Decentralisation in India Challenges & Opportunities

Discussion Paper Series - 1

United Nations Development Programme 55, Lodi Estate New Delhi - 110 003 India

The analysis and policy recommendations of this Paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or its Member States. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This discussion paper was prepared under the guidance and leadership of Dr. Brenda Gael McSweeney, UNDP Resident Representative & UN Resident Coordinator. The team from the HDRC comprises of the following: Dr. K. Seeta Prabhu, Dr. Suraj Kumar, Ms. Elena Borsatti, Mr. V. Srinivasan and Ms. Aparna Pande. Dr. R. Sudarshan developed the theme and outline of the paper.

We acknowledge with thanks the contributions of the following resource persons who prepared background papers for this study: Mr. Amitabh Mukhopadhyay, Prof. Niraja Gopal Jayal, Mr. S. S. Meenakshisundaram, Dr. Solomon Benjamin and Dr. Vinod Vyasulu.

Dr. Suraj Kumar and Mr. Peter Siegenthaler conducted a decentralisation mapping exercise of the UN system in India, for the India United Nations Development Assistance Framework, whose findings have been incorporated into the Paper. We would like to thank all members of the UN family for their cooperation and inputs.

We thank Ms. Daman Singh, Dr. Junaid Ahmed, Dr. P.S.A. Sundaram, Mr. R. Gopalakrishnan, Dr. Rajan Katoch, Dr. Ramanath Jha and Dr. Satyajit Singh for their suggestions and input on earlier outlines and drafts of the paper. The paper also benefited from feedback from colleagues within UNDP India Country Office.

Finally, we wish to thank all the participants at the National Consultation on Strengthening Decentralisation, held at New Delhi on 12 December 2000 for lively debate on various aspects of decentralisation. This paper benefited substantially from their views, experiences and expert comments. UNDP is grateful to Dr. Rohini Nayyar and her team at the Planning Commission for their partnership and support to the dialogue on Decentralisation. CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

PART I CURRENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR DECENTRALISATION 3 1 Purpose and Background 3 2 Historical Overview 4 3 Current Status and Key Features of Decentralisation in India 8 4 Constraints in Institutionalising Panchayats: Conformity and Operational Issues 8 4.1 Legal Issues and Litigation Surrounding Panchayati Raj 8 4.2 Relationships between Panchayati Raj Institution Levels 12 4.3 Panchayats and Line Departments: Operational Issues 14 4.4 Reforms Required for More Effective Linkages 16 5 Contribution of PRIs to Governance Structure 21 6 Decentralisation and Urban Local Bodies 24 6.1 Features and Critique 24 6.2 Urban Local bodies and Poverty Issues 26 6.3 Trends in Urbanisation and Civic Participation 26 7 Women’s Representation in Local Government: Creating a Politics of Presence 32 7.1 Backdrop of Legislation 33 7.2 Women and Elections to the New Panchayats 34 7.3 Women Representatives: Social and Economic Characteristics 35 7.4 Why Women Contest 37 7.5 Women’s Awareness of Panchayati Raj 37

PART II REVITALISING PUBLIC SYSTEMS THROUGH PEOPLE’S ACTION 50 8 Panchayat and Community Finance 50 8.1 Context 50 8.2 Panchayat Budgets 52 9 Accountability of Local Bodies 61 9.1 Accountability and Constitutional Status of Local Bodies 62 9.2 Transfer of Financial Powers and Desirable Structures of Accountability 63

iii 9.3 Municipal Finance Reforms 67 9.4 Accountability, Accounts and Audit 69 10 Women in Power (Security through Leadership): Where Do We Go From Here ? 74 10.1 Developmental Consequences of Women’s Representation 74 10.2 Emancipatory Impact of Women’s Representation 75 10.3 Policy Reform and Capacity-Building 77 10.4 The Long, Slow but Irreversible Route to Empowerment 78

PART III POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 79 11 Strengthening Decentralisation : UN Initiatives 79 11.1 National Priorities 79 11.2 Towards Decentralisation: Results from a UN Decentralisation Mapping Exercise 79 11.3 The Decentralisation Imperative 80 11.4 Decentralisation of Development Responsibilities – The Challenges 82 11.5 Key Elements of a Decentralisation Strategy 84

LIST OF BOXES Box 1 Mahatma Gandhi on Panchayati Raj 3 Box 2 Decentralisation: The National and Global Context 5 Box 3 Salient Features of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment 7 Box 4 Panchayats Dispense Justice 13 Box 5 The 74th Constitutional Amendment: The Urban Bill of Rights 24 Box 6 Who Will Make the Chapatis? 37 Box 7 Equity and Social Inclusion: Women’s Voices 49 Box 8 Administrative and Financial Devolution: Strengthening Local Domains 62 Box 9 Public Hearings and Accountability on Demand: Jan Sunvai 73 Box 10 UN Assistance to Strengthening Local Government Institutions 81 Box 11 UN Assistance to Community Management of Basic Services 81 Box 12 UN Assistance to Empowerment of Community Groups in Local Political Processes 82 Box 13 Grassroots Concerns for Panchayati Raj 82 Box 14 Issues for User Groups: Linkages with Communities, Civil Society Organisations and Local Bodies 85 Box 15 Community Driven Management: Avenues for Decentralisation 86

iv ABBREVIATIONS

BDO Block Development Officer CA Constitutional Amendment CAG Comptroller & Auditor General CBO Community Based Organisation CEO Chief Executive Officer Cr. P.C. Criminal Procedure Code CWDS Centre for Women’s Development Studies DDA District Development Authority DDC District Development Council DM District Magistrate DPC District Planning Committee DPEP District Primary Education Programme DRDA District Rural Development Agency DUDA District Urban Development Authority ICDS Integrated Child Development Scheme IDC Inter-District Council ILO International Labour Organisation IPC Indian Penal Code ISED Institute for Socio-Economic Development LAD Local Accounts Department MARG Multiple Action Research Group MKSS Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan MLA Member of Legislative Assembly MMR Monthly Monitoring Report MP Member of Parliament MPC Metropolitan Planning Committee MPLADS MPs’ Local Area Development Scheme NCPRI National People’s Campaign for the Right to Information NGO Non Governmental Organisation OBC Other Backward Class PRI Panchayati Raj Institution SC Scheduled Caste SEC State Election Commission SFC State Finance Corporation SHG Self-Help Group ST Scheduled Tribe UNCHS United Nations Centre for Human Settlements UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDCP United Nations Drug Control Programme UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women ULB Urban Local Body WFP World Food Programme ZP Zila Panchayat / Zila Parishad v List of Background Papers

Amitabh Mukhopadhyaya. “Accountability and Audit of Panchayats”

Nirja Gopal Jayal. “Gender and Decentralisation”

S.S. Meenakshisundaram. “Relationship of Panchayats with Other Structures of Governance”

S.S. Meenakshisundaram. “Legal Issues Surrounding the Implementation of the

Constitutional Seventy Third Amendment” Solomon Benjamin. “The 74th Constitutional Amendment: A Livelihood & Developmental Perspective”

Vinod Vyasulu. “Panchayat Finances”

vi Executive Summary

The Context This document argues that rapid human development and strong local democracy go hand in Decentralisation and community driven manage- hand. Strengthening local democracy, in turn, ment acquire special importance in the context requires support to people’s participation in the of the ongoing process of globalisation and as- management of local resources and local insti- sociated economic reforms. While the process tutions. Enabling people’s action through local of globalisation acts in ways in which the market governance institutions will help overcome so- acquires supremacy to the detriment of people cial inequalities based on caste and gender. An- who lose control over their livelihood patterns as other objective of the document is to address well as other choices, the process of skepticism about the effectiveness of local in- decentralisation could act as a countervailing force stitutions (Panchayati Raj) as a viable approach enabling people to acquire control over decisions for poverty eradication and sustainable human that influence their lives in critical areas. development. India’s Ninth Five Year Plan as also the recent Macro Environment Mid-Term Review have noted that proper implementation of development programmes has The document attempts to articulate the con- Rapid human been hampered by the fact that benefits from nection (hitherto insufficiently emphasised in development and these have largely been appropriated by the lo- the literature) between economic dependency strong local cal elite. Participation of women and members of vulnerable groups on the local elite, on the democracy go of SC/ST communities in Gram Sabhas (vil- one hand, and effectiveness of local governance hand in hand lage councils) and Panchayat meetings is institutions in delivering basic services to the favoured to ensure representation of interests poor, on the other. Recognising the existence of the poor. The 73rd and 74th Amendments of structural impediments to the effective func- envisage the village panchayat/ ward council as tioning of local government institutions, this a forum and action point where local solutions document draws attention to the fact that the to local problems will remedy lacunae in bu- success of decentralisation depends critically on reaucratic, top-down schemes. Although na- the existence of a congenial macro policy frame- tional goals and aspirations are supportive of work that ensures the provision of livelihood decentralisation, during its implementation we security for the poor. The ingredients of a need to address concerns for inclusiveness, ac- “panchayat-friendly” macroeconomic and policy countability and effectiveness. For realising the regime need to be identified. The paper attempts progressive intent of national policy, elected lo- this exercise, based upon an analysis of the is- cal government institutions must be helped to sues pertaining to removal of administrative, become vehicles for social transformation, articulat- legal and procedural anomalies, structural de- ing the felt needs of the community, especially sign of the three-tier system, panchayat finance those of women and marginalised groups. and budgets, gender, urban poverty and liveli- Livelihood security for the poor would ensure hoods as also imperatives for future action, in effective participation and better mobilisation rural as well as urban areas. of local resources. Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 1 Administrative Procedures recommendations of the Eleventh Finance Commission, which analysed the issue of re- Several constraints in the institutionalisation of structuring Centre-State financial relations also Panchayati Raj stem from the fact that the in the light of the need to strengthen the fi- rationalisation of laws, administrative procedures nances of local bodies become relevant here. and systems has not kept pace with the consti- In the absence of such an approach, the trans- tutional sanction to local governance bodies. fer of financial powers to the third tier of gov- There is need to tailor government rules, ad- ernance would ultimately become a meaning- ministrative structures and procedures so that less exercise in transferring non-existent re- the local bodies have the necessary wherewithal sources. The issue of State finance reform can- to carry out their mandated duties. States such not therefore be seen in isolation from that of as Kerala and Madhya Pradesh have placed line greater and more effective fiscal devolution departments in several sectors under the con- through the national and State finance commis- trol of local bodies, a factor that has contrib- sions. uted to the resilience of their decentralisation initiatives. Decentralisation from Below In order to Strengthening the Gram Sabha is another im- The argument for greater devolution is based transform present portant step in this direction. Taking govern- on the experience of States such as Kerala, realities, it is ment closer to the people, to ensure that the Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, imperative to Gram Sabha serves as the empowered and proxi- which demonstrate that the transfer of funds, strengthen mate forum for local democracy, especially so functions and functionaries is the key to more decentralisation in regions characterized by a dispersed pattern successful decentralisation. Local bodies need to be from below, so of settlement is an essential step. The Panchayat seen as institutions of self-governance not as ‘delivery that voices of the Extension to Scheduled Areas Act, 1996, has mechanisms’. taken steps in this direction, by making the Gram poor could carry For this to happen, decentralisation from above Sabha the cornerstone of people’s empower- weight in village must converge with decentralisation from be- ment. The momentum of this initiative needs assemblies and low. This can achieved by forging links between to be built upon to ensure that the village as- ward council local bodies and informal associations and user sembly/ ward council becomes the centre-piece meetings groups. of local democracy. In brief, in order to transform present realities, Fiscal Devolution it is imperative to strengthen decentralisation The document addresses issues pertaining to from below, so that voices of the poor could fiscal devolution and argues that systems of due carry weight in village assemblies and ward coun- diligence must be put in place such that cil meetings. Apart from social mobilisation, this panchayat / municipal finance have sound legal can be accomplished by strengthening commu- and auditing underpinnings. The paper marshals nity networks and institutions. These would evidence that, with community-based mecha- build the capabilities of the poor, provide secu- nisms of transparency and accountability, the hard rity of livelihood and a safeguard against desti- budget constraint is strengthened, not undermined by fis- tution, hunger, disease and alienation. Initiatives cal devolution. that empower the poor, especially women to manage local resources and local institutions, are In the absence of transfer of financial powers steps in this direction. The success of the world’s (including revenue raising) and untied funds, largest experiment in deepening democracy Panchyati Raj Institutions and Urban Local ultimately depends upon the success of these Bodies will not be able to carry out their func- initiatives. tions and have credibility at the local level. The

2 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA PART I

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation

1. Purpose and Background existing malaise of bureaucracy and politics which hinders effective implementation of In an era of globalisation, decentralisation is programmes documented in the Mid Term the principal countervailing trend which can Review of the Ninth Plan. ensure that the growth process is pro-poor, pro-women, pro-nature and pro-jobs. As mar- It has been argued (e.g., Lieten 1996a) that the ket integration and technological innovation current functioning of panchayats fares poorly on the criteria of efficacy in service delivery, renders the national frontiers more permeable, It is crucial to put inclusiveness and accountability. Although na- it is crucial to put in place and strengthen sys- in place and tional goals and aspirations are supportive of tems of negotiation, regulation and strengthen decentralisation, the translation of aspirations decentralised governance. These can ensure systems of into reality requires strengthening the institu- that the voices and concerns of the poorest negotiation, tions of Panchayati Raj so that there is greater of the poor, in keeping with Mahatma regulation and linkage with informal people’s groups, user Gandhi’s message, are centre-stage in policy decentralised groups and also greater devolution of ‘funds, dialogue at the global, regional and governance national levels. (Box 1) functions and functionaries’. In the Indian context, economic reforms and The Eleventh Finance Commission’s recom- Panchayati Raj have been the two major policy mendations on strengthening panchayat and imperatives since the early 1990s. For both, it municipal finances by including local bodies is not so much the necessity of the policy direc- under the ambit of tax-base widening initiative, but its content and underpinnings that are be- tives through better exploitation of land based ing debated. Direct local democracy has been mandated constitutionally through the 73rd and BOX 1 Mahatma Gandhi on Panchayati Raj 74th Amendments. The principle of ‘Coop- erative Federalism’ (decentralised implemen- Every village has to become a self-suf- ates, in which no one is idle for want ficient republic. This does not require of work, in which everyone is use- tation based upon harmonious understand- brave resolutions. It requires brave, fully occupied and has nourishing ing between the three tiers of governance – corporate, intelligent work…. I have food, well-ventilated dwellings, and Centre, State and local - is the basic premise not pictured a poverty-stricken India sufficient Khadi for covering the of India’s Ninth Five Year Plan. However, the containing ignorant millions. I have body, and in which all the villagers actual progress of decentralisation has been pictured to myself an India continu- know and observe the laws of hygiene ally progressing along the lines best and sanitation. There is nothing in- uneven across States. In the absence of ad- suited to her genius. I do not, how- herently impossible in the picture equate financial clout, functioning of the ever, picture it as a third-class or even drawn here. To model such a village Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and Urban a first-class copy of the dying may be the work of a lifetime. Any Local Bodies (ULBs) have been severely con- civilisation of the West. If my dream lover of true democracy and village strained. In the absence of measures to is fulfilled, and every one of the seven life can take up a village, treat it as his lakhs of villages becomes a well-living world and sole work, and he will find strengthen public systems at the local republic in which there are no illiter- good results. level, panchayats run the same risk as the co- Source:R. Prabhu & UR Rao (eds), Village Republics: the Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, pp. 246-247, operatives of being co-opted into the Ahmedabad, Navjivan Press

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 3 taxes, better administration of property taxes poor to have a voice in governance, PRIs will and other taxes, are a step in this direction as also be constrained by the pathologies that go they catalyse greater fiscal devolution. This with entrenched power structures. Clearly, transfer needs to be governed by the vision of measures are needed whereby the poor can empowering people and reflected in comple- participate more effectively through PRIs and mentary measures, which build poor people’s local informal groups and people’s move- partnerships in the decisions taken by ments. Measures are required for addressing panchayats and municipal bodies, so that fis- the difficulties of institutionalising the partici- cal clout contributes to people’s power. pation of the poor in PRI functioning. This involves removing the legislative and proce- Like any strategy for fundamental democratic dural problems that constrain the Gram Sabha, change (and Panchayati Raj in India is one of greater devolution of funds, functions and the largest such “transformational experi- functionaries, putting in place mechanisms of ments”), the institutions of local governance audit and accountability and strengthening the tend to reflect the socioeconomic and politi- participation of women. cal milieu in which they are located. In India, the poor face multiple constraints emerging For realising the progressive intent of national from economic, political and social factors. The goals, elected local government institutions social constraints often derive strength from must be helped to become vehicles for social The institutions of religious beliefs and prevalent cultural norms. transformation, articulating felt needs of the local governance In the case of women, these are reinforced by community, especially those of women and tend to reflect the the pervasive discrimination based on gender. marginalised groups. Livelihood security for socioeconomic While each of these constraints is powerful the poor would ensure effective participation and political enough to impede upward mobility for the and better mobilisation of local resources. For milieu in which poor, what is daunting is that the constraints this to happen, it is imperative to strengthen they are located act in a mutually reinforcing manner render- Decentralisation from below, so that the voice ing the task of overcoming them virtually im- of the poor could carry weight in village as- possible for any single individual. Government semblies. Apart from social mobilisation, this policy aimed at amelioration of the living con- can be accomplished by strengthening com- ditions of the poor would have greater chances munity networks and institutions. These would of success if it were to be multi-pronged in build the capabilities of the poor, providing nature and coordinated in a manner that security of livelihood and a safeguard against synergises the effects of interventions in di- destitution, hunger, disease and alienation. Ini- verse fields. tiatives that empower the poor, especially women, to manage both village resources and It is in this context that the role of the village institutions, are steps in this direction. Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) acquires im- The success of local democracy depends upon portance, for they provide an opportunity to the success of these initiatives. The linkage undertake the implementation of coordinated between political, financial and economic action at the grass root level for the benefit of decentralisation is the key to a successful the disadvantaged sections of society. How- programme of pro-poor reform (see Box 2). ever, for such action to actually materialise, it is necessary that mechanisms to counter local 2. Historical Overview power structures are built into the process of Decentralisation. In the absence of a rights- In order to understand the crucial dynamics based approach that fosters mobilising the of Panchayati Raj, it is instructive to assay the

4 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA evolution of institutions of Indian village “de- had been transformed. These legislations were mocracy”, a subject of heated debate in the not prompted by any regard for customary law Constituent Assembly. or traditional wisdom that might express itself as the general will of the people. They In pre-British India, both caste and village were considered necessary as agencies for de- panchayats existed. Caste panchayats were velopment of the rational-legal institutions of concerned with issues related to jajmani, mar- representative government. Arguing for bud- riage, and rituals. Village panchayats consisted getary freedom for development functions to of elders of prominent households in a vil- be performed by local bodies, Lord Ripon’s lage (whether family of original clearers of the Resolution of 1880 stressed that the educa- The role of land for cultivation or family of superior caste tive principle of training people to participate panchayats as who was granted the village by a political pa- in representative institutions of government institutions tron). They were concerned primarily with ad- should not be subordinated to demands for administering judicating civil disputes of residents related to efficiency in development activities. The Ben- justice was rights in land and administering criminal jus- gal Municipal Act of 1884 and Bengal Local eliminated by the tice. They also performed regulatory functions Self-Government Act,1885 were informed by British Raj related to village commons (grazing lands, this philosophy. woods and water bodies). Responsibility for payment of tithes and taxes was, strictly speak- In 1919, to ease the burden on imperial fi- ing, not their concern; the revenue systems nances and bring to bear local supervision and introduced since the times of Sher Shah Suri vigilance on development activities, local took care of these. They did, nevertheless, have bodies were re-legislated to life in other some say by way of counseling the village residents on matters related to allegiance owed to BOX 2 different political masters like zamindars/ Decentralisation : The National and Global Context subedars/riyasats and so on. International experience bears out the success of reform programmes in close link between reform and such contexts. The role of panchayats as institutions admin- Decentralisation. Apart from the The issue of sequencing and forms istering justice was eliminated by the British theoretical logic of a reduced role of of Decentralisation, therefore, as- Raj. Legislation in 1860 such as the Indian Pe- government creating opportunities sumes much significance. In the both for private enterprise and for above-mentioned countries, only nal Code (IPC), Criminal Procedure Code community action, in many countries South Africa has undertaken the most (Cr.P.C.), Contract Act etc., along with Baden- actual reform programme has been comprehensive devolution of powers Powell’s schema for land revenue settlements built upon increasing institutional to the third tier. In China, the reforms supplanted the customary/traditional law. space for Decentralisation. Reform were not related to political freedom. Collectorates and courts usurped powers of programmes in developing countries/ Indeed, that is proving to be a hin- transition economies as diverse in drance as China integrates more into caste/village panchayats to establish the rule range as Poland, Chile, Argentina and the global economy through institu- of law. The impact of the IPC and Cr.P.C. on South Africa and China, the autonomy tions such as the World Trade transplanting European notions of equality to to local units in decisions on incen- Organisation (WTO). Indian soil remains under-researched; we ven- tives for investment and capital mar- Political Decentralisation provides a ture to suggest that it was as significant as land ket access, has given a strong founda- more durable ‘rational-legal’ frame- tion to reforms. In the case of China, work that makes Decentralisation an reforms or social movements. For now it is the Town & Village Enterprises integral part of the political and civic sufficient to flag the point that the flexibility (TVEs) were given a wide range of discourse. India is the world leader in of customary law contrasted with the rigid powers in matters relating to resource creating space for political structures of the rule of law. mobilisation, user fees, and recruit- decentralisation. Now the concomi- ment of experts, apart from imple- tant arenas of fiscal devolution and When village panchayats were re-legislated to mentation responsibilities that they economic decentralisation require life in India as ‘local bodies’, their character already had. Clearly, economic greater attention by policy research- decentralisation has been the key to ers.

