006, the penyam- bang party “stubbornly insisted” that the perpetrators were immediately brought to justice. “The act of burning the vessel is clearly a violation of the law. The people of Balikpapan expect the law to be enforced … We are not pleased, and even very disappointed if the legal process does not work. Something bigger may happen from here. My men have already said, well in that case, we could have done that too. It is okay to do that,” a penyambang said (interviewed on 13/02/06). The penyambang also complained about the negative impacts of the purse seine’s not operating. The impact consisted of the loss of jobs of their own workers as well as those of the unskilled laborers, ice factories, etc. “The economy (in Kampung Baru) plummeted”, a penyambang figure said. While the “traditional” fishermen were complaining about the fall in fish prices due to the introduction of fish from purse seine vessels, on the contrary the penyambang voiced “the people’s com-

1 Pakaca is a term or name given to a pejala fisherman who is assigned to get into the water to see the condition of the fish, to find out whether there is plenty of fish or not. He is the one to decide whether to lower the net or not (to operate or not to operate), based on the presence of fish in the fishing ground location. 96 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen plaints” about the inflated price of fish due to lack of suppy since the purse seine vessels were not operating. The penyambang also laid the blame at the doors of the Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office and were inclined to assume that the Head of Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office had made a statement that had “provoked” the Balikpapan “traditional” fishermen. It appears obvious here that the same social phenomenon is interpreted very differently by the two conflict- ing groups. On the part of the “traditional” fishermen they partly blamed the penyambang as the source of conflict between the purse seine fishermen and the traditional fisher- men. The penyambang were blamed because they were the ones who “invited” the purse seine fishermen to come to Balikpapan area. A “traditional” fisherman in Manggar said: “The thing that needs looking for is ‘the tail’, who gets the Javanese fishermen to come here. Do not blame the (“traditional”) fishermen… Do not look for the provocateur” (interviewed on 21/01/06). The same thing was also expressed by many other “traditional” fishermen. Even a pejala fisherman’s wife firmly said: “The penyambang are the ones to be attacked. So, we should rally against them” (interviewed on 12/07/06). The conflict between “traditional” fishermen and thepenyambang concerning the purse seine fishermen’s operation in Balikpapan area shows that the conflicts between purse seine fishermen and “traditional” fishermen are not based on issues of ethnicity. Had the issue been more of an ethnic issue, the brutal conflicts should not have occurred, because the purse seine fishermen were backed up fully by the penyambang who are from Bugis ethnic group and have even had a family relation with those “traditional” fishermen. So, again, the main problem in the conflict between the purse seine fishermen and the “traditional” fishermen is a matter of technology. Even if there are elements of ethnicity and place of origin in the con- flict, its “contribution” is very small, and it only serves to reinforce the conflicts. The most important reason is the technology issue. And, because this conflict occurs between fishermen with very different levels of technology used, thus in other words, this conflict is a class conflict. As described above, in a general sense, the main problem causing the conflict between “traditional” fishermen and purse seine fishermen is the fishing gear or technology. In this case, there is a huge technological gap between the “traditional” fishermen and the purse seine fishermen. Like in a war, the “traditional” fishermen said, the purse seine fishermen are using cannons whereas the “traditional” fisher- men are simply using bamboo spears. Meanwhile, a purse seine fisherman drew an analogy between the purse seine vessel and the local fishing boat as “an elephant versus a goat”. Obviously the “traditional” fishermen lost the competition for the fishery resources. This is what caused the anger of the “traditional” fishermen that led to the burning of the purse seine vessel. The opinions of various parties that this conflict is a conflict of fishing gear or conflict of technology is not wrong. However, is there any weightier explanation than that it is “merely” a technological conflict like previously mentioned? What is really behind the “technological conflict”? Cordell and Bavinck see that behind the conflicts between modern and traditional fishermen there are actually issues of “sea 5.4 Discussion 97 tenure” (see Bavinck 2001). Cordell says, “sea tenure issues are at the core of fish- ermen’s livelihood. They are worth fighting over either on the water or in court” (cited by Bavinck 2001: 24). In agreement with Cordell’s opinion, Bavinc says that, “Framed in this fashion, the clashes between the two groups of fishermen emerge as a struggle for control over scarce resources as confrontation about rules of the game and about who decides them” (Bavinck 2001: 24–25). I would like to look at this issue from a point of view of class analysis. In Marx’s view, the main issue that triggers class conflict is the exploitation of the workers by the capitalists. Correspondingly, prominent contemporary sociologist Erik Olin Wright, for example, emphasizes the importance of this problem of exploitation in class concepts (Wright 1987, 2002). However, some Marxists emphasize the prob- lem of dominance in class analysis (Wright 1987). As described earlier, according to Wright, exploitation is more than just eco- nomic oppression, but it also includes elements of appropriation of the work result of one class by another class. “Exploitation, on the other hand, implies more than just economic oppression; it includes both economic oppression and the appropria- tion of the fruits of the labour of one class by another”, Wright says (Wright 1987: 74). Another important element in the concept of exploitation according to Wright is “the welfare of exploiting the class depends upon the work of the exploited class” (Wright 1987: 75). By referring to the notion of exploitation presented by Wright, I would argue that no exploitation has occurred in the class relation between the upper-class (purse seine) fishermen and the lower-class (“traditional”) fishermen in this Balikpapan case. There is no appropriation of the lower-class fishermen’s work by the upper-class fishermen in the relationship between the two classes. In addi- tion, the life of the upper-class fishermen from Java is also not dependent on the work of the lower class fishermen in Balikpapan. What happens in this case is domi- nation or “economic oppression” (Wright 1987: 73–77). This domination or economic oppression mainly occurs in production or fishing activities, although it does not deny the presence of domination on the market side as emphasized by Weber (Wright 2002; Weber 1978; Hamilton and Hirszowicz 1987). In the fishing process, both the lower class fishermen and the upper-class fishermen put in efforts to catch the fish (and other fishery commodities) from a common source, which is a particular fishing ground. In this production process, the appropriation of the lower class fishermen’s work by the upper class fishermen does not happen. The welfare of the upper-class fishermen does not rely on the “tradi- tional” fisherman work. What happens is that the upper- class fishermen dominate the lower-class fishermen because the upper-class fishermen have a more sophisti- cated fishing technology. As a result of this dominance, the “life-chances” of lower-­ class fishermen increasingly worsens. The deterioration of the catch that has led to the deterioration of life has “forced” the lower-class fishermen to put up resistance. Hence, a class conflict occurs as a result. As Betke says, “Finding themselves trapped in an increasingly hopeless ­situation, Indonesian fishermen eventually rebelled and desperately counter- attacked the representative of a modernization that threatened their survival” (Betke 1988: 59). Thus, judging from point of view of class analysis, the problem of con- 98 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen trol over resources and regulations as presented by Bavinck is no more than a sur- face appearance. The more fundamental issue is the domination of one class by another, or in this case the domination of the “traditional” fishermen by the fisher- men that use purse seine. The opposition of the subordinate group (the “traditional” fisherman) is a resistance to this domination. In the case of class conflict in Balikpapan, for the subordinate class, the struggle to obtain control over resources and regulations is the means against domination, while for the dominant class it is their means to preserve its dominance. Class domi- nation in the process of production or capturing the fishery resources has a distinc- tive feature that, to the best of my knowledge, has not been mentioned by social scientists. This characteristic involves a concept that I call the “domination dis- tance”, namely the spatial distance of domination of one class over another. In the case of modern purse seine fishermen and Balikpapan traditional fishermen, this distance of domination is more than 5 nautical miles. A pejala fisherman figure said that the distance even extended to 30 miles. That is why Balikpapan traditional fishermen rejected the Semarang agreement in which it is stated that the Central Java purse seine fishermen did not do fishing activities within a range of 5 (five) miles from the Balikpapan fishermen’s rumpon area. In their opinion the distance is too close (in other words shorter than the purse seine fishermen’s domination distance), therefore the Balikpapan traditional fisher- men still lose the competition. In the Central Java purse seine fishermen’s case, the domination distance is closely related to the use of lights in the capture process. The power of the lights used by the purse seine fishermen may reach up to tens of thousands of watts. According to the Head of Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office, the power of the lights that they use is 40,000 watts for the above water activity and 5000 watts in the water (interviewed on 9/2/06), while AMN recorded that the floodlight power they used ranges from 30,000 to 50,000 watts. With the use of such light, fish get attracted or sucked into the lighted area. As the Head of Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office put it, “With such powerful lights, even fish that were as faraway as 4–5 miles will be attracted”. Fishermen claim that even the fish that are within a radius of up to tens of miles get attracted. “They don’t use ordinary lights, but powerful floodlights. If rocks could move, they would also be attracted to the light”, said a fisherman figure (interviewed on 11/8/06). Since the lights have a significant role in determining the domination distance of the purse seine ship, the light issue is included in the 17 January Semarang Agreement. Point 5 of the agree- ment says: “while waiting for regulation governing the use of light to be issued by the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, the purse seine fishermen from Central Java will use light with a maximum power of 12,000 watts”. Obviously such deci- sion was made to reduce the domination distance of Central Java purse seine fishermen. The concept of domination distance in the production process is inseparable from the nature of fishery resources itself. As already known, fishery resources at sea are common property, or it is sometimes known as a common pool. Although there are attempts to make fish private property, such as through a fish trap called 5.4 Discussion 99 rumpon, basically the fish still belong to everyone since they can move freely every- where. Similarly, there are also attempts to “divide the sea into lots” through the delineation of territory boundaries it still cannot change the fish themselves to become private or group property. Therefore, fishing process at sea remains a “direct competition” between all fishermen. As Conner Bailey says, “… fishers directly compete with one another over a finite resource” (Bailey 1988:26). Furthermore, Bailey says, “Through the promotion of rapid technological change, Fishery devel- opment in Indonesia has become a zero-sum game, where those who control the most powerful technologies have a clear competitive advantage and individually prosper, even as others are swept aside and fish stocks depleted”. This direct com- petition is of course very much significant when the lower- class/traditional fisher- men and upper-class/modern fishermen operate on the same fishing ground. The jaring Rambo nets (boat-operated lift nets) equipped with powerful lights also cause fish to get attracted or sucked. Thus, the dominant distance of thejaring Rambo is determined by the power of the light used on the jaring Rambo gear. Therefore, all this time the Rambo fishermen have been asked by fishermen to not operate near their rumpon. Essentially, the purpose of the ban to operate near the rumpon is to avoid or get out from the Rambo fishermen’s domination distance, especially if there are small fishermen operating within the modern fishermen’s domination dis- tance. Judging from the Balikpapan case, the domination of upper-class/modern fishermen could definitely make the lower- class/traditional fishermen get “swept aside”. Problems of domination also occurred within the relationship between the jaring Rambo fishermen and the small fishermen in Balikpapan. Thejaring Rambo nets (boat-operated lift nets) equipped with powerful lights also cause fish to get attracted or sucked. Thus, the dominant distance of the jaring Rambo is highly determined by the power of the light used on the jaring Rambo gear. Therefore, all this time the jaring Rambo fishermen have been asked by fishermen to not operate near their rumpon. Essentially, the purpose of the ban to operate near the rumpon is to avoid or get out from the Rambo fishermen’s domination distance, especially if there are small fishermen operating within the modern fishermen’s domination distance.

5.4.2 Level of Conflict Violence

The brutality or violence of a conflict concerns actions taken by the conflicting par- ties to defend their interest. As Dahrendorf puts it, “… the violence of conflict relates rather to its manifestation than to its causes; it is a matter of the weapons that are chosen by conflict groups to express their hostilities” (Dahrendorf 1963: 212). As an example, some people fight for their rights by entering into dialogue, some by ­convening peaceful rallies, but there are also some who resort violent acts, such as burning, beating, and killing. Dialogue and peaceful rallies do not contain elements of violence, while burning, beating, and killing are considered as violent ways. 100 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

As described earlier, in the class conflict case between the purse seine fishermen and Balikpapan traditional fishermen, the Balikpapan traditional fishermen had launched an attack against the Central Java purse seine fishermen. In that attack, they threw objects to the purse seine ship, including rocks, and at last setting the Mutiara Sakti purse seine vessel on fire. They also had beaten up the deputy master of the vessel, leaving him with a light injury on his right eye temple. The traditional fishermen’s level of emotion was so high that the gunshots fired by the security officers to warn failed to stop them from mounting their attack. The first fisherman that climbed aboard the Mutiara Sakti vessel said that he was not afraid to die. “I’d rather die bleeding than die starving. No matter how long you wait sir, you will still die. What else can you think of?” the man said (interviewed on 18/7/06). He also said: “I was fighting for justice and truth. I was fighting for the fishermen’s liveli- hood, not for my own personal interest. It’s public interest that I was striving for, sir. If I die, everyone will remember my good name” (interviewed on 18/7/06). According to AMN activists, during the attack, the fishermen had already bid fare- well to their family, which in Bugis tradition means that they are “ready to die”. Hence, this conflict is considered as violent conflict. Why were those traditional fishermen so desperate that they dared to commit such violent action? Has it become a habit for them to resort to the “path of vio- lence” when engaged in a conflict? Based on the results of interview with several fishermen in Balikpapan, it could be established that they have reasons for conduct- ing such violent acts against the modern fishermen. They resorted to violence because the previously made peaceful attempts had ended in deadlock. As men- tioned earlier, they had lodged their complaints and objections to the Mayor, the Office of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, as well as the Regional House of Representative, not to mention the number of agreements that they had entered into. However, the modern purse seine ships from Central Java continued their operation in Balikpapan waters. The phenomenon of violence used by traditional fishermen in Balikpapan is in line with White’s (1989) study of violence perpetrated by people in Ireland. White describew that the support and involvement of a person in political violence in Ireland is the result of a conscious decision made by that person, when he feels that peaceful protests are futile (White 1989: 1297). Judging from of its aspect of violence the class conflict between fishermen in Balikpapan shows a difference from the theory presented by Lewis Coser. According to Coser, if the conflict involves “nonrealistic issues” such as beliefs and ideologies, it will be violent. “When groups engage in conflict over nonrealistic issues, the greater is the level of emotional arousal and involvement in the conflict, and hence, the more violent the conflict will be …” (Turner 1998: 1973). On the contrary, if the conflict involves “realistic issues”, such as obtainable goals, it will be less brutal because a compromise between the conflicting parties could be worked out. “When groups engage in conflict over realistic issues (obtainable goals), they are more likely to seek compromise over the means to realize their interests, and hence, the less violent the conflict will be” (Turner 1998: 173). The class conflicts case in Balikpapan shows that it is not only nonrealistic issues that can be brutal. Even 5.4 Discussion 101 though the conflict involves “realistic issues”, when the issue concerns “source of livelihood” or source of life, or known among the peole as the “problem of the stom- ach”, it is also likely to be brutal. A fisherman said: “If your share of income is taken away, when your stomach gets hungry and there’s nothing left in it, and there’s noth- ing’s left either for your children’s school, yes, make war if it will work” (inter- viewed on 11/7/06). When questioned whether the act of violence was consistent with their beliefs, a fisherman replied: “Yes, of course. Our source of food is being targeted by other people. So, we say yes to fight”. Thus, while Lewis Coser thinks that the level of brutality relates to whether the issues on dispute is realistic or unre- alistic, I would like to put forward a proposition that the brutality level is also related to whether or not the issue involves the source of livelihood/“problem of the stomach”. The proposition that a conflict tends to be violent when it comes to sources of livelihood or “problems of the stomach” does not seem to be typical of class conflict in Balikpapan. However problems of livelihood applies to other conflicts, both among fishermen and non-fishermen. Among the fishermen such things can be found in the conflict case that occurred in Bengkalis (Riau), in Kota Baru (South Kalimantan), as well as conflict cases between traditional fishermen and trawl fish- ermen in the 1970s and 1980s.

5.4.3 Class Alliance

As Erik Olin Wright says: “Once class analysis move away from a simple polarized view of the class structure, the problem of class alliances looms large in the analysis of class formations. Rarely, if ever, does organized class struggle take the form of a conflict between two homogeneously orga- nized camps. The typical situation is one in which alliances are forged between classes, segments of classes and, above all, between contradictory class locations” (Wright 1987:124). In the conflict case between Balikpapan “traditional” fishermen and Central Java purse seine fishermen, the alliance between various social classes of fishermen is very strong. The main class of the Balikpapan traditional fishermen that conflicted with the purse seine fishermen from Java is the middle-class fishermen, particularly the pejala rumpon. Correspondingly, the main class that forms alliance with them is the working class or laborers of the FAD fishing gear itself. That is, the pejala, both owners and laborers were united against purse seine fishermen. Furthermore, fishermen from various other classes, namely the small fishermen (especially the pedogol) and local capitalists (boat-operated lift net fishermen) also joined alliance against the purse seine fishermen. However, the number of those who participated in the rallies and attack against the purse seine vessel was not that many. The participation of small fishermen using rengge fishing gear and shellfish trap is very much less. 102 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

As it turns out, a very strong alliance actually comes from the punggawa (the capital class). They are very vocal in their resistance against the presence of purse seine fishermen. They also participated actively in the rallies as well as in the attack of the purse seine ship during the 16 January 2006 incident. They were also the ones who provided the gasoline to be used to set the purse seine ships from Java on fire. On the big capitalist purse seine fishermen’s side, class alliance between fisher- man laborers and their owners is also very strong. As described in several previous sections, during the 16 January incident, the owner of KM Mutiara Sakti vessel immediately came to Balikpapan to handle the conflict. The owner was also highly active in fighting against the traditional fishermen in Balikpapan. Naturally they got full support from the fisherman laborers who worked on those purse seine vessels from Central Java. Thus, the owners and laborers of purse seine fishing gear were united against traditional fishermen in Balikpapan. As a record, this pattern also occurred in conflicts between Central Java purse seine fishermen and traditional fishermen in Kota Baru, South Kalimantan. There are two issues from this case that are interesting and important to under- stand. First, class alliances of fishermen are closely related to the type of fishing gear. On the one hand, the type of fishing gear becomes a “mediator” that can unite the owner class and the laborer class so that the two classes unite against their oppo- nent. On the other hand, this type of fishing gear is also able to play a role of arbiter to both the labourer class and the owner class into two hostile camps. This phenom- enon occurs not only within the lower and middle-class fishermen, but also within big capitalist fishermen like the purse seine fishermen. During the 16 January incident, “traditional” laborer fishermen were directly confronted with the laborers and owners of the purse seine fishing gear, while the owner fishermen were also confronted with the owner fishermen and laborers of the purse seine fishing gear. This pattern does not only occur in the case of the 16 January incident, but it also occurs in other class conflicts such as betweenpejala fishermen and boat-operated lift net fishermen, between traditional fishermen and blast fishermen, or within inter-class conflicts such as the conflict between pedogol and perengge. Thus, to the fishermen, the type of fishing gear plays a very important role in determining the pattern of class alliances that exists between them. The conflict case between the purse seine fishermen and Balikpapan “traditional” fishermen is basically similar to my hypothesis as presented in the scheme inPicture 2.3. The difference is that in this hypothesis, I classify “small fishermen” as the party conflicting with big fishermen/capitalists, whereas in this case the small fish- ermen are called “traditional fishermen”, which are an alliance or coalition between the laborer class fishermen, small/lower-class fishermen, middle-class fishermen, upper-class/local capitalist fishermen, and local financier class. This conflict is -pre sented schematically in Picture 5.10 below. Bibliography 103

Big capitalist fishermen and laborers

Conflict LocalCapitalist Financiers Fisherman and laborer

ALLIANCE = Tradi onal Fishermen

Small fishermen Nelayanmenengah and laborers dan buruh

Picture 5.10 Conflict scheme between thepurse seinehfise rmen (big capitalists) and “tradi- tional” fishermen

Bibliography

Books

Bavinck, Maarten. 2001. Marine Resource Management. Conflict and Regulation in the Fisheries of the Coromandel Coast. New Delhi/Thousand Oaks: Sage. Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1963. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Fairley, Bryant. 1990. The Crisis, the State and Class Formation in the Newfoundland Fishery. In Restructuring and Resistance: Perspectives from Atlantic Canada, ed. Fairley Bryant, Colin Leys, and James Sacouman. Toronto: Garamond. Hamilton, Malcolm, and Maria Hirszowicz. 1987. Class and Inequality in Pre-Industrial, Capitalist and Communist Societies. New York: Wheatsheaf Books-Sussex, St. Martin’s Press. Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. 1948/1991. The Communist Manifesto. New York: International Publishers. Turner, Jonathan H. 1998. The Structure of Sociological Theory. 5th ed. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont. Weber, Max. 1978. In Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenter Roth and Clauss Wittich, vol. 1 and 2. London: University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles. Wright, Erik Olin. 1987. Classes. London-New York: Verso. 104 5 Class Conflicts Between Fishermen

Journals

Bailey, Conner. 1988. “The Political Economy of Marine Fisheries Development in Indonesia”. Indonesia No. 46 (Oct). Cornell Southeast Asia Program. White, Robert W. 1989. From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. American Journal of Sociology 94 (6): 1277–1302. Wright, Erik Olin. 2002. The Shadow of Exploitation in Weber’s Class Analysis. American Sociological Review 67: 832.