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 5 presidencies. The taluka/tehsil served as the Panchayati Raj was a strategy for rural devel- basic unit for local boards, assigned subjects opment in a context of centralism that was such as sanitation, education and health, with then seen as a historical necessity. The moral powers to levy fees and taxes. Provincial gov- weight of the national movement required that ernments in 1935 wrested the power to enact the aspirations of the peasantry to better con- legislation on local self-government. Acts were ditions of life be fulfilled. The Government voted by provincial governments to vest pow- that came to power initiated land reforms and ers of administration, sometimes including institutional change to do away with nefari- criminal justice, with the panchayats. ous traditions of discrimination and domination based on religion and caste. This required However, it is noteworthy that several of the the will of strong Central and State Govern- legislations of provincial governments on ments to be pitted against local vested inter- Panchayati Raj carried over to the post-inde- ests, whether landlords or ‘superior castes’. pendence scenario were legislated between Moreover, land revenues had to be reduced 1947 and 1950 (i.e. prior to the adoption of and since income levels were low and highly the Constitution). All of them provided for skewed between individuals and regions, reli- panchayats by and large co-terminus with ad- ance on the spread of indirect rather than the ministrative units like the Patwari Circle, narrow incidence of direct taxes was neces- Tehsil/ Taluka and District. The provincial sary which naturally resulted in a centralised governments jealously guarded their interests system of finance. These constraints, along In the 1950s, by providing for powers of the Collector to with others related to the legacy of the Raj, Panchayati Raj supersede the decisions of apex level district partition of the country and the enthusiasm was a Central bodies. Government for a planned economy, shaped centralism. strategy for rural While distributing powers between the Union However, this centralism was not conducive development and the States, the Constitution of India at to the growth in the status of local bodies. Article 40 (Directive Principles of State Policy) As the funding for Community Development vested local bodies and Panchayati Raj as a projects dried up by the mid-1960s, panchayats subject with the States but did not further stagnated. They languished for decades with- elaborate on the relations between the States out funds, superseded by decisions of district and this third tier of Government. Panchayati collectors, without elections being held to re- Raj was given another lease of life in the con- constitute them and remained insufficient to text of community development projects provide representation for women, Scheduled launched in 1952. The Balwantrai Mehta Com- Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In a few States mittee Report in 1957 underlined the role of efforts were made to revive them after the elected Panchayat Samitis at the community Ashok Mehta Committee Report was submit- development block/tehsil level as the basic ted in 1978. This Committee recommended unit of democratic decentralisation. Only an grouping of a number of villages to consti- advisory role was contemplated for the Zila tute a mandal panchayat covering a popula- Parishads constituted of panchayat samiti tion of 15,000 to 20,000. Andhra Pradesh and heads chaired by the Collector. However, the Karnataka tried out such mandal panchayats. legislation that followed the Committee’s Re- It is significant that in a dissenting note, the port basically continued the earlier enactments late EMS Namboodiripad, a member of this of Provincial Governments to re-iterate the Committee, pointed out the bureaucratic bias three-tier structure and provide for over-riding in constituting panchayats on the basis of ad- powers of the State Government acting ministrative units instead of corporate bodies through the Collector.

6 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA with face to face relations as obtained in a the details as to the powers and functions of single village. The important place assigned the various organs. All States have enacted new to gram sabhas in the schema of participa- Acts or incorporated changes in their existing tion in our development Programmes in re- Acts in conformity with the 73rd and cent years, especially in the Panchayati Raj Ex- 74th Amendments. The salient features of the tension to Scheduled Areas Act 1996, vindi- 73rd Constitutional Amendment are given cates the significance of this dissenting view. in Box 3. In the absence of functioning district and sub- 4. Constraints in Institutionalising district level development institutions, in 1979- Panchayats: Conformity and 80, the District Rural Development Agencies Operational Issues (DRDAs) were jointly registered by the Union and State Governments in each district as so- 4.1 Legal Issues and Litigation cieties under the Societies Registration Act, Surrounding Panchayati Raj 1860. They served as conduits of finance to Although expectations have been raised by by-pass budgetary procedures of the State providing Constitutional status to the PRIs, Governments and implement poverty in actual practice, at the operational level, they alleviation programmes sponsored by the Cen- appear to have been saddled with a variety of tral Government. Similar district level societ- problems. There are many impediments af- ies mushroomed for implementing fecting the functioning of the PRIs in several It is through the programmes for industries, fisheries, adult edu- States with regard to structural pattern, com- Gram Sabha that cation, primary education of children, equality position of Panchayats, organic linkages be- the elected for women, women’s employment and so on. tween PRIs, electoral process, concept of ro- representative is The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments tation in the case of reserved seats, devolu- made in 1992-93 have ushered in the present phase tion of powers and functions, bureaucratic accountable to where panchayats are described as institutions control over local bodies etc. It is useful to the electorate of local self-government, and are expected to analyse some of the legal issues surrounding prepare plans for economic development and the implementation of the Act and examine social justice. There are now approximately the need to have a further amendment to 250,000 Gram Panchayats, 6500 Panchayat revitalise PRIs so as to make them vibrant. Samitis and 500 Zila Parishads duly elected Distance from the Gram Sabha and governed by State legislation. To function effectively, these require rationalisation of The Gram Sabha, which was a pivot of the district and sub-district administrative ap- Panchayati Raj in the new dispensation, has paratus consistent with the State level Con- been sidelined in many cases. It is through the formity Acts. Gram Sabha that the elected representative is made accountable to the electorate. This pre- 3. Current Status and Key supposes two things. Firstly, if the participa- Features of Decentralisation tion in gram sabha has to be meaningful the in India gathering cannot be large. Secondly, the gram sabha should meet periodically and the sub- The Amendments inserted Parts IX relating jects placed before it are such that they attract to panchayats and IX A relating to munici- public attention. Only then, the electorate will palities in the Constitution. Articles 243-243O have any interest to attend the gram sabha, and 243P - 243ZG of the Constitution are in foregoing their day’s income. Unfortunately, the nature of basic provisions supplemented the Act does not appear to provide for both by laws of the respective States, which define Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 7 these requirements explicitly. While in some ters village of the panchayat, citizens from the States, the gram sabha meetings take place in other villages either do not attend the gram every village whenever the village panchayat sabha or are reluctant to articulate their needs. consists of more than one village, in some Unless each village has a gram sabha of its other States only one composite gram sabha own, the purpose of accountability may not is convened for all the villages which consti- be served, especially when the village tute the gram panchayat. Since this compos- panchayat serves a population of a few ite gram sabha is usually held in the headquar- thousand.

BOX 3 Salient Features of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment

Continuity: By providing for duration of less than one-third of the seats so reserved stipulate by rules the tenure and conditions 5 years for an elected panchayat and re-elec- are further reserved for women belonging of their service. tion of panchayats before expiry or within to SC/ST. Besides this, not less than one- Finance Commission: Governors of States six months of their dissolution as well as third of the total number of seats in a are also empowered to constitute State Fi- non-interference by Courts in electoral mat- panchayat are reserved for women and such nance Commissions to review the financial po- ters, continuity of panchayats has been en- seats may be allotted by rotation to differ- sition of the panchayats and to make recommenda- sured by the 73rd Amendment. ent constituencies in a panchayat. Similar tions to the Governor as to reservations for backward classes has been Gram Sabhas: All States have provided that left to the discretion of States. l The principles which should govern a Sarpanch/Mukhia/Adhyaksha/Pradhan of the gram panchayat will convene a Gram Powers and Authority: It is noteworthy that – the distribution between the State and the Sabha, consisting of persons registered in the 73rd Amendment provides for States to panchayats of the net proceeds of the taxes, the electoral rolls relating to a village com- endow the panchayats with powers and au- duties, tolls and fees leviable by the State , prised within the area of panchayat at the thority ‘to enable them to function as institutions which may be divided between them under village level at least twice a year. of self government’. However, the functions this part and the allocation between the of panchayats Stated in the same Art 243G panchayats at all levels of their respective The following matters shall be placed be- are in the nature of entrusted development shares of such proceeds fore it by the gram panchayat : functions: “(a) preparation of plans for economic – the determination of the taxes, duties,tolls l Annual Statement of accounts and au- development and social justice and (b) the imple- and fees which may be assigned to, or appro- dit report mentation of schemes for economic development and priated by, the panchayats social justice as may be entrusted to them including l Report on the administration of the pre- those in relation to matters listed in the Eleventh – the grants in aid to the panchayats from the vious year Schedule.’’ Consolidated Fund of the State l Proposals for fresh taxation or for en- Functions that by tradition are uniquely as- l the measures needed to improve the financial hancement of existing taxes signed to panchayats consist of the provi- position of the panchayats l Selection of schemes, beneficiaries and sion and maintenance of what may be l any other matter referred by the Governor in the locations termed as ‘neighborhood’ public goods — interests of sound finance of the panchayats. Three-tier System: A uniform structure of of street lighting, sanitation, village com- Audit of Accounts: Audit of panchayats three tiers – at village, intermediate and dis- mons, and water supply – as opposed to ‘na- are to be provided for by the State Legisla- trict levels has been prescribed but the con- tional’ public goods like justice and national tures. We may note that only the Karnataka stitution and composition of panchayats has defense. The national level is also uniquely Panchayati Raj Act, 1993 has provided for been left to preferences of States subject assigned the functions of income redistri- entrusting audit of Taluk Panchayat Funds to all seats being filled by elected persons bution and macro-economic stabilisation, and Zila Panchayat Funds to the Comptrol- from the respective territorial constituen- which involve cross-regional issues. There ler & Auditor General (CAG) while the cies of the panchayats. are intermediate functions like education, which cannot be classified in either local or Controller of State Accounts may authorise Reservation of Seats: Seats have been re- national slots. any officer to audit Gram Panchayat ac- served for SC/ST in every panchayat on the counts. Election Commission: Governors of States basis of proportional representation and are empowered by the 73rd Amendment to such seats may be allotted by rotation to dif- appoint State Election Commissioners and ferent constituencies in a panchayat. Not

8 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA Rigid Structure panchayats consisting only of the elected representatives representing that area in the vil- The structure of the PRIs envisaged under lage as well as district panchayats. While the the Act is rather rigid. While the district has Chairman of this panchayat was directly been defined as a normal district in a State, elected in some States, in some other States the jurisdiction of village and intermediate the chairperson of this intermediate panchayat levels has not been specifically defined in the was either elected from among the members Act. While many States have more or less ac- or nominated by the State government. cepted the constitutional dictum of a three- tier structure, some would like to have the free- There is debate regarding whether direct elec- dom to choose the pattern of decentralisation tions should be held to constitute the which, in their opinion, is most suited to them. panchayats at all the three levels or whether the intermediate panchayat at least can be con- The institutional design for decentralisation stituted by nomination of the concerned should take into account not only the devel- elected members belonging to the other two opmental thrusts built upon the capabilities tiers. A related issue, raised in a recent Consti- at the local levels, but also the need to ensure tutional Amendment proposal is whether we local participation in decision-making. The could restrict direct elections to the village level The institutional problem of striking a balance between tech- only and have the village and intermediate design for nical requirements and possibilities for mean- panchayats elect members who will represent decentralisation ingful participation by the people in develop- them in the next higher level panchayats. should take into ment management occurs at levels below the While this may provide an organic linkage account not only district. The question of adequate area for a between the different tiers of the system, it the developmental unit of administration is quite complicated in may not perhaps satisfy the democratic norms thrusts built upon any State, owing to unevenness in terms of for decentralisation, by diluting the element the capabilities at economic resources, communication facilities, of direct democracy at the district level. the local levels, population density, level of social integration, but also the need civic commitments, etc. A uniform set of cri- Reservations to ensure local teria cannot, therefore, apply throughout the l There is a mandatory provision for reser- participation in country. It would be appropriate to leave the vation of seats for the Scheduled Castes decision-making exact pattern of local government below the (SCs), the Scheduled Tribes (STs) and one- district to the States/Union Territories. The third reservation for women (including Central Government can at best lay down gen- women from the SCs and the STs). It also eral criteria for the guidance of the States, has an enabling provision for reservation making it compulsory to have one tier closer for Other Backward Classes (OBCs). to the people to implement the development (There is no reservation, as of now, for programmes and another at a higher level to OBCs in the State Assemblies and the Par- supervise and monitor implementation. liament even though reservation is pro- Election to Panchayats vided in these fora for the SCs and STs.) Reservation for OBCs in the panchayats The constitution of Panchayats as mandated has led to controversies and litigation in under the Act has also posed problems in several States. Even the holding of elec- some States. Under Article 243C (2), all the tions came to be stalled on account of this seats in a panchayat shall be filled by persons in Bihar and Pondicherry, as the identifica- chosen by direct election from territorial con- tion of OBCs in these places has itself run stituencies in the panchayat area. Prior to the into difficulties. Act, some States had intermediate level

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 9 l There has also been a debate on the desir- they should not continue in such positions, ability of prescribing reservations to the beyond one term. Since this provision of ro- offices of chairpersons in the Panchayats. tation applies to the chairpersons also, it is pos- These reservations have, in fact, resulted sible that the bureaucracy may take an upper in administrative problems in some States. hand in some places, as they are sure that the There have been instances of the ruling chairperson has no chance of getting re- party not having even a single elected rep- elected. While the concept of rotation is com- resentative from the category of SC/ST or mendable, it is also desirable to specifically pre- women, when the chairperson’s post was scribe the period for such rotation. This pe- reserved in their favour, and under riod should be long enough for the incum- Art.243C(5), the chairperson has to be bent to get acclimatised to such positions and elected from among the elected members deliver the goods before completing that pe- only. Besides these practical problems, riod and short enough to give all sections of there can also be a question as to why the the community a chance to get into positions post of the chairperson of a Panchayat of power at the local level. should only be reserved for a particular Dissolution community/sex, when a similar reservation The Constitution has not been made for any other public Article 243E specifies the duration of tenure expects the State office anywhere in the country. On the of panchayats and makes it mandatory to con- Legislature, by other hand, it must also be borne in mind stitute the next panchayat before the expiry law, to endow the that, without such a reservation, the coun- of the duration of the previous panchayat or panchayat with try could produce only a handful of Chief before the expiry of a period of six months such powers and Ministers in the States who belong to the from the date of dissolution, if any. While authority as may category of SC/ST or women. the Constitution thus acknowledges the pos- be necessary to sibility of a dissolution, it does not deal with enable them to l The concept of rotation prescribed under the running of the panchayat during the in- function as the Act in respect of the reserved seats has terregnum, that is between the dissolution and also posed certain practical difficulties. Ar- institutions of self- the constitution of the new panchayat. It may ticle 243D clearly directs that the reserved government perhaps be necessary to provide for the con- seats, both for SCs and STs as well as tinuance of the existing office-bearers of the women shall be allotted by rotation to dif- panchayat to manage the day-to-day affairs of ferent constituencies in a panchayat. This the panchayat during this interregnum, if nec- has been interpreted to mean that such ro- essary under the supervision of the Panchayat tation should take place at the end of ev- at the next higher level. ery five years. If this interpretation is given effect to, no SC, ST or women member Devolution will ever get the opportunity of occupying l The Constitution expects the State Legis- the same seat for a second term, as it is lature, by law, to endow the panchayat with highly unlikely that these persons would be such powers and authority as may be nec- allowed to contest from the same constitu- essary to enable them to function as insti- ency, when the reservation is removed. tutions of self-government and such law If we accept the theory that most of the SC/ may contain provisions for the devolution ST and women members do not have any prior of powers and responsibilities upon the experience and will find it difficult to occupy panchayats at the appropriate level. How- positions of power in the initial period, it ever, the devolution of powers and func- would be very difficult to support the idea that tional strengthening of the different tiers

10 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA of the Panchayati Raj system have not taken meaningful interface between the Eleventh place in most States. Detailed executive Finance Commission and the SFCs. One instructions devolving powers and respon- solution could be to expedite the setting sibilities on the different tiers of the PRIs up of the second SFCs. This will require have not been issued and a feeling is gain- an amendment to Article 243I and 243Y, ing ground that the initial momentum is as the second SFCs cannot be set up be- somehow lost. fore the expiry of five years from the date when these were first set up. Unless the l In addition, a review of the provisions in financial devolution from Centre to the the States’ Acts reveals that bureaucratic States and the PRIs is put on a realistic and control over the panchayats continues to sound footing, no functional devolution be very strong. Even where direct bureau- can become meaningful. cratic control is not visible, the panchayats have been placed in such a position that Summing up the above discussion, we may say the chairpersons have to make repeated that since the panchayats have now come to trips to government offices located far stay as a constitutionally recognised tier of away, for getting approvals and sanctions. governance, it is time to strengthen them so Since the This dismal picture obtaining in most of that they can discharge the duties cast on them panchayats have the States leads us to the question whether in the best manner possible. At the same time now come to the Act should have gone to the extent of it must also be borne in mind that even with- stay as a drawing up a fourth list in the Seventh out a further amendment to the Constitution, constitutionally Schedule of the Constitution for district it is still possible to implement the spirit of recognised tier of subjects, instead of simply outlining 29 decentralisation in this country. In areas which governance, it is matters in the Eleventh Schedule. have been left to the discretion of the State time to strengthen Governments under the Act, it is possible for l Functions go where there is money, regard- them so that they the State Governments to bring in improve- less of any list. Consequently, it is perhaps can discharge the ments either through administrative orders of more important to install a new financial duties cast on the Government or by amending the State stat- regime than to devise new lists. That takes them in the best utes appropriately. Only in cases where the us to the constitution of the Finance Com- manner possible Act comes in the way of meeting a particular mission as prescribed in the Act. Article field situation specific to a State, there is a need 280(bb) and 280(cc) require the Central Fi- for seeking a Constitutional Amendment. Such nance Commission to take into account the cases do exist; but are not very many. recommendations of the State Finance Commissions (SFCs). A paradox is that the Central Legislature was neces- sitated to bring about decentralisation in the country. l The SFCs who have already submitted the While agreeing with the view that a Constitu- reports have given their recommendations tional Amendment may not be the best form for the period 1996-2001 while the Elev- of bringing in decentralisation in any coun- enth Finance Commission which has been try, we must also remember that Article 40 set up recently, will be concerned for the which was in our Constitution for several years five years beginning 2001. Merely project- could not help in establishing meaningful lo- ing the requirements based on the avail- cal bodies in most States of our country. We able SFC reports by the Central Finance will, therefore, have to live with the idea of Commission will be a very static way of amending the Constitution not only to bring dealing with the issue. Some method will, in but also to enhance decentralised gover- therefore, have to be found to bring a nance. Anomalies that have crept in have to

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 11 be rectified and the challenge of the time has light of experience and changes in the na- to be met. These will again need a public de- ture of governmental activities. This can be bate to crystallise ideas, and political will to best done under rules and notifications is- translate these ideas into a workable sued by the State Governments for which legislation. necessary provision has to be made in the statute. 4.2 Relationships between PRI Levels l Thirdly, while the principle of subsidiarity We now turn our attention to the relationship will have to govern the allocation of func- among the different tiers of the Panchayati tions among the different tiers of the PRIs, Raj structure. A major area of friction between we must also take into account certain ba- the tiers has been the allocation of functions sic principles of decentralisation, namely: among them, as the Constitution has left this (a) every activity requires a minimum size entirely to the discretion of the States. for functional efficiency and economy; While devising the pattern of devolution not (b) the area of benefit should not extend only between the State Government and the beyond the jurisdiction of the panchayat PRIs but also between the PRIs themselves, concerned; and (c) the administrative re- three aspects have to be borne in mind. sources available at that particular level is capable of handling the activity in a com- l Firstly, administrative units and structures are The panchayats petent manner. at the higher level not uniform in every State. Each State has have therefore its own unique historical background for There is a need to establish functional link- to act as the evolution of its present administrative ages between the tiers, at least for three dif- coordinating and institutional patterns. It is therefore ferent reasons. neither feasible nor desirable to lay down a bodies for the l Firstly, there is a commonality of functions uniform pattern for all States. The devolu- panchayats at the among all the three tiers. While in any given tion of functions among the tiers will have levels below area, the nature of activity entrusted to the to be left to the local genius, keeping in view different levels could be different, such ac- the existing culture of the State and the ca- tivities have to be meaningfully integrated pabilities that can be created at different with one another. levels. l Secondly, the administrative support to the l Secondly, the Eleventh schedule of the Con- activities of the panchayats at different lev- stitution, as already mentioned, covers all els is provided by different rungs of the the three levels of panchayats and there is same official hierarchy which in any case an apparent overlap of functions. There- will function in accordance with the offi- fore, demarcation of operational responsi- cial hierarchy already established. bility between one level of panchayats and another has to be made specifically with ref- l Thirdly, there has to be some uniformity of erence to each programme or activity. The standards in the provisions of basic and es- number of plan schemes, as of now, liter- sential services within the district/interme- ally runs into hundreds. Each of them has diate panchayats. The panchayats at the to be examined to see what should be re- higher level have therefore to act as coordi- tained by the State Government and what nating bodies for the panchayats at the lev- should be entrusted to the district/interme- els below. In some areas, as mentioned ear- diate/ gram panchayat. Such demarcation lier, the latter can be the implementing cannot be a one time exercise and may call agency for the programmes of the former. for adjustments from time to time in the 12 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA The relationship between different tiers can- fraction of such services. On the other hand, not be described in hierarchical terms. Dia- the land scarcity in urban areas has given rise logue and consultation should be the more to problems of proliferation of slum popu- appropriate way of interaction. For this to lation in unplanned settlements with severe happen, it is necessary to assign responsibili- deficiencies in basic civic amenities, forcing ties for oversight and accountability between the inhabitants to live in dangerously polluted the three tiers. Although the exact modalities environments and dilapidated structures. The of functioning of each tier would differ across case for ending dualism in local government States, this implies that residuary powers is thus strong. should be vested in the district tier and the A single local Single Local Government panchayat body at a higher level should have government at some power to monitor the activities of the A single local government at the district level the district level lower tier, and thus also serve as a forum of can look after the needs of its urban and rural can look after the redressal of grievances and settlement of components with a set of safeguards built into needs of its urban inter-panchayat disputes. (See Box 4) it so as to ensure just development of the en- and rural tire area. Such a district government can also components with If the local bodies ought to be distinct politi- plan for the entire district obviating the need a set of cal entities, should each one of them be inde- to have a separate district planning commit- safeguards built pendently elected from a distinct constituency tee to coordinate action by various implement- into it so as to or should there be a link in membership? Ob- ing agencies at the district level including the ensure just viously, the lowest tier in any system has to be district panchayats and the municipalities. Over development of directly elected. Whether the higher level bod- a period of time, this can lead to true federal- the entire area ies should also have directly elected member- ism with the district tier becoming as effective ships or whether they could be constituted in- as the State government in its sphere of ac- directly through the elected members of the tivities. Madhya Pradesh has initiated the ex- lower level bodies is a point for debate, as periment with district government since 1999, raised in the Eighty-seventh Amendment Bill. with the innovation of the district budget, The issue of its implications for democratic which is reflected as a line item in the State countervailing forces at the district level also budget. Such experiments in de-concentration needs to be examined. Costs BOX 4 Panchayats Dispense Justice The costs of parallel forms of local govern- Another related issue is the revival of effectively, they could enable the dis- ment are equally high and have produced arti- nyaya panchayats to secure speedy and advantaged to seek justice in a rela- ficial resource constraints. Even though ur- inexpensive justice in civil and crimi- tively inexpensive manner and con- ban population’s need for water, land, energy nal matters of a relatively minor na- stitute an important mechanism for and nutrients is increasing, it has not been able ture right at the village level. It is in- overcoming the various structural teresting to note that these nyaya constraints facing them. Electing nyaya to develop these resources for more equitable panchayats were in existence even be- panchayats in a caste and community sharing simply because these resources are fore the British rule. The purpose ridden society may pose problems in usually located outside their jurisdiction. Nor then was to shorten the span between the first instance. In such an event, have the rural areas been able to develop them crime and punishment, and injury and nyaya panchayats could be entrusted because of severe financial constraints. The redress as well as the hope that truth with the functions of mediation and would surface locally without elabo- conciliation to start with. Over a pe- urban local governments have been reluctant rate evidentiary procedures. The in- riod of time and with the experience to expand services like water supply, electric- stitution of nyaya panchayats will be a gained, a workable system could be ity, roads, transport and sewerage etc., to valuable aid to the development of evolved combining the local wisdom nearby villages because the revenue income social habits of self-government and and the required local talent. from the villages is too small to pay for even a the rule of law. If they function Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 13 of administrative power can help infuse greater The lack of specification of functions and interest in hitherto neglected mechanisms such powers between the three levels results in a as the District Planning Committees. While, feeling –at each level– that the other two have there may be apprehensions of capture of greater powers and resources. The devolution these by local bureaucracy and politicians, over of powers in the States’ conformity legisla- a period of time, these will become platforms tions is not merely seen to be inadequate, but for accountability at the local level. the Acts are also generally vague about which functions are meant to be performed by which The structural relationships between the vari- tier. There are also no mechanisms for co- ous tiers of governance will, therefore, depend ordinating the functioning of the three tiers. upon the attitude of the people manning them The criteria of functional efficiency and and their own commitment to the process of economy, as also of administrative resources, decentralisation. All of them should realise could have been used to define more clearly that the success of the PRIs will depend on the role of each tier in the planning and imple- how effectively they are able to perform. Ef- mentation of programmes. fective governance is a key ingredient for good The structural delivery and all relationships should therefore Ambiguities in the Panchayat- relationships have to be designed on that basis. Administration Relationship between the 4.3 Panchayats and Line Departments: The relationship between the panchayats and various tiers of Operational Issues thes local administration has been interpreted governance will, differently across States. The Government of We examine the following issues in the con- therefore, depend Rajasthan amended, by ordinance, some of text of the Constitution 73rd Amendment, with upon the attitude the provisions of the conformity act to in- regard to the relationship between PRIs/ of the people crease the control of government over the two ULBs and government departments, to iden- manning them higher tiers. However, this is by no means tify steps that need to be taken to ensure that and their own definitive evidence of the superiority of elec- not only the PRIs but also the other actors commitment to tive over appointed authority. On the contrary, play their role in tandem for the benefit of the process of evidence is to be found in virtually all States the rural poor: decentralisation of the dominance of the bureaucracy over the l Relationships between the PRIs and the Na- people’s representatives. In Haryana, the bu- tional and State Governments and their reaucracy is seen to exercise inordinate con- parastatals. trol, as it substantially guides and directs the developmental activities of the panchayats, in- l The role that should be played by the PRIs stead of merely facilitating these. This rela- in the field of development so that their tionship can become especially stifling in replace in the federal structure of our polity lation to panchayats headed by women, and gets duly integrated with the other existing even more so those headed by dalit women. structures of governance. Further, lower-level government functionar- The silence of the 73rd Amendment Act on ies, attached to the panchayats, are also con- the manner in which the three tiers should be fused as they are simultaneously accountable linked has resulted in a variety of practices to their superior in the government as well as and some confusion in this regard. This can to the elected leaders of the panchayats. A and frequently does result in a lack of co-or- notable exception in this regard is the Con- dination between the three levels, which weak- formity Act of Gujarat which provides for ens the structure as a whole1 . sectoral development staff of the gazetted

14 1 For instance, the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act does not provide for the sarpanch ofDECENTRALISATION the Gram Panchayat to be IN a member INDIA of the Panchayat Samiti, or for the Pradhan of the Samiti to be a member of the Zila Parishad. officers’ rank to be transferred to the “….it shall be the duty of the Gram Panchayat panchayat institutions to carry out develop- within the limits of the funds at its disposal, to mental work. Despite this provision, Gujarat make arrangements for carrying out the requirements has not been able to decentralise planning of sabha area in respect of the following mat- which Karnataka or Maharashtra have been ters….” (Emphasis added) able to do somewhat better, arguably due to a It is evident that many of these problems re- more long-standing engagement with lating to the structure of the Panchayati Raj panchayat institutions. system have implications for the functioning Devolution of Powers, Functions and of panchayats, but that these become espe- Resources in the State Conformity Acts cially difficult in the context of panchayats headed by women is not often realised. The While structures undoubtedly predispose in- obstacles faced by women as members or stitutions to evolve in particular ways, the most heads of panchayats tend to be evaluated in stringent test of any exercise in democratic terms of their own subjective perceptions, and decentralisation is the actual powers and func- are rarely related to the structural inadequa- tions that are devolved to democratic institu- cies of the Panchayati Raj framework. tions at the local level, which must enjoy autonomy in the exercise of these. Regulatory and Development Functions The most stringent test of The relevant article of the Constitution de- The fundamental question before the institu- any exercise in scribes panchayats as institutions of self-gov- tions of decentralised governance has been democratic ernment, but if the scope of self-government whether they are there for development func- decentralisation is is externally defined and circumscribed, the tions only or for the wider purpose of self- the actual powers institutions will be limited in this role. Article governance. and functions that 243(G) itself provides for such circumscrip- In his dissenting note to the Ashok Mehta are devolved to tion, as it permits the States to endow the Committee Report, E.M.S. Namboodiripad democratic panchayats with powers, without actually mak- said “Democracy at the central and State lev- institutions at the ing it imperative for them to do so. An exami- els, but bureaucracy at all lower levels – this is local level nation of the powers and functions actually the essence of Indian polity as spelt out in the devolved makes evident the fact that the im- Constitution. I cannot think of the Panchayati plications of the Constitutional Amendment Raj Institutions as anything other than the were perhaps more radical in reservation pro- integral parts of the country’s administration visions than in the powers and functions which with no difference between what are called the were left to the States to determine and finance. ‘development’ and ‘regulatory’ functions. I am In fact, only three Conformity Acts – those afraid that the ghost of the earlier idea that of West Bengal, Bihar and Tripura – State that Panchayati Raj Institutions should be com- they aim to endow panchayats with powers pletely divorced from all regulatory functions and functions that can enable them to work and made to confine themselves only to de- as institutions of self-government. The velopmental functions is haunting my col- Haryana Act specifically States that the objec- leagues. What is required is that, while certain tive of the panchayat institutions is to adminis- definite fields of administration like defense, ter rural areas better. Indeed, Article 20, Chap- foreign affairs, currency, communication etc., ter IV of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act of should rest with the Centre, all the rest should 1994, specifies the “functions and duties” of be transferred to the States and from there to the Gram Panchayat as follows: the district and lower levels of elected administrative bodies”.

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 15 Article 243G of the Constitution which now For a truly rational pattern of devolution of governs the entrustment of functions to the powers to the PRIs, it may be necessary to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) makes it review the entire gamut of powers and respon- clear that the primary role of the panchayats sibilities from the Union to the Gram will be in the area of development. Planning Panchayat levels. However, in the Indian con- and implementation of programmes of eco- text, the establishment of a strong Panchayati nomic development and social justice ought Raj system has never been a ground for de- to be the focal points of their activities. mand for greater autonomy by the States. A strong State does not automatically mean If the role envisaged for the PRIs, at least for that the State would have an active network the time being, is primarily in the field of de- of PRIs. velopment, how are they to perform this role alongside several other actors who are already Centralised Planning and Local Autonomy in this field? What should be their relation- In reality, the system of centralised planning ship with the other existing structures of gov- which the country has followed for over four ernance – the Central Government, the State decades, severally constrains local autonomy. Governments, the parastatals, the community When such constraints operate at the State based organisations etc., who also have their The Central level, it is obvious that they would also be vis- assigned roles in development. Admittedly, Government at ible at the panchayat levels. Earmarking of a PRIs have entered the scene only recently. All the highest level large proportion of plan provisions besides the other actors have been in the field for sev- of our federal committing a substantial outlay for on-going eral years by now. The rules governing them structure has the activities in the Five Year Plans does restrict have either been defined or evolved over a long responsibility to the extent to which a sectoral allocation can period of time. Do we need to bring about promote and be altered by the panchayats. A large propor- changes in these rules to facilitate the PRIs to nurture effective tion of centrally sponsored schemes with tied establish themselves in their assigned place in panchayats at the funds and national guidelines has further ag- governance? grassroots of the gravated the situation. federal pyramid Secondly, since all the three tiers of the The limited availability of untied funds and Panchayati Raj Structure have the common severe restrictions in implementation tend to goal of development, how to delineate their make PRIs agencies of the State Govern- functions and powers in such a manner that ments, rather than units of local government. there is space for each one of them without There is a need to change the system of plan- any significant overlapping? ning at the all India level. While the need to 4.4 Reforms Required for More assign national priorities in key areas cannot Effective Linkages be disputed, it is desirable that the scope of earmarking by the Planning Commission is The Central Government suitably reduced so that the PRIs can have It has been at the instance of the central gov- substantial untied funds, besides some say in ernment that panchayats came to be estab- the prioritisation which can make local plan- lished in most States at different points of ning more meaningful. The number and scope time, barring one or two notable exceptions. of centrally sponsored schemes should also Given this context, the Central Government be curtailed in terms of both range and vol- at the highest level of our federal structure ume. A gradual shift from sectoral planning has the responsibility to promote and nurture to area planning appears necessary in the con- effective panchayats at the grassroots of the text of people’s participation in the planning federal pyramid. process. 16 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA The quantum of powers and functions that a It is imperative that the Central Finance State would want to transfer to the PRIs would Commission is encouraged to make a liberal depend upon the extent of power the State use of this provision to augment the funds of itself can obtain from the Central Govern- the PRIs so that the availability of funds can ment. The more it receives from the Centre be linked to the discharge of functions as- the more it would be willing to transfer. It is signed to the local bodies by the respective therefore necessary to have a fresh look at the State Governments. A substantial provision recommendations of the Sarkaria Committee of untied grants would also help in implemen- dealing with Centre-State relations in the field tation of innovative programmes for the ben- of allocation of functions especially those re- efit of the people by the local institutions. It lating to development sectors. would also encourage the gradual shift towards area development mentioned earlier. Periodic Review Local Area Fund of MPs and MLAs A periodic review of the functions and powers that are delegated to the PRIs by the State It is unfortunate that soon after the PRIs came Governments, in the context of the freedom to be established, a discretionary development available to a State Government for implemen- fund has been made available to each Mem- The quantum of tation of programmes in the development ber of the Parliament (MP) for local area de- powers and field, can also be initiated by the Central Gov- velopment. The MPs’ Local Area Develop- functions that a ernment. The Planning Commission itself can ment Scheme (MPLADS) grants at the re- State would want initiate the process of activating the District cently revised rates account for over Rs. 1,500 to transfer to the Planning Committees to perform their role in crore per year and coupled with similar funds Panchayati Raj decentralised planning as envisaged under 73rd available to the Members of the State Legisla- Institutions would amendment. It is possible for the Planning ture in some States, the sum of such grants depend upon the Commission to verify whether the district may well exceed Rs. 2,000 crore per annum. extent of power planning exercise has been scrupulously fol- These grants are not related to any specific the State itself lowed or not by the State Government, while development programme and as such they are can obtain from finalising State Plan outlays as a part of its an- untied funds available to take up local devel- the Central nual exercise. This will also put some pres- opment works, which mostly fall within the Government sure on the PRIs to prepare local level plans domain of the local government institutions. in time, duly taking into consideration the local It is desirable to dispense with such schemes needs and aspirations. that create a clash of interests at the local level. On the other hand, it would be desirable to Financial Adequacy and Discretionary Funds place these funds as untied grants at the dis- Availability of adequate finances and untied posal of the PRIs themselves. A continua- funds is necessary for the efficient discharge tion of MPLADS and other similar schemes of functions assigned to any panchayat. will only erode the importance of Article 280(3) (bb) of the Constitution had decentralised planning through local bodies cast a duty on the Union Finance Commis- as envisaged in the Constitution. Hence the sion to make recommendations to the Presi- need for the Central Government to take a dent on the measures needed to augment the lead in abolishing the MPLADS which will consolidated fund of a State to supplement hopefully result in the abolition of similar the resources of the panchayats in the State. schemes for MLAs now implemented by This would be based on recommendations several States. made by the Finance Commission of the State.

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 17 Centrally Sponsored Schemes Government continues to retain both its legislative and executive powers in respect of If the development planning process has to the functions entrusted to the PRIs. The man- be decentralised down to the panchayat level, ner in which the State Government exercises this should go hand in hand with the Govern- its executive powers in these matters is deter- ment of India reducing the range and volume mined by the State Legislation on the subject. of the centrally sponsored plan schemes, and allowing the State Governments to function Functions Not Specified freely in their allotted spheres. It should fur- Similarly, the functions of each level of ther be accompanied by suitable devolution panchayats have not been spelt out in detail, of financial resources between them and from especially with reference to the 29 subjects that them to the panchayats. PRIs may lose inter- have been listed in the Eleventh schedule. est in the preparation of plans unless adequate Since this has been left to the discretion of funds are provided for meeting the expendi- State governments, the progress on actual ture. Therefore, there is a need to increase the transfer of functions (as distinct from subjects panchayat’s area of discretion in spending their listed in the Eleventh Schedule), there is con- own funds and to ensure that the sectoral siderable variation across States in terms of schemes of the line departments are coordi- progress. In most States the principle of nated and integrated by them. subsidiarity has not been fully observed in the The functions to State Governments devolution of powers and functions to the be performed at three tiers in a balanced manner. In some States The momentum of decentralisation at the each level of the government departments dealing with State level requires political will and an enabling panchayats must these subjects have been brought under the environment, and a resolution of angularities be clearly administrative control of the PRIs whereas in in Centre-State relations, as pointed by the identified many other States, the PRIs have not been Sarkaria Commission Report in 1986. The given any powers to control either the staff addition of the Eleventh Schedule to the Con- or the budget or the schemes. stitution listing out certain subjects for being looked after by the PRIs does not really mean The functions to be performed at each level that a constitutionally independent set of func- of panchayats must be clearly identified. The tions have now been allocated to the implementation of such functions would call panchayats on the same lines as the allocation for simultaneous amendments to subject-mat- of functions between the Union and the States ter legislation to enable assumption of such in the Seventh schedule. functions by the panchayats. A clear delegation of powers may have to be given in mat- Unfortunately there has been very little dis- ters not covered by legislation such as anti- cussion on the problems that are being faced poverty programmes, preparation of local by the State Governments and the PRIs while plans, construction of roads, etc. The implementing Article 243G both in letter and panchayats must be given specific powers to spirit. The allocation of functions under this pool resources and undertake integrated local Article does not in any way reduce the execu- development. There should be no requirement tive and legislative powers of the State con- to get any approval from higher levels of bu- ferred under Article 264 of the Constitution reaucracy in the department of Panchayati Raj read with the Seventh schedule relating to the or in any other Government department. subjects over which the States have jurisdiction. In other words, it appears that the State

18 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA Monitoring Through Audit Strengthening Cooperative Federalism Monitoring should be only through annual The problem of overlapping functions and performance reports and through audits. In- jurisdiction between the State Governments dividual decisions of panchayats should not and the PRIs need not necessarily be seen as also be subject to review or revision by the reflecting an unsatisfactory situation with po- bureaucracy or by the Ministers at the State tential conflicts and confusion. The present level. For the effective discharge of functions, situation actually presents a challenge to our panchayats should have control over the staff polity which can be met by evolving systems working for them. The panchayats can be em- of synergy between different levels of gover- powered to hire their own staff over a period nance. We already have cooperative federal- of time. Until then the staff deputed to them ism evolved in this country where the Central should work under the direct control of the Government formulates various schemes and panchayat concerned. shapes policy relating to several State subjects besides providing funds to implement such The State Government should have powers schemes. vis-a-vis the panchayats for the following National plans reasons: Integration of District Plans with State Plans have several l The “hard budget constraint” and compres- Another issue that has the potential of con- objectives, which sion of public expenditure occasioned by flict between the State Government and the can be achieved the States’ fiscal crisis implies that the ef- PRIs relates to the integration of district plans only in the long forts to reform State finances must not be with the State and national plans. Admittedly, run whereas undermined by profligacy or “soft budget the national plans have several objectives, district plans constraints” at the local level. which can be achieved only in the long run reflect the whereas district plans reflect the immediate immediate needs l State Governments have the responsibility needs of the people, which may sometimes of the people, to carry out the agreed national priorities overlook the long term need. Presently, the which may and to ensure compliance of these priori- Planning Commission does the work of co- sometimes ties, they need to have some say over the ordinating the State plans with the national overlook the long implementation of programmes by the plan. On this basis, Five Year Plans and the term need PRIs. annual plans are finalised. A similar process l Given the nature of available tax bases, the will have to be adopted for approving the dis- extent to which PRIs can raise funds trict plans at the State level. This could per- through local taxation, is limited. They have haps be done either by the State Planning to depend primarily on financial resources Department or by setting up a State Develop- transferred to them by the State government Council which will help in establishing ments. While devices such as the Finance the necessary coordination at all levels both Commission awards may insulate resource in physical and financial terms. transfer from political uncertainties, the While it may be easy to establish an institu- transfer can be effected only through the tional framework to coordinate the various dis- budget, with the approval of the State Leg- trict plans with the State and Central plans, the islature. The answerability of the State gov- more difficult task would be how to reconcile the pro- ernment to the Legislature in respect of cess of decentralised planning with comprehensive State State funds will thus remain even in respect planning. A healthy interaction between the of the funds transferred to PRIs. To fulfil different tiers of the PRIs on the one hand, this obligation, the State needs to have some the State Planning Units and the authority over the PRIs. Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 19 National Planning Commission on the other Availability of Functionaries is, therefore necessary to minimise the effects Availability of functionaries is as important of the inherent dichotomy between the free- as the provision of functions and funds to the dom available to the PRIs and the discipline PRIs. The overlapping control of PRIs and demanded by national planning. If the ‘hard State Government over the administrative budget constraint’ is not be undermined by machinery for implementing development fiscal profligacy at the local level, it would be programmes entrusted to the PRIs reduces the necessary to integrate local and State plans, functional autonomy of all these bodies to a thereby ensuring that State level reform is considerable extent. In addition, the panchayat driven by local imperatives as well. functionaries, who are on deputation to these Dependence of PRIs on State and Central institutions from the State Government, as in Funding Karnataka, may continue to regard themselves as government servants only and may tend to The near total dependence of the PRIs on look up to their State level seniors than the State and Central funding for their activities, A great deal of elected leaders of the panchayats for guidance necessarily limits their ability to develop into streamlining is and leadership. This situation is further com- vibrant institutions of self-governance. The also needed in pounded in some States by the control exer- PRIs at present do not have any sources of the procedure cised by the legislators over local administra- tax income worth mentioning. A dependable associated with tion through the mechanism of annual trans- system of revenue sharing with the Union and the release of fer of officials which is effected by the State State Governments is still not in place, even funds to the administration largely at the initiative of the though Articles 243-I and 280 (3)(c) provide Panchayati Raj legislators and the other State level political for allocation of resources to the PRIs through Institutions, leaders. This practice of large scale official the State Finance Commissions. In actual op- before such transfers at the initiative of legislators can se- eration what has happened is a mere transfer transfer of funds riously undermine the functional autonomy of certain schemes with related tied grants can confer any of PRIs, besides contributing to the dilution from the State Government to the PRIs. A reasonable of administrative accountability. A series of great deal of streamlining is also needed in degree of changes would therefore be required in the the procedure associated with the release of financial administrative arrangements for programme funds to the PRIs, before such transfer of autonomy on the planning and implementation in respect of the funds can confer any reasonable degree of fi- panchayats schemes and programmes transferred to the nancial autonomy on the panchayats. To aug- PRIs for implementation. ment the available resources of the panchayats, it is necessary that all plan funds are placed at Though a good part of administrative machin- the disposal of the concerned panchayat with ery can be easily transferred to work under a clear mandate to implement the scheme for the PRIs, yet the PRIs cannot work in isola- which the funds are meant. The PRIs can also tion of the other Government structures at be authorised to tap the untapped resources the local level. For instance, several depart- such as water rates for commercial crops etc., ments such as cooperation, command area de- The agencies working at the district level dis- velopment, land revenue etc., have a tremen- charging functions that fall within the ambit dous bearing on the effectiveness of the PRIs, of the PRIs should be abolished and their ob- even they are not listed under the Eleventh jectives transferred along with the functions Schedule. Institutional arrangements will have and finances to the PRIs. This includes the to be made to provide for dialogue and direct district rural development agency, the drought communication between the PRIs and these prone area programme committees, etc.