Dissertations and Thesis

Betke, Friedhelm. 1988. Prospect of a “Blue Revolution” in Indonesian Fisheries: A Bureaucratic Dream or Grim Reality?. Disertasi, Bielefeld University, Jerman. Chapter 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

As Erik Olin Wright says, aside from class structure one of the focuses of the analy- sis is class formation. Class formation itself is “the formation of organized collec- tivities within that class structure on the basis of the interests shaped by that class structure” (Wright 1987: 10), or “the formation of classes into collectively orga- nized actors” (Wright 1991: 18). It is further explained that, “if class structure is defined by social relations between classes, class formation is defined by social relations within classes, social relations which forge collectivities engage in strug- gle” (Wright 1987: 10). In other words, class formation is a process of the formation of the social class from class in itself to become class for itself, a social class that has already had class awareness (see also: Burawoy 1991). On a related note in his study on fishermen’s organization in Canada Clement says, “This is a study of class formation, that is, the way collectivities of fishers become organized and act as a class” (Clement 1986: 14). This chapter will explain about the formation of fisherman class in Balikpapan. Consistent with the meaning of class formation itself for a better understanding about class formation an explanation about resistance movement or struggle by fish- ermen in Balikpapan will be provided.

6.1 Fisherman Laborer

Class formation among the fisherman laborers of Balikpapan, has yet to be estab- lished. This is reflected through the fact that they have never organized themselves as a collectivity that struggles together to fight for their rights. As previously explained in the earlier chapter conflicts between sawi and owners have so far been individual by nature. There has never been a conflict between the sawi class as a collective and the owner. Collective resistance by fisherman laborers in Balikpapan against non-fisherman parties, such as a company, has never occurred either. So far fisherman laborers in Balikpapan have had no association or organization of their

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 105 R. A. Kinseng, Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0986-5_6 106 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan own as a shared tool or a vessel for their struggle and it seems that it will remain so in the distant future. In various resistance movements and struggles conducted by fishermen in Balikpapan to date, laborers tend to just follow. A FAD laborer says that, “for sawi it will depend on what the boss and the punggawa say. If he says okay, then it is okay. We will just obey. If he says A then it will be A. As long as they don’t command us to kill” (interview on 18/8/06). In other words, fisherman laborers’ social class in Balikpapan is still limited to the objective structure or class-in-itself formation. They have not changed into a class-for-itself formation. This is in line with my hypothesis. As described in the previous part, Stavenhagen explains that class consciousness is the power that changes class-in-itself into class-for-itself. He says: “Class consciousness is the link that allows the transformation of a class ‘in itself’, a group- ing with objective, ‘latent’ interests, into a class ‘for itself’, or a power group which tends to organize itself for political conflict or struggle and whose interests at some point become ‘manifest’” (Stavenhagen 1975: 30). One of the reasons that the class-for-itself structure has not been formed among the fishermen laborers in Balikpapan is also by reason of the lack of class con- sciousness among them. The question is, why? There are several factors that hinder the emergence of class consciousness and class formation among fishermen labor- ers in Balikpapan. These factors will be described below.

6.1.1 Fragmentation

The fisherman laborers’ work pattern has fragmented them. In their daily activities when they go to sea they are fragmented into groups in each of the vessels where they work. For the FAD gear and boat-operated lift net, as mentioned earlier, the number of laborers is between 6 and 11 men in each vessel. The fragmentation and “isolation” is naturally worse within types of gear like dogol and rengge that only employ one or two workers. Thus, in their daily work, the fisherman laborers don’t actually gather in a huge numbers to form a mass of laborers like what normally takes place in factories or large companies. It can be said that in the capture pro- cesses (production) a group of fisherman laborers in one vessel tends to be alienated from a similar kind of group in another vessel. The fragmentation is worse with the grouping based on type of gear. With the grouping based on the gear then laborers become fragmented based on the differ- ences of type of gear used where they work. The kind of fragmentation caused by differences in gear can be found among fishermen in Canada. As Muszynksi puts it, “… fishers were also divided by racial distinctions, as well as by gear (for example, gillnetters, seiners and trollers)” (Muszyinski 1986: 99). Actually, the gear-based fragmentation is worse, because sometimes conflicts do emerge among fishermen with different types of gear. In the event of conflict, the laborers will automatically be engaged in conflict also. What Paul Alexander says about Sri Lankan fishermen, 6.1 Fisherman Laborer 107 that they are “atomistic and faction-driven” (Alexander 1982: 264) also occurs among fishermen in Balikpapan. It is also interesting to point out that when asked, “if capture fishing is likened to a soccer game, who do you think is your team players”, of the nine sawi respon- dents, 68.7% answer, “everyone in one vessel, including the owner of the boat/ gear”, while only 17.2% answer, “all of the workers using all types of gear”, and 9.1% answer, “all workers that use a similar type of gear only”. The important fact that is pointed out here is the presence of strong unity within one vessel on the one hand, and, paradoxically on the other, the weak sense of solidarity between fellow workers beyond those who work with them in one vessel. Furthermore, when asked, “who do you think is the opposing team”, 11% of the 100 sawi respondents answer, “all fishermen from other vessels (the crew and the vessel owners)”, and 76% say, “only the large/modern fishermen (the owners and the crew)”. However, when asked with whom they think they share their fate and life’s trials and tribulations with, only 21% of 100 respondents say that all fishermen laborers in Balikpapan are their fellow-sufferers, while the percentage of those who feel they share the same fate with all fishermen in Balikpapan is 32%. Again, the data shows that the sense of togetherness between fellow fishermen laborers is weaker than that of between all fishermen, which include both the laborers and the owners. In addition to being fragmented into groups under different boats and fishing gear, in terms of time use the fishermen’s working patterns also affect the intensity of togetherness between fellow fisherman laborers. As previously explained, most of the fisherman laborers’ time, which is particularly true for laborers working with FAD gear and boat-operated lift net, is spent on doing fishing activities at sea. With so much time spent at sea with the other crew on the boat, their time to interact with fisherman laborers from other boats become quite limited. Meanwhile, when they are on shore they will use most of their time to rest or to do some preparation for the next fishing trip. Activities such as mending nets, repairing boats, preparing the FAD, for example, are done on land by members of one particular boat’s crew. In addition, they also use their free time to “ease off” from all the hard work at sea by having a good time, which includes spending money on drinking alcohol and women. This is a common culture among fishermen in various places throughout Indonesia. Such work pattern tends to worsen the fragmentation among fishermen. With the kind of work pattern the fragmentation tends to even continue on shore. Meanwhile, the locations where the fishermen laborers’ live have also geographically exacer- bated their on-shore fragmentation. Fishermen workers who live in a neighborhood live tend to socialize and spend time with members of that particular group only. For example, the fisherman laborers who live in Tanjung Kelor are relatively separated from those who live in BTN, Manggar Beach, and Selili, although those neighbor- hoods are not very far from one another. However, in each of the neighborhoods a kind of fisherman community is often established, which is rather separated from the fisherman communities in the other neighborhoods. As a result, interaction between groups based on their residential location is relatively less compared to that between fellow members of community or between members of their own group. 108 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

The fragmentation of fishermen laborers both within fellow laborers from the same fishing gear and within laborers of different types of fishing gear certainly hinders the establishment of strong communication networks between them. In fact, as Marx explains, subordinates will tend to build their collective consciousness when they can communicate their grievances to one another, the communication of which in turn is facilitated by the ecological concentration of the subordinate groups (Turner 1998: 157). Lewis Coser (1977) and Dahrendorf (1963) also emphasize the importance of communication network in encouraging the development of class consciousness. Thus, the fragmentation and even conflicts between the groups of fisherman laborers themselves clearly inhibit the emergence of the laborers’ class consciousness.

6.1.2 Class Permeability

Class permeability refers to the level openness and closeness of class boundary (Wright and Cho 1992: 85). Among fishermen in Balikpapan, the permeability between the laborer class and owner class is very high. This is reflected in the inten- sive social interaction that occurs between laborers and owners. As is known, in general, vessel owners in Balikpapan will go out to sea to take part in the fishing activities. Only a small number of vessel owners will not go out to sea; normally an owner will concurrently take the role of a fish buyer (punggawa) and a capitalist fisherman. To illustrate, 79% of the 100sawi respondents say that the vessel owner also goes out to sea with them. During the fishing trip the owner and the crew or the laborers would work together, eat and drink together, and even sometimes sleep together in one vessel. As one pejala puts it, “on the boat, although we are not related, we are all like a family, because we are on the same boat” (interviewed on 12/7/06). In addition, social interaction between the laborers and owners also occurs dur- ing times when they are onshore. Activities such as repairing boats, repairing nets, preparing the FAD, and so on are carried out together, or at least the owner is present together with his workers. Moreover, there are cases in which the laborers live together or board with the employer (owner), where they will share meals with the owner’s family. For example, 6.1% of the 99 sawi respondents interviewed live with their employers; while 14,6% of the 95 owner fisherman respondents says there are fishermen who board freely in their house. Cases like this could happen because some of these workers may have just come from Sulawesi, as I found in a prominent fisherman’s house. In this case, the two young men who worked as laborers did not even have any work experience at sea, so they were still suffering seasickness. For small fishermen who only employ one or two men, obviously their relation- ship with the workers is closer and more intimate. The relationship between the worker and employer in this case is more like a relationship between co-workers or partners rather than a typical worker-employer relationship. This is especially the 6.1 Fisherman Laborer 109 case if the “worker” is a neighbor, a close friend, or a relative, and only works occasionally. Similarity ethnic identity plays an important role in the establishment of high permeability between workers and employers. As is known, the fishermen in Balikpapan, both the owners and the laborers, are generally Buginese from Sulawesi. Naturally the similar ethnic identity creates an “in group” sense between the worker and the employer. Thus, it is not surprising that the worker-employer relationship could be reasonably close and harmonious. The “in group” sense between fellow “people from Sulawesi” could even be strengthened because they both feel that they are “emigrants in other people’s land”. Furthermore, often times the workers are related to the owner, such as the own- er’s nephew, cousin, distant relative, or even his own son. For example, 68% of the 100 sawi respondents that was interviewed say that they “have a relative who is an owner fisherman”. In the meantime, 11.2% of the 92sawi said that their father was an owner fisherman, while 13.0% say that their grandfather was an owner fisher- man. Actually some 34,7% of them said that their father was a fisherman, whereas 21,7% said that their grandfather was a fisherman. Meanwhile, only 7.1% said their father was a member of the boat crew, and the number of those who said that their grandfather was a member of the boat crew is even smaller, comprising only 4.3%. Moreover, among the sawi themselves, 6% of the 50 respondents are former owner fishermen, and 22% were former fishermen, while 16% were former members of a boat crew. Furthermore, 50.5% of the 95 sawi that were interviewed say that they “have family relationship with the current employer”. In addition, they would also bring their friends or neighbors that need work to join them to work as a laborer. Or, in some cases, it is the owner who asks them to find help, or offers the work to them. Thus, it is not surprising that 53% of the 100 sawi respondents during the interview say that they “have friends who are owner fishermen”. The data shows that the rela- tionships between laborer/sawi and owner are really close, hence undermining the development of laborers’ class consciousness and class formation and the antago- nistic attitude of laborers against the owner fishermen or employers. It is also important to highlight that 97% of the 100 sawi respondents state that they “have hopes/aspiration to have their own vessel and fishing gear”. This also affects class consciousness as well as their attitudes towards the employer or owner. As Macdonald and Connelly say, “…the experience of owning a boat, or the aspira- tion to become a boat owner coloured their consciousness while they were in a working class position” (Macdonald and Connelly 1989: 71). The various factors explained above have created a kind of togetherness and even kinship between the workers and the employers, which makes the level of permea- bility between the classes higher. At the same time, high permeability also increas- ingly intensifies their togetherness. According to Orr and McNall, the togetherness and kinship may be able to dampen class conflict and reduce the workers’ ability to articulate their grievances and to form autonomous organizations (Orr and McNall 1991). In other words, the intense togetherness between the worker and the employer obstructs or blocks class consciousness and class formation among the fisherman laborers, and deters their antagonistic attitude towards the owner fishermen as well. 110 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

6.1.3 Dependence on the Employer

A fisherman laborer is indeed indispensable for an employer. For some certain types of fishing gear, such as FAD and boat-operated lift net, for instance, it is impossible for the owner (employer) to run his capture fishing business without the help of laborers. However, the laborers continue to be at the mercy of their employers. The fisherman laborers’ bargaining position against the owners remains weak, as they need the work provided by the owners. For fisherman laborers in general, limited education, skills, experience and employment opportunities outside fisheries, means that to become a fisherman laborer is the only option. As a consequence, they are highly dependent on the owner fishermen for work opportunities. As mentioned before, one dimension of the relationship between the employer and the sawi is that of a patron-client one. In the patron-client relationship the fisherman workers often receive assistance in various forms from the employer. Thus, it is not surprising that they want to “return the favor” to their employers. As a senior fisherman laborer says about his employ- er’s assistance, “Without his help I will not even be able to eat”. As an illustration, out of the 99 sawi respondents, 51,5% feel indebted to their employers, and 21,5% still owe their employers some money. The dependence of the fishermen workers on their respective employers, of course, greatly hinders the emergence of class consciousness to “fight against” the employers. Hence, when asked a question concerning the prospect of establishing an organization or association of fishermen sawi( ) a senior fisherman laborer says: “To establish a sawi association is difficult. It is like making a chair without putting on the back support. What is the next step once we form the group? After the rallies, we will return to the same employers. Other (industrial) laborers have protection, but there is no protection for fishermen. Fishermen have no power” (interview on 8/2/06). Correspondingly, when asked “is it necessary to have a fisherman laborers’ orga- nization as a forum for the fisherman workers’ struggles”, 34.4% of the 90 sawi respondents say “no”. There are indeed 65.6% of them who say it is necessary, but when asked further “is it enough to establish an organization for fishermen that incorporates both owners and workers?” 84.7% of the 85 sawi respondents said “yes”. In other words, there are still many sawi fishermen who do not think they need an organization of fishermen as a forum for their struggle, and think it is better to just be affiliated with the owner or employer.

6.1.4 Absence of Leader

As previously described, according to Marx one factor that encourages the emer- gence of class consciousness is the ability of the subordinate class to establish a unifying ideology. The capacity to construct the unifying ideology itself should be 6.1 Fisherman Laborer 111 facilitated by the presence of a spokesperson among them to articulate it. In other words, the subordinate class needs a leader. As previously explained, the fisherman laborer community does not have a prominent person to become their leader. Instead, they tend to “circle” around their respective employers. Thus, both the unifying ideology and the person who is sup- posed to be its spokesperson have failed to emerge.

6.1.5 Absence of Common Problem or Common Enemy

As stated earlier, according to Marx one of the pending factors that inspire the emer- gence of class consciousness is the disruption to the life or social conditions of the subordinate class due to changes caused by the dominant class. Meanwhile, Coser says that “class interests” emerge and are formed through the “exposure” of those who occupy certain social positions within a certain social condition. Coser says: “…. potentiality is transformed into actuality, Klasse an sich (class in itself) into Klasse fuer sich” (class for itself), only when individuals occupying similar posi- tions become involved in common struggles: a network of communication devel- ops, and then thereby become conscious of their common fate” (Coser 1977: 48–49). This is also in line with Bryant Fairley’s opinion that says, “…class formation and social development are seen as effects of the struggles of concrete actors….” (Fairley 1990: 177). To be able to be involved in the “common struggle” as meant by Coser and Fairley, there should be a common problem or “common enemy” at hand. “Disruption to the life or social condition of the subordinate class” as mentioned by Marx is one “common problem or enemy”. So far, there seems to be no common problem felt by the fishermen workers in relation to their employers. As explained in the other part of the book, problems between workers and employers have so far been personal or individual by nature. Even if there are employers who are considered “not good”, they will still be able to find other employers who are “better”. The profit sharing system, for instance, is considered as something “given” since it has been passed down through genera- tions. A fisherman laborer says that the system is “fair, it’s a tradition, no one is protesting against it, that’s the way it is” (interview on 18/8/06). Another fisherman laborer says, “the profit sharing system cannot be protested against because it is common, it has become the general rule” (interview on 8/2/06). Unsurprisingly, 20% of the 100 sawi respondents say that the currently applied profit sharing system is “very fair”; with 76% saying “fair”, and only 4% says “not very fair”. None of the respondents feel that the system is “very unfair”. Also, when asked, “do you feel that there is some injustice in your work as a fisherman laborer”, 89% of the 100 sawi respondents say “no”. Similarly, when asked, “do employers often try to profit themselves by harming the workers/crew members”, 89,7% of the 97 sawi respon- dents say “no”. The common problem that often arises among the fishermen is a problem that is common for “all” fishermen, both the owners and laborers. For example, problems 112 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan of collision between vessels or different types of fishing gear, problems of FAD cut- ting, stone disposal at fishing grounds, and problems of kerosene scarcity are all common problems for both the owner fishermen and laborers.