20 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA organisations. The district planning commit- purview of the PRIs, in view of its larger area tee can perhaps play a crucial role in this of operation which may extend beyond a dis- regard. trict and require coordination between the districts, it is necessary to build up working rela- Parastatal Organisations tions between the District Panchayats and the Many States have, over a period of time, set district unit of the parastatals. This may in- up a number of parastatal organisations to clude the constitution of monitoring/coordi- meet the self-employment and economic de- nation committees at the cutting edge levels, velopment requirements of vulnerable sec- in addition to a legal provision compelling the tions of society. Some of these institutions attendance of the representatives of the have an in-built bias for social justice. For in- parastatals during the meetings of the con- stance, the Finance Development and Hous- cerned panchayat whenever required. ing Corporations set up for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the Backward 5. Contribution of PRIs to Classes, the minorities and women, both at Governance Structure The Gram Sabha the Central and State levels invariably deal with Forum to Explain Development Strategies subjects which have now been assigned to the should be PRIs. These institutions were basically con- Firstly, the PRIs, and more particularly the encouraged to ceived for mobilising finances from leading Gram Sabhas, can be made use of by the invite members of development institutions such as the higher tiers of governance as a forum where higher level NABARD, the Land Development Banks, etc. they could explain their development strate- panchayats, Budgetary grants are also made in favour of gies to the people and receive valuable feed- legislature and these institutions by the State and Central Gov- back on the problems arising out of the imple- even the ernment to facilitate mobilisation of further mentation of their programmes. The Gram Parliament to finances from commercial institutions, using Sabha should be encouraged to invite mem- participate in their these provisions as margin or seed money. bers of higher level panchayats, legislature and meetings and even the Parliament to participate in their articulate their In the context of the Eleventh schedule of meetings and articulate their needs in their needs in the the Constitution, these institutions appear to presence. Higher level Panchayats and the State presence of the be eminently suited for transfer from the State Governments can also depute a designated invitees level to the PRIs, mostly at the district level. officer to each Gram Sabha to have the views All their programmes whether aimed at infra- of the Gram Sabha recorded and reported to structure or at individuals or a combination appropriate level of governance for informa- of both, requiring forward and backward link- tion and mid-course correction wherever nec- ages are implementable and can be imple- essary. mented by the PRIs. The only action that is required is to transfer in their entirety these Inter-Sectoral Convergence of Development institutions to the PRIs with all their budgets Efforts and staff. In doing so, care should be taken to Secondly, the PRIs can play an effective role associate all the existing technical and admin- in convergence of development efforts at the istrative personnel in the functioning of the local level. This convergence can be of two programmes concerned so as to ensure that kinds – one, internal to the efforts of the line their experience and expertise continue to be departments working under the control of the available to the decentralised local institutions. PRIs and another external by converging the If in some cases, it is felt absolutely necessary efforts of the line departments with the ef- to keep a particular parastatal outside the forts of the organs of the larger society

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 21 outside such as research bodies, universities Gram Sabhas. Steps can be taken to provide and voluntary organisations. The sectoral al- access to official records and accounts at least locations made at the Central and State levels at the Gram Panchayat level and this can be can be amalgamated to prepare an area-wise extended to the higher tiers over a period of plan at the local level and this can form the time. Such arrangements for ensuring trans- basis for converging the various programmes parency in administration can be fully under implementation within the jurisdiction operationlised throughout the country on the of the panchayat concerned. The district plan- basis of the experience gained at the local lev- ning committee can play an effective role in els. The activities of the various community the external convergence, by involving the aca- based organisations working at the village lev- demicians, researchers and other non-govern- els can be effectively monitored by insisting mental organisations in plan formulation and on their reporting to the Gram Sabhas of their wherever necessary for monitoring and evalu- activities. These include the watershed devel- ation as well. The PRIs can ideally be the opment committees, the user groups under the mechanism by which various government ini- water supply and sanitation programmes, the tiatives for the poor and disadvantaged can be parents’ committees constituted under the dis- Voluntary synergised to yield the maximum benefits by trict primary education programme, the joint councils of ensuring effective delivery. forest management committees etc., Even the experts and voluntary organisations working for the ben- eminent citizens Enhance Accountability of Elected efit of the poor within the jurisdiction of the constituted by the Representatives village can make use of the Gram Sabha both Gram Sabhas Thirdly, the Gram Sabha which readily pro- for dissemination of knowledge and also for can evaluate the vides a forum for accountability that can com- better implementation of their own work carried out pel an elected representative to face his con- programmes with community participation. by the stituency periodically, can be activated so that panchayats and Ensure Better Performance of Public the elected representatives are made to explain Facilities for Education and Health judge their quality, to the electorate what they had done and what effectiveness and they propose to do. The Gram Sabhas, if regu- If the Panchayati Raj structure takes a firm conformity with larly conducted, can definitely achieve the pur- root in our polity, one can hope for better re- accepted norms pose for which they have now been created, sults at least in two areas, which are largely by providing a ready and effective forum of governed by the Central and State Govern- accountability not only for the Gram ments. at present – namely primary education Panchayat members but also for the elected and rural health. It may not be out of place representatives of the higher tiers. This would here to mention that the Zila Parishad and augur well for our democratic polity. Mandal Panchayats Evaluation Committee constituted by the Government of Karnataka Initiate Social Audit in 1989 came to the conclusion that during The existence of the PRIs can help in intro- the two tier panchayat regime in Karnataka ducing the process of social audit at the local “attendance of school teachers, medical of- levels. Voluntary councils of experts and emi- ficers, para-medical staff in rural institutions nent citizens constituted by the Gram Sabhas improved remarkably”. Such a conclusion can can evaluate the work carried out by the be expected, as the lower level panchayats are panchayats and judge their quality, effective- bound to take an active interest in the perfor- ness and conformity with accepted norms. mance of the primary schools and the primary The PRIs can also ensure wide publicity for health centre operating within their domains, their activities among the people through the as compared to the State and Central

22 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA Government functionaries located far away l It must be recognised that the local gov- from these institutions. Since the success of ernments not only need guidance from development efforts in this country largely de- above but they also have to be defended pend on significant improvements in the edu- against any erosion stemming from outside. cation and health sectors, strengthening of the The need to build up a local government PRIs and devolving adequate powers on them sector within every higher level of govern- would go a long way in reaching our goal. ment which understands decentralisation, is committed to its aims and is able to de- The success of this system would however fend it, requires no emphasis. An associa- depend on how the PRIs integrate themselves tion of local governments., operated by the with the other existing structures of gover- local authorities themselves can also play a nance, for the benefit of the people. Of supplementary role in protecting the cor- course, there is also the need for providing an porate interests of the entire sector. enabling environment. What are the minimum ingredients of such an enabling environment? l Another key element for the success of PRIs is the change of mindset from one Ingredients of an Enabling Environment that works for the people to one that works l Firstly, local government, as we noted ear- with the people. This would require a re-ori- Another key lier, is essentially a power sharing mecha- entation of both the bureaucrats and se- element for the nism. It is not reasonable to expect a na- nior politicians at the central/provincial lev- success of tional regime that feels its own legitimate els, from an attitude which is centralizing, Panchayati Raj powers to be threatened, to undertake any control oriented and populist to one of Institutions is the experiments in power sharing. Thus human sharing authority through regular institu- change of security and peace is the pre-requisite for tions of democracy. This can be achieved mindset from one successful local government. through a process of training and fresh that works for the institutionalisation. l Without a strong political will, an autono- people to one that mous local authority, even if there is one, l Finally, comes the need to train local gov- works with the will always remain the weaker party in any ernment representatives themselves for their people conflict with a nationally based department new role. The PRI representatives and lo- functionary. cal officials must devise mechanisms for collaboration in the context of direct democ- l The third pre-requisite is strengthening the racy. It is in their interest to understand poor, so as to protect them from the con- each others’ problems and limitations at a trol and exploitative behaviour of the rich. very early stage and in smaller territories The strengthening of PRIs must be under- where the problems are comparatively easy taken in the broader context of measures and manageable. The attitudinal differences to empower the poor if there is to be genu- between the politicians and bureaucrats can ine participation of the disadvantaged in lo- be brought down to an acceptable level over cal government activity. These steps could a period of time, as both the groups gain include redistribution of assets through an experience in working together and man- effective implementation of land reforms aging local administration. Till then, the as was done in West Bengal and Kerala, de- need to train both of them independently velopment of common property resources, and also jointly with a view not only to efficient public distribution system, ensur- equipping them for their tasks but also to ing the access of the poor to schools and co-exist harmoniously will remain. health facilities and ensuring the effective functioning of these facilities. Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 23 6. Decentralisation and Urban which of the 12th Schedule functions may Local Bodies be devolved to the ULBs. Most States, have amended their acts to include part or in 6.1 Features and Critique some cases all of these. Studies suggest that Main Features only marginal changes that were regarded as mandatory have been carried out. A com- In almost all The key provisions of the 74th Constitutional parison of the State legislation’ with cen- States political Amendment which pertains to urban local tral Act reveal that few State governments decentralisation bodies are given in Box 5. have availed of the opportunity presented th has not been A Critique of the 74th Amendment by the 74 Constitutional Amendment to backed by clarify municipal functions listed as ‘obliga- enough financial Several academics, administrative and consti- tory’ and ‘discretionary’ and avoids overlap- devolution tutional experts have reviewed the act from a ping institutional functional and geographic critical perspective. Drawing from these docu- jurisdictions. ments, the following issues can be highlighted: l In almost all States with the exception of l The XII Schedule is not mandated and it is West Bengal and Kerala, political up to the State governments to decide as to decentralisation has not been backed by enough financial devolution. Thus, ULBs BOX 5 th have to depend upon the State government’s The 74 Constitutional Amendment: The Urban Bill of Rights political and bureaucratic lobbies to access Institutions of Self-governance: Municipali- of elected local representatives. funds. Also, there is still very significant ties are visualised as ‘institutions of State Finance Commission: To ensure fi- self-government’, with the capability nancial stability of ULBs, the act man- dependence in terms of permission seek- to prepare ‘plans for economic devel- dates the constitution of a State Fi- ing for even relatively simple matters. This opment and social justice’. They nance Commission (SFCs) every five further reinforces the lack of financial devo- would functions pertaining to the XII years. This would review the financial lution. Schedule and additional ones en- position of rural and urban bodies trusted by the State Government. The and recommend devolution of taxes, l While provisions for reservation for SC/ XII Schedule is an illustrative list and charges, fees, tolls, duties, shared rev- STs and women have been made in accor- not a directive one. enues mid inter-governmental trans- dance with the constitutional provisions in Ward Committees: It is mandatory for fers to municipalities and other mea- Corporations to constitute Ward sures. Based upon the recommenda- all States, in its details this does not reflect th Committees. These would include tions of State Finance Commission, the sprit of the 74 Constitutional Amend- representation from women, citizens’ the Central Finance Commission is ment. For example, the decision of which groups, SC/ STs etc. in cities with a expected to suggest measures for aug- seats are reserved need not follow any set population of over 0.3 million. For menting the consolidated funds in a criteria and could be used for political pur- lower level of Urban Local Bodies State, for supplementing the resources (ULBs), the State government can of municipalities poses by the ruling party. This situation decide. The Wards Committee is to State Election Commission To ensure a undermines the effort to broad-base par- bring governance closer to the people democratic process, the act mandates ticipation by women and ST/SCs. and could be empowered to carry out the creation of State Election Com- the responsibilities of the ULB includ- missions (SECs). This would oversee, l Similarly while legal provisions for the con- ing those of the XII Schedule direct, and control the preparation of stitution of ward committees have also been District Planning Committees: To effect electoral rolls and conduct elections made in most States, the actual sprit of the spatial and economic development, to rural and urban bodies. Another amendment is diffused since State Govern- and also rural and urban planning, the key task of the SECs is to ensure that act advises the constitution of Dis- election to municipalities dissolved by ments can “club” several wards together to trict Planning Committees (DPC) and the State government, be held within form a single committee. Also, while they Metropolitan Planning Committees 6 months of the dissolution. can be given wide-ranging powers, this does (MPCs) with majority representation not necessarily co-relate with financial

24 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA allocations. One could argue that the posi- surprising that this is a significant issue of tions of the councilors, the building block debate. Mayors in Karnataka have a term of a municipal and democratic system still of only one year, while Presidents of a remains undermined. Traditionally, they TMC, for two and a half years. Kerala and formed critically important conduits for lo- West Bengal in contrast provide a longer cal priorities and also to ensure account- term for mayors / presidents. The length ability. This group finds little or no of terms affects the implementation of mention. programmes. This is especially when clear- ances are required by the State Government l All the States have established SFCs and by at each stage. Most significant, the leader- March 1997, 10 SFCs had submitted reports ship in ULBs would be fractured in the set- to their respective State governments. ting and implementation of developmental There has been, however, a substantial time- priorities. By default, project proposals and lag between the submission of the SFC re- the State political parties would influence port and its placement in the State legisla- clearance. ture. Here again, it is up to the State Gov- ernment to indemnify funds being allocated Despite the growing realisation of the limita- to ULBs against inflation. tions of the 74th Constitutional Amendment, Short duration of it is significant that there is almost no evidence the terms for l The SECs have been established and have of a reversal of a democratic situation as hav- Mayors and conducted elections in all ULBs except a ing positive impacts. A careful reading of the Presidents make few North Indian States. By January 1997, opinions documented suggest that what con- for poor about 60,000 elected representatives in strains the local elected system is the power- programme 15 States have assumed their positions in ful and omnipresent presence of the State various ULBs. An emerging issue is that of implementation Government reinforced by the political party and tighter State adequate training and grounding of new system. Both together suppress any local ini- government councilors in matters of municipal admin- tiative, promote political clientalism within the control over istration and conduct. This happens at political structure itself, and reward passive Urban Local present, largely via the party system and peer party obedience rather than actual ground group support. Bodies work. l DPCs have been set up only in Kerala, This raises another important issue. Even Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal. Here, when there is an elected body in place, unsuit- separate legislation has been enacted for the ability in the local political arena can take a purpose. As yet, no State government has serious toll on local governance, which is to notified a Metropolitan Planning Commit- the advantage of higher levels, political cir- tee. Kerala is in the process of drafting leg- cuits. There are obviously financial aspects islation on the issue. No State has been able of this issue. Ghosh notes that in the case of to take specific action on the situation of Punjab, municipal bodies do not get proportionate ben- Development Authorities except Kerala efit of the growing richness of the cities because of where the process is underway. Kerala has high industrial growth. While the net value added also attempted to bring various line agen- from industrial production increased on an cies under the ULBs or RLBs. average by 173 percent annually in 1970s and l Short duration of the terms for Mayors and 1980s, municipal incomes have grown only by Presidents make for poor programme 69 percent during this period. In Bengal, implementation and tighter State govern- despite the adoption of the Mayor in Council ment control over ULBs. It is not system, the State Government via the

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 25 Municipal Affairs Department promoted a Re- l The Amendment does provide institutional vised grant scheme. While aimed to lay em- openings that respond to such on going phasis on financial streamlining, this seems to changes. For instance, the stress on the sta- reinforce State control over ULBs. The point bility of municipal institutions, reinforcing here is to recognise that the situation is full of the ward as a focus of developmental ac- cross currents. It is important to realise that tivities, are important starting points. Per- such amendments are part of a longer-term haps the most important is the revival of a political process – shaped by the experience local political and (perhaps economic) iden- of their implementation in a diverse country tity. This revival helps to question the domi- as India. nance of para-statal agencies over local bodies and State level political circuits over lo- 6.2 Urban Local bodies and Poverty cal ones. Issues l It is critically important in this respect, that This section addresses issues relating to the international development funds give seri- 74th Amendment (principal features outlined ous attention to processes of decentra- in Box 5) from a developmental perspective lisation. This is at two levels. First, to struc- framed along the following two themes drawn ture development programmes which pro- from case studies and experiences from vari- The 74th vide a legitimate place to local elected rep- ous parts of India: Amendment is resentatives and municipal bodies; Second, part of a larger l Productive Cities: Where livelihood oppor- to ensure that funding routes do not un- process of tunities are maximised for poor and other dermine their legitimate and developmen- political groups via local economies. tal functions. This attention to issues of lo- decentralisation cal governance is important from several l Institutions and ‘Good politics’: Where that in turn relates aspects: From the point of social justice to poor groups facing competition from other to rapidly be responsive to the needs of those groups more powerful groups in society, can ac- emerging local in situation of severe poverty; Second, to cess resources and shape the nature of pub- economies help make programmes sustainable. This is lic investments. This includes poverty both political (to minimise a post funding programmes that address the systemic and political backlash) and economic (by help- structural conditions of poverty. ing local bodies tap the wealth created from A common thread binds these themes - the urbanisation). key role played by local bodies, and its repre- Recognizing existing decentralisation sentative agents. efforts and the openings provided by the 74th. l The 74th Amendment is part of a larger pro- CA would go a long way in addressing these cess of political decentralisation that in turn issues and allow for greater “local ownership” relates to rapidly emerging local economies. in the longer term. Thus, even prior to the enactment, a close 6.3 Trends in Urbanisation and Civic study of the urban terrain in both metro- Participation politan and small town settings reveal that effective social and economic change has Cities today also reveal increasing disparities happened via civic actions pushing for po- between rich and poor groups manifest in litical decentralisation. This has in turn neighborhoods with contrasting levels of civic shaped the nature of institutions and also amenities. Earlier, among planners, adminis- to some extent, the political process. trators and economists, ways of defining and dealing with urban problems was seen to be