6.1.6 Payment System

As described in another section of the book, payment to the fishermen in Balikpapan is not made in the form of wages or salaries, but instead through a profit-sharing system. Under this system the amount of share received by a fisherman laborer fluctuates based on the proceeds from the catch. Subsequently, in dividing the profit an owner who also takes part in the work or fishing activities will also get the same share as the workers. He will get more shares by applying “smart” labeling, namely the vessel share, engine share, or the net share. As for the FAD fishermen, since some of the fishermen laborers do have their own nets, they will take turns to use the nets. In that case, the “net share” is given to the owner of the nets currently being used. In my opinion, such profit-sharing system may strengthen the spirit of together- ness between everyone on the vessel. When the proceeds are great, everyone gets a lot; in contrast, when the proceeds are small, everyone gets a little, despite the fact that the owner actually gets a far greater amount. In addition, the fisherman laborers could also get quite sizeable income from the cancoan or from their own fishing. For diligent fisherman laborers, the proceeds from fishing are sometimes bigger than the share they get from the fishing activities they do together. The profit-sharing system and the opportunity to get their own additional income by fishing or from thecancoan could reduce feelings of injustice or displeasure at the employers. Thus, they also hinder workers’ class formation and consciousness.

6.2 Small Fishermen

The formation of small fishermen in Balikpapan has begun to establish. This can be seen from the various collective movements they have made so far in their struggle for their interests. The following will describe the cases that show their struggles and the resistance that they mounted.

6.2.1 Cases of Fishing Vessel and Fishing Gear Collisions

The sea around Balikpapan is very busy and crowded with large ships, both domes- tic and foreign, coming to and going from Port Semayang, Balikpapan. For exam- ple, in 2005, there were a total of 4783 domestic ships arriving at that port and 4735 6.2 Small Fishermen 113 departing from Port Semayang. In terms of the foreign vessels, there were 4201 arriving and 4201 departing from Balikpapan port. The high frequency of arrival and departure of ships crossing Balikpapan waters has its own consequences on the fishermen operating in those waters. One of them is frequent collision between the passing large ships, the fishing vessels and the fish- ing gear. The Port Administration’s data shows that during 2002–2003 there were 13 cases of collisions reported by fishermen, while a fisherman figure, Ruslan Riva’i, noted that there were 24 cases of collisions in the period 2000–2004 (Riva’i 2006). The types of fishing gear that was hit were mainly fixed lift net, mini trawl,rengge , and the fishing vessels themselves. Those cases of collision with the fishing vessels could be identified as the begin- ning of the emergence of the collective struggle movement of fishermen in Balikpapan, especially in Manggar and its surrounding areas. The following are accounts that a notable fisherman, Ruslan Riva’i, has written of the collision cases (Riva’i 2006). On November 5, 1999, several fisherman leaders held a meeting to discuss the collision issues. It was agreed in that meeting to bring the collision case to the local house of representatives or the DPRD. On the other hand, at that time the East Kalimantan Governor’s Decree No.75/1973 that banned the operation of the fixed lift net in Balikpapan area was still applied. Therefore, in addition to demanding the companies’ accountability in the collision with the fishing vessels and gear, they also demanded the Mayor to issue a decree to allow the use of fixed lift net in Balikpapan waters. In order to bring the case to the DPRD, the fishermen collected signatures from their fellow fishermen as a form of support, and appointed 30 fishermen as their representatives to meet with the local parliamentarians. For the purposes of an established identity, they agreed to call themselves the Mandate of the Community of Fishermen Alliance (Amanat Aliansi Masyarakat Nelayan or AAMN). The group also disseminated information about their plan to go to the parliament office to local newspapers so as to be known by the public. They went to the parliament on November 11, 1999, and were received by Commission B and Commission E. The DPRD’s Vice Chairman chaired the meeting. Furthermore, on 11 April 2000, on behalf of AAMN, around 150 fishermen returned to DPRD office. The claim they filed was still in regard to the demand for accountability of the vessel/pontoon that had hit the fishermen’s fishing vessels and gear, as well as for the revocation of the Governor’s Decree that banned the fixed lift net. However, until then the ships and pontoons were still passing through the fisher- men’s fishing ground areas, and the governor’s decree had never been revoked. Finally, on April 20, 2000, the fishermen took action by intercepting three vessels that went passing through their fishing ground area. After being held “hostage” for 3 days the vessels were finally released. However, the fishermen detained their doc- uments. After that, the fishermen went again to the DPRD office for the third time. This time they were “greeted” in a meeting attended by all the commissions of DPRD and the other related parties, such as the Fisheries Agency, the Port Administration, Air and Water Police (Polairud), the Balikpapan Municipality Government’s Legal Section Head, and some representatives of the companies that 114 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan owned the pontoon ships. As a result of that meeting, aside from the agreement to pay damages to some fishermen, the Governors Decree concerning the ban on the operation of fixed lift net was also revoked. To replace it, the mayor of Balikpapan issued Decree No. 188/2000 concerning the recognition of the presence of fixed lift net in Balikpapan waters. The actions taken by these fishermen made their movement more visible and at the same time they gained more sympathy from their fellow fishermen. The scope of their struggle also became wider. As Ruslan Rivai says: “The investigation con- ducted into the collision case has triggered the strengthening of community con- trol and encouraged a more critical view on policy issues in the economic, environmental and budget areas, because those policies affect the life of the fishermen”(Rivai 2006: 142).

6.2.2 The Case of PT Thiess’s Dock Construction Project

PT Thiess is a large multinational mining company with an office in Balikpapan. From June 2004 to April 2005 the company was carrying out a dock construction project behind its office. While the dock construction works were underway they dredged sand along the track that would be used to bring heavy equipment to the dock. Small fishermen, especially thepedogol , felt disadvantaged by the construc- tion works since it had made them lose not only their fishing ground, but their fish- ing gear as well. As a result, the fishermen in Manggar claimed for damages to PT Thiess. The negotiation process between the fishermen and PT Thiess was very tough and protracted. In the struggle to defend their interests and demands, the fish- ermen formed a “Forum for Thiess Victim Fishermen” (FBNKT- Forum Bersama Nelayan Korban Thiess). Meetings between the fishermen and PT Thiess were held several times. On March 4, 2005, a meeting was held at Bahtera Hotel between the fishermen and PT Thiess, attended by the vice mayor of Balikpapan, parliamentarians, the local police chief, the local military commander, and the sub-district head. Subsequently, another meeting was held in the sub-district of East Balikpapan on March 232,005, during which a verification team was formed. On the following meeting on April 26, 2005 between the fishermen’s representatives and PT Thiess it was agreed, among others, that the damaged fishing gear would be examined as evidence. After seven months of waiting for the realization of the promise to pay damages and five unsuccessful meetings, about 300 fishermen eventually staged a demon- stration against PT Thiess on Monday, June 20, 2005. They demanded a compensa- tion of 1 billion rupiah for the loss of their fishing ground due to the company’s dock construction activities. In addition, they also claimed damages for their dam- aged or lost fishing gear. During the rally, the fishermen threw rotten eggs at the company’s office. The vice mayor of Balikpapan, H. Mukmin Faisyal, then came to the scene and asked the fishermen to prevent themselves from creating anarchy, and asked to be granted 1 week’s time to solve the case. After delivering long speeches, 6.2 Small Fishermen 115 the fishermen finally agreed to have a dialogue with PT Thiess, which was attended by Vice Mayor, Local Police Chief of the sub-district Head of East Balikpapan, the Manggar Village Head, and a number of Balikpapan DPRD members. As a follow-up, on June 21, 2005 a meeting was held at the mayor’s office to discuss the fishermen’s claims, which was attended by the vice mayor, members of the DPRD, the local police chiefs of East and South-East Balikpapan and Head of Marine Affairs & Fisheries Agency Office. Despite various efforts, the fishermen still had not received their compensation. On February 12, 2006, the fishermen through the AMN sent a letter to PT Thiess asking for the follow-up of the process. The company replied on May 30, 2006 stat- ing that the fishermen’s allegation to PT Thiess had not been proven, hence the company was not obliged to award compensation as demanded by the fishermen. The company also stated that the case had been settled through a mediation by the vice mayor. Thus, despite the lengthy struggles, until September 2006 the result remained unclear. There was a growing rumor among the fishermen that PT Thiess had given some money to the fishermen, however, the fishermen in Manggar claimed they had never received the money. Therefore, the pedogol fishermen in Manggar area con- tinued to fight to get the compensation payment from PT Thiess (Picture6.1 ).

6.2.3 Kerosene Case

As a result of the fuel price hike in October 2005, including that of diesel fuel, many fishermen, in particular the small fishermen who usedogol and rengge as their fish- ing gear, were forced to replace the fuel for their fishing vessels from diesel fuel to kerosene. This strategy was used to save their operational cost since diesel fuel price was much higher than the price of kerosene; the price of diesel fuel was about IDR 4300 per liter, whereas the price of kerosene was around IDR 2600 per liter. Middle and upper-class fishermen, such as the FAD, angler, and boat-operated lift net fish- ermen, continued to use diesel fuel because their boat engine’ prices were quite expensive. They did not want to sacrifice the engines, given that the use of kerosene as a fuel could actually damage the engine faster. Since April 2006, it started to get difficult for fishermen to get kerosene, whereas they absolutely needed fuel for their fishing operation. Therefore, some fishermen figures began the struggle to obtain kerosene. It took a long time for them to struggle to get the kerosene ration for fishermen. They visited DPRD Office and City Government many times. On May 13 and 17, for example, a meeting was held between them and the mayor to discuss fuel ration for fishermen. On July 20, 2006, some fishermen figures came to DPRD Office. However, because none of the DPRD members were there, they expressed their aspiration to the journalists, and their plight was then published in one of the local newspapers the next day. The meeting with the DPRD was resumed on July 24, 2006. On July 26, a joint meeting was again held at the DPRD office, which was attended by the officials from the 116 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

Picture 6.1 Fishermen demonstration against PT Thiess. (Source: Tribun Kaltim, 21/6/2005) 6.2 Small Fishermen 117

Municipality Administration, the Industry and Cooperative Agency, Hiswana Migas, and Pertamina Marketing Unit VI (UPMS) Balikpapan. As it turned out the Mayor of Balikpapan and even the Governor of East Kalimantan had actually officially requested some additional quota for fuel for fish- ermen to Pertamina UPMS. The mayor has also submitted the request both infor- mally and directly to the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Purnomo Yusgiantoro in Jakarta. However, the request could not be granted because it was not in accordance with Presidential Regulation no. 9/2006, or, to be precise, fisher- men’s capture fishing is not included on the list of activities that are allowed to use kerosene. Kerosene scarcity in Balikpapan continued until September 2006, resulting in long queues at many gas stations in Balikpapan and difficulties for fishermen to go on fishing at sea. Worse still, various parties, including Pertamina and local govern- ment officials tended to put the blame on the fishermen by saying that the kerosene shortage occurred because the fishermen used it to go out to sea (seeTribun Kaltim, 5/9/06 and Kinseng, 11/09/06). Since the situation was dragging on, finally the fish- ermen, particularly the mini trawlers (pedogol) and perengge, staged a demonstra- tion in front of the Pertamina UPMS VI Balikpapan office and then continued to the mayor’s office on Wednesday, 13 September 2006. The demonstration received extensive coverage from both print and electronic media. In response to demonstration, the Regional Leaders Consultation Forum (Muspida) immediately held a meeting in the evening to discuss the fishermen’s demand. A fisherman figure received information from the Head of Economic Section and the Mayor that the fishermen still could not get the additional kerosene quota with the provisions of the Presidential Regulation No. 9/2006 remaining as the stumbling block. Upon receiving the information the fisherman then called the police and “threatened” to stage another demonstration and would bring torches to Pertamina’s fuel storage tanks. To avoid possible riots, on Friday morning of 15 September, the Police Chiefs along with their staff went directly to the TPI Manggar to hold a dialogue with the fishermen. As a result of the dialogue, eventually the Police Chief contacted Pertamina to ensure that the fishermen could get the kero- sene quota. For a few weeks after that Manggar fishermen received 5000 liters of kerosene in a single delivery. The fuel delivery remained “unofficial” by nature given that in reality the fishermen still did not get the kerosene quota. Therefore, the fishermen in Manggar, in the sub-district of East Balikpapan, continued their strug- gle to get the official quota. They then purposefully formed a Working Group (POKJA) ofthe Kerosene Distributor for Fishermen on Wednesday, 20 September 2006 (Picture 6.2). 118 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

Picture 6.2 Demonstration of fishermen against the kerosene shortage. (Source:East Kalimantan Post and Tribun Kaltim, 14/9/06) 6.3 Intermediate Fisherman 119

6.2.4 Beach Tourism Development Case

The fishermen in Aji Raden area, in the sub-district of East Balikpapan had also staged a demonstration against the development of a tourism beach in Lamaru by PT Sumber Mas. The owner of this company was a big Balikpapan-based business- man who owned a luxury hotel in the city, namely Hotel Gran Senyiur. The develop- ment had caused siltation of the Aji Raden River, which in turn making it difficult for fishermen to go in and out to sea. That was the reason why the fishermen pro- tested against this tourism beach development. In 1999, Aji Raden fishermen protested by blockading the road access to the beach area and claimed for compensation for the siltation of the Aji Raden River. Furthermore, in the same year, the fishermen staged another protest by visiting the Balikpapan Municipality Government office. At that time, the company promised to dredge the river estuary that had undergone such siltation, and finally, the company provided “help” through a Community Development (Comdev) program, which was distributed through the Aji Raden Community Empowerment Institute (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat or LPM). In addition, the company, PT Sumber Mas, also employed several fishermen from Aji Raden. From the above description, it can be observed that small fishermen, namely the fixed lift net fishermen, pedogol and the perengge in Balikpapan seemed to have had a class consciousness that encouraged the process of their class formation. However, this class formation was not strong enough and tends to be temporary, emerging only when they are facing common problems together. However, when there is no problem, each of them will be busy working by themselves.

6.3 Intermediate Fisherman

Similar with the small fisherman, the class formation of the intermediate fisherman in Balikpapan has begun to appear as well. This class formation can be seen espe- cially through two cases, when they were engaged in a collective struggle. The first was their struggle against Unocal, a multinational company, and the second was a case of conflict with Central Java’s purse seine fishermen.

6.3.1 Unocal Seismic Survey Activity Case

The pejala fishermen in Balikpapan had come into quite a major conflict with Unical, a large multinational mining company. This conflict started with the seismic survey activities undertaken by Unocal on 15–22 July 2004, at the fishing ground of the FAD fishermen (Tribun Kaltim, 27/10/04). During the activities Unical cut off tens of the fisherman’s FAD in Balikpapan. That was the crux of the matter between 120 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan the fishermen and Unical, which prompted the fishermen to demand for compensa- tion from Unocal. The process to get the compensation was protracted and rough. According to a fisherman figure who was one of the leaders in the negotiation with Unocal they had held three rallies and held three meetings at the DPRD office, paid one visit to the City Government office, and staged one demonstration at Unocal’s office. On Tuesday, 28 September 2004 a joint meeting was held at the DPRD office between some DPRD members, Unocal’s representatives, and the fishermen who were accompanied by the AMN. The fishermen insisted the payment for the compensa- tion to be made soonest (Tribun Kaltim, 29/9/04, Post Metro Balikpapan, 29/9/04). Furthermore, on Tuesday 28 December 2004, hundreds of fishermen staged another demonstration in front of Unocal office demanding for compensation. Escorted by the Balikpapan Head of Police, finally five people representing the fishermen were received to have a dialogue with Unocal (Tribun Kaltim, 29/12/04). Meanwhile, on the same day, the fishermen who joined the Fishermen’s Union of Balikpapan (SNB-Serikat Nelayan Balikpapan) also put up resistance against the Unocal seis- mic survey activities by blocking the vessel owned by Unocal contractors that was used in seismic survey. The vessel was herded back to the bridge near TPI Manggar (Tribun Kaltim, 30/12/04). The demand remained unchanged. They demanded Unocal to pay compensation for the fishermen whose business had been disrupted during the seismic survey activities. In terms of the number of fishermen entitled to receive compensation, initially Unocal only had 14 fishermen in their data (10 FAD fishermen and 4 trap fisher- men). However, according to the fishermen’s data, there were 41 FAD fishermen that should be compensated. And the number kept changing. First, it changed from 41 to 60 people, and then changed again to 68, and lastly 72 people. The agreement was reached after tough discussions in many meetings conducted between the fish- ermen and Unocal, and involving several government agencies, including the Office of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. Besides the issue regarding the number of fishermen entitled to receive compen- sation, another issue on the amount of compensation to be paid was also a matter of long debates. Initially, the fishermen requested compensation of 30 millionrupiah . As Unocal considered that the demand was too high, they almost discontinued the negotiation process. The fishermen then reduced the compensation to 10 million rupiah, but Unocal argued that it was still too high, so the fishermen reduced the demand to 8 million rupiah for each FAD for 86 fishermen Tribun( Kaltim, 31/7/04 and 13/1/05). On Wednesday January 12, 2005, a meeting facilitated by the Police Head was held between Unocal and AMN in the City hall and was also attended by the First Assistant of the City Government. It was agreed in the meeting that as many as 41 fishermen would receive compensation of 12 million rupiah each, while 14 other fishermen received 14 million rupiah each. 6.4 Big Fisherman (Capitalist) 121

6.3.2 Purse Seine Fishermen Case

This conflict case has been described in Chapter Five in detail. This will explain the conflict against the purse seine fishermen. The FAD fishermen were the main com- ponents in putting up the resistance. Other fishermen, such as the anglers and those using boat-operated lift net had not been as dominant as the FAD fishermen, as for the mini trawlers and the perengge; their participation was not more than just expressing solidarity. As described by the AMN activists, “the FAD fishermen were the ones who put up the strongest resistance against the purse seine fishermen because the latter were operating in their FAD areas. Fishermen using other types of fishing gear were involved mainly as an expression of solidarity” (interviewed on 3/2/06). Similar with the small fishermen, the intermediate fisherman class formation was still not very strong and temporary by nature. They have yet to have yet a permanent organization as a forum for their cause. A pejala figure said that the unity among fishermen in Balikpapan was still weak. “The unity amongpejala fishermen here is not very strong”, he said. He went on to say, “they unite in the mouth, but not in the heart. I do not trust those people, so I have my own group; there are five owner fishermen who joined my group” (interviewed on 17/8/06) (Picture6.3 ).

6.4 Big Fisherman (Capitalist)

As explained earlier, these big fishermen or capitalists are mainly fishermen who use boat-operated lift net or Rambo net as their fishing gear. Fishermen who use mini purse seine (gae) were also fall into the category of capitalist fisherman class. A fisherman figure who used bombs in fishing also belongs to this category, whereas the investors who also own several boats and fishing gear are more appropriate to be included into the class of financiers or merchant class. The formation of capitalist fisherman class in Balikpapan has yet to happen. So far, there has been no collective movement of these capitalist fishermen in order to struggle for their overall interests. One of the“factions” within them in Balikpapan, namely the fishermen who use bombs, can indeed be said to have a collective con- sciousness among them. They are exclusive; all of them were under the leadership of a very famous figure. As described in another section, they have been involved in the conflicts with anglers, and have also pursued purse seine fishermen from Central Java. 122 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy”

The above description shows that one of the most fundamental and crucial factors to trigger the emergence of class consciousness and then class formation is a commu- nal problem faced by fishermen who are on the same class location. The absence of a shared problem for people on the same class location will hinder the growth of class consciousness and class formation. On the contrary, the existence of a shared, “cross-class” problem can unite two or more classes in a common struggle. An example of this “cross-class” case was a case of contamination of Balikpapan’s coastal environment caused by the sludge oil spillage that occurred in June 2004. This problem was not only confronted with resistance by the fishermen, but also by the people of Balikpapan in general. The Balikpapan City Government itself formed the Balikpapan Advocacy Team of Oil Spillage led by Head of the Regional Environmental Impact Management to handle this problem. The case was consid- ered as an “international case” as it involved a Greek-flagged tanker, the Panos G, which was suspected to be the source of the spillage.

Picture 6.3 Fishermen’s demonstration on sludge oil and seismic survey activities case. (Source: AMN Document, East Kalimantan) 6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy” 123

Picture 6.3 (continued) 124 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

On Wednesday, 27 July 2004, hundreds of fishermen under the AMN staged a demonstration at the office of the Pertamina Processing Unit (UP) V in Balikpapan. They demanded severe punishment of the perpetrators of the coastal pollution. In addition, they also demanded that Unocal terminated its seismic survey activities in East Balikpapan. In addition, they also firmly rejected the City Government’s plan to build a coastal road from Port Semayang to Sepinggan Airport because it would bring harm to the fishermen. In total, they issued ten demands during the rally. After demonstrating in front of the Pertamina office, the fishermen then went to the DPRD building and had a dialogue with some DPRD members. Leadership, communication, and other factors will take its role when there faced with a common problem. Furthermore, the existence of class consciousness and class formation itself will encourage the emergence of further collective struggle and collective action of the class as a form of resistance, which in turn will reinforce class consciousness and formation. Yet, the reverse also applies. Class formation will further strengthen class consciousness, as well as class struggle. Class struggle itself will also help strengthen the class formation directly. Thus, the relationship between class consciousness, class formation, and class struggle is dialectical. Schematically this description can be seen in Picture 7.4 (in Chap. 7, page 248).

6.5.1 Role of Fishermen Organization

The above and previous descriptions imply that fishermen organization plays an important role in the history of Balikpapan fishermen’s struggle. In fact, in Balikpapan there is actually a branch of the formal nation-wide fisherman organiza- tion, namely the Indonesian Fishermen Association (HNSI-Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia). On the list of the organizational structure of the Board of Executive Director (DPC) of the Balikpapan branch of the Indonesian Fishermen Association for the 2004–2005 period were names of “big” prominent figures in Balikpapan, such as H.M. Mukmin Faisyal, SH (Chairman) who was also Chairman of Golkar Party’s Balikpapan chapter, H. Dachri Mamma (Treasurer) who is a mem- ber of the DPRD, Ir. Adriani (Adviser) who is Head of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Agency Office in Balikpapan City, and prominent fishermen such as H. Padlan, H. Ismail, Syaiful Polo, Ruslan Riva’i and H. Makmur. However, in reality, HNSI had been either “not functioning” or “doing nothing for fishermen” as one fisher- man figure said (interviewed on 17/8/06). In one of the meetings they were saying the same thing; “HNSI has never done anything for fishermen”, they said. Furthermore, among the fishermen in Manggar area there was a fishermen orga- nization called Bina Keswadayaan Nelayan (Biken). In 2002, Biken assumed responsibility to distribute aid provided by Unocal in the form of 13 units of boats and fishing gear. Unfortunately, however, the program did not run as expected, and was even stuck. Currently, Biken practically had neither an office nor any activity. However, as a prominent fisherman figure, Biken’s chairman, Mr. Abdul Azis, was still playing an active role in the struggle for the rights of fishermen in Balikpapan. 6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy” 125

So far, there are two organizations of fisherman that are quite dominant in influ- encing the fishermen’s movement and struggles in Balikpapan, namely the Fisherman Community Alliance (AMN) and Balikpapan Fishermen’s Union (SNB). To further understand the role of these two organizations, more details about them will be described in the following.

6.5.2 The Fishermen Community Alliance or Aliansi Masyarakat Nelayan (AMN)

As mentioned in the previous section, on 11 November 1999, about thirty fishermen were appointed as the fishermen’s representatives to bring the case of fishing vessels and gear collision to the DPRD Office. They also agreed to identify themselves as the Mandate of the Fishermen Community Alliance (AAMN). In December 2000, a group of fishermen officially inaugurated their movement under the same name, and then converted it to the Fishermen Community Alliance shortened as AMAN or AMN (Aliansi Masyarakat Nelayan). Thus, AMN was established by the fishermen in Manggar as a forum for their struggle for their interests. Concrete problems or threats faced by fishermen at that time were the driving factor that had triggered the social movement that later gave birth to this organization. At the initial stage of the establishment, the AMN Coordinator was entrusted to Ruslan Riva’i, a young fisherman figure who had actively mobilized the fishermen to struggle for their interests in the collision cases. Ruslan Riva’i has an educational background in economics from a private university in Makassar. Under his leader- ship AMN became more widely known in Balikpapan. He also actively shared his thoughts and opinions by writing in the local print media and attended various semi- nars and trainings. AMN’s programs were also increasingly wide- ranging, such as organizing civic education for fishermen, initiating regular discussions among fish- ermen at village level, encouraging the establishment of small business loan (KUB) for women, providing scholarship for fishermen’s children, etc. The support the programs AMN received funding support from CRP- UNDP. AMN also periodi- cally issued a bulletin named Suara Nelayan (Voice of Fishermen) in joint coopera- tion with CSSP and USAID. AMN’s first congress was convened from March 8 to 10, 2004. One of the series of activities was to invite legislative candidates from various political parties to hold an open debate in front of the fishermen. Representatives from 6 political parties, namely PDS, Golkar, PPP, Partai Merdeka, Partai Pelopor, PKS, and representatives from the Regional Representative Council of East Kalimantan attended the debate. According to Ruslan Riva’i, this kind of direct dialogue between the parties and the fishermen has opened a new phase for politics in East Balikpapan. After the dia- logue, each party established direct communication with the fishermen. On the other part, the fishermen also gained confidence to directly interact with the 126 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

­politicians. At the same time it also succeeded in freeing the prominent fishermen figures of East Kalimantan from the domination of Golkar. The Congress also produced several important outcomes, such as: first, AMN’s type of organization, namely a mass or community organization (CSO), not a non- government organization (NGO); second, AMN’s working area; originally AMN’s working area only within Balikpapan, but now AMN had expanded to all of the East Kalimantan region. In addition, AMN’s organizational board was also changed. Through a voting in the congress, Agusalim was elected as Chairman to replace Ruslan Riva’i. Based on the congress results, East Kalimantan AMN board member for the period 2004–2008 was as follows: Chairman: Agusalim General Secretary: Summang Department of R&D: Adhie Supriadi Department of Economic Issues: Kaharuddin Department of Social, Political, and Law Issues: Udin Dohang Department of Environmental Issues: Ismail Khan Department of Home Affairs & Fundraising: Rusdin It is important to underline here that all of the members of the board resulted from the First Congress of AMN have a university background (undergraduate) with vari- ous areas of expertise, such as fisheries, economics, politics, and law. In addition, although some of them were children of fishermen and had gone to sea before, none of them worked as fishermen. Furthermore, since mid 2006, the organizational structure of the East Kalimantan AMN had changed with Summang, Adhi Supriadi, Uding Dohang and Kaharuddin leaving the organization. In AMN’s Articles of Association, it is explained that the organization is a “forum of fishermen and fisheries communities in East Kalimantan”. AMN’s goal is “to attain a decent, fair, physical and spiritual welfare for fishermen/fisheries communi- ties, especially within the communities of fishermen in East Kalimantan, based on the 1945 Constitution (UUD 45)”. It was furthermore explained that “an ordinary member is an Indonesian citizen whose livelihood is earned by working as a fisher- men and/or through fisheries business”, whereas “an extraordinary member is an Indonesian citizen whose livelihood is not earned from fisheries business but has a concern to improve the development of fisheries and improve the living standards of fishing communities/fishing communities. Furthermore, it was explained that “Those who can be accepted as ordinary members are Indonesian citizens whose livelihood is fisherman and/or fishery business“, whereas “Those who can be accepted as extra ordinary member are Indonesian citizens whose livelihood is not from fishery business but has a concern in the advancement of fisheries and improve the living standards of fisherman/fisheries communities”. 6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy” 127

6.5.3 Balikpapan Fisherman Union or Serikat Nelayan Balikpapan (SNB)

The Balikpapan Fishermen’s Union (SNB) was established based on an agreement of 50 people consisting of fishermen and fishermen’s assistants. Similar to AMN, the establishment of SNB also started with a struggle, which was a protest against environmental pollution caused by sludge oil spillage (2004). The figure behind SNB’s establishment and activities was none other than the former AMN Coordinator, Ruslan Riva’i. The SNB document states that the background of the union’s establishment is “to enable SNB members to struggle for their rights as citi- zens, which include social, economic, political and environmental rights”, while the objective is “to strengthen fishermen’s position and bargaining power in asserting their rights as citizens”. As regards the membership, in the profile of Balikpapan Fishermen Union (2005), it is described that: 1. SNB membership is open to all fishermen; 2. SNB shall only accept fishermen who are active and are willing to give a state- ment and commitment to comply with all applicable regulations of SNB Organization. Thus, the SNB is an organization that is open to all fishermen, not only fishermen who use a certain fishing gear, or those who are owner fishermen, but all kinds of fishermen. The organizational structure of SNB for the period of 2005–2008 is as follows: (I) Board of Supervisor: Chairman: Dervish Member: Misbahuddin, Jupri (II) Board of Management: Chairman: Te’be Vice Chairman: Berahima Member: H. Ambo Ala, Japri Lili, Alvin, Rabbi, and HM Arif Within SNB organization there was a term known as “rumpun”, which referred to the division of the working area of the organization and member, which currently consists of eight areas. The rumpun is managed by a Chairman and Vice Chairman. It is important to note here that members of the SNB board are active fishermen. Ruslan Riva’s name does not exist in the SNB organization’s structure. He only acts as a counselor, or is also known as the “dinamisator” or “mobilizer”. However, he is the real motor and conceptor of SNB’s entire activity. It should be highlighted also that Ruslan Riva’i is an active fisherman who uses a mini trawl dogol( ) fish- ing gear. In terms of activity, so far SNB activities focused more on providing advocacy, such as in the protest demanding for the a settlement of the oil sludge spillage case, 128 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan resistance against Unocal seismic survey activities, as well as fighting for kerosene supply for the fishermen. Together with AMN, SNB mobilizers like Ruslan Riva’i and Rudi were also active in assisting female workers working in a shrimp company (PT Aromah) when they encountered problems with the company. SNB also owns a business unit in the form of a small shop selling the member fishermen’s necessities.

6.5.4 Relationship with Mass Media

One thing that is very interesting and quite unique about the fishermen community in Indonesia is the close relationship between the fisherman figures, activists and the journalists (press media). Ruslan Riva’i was one of them. He could easily get in touch with journalists from various printed media in Balikpapan. For example, dur- ing the period of kerosene crisis, on 5 September 2006, Ruslan Riva’i contacted several journalists to disclose the “threat” that the fishermen would gather and occupy the office of Pertamina UPMs VI. The threat was published inPost Metro Balikpapan daily with a big headline that read: “Nelayan Siap ‘Duduki’ UPMs VI” or “Fisherman Ready to ‘Occupy’ the UPMs VI” (Post Metro Balikpapan, 6/9/06 p. 13). A similar case occurred during the demonstration at the Pertamina office staged on Wednesday, 13 September 2006; on Tuesday evening, while the fishermen were preparing for the demonstration, a reporter from the Tribun Kaltim newspaper contacted Ruslan Riva’i. The next day the demonstration plan was published under the title: “Hari ini Nelayan Demo Krisis Minyak Tanah” or “Today Fishermen Stage Kerosene Crisis Demonstration” (Tribun Kaltim, 13/9/06, page 11). Some of AMN activists from the previous management board very often appeared in the pages of the local media. They maintained a very close relationship with jour- nalists. Whenever issues concerning fishermen and coastal communities arose, AMN activists were always contacted and asked for their opinion or comments. In addition, some of the AMN activists also regularly wrote articles in local newspa- pers. One of the most notoriously critical AMN activists and is often featured by the media during that period of time was Summang; the Secretary General of AMN, and Adhi Supriadi; AMN’s Acting Chairman who also often appeared both as a resource person or article writer. Under the current AMN board, Ilham Jaya; Chairman of DPD AMN Balikpapan was often invited as a resource person by the local newspaper. The relationship with the media had become even much stronger when an AMN official, Udin Dohang, joined theTribun Kaltim daily as a journalist. It did seem that the local media’s interest in issues related to coastal or fisheries communities in Balikpapan was quite intense. The social movements launched by fishermen in 1999 to demand compensation for the losses caused by the collision with their vessels and fishing gear, for example, received extensive print media cov- erage. In the same way, several actions by East Kalimantan fishermen in their strug- gle for their rights were also intensely covered by the media, such as the visiting of the DPRD and local government offices, the rallies against Unocal and Thiess, at Pertamina, and the burning of the purse seine vessels, etc. The case of kerosene 6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy” 129 crisis that lasted from April to September 2006 was also reported extensively in the newspapers. The number of local newspapers available in Balikpapan is quite considerable, namely Post Metro Balikpapan, Tribun Kaltim, Kaltim Post, and the newly pub- lished Borneo Post. These newspapers had great interest in issues relating to fishing communities, particularly in East Balikpapan. Journalists from these newspapers were very active in monitoring and covering various activities surrounding the fish- ing communities. For example, my article entitled, “BBM dan Pemiskinan Nelayan” (Fuel and the Impoverishment of Fishermen) was published by Tribun Kaltim daily (Monday 11/9/06). In the meantime, a journalist from Borneo Post who is active in monitoring fishermen’s activities in relation to issues of kerosene also interviewed me, and the result of the interview was published in Borneo Post daily on 20/9/06 (Pictures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6).

6.5.5 Government Factor

As mentioned in the preceding section, many scholars argue that the government has a profound influence on social processes, including social conflict and revolu- tion. Dahrendorf (1963), for example, says that a totalitarian political system will inhibit the formation of interest groups. According to Dahrendorf: “The totalitarian state is probably the most unambiguous illustration of a social situation in which these conditions are not fulfilled, and in which therefore at least oppositional interest groups cannot emerge despite the presence of quasi-groups and latent interests. Where a

Picture 6.4 A journalist from Tribun Kaltim is interviewing a Fisherman Figure 130 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

Picture 6.5 Examples of News concerning Fishermen in the Local Media. (Source: Riva’i 2006)

plurality of conflicting parties is not permitted and their emergence suppressed by the absence of freedom of coalition and by police force, conflict groups cannot organize them- selves even if all other conditions of their organization are present” (Dahrendorf 1963: 186). Dahrendorf’s opinion is clearly evident in Indonesia’s case. Social scientists gen- erally agree that the New Order regime was authoritarian by nature. At that time, 6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy” 131

Picture 6.6 Examples of News concerning Fishermen in the Local Media (2) (private collection) rallies were almost non-existent because the government suppressed them. The rise of the use of demonstration as a form of struggle in Indonesia did not occur until the New Order regime collapsed and was replaced by the “Reformasi Order” that began in 1998. In line with the emergence of the “Reformasi Order”, demonstration became rampant throughout the country. For the case of fishermen in Balikpapan, it was no coincidence that the demon- stration which initiated the Balikpapan fishermen’s struggle movement was staged 132 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan in 1999; a year after the “Reformasi Order” began. Previously fishermen in Manggar had carried out a collection action in the case of the round up of Japanese trawlers in the 1970s and during the conflict between peerage fishermen and the mini trawl- ers in the 1980s. However, before the reformasi era they had never staged any dem- onstration at the office of the DPRD or City Government as was occurring more recently. The government has also influenced the process of establishing and strengthen- ing fishermen’s collective consciousness and action in Balikpapan through the pol- icy they made. The presence of Central Java purse seine fishermen around Balikpapan fishermen’s fishing grounds were not unrelated to the existence of Law no. 32/2004 on Regional Administration, which, among others, governs the author- ity of Central, Provincial, and District/City in the management of sea territory. Article 18 paragraph (4) of Law no. 32/2004, states that the province has authority to manage marine resources in sea territory not exceeding 12 (twelve) nautical miles measured from the coastline to the open sea and/or to the archipelagic waters. While district/municipal government only has authority for 1/3 (one third) of the territory under the authority of the province. Thus, since the location where the Central Java purse seine fishermen operated around Balikpapan exceeded 12 miles, from man- agement point of view the territory is under the authority of the central government. As a consequence, the provincial government, let alone the district/municipality, cannot forbid them from operating in those waters, despite the fact that the territory had been the “traditional” fisherman of Balikpapan’s fishing ground for generations. The situation was the same in terms of business licensing. In the Decree of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries No. 10/2003 concerning Capture Fishing License, it is explained that for fishing operation using fishing vessels of more than 30 GT and/or more than 90HP engine power, the license is granted by the Minister. The provincial government (Governor) has the authority to grant permits for capture fishing for fishing vessels of more than 10 GT to 30 GT and/or with less than 90HP engine power, while the District/Municipal Government (District Head/Mayor) has the authority to grant permits for capture fishing for fishing vessels of up to 10GT and/or with less than 30HP engine power. Correspondingly, in article 18 of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Regulation No.17/2006 on Capture Fishing Business, it was also explained that the authority to grant license for fishing vessels of up to 30 GT/90 HP is under the authority of the provincial and district/city admin- istration. Based on those two regulations, the entity that is entitled to grant the capture fishing operation license for the Central Java purse seine boats/vessels of 30 GT/90HP is the central government.1 Furthermore, since the Central Java purse seine fishermen already had the fishing license from the central government, the district/city and provincial governments had no authority to forbid them to operate. In addition to that, in the Decree of Minister of Agriculture no. 392/1999 on fishing lanes, it was provided that fishing lanes consisted of three areas, namely lane I