26 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA one of management. Recent recognition of This raises issues in the context of broader the complexities has shifted this view to one developmental questions. To do this, we first of governance. Mechanistic solution to prob- highlight some key questions that confront lems is replaced by a closer look at economic policymakers such as: growth in terms of its institutional processes, l How are cities of the future going to pro- and administration in terms of the extent and vide livelihood to their growing popula- form of civic participation. In this perspec- tions? tive, the 74th Constitutional Amendment needs to be viewed from its societal and develop- l How do we conceptualise increasingly com- mental perspective. plex urban economic processes that would provide livelihood to these groups? To respond to these complex changes governance has to give space for innovation and l What would be the form of institutional flexibility. Urban management can no longer and political processes that would underlie be assumed to be a static, top-down, State these economic structures? centred, and set in a long-term horizon. In l How are governments going to respond? the last decade or so, policy makers and aca- Is it going to be more of the conventional The traditional demics have recognised the innovative role of poverty and employment projects that will way of centralised local governments. Here, a key issue has been address these issues? control needs to of representation. Disparities of resources give way to a between rich and poor in its most fundamen- l What could be the nature of governance? judicious mix of tal sense, represents a serious fracture of gov- Will the civic process, recognised as a key support from th ernance. The 74 Amendment, has to be seen element of urban management, be restricted higher levels of as part of a larger process of political trans- to more active roles by NGOs, or will they government to formation. form part of a broader spectrum of social ensure the activism? In this transformation, local governments can stability and no longer remain as passive sub-contractors l How would international funding agencies continuity of of centralised schemes. They are increasingly respond and at what level? developmental pushed to take on a proactive and develop- programmes l How can public policy, at an operational ment role. This is obviously not an easy situa- level, tap the wealth created by urbanisation tion for higher levels of government. Since and facilitate its reinvestment in a way that Independence, with the task of nation build- generates jobs, and makes cities productive? ing heavy on them, they have been constituted by interest groups used to deciding on issues There are three aspects in defining a direction in a centralizing way to ‘plan’ solutions for of investigation to address issues raised by the “problems” at the lower level. This forced above questions. reversal of roles not only implies a different First, rather than speculating about the future way of working, but also very different atti- structure of cities, it seems useful to first start tudes and relationships. The traditional way by understand parts of cities and towns that of centralised control needs to give way to a support large numbers of people, and try and judicious mix of support from higher levels see as to what makes these areas tick. This re- of government to ensure the stability and con- quires a fine grained and cross-sectoral ap- tinuity of developmental programmes, and proach. more than sufficient autonomy which allows Local Bodies to develop management strate- Second, to understand the complexities of ur- gies that can respond to local situations. ban structure, we need to use an appropriate

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 27 conceptual framework. It is almost certain that economy generated from these livelihood the conventional Master Planning approach nodes, rather than being “marginal” and part to understand urban structures is inadequate. of the “informal sector”, are very much part Here, various functional aspects are seen in a of the mainstream economy. They generate compartmentalised fashion as specific land widespread employment that reach far beyond uses Residential; Commercial; Recreational; the physical boundary of these neighborhoods and, Industrial. This approach misses out im- into the national, and at times even global level. portant local characteristics and also to link The Importance of Land in Livelihood Issues spatial issues with economic ones. A strict econometric approach too seems equally A critically important issue in urban planning problematic. These fail to clearly identify the and management is that of land management. complicated institutional and political aspects Detailed research in these settings reveal that of economic processes. This approach also land issues form a core issue of such produc- often uses a framework centred on “Sectors” tive settings. This is what we term as “flexible more appropriate as a form of accounting settings”. Such settings are found in most small rather than conceptualizing development. Fi- towns and cities in India, although called by nally, a key issue of urban growth is one of different names and subject to varying local land. Land has significant non-economic as- regulation. Some towns and cities have settle- pects and important locational attributes. ment types that are unique to their particular history. Baroda in the Western State of A critically In a conceptual framework, it is also impor- Gujarat, and Madikeri in the Southern Indian important issue in tant to move away from a narrow “poverty” State of Karnataka for instance, have settle- urban planning focus, and consider the situation of poor ment types that were formed out of royal or- and management groups in a relative sense. This is important dinances. Kanchipuram, like many other is that of land since the situation of the poor in relationship temple towns, has a bulk of its land that ex- management with other groups will shape the nature of ur- isted under a dual form of tenure on a lease- ban management, its economy, forms of rep- hold basis from the various temples. Despite resentation and political structures in substan- this diversity, most towns and cities have very tive ways along two broad themes of produc- similar forms of land settlement types. The tive neighborhood and good urban most common ones, in addition to Master governance2 Planned sub-divisions, are “Productive Neighborhoods” for l Privately sub-divided land usually both on “Productive Cities” urban peripheries and central city areas A close look at cities reveals an interesting l Urbanised villages paradox. Projects to promote employment and poverty reduction have had a limited impact. l Traditional city housing Even so, poorer groups have evolved mecha- l Squatter settlements nisms and institutions that positively impact their livelihood situation. Of particular signifi- Flexibility in these settings comes out of sev- cance here, is the local economic structure that eral aspects that allow an efficient functional has emerged in many cities and towns of In- and economic relationship between economic dia. What started off as residential neighbor- activities such as possibilities for incremental hoods in fact, get transformed into significant development, a locally defined regulatory en- livelihood clusters of intensive commercial, vironment and one that allows for mixed land manufacturing and service activities. The use, and a diversity of tenure conditions.

28 2 These themes also incorporate other aspects like gender issues, the urban environment,DECENTRALISATION finance, infrastructure IN INDIA These characteristics allow for a local economy opportunities. Local government can be key to evolve in response to changing market con- mediators in this complex process. ditions and in tune with the particular mix of Land issues, especially those relating to enterprises locating there. Thus, just as clus- regularisation and extension of services, have ters specialise in particular items of manufac- been long recognised as having important in- ture and are constituted by a particular group- stitutional and political dimensions. This is true ing of enterprises, their land setting also ac- of almost all these flexible land settings, since quires particular characteristics. An important they have evolved outside the planning pro- aspect of these land settings is also that often cess. Thus, any improvement of infrastruc- their incremental development contributes to ture is highly politicised. The political aspects a vigorous real eState market that funds the are emphasised since settlers in these areas, local economy and also acts as a source of especially poorer groups, lack any other investments. mechanism except the elected channel of the It is also significant that of the above types of ULBs to channelise their demands. Council- settlement, private subdivisions are the most lors, members of the Standing Committees common. These often amount to between 50 and also at times, higher level political repre- percent to 75 percent of total residential land. sentatives like MLAs / MLCs and MP play a Land issues, Master Planned neighborhoods range between key role in pressuring the administration and especially those 10 percent to15 percent of total residential planning institutions to either recognise the relating to land. In metro-settings, while Master-Planned local realities. They also become important regularisation and areas increase as a proportion of total resi- agents to stop or diffuse actions that disrupt extension of dential land so does land occupied by squatter the essential livelihood generating character- services, have settlements. In smaller towns and cities, both istics. been long areas under squatter settlements and Master recognised as Detailed research on livelihood clusters sug- Plan areas decrease while the proportion of pri- having important gests rather than as a result of a particular de- vate sub-divisions increases. Thus one can as- institutional and sign, “flexible” aspects of land are shaped by sume that a large proportion of urban land has political a congruence of interests and institutions. A inherent flexible characteristics: Depending dimensions very significant issue here is that ULB actions upon locational, market, and other factors, it having a significant impact on urban poverty, could develop as a setting for local economies. productivity and livelihoods, does not come Good Urban Governance - Role of Local from any formally established development Bodies programmes for poverty alleviation and employment generation. Rather, these actions re- ULBs have an important bearing on the evo- late to ULBs being pressured by a local politi- lution of flexible land settings. This is despite cal process promoted by groups with a direct the fact that officially, land policy is decided at stake in livelihood. the State level. ULBs are envisaged to have a maintenance role. In reality, while it is true ULB centred programmes also ensure that lo- that ULBs have almost no role in the Master cal groups can use public inputs creatively in Planning process, their “maintenance” in- conjunction with their own locally available cludes the upgrading of infrastructure, resources and complimenting skills to achieve regularisation, and the provision of civic a powerful force multiplier. Local representa- amenities. The significant point is that it tion is also important to ensure the efficacy is these very actions that spur economic of developmental programmes concerning linkages, productivity, and livelihood poverty alleviation and employment

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 29 generation. For instance, an initial review of l First, as a political objective, it provided the the operational structure of both successful powers of governance to the local elite. and less successful programmes suggests two These groups were set in place by virtue of important aspects: The key role of ULBs and their social standing, rather than via demo- the extent of local participation. It is well cratic elections. This was important to en- recognised that strengthened and responsive sure political control and also for the trans- municipal organisations are critically impor- fer of resources. tant to ensure effective health and education l The second was a concern with public programmes, including a coordinating role for health. Decentralising these functions the private sector. This is critically important would be more effective in controlling and to reduce absolute poverty. preventing epidemics that could threaten all The pivotal role of ULBs in ensuring that cit- classes. ies remain productive for poor groups while After Independence, democratically elected addressing issues of poverty alleviation is representatives replaced managers and the lo- based on two factors: First, it is primarily ULBs cal elite who were previously nominated by that are responsible for civic improvements, the colonial powers. This brought opportu- which spur livelihood opportunities. These nities for greater democracy and enhanced the actions are also instrumental in addressing is- Strengthened and role of local representatives. However, there responsive sues of health due to the direct environmen- was a roll-back in the 1970s, with the setting tal linkages. At a more political level, ULBs municipal up of special purpose institutions, which has form the key institution through which local organisations are eroded the functional and development base groups, especially poorer sections of civic necessary to of ULBs. ensure effective society, channelise their demands. health and Initially, these institutional changes were made Parastatal Regimes as Constraints to Urban to effect “comprehensive planning” centred education Productivity programmes on Master Plans. In recent times, a much wider Experts on public administration have writ- range of parastatal agencies – not only De- ten extensively over the last two decades about velopment Authorities, characterise urban the increasing powers of parastatal and spe- management. These agencies, often under the cial purpose institutions. These institutions are highest level of State government authorities, promoted by State government political in- function as management entities for “Mega” terests, and have effectively taken over sub- infrastructure or urban development projects. stantive areas of urban management. As a re- In this situation, it is not surprising that most sult, ULBs have been left with maintenance municipalities were and still exist in a financially functions. A brief historical review of gover- precarious position. In 1986-87, the income of nance in India is useful to understand that this all municipal bodies in Class 1 towns exceeded has been a historical process, with the 74th their expenditure only by Rs. 311 million. The Amendment only one part of it. overlapping territories and responsibilities be- India has a long tradition of urban local bod- tween ULBs and Development Authorities led ies dating back to 1688 when the Madras Cor- to problems of non co-ordination, and more poration was constituted as the first corpora- seriously increased corruption and lack of action in South Asia. This was followed by the countability. This criticism against Development Calcutta, and Bombay Municipal Corporation Authorities is very important as these develop- in 1726. The consequences were two-fold: ments have a serious impact on livelihood generation in the following ways:

30 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA l Regressive land policy: The form of land policy impact the creative potential of local resulting from Master Planning is highly re- bodies to be more efficient. gressive to local economies in two ways. l Reducing the wealth creating effects of First, Development Authority promote un- infrastructure: It is important to realise that realistic land use regulations like unilateral local economies represent wealth created by and rigid land use and setbacks that go urbanisation. Economic productivity comes against the very grain of local economies. from the action of people coming together, Due to this, master planning de-legitimises urbanising and whose productivity is most non-master planned areas including boosted by ULB upgraded interventions. A livelihood nodes. Second, a key aspect of a significant proportion of this productivity productive and flexible land setting is that is reflected in the active local land markets. enterprise clusters exist in a situation of di- Thus, a very significant problem of verse tenure regimes. This allows for a vari- urbanisation would be solved if ULBs can ety of firms to locate in close physical prox- recoup some of these surpluses to pay for imity. Development authorities among other infrastructure and investments. This is not parastatal agencies, instead promote a very easy. However, there is strong evidence that narrow spectrum of legality which is not A regime of a regime of parastatal organisations reduce accessible to most poor groups. This in turn governance possibilities for public authorities, especially is reinforced by strict master-planning centred on ULBs, to use such sources. The basis for norms. municipal local political autonomy lies in financial au- structures is vital l Burdening ULBs with financial obligations and tonomy brought about by tapping growing not only to ensure constraining their operational area: Most large local economies. Possibilities for negotia- the health of scale funding for infrastructure and other tion directly threaten higher level political livelihood settings capital-intensive works are routed through circuits. ULBs in tapping the wealth of but also to parastatal agencies. These institutions often urbanisation, would be part of a highly po- generate a define the kind of projects funded under litical process. political process such allocations and the terms of borrow- The points highlighted above suggest that ur- that sustains this ings. However, the burden of repayment ban governance plays a structural part in ef- situation of both capital and interest falls onto ULBs. fecting livelihood settings to emerge. A regime Since ULBs have little role in defining the of parastatals not only roadblocks these ef- projects, it is not even clear if the proposed forts but increases the dependence of local projects actually address the needs and situ- bodies on higher levels of government. In ation faced locally. Just as the ULBs have contrast, a regime of governance centred on little say in the matter, there is little or no municipal structures is critically important not public process involved in the decision mak- only to ensure the health of livelihood set- ing. Parastatals reinforce each other’s pres- tings but also to generate a political process ence to institutionally crowd out ULBs. The that sustains this situation. Local bodies play multitude of institutions reinforces this situ- a significant mediating role between different ation, by promoting developments that ef- competing groups in distributing infrastruc- fectively “pirate” civic services by ULBs ture that spurs the productivity of these econo- without adequate financial remuneration. mies. Thus, strengthened local democracy All this means that while ULBs are hard helps poor groups to represent their priori- pressed to respond to livelihood nodes, they ties to government to shape their interven- have to also contend with these white el- tions in infrastructure and regulation to en- ephants. Such centralised relationships also sure the maximum positive impact on

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 31 livelihood opportunities. In conclusion, the councillors and also specific parts/ posi- above discussion suggest a triangular relation- tions of municipal organisations – namely ship underlying urban productivity: Standing Committees/Mayors Presidents/ Dep. Mayors and Vice Presidents. The sec- l Local economies generating vast livelihood ond relates to position of civic opportunities. organisations like Associations/ Sanghs, l Flexible land settings that spur and often NGOs, Federations, Ward committees. For fund the local economy. effective representation, a governance regime must maintain institutional openings l Local governance centred on political au- that allow these groups to access and di- tonomy strengthened by local economic rectly influence decision-making. This must surpluses. be not only reactive to programmes already It is important to recognise the wider terrain prepared, but be pro-active in allowing a of interventions influenced by ULBs, rather review of base information, a critique of than be restricted to a conventional and offi- assumptions used to formulate actions. cial view of their roles and responsibilities. The l Diluting and making parastatal regimes more ac- impact of the 74th Amendment must there- countable: ULBs need to regain the develop- fore be viewed in this wider developmental mental terrain that has been encroached by Urban Local perspective. Not surprisingly, the fracturing of higher level institutions. In particular, land Bodies need to municipal bodies, their finance, and functions policy and resource mobilisation is a criti- regain the exists in parallel with increasing disparities be- cal area. In parallel, parastatal agencies while developmental tween poor and rich groups – reflecting their they exist, need to be constituted on the terrain that has un-equal bargaining power in access to re- basis of broad-based local representation. been encroached sources. Thus, it is specifically important that by higher level international funding agencies recognise the Our conclusion is that local democratic pro- institutions role of ULBs, rather than bypass them in fram- cesses, however uneven and unruly, need to ing development priorities and programmes. be fostered since these are the basis for the emerging productive structure of cities, and Summing Up: Urban Self-governance as the ones that directly affect the lives of their un- Basis for “Good Politics” der-privileged. Efforts by National Govern- Development is inherently a political process ments and International Aid agencies need to shaped by actions of individuals, groups, and be sensitive to these emerging institutions and institutions. In this context, it is useful to de- ensure that programmes and interventions do fine “good” politics. One definition based on not undercut them. our discussion till now, could be those political structures that are responsive to poor 7. Women’s Representation in groups and strengthens their livelihood op- Local Government: Creating a portunities. In other words, “good politics” is Politics of Presence related to a governance regime centred on In the aftermath of the elections to panchayati ULBs. In order to understand the implications raj institutions in the various States, several of the 74th Constitutional Amendment on this studies have appeared, evaluating the experi- perspective, we see two key aspects of ment of women’s representation. Most such Municipalised governance. studies have adopted survey methods to evalu- l Local governance via effective civic representation: ate the nature of women’s participation in This includes two aspects: The first is en- panchayats. suring substantive operational spaces for 32 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA The choice of methodology leads unavoid- The all-women panchayats were not, of ably to a focus on the subjective perceptions course, legislated. They simply emerged, and attitudes of women representatives and, either because women took the initiative, or at best, those of some male colleagues, rela- because men in factionally divided villages tives and officials. In what follows, we will could not agree with each other. In summarise the findings of these studies and Maharashtra, they also emerged when domi- seek to extrapolate from them, commonali- nant rural interests like sugar barons wanted ties and variations relating to the participation puppet panchayats they could control, or be- of women in these institutions across differ- cause of the Shetkari Sangathan’s program- ent States. matic commitment to encourage rural women to enter politics. Generally, such panchayats The analysis will also overstep the customary came to power without an election, simply boundaries of such studies by crossing over because there was no opposing panel. Of into the domain of the panchayati raj institu- course, they frequently reflected the local caste tions per se, their structure, powers and possi- and class structures, with most women bilities. This will help to identify the exog- sarpanches belonging to families of the rural enous and institutional factors, apart from the political elite. A study of the gender-specific ones, that inhibit the proper all-women functioning of panchayat institutions. These A study of the all-women panchayats of panchayats of span a vast range from the multiple inequali- Maharashtra (Datta 1998) concluded that such Maharashtra ties and forms of social discrimination that panchayats gave expression and importance concluded that are embedded in rural society to the lacunae to local needs, by addressing issues like water such panchayats in the structuring of panchayat institutions. scarcity, or schoolrooms. It also found that gave expression women used informal and often innovative 7.1 Backdrop of Legislation and importance to methods of getting their way. For example, local needs, by Scenario Preceding the 73rd Amendment the sarpanch of Bitargaon drew the attention addressing issues of a visiting MLA to the acute water scarcity It is worth remembering that, even before the like water in the village by telling him that they could 73rd Amendment, women in Karnataka, scarcity, or not offer him tea. Similarly, in Vitner, the Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra had, since schoolrooms panchayat instructed the women to let their the 1970s, been contesting elections, occupy- cattle loose on 52 acres of common property ing reserved positions and participating in land that had been encroached upon. The re- panchayats. claimed land was then turned into a commu- Indeed, the oldest known all-women nity orchard, the proceeds of which augment panchayat was that which held office between the panchayat’s resources. 1963-68 in Nimbut village in Pune district of The barriers cited, in this study, to the effec- Maharashtra. It was observed, for instance, tive participation of women, are not very dif- that the representation of women had resulted ferent from those in other States: patriarchy, in a greater priority for issues such as drink- illiteracy, lack of information, bureaucracy, ing water supply and the installation of lack of financial powers, and so on. Similarly, pumps; the construction of wells, play- the positive contribution of these panchayats grounds, roads, public toilets and other com- (dissolved in 1994) in terms of the empower- munity infrastructure; the closure of liquor ment of women also suggest a picture vends; more effective control over schools; broadly similar to that emerging from some and even the transfer of land from men to post-Amendment studies: enhanced social their wives. recognition and respect; a feeling of

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 33 self-confidence; greater mobility, awareness 7.2 Women and Elections to the New and knowledge; and, in some cases, even en- Panchayats hanced status within the family (Datta,1998). Madhya Pradesh was the first State to con- The quality of women’s participation in ac- duct and complete elections to all three tiers tual processes of decision-making may have in May-June 1994. Between 1994 and 1995, been less than satisfactory, but this is, as we several other States – including Tripura, shall argue, only one measure of empower- Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh ment. The adoption of a wider perspective in – conducted elections under the new acts, terms of gender needs and interests, as well though the lowest tier was excluded in Punjab. as the rather ephemeral nature of the notion In Orissa, West Bengal and Karnataka, the of empowerment, deserves special consider- terms of existing panchayats had not yet ex- ation, and is remarked upon subsequently. pired. The Karnataka Conformity Act was Scenario After the 73rd Amendment passed in May 1993, followed by Gram Panchayat elections in December of the same The participation of women’s representatives year. Three States – viz., Orissa, West Bengal in the panchayats elected after the 73rd. and Maharashtra - conducted elections, with Most women Amendment may therefore be evaluated by 33 per cent reservation for women, after the surveyed report first examining the evidence of their aware- Amendment, but before the State conformity a positive ness of panchayati raj institutions and their acts were enacted. Himachal Pradesh and enhancement of formal engagement with panchayat processes, Punjab, by contrast, held elections after the status within the such as attending and taking part in meetings. Amendment, and before the conformity Acts family and the Several studies have surveyed these aspects in were passed, but without reservation for community, and the different States. Next, we will examine the women. a heightened specific obstacles and handicaps faced by The panchayat elections across the country commitment to women which appear to them to hamper their brought over 700,000 women to panchayati literacy, especially participation. These span a wide range - from raj institutions at all three levels. The statistics for the girl child the routine exclusion from effective decision- (Kaushik 1998) show that, with the making to physical violence against women exception of a few States, most have met – representatives. There are also structural ob- and some have even exceeded – the one-third stacles relating to the design of panchayati raj quota for women’s reservation at the Gram institutions, such as the role of the bureau- Panchayat Level. The States which have failed cracy or the provisions for no-confidence to meet the quota include Assam and Punjab motions or the two-child norm. Another type (where only 30 percent of women were elected of structural limitation is that relating to the to the Gram Panchayats); Sikkim local structures of dominance - including pa- (1.48 percent); undivided Uttar Pradesh triarchy, caste and class – issuing in exclusion, (25.55 percent), and Chandigarh (20.18 per- tokenism and surrogate representation. De- cent). Karnataka has 43.79 percent women spite these obstacles, most women surveyed representatives at the Gram Panchayat level, report a positive enhancement of status within which not only exceeds the requisite quota but the family and the community, and a height- is also the highest among all States. The other ened commitment to literacy, especially for the States, which substantially exceed the 33 per- girl child. Though the new panchayati raj in- cent quota, include Goa, Kerala, Manipur, stitutions were not specifically designed with West Bengal and Daman and Diu. this objective in mind, these are surely among their most heartening achievements.