1 KM Mutiara, which was set to fire, for instance, weighed 121GT with 280HP engine power. 6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy” 133

(0–6 miles), lane II (6–12 miles), and lane III (12–200 miles, or the outer boundary of the Exclusive Economic Zone). It was moreover explained that within lane III capture fishing activities are permitted for “Indonesian-flagged fishing vessels that are smaller or equal to 200 GT, except those with big purse seine in Tomini Bay, Maluku Sea, Seram Sea, Flores Sea and Sawu Sea that are prohibited for all boat sizes. Based on the above mentioned Law no. 32/2004, Ministerial Decree No. 10/2003, and Ministerial Regulation No.17/2006, and Ministerial Decree no. 392/1999, it was legal for the Central Java purse seine fishermen to operate in Makassar Strait near the Balikpapan fishermen’s fishing ground. They did not violate any applicable regulation. That was why they continued to fish, despite the strong resistance against it mounted by the Balikpapan fishermen. Their presence, which was justified by the Law and the Ministerial Decree, had turned in to a communal problem for fishermen in Balikpapan, which in turn generated and strengthened the collective conscious- ness and action of Balikpapan fishermen, whether in the form of “reporting” the rallies, or even through the burning of KM Mutiara Sakti purse seine vessel. Law no. 32/2004 governing that the District/Municipality authority only applies within 1/3 of the provincial territory of authority was obviously disadvantageous for fishermen in Balikpapan. All this time they had been operating as far as up to 40 miles or further around the waters in Makassar Strait. With the enactment of Law No.32/2004, the Balikpapan City administration was not entitled to demand ‘out- sider’ fishermen who were using far larger and more sophisticated fishing gear not to operate in the Balikpapan fishermen’s fishing ground. Even the provincial gov- ernment itself had no right to do it either; the authority to determine whether the purse seine fishermen could operate in the sea territory that is further than 12 nauti- cal miles is in the hands of the Central Government. Therefore, the Law no. 32/2004 had put the Balikpapan fishermen in a vulnerable position. It is not surprising if they felt that the government had been unjust and had not been on the “traditional” fish- ermen’s side. “In fact, the law has marginalized traditional fishermen”, a notable fisherman said (interviewed on 14/2/06). An official at the Balikpapan Marine Affairs and Fisheries Agency Office said that Balikpapan fishermen would install their FAD at a distance of up to 60 nautical miles. “Whereas according to Regional Autonomy Law, the area under District/City authority covers only up to 4 nautical miles. But the fishermen ignored it. They have been catching fish in those areas since their ancestors’s time”, he said (interviewed on 20/1/06). The official further explained that he once gave a briefing concerning this law and regulation to the fisherman, but instead, the fishermen were infuriated. They walked out of the official’s room and slammed the door. “At the end, I did not dare to deliver further briefing”, he said. In the case of the conflict between the Balikpapan “traditional” fishermen and Central Java purse seine fishermen, the local government also had an influence. The fishermen felt that the local govern- ment was not able to protect their interests. In the case of conflict between the Balikpapan “traditional” fishermen and the Central Java purse seine fishermen, the local government had also had an influence. The fishermen felt that the local government was not able to protect their interests. 134 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

They had repeatedly complained about their problems to the local government, both to the Marine Affairs and Fisheries Agency Office as the technical institution that handles issues of fisheries as well as to the Mayor directly, and the DPRD. The Central Java purse seine fishermen had entered into an agreement that they would not operate within the Balikpapan fishermen’s fishing ground. However, they breached the agreement, and the local government was considered powerless to ensure that the agreement was honored consistently. “The government here is weak, it is not forceful”, a fisherman said. The government’s policy of raising the fuel prices in October 2005 had caused greater difficulties to fishermen. “Speaking of the impact of the fuel price hike, I simply felt like crying. Like a rope with two ends, the fishermen’s list of complaints is so long that you cannot see its end”, said a fisherman. “We won’t be able to cover (the operational cost) if we use diesel fuel”, said another fisherman, which meant operating at a loss as the costs are too high and not worth the result. Consequently, as a strategy to survive, many fishermen were compelled to use kerosene to replace diesel fuel. However, it turned out that the use of kerosene to fuel their engine had led them to another inconvenient situation. They were not only faced with the fact that kerosene caused damage to the engine, but also that the subsidized kerosene was highly scarce, which eventually forced them to stay onshore, unable to go on fishing. Their aggravation with the government has become greater. “We are actu- ally good people. It is them (the government) that makes us fierce,” said a fisherman during a gathering to discuss their struggle to get the kerosene quota on 29 September 2006. Previously, a fisherman expressed his frustration as follows: “Now there is no kerosene… what is wrong with this government? … Manggar fishermen have cried out loud, the clock’s ticking before everything explodes. So, where is the govern- ment? The president has changed, but our situation had gotten worse. The government is really brave to dare to create this kind of crisis. Even small ants would unite when trapped in a corner. Don’t blame the small people if they will later …” (what he meant was if they acted brutally; they were not to blame) (interviewed on 6/9/06). As previously described, the fishermen’s aggravation with the kerosene problem was finally expressed in the form of a rally in front of the offices Pertamina and the City Government. They also threatened to hold Pertamina fuel storage tanks hos- tage, and even to blow up Pertamina’s oil refinery in Balikpapan if they were not granted the kerosene quota. “This is a stomach problem, and if it is a stomach prob- lem, no law applies”, they said irritably. From the above description, it is clear that the government, both in terms of sys- tem and policies, had influenced the process of forming and strengthening the fish- ermen’s collective consciousness and action in Balikpapan. A more democratic government system had provided the opportunities for the fishermen to build strength and take collective action. Meanwhile, government policies that threatened the fishermen’s interests in turn created a “common problem” that emboldened them to unite as well. Alliances between the fishermen’s social classes were created when they faced common problem or “common enemy” together. 6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy” 135

6.5.6 Fishermen and Politics

The involvement of prominent fishermen figures in Balikpapan politics is quite intense. Over the past few years, some prominent fishermen figures in East Balikpapan were generally supporters of the Golkar Party. Therefore, it was not surprising that the East Balikpapan area was known as a Golkar base. As an illustra- tion, 33% of the 100 sawi respondents were members of political organizations with the following composition: 60.6% Golkar, 33.3% PDIP, with Democrat and PBR 3% each. Among owner fishermen, the pattern was almost similar. From the 101 respondents, 58.4% were members of political parties with the following composi- tion: 72.9% Golkar, while each of PDIP and PPP was 13.6%. Therefore, it was not surprising that during the direct election of regional head (Pilkada) in March 2006, even though Golkar – in a coalition with Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, or Justice and Prosperous Party – now changed to Justice Party) – lost in overall, in East Balikpapan the coalition itself gained an absolute win. Golkar candidate’s support- ing team that came from the fishermen communities of East Balikpapan was mobi- lized by the “Golkar trio”, consisting of Haji Padlan, Haji Makmur, and Mr. Syaiful, whereas Mr. Agus Mulyadi was for PKS Party. Haji Padlan was a punggawa who was a former fisherman. In Golkar Party, he held the position of the Coordinator of the Eastern Region. Meanwhile, H. Makmur, who was also a punggawa in Manggar Baru was the Chairman of Golkar Party of Manggar Baru Village. He also served as a Chairman of the Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (LPM) or, the Community Empowerment Institute of Manggar Baru. Mr. Agus Mulyadi, who was known as a pejala fisherman figure was one of PKS Board members. As for Mr. Syaiful; although officially he did not hold any position in Golkar Party, he played a big role on the ground. As an influential fisherman fig- ure, Mr. Syaiful was able to mobilize fishermen’s support for Golkar Party. Some other notable fishermen were also engaged in political activity, at least when there was an election; both for executive and legislative members. For a long time, for example, political leaders would contact a pedogol fisherman figure, Mr. Te’be, for his support. Mr. Te’be had also been actively supporting the Golkar Party, even though he had once changed over to the opposite camp to PPP Party due to his disappointment with Golkar, which he considered, “had failed to protect people’s livelihood” during the trawling ban incident. According to him, when he moved to PPP and brought with him other influential figures of that time, one of which was Mr. Daeng Polo, the party won in the eastern region during the legislative election in 1985. However, after one period in PPP, Mr. Te’be then moved back to the Golkar Party. During the election in March 2006, Mr. Te’be claimed that H. Mukmin Faisyal, the mayoral candidate from PKS Party, contacted him twice. At the same, the candidate from PDIP, Mr. H. Imdaad Hamid, who was later elected as Balikpapan Mayor for the period of 2006–2011, also requested his support. Mr. H. Imdaad Hamid had also asked a fisherman figure that has used various types of fishing gear including boat-operated lift nets, namely Mr. H. Suardi, in the previous election for support. At that time Mr. H. Suardi was engaged in several 136 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan activities that H. Imdaad conducted as a mayoral candidate during the election cam- paign time. As he was busy with the election, Mr. H. Suardi’s boat- operated lift net was abandoned and eventually knocked by the waves. Currently Mr. H. Suardi returned to sea to go fishing using mini trawl/dogol again. He proudly claimed that he was the only fisherman who was invited to the inauguration of Mr. H. Imdaad as Balikpapan Mayor on 28 May 2006. The above fact has shown that fishermen’s “political consciousness” and partici- pation in East Balikpapan is actually quite high. However, it should be noted that such consciousness and participation among owner fishermen was much higher compared to that among fisherman laborers or sawi (58.4%–33%). As regards the engagement in mass organization, the pattern was similar. Among the fisherman owners, 22.8% of the 101 respondents claimed to be members of mass organiza- tions, such as AMN, while the percentage of laborer fishermen answering in a simi- lar way was only 7%. This data on participation in the field of community and political organizations confirmed my previous opinion, that the level of class con- sciousness and class formation of laborer fishermen was lower than that of the owner fishermen’s. The Fishermen Community Alliance had also done something quite “spectacu- lar” in Balikpapan’s politics. During the past election, AMN entered into “social and political contract” with the candidates of Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Balikpapan for the period of 2006–2011. There are 10 points under the terms of contract, consisting demands for the Mayor and Vice Mayor to run programs for the improvement of lives of the fishermen once they were elected. For example, point three says, “To facilitate and resolve cases faced by Balikpapan fishermen including cases of pollution of the coastal and marine environment”, while point six says: “To allocate budget for fuel subsidy for fishermen”. The fishermen’s political engagement in Balikpapan, in particular in East Balikpapan District, could not be detached from the socio-political condition in Balikpapan as a whole. Some government officials and political figures were from Bugis and they had close relationships with fishermen. Mr. Mukmin Faisyal, who served as Deputy Mayor in the 2000–2005 period, and ran as mayoral candidate for the period 2006–2011, for example, is a Bugis. His parents used to work as pung- gawa, and now two of his siblings continued their parent’s business as a punggawa in Manggar. Mr. Mukmin himself served as Chairman of HNSI Board of Balikpapan City since he became a parliament/DPRD member (before becoming Vice Mayor for the 2000–2005 period) until now. As for his engagement in politics, Mr. Mukmin now served as Chairman of the DPD (Regional Leaders Board) of Golkar of Balikpapan City (Picture 6.7). Furthermore, H. Sappe, Chairman of Commission III of the local parliament, was a fisherman. Hence his continuing interest in issues related to fishermen. In fact, H. Sappe was one of the signatories of the “Semarang Agreement”, which was the formulation of the outcome of the meeting held to solve the conflict between Balikpapan fishermen and the purse seine fishermen from Central Java in Semarang on 17 January 2006. He was also involved in the meeting held between some of the purse seine fishermen from Pekalongan with Balikpapan fishermen at the DPRD on 6.5 Discussion on the Importance of the Common Problem or “Common Enemy” 137

Picture 6.7 A mayoral candidate of during the 2006 Regional Election for Mayor was signing the Social Political Contract Proposed by East Kalimantan AMN

15 December 2005. Mr. Sappe at the time chaired the “heated” meeting. ‘The issue should have been the responsibility of Commission II, but since I used to be a fisher- man, I decided to step in to help”, he said (interviewed on 13/2/06). The fisherman figures’ active participation in politics was a supporting factor for fishermen’s movement and struggle in Balikpapan as well as the close relationship between fishermen and some political figures both in the local parliament (DPRD) and in the government. These days, the fishermen in Balikpapan were already accustomed to go to the local parliament to defend their interests. They would no longer hesitate to contact the government, including the Mayor, when they encounter problems such as kerosene shortages.

6.5.7 Class Fraction and Intra-class Conflict

One of the characteristics of Balikpapan fishermen’s social class was the existence of fractions within the same class. The most important basic of this fraction was the type of fishing gear. Within the small fisherman class, for example, there were the factions of mini trawlers, perengge, fixed lift net, and shellfish trap fractions. Within the medium-scale fisherman class, there were the factions of FAD fishermen and the hook and line fishermen’s, whereas within the capitalist class there those of the boat-operated lift net fishermen, pejala gae fishermen and blast fishermen. And 138 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan within the working class, of course there were fractions according to all types of those fishing gear. This class fraction is a key factor that inhibited the emergence and strengthening of class consciousness and class formation. Each fraction within one class may have different interests and problems, thus making the relationship between fractions not always harmonious. A young fisherman figure said, “It is difficult to combine all of the fishermen’s “knots” (which meant the fishermen’s grouping by type of fishing gear). There will be a tug of interests. The problem will be resolved thoroughly in each “knot” (discussion dated 23/9/06). The relation between these various fractions in one class does not only tend to be disharmonious sometimes, but can even be a brutal open conflict. In other words, a vicious intra-class conflict may occur. This had happened before in Balikpapan. The intra-class conflict once occurred within the small fishermen class between the frac- tion of fishermen who used mini trawl and the fraction of fishermen using rengge. The following part will describe it in more detail. As described earlier, the use of mini trawl in Manggar started at around 1978 before the Presidential Decree No. 39/1980 that bans the use of trawl was passed. At that time, there were seven boats using mini trawl operating in Manggar. Since the enactment of the presidential decree, the police would often conduct raids, both at sea and on the land. In about 1983/1984, Mr. Te’be was the first person that was arrested for using mini trawl, and many more mini trawlers were caught during 1984. At that time a highly respected fisherman figure named Daeng Polo was also arrested and detained by the police. He took over the responsibility on behalf of the fishermen using mini trawl/dogol. Meanwhile, after the mini trawl was banned, which was around 1981, the Fisheries Office introduced a fishing gear that was almost similar to mini trawl, which is called dogol. During the period after the ban was imposed in 1980, con- flicts often occurred between perengge fishermen (who happened to live in Tanjung Kelor) and the pedogol/mini trawlers (who happen to live across the Manggar River, which was at Manggar Beach). “The conflicts were quire serious, to the extent that they set fire to each other’s fishing gear”, said a young fisherman figure. Mini trawls were set on fire by perengge fishermen. They worked together with the police to catch fishermen that were using mini trawls. The Police would even sometimes go to sea, to catch mini trawl fishermen. Another fisherman figure who used to be a perengge fisherman and used to be involved in the burning incidents said that in 1985, up to two or three mini trawls were set on fire in 1 month. In total the number of mini trawlers that were set on fire at that time was about 50. Conflict decreased in the 1990s, and in that period of time, the perengge fishermen in Tanjung Kelor began to think, “we’d better use dogol ourselves,” said that fisherman figure. According to a fisherman figure, considered a “pioneer” in Balikpapan,. “At that time the amount of catch using dogol was higher, so rengge lost. As a result, they felt unhappy “. A young fisherman figure also said: “The pedogol’s catch was more numerous and continuous by nature, whereas for rengge, the same thing only occa- sionally took place. As a result, the parengge fisherman felt hard done by. This is one of the triggers of the conflicts”. Bibliography 139

According to the informants, conflicts that occurred during that period were solved by involving the security forces. Their involvement included arresting fisher- men using mini trawls. “The highest point was when the fisherman figure Daeng Polo was arrested,” the young fishermen said. Although the open and brutal conflicts between thepedogol and the perengge has not been happening lately, the potential for conflict between the two fractions remain quite large. This conflict potential was greater during the south season, because pedogol fishermen operated in the periphery areas that were also the fishing ground areas of the perengge. Similar operational areas may result in a collision between rengge and pedogol. In addition, the perengge felt unhappy when the pedo- gol operated too close to their rengge as it could harm them. Those were things that could trigger conflicts between the two groups of different types of fishing gear. The above description and the other one concerning the conflict with Central Java purse seine fishermen indicate that the fishermen in Balikpapan, in particular East Balikpapan, are very critical and active in putting up struggle and resistance against various parties that threaten their interests. Their pattern of struggle varied, ranging from personally contacting journalists and holding press conferences, dialogues, rallies, and hostages as well as vessel burning. The opposite parties also varied widely: from state-owned companies (Pertamina), private companies (e.g. Somber Mas Group), to multinational companies (such as Unocal, Thiess, and ship/tanker companies). They also critiqued the central and regional governments in Balikpapan, for instance with regards to the policies of raising fuel prices and the allocation of the fuel quota, zonation of fishing grounds, issuance of the decree banning mini trawl, and the that of coastal road development by Balikpapan municipal govern- ment. The local parliament or the DPRD was also one of the entities to submit complaints and stage protests against in order to defend their interests.

Bibliography

Books

Alexander, Paul. 1982. Sri Lankan Fishermen. Rural Capitalism and Peasant Society, Australian National University Monographs on South Asia No. 7. Canberra: Australian National University. Burawoy, Michael. 1991. Painting Socialism: Working-Class Formation in Hungary and Poland. In Bringing Class Back In. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives, ed. Scott G. McNall, Rhonda F. Levine, and Rick Fantasia. London: Westview Press. Clement, Wallace. 1986. The Struggle to Organize. In Resistance in Canada’s Fishery. Ontario/ Toronto: McClelland and Steward/The Canadian Publishers. Coser, Lewis A. 1977. Masters of Sociological Thought. Ideas in Historical and Social Context. 2nd ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1963. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 140 6 Class Formation of Fisher in Balikpapan

Fairley, Bryant. 1990. The Crisis, the State and Class Formation in the Newfoundland Fishery. In Restructuring and Resistance: Perspectives from Atlantic Canada, ed. Fairley Bryant, Colin Leys, and James Sacouman. Toronto: Garamond. Orr, James R., and Scott G. McNall. 1991. Fraternal Orders and Working-Class Formation in Nineteenth-Century Kansas. In Bringing Class Back In. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives, ed. Scott G. McNall, Rhonda F. Levine, and Rick Fantasia. Boulder: Westview Press. Riva’i, Ruslan. 2006. “Menggugat Penabrak di Laut. Nelayan Balikpapan Membangun Gerakan,” dalam M. Imran Amin dkk (Penyunting). Meninggalkan Titik Nol. Nelayan Melawan Perlakukan Buruk. Bogor: Jaring Pela&CBCRM-RC. Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 1975. Social Classes in Agrarian Societies. Trans. Judy Alder Hellman. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday. Turner, Jonathan H. 1998. The Structure of Sociological Theory. 5th ed. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont. Wright, Erik Olin. 1987. Classes. London-New York: Verso. ———. 1991. The Conceptual Status of Class Structure in Class Analysis. In Bringing Class Back In. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives, ed. Scott G. McNall, Rhonda F. Levine, and Rick Fantasia. Boulder: Westview Press.

Journals

Macdonald, Martha, and M. Patricia Connelly. 1989. Class and Gender in Fishing Communities in Nova Scotia. Studies in Political Economy 30 (Autumn): 61–85. Muszynski, Alicja. 1986. Class Formation and Class Consciousness: The Making of Shoreworkers in the BC Fishing Industry. Studies in Political Economy 20 (Summer): 85–116. Wright, Erik O., and Donmoon Cho. 1992. The Relative Permeability of Class Boundaries to Cross-Class Friendships: A Comparative Study of the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Norway. American Sociological Review 57 (1): 85–102. Chapter 7 Conclusion

7.1 General Conclusion

From the results of the study on class and class conflict between fishermen in Balikpapan the conclusion is as follows: 1. The fishermen’s class structure in Balikpapan does not evolve into a “simpler” direction, namely a dichotomy into main classes that are antagonistic and mutu- ally hostile, such as the laborer class and the capitalist class, but instead it evolves from a simple class, namely the owner or juragan, and the laborer, to become more “complicated” with the emergence of a new middle class. However, this new middle class is not “service class” or “professional-managerial class” as often happens in the “industrial world”, instead, it is a group of owner fishermen, which consists of small-scale and medium-scale fishermen or the “new bour- geoisie class”. With such complicating process, the class structure of fishermen in Balikpapan ends up consisting of four class categories, namely the laborer class, small fishermen, middle-class fishermen, and upper-class fishermen/capi- talist. However, when compared with the Central Java purse seine fishermen, the capitalist fishermen in Balikpapan are still much smaller, so they deserve to be called “small capitalists”, while the Central Java purse seine fishermen deserve to be called “big capitalists”; 2. The fisherman laborers (sawi) in Balikpapan do not have class consciousness yet. Accordingly, class formation of the fisherman laborers has not taken place. In other words, the fisherman laborers in Balikpapan only existed as class-in-­ itself, as it has not transformed yet into class-for- itself; 3. Corresponding to point two above, it can be said that there has been no struggle of the fisherman laborer class in Balikpapan yet. Conflicts between laborers and employers, for example, are still individualistic by nature. The form of their indi- vidual resistance is generally only limited to “grumbling”, questioning, protest- ing, and the “toughest” one is quitting or changing employer. However, the

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 141 R. A. Kinseng, Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0986-5_7 142 7 Conclusion

fisherman laborers are involved in the struggle with the owner fishermen in fight- ing for the interest of fishermen in general; 4. Overall the owner-class fishermen in Balikpapan have begun to have class con- sciousness, and correspondingly, class formation of the owner fishermen has started to happen. In other words, transformation from class- in-itself to class-­ for-­itself among owner fishermen has started to happen. However, the class for- mation and consciousness of these owner fishermen is still relatively weak and tends to be temporary (ad hoc), particularly when there is a common problem or common enemy. When there is no common problem or common enemy, each fisherman tends to be fragmented and works autonomously. In addition, there is no organization that brings together these owner fishermen neither in each class, nor among owners as a whole, as a means for common struggle. The fishermen organizations in Balikpapan such as AMN and SNB are organizations of all fish- ermen, regardless of their class; 5. Consistent with point 4 above, owner fishermen often put up struggle together with fishermen of the more dominant class as in the case of purse seine, as well as with large capitalist powers beyond fishermen/fisheries, such as mining com- panies, shipping companies, and Pertamina. In this struggle, there is even an interclass alliance between owner class fishermen and the fisherman laborers. The form or pattern of struggle of these fishermen varies, ranging from making statements in the local media, engaging in a dialogue with the executive (City Government) and legislative members (the DPRD), staging rallies, holding ships hostage, to setting vessels on fire. In other words, the struggle that they put up starts from “peaceful means” to “violent means”; 6. Some factors that have prevented class consciousness and class formation among the fisherman laborers in Balikpapan from emerging are: the fragmentation of the fishermen itself, high class permeability, labor dependence on employer, absence of leaders, lack of common problem or common enemy, and profit-­ sharing payment system. Reversely, the emergence of class consciousness and class formation among owner fishermen is primarily due to a “large” and repeated common problem or common enemy, such as the case of boat/fishing gear colli- sion, FAD cutting, damage of fishing ground and fishing gear, presence of purse seine fishermen that leads to class domination, and kerosene scarcity. In addi- tion, among the owner fishermen also appear leaders who can mobilize a collec- tive movement to mount resistance. Fishermen organizations such as AMN and SNB play a significant role in fostering class consciousness and class formation. Furthermore, the government also plays a role through their policies in nurturing class consciousness and formation. Another factor that is also important is the media. Through intense reporting about the fishermen’s problems and struggles, the media has really contributed to the process of forming class consciousness and class formation; 7. Class conflict between purse seine fishermen (big capitalist) and traditional fish- ermen in Balikpapan (an alliance between middle-class fishermen with small fishermen, local capitalist fishermen, and fisherman laborers) were caused by the dominance of big capitalist fishermen over “traditional” fishermen in the 7.2 Theory Implication 143

­production process. The basis for such class domination is the level of fish-cap- ture technology. Meanwhile, the issue in this class conflict is the economy, namely the issue of livelihood or the “source” of life. Therefore, the issue falls under the category of “realistic issues”. However, since this issue concerns the “source” of life or “problem of the stomach”, conflict that occurred was quite violent, such as setting a ship on fire and beating a deputy master; 8. Within fishermen, a very clear class fraction can be found, mainly formed based on the type of fishing gear. The relationship between these fractions in one class can be inharmonious even antagonistic, causing intense and brutal interclass conflicts.

7.2 Theory Implication

7.2.1 Patterns of Fisher Class Conflict

In the theory implication, the first discussion will be in regard to pattern of class conflict between fishermen. As previously described, the often-violent class con- flicts between fishermen generally occur not between the laborer class and the owner class. Class conflicts between these two classes are more latent, individualis- tic, and non-violent. The open and often brutal class conflicts happen between owner fishermen who belong to different classes, such as between “big capitalist” fishermen and “small capitalist” fishermen, or between “small capitalist” fishermen and middle-class fishermen. In this case, a characteristic that is unique to class con- flict among fishermen is the very strong alliance between the owner and the laborer in each class of the owner fishermen. Thus, the pattern of class conflict of these fishermen can be explained as in Picture7.1 .

“Upper-Class” owner ALLIANCE Laborers fise rmen

Conflict

“Lower-Class” owner ALLIANCE Laborers fise rmen

Picture 7.1 Pattern of “fishermen class” conflict 144 7 Conclusion

In addition, the uniqueness of class conflict within the fishermen is a relatively frequent and easily formed class alliance that is characteristically “broad”, such as an alliance that occurs between various “lower” classes when dealing with fisher- men from “higher” classes. When the “higher” fisherman class does not exist, the relationship between the allied fishermen classes is also often antagonistic and open conflict occurs sometimes. In the conflict case between purse seine fishermen and Balikpapan fishermen, the purse seine fishermen are the “upper-class” fishermen (“big capitalists”), whereas the fishermen who call themselves “traditional fisher- men” are the “lower class” fishermen. This pattern of fisherman class conflict appears to be very different from the one usually found in the industrial sector. Class conflicts in the industrial sector that frequently occurs and are often brutal are those between workers and owners/finan- ciers (and their representation). In Indonesia, it can be seen lately in the occurrence of a kind of “revival of the workers”, which is manifested in massive rallies that are often staged by the laborers against the owners and company management. In these cases of “industrial” class conflicts, a strong alliance between the workers and the “big” corporate owners against the workers and owners of “small” companies rarely or has never happened, as in the pattern of fishermen class conflicts. Thus, the con- flict is more “bipolar” in Picture7.2 . Meanwhile, class conflicts in agricultural industry (including plantation and live- stock) also tend to be a bipolar one between workers and owners as well as between smallholder farmers or peasants (lower class farmers) with landlords (upper-class farmers). However, it seems that in agricultural class conflict, alliance between workers and lower-class owners faced with an alliance between workers and upper-­ class owners is not as common as the class conflict between fishermen. Schematically this pattern of agricultural conflict is illustrated in Picture 7.3. Such pattern of fisherman class conflict is inseparable from the nature or charac- ter of the process of “production” or the capture process itself. As explained in the previous section, fish and other catch are “common property”, not individual or group property. Therefore, in the process of “production” direct competition takes place between all fishermen. In such direct competition, the difference in the levels of capture technology will greatly affect the ability to compete. Lower class fisher- men will be the losers in this “production” process.

Picture 7.2 “Industrial class” conflict pattern Owner Class

Laborer Class 7.2 Theory Implication 145

“Upper-Class” Farmers

“Lower-class” Peasants ------farmers

Picture 7.3 Pattern of “farmer class” conflict Notes: <---> shows conflict

Furthermore, in practice, fishermen in each production unit, namely the boat or the fishing vessel, do the “production” activity itself. Therefore, competition that occurs is one between the fishing units. In this “production” process, the owners and laborers of one fishing gear type become one social group; they are “united” by the fishing unit. In this “production” process both social classes (owners and laborers) have the same interest, namely, to get the maximum catch. The competition taking place in this process is a competition between one unit of production and another. Furthermore, since the owner and laborer are “united” in each unit of production (boat or vessel), the competition or conflict between the fish-capture units is a con- flict between social groups consisting of the owners and the laborers. The explanation shows that social conflicts between upper-class fishermen and lower-class fishermen could also be seen as conflicts between social groups formed by the type or level of technology used in their fish-capture unit. However, I would argue that it is more appropriate to treat the conflict between purse seine fishermen and traditional fishermen happening in Balikpapan in this study as class conflict. The argument is, first, in this “social group”, the components re the owner class and the laborer class. Meanwhile, the laborer class itself remains a subordinate class within that fish-capture unit. Thus, conflicts taking place between the “social group” in the purse seine fish-capture unit with the “social group” in the FAD fish- capture unit, for example, are essentially conflicts between the purse seine owner class (cap- italist fishermen) and the FAD owner class (middle class fishermen). The role of the fisherman laborers in each type of the fishing gear is more as “followers” or “allies” of the owner class. Second, the purse seine fishermen group and the pejala fisher- men or “traditional” fishermen meet the criteria of social class concepts as proposed by Van Parijs (1989: 215), namely: 1. Relevant to explain consciousness and/or action, including social conflict; 2. Hierarchical, in the sense that one class can be considered superior over the other; 146 7 Conclusion

3. Being “discrete”, in the sense that being in one social class is not just a matter of degree. The third argument is, a conflict case that is similar the case in Balikpapan, namely the conflict between Danish seine fishermen and gillnet fishermen and the anglers (longline and handline) that occurred in Lofoten, Norway, is also mentioned as class conflict by Holm et al. 2000( ). Therefore, according to them, the restrictions on the use of Danish seine in Lofoten waters “fit nicely into the traditional pattern of class struggle in Norwegian fishery”. The above description shows that “production” process done by fishermen is unique, which then produces a variety of distinct social consequences, including the relationship pattern between the laborer and the owner, the alliance pattern, and the class conflict pattern. Therefore, it is perhaps not wrong that this “fishermen produc- tion process” is referred to as “fishers’ mode of production”, in a parallel sense to “peasant mode of production”, for example. Thus, the variety of uniqueness was inseparable from the uniqueness of “fishers mode of production” itself.

7.2.2 Factors of Fish-Capture Unit and Type of Fishing Gear in Class Analysis

From the above description, it can be seen that the fish-capture unit and/or the types of fishing gear type play an important role in class analysis among fishermen. The fish-capture unit and/or the fishing gear type have multiple roles, which make class formation in fishermen class conflict becomes unique as discussed in the first section above. On the one hand, this fish-capture unit and fishing gear type factors can make two classes that in Marx’s view is considered always “hostile” to each other, namely the laborer class and the owner class, forge an alliance (“united”). Even more than that, this alliance is also involved in often-violent conflicts with the same alliance either in a lower or higher class. On the other hand, this fish-capture unit and/or fishing gear type may result in a sharp “disunity” or fragmentation between fellow laborers and owners among the fishermen. Class fraction and class alliance around this fish- ing gear type contributes to the class conflict pattern as shown in Picture 7.1 above. While Frank Parkin (1979) sees race, ethnicity and religion as factors that can be a source of “disunity” and social-political antagonism other than class, among the fishermen the crucial factor is the fish-capture unit and/or the fishing gear type. As mentioned above, this fish-capture unit and/or the fishing gear type can “disunite” members of the same social class, or on the contrary it can unite member of different classes in a struggle. Thus, in analyzing class structure, class consciousness, class alliance, class formation, and class struggle among the fishermen, the fish-capture unit and/or the fishing gear type cannot be dismissed. As previously described, this phenomenon is closely related to the nature and character of the “production” pro- cess in capture fisheries, which in turn is also affected by the nature of the capture fisheries resources themselves. 7.2 Theory Implication 147

7.2.3 Distinction Between Ownership of the Means of Production and Ownership of Financial Capital

Among the fishermen, a distinction should be drawn between means of production ownership and financial capital ownership. This distinction is very important because fishermen who own the means of production, especially small to middle- class fishermen, generally have a very weak position when dealing with the “mer- chant class”. They are actually a subordination of the merchant class, and they are even exploited by that class. Therefore, this study strengthens Clement’s opin- ion that: “Most fishers have experienced the real subordination of labor but not the formal subordi- nation. Those who continue to own (nominally) or rent boats have possession but not real economic ownership, and crews have neither possession nor real economic ownership, yet neither group has been formally subordinated to capital in the sense of becoming wage labor employees” (Clement 1986:195–196). This fishermen’s weak position when dealing with the merchant class is also reviewed by Barbara Neis in her research about class struggle of the fishermen in Newfoundland, Canada (Neis 1981). However, in the case of the fishermen in Balikpapan, generally the capitalist fishermen are not bound by the financiers. As an example, four of the five people interviewed said that they had no attachment to the financier. Therefore, they are not subordinated to the merchant class.

7.2.4 Concept of “Domination Distance” in the Fisherman Class Analysis

Besides exploitation concept, domination is a very important concept in sociology, particularly in class analysis and conflict theory. However, to the best of my knowl- edge, spatial distance element has never been included in the discussion about this domination concept. This research found that spatial distance element is very impor- tant in the domination occurring among fishermen in the production process. Hence, I propose a concept, namely “domination distance”. Domination distance is the spa- tial distance of domination of one social class or group over another class (group). Domination distance among the fishermen in the production process is highly determined by the level of technology used by the dominant class itself. In the case of the Central Java purse seine fishermen, the domination distance is closely related to the power of light used on the purse seine vessel. In this case, the domination distance of the purse seine fishermen (dominant class) is quite far. One fisherman figure even mentioned that within 35 miles, the influence of the purse seine fisher- men is still felt. In other words, in the opinion of traditional fishermen, the domina- tion distance of the purse seine fishermen stretches to 35 miles. This may not be right, considering there has been no definite research has been conducted to deter- mine the domination distance of these purse seine fishermen. 148 7 Conclusion

Domination distance is also important in the relationship between fishermen using boat-operated lift nets and the FAD-using fishermen. For that reason, FAD- using fishermen refuse the boat-operated lift nets to operate near their FAD. In other words, domination of fishermen using boat-operated lift nets occurs over those using FAD, which always triggers conflicts between the two fisherman classes, although so far it has never involved violence. In general, when domination of one class over another class occurs in the production process, a class conflict will almost certainly occur sooner or later. Domination itself would happen in various levels of class, such as the domination over the small fishermen by the medium-scale fisher- men, the domination over the medium-scale fishermen by the capitalist fishermen, and even the domination over the “small capitalist” fishermen by the “big capitalist” fishermen (example: domination over fishermen using boat- operated lift nets by the purse seine fishermen).

7.2.5 Level of “Violence” in Conflict

According to Lewis Coser, when the conflict concerns ‘realistic issues’, namely obtainable goals, the conflicting parties tend to make compromises, so the level of violence of the conflict is low. On the contrary, if the conflict concerns “nonrealistic issues”, such as matters of value system, belief, ideology, or vaguely defined class interests, then the conflict will be more violent (Turner1998 : 173). This study shows that the level of conflict violence is not only determined by whether or not the issue of the conflict is realistic, but what is very important is whether or not the issue concerns problems of “source of livelihood”. If the issue concerns “source of livelihood” or “problems of the stomach”, as the fishermen say, then the conflict tends to be violent, even though such issues are categorized as “realistic issues”. Furthermore, a conflict also tends to be violent when various “peaceful means” have been attempted but the results have not satisfied the “subordinate class”, espe- cially when the “dominant class” breached the agreement that has been entered into. Such circumstances will make the subordinate class feel frustrated; their anger will increase and accumulate, thus triggering them to use the “violent means”.