34 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA At the Panchayat Samiti level, Assam, Punjab 7.3 Women Representatives : Social and and undivided Uttar Pradesh fall below the Economic Characteristics quota, while Karnataka (with 40 percent In this section, we compare the findings of women representatives) again exceeds it. At two studies, which only partly overlap in their the Zila Parishad level, again, Uttar Pradesh choice of States, though not at all in their (at 25.40 percent) remains the major defaulter, choice of districts within those States. The first apart from States like Sikkim and Union Ter- of these (CWDS 1999) compares Madhya ritories like Chandigarh and Dadra and Nagar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, with a Haveli. sample of 843 women, fairly evenly divided The statistics for women chairpersons at the between the three States. Of this sample, 200 various levels of Panchayati Raj (Kaushik women are chairpersons of panchayats, while 1998) show that only Karnataka, Maharashtra, the remaining 643 are members of panchayats Orissa and Tamil Nadu meet the quota at all at all three levels. The other study (Kaushik three tiers. West Bengal’s record in this respect 1998) is based upon a survey of 600 women is a surprisingly low 4.62 percent at the third representatives in six State-level studies – of tier, 3.00 percent at the middle tier, and nil at Tamil Nadu, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, the top tier. Orissa, Rajasthan and the then Uttarakhand region of Uttar Pradesh - have also been col- State Election Commission data pertaining to lated in an overall report. (Kaushik, 1998) 40 percent of the Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan have shown women that less than 1 per cent of seats in panchayats Literacy Levels representatives remained vacant, and that these were not lim- The majority of women entering the new surveyed belong ited to positions reserved for women. In panchayati raj institutions are illiterate or barely to families with Madhya Pradesh, many of these seats fall in literate. Kaushik’s study confirms this finding incomes that districts with a substantial tribal population. for Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, place them below A study of approximately 850 women repre- where 25 percent of the elected women sur- the poverty line sentatives, across three States, shows that 49.5 veyed were unable to read and write. How- percent women were elected without a con- ever, Kaushik’s study shows that in Tamil test. Most of these were at the level of the Nadu, Orissa and the Garhwal region of U.P., gram panchayat and, at all levels, there were there are very few illiterate women represen- more such unopposed elections for members tatives.3 In these States, 23 percent women are rather than chairpersons of panchayats. In educated upto the primary school level, while Madhya Pradesh, women have even been 9.5 percent are college educated. elected to seats which were not reserved for them. (CWDS, 1999) A study of two districts Income and Occupation in Tamil Nadu, which surveyed 100 women The Kaushik study does not provide data on members, found that 88 of them had won income or landholding, but it is heartening to from constituencies reserved for women, and find that 40 percent of the women represen- 7 from constituencies reserved for the Sched- tatives surveyed in the CWDS study belong uled Castes, though open to both men and to families with incomes that place them be- women. (Athreya et al., 1998) Similarly, a study low the poverty line. 14.2 percent of them are of Angul district in Orissa also showed that landless, 19.5 percent have marginal holdings, 33 out of 53 ward-members were elected un- and 20.6 percent have small holdings. Only opposed, and two were elected from unre- 33 percent of all those surveyed had an an- served constituencies. (ISED,1998) nual income over Rs. 20,000. The reporting

Current3 This is Status accounted and Prospects for by distinct for Decentralisation reasons in each case. The districts chosen in Tamil Nadu were those which had had fairly 35 successful mass literacy campaigns (Athreya, 1998:2) Female literacy in the Garhwal region of Uttar Pradesh is higher than the State average. In Orissa, the amended Gram Panchayat Act makes literacy mandatory for the representatives. (Panda, 1996:726) of occupational background in the two stud- studies also found that an overwhelming per- ies is also not vastly dissimilar : the Kaushik centage (over 90 percent) of women repre- study reports that 50 percent of the women sentatives was married. The data relating to representatives are cultivators, while 40 per- age are corroborated by evidence from Ban- cent describe themselves as housewives (which galore Rural District in Karnataka (Vidya, includes support to the dominant household 1997) and Karnal district of Haryana. occupation, whether it is agriculture or busi- (MARG,1998:38-39) ness). The CWDS study also reports 37.2 per- Family Background cent women as housewives and 38.3 percent as cultivators, with 10.2 percent being cultiva- The CWDS study - especially the part of it tors and labourers. Following from these data, relating to Madhya Pradesh – contradicts the the caste profile of women representatives is common assumption that the women repre- not surprising. According to the CWDS study, sentatives would belong to locally influential the highest percentage, in terms of caste, families with political connections. The The study among both members and chairpersons is that Kaushik study, too, found that only conducted by the of OBCs (28.9 percent and 30.3 percent re- 30 percent of the women interviewed came Centre for spectively). The Kaushik study also shows that from politically connected families. Many oth- Women’s women representatives from Madhya Pradesh, ers however had a history of involvement with Development Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu were mostly from Mahila Mandals, and this was especially true Studies the OBCs. However, in the upper caste-domi- of the women in Garhwal (U.P.), Tamil Nadu contradicts the nated hill region of U.P. and in Haryana (where and Madhya Pradesh. This study also found common Yadavs are closer to the high castes), most that political families played a greater role at assumption that women representatives belong to the upper the upper two tiers. castes. A district-level study of Karnataka also the women Previous Experience representatives showed the predominance of the landown- would belong to ing upper castes, the Vokkaligas. (Vidya, 1997) The CWDS study also shows that the major- locally influential Similar findings are reported from a study of ity of women elected to the panchayats in families with Orissa, where 66 percent of the elected Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh political women members in the State are from the are first-timers, with only 3 percent having any connections Karan and Khandayat castes, and the percent- previous experience of participation in age of scheduled castes and tribes among the panchayats. Only 20 percent reported mem- upa-sarpanches is lower than that of other bership of a political party, with an equal pro- castes. It is only in ward membership that the portion reporting the political affiliations of lower castes are found to dominate. their natal or affinal families.4 It is clear that (Srinivas,1998:124-5) the prior level of political engagement among these women is very low. The MARG study Age in Haryana also shows that, for 50 percent of As regards the age profile, the Kaushik study the respondents, this was their very first ex- shows that 74 percent belonged to the posure to political activity, as neither they nor 20-40 years age group, while in the CWDS other members of their families had any pre- study 69 percent were below 45 years of age. vious experience of political engagement. Thus, both studies found a marked contrast Again, however, there are a few women who to the pre-Amendment panchayats, in which have been active in the campaign for prohibi- older women, free of their child-bearing and tion or in the women’s wing of national domestic responsibilities predominated. Both political parties.

36 4 6.3 percent reported that their natal families, and 14.9 percent reported that their affinalDECENTRALISATION families, had political INaffiliations. INDIA These findings provide a sharp contrast to male representatives in these three States, 20 percent of whom in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and 32 percent in Rajasthan, had previous experience of panchayats. The proportion of those politically affiliated is also much higher: 53 percent in Rajasthan, and 30 percent in Madhya Pradesh. (CWDS, 1999:88) It is interesting to observe the regional varia- constituency, leaving the task of mobilising tions in this respect. High levels of political male votes to their husbands and other male affiliation are reported from States like Tamil relatives. In sharp contrast to this is the pic- Nadu, where 62 percent of women panchayat ture emerging from a study of two districts in members in two districts claimed involvement the Garhwal region of Uttar Pradesh where, in party enrolment, addressing public meet- of the hundred women representatives sur- ings and collecting funds. (Athreya, 1998:17- veyed, as many as 30 reported that it was their 18) In the study of Madhya Pradesh, Uttar own decision to contest. Others cited hus- The provision for Pradesh and Rajasthan, dalit and tribal women bands, family, and village community, while reservation made are seen to consistently report higher levels some were asked to contest by the Mahila women’s of political affiliation. (CWDS, 1999:89) In Mangal Dal. representation Garhwal - atypically for Uttar Pradesh as a possible because 7.5 Women’s Awareness of Panchayati whole - we find considerable evidence of a it compelled the Raj prior engagement in the Mahila Mangal Dal, men in the though virtually none of political affiliation Of all the available studies that have exam- community to or activity. (Verma, 1998:54-55) ined this issue, we may contrast the experi- take the initiative ence of Karnataka, the State which appears in persuading the 7.4 Why Women Contest to have the highest levels of awareness with women in their Studies of women’s participation in the PRIs that of Haryana, which probably ranks among families to contest have shown that a variety of factors lead the lowest in this respect. The Karnataka study women to contest in such elections. The first reports that 19.35 percent of the respondents and most obvious factor is, of course, the man- knew about the panchayati raj legislation in datory provision for reservation, in the ab- detail, while the remaining were aware of its sence of which few women – except in a handful of States like Karnataka and Maharashtra BOX 6 – had considered, or were likely to consider, ‘Who Will Make the Chapatis ?’ contesting an election. The provision for res- This argument (Datta,1998) is rarely sort of surrogate election. This is encountered in the post-Amendment probably why some studies (such as ervation made women’s representation pos- narratives of panchayati raj. Instead, CWDS, 1999) report more co-opera- sible because it compelled the men in the com- we frequently find household respon- tive arrangements within the home, munity to take the initiative in persuading the sibilities being assumed – mainly by with domestic responsibilities being women in their families to contest, whether other women in the household, such more cheerfully shared. But travelling to keep the seat in the family till the rotational as mothers-in-law or unmarried sis- long distances to attend panchayat ters-in-law - to allow women members meetings is still perceived as some- system caused the reservation to lapse, or to of the panchayat to be free of their thing women cannot do unescorted. retain their control over panchayat resources. domestic commitments. Hence, it is not unusual to find There are, of course, multifarious con- women members being accompanied A study of women representatives in Karnal straints within the home. These in- by husbands or other male relatives. district, Haryana documents pressure and/or clude the ‘who will make the chapatis?’ This occurs, of course, where the lat- support from family and community as being and ‘who will look after the children?’ ter are not actually attending the meet- the main reason for contesting. The only ex- arguments, but are found to be more ings in place of the woman, an ac- ception - a woman who took her own deci- weakly articulated after reservations tion which carries its own legitimacy than they were before. This is clearly in many parts. CWDS study found sion to contest for the Panchayat Samiti elec- because an independent initiative by a that while more than 75 percent of tion - was subjected to verbal and physical woman to contest elections is per- the women representatives in Uttar abuse from her husband and family. Here, as ceived as more threatening by men, Pradesh are escorted, in Madhya elsewhere, the election campaign is largely whereas a man’s initiative on behalf Pradesh and Rajasthan the corre- organised and run by the men, with the women of his wife or mother for a reserved sponding figures are 30.7 percent and seat is seen – in terms of social ac- 39.4 percent respectively. canvassing mainly among the women of their ceptability - as par for the course, a

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 37 contents in general terms.5 By contrast, the informed about. In Tamil Nadu, women in Haryana study shows that the knowledge of panchayats are seen to take a keen interest in women’s representatives about panchayati raj panchayat finances, though they report some institutions was limited to their traditional confusion about the relationship between the functions only, and they were unaware of the three tiers. (Athreya, 1998:22) In Garhwal, new Haryana Panchayati Raj Act and the func- Uttar Pradesh, similarly, women representa- tions assigned to panchayats under it. They tives are aware of the new panchayati raj sys- were also found to be completely ignorant of tem, and affirm the value of reservation, the procedural aspects of welfare schemes, and though there are a few who believe it is mean- the financial powers of panchayat ingless in the absence of real devolution of bodies. (MARG, 1998:87-90) powers. (Verma, 1998:38) Again, the lack of knowledge mostly pertains to finances, bud- The CWDS study, however, shows that the geting and accounting. levels of awareness about panchayat-related matters do not vary significantly according to gender. Kaushik’s study brings to the fore an impor- Thus, if 18.7 percent female members and tant, but largely neglected, aspect of this is- chairpersons of panchayats report no knowl- sue: awareness among women representatives edge about panchayat matters, so do 16.2 per- about the Gram Sabhas, their powers and func- In general, data cent of their male colleagues. (CWDS, tions. In the six States surveyed by this study, reveals a high 1999:99) Indeed, on the financial resources of Tamil Nadu and Orissa manifest the greatest level of panchayats, there is no response from an equal ignorance about the Gram Sabha. In Orissa, awareness about proportion of men and women members. In in fact, even most sarpanches of the Gram reservations, but general, CWDS data reveals a high level of Panchayats and Panchayat Samitis are not low levels of awareness about reservations, but low levels aware of the role that the Gram Sabha is ex- awareness about of awareness about the powers and responsi- pected to play. (Kaushik, 1998:30) This igno- the powers and bilities of panchayats. Indeed, the distinction rance about the foundation of the entire py- responsibilities of between powers, functions and duties was ramidal structure of local democracy is surely panchayats found to be blurred, as the respondents listed, a matter of concern. It also perhaps serves to under panchayat powers and functions, road explain the fact that while the Gram Sabha is construction, water supply and land revenue ostensibly the most important unit in the en- collection. Unsurprisingly, CWDS also found tire structure of the new panchayati raj insti- literacy and education to be correlated with tutions, it is nowhere effective as an instru- higher levels of awareness. Thus, of the three ment of direct democracy, and records a fairly States studied, it is Uttar Pradesh which mani- low presence of women. Proposals such as fests lower levels of awareness than the other the introduction of a sub-quorum for women two. are administrative solutions, rather than political ones, and are therefore unlikely to cre- The positive correlation between literacy and ate a genuinely participatory climate. education, on the one hand, and awareness, on the other, is reinforced by data from Tamil Modes of Participation Nadu and the Garhwal region of Uttar Attendance at Meetings Pradesh. In both these regions, we find better literacy indicators, as well as higher levels of From noting the varying levels of awareness, awareness about the basics of the new among women representatives, about the pow- panchayati raj system. In fact, the lack of ers and functions of the panchayat bodies, we knowledge generally pertains to aspects which proceed to a consideration of the various in- most ordinary citizens would need to be dices of women’s participation that have been

38 5 This may partly be accounted for by the fact that Karnataka has a long history of DECENTRALISATIONreservation for, and participation IN INDIA by, women in panchayats. Indeed, the study cited covers panchayats elected prior to the Amendment, in the period 1987-92. (Vidya, 1997) surveyed. The CWDS study constructs a com- about meetings is fairly regularly communi- prehensive index of participation that in- cated, but agenda papers are not. In many cludes: attendance at panchayat meetings; ef- States, the dates of the meetings are statuto- forts to carry one’s viewpoint in such meet- rily fixed. But, as the Haryana study shows, ings; weekly time devoted to panchayat work; though the dates of the meetings are supposed petitions and problems received and attended to be fixed, the schedule is generally not fol- to; and efforts to overcome difficulties that lowed and meetings are held as and when the are encountered. The survey of Madhya Sarpanch or the Village Secretary deem it nec- Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh found essary. Information about the meeting is sent that 65.5 percent of women representatives through the village chowkidar, usually to the regularly attend panchayat meetings, with at- husband/son of the woman representative. If tendance being higher among chairpersons, there are factional divisions within the village, and lower among members, especially in U.P. such information may simply be withheld. The reasons for failure to attend generally per- Even if the date of the meeting is communi- tain to domestic work or livelihood concerns, cated, it may be postponed for lack of quo- with smaller numbers citing the inconvenience rum. Such unpredictability is naturally irksome, of distance or seclusion as the reason for non- especially to those who have to miss a day’s Women attendance. livelihood for this purpose. Political differ- representatives – ences can also influence this aspect, especially especially The results of other studies are not vastly dis- at the two higher levels. In Garhwal, for ex- chairpersons of similar. Kaushik’s six-State study, for instance, ample, one Kshetra Panchayat (middle tier) panchayats - in shows that elected women are fairly regular in member complained that the pramukh – who Madhya Pradesh attending meetings, and that the phenomenon belongs to the rival political party - tampers apparently seek of proxy attendance – by husbands or other with the post so that she does not receive the to gain support male relatives – is actually on the decline. letter notifying the meeting in time. (Verma, for their viewpoint (Kaushik, 1998:28) The Tamil Nadu study 1998:40) through a variety shows that 70 percent of the respondents have of methods, both attended all the meetings and all but one have Participation in Panchayat Proceedings formal and attended with a fair degree of regularity. The As different studies use different measures of informal presence of male escorts to accompany participation, the available data does not sup- women to meetings is generally ascribed to port precise inter-State comparisons on this distance, poor public transport facilities, and issue. It can, however, be used to create a mo- meetings that do not always end before night- saic encompassing various dimensions of par- fall. (Athreya, 1998:21) In Garhwal, not only ticipation. Thus, women representatives – es- do women attend meetings regularly, they also pecially chairpersons of panchayats - in go largely unaccompanied. The evidence from Madhya Pradesh apparently seek to gain sup- Karnataka – though it relates to the period port for their viewpoint through a variety of 1987-92 – confirms this trend. As on several methods, both formal and informal. They other counts, the evidence from Haryana is lobby with fellow-members outside the discouraging, with only 13 of the 128 women panchayat, enlist the support of their hus- representatives surveyed by the MARG study bands, and sometimes even boycott having attended all meetings. (1998:110) meetings.(CWDS, 1999:105-06) In Uttar Information about meetings is frequently not Pradesh, however, almost 60 percent of even properly communicated. Here again, the women representatives devote no time at variations between States are considerable. In all to panchayat-related work; and only Madhya Pradesh, for instance, information 27 percent of women representatives in

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 39 Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan which is a small proportion, possibly because (taken together) devote more than 3 hours not all decisions are subjected to a formal vote. weekly to such work. (ibid.) (Athreya, 1998:22) In Orissa, on the other hand, some members of the Gram Panchayat There are also important regional variations and Panchayat Samiti expressed hesitation in on the petitions received, and attended to, by speaking at meetings, while others, who had women representatives. The three-State fewer inhibitions in communicating, neverthe- CWDS study records that about a quarter of less felt that their suggestions were not seri- the petitions received by these women relate ously heard or considered. (ISED,1998:19-21) to family conflict, and approximately half to issues such as land disputes, land distribution, The Karnataka study records greater partici- employment and assistance with basic needs. pation at the Zila Parishad level than at the In terms of receiving and attending to such Mandal Panchayat, partly because women petitions, 63.6 percent of the women repre- members of the Zila Parishad are in any case sentatives surveyed in Madhya Pradesh ac- better educated. Only one scheduled caste About a quarter of knowledged receiving petitions, but only 49.8 member of the Zila Parishad attended all the petitions percent reported having attended to them. In meetings but never spoke at any. (Vidya, 1997) received by these Uttar Pradesh, by contrast, only 19 percent This is an important dimension of participa- women relate to women representatives reported receiving pe- tion, because women belonging to the sched- family conflict, titions, and a meagre 15.6 percent reported uled castes and scheduled tribes are – virtu- and attending to them. In both these States, it ap- ally across all States – seen to be singularly approximately pears that women belonging to the scheduled disprivileged in such forms of participation. half to issues castes and scheduled tribes receive most peti- This is reflected even in the physical such as land tions from their own groups, though such pe- organisation of the panchayat space. In many disputes, land titioners also appeal to representatives of other gram panchayats, the women members tend distribution, castes for help. OBCs and upper caste per- to sit separately from their male colleagues, employment and sons, however, tend to go to people of their though in others men and women have gradu- assistance with own castes, and much less to members of the ally begun to sit in a mixed fashion. Even in basic needs scheduled castes and tribes. (CWDS, 1999:107- Karnataka, women in Mandal Panchayats are 8) It is notable that one-third of the women made to sit in one corner of the room, either reported taking the help of their behind the men or to one side. However, at husbands to resolve the problems presented the Zila Parishad, men and women interact to them, while another third reported taking more freely. Even if gender equations are, in the help of government officials attached to this superficial sense, changing, caste equations various government programmes and remain more deeply entrenched. In a Haryana schemes. Gram Panchayat, for instance, a scheduled caste chairperson was found sitting on the The six-State study co-ordinated by Kaushik floor with the caste members sitting on a measures participation in slightly different charpoy at a higher level. In many Gram terms. The evidence from Tamil Nadu, for Panchayats, women belonging to the higher example, compares types of participation in castes refuse to eat with scheduled caste terms of participating in discussions, in which women, though sometimes the caste objec- the women members are most active; speak- tion is sought to be disguised by excuses ing in community meetings and putting for- such as that the individual is not feeling ward suggestions, in which they are reason- very hungry! ably active; and casting a vote in meetings