7.2.6 Importance of Common Problem or Common Enemy

As noted earlier, I would argue that common problem or common enemy is crucial in the construction process of class consciousness, class formation, and class strug- gle. The common problem or common enemy factor experienced or felt by people within the same class location is the direct trigger of the emergence of class con- sciousness as well as class struggle. This is consistent with Lewis Coser’s (1956) who says that different or even antagonistic groups can be “united” albeit only tem- 7.2 Theory Implication 149 porarily by the “common danger” that they are facing. Naturally, class conscious- ness, class formation, and class struggle are not merely influenced by a common problem. As previously mentioned, various other factors also influence this process. However, I just want to emphasize that this factor of common problem plays a very important role in that process. Moreover, according to Stavenhagen (1975), class consciousness itself is a “link” that transforms class-in-itself into class-for-itself. This opinion seems to correspond with Dahrendorf’s opinion. According to Dahrendorf, “the force that effect class formation is class interest. In a sense, class interests precede the formation of classes” (Dahrendorf 1963: 14). In his turn, Coser mentions that class-in-itself will turn into class-for-itself when people in the same class location are involved in a common struggle. He says: “… potentiality is transformed into actuality, Klasse an sich (class in itself) into Klasse fuer sich (the class for itself), only when it comes to occupying similar positions; a network of communication develops, and then thereby becomes conscious of their mutual fate” (Coser 1977: 48–49). In his book titled “The Function of Social Conflict”, Coser (1956) also emphasizes the importance of the involvement of a social class member in a conflict or struggle in the creation of class consciousness. “Only through and in action can its members become conscious and aware of their class identity,” Coser says. Coser’s concept is in line with Fairley’s view, who men- tions that “… class formation and social development are seen as effects of the struggles of concrete actors …”. Based on those various opinions and in relation to the result of this research, in my opinion the relationship between class consciousness, class formation, and class struggle is dialectical. That is, class consciousness encourages class formation, but reversely class formation will also reinforce class consciousness. Class conscious- ness promotes class struggle, yet class struggle also strengthens class conscious- ness. On the other side, class formation will encourage class struggle, yet in its turn class struggle also strengthens class formation. Nevertheless, as earlier mentioned, the triggering factor in this process is the presence of a common problem or com- mon enemy, which encourages the emergence of class consciousness and/or class struggle. Schematically the relationship between mutual problem and the dialectical pro- cess of class consciousness, class formation, and class struggle is presented in Picture 7.4. It should be noted that Picture 7.4 does not intend to describe all the factors that influence the formation process of class consciousness, class formation, and class struggle, but rather it shows the relationship between the common prob- lem itself with those processes. The above description also concurrently confirms that I do not adhere to the concept mentioned by Carchedi (1989) as structuralism or deterministic, namely the structure that determines class consciousness. However, I do agree with Carchedi that the relationship between class structure and class consciousness is dialectical or mutually influential. He says, The“ dialectical method does not consider phenom- ena as dependent and independent variables. Rather, there are determinants and determined social phenomena. They all interact with, and modify, each other so that a certain instance’s realization is the result of the interaction of all instances, deter- 150 7 Conclusion

Common Problems

Class Consciousness

Class Class

Picture 7.4 Common problems and dialectics of class consciousness, class formation and class struggle minant as well as determined” (Carchedi 1989: 119). As previously described, the fragmentation (and communication) within class members, leadership, class perme- ability, government policy, fisherman organizations, and mass media, also influence the formation process of class consciousness and class formation. The role of the actor (agency) in the change of fisherman class structure in Balikpapan can also be seen in the history of the development of fish-capture tech- nology in Balikpapan. Changes in fish-capture technology among fishermen in Balikpapan are characterized by the individual initiative of fishermen and financiers (actors) in their attempts to improve their catch as well as to make the work “lighter”, for example, by replacing paddles and screens with engines, replacing small engines with large ones, replacing net material from yarn to nylon, and so on. Thus, to use Marxist language, the superstructure is not only a reflection of or determined by the base, but it has a certain dynamic and degree of autonomy. This is in line Neo-­ Marxists’ thoughts, including the Frankfurt School (see Turner 1998, for example). On the other hand, the class conflicts occuring among fishermen in Balikpapan waters (Makassar Strait) also show the influence of class structure on behaviour pat- terns (mindset, attitude, and action) of an individual (actor). Middle-class fishermen (the pejala), for example, have an antagonistic attitude against large capitalist fish- ermen (purse seine). This is similar also to the relationship between the big mer- 7.3 Policy Implication 151 chant class (the penyambang) and Balikpapan “traditional” fishermen, and eventhe small merchant class in Manggar area. So, just like Roger Sibeon’s concept (2004) that he refers to as “dualism”, the agency and structure are “separable, relatively autonomous elements … whose interconnections remain to be empirically discov- ered in each instance …” (Sibeon 2004: 75).

7.3 Policy Implication

The findings in this study also have implication toward policy. Some of the policy implications relate to the issues discussed in the preceding section are as follows:

7.3.1 Domination in Fish-Capture Process

In relation to domination problem, it is necessary to make a policy that deliberately reduces, even eliminates the domination of one fisherman class by another fisher- man class in the production or fish-capture process. There are two strategies that can be done to reduce or eliminate that. The first one is to equalize the technology levels of fishermen operating in the same fishing ground. Equalizing of technology can be done in two ways. The first is by improving the “lower class” fishermen’s technol- ogy to be equal to that of the “upper-class” fishermen. However, this method is not easy to implement. The first factor is the “lower class” fishermen’s weakness in terms of financial capital. As a case sample, most “traditional” fishermen in Balikpapan will not be able to own a modern purse seine vessel and fishing gear because of the lack of financial capital. In addition to the weak financial capacity, the changes in capture technology from the types that they traditionally use to new types of fishing gear such as purse seine obviously require various changes that fol- low, such as work pattern and social relationship. Furthermore, the use of purse seine by Balikpapan’s “traditional” fishermen can lead to a situation where ownership of financial capital and means of production is increasingly concentrated with only a few fisherman elites/financiers. Small and middle-class fishermen may be “forced” to turn into laborer (ABK) on purse seine fishing gear owned by capitalist fishermen or thepunggawa . Consequently, prole- tarianization among fishermen will take place. In addition, the adoption of purse seine technology by some elite fishermen or financiers in Balikpapan has high potential to lead to class conflict between fellow Balikpapan fishermen themselves. A very influential fisherman in East Balikpapan, Mr. H. Taher, has been repeatedly persuaded by purse seine fishermen from Java to work together. In the 1990s, a purse seine fisherman from Pekalongan asked Mr. H. Taher to help him operate in Balikpapan’s waters. The purse seine fisherman was willing to hand over two of his five purse seine vessels to be managed by Mr. H. Taher, provided that Mr. H. Taher would secure his purse seine vessel operation in Balikpapan area. Mr. 152 7 Conclusion

H. Taher rejected the offer, and at the time he said: “I do not want to kill the small people” (meaning the “traditional” fishermen). He also said: “Your gear is not suit- able in the waters near traditional fishermen in Balikpapan. Do not disturb them” (interviewed on 8/09/06). Ecologically, massive use of purse seine fishing gear in Makassar Strait is also dangerous. The “traditional” fishermen in Balikpapan predict that if they all also use purse seine fishing gear in Makassar Strait, the fish resources may be depleted within 2–5 years’ time. Thus, the future of these fishermen, their children and grandchildren will be dark. Rejection by Balikpapan “traditional” fishermen to point 4 of the Semarang meeting result concerning the idea of technology transfer was due to this ecological reason. According to them, they are able to build a decent life with the current technology they use. The sustainability of fishery resources can also be maintained for a prolonged period of time because the fish are not exploited massively in a very short time. Thus, the option to equalize technology level by rais- ing the Balikpapan “traditional” fishermen’s class becomes a difficult issue. Equalizing the level of technology can also be done by lowering the big fisher- men/capitalists’ technology level so as to be equivalent to the level of technology of the “traditional” fishermen. However, this option will most likely be rejected by the big fishermen/capitalist. Thus, the strategy of eliminating class domination through equation of level of technology does not seem to be an easy option. The reduction or elimination of this class domination can also be done through the second strategy, namely by fishing ground zoning. The arrangement of this fish- ing ground zoning should be done by putting into consideration the domination distance of the “upper” class fishermen. To illustrate, if the domination distance of purse seine fishermen to the “traditional” fishermen’s FAD nets stretches to 15 miles, for example, the purse seine fishermen’s area of operaton should be separated by a minimum of 15 miles from the “traditional” fishermen’s and FAD nets. In other words, purse seine fishermen should not operate within a perimeter of 15 miles around FAD nets. This domination distance can be defined as the “free zone”. Small or “traditional” fishermen may be allowed to operate in these free zones, but they should not protest or complain if they do not get the catch due to the domination of the purse seine fishermen, since the area is actually within the domination of the purse seine fishermen.

7.3.2 “Traditional Right” of the Fishing Ground

“Traditional fishermen in Balikpapan have been practicing capture fisheries for gen- erations around Balikpapan waters. For fishermen who use fishing net, the fishing ground reaches 40 miles or more. The “traditional” fishermen of Balikpapan do not claim that the area belongs to them. They generally think that the sea is “common property”, and that everyone has the right to carry out fishing activities there. However, they demand that their “utilization right” is recognized and respected. Therefore, they feel entitled to refuse or forbid outside fishermen from entering the 7.3 Policy Implication 153 fishing ground if they use larger and more sophisticated fishing gear than what they have been traditionally using all this time. Based on the facts on the ground, I suggest that the “traditional utilization rights” that the “traditional” fishermen in Balikpapan are entitled to is officially recognized. Without official recognition of traditional utilization rights, many of these tradi- tional “fishermen” such as in Balikpapan will be marginalized and “displaced” from their hereditary fishing ground. The arrangement of fishing ground zoning between lower-class fishermen and other upper-class fishermen that might come upin the future and should be implemented by referring to or starting from that idea of tradi- tional fishing ground. Since the “traditional fishing ground zone” covers an area of up to or more than 12 miles, it is recognized under the authority of the national government or the national office of the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheris (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan or DKP). Furthermore, to facilitate its man- agement, the DKP may delegate the authority of that “traditional fishing ground zone” management to the local administration (Balikpapan City Government and the Office of Fisheries and Maritime of Balikpapan City). Establishment of this “traditional fishing ground zone” has a strong legal basis. In Article 2 of Law No. 45/2009 concerning Amendment to Law No. 31/2004 con- cerning Fisheries, for example, stipulates that, “Managemen of fisheries is based on the principles of benefit, justice, togetherness, partnership, independence, equity, integration, transparency, efficiency, preservation and sustainable development”. Moreover, Article 7 also explains the various authorities that the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries has in order to support the fisheries resources management policy, such as establishing “areas, lanes, and times or fishing seasons” (letter h). Recognition of traditional rights in fshing ground zoning is inseparable from the attempts to avoid the domination of upper-class fishermen over lower-class fisher- men. In other words, this is one means to avoid the “survival of the fittest” competi- tion, and instead creating a “fair competition” practice among fishermen. If this traditional right is not legally recognized then the upper-class fishermen will have justification to operate in the same area as the lower-class fishermen’s fishing ground, and so the domination will occur, thus triggering class conflict.

7.3.3 Fishing Lanes

Ministerial Decree no. 392/1999 divides fishing lanes into 3, namely lane I (0–6 miles), lane II (6–12 miles), and lane III (12–200 miles or beyond the bound- ary of the Exclusive Economic Zone/ZEE). It is explained that on lane III; fish-­ capture activities for Indonesian-flagged fishing vessels that are smaller or equal to 200 GT are permitted, except those using a large purse seine in Tomini Bay, Maluku Sea, Seram Sea, Flores Sea and Sawu Sea that are forbidden for all sizes”. Based on this Ministerial Decree, operating purse seine fishing gear in Makassar Strait within 12 nautical miles is still permitted. In fact, as described above, the traditional fishing ground zone of Balikpapan fishermen stretches up to 40 miles. Therefore, Decree 154 7 Conclusion

392/1999 needs to be amended, for example, by adding an explanation that the enforcement of the fishing lane may be an exception, depending on locally specific management system (including fishing zone). The amendment should be drafted in the context of avoiding the domination of upper-class fishermen over the lower-class fishermen. Without the amendment of this Ministerial Decree, the upper-class fishermen will have a legal basis to legiti- mize their operation within the lower-class fishermen’s fishing ground, after which domination will occur, which in turn will trigger conflict between upper- class and lower-class fishermen.

7.3.4 Comprehensive Conflict Prevention and Resolution

To handle the fishermen conflict so as not to be destructive, it is necessary to take preventive action. Better preventive action can be taken if the latent conflicts among the fishermen is adequately understood, such as the conflict type, the main “actor” and other relevant actors, key issues, local leadership pattern, local wisdom in con- flict management, etc. Furthermore, based on the understanding of the conflict potential, it is necessary to establish rules, both at the local and national levels, whether in the form of decree, regulations, and Law. Meanwhile, for a currently ongoing conflict, a quick “resolution” should be adopted. A protracted settlement or omission of a conflict will only heighten the escalation of the conflict, which in turn tends to be violent.

7.3.5 The Supervisory Agency for Fish-Capture Business (BPUP)

Leaving fishermen to compete against each other without “referees” will only lead to the so-called “social Darwinism”. In that system, the “law of the jungle” applies, namely, the strongest will prevail (survival of the fittest). If the law of the jungle is in force, destructive conflicts will certainly happen. Therefore, there is a need to establish an institution that acts as a “referee” governing the fishermen’ business activity. For that purpose, it is then necessary to establish a “supervisory agency” or BPUP at all government levels (national, provincial, and district/city). Members of this agency should consist of various parties, namely fishermen, customary figures, religious leaders, community leaders, NGOs, and fishermen organizations, mem- bers of the Regional House of Representative/DPRD, government officials, and aca- demics/experts. In the political field, there is an election supervisory agency known as the Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu); in broadcasting there is also a broadcasting supervisory institution; in business, Indonesia has the Business Competition Supervisory Commission; thus, the establishment of this “capture fish- 7.3 Policy Implication 155 ing business watchdog” is not something unusual and extraordinary. This agency is tasked or mandated to oversee fish-capture activities, including monitoring the com- petition and conflicts among the fishermen that might occur during the activities. In addition, this agency can provide references and recommendations in dealing with fishermen conflicts comprehensively as mentioned in point 7.3.4. above. It is expected that with the presence of the supervisory body fishermen in Indonesia are no longer involved in destructive conflicts that often prevent them from working peacefully.

7.3.6 Fisherman Laborer Organization

In order to increase the fisherman laborers’ bargaining position, it is very important to establish an organization or association of fisherman laborers. In the early stage, a group of fisherman laborers can be formed based on each fishing gear type. Moreover, it would then be better if later on the association will be open for all fisherman laborers in Balikpapan. The program does not need to be ostentatious. Improving togetherness and fos- tering solidarity through organizing monthly or bi-monthly social gathering should be sufficient for the early stage. In this case, an active role of a person who has a “concern” about the life of the fisherman laborers is needed to start this kind of col- lective action. The AMN activisits or academics and students from local universities in Balikpapan could play the role as the motivator and initiator.

7.3.7 Fisherman Cooperative

Establishing a fisherman cooperative that really aims at improving the economic condition of fishermen, both workers and owners, particularly the small and middle-­ class fishermen is also very important. The presence of a strong fishermen coopera- tive that could help in providing fishermen’ various purposes, including business capital, will be very useful in improving fishermen’ lives. However, it is not easy to establish a cooperative for fishermen. It also needs the role of people who have noble idealism, honesty, and someone who really wants to bring improvements in the lives of fishermen; the working mechanism of the coop- erative also needs to be decided. It seems necessary to do an experiment in estab- lishing a fisherman cooperative where its work mechanism could be as similar as possible to the work mechanism of the financier, namely by building patron- client relationship with the fishermen. However, the fisherman cooperative carries out a social mission, namely to be seriously committed to improve the living standards of fishermen. 156 7 Conclusion

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Neis, Barbara. 1981. Competitive Merchants and Class Struggle in Newfoundland. Studies in Political Economy 5 (Spring): 127–143.

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Shaliza, Fara. 2004. Dinamika Konflik Antar Komunitas dan Transformasi Modal Sosial (Studi Kasus Konflik antara Komunitas Nelayan Parit III dan Melati di Kabupaten Bengkalis, Provinsi Riau). Tesis Magister Sains pada Program Studi Sosiologi Pedesaan, Sekolah Pascasarjana, Institut Pertanian Bogor. Glossary

Cancoan Fish taken by the workers (fisherman laborers) after they go to sea, for their own consumption (not for sale). Dogol A type of Danish seine fishing gear which operation is similar to that of the mini trawl (for the case in Balikpapan) Gae The local name given for mini purse seine fishing gear Jaring Rambo The local name for boat-operated lift net Penyambang The big capitalists who buy fish at sea. Their crew will would approach fishermen at sea by using quite a large vessel Punggawa Financier. A financier may also concurrently position himself as a fish- ing gear owner. Rengge The local name for gillnet. Rumpon A fish-aggregating device (FAD) that is put in the sea, made from coconut or nipah (nypa fruticans) leaves Sawi Fisherman laborer or “subordinate”

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Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 1975. Social Classes in Agrarian Societies. Trans. Judy Alder Hellman. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday. Turner, Jonathan H. 1998. The Structure of Sociological Theory. 5th ed. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont. Vago, Steven. 1989. Social Change. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs. Van Parijs, Philippe. 1989. A Revolution in Class Theory. In The Debate on Classes, ed. Erik Olin Wright et al. London: Verso. Winson, Anthony. 1992. The Intimate Commodity: Food and the Development of the Agro-­ Industrial Complex in Canada. Toronto: Garamond Press. Wallace, Ruth A., and Alison Wolf. 1999. Contemporary Sociological Theory. Expanding the Classical Tradition. 5th ed. Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River. Weber, Max. 1978. In Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenter Roth and Clauss Wittich, vol. 1 and 2. London: University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles. Wright, Erik Olin. 1987. Classes. London-New York: Verso. ———. 1991. The Conceptual Status of Class Structure in Class Analysis. In Bringing Class Back In. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives, ed. Scott G. McNall, Rhonda F. Levine, and Rick Fantasia. Boulder: Westview Press. Yamin, Muhammad dan Dhe. 2005. Sisi Gelap Kehidupan Nelayan Deli Serdang. In Potret Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Petani dan Nelayan, ed. Nur Hafsah (Penyunting). Jakarta: Sekretariat Bina desa.

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Bailey, Conner. 1988. “The Political Economy of Marine Fisheries Development in Indonesia”. Indonesia No. 46 (Oct). Cornell Southeast Asia Program. Charles, Anthony T. 1992. “Fishery Conflicts. A Unified Framework”. Marine Policy, September 1992. Frey, R. Scott, Thomas Dietz, and Linda Kalof. 1992. Characteristics of Succesful American Protest Groups: Another Look at Gamson’s Strategy of Social Protest. American Journal of Sociology 98 (2): 368–387. Goldthorpe, John H. 2000. Rent, Class Conflict, and Class Structure: A Commentary on Sorensen. American Journal of Sociology 105 (6): 1572–1582. Kohn, Melvin L., et al. 1990. Position in the Class Structure and Psychological Functioning in the United States, Japan, and Poland. American Journal of Sociology 95 (4): 964–1008. Logan, John R. 1977. Affluent, Class Structure, and Working-Class Consciousness in Modern Spain. American Journal of Sociology 83 (2): 386–402. Macdonald, Martha, and M. Patricia Connelly. 1989. Class and Gender in Fishing Communities in Nova Scotia. Studies in Political Economy 30 (Autumn): 61–85. Muszynski, Alicja. 1986. Class Formation and Class Consciousness: The Making of Shoreworkers in the BC Fishing Industry. Studies in Political Economy 20 (Summer): 85–116. Neis, Barbara. 1981. Competitive Merchants and Class Struggle in Newfoundland. Studies in Political Economy 5 (Spring): 127–143. Oberschall, Anthony. 1978. Theories of Social Conflict. Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978): 291–315. Portes, Alejandro. 1971. Political Primitivism, Differential Socialization, and Lower-Class Leftist Radicalism. American Sociological Review 36: 820–835. Stincombe, Arthur L. 1961. Agricultural Enterprise and Rural Class Relations. American Journal of Sociology LXVII (2): 165–176. 162 Bibliography

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Dissertations and Thesis

Adhuri, Dedi Supriadi. 2002. Selling the Sea, Fishing for Power: A Study of Conflict Over Marine Tenure in the Kei Islands, Eastern Indonesia. PhD Dissertation, The Australian National University. Betke, Friedhelm. 1988. Prospect of a “Blue Revolution” in Indonesian Fisheries: A Bureaucratic Dream or Grim Reality?. Disertasi, Bielefeld University, Jerman. Herwening, Eko. 2003. Modernisasi Perikanan dan Potensi Konflik (Studi Kasus di Kelurahan Pelabuhan Ratu, Kabupaten Sukabumi). Tesis Magister Sains pada Program Studi Sosiologi Pedesaan, Program Pascasarjana, Institut Pertanian Bogor. Jufri, Muhammad. 2006. Konflik Kenelayanan di Kepulauan Spermonde: Analisis Terhadap Peristiwa Konflik Antar Nelayan. Tesis S-2 Magister Manajemen Pembangunan Sosial, Departemen Sosiologi, Universitas Indonesia. Satria, Arif. 2000. Modernisasi Perikanan dan Mobilitas Sosial Nelayan (Studi Kasus Kelurahan Krapyak Lor Kodya Pekalongan Jawa Tengah). Tesis Magister Sains pada Program Studi Sosiologi Perdesaan, Program Pascasarjana, Institut Pertanian Bogor. Shaliza, Fara. 2004. Dinamika Konflik Antar Komunitas dan Transformasi Modal Sosial (Studi Kasus Konflik antara Komunitas Nelayan Parit III dan Melati di Kabupaten Bengkalis, Provinsi Riau). Tesis Magister Sains pada Program Studi Sosiologi Pedesaan, Sekolah Pascasarjana, Institut Pertanian Bogor.

Documents

Asosiasi Perikanan Indonesia (tanpa tahun). 16 Janurai 2006. Kasus Pembakaran KM Mutiara Sakti di Perairan Balikpapan, Kalimantan Timur Senin. Cabang Dinas Perikanan Balikpapan. 1996. Laporan Tahunan 1995. Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan, Direktorat Jenderal Perikanan Tangkap. 2006. Statistik Perikanan Tangkap Indonesia, 2004. Dewan Hankamnas dan BPP Teknologi. 1996. Benua Maritim Indonesia. Kantor Perikanan dan Kelautan Kota Balikpapan. 2006. Laporan Tahunan 2005. Pemerintah Kota Balikpapan. 2005. Profil Kota Balikpapan. ———. 2006. Menyongsong Tugas Pemimpin 5 Tahun ke Depan Kota Balikpapan. ———. tanpa tahun. Sekilas Kota Balikpapan. Pemerintah Kelurahan Manggar. 2006. Monografi Kelurahan Manggar. Januari s/d Juni 2006. Pemerintah Kota Balikpapan, Kelurahan Manggar Baru. 2006. Monografi Kelurahan. Januari – Juni 2006. Bibliography 163

Papers

Adhuri, Dedi Supriadi. 2004. “Setelah Reformasi: Pelajaran dari Konflik-konflik Perikanan Kontemporer”. Makalah disampaikan pada Seminar Nasional Sehari, “Membangun Politik Kelautan: Memadukan Dimensi Teknis, Manajerial, dan Sosial Budaya, Jakarta 8 September 2004. Hamid, Imdaad. 2006. “Makalah Walikota Balikpapan”. Disampaikan pada: Seminar Kesiapan Infrastruktur-Building Capacity Kota Balikpapan Dalam Rangka Menciptakan Daya Saing Perekonomian Daerah. Balikpapan, Selasa 8 Agustus 2006. Kinseng, Rilus A. 2006a. “Konflik Kelas di Kalangan Kaum Nelayan di Indonesia (Sebuah Catatan Awal)”. Makalah disampaikan pada Workshop Nasional Riset Sosial Ekonomi Kelautan dan Perikanan, Bogor 2–3 Agustus 2006. ———. 2006b. “Mengelola Konflik Nelayan: Belajar dari Kasus Balikpapan”. Makalah disam- paikan pada acara “Apresiasi Pengelolaan Sumber daya Ikan”, Bogor 14-16 November 2006.

Newspapers

Borneo Post. 2006. Penambahan Kuota Minah. Usulan Walikota Diragukan, September 20. Kaltim Post. 2004a. Nelayan Tuntut Rp 500 Ribu per Hari, September 9. ———. 2004b. Tuntutan Ganti Rugi Nelayan Kandas, September 29. ———. 2004c. Pemkot Somasi Pertamina, October 19. ———. 2004d. SNB Ancam Adang Seismik Laut dan Darat, December 29. ———. 2004e. SNB Blokir Kapal Seismik, December 30. ———. 2006a. Pembakaran Kapal Dilaporkan ke Kapolri, January 19. ———. 2006b. Nelayan Tolak Rumusan Semarang, January 20. ———. 2006c. Terkait Kapal yang Dibakar di Balikpapan, Tiga Bulan, Nelayan Jateng Tak Boleh Masuk, January 20. Kinseng, Rilus A. 1995. “Nelayan Kecil: “Maju Kena, Mundur Kena” (Suara Pembaruan, 29/8/95 hal 2). Kompas. 2005a. Tak Sanggup Beli Solar Rp 3.000 per Liter, Nelayan Tidak Melaut, April 12. ———. 2005b. Nelayan Banyuasin Tak Mampu Lepas dari Jeratan Utang Tauke, April 19. ———. 2006a. Kapal Ikan Jateng Dibakar di Perairan Kaltim, January 17. ———. 2006b. Konflik Nelayan Hambat Investasi, February 15. Post Metro Balikpapan. 2005. Lagi, Nelayan Manggar Desak Unocal, January 26. ———. 2006a. Diselesaikan Secara Damai, January 18. ———. 2006b. Kerugian Rp 1, 3 M Lebih, January 18. ———. 2006c. Kapolri Diminta Mengususut, January 19. ———. 2006d. Proses Pembakar Kapal!, January 19. ———. 2006e. Wakil Nakhoda Dipukul Nelayan, January 19. ———. 2006f. Nelayan Serbu Balai Kota, January 20. ———. 2006g. Para ABK Mutiara Sakti Pulang, January 20. ———. 2006h. Polisi Tetapkan 4 Tersangka, February 4. ———. 2006i. Pembakaran Kapal Dibahas, February 8. ———. 2006j. Pembakaran Kapal Direncanakan, February 20. ———. 2006k. Nelayan Manggar Baru “Teriak”, July 25. ———. 2006l. Nelayan Siap ‘Duduki’ UPms VI, September 6. ———. 2006m. Nelayan Bukan Basa Basi, September 17. Tribun Kaltim. 2004a. Sidang Gugatan Berkas Lantung Diserahkan, August 31. ———. 2004b. Nelayan Tuntut Ganti Rugi Rumpon, December 29. ———. 2005a. Pembayaran Paling Lambat 27 Januari, January 13. 164 Bibliography

———. 2005b. Penerima Ganti Rugi Rumpon 39 Nelayan, January 27. ———. 2005c. Nelayan Tuntut Ganti Rugi Rp 1 Miliar, June 21. ———. 2006a. Kapal Porssein Datang Tangkapan Berkurang, January 17. ———. 2006b. Pembakaran Itu Konflik Teknologi, January 20. ———. 2006c. Hari ini Nelayan Demo Krisis Minyak Tanah, September 13. ———. 2006d. Ganti Rugi Rumpon Berlarut-larut, September 29. Index

A Capitalistic production pattern, 19 Abundant season, 47 Capture process, 62, 98, 106, 144, 151–152 Activists, 79, 89, 91, 92, 94, 100, 121, 128 Case of coastal tourism, 136 Actor (agency), 150 City Mayor, 35, 76, 79, 80, 82, 93, 100, Agrarian revolution, 16 113–115, 117, 132, 134–137 Agriculture, 13, 16–18, 21, 23–25, 62, Class, 2, 10, 55, 69, 105, 141 132, 144 Class alliance, 101–103, 144, 146 Authority, 2, 11, 12, 46, 82, 91, 132, 133, 153 Class base, 11, 12, 55 Class consciousness, 13–15, 18, 25–28, 106, 108–111, 119, 122, 124, 136, 138, 141, B 142, 146, 148, 149 Balikpapan, 3, 22, 33, 55, 69, 105, 141 Class domination, 92–99, 142, 143, 152 Balikpapan Fishermen’s Union (SNB), 120, Class for itself, 13–15, 26, 105, 106, 111, 141, 125, 127–128, 142 142, 149 Big-scale fisher, 59–60 Class formation, 4, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20, Bipolar class, 11, 27, 144 27, 101, 105–139, 141, 142, 146, Boat, 5, 19, 39, 57, 69, 106, 142 148–150 Boat collision, 112–114, 125, 128, 139, 142 Class fraction, 137–139, 143, 146 Boat-operated lift net, 41, 43, 45, 49–51, 57, Class in itself, 12, 14, 15, 26, 105, 106, 111, 59, 60, 62, 71, 73–74, 93, 99, 101, 102, 141, 142, 149 106–108, 110, 115, 121, 135, 137, 148 Class permeability, 108–109, 142, 150 Brutal, 3, 26, 91, 96, 99–101, 134, 138, 139, Class situation, 11, 12 143, 144 Class structure, 11–14, 19, 25, 55–67, 69, 70, Bugis, 35, 36, 40, 44, 56, 60, 92, 93, 95, 96, 101, 105, 141, 146, 149, 150 100, 136 Class struggle, 4, 13–15, 18, 20, 26–28, 56, 101, 124, 146–149 Climate change, 2, 3, 24 C Coastline, 2, 38, 48, 49, 132 Cancoan, 70, 71, 112 Common enemy, 111–112, 122–139, 142, Capital, 12, 16, 19–21, 24, 27, 33, 34, 45, 56, 148–151 59, 64, 66, 102, 147, 151, 155 Common property, 2, 63, 98, 144, 152 Capitalist class, 11, 20, 60, 69, 137, 141 Common situation, 12 Capitalist fisher, 17, 22, 24–26, 60, 70, 73–74, Conflict management, 2, 86–91, 154 102, 108, 121, 141, 143, 145, 147, 148, Conflict pattern, 143–146 150, 151 Cooperative production pattern, 20

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 165 R. A. Kinseng, Class and Conflict in the Fishers’ Community in Indonesia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0986-5 166 Index

D 127, 128, 133, 135, 137–139, 142, 143, Demonstration, 114, 116–120, 122, 145, 146, 151–153, 155 124, 128, 131 Fishing ground, 2, 21, 22, 42, 51, 73, 82, 87, Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 88, 91, 95, 97, 99, 112–114, 119, (DKP), 93, 153 132–134, 139, 142, 151–154 Dependency, 16, 25, 110, 142 Fishing lanes, 132, 153–154 Dependent production pattern, 20 Fishing net, 3, 152 Destruction, 3, 154, 155 Fishing trip, 39, 50, 107, 108 Direct competition, 99, 144 Fixed lift net, 40, 49, 57 Discrete, 146 Fragmentation, 106–108, 142, 146, 150 Dock, 114–115 Fuel, 129 Dogol, 22, 40, 44–48, 57, 58, 64, 106, 115, Fuel oil, 24, 129 127, 136, 138 Full time fisher, 23 Dominant class, 12, 14, 15, 98, 111, 142, 147, 148 Domination distance, 98, 99, 147–148, 152 G Gae, 45, 59, 60, 121 Gill net, 40, 41, 48 E Gillnet fisher, 146 East Kalimantan, 3, 4, 6, 33, 34, 38, 80, 88, Gillnetter class relation, 43, 44, 106 90–94, 113, 117, 118, 122, 125, 126, Government, 3–5, 15, 18, 21, 28, 33–35, 128, 137 43, 45, 46, 66, 72, 75, 82, 87, 91, Employment relation, 12 93, 113, 115, 117, 119, 120, 122, Engines, 39, 42–45, 48, 57–60, 62, 64, 65, 69, 124, 126, 128–134, 136, 137, 139, 77, 112, 115, 132, 134, 150 142, 150, 153, 154 Enterprise, 17 Governor, 90, 91, 113, 114, 117, 132 Ethnic, 21, 22, 35, 40, 92, 93, 96, 109, 146 Exposure, 14, 17, 111 H External allocation, 21 Hearing, 82, 89 Extra part time fisher, 23 Hegemony, 67 Hierarchy, 145 Hook and line fisher, 41, 42, 44, 51–52, F 57–59, 64, 74, 137 Financial class, 5, 16, 61, 71, 147 Fish bomb, 74, 121 Fisher labor class, 26, 57, 61, 70, 102, 105, I 108, 141, 143, 145, 146 Independent production pattern, 19 Fishermen Community Alliance (AMN), Indonesian Fishermen Association 76, 77, 79, 87–89, 91, 94, 98, 100, (HNSI), 28, 82, 84, 93, 124, 136 115, 120, 121, 124–128, 136, 137, Internal allocation, 21 142, 155 Fisher organization, 124–125, 142, 154 Fisher owner class, 26, 27, 61, 64–67, 102, J 108, 142, 143, 145, 146 January incident, 75, 102 Fisher using dogol fishing gear, 44, 47, 127 Jaring Rambo nets, 99 Fishery jurisdiction, 21 Juragan (owner), 57, 62, 71, 141 Fishery production, 19 Juwana, 6, 57, 75–80, 88, 89, 92 Fishing class conflict, 3, 4, 11, 15–18, 21, 22, 25, 27, 69–103, 109, 141–146, 148, 150, 151, 153 K Fishing gear, 5, 19–22, 24, 26, 39–41, 43–52, Kerosene, 49, 112, 115–119, 128, 129, 134, 56–59, 64, 65, 73, 87, 90, 92, 93, 96, 137, 142 101, 102, 107–110, 112–115, 121, 124, Ketinting, 43, 44, 66 Index 167

L P Labor fisher, 3, 4, 25, 71, 93, 102 Paceklik, 24, 52 Labor fisher organization, 10, 105–112, 136, Pancing, 57 142, 150, 154, 155 Passive, 26, 40 Leader, 72, 74, 92, 93, 95, 111, 113, 117, 120, Patron-client, 62–64, 67, 110, 155 135, 136, 142, 150, 154 Payment system, 112, 142 Lift net, 40, 41, 44–46, 49, 59, 71, 73, 92, 93, Petty bourgeoisie, 12, 20, 55 99, 101, 102 Politic, 13–18, 20, 25, 28, 66, 100, 106, Livelihood, 2, 38, 97, 100, 101, 126, 135, 125–127, 129, 135–137, 154 143, 148 Political party, 28, 125, 135 Local capitalist fisher, 102, 142 Port, 34, 76–78, 88, 89, 112, 113, 124 Local parliament, 136, 137, 139 Poverty, 23, 25 Private property, 10, 98 Production factor, 16 M Production pattern, 19 Main part time fisher, 23 Professional worker, 12, 25, 69, 95, 141 Management mechanisms, 21 Profit-sharing system, 19, 22, 57, 62, 64, 111, Managers, 12 112, 142 Manggar, 36, 40–47, 50, 59, 61, 65, 66, 71, 76, Proletariat, 11 79, 89, 92, 95, 96, 107, 113–115, 117, Proletariat production pattern, 11 120, 124, 125, 132, 134–136, 138, 151 Purse seine, 3, 22, 45, 57, 70, 119, 141 Manggar Fish Auction Place (TPI), 42, 47, 76, 79, 89, 92, 93 Marine and Fisheries Office, 23 Q Marine biodiversity, 2 Qualitative methods, 4 Market, 11, 19, 24, 42, 47, 67, 97 Mass media, 128–129, 150 Material conditions of existence, 12 R Means of production, 10–12, 19, 20, 23, 24, Regional People’s Representative Assembly 38, 55, 69, 147, 151 (DPRD), 74, 88, 113, 115, 120, 124, Merchant, 5, 19, 20, 27, 60–61, 64–67, 121, 125, 128, 134, 136, 137, 139, 142, 154 147, 150–151 Residents, 35, 36, 38, 92, 107 Middle scale fisher, 56, 58–59, 67, 70, 73–74, Result allocation system, 21 137, 141, 148 Rough job labor, 23, 120 Migrant fisher, 63 Rural, 16 Mini trawl, 41, 42, 44, 48, 113, 127, 136, 138, 139 Modern fisher, 75–91, 99, 100, 107 S Motor boat (KM), 57, 60, 61, 75, 77–82, Sea leveling, 35 84–86, 90, 102, 132, 133 Seismic, 119–120, 122, 124, 128 Motor temple (outboard engine), 43, 69 Semi-labor, 55 Multidimensional class, 11, 36, 55 Shores, 39, 42, 44, 47, 48, 50, 52, 70, 89, 107 Significant others, 17 Skill, 11, 47, 110 N Skipper, 19, 47, 57, 60, 61, 77 Navy, 79, 85, 91 Small employer, 12, 55 Non-government organization (NGO), 4, 28, Small-scale fisher, 55, 58, 64, 65 126, 154 Snail trap, 40, 45, 50, 51, 57, 58, 101, 137 North season, 52 Social class, 3, 10–13, 15, 17–21, 25, 26, 55, 56, 60, 69, 101, 105, 106, 134, 137, 145–147, 149 O Social conflict, 1–3, 9–11, 15, 21–22, 25, 28, Open-access, 63 129, 145, 149 Ownership of means of production, 55 Social movements, 16, 18, 125, 128 168 Index

Source of life, 101, 143 Traditional fisher, 3, 6, 21, 22, 74–93, South season, 52, 139 95–102, 132, 133, 142, 144, 145, State, 18, 33, 139 147, 151–153 Stomach problem, 134 Traditional fishing boat, 6, 88, 96 Subordinate, 14–16, 61, 62, 70, 72, 98, 108, Traditional rights, 152–153 110, 111, 145, 148 Trawler fisher leader, 117, 135 Subsistence production pattern, 19 Supervisory Agency for Fish-Capture Business (BPUP), 154 V Vessel’s crew (ABK), 56, 151

T Tauke, 24, 60 W Tenurial system (ownership system), 95 Water Police, 77, 79, 113