40 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA Participation in Committees of undertaking useful developmental activity, while members were less so. (ISED, 1998: An important aspect of women’s participation Chapter IV) in the proceedings of the panchayats is their role in committees. Most panchayats have sev- The evidence from the Garhwal region is more eral committees, but there is no provision for positive, with many Gram Panchayat members a quota-based representation of women on involved in work related to literacy, health, panchayat committees. This remains a serious roads, tanks, pensions, and forest conserva- lacuna because it provides a convenient handle tion. For some, the establishment of income- for excluding and marginalising women mem- generating schemes and small-scale industries bers. The Kaushik study shows that women for women is also an important objective. At are largely ignorant about the existence of the middle tier, members reported involve- committees, and are mostly excluded from de- ment in water, electricity, schools and roads, velopmental committees. Of the total num- though the majority of Kshetriya Panchayat Women attempt ber of 600 women representatives surveyed members complained of their lack of power to address the in six States, 61 reported no knowledge of and the failure of Gram Pradhans to consult more vital needs committees, and another 134 were not mem- them. of women. As bers of any committee. 65 women were mem- such, they work The CWDS study also records that women bers of the Health Committee, and a mere 16 on schemes for attempt to address the more vital needs of of the Women and Child Development Com- bringing piped women. As such, they work on schemes for mittee (Anganwadi Committee). water into the bringing piped water into the village; inspect village; inspect Participation in Panchayat Activities development works and nutrition centres un- development der the ICDS; and pay particular attention to The chief concerns of women in panchayats works and children’s education. They also take the initia- are similar to those noted in the earlier expe- nutrition centres tive in a variety of family and matrimonial mat- rience of all-women panchayats in under the ters, from counselling abusive or alcoholic hus- Maharashtra. Most surveys project the inten- Integrated Child bands to settling land disputes. (CWDS, 1999: tions of women representatives, rather than Development 137) In West Bengal, Kamala Mahato, the documenting their actual achievements so far. Scheme; and pay panchayat pradhan of Bandoan in Purulia dis- One study of 16 Gram Panchayats in Ganjam particular trict, numbers first among their achievements district of Orissa claims that the non-politi- attention to the 10 wells that she has had dug for drinking cal background of the women panches and children’s water as well as irrigation, and the income- sarpanches surveyed was an asset in arriving education generating schemes for women under the In- at unbiased decisions on community matters tegrated Rural Development Programme. such as the construction of a community hall, (Panchayat Update, April 1998) the selection of beneficiaries under the widow allowance scheme, water supply and work Gender Exclusion under the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana. (Panda, Exclusion takes many forms, and is effected 1996:727) A very different picture emerges in a variety of ways. For purposes of this analy- from another Orissa study of 49 Gram sis, we consider the several modes of exclu- Panchayats, 4 Panchayat Samitis and one Zila sion under two broad categories : Parishad in Angul district. This suggests variations (a) between the three tiers, with greater l social constraints involvement as we go to the higher levels, and l institutional constraints (b) between members and chairpersons. Thus, sarpanches at all three levels were confident

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 41 Social constraints include the patriarchal order- tal institutional constraints affect equally both ing of society which includes commonly ob- male and female members and chairpersons served phenomena of tokenism and surrogate of panchayats. These include : the inadequate representation. They also include illiteracy devolution of powers, and of financial pow- which makes it well-nigh impossible for ers in particular, in many States; the lack of women to participate in processes of decision- specification about the relationship between making that are heavily dependent on the writ- the three tiers; and the relationship between ten word and the legalese of agenda, minutes the bureaucracy and the elected representa- and signatures. Caste is also a form of social tives. Institutional constraints vary across constraint, insofar as it mandates seclusion or States, depending mostly on the provisions of places women belonging to lower caste or the conformity acts, but also on the adminis- scheduled caste groups at the twin mercies of trative and political climate, and the patriarchy and caste position. Social constraints organisational norms and values that vary considerably depending on the nature of characterise it. local society, rather than on State boundaries. Finally, we shall examine some of the positive Where structures of patriarchy and caste are trends that are discernible despite the multiple more oppressive, the empowerment of constraints operating on the effective partici- Social constraints women through panchayati raj institutions pation of women. These signposts will help vary considerably faces formidable obstacles. Where, on the depending on the us to identify the transition to empowerment other hand, caste structures are relatively less that is, slowly but quite unmistakably, taking nature of local oppressive and patriarchy is weaker due to place through the representation of women society, rather male migration or social mores, the participa- in panchayat institutions. than on State tion of women in panchayat institutions is less boundaries constricted. Social Constraints One of the most extreme forms that social “The Unimportance of Being Woman”: constraints take is the physical violence to It is neither surprising nor uncommon to find which women and lower caste/scheduled caste most surveys reporting a lack of confidence representatives alike have been subjected. This among women representatives in panchayats. coercive mechanism of exclusion is more se- Seclusion behind the veil (purdah) is clearly a rious than the simple disfranchisement that cultural practice that inhibits participation6 . issues from illiteracy or patriarchal values that Even though 42 percent of CWDS’s respon- are enforced or internalised. By contrast, physi- dents said they observed purdah in panchayat cal violence represents direct intimidation and meetings, 7.4 percent said they had given up coercion against women and other the practice of observing purdah after enter- dispriviledged social groups, intended to ing the panchayats. In Rajasthan, 12.3 percent threaten them into withdrawal. of the women representatives had discarded Institutional constraints include provisions such the veil, while only 3.2 percent in Uttar Pradesh as the two-child norm which debars women reported such a change. In Bilaspur district with more than two children from member- of Madhya Pradesh, a three-day training camp ship of panchayats in some States. It also infor panches and sarpanches spent a whole day cludes the provision for no-confidence mo- discussing the veil, particularly encouraging tions, which are frequently invoked to subvert men to recognise their ‘mental veils’, which the purpose of reservations by removing duly made them keep their wives behind a elected women pradhans and replacing them physical veil. by male upa-pradhans. The more fundamen-

42 6 There are marked regional variations in this respect also. CWDS’s three-State study, forDECENTRALISATION example, found that only IN 8 INDIApercent of women representatives reported the veil (or ‘ghunghat’) as a constraint. This figure is an average of widely varying State percentages: thus, 2 percent of Uttar Pradesh respondents, 8.5 percent of Madhya Pradesh respondents and 13.4 percent of Rajasthan respondents reported the veil as a constraint. Despite their own reticence - stemming from deed, several studies have concluded that the the internalisation of generations of gender attempt to empower women through quota- bias – there are many women who observe based representation has issued in, at best, to- and remark upon the manifest discrimination kenism. There is indeed plenty of evidence against them in panchayats. Among these, they of surrogate or proxy representation by hus- cite: the attempt by elected male colleagues to bands and other male relatives who not only dominate; the inattention to suggestions and canvass for their women, but also receive no- opinions put forth by women; and the nega- tices of and attend meetings in their place. One tive attitude of male officials. As mentioned husband in Alwar, Rajasthan not only can- earlier, social custom often dictates that the vassed for his wife’s election, but also had the women sit separately (with each other) and do banners printed with his name on them. Hus- not speak in the presence of men. This as- bands of women pradhans are all too fre- pect is, however, gradually undergoing a quently referred to as the pradhan, as they as- change in many regions as women get accus- sume the authority of the pradhan and dis- tomed to sitting and even speaking in the pres- charge the functions of the office. Given the ence of men. patriarchal ordering of Indian society, it is not astonishing that instances of surrogate repre- Despite their own The MARG study of a district in Haryana sentation are found all over the country. It is, reticence - brought forth, from a scheduled caste woman however, important to note that while there stemming from member of the Panchayat Samiti, the sugges- are regions where this phenomenon is par- the internalisation tion that there should be a room where women ticularly strong, there are also regions where it of generations of can meet and sit together. Another suggested is weak. It is important to not lose sight of gender bias – that there should be some meetings of only regional differentiation in social structure, in- there are many the women members of the panchayat where cluding the structures of patriarchy, in order women who they can freely discuss certain issues, arrive at to avoid the rather rash general conclusion that observe and a consensus, and then place this before the women’s empowerment under the new remark upon the entire panchayat. (MARG, 1998:183) This panchayati raj system is a complete and hope- manifest clearly shows that women hesitate to partici- less failure. discrimination pate as individuals, but that their desire to par- against them in ticipate and have their voice heard is never- Studies of western Uttar Pradesh provide panchayats theless strong. Therefore, the mechanism they some of the more depressing evidence of suggest is one through which they can have surrogate representation. In an early survey the satisfaction of expressing their opinions, of 100 members in 7 panchayat bodies in possibly even having these carried, and placed Shahpur block of Muzaffarnagar district, G.K. before the whole panchayat as the now- Lieten (1996a) argued that though the 1995 weightier collective view of all the women elections have brought about a numerical pre- members. They are, it appears, often deterred ponderance of agricultural labourers and small by the infighting among the men, and their peasants, the new panchayats continue to func- use of intemperate language, as also by the tion rather like the earlier ones: with large num- absence of trust and the consequent inability bers of nominal or ‘namesake’7 members, ex- to arrive at a consensus or a decision. tensive corruption in development works, rig- ging of elections through the ‘capture’ of poll- Tokenism and Surrogate Representation ing booths, and an agenda that is devoid of The exclusion of women representatives from social concerns because it reflects only the ineffective decision-making in panchayat insti- terests of the dominant local elite, represented tutions has been repeatedly documented. In- by the pradhan. While the earlier panchayats

Current7 The term Status ‘namesake’ and Prospects refers not for to Decentralisation someone bearing the same name, but is a literal translation of a Hindi phrase meaning ‘in 43 name only’. It is used to denote membership in name only, rather than in substance. usually had one female member nominated by villages, the 1995 election brought a dalit the pradhan, she was never asked to attend woman to the post of pradhan. Since these meetings or involve herself with any public are also Ambedkar villages, their grants for de- work. velopment schemes were doubled for a two- year period, and channelised through the Some of the women even did not know that panchayat. This has enabled a great deal of they were a member. Once or twice the developmental work to take place, and vested pradhan had dispatched a document for sign- the pradhans with tremendous powers of pa- ing, but they did not know what it was for. tronage. However, Pai found that it is the hus- Without being derogatory towards women in bands of the pradhanis – locally described as general, the impression is that women stand a the pradhans – who take all the decisions. better chance of becoming a member of the panchayat if they are illiterate, frail of body and of mind and Yet, the mere fact of having been elected to rather old. The women who at least knew that the post of pradhan has provoked the they were panchayat members very rarely went realisation, among these women, of the need to the meetings. If they did, then they only to acquire an education or at least literacy skills. did so in order to put their thumb impression Inspired by the example of Mayawati, the dalit The mere fact of or to sign and then came back. The usual pro- woman who became Chief Minister of Uttar having been cedure, however, is for the pradhan to send Pradesh, they are keen that the girls in the vil- elected to the the document to be signed to their house. lage attend school regularly. This phenomenon of what may be called proto-empowerment de- post of pradhan This procedure, as a matter of fact, applies not only to serves to be taken seriously. has provoked the the women, but to most of the male members as well. realisation, (emphases added) (Lieten, 1996b) The Government of Uttar Pradesh has issued among these orders intended to help women gram pradhans This leads Lieten to affirm Ambedkar’s cyni- women, of the to keep their husbands from interfering in their cism about panchayats. They are, he concludes, need to acquire work. Husbands, according to this order, will inappropriate instruments of rural develop- an education or at not be allowed to enter their wives’ offices (ex- ment or of transforming landed power rela- least literacy skills cept for urgent work or to take part in meet- tions. (ibid.:2705) A recent study by Sudha Pai ings of the village panchayat); to accept memo- provides a more nuanced understanding of randa from villagers; and to travel in official the phenomenon of surrogate representation, vehicles. (Panchayati Raj Update, October though her survey of three villages in the green 1998) revolution area of Daurala block in Meerut district echoes Lieten’s in some respects. Like Lack of Literacy Lieten, she records the changed social com- A recent survey has revealed that 40 percent position of the new panchayats, with their pre- of the 20,000 women gram pradhans in the dominance of lower castes and shows that the State of Uttar Pradesh are illiterate. The re- pradhanis who have been elected to the sponses of the women representatives sur- panchayats after 1995 are ‘namesake’ members. veyed across several States show that these Their perception of the panchayat as a gov- women themselves perceive the absence of ernment organisation does not encourage reading and writing skills as a major handicap, them to see their participation as necessary. which hampers their effective participation in Indeed, Pai found that “interviewing them for panchayat institutions. Without exception, ev- understanding the working of the panchayat ery single piece of survey research on this was of little use as they are ignorant of local question cites the recognition of women affairs”. (Pai,1998:1009) In each of Pai’s

44 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA representatives that they would have been bet- to such pressures, because the dominant castes ter able to contribute to the proceedings and and landholding groups manage to prevail. activities of the panchayats had they had the There are, however, heartening examples like advantage of schooling. The sarpanch is pro- the following. Ganga Devi Rawat, sarpanch vided with a secretary, whose performance she of Khawada in the Bhilangana block of Tehri has no authority to check. Alternatively, Garhwal district in Uttar Pradesh, is high- sarpanches appoint a secretary at a monthly school educated. She was asked by her rela- salary of Rs. 500 (which is equivalent to ten tives to sign on a set of suspect accounts, she days’ wages for unskilled labour), who can refused to do so on the grounds that she was hardly provide administrative support even for not convinced of their veracity. Despite pres- tasks like book-keeping. sure from the extended family, she steadfastly In Haryana, the women ask for education and refused because, as she put it, “this hand and training so that they would be better equipped this signature are no longer my own. They have to approach police and government officials been given to me by the people of the vil- with their problems. They also ask for greater lage.” She has also consistently refused to yield knowledge about the law on panchayati raj. to the demands for commissions and cuts (MARG, 1998:181) In Rajasthan, close to 12 from the officials who sanction development percent of the women link their ineffective- funds. Her efforts at transparency have been ness to illiteracy. (CWDS, 1999:124), while in supported by the Chetna Andolan, which In addition to Tamil Nadu, even women who hold a holds regular jan sunwais (public hearings) on literacy, the bachelor’s degree feel that they are not taken matters of public interest and public expen- women ask for seriously unless they have the backing of a diture, and demands the right to information. training in powerful male. In particular, there is a wide- Another heartening example is that of leadership, legal spread feeling that, even more than their male Fatimabee, the sarpanch of a village in literacy, gender colleagues, it is officials who are dismissive of Kurnool district, Andhra Pradesh. She wears justice them. As one panchayat president in Tamil the burkha in deference to social custom, and Nadu observed, “Officials are especially in- can neither read nor sign her name. Despite different towards women representatives, but an initial lack of confidence, she has managed they respond immediately to male represen- to get the access road to the village metalled; tatives.” (Athreya, 1998:23) started work on a school; had the public wa- A member of a Janapad panchayat in ter tap repaired; got land ownership pattas reg- Chhatarpur, Madhya Pradesh notes that istered; and physically led the women members are simply told to collect village to clean up a large tank. Above all, by their travel and daily allowances and leave. The refusing to oblige one of her supporters, who resolutions are not read out -even on the re- was pressing her to lease him the village pond quest of a member who is illiterate – and they for twenty thousand rupees, she held an open are simply asked to append their signature. auction which has yielded a lakh of rupees This can be particularly difficult if accounts for the panchayat fund. (Panchayati Raj Up- are involved. The members invariably want a date, December 1997:6) commission on the development work sanc- In addition to literacy, the women ask for train- tioned, and ask that the sarpanch falsify the ing in leadership, legal literacy, gender justice. accounts accordingly. They also ask her to give But training remains woefully inadequate as below-poverty-line certification to ineligible well as ineffective. If it imparts anything at all, persons. If the sarpanch happens to be a dalit it is more because its recipients are so eager to or tribal woman, she can scarcely refuse to yield

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 45 learn, rather than on account of any intrinsic knife. (Kaushik,1998:45) A tribal woman merit in the training itself. Training sarpanch in Pune district in Maharashtra, who programmes need to address themselves much also happens to be a primary school teacher, more frontally to women’s concerns. As such, was beaten up by the rival male candidate (and they need to create a consciousness in them his hired goons) simply because she had won about patriarchy and the social and cultural the election and he had not. (Panchayati Raj practices that affect women, as also how to Update, 1994) organise and build networks and alliances. Women representatives in Haryana have com- Above all, training programmes that impart plained of physical abuse by drunken hus- gender-sensitivity to men hold the key to more bands, which may not be directly related to enlightened policy, even at the micro-level. their functioning in the panchayat, but certainly Physical Violence impairs their ability to work. In Tamil Nadu, a woman vice-president of a village panchayat Physical violence or the threat of it, as well as said she was reduced to tears by abuse from many shades of intimidation and outright co- male colleagues. Another woman representa- ercion, are not uncommon. As in other elec- tive was simply prohibited by her husband tions, violence during panchayat elections is a from attending a training camp. (Athreya, routine occurrence. In Orissa, 12 lives were 1998:23) Above all, training lost and many persons injured, during the programmes that panchayat elections in January 1997, apart Sexual abuse is also not uncommon. In impart gender- from the familiar range of electoral malprac- Uttarakhand, a panchayat member accused of- sensitivity to men tices, viz., intimidation, booth capturing, rig- ficials of sexually exploiting illiterate members hold the key to ging and the snatching of ballot papers and before giving approval to the works proposed more enlightened boxes. It is interesting that though panchayat by them. (Verma, 1998:52) In Rajasthan, the policy, even at the elections in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh adhyaksha of a panchayat samiti, who was micro-level and Rajasthan have not seen high levels of forced to contest the election, was subse- violence, in each of these States, more vio- quently sexually abused by her brother-in-law lence has been reported in women’s constitu- who insisted on accompanying her every- encies than in others. (CWDS, 1999:96) where. When she resisted and complained, her husband and family disallowed her from at- Women members of panchayats, from tending meetings. (Kaushik, 1998:46) In Haryana in the north to Tamil Nadu in the Madhya Pradesh, Kusum Bai, the OBC south, have faced threats of violence, when woman sarpanch of a gram panchayat in they have expressed a desire to contest elec- Khandwa district, defeated another woman tions or, once elected, have insisted upon cer- candidate, whose husband, along with three tain decisions. In Haryana, when a woman others, gang-raped her. Two days later, com- who had a record of involvement in the cam- pletely traumatised, she tried to commit sui- paign against prohibition, decided to contest cide. Other than rape and sexual abuse, it has elections to the Panchayat Samiti on her own, also been found that women representatives her husband and other relatives physically who are efficient often attract slanderous alle- abused her and threatened to throw her out gations of sexual liasions. In many States, there of the house. (MARG, 1998:53) In Tamil have even been attempts to intimidate women Nadu, a woman representative said that when into withdrawing from the election by insinu- she won the election, the opposition beat up ations of affairs with men. her husband and relatives. Now she does not move around unescorted, and always carries a

46 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA Violence against women representatives is, of Sarman thought he would die. No one came to his course, generally worse when they also hap- rescue. Later, an old man intervened firmly, and he pen to be members of the scheduled castes was released. or tribes. Gundiyabai Ahirwar, the dalit (Matthew and Nayak, 1996:1768) sarpanch of Pipra village in Tikamgarh district of Madhya Pradesh was prevented from In Rajasthan, Mewa Devi, a scheduled caste performing a ceremonial duty - hoisting the member of a panchayat samiti was actually national flag in her village on Independence beaten by her fellow-villagers for ‘not getting Day – because the Yadav majority in the vil- their work done’, and though a police case was lage did not think that a dalit should even touch registered, nobody came forward to help her the national flag. (Sainath, 1998) In the same on account of her caste. Many women repre- district, in a village where the dalits are in a sentatives surveyed in the various State stud- majority, the dalit woman sarpanch complains ies have reported discrimination on grounds of domination by the OBCs, on whom the of caste. There are several instances of sched- landless dalits are economically dependent. uled caste women representatives who are hu- Though it is The panchayat meetings are held in the late miliated and discriminated against, with their apparent that evening in the OBC area, where a dalit woman capacity to chair the panchayats being con- discrimination is would hardly dare to venture even during the stantly questioned. (Kaushik, 1998:46) more pronounced day. She is never consulted about the agenda P. Sainath’s survey of several of the 104 dalit- in the case of of the meeting, but told when to come. When led panchayats of Tikamgarh in the women, the decisions have been taken, she is simply Bundelkhand region of Madhya Pradesh, panchayat asked to put her thumb impression on paper, shows how, after the first year, dalit sarpanches representatives which she does. (ibid.) are regularly ousted by a variety of methods : belonging to the Caste and Disadvantage rigged suspensions, manipulated votes of no- scheduled castes confidence, or forcing them into expensive liti- and tribes are Though it is apparent that discrimination is gation. Where there are two scheduled caste victims of more pronounced in the case of women, groups in a village, the upper castes support discrimination and panchayat representatives belonging to the and prop up the smaller one, so that they can exclusion, scheduled castes and tribes are victims of dis- retain their control over the panchayat. The irrespective of crimination and exclusion, irrespective of gen- fact that all this invariably takes place only gender der. In 1994, Manulal, a dalit panch in after the first twelve months have elapsed – Barbatpur village (Raisen district, Madhya because the rules disallow no-confidence mo- Pradesh) was beaten up, simply because he did tions in the first year – is clearly not a coinci- not provide the whereabouts of his brother dence. (Sainath, 1998) who had had a quarrel with a young thakur while playing dice. In another case, in Thus, despite the reservation of seats for Chhatarpur district (Madhya Pradesh), Sarman women and members of the scheduled castes, Ahirbar, a dalit who won the election to the it is clear that the domination of the upper- post of upa-sarpanch against a rival yadav can- castes endures. In intra-family disputes and didate (though with the support of a high- similar conflicts, it is the upper-caste leaders caste sarpanch) was tortured thus : that village folk tend to approach, rather than the gram panchayat. These castes also tend to They tied Sarman’s hands with a stick in the cross influence the choice of candidates for elec- position and poured molasses on his head. The sweet tions, as well as voting behaviour. Hence, to molasses attracted black ants and he was viciously bit- expect panchayat institutions to work in a way ten. To add insult to injury, he was paraded around that is insulated from the inequalities of local the village for an hour. Helpless and humiliated, Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 47 society may be utopian, but is it also utopian have thus faced a larger percentage of such to expect that, in the long run, these institu- motions. (CWDS, 1999:130) A scheduled caste tions will themselves become mechanisms for sarpanch of a village in Rajasthan was removed assertions by these marginalised groups? by a no-confidence motion, made possible by the abduction of her supporters. (Kaushik, Modes of Gender Exclusion 1998:45) The use of such provisions is also Procedural Subversions: No-Confidence Motions seen to be more frequent in seats which are reserved for scheduled caste candidates, irre- State conformity legislations specify the pro- spective of gender. cedures for no-confidence motions against chairpersons and vice-chairpersons at all three Procedural Subversions : Quorum tiers of the new panchayat system, and though There are variations across States in the quo- many of these require a two-thirds majority rum required for a meeting, with some requir- of elected members or of members present ing a one-third quorum, and others half. How- and voting, they are found to have been inge- ever, no State provides for the mandatory pres- niously used to effectively de-reserve a re- ence of women representatives or members served seat. In various States, it has been ob- Any initiative for of the scheduled castes and tribes. This fre- served that there is a pattern in the use of such democratisation quently makes it possible for chairpersons to provisions, which are systematically used by is bound to be conduct the meetings with upper caste male male upa-pradhans to unseat female pradhans, less than effective members and take decisions. The absence of and take control of the panchayat themselves. if mobilisation is women is particularly notable at the most ba- In many States, safeguards have been at- enforced rather sic unit of democracy : the gram sabha. Sev- tempted against such misuse : e.g., in Rajasthan than spontaneous, eral conformity legislations – e.g., those of and Uttar Pradesh, the legislations prohibit a if those who Gujarat and Karnataka - do not specify a quo- no-confidence motion in the first two years are being rum for the gram sabha, though some others, after election, and again for a whole year after enfranchised like Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal an unsuccessful no-confidence motion. In voluntarily Pradesh specify between 1/5 and 1/10 of the Madhya Pradesh, no-confidence motions are disfranchise members as quorum, and a less demanding disallowed in the last six months of the five- themselves proportion for adjourned meetings. The gram year tenure of the panchayat. sabha is precisely the level at which the invis- In Uttar Pradesh, the Zila Panchayat president ibility of women is the highest. Attempts to in Saharanpur district was actually thrown out increase the visibility of women in this forum by invoking this procedure, while a pradhan invariably take the unsatisfactory form of ex- of a gram panchayat in Dehra Dun district ecutive diktat – e.g., a sub-quorum for women was threatened with a no-confidence motion, – which cannot fulfil the purpose of political only because she refused to surrender the bank participation. Any initiative for democra- passbook to them. In a village panchayat in tisation is bound to be less than effective if Alwar district of Rajasthan, the pradhan ob- mobilisation is enforced rather than sponta- tained a stay from the courts to prevent being neous, if those who are being enfranchised unseated, but once the stay was cleared, she voluntarily disfranchise themselves. To make ceased to be the sarpanch. An inter-State com- the gram sabha a truly participatory forum for parison of no-confidence motions suggests women and men alike, and for people of all clearly the intersection of caste, class and gen- castes, would therefore be a necessary step to- der. Women from the scheduled caste and wards democratisation. OBC categories in U.P., M.P. and Rajasthan

48 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA The Two-Child Norm have also contemplated introducing such a norm. Though challenged on grounds of its What has come to be euphemistically referred incompatibility with the Representation of to as the two-child norm is, in reality, a legal Peoples Act and Muslim Personal Law, the provision rather than a norm. The Rajasthan High Courts in Rajasthan, Haryana and Orissa government issued an ordinance barring those have upheld its validity. Such a provision clearly who have more than two children from con- discriminates against individuals from less testing panchayat and municipal elections. If privileged social groups who might consider a third child was born to a member after the contesting elections for the first time. It also election, the person risks losing her/his seat. places at a disadvantage women who custom- 450 persons were so disqualified, after their arily have little or no control over reproduc- election, 112 of these being women, mostly tive decisions. at the level of the gram panchayat. Other States

BOX 7 Equity and Social Inclusion: Women’s Voices

Women representatives from gram problems, viz. violence, lack of political ex- l To reinforce political will, which would panchayats said that according to their experience, lack of community support and empower the PRIs, ways of creating a perience functions have been entrusted to leverage. To monitor and facilitate gender ground swell and demand for good gov- the panchayats although they do not have empowerment in the communities, many felt ernance through the PRIs could be ex- the corresponding powers for implementa- that it could be advisable to find out how plored. This could be done by mobilising tion. A majority of the panchayat members many women are actually contesting elec- the media, facilitating discussions in civic pointed out that some factors, viz. lack of tions in the unreserved seats. society forums, gearing up activities for education, inadequate disposable finance, The group also acknowledged that in many extensive information disseminating, low access to information about the actual parts of the country women still do not have documenting and sharing best practices, management of the PRIs, and lack of ex- the right to property. This disempowerment etc. posure to the outside world inhibit their ef- often manifests itself in women’s lack of self l An institutional framework with adequate fective functioning. They said that to bring confidence and voice. resources from district to the national about all round development in their villages, Literacy can be used as a useful tool for level should be introduced to handle gen- problems related to availability of basic women’s empowerment, although this does der sensitive and high quality capacity- amenities such as water and roads should be not mean that illiterate women cannot func- building programmes. Elected women solved. tion as effective leaders. Literacy helps representatives and women’s groups It was felt that discussions on gender and women leaders to function to their full po- should then carry out gender audit of governance should be in the context of pow- tential and makes it easier to deal with fi- these programmes. ers and capabilities of the PRIs. As the nancial management and legal matters. l Information technology may be used for Kerala experience shows, PRIs are effective The following recommendations emerged: up-scaling programmes at all levels and when political parties give them opportuni- l Empowering strategies must be laid down to build up women’s constituencies and ties to exist and function independently. It in order to help the PRIs to move for- federate women’s collectives. Also, self- is urgent to look at the systems of account- ward. Sensitisation for government offi- help groups (SHGs) and other women’s ability at the panchayat level, as well as to cials and other area officials by elected groups could be used as solidarity net- question, scrutinise and study the power re- women representatives should be con- works for elected women’s representa- lations in society. Some were of the opinion ducted. tives. that gender empowerment is a political is- l Capacity building training programmes An integrated approach for strengthening sue. Caste and class barriers are also reflected should be imparted to all the actors in various policy initiatives and interventions in the PRIs, and result in being exacerbated the PRIs, female and male representatives, related to governance, e.g. right to informa- in the case of women representatives. Thus government officials, members of politi- tion, reservation for women in parliament, women representatives face various cal parties, etc. electoral reforms etc., could be also used.

Current Status and Prospects for Decentralisation 49 PART II

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action

8. Panchayat and Community the PR Finance Commission of Karnataka Finance in 1989 that the paradigm of the taxation role is regulatory and coercive and there- 8.1 Context fore does not go well with the development Ideally, as units of government, the role, much less with welfare and extension panchayats should have full autonomy in roles. They recommended only the gram deciding their priorities and determining the panchayats should enjoy taxation powers. allocations to different programmes. In Limited Options reality, however, the system of centralised planning followed over the last four decades Insofar as options for making panchayats severely constrains local autonomy. Not institutions of self government in matters only is a substantial part of the outlay of a of economic planning and development as rd Five-Year plan committed to ongoing envisaged by 73 Amendment are The only tier of the activities, but ‘earmarking’ a large concerned, it may be noted that panchayats panchayats that has proportion of plan provisions restricts the are not allowed to borrow and there is a regulatory powers is extent to which sectoral allocations can be balanced budget constraint on them. Prior rd the gram panchayat altered. The situation was aggravated by the to 73 Amendment, Karnataka was the first enlargement, since the Seventh Five Year to try decentralised planning but was Plan, of Centrally Sponsored Schemes with constrained by Central sectoral planning. tied funds and national guidelines. This left a very limited scope for discretion by panchayats. It was found by the PR There are broadly three sources of funds Finance Commission of Karnataka in 1989 for panchayats: and later by a study team of Government

l Own resources through direct taxation of AP that 40 per cent of plan funds of the powers or income from owned or vested Union and the States put together account assets of a panchayat. for what may be termed as ‘district schemes’ in almost all the States. The total discretion l Fees or assigned revenues like cesses/sur- that panchayats had in selecting their own charges/share in taxes. schemes was only 13-14 percent of the

l Purposive or untied grants, of different total Plan allocation to a district. It was also types. found that only a paltry 6 percent of the funds intended for district schemes were The only tier of the panchayats that has being channelised through panchayats. In regulatory powers is the gram panchayat. Karnataka the total of 40 percent of funds Conceptually, the other two tiers play only intended for district schemes was extension and development planning/ channelised through Zila Parishads. After a welfare roles. Working on this principle, great deal of relaxation in the planning sys- prior to 73rd Amendment , it was argued by tem at the district level only 14 percent

50 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA untied funds could be made available to the incentives for local taxes or fees. The lev- Zila Parishad. The earmarked schemes ies by Panchayats are most often specific claimed 86 percent of the total funds. rather than ad-valorem because of the dif- Several scholars have argued in favour of ficulty of valuation in the rural context, and untied funds for development to be granted are not indexed for inflation. The only to panchayats. It has been Stated forcefully segments of rural property which fall within that 40 percent of resources should be given the taxable domain of Panchayats as defined from total Plan allocations for district at present are buildings, non-agricultural schemes to the panchayats for spending as land and non-motorised vehicles. The untied funds on schemes and activities of levies on buildings and land offer some pos- their choice as determined by a bottom-up sibilities for augmenting panchayat micro and district planning process. resources. There could be a user levy on agricultural pumpsets over and above elec- Reliance on State Legislatures tricity charges, since pump sets use ground State Legislatures can grant powers to tax water, a local common resource. Scope for any of the tiers of panchayats. Though State new property based levies like this appears Legislations have provided for granting to be indicated by beneficiary willingness powers to tax or assign certain taxes to to pay in rural West Bengal. The improved The only segments panchayats, it is quite clear from a compara- service resulting from transfer of manage- of rural property 8 tive chart that the size of the fiscal domain ment of tubewells from the State Govern- which fall within the in all States is inversely related to the ment to panchayats is a pre condition for taxable domain of panchayat level. The largest number of willingness to pay. A developmental charge Panchayats as charges and taxes are leviable at present by on new construction, commonly levied only defined at present gram panchayats. Even where powers of by Municipalities, has been tried out by are buildings, non levy are vested at Panchayat Samiti or Zila Maharashtra which empowered gram agricultural land and Parishad levels, actual collection is done by panchayats to charge a betterment levy on non-motorised the gram panchayat and the revenue passed lands which have benefited from schemes vehicles on; in some cases, these revenues are shared. paid for from Panchayat funds. Concurrent powers of levy are sometimes Taxes and Levies assigned on the same base, or the Panchayat Samiti and/or Zila Parishads are empow- A variant of the betterment levy is a ered to levy a surcharge on any Gram valorisation tax, where infrastructure Panchayat tax or fee. The common features projects are financed through prior collec- of the fiscal domain of gram panchayats tions from potential beneficiaries, with the across the States need to be focussed on concomitant involvement of these benefi- for buoyancy – improving measures of ciaries in the conception and realisation of general validity. At the same time, taxes or the project. At present eight States do charges peculiar to one or a few States empower gram panchayats to collect a suggest possibilities for introduction special tax for construction of public works, elsewhere. on agricultural land and residential structures or on adult males. The tax on adult Fiscal Transfers and “Gap-filling” males is also payable through a labour It has been said that gap-filling as an contribution. This special tax could be approach to State local transfers must be applied in all States. Project specific explicitly rejected in favour of other contribution of this kind meet with less re- approaches more compatible with sistance than recurring levies and confer

8 See the useful comparative Tables presented by Indira Rajaraman, O.P. Bohra, VS Renganathan in Augmentation of Panchayat 51 Resources, EPW, May 4 , 1996 on the local community a sense of owner- Panchayats. The other issue is major levies ship that ensures better maintenance. on rural property and common resources which together fall within the natural fiscal User charges domain of local governments but are lev- Water and lighting rates are most commonly ied by State Governments at present. These found across the States, usually at gram are: land revenue on agricultural land, stamp panchayat level and occasionally obligatory duty on property transfer, and royalties in nature. Where the facility has resulted from mineral and forest resources. Land from a scheme funded by Panchayat samitis revenue and stamp duty are commonly or Zila Parishads they also levy charges in shareable with Panchayats under present some States on water or lighting. But in all legislation; forest and mineral resources these cases, the levy is collected by the gram rarely so. It has been demonstrated that a panchayat and shared with higher levels. restructuring of sharing provisions and of Surprisingly, empowerment to levy charges tax design of the first two could lead to for street cleaning or for the maintenance greater buoyancy of collections; and A detailed tax wise of public or private latrines is less common Panchayat shares of forest and mineral rev- examination of the and rarely obligatory. The right to levy taxes enues from those State levies at present provisions under on fares, festivals ad pilgrims is also not shared only with municipalities could help present legislation in commonly assigned which is an obvious increase the resources of Panchayats. For respect of both omission considering the strain these events now it is sufficient to note that transfer of sharing of State level place upon the sanitation infrastructure. staff and funds for staff costs, augmenting taxes and taxes Some States also have an explicit charge for panchayat’s own resources, and grant of leviable at irrigation water although in other States untied funds for village plans/district plan- Panchayat level is such as Tamil Nadu, a charge on irrigation ning are important issues requiring attention. necessary to assist is incorporated in the land revenue. 8.2 Panchayat Budgets State Governments Panchayats are not commonly empowered to provide revenue to levy user charges on health and educa- This section reflects on the current posi- additionality for tion except in Bihar, Haryana, Rajasthan, tion of the panchayat finances in India. The Panchayats UP and West Bengal. It is debatable whether discussion is not around budget numbers, such a user charge on students does not trends and proportions. It is about the come up against the constitutional guaran- gradually decentralising system in which tee of free education for all. The fee on panchayat finances are to be located today. weekly bazars and markets is the counter- ll To elaborate, what are the links of part at Panchayat level of the sales tax of panchayats to other levels of govern- States. It is at present assigned to gram ment, both above and below for panchayats in ten of the fourteen General finances? Category States. ll How are they changing? Tax Sharing ll Where do funds come from, and how are A detailed tax wise examination of the pro- they spent? visions under present legislation in respect of both sharing of State level taxes and ll Who decides what is to be spent, and who taxes leviable at Panchayat level is controls spending? Are these systems and necessary to assist State Governments to procedures changing in a way that pro- provide revenue additionality for motes local autonomy?

52 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA ll Is the panchayat truly local self recommendations. It may be noted that a government, or is it something else: the State seemed to move forward only when local representative of the State the incumbent Chief Minster took an government? interest in decentralisation. Thus it would appear that local self government is still ll Is this difference important at all? dependent on the patronage of the head In other words, is the system that has been of the State government. The system is still ushered in by the 73rd Constitutional in the process of getting established. This Amendment something radically different also means that these changes cannot be from that which prevailed hitherto, or is it considered irreversible: a point often the old system dressed up in new clothes? forgotten in this debate. There is little literature that has looked at Status of Decentralised Budgets this question from a finance perspective. The budgets of the union and State This may not be all that there is to an governments are presented to the Lok efficient panchayat system. But it is a nec- Sabha and the Vidhan Sabha under consti- essary ingredient of a new kind of local tutional provisions. The union budget is government for this country, because of the presented under Article 112. The budgets fact that the impetus for local self govern- of the States are presented to the Assem- True devolution to ment has not come from below – the people blies under Article 202. Under this Article, local governments themselves. It has come from the top for the Governor of a State is required to lay may be said to take various reasons – chief among them being before the legislature every year a Statement place only when the question of administrative efficiency. of receipts and expenditures for the finan- funds, functions and True devolution (as opposed to cosmetic cial year – April 1 to March 31. Other functionaries are administrative change) to local governments articles9 that are relevant to the budget transferred to the may be said to take place only when funds, process are 204, 266 and 267. Basically, the appropriate level of functions and functionaries are transferred to State must have a Consolidated Fund for local government the appropriate level of local government. its revenues and expenditures, and this can Such a transfer has to be made in substance, only be operated on the basis of the not in form only. And it has to go together Appropriation Act being passed by the – the mere transfer of funds without other Assembly. The funds of local bodies are changes may even worsen the situation. included in the demands of different departments that implement the various This issue becomes important and relevant schemes. Sometimes, supplementary because the panchayat system has been budgets are presented, but the underlying introduced from above, as it were, through process remains the same. a Constitutional Amendment less than ten years ago. In the Indian constitution, The State also has a Contingency Fund for residual powers are with the union, not emergencies. And finally, there is a Public States and local bodies, as in the United Account in which the State acts as a banker. States or Switzerland. This tends to favour In the Public Account, the State deals with the higher levels of government, which are claims and receipts, such as from the also well established in comparison to the Provident Fund. The various Reserve new panchayats. Those working to Funds of the State are shown in this Ac- strengthen panchayats have, therefore, to count. The State has no ownership on the constantly justify and defend their views and Public Account, but acts as a receiving and

9 This has been well discussed in S.S. Karnik, Essentials of the Budget Process of the State Government, Centre for Budget Studies, 53 A Vidhayak Sansad Publication, Mumbai, 1998. disbursing agency. The approval of the leg- often not available in the appropriate form. islature is not necessary here. Studies of Since it is not mandatory, accounts are kept the Public Account are few and far between. as they evolved over time. Often it is not a system of double entry book-keeping. This It is the State government that is respon- makes budget analysis at this level rather sible for the finances of local bodies, be they complex. urban or rural. Even today, many of the powers that have been given to local bod- We look at the question of financial ies are delegated powers, and the State gov- decentralisation as a necessary aspect of the ernment continues to retain overall respon- functioning of the PRI system. Here we sibility in this matter. This means that suit- look at the experiences of a pioneer State – able arrangements for the transfer of funds Karnataka; a State which took up PRIs af- and their use become necessary after the 73rd ter the 73rd and 74th amendments – Madhya amendment. In part, this has been looked Pradesh; and a latecomer to this system, after in part by the setting up of a State Fi- Uttar Pradesh. In each of these States, when nance Commission on lines similar to the Panchayati Raj was on the upswing, the top one set up every five years by the union gov- political leadership in the State was at the ernment. In Art 280. In clause (3), after sub- forefront of the decentralisation movement. clause (b), the following sub-clause has been Many of the powers Karnataka added: that have been given Karnataka has vested administrative control to local bodies are “(bb) The measures needed to augment the of local officials in the Chief Executive delegated powers, Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement Officer (CEO) of the Zila panchayat. They and the State the resources of the panchayats in the State are not under the control of the local elected government on the basis of the recommendations made body—as they used to be in the earlier law. continues to retain by the Finance Commission of the State.” They continue to be employees of the State overall responsibility The powers, authority and responsibilities government. The CEOs also have powers, in this matter of the three levels of panchayats are laid defined in the recent law, to refer to the State down in Article 243G, 243H, 243I, and government decisions of the ZP which they 243Z of the Amendments. For finances, the feel are not in tune with the law. The CEO key article is 243H, according to which the is the nodal point of development effort in “Legislature of a State may, by law…” the district. One indicator of this lies in the authorise the panchayats. Few things are fact that about 40 percent of the State’s de- mandatory in these articles. They leave a velopment budget is transferred to the Zila great deal of discretion to the State in what panchayats after the budget is passed each is to be passed on to the panchayats. year. While the ZP may discuss the budget, it cannot act if the CEO disagrees with its The system of accounts to be used is the decisions and decides to refer the matter to one approved by the Comptroller and Au- the State government. ditor General of India. This is a system that arranges all items under clear heads of ex- When we speak of district budgets, it is dif- penditure with unambiguous codes. This ficult to find two sides – income and ex- system is uniform across the country. But penditure. While there is some tax power as it stands today, the system has been de- with the local bodies, very little by way of fined only for the union and State govern- taxes is collected. Thus they have very little ments. Thus, when it comes to panchayats, by way of their own resources. They de- and local bodies, budget information is pend on devolutions from the State and

54 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA central governments. Some have argued that level. This takes time, and leads to time and the share of own funds to devolved funds cost over-runs. Thus, the local body is a would be an index of autonomy of the ZPs. channel for directing expenditure, but it has Perhaps. But it must not be forgotten that no discretion. The result is that money al- the local bodies are entitled to a share in located may not get spent. If this is to the tax and other revenues of the higher change, then flexibility at the local level is tiers of government. Their share today is essential. given in tied form – it is for untied funds Also, not much may be designed to be spent at the that they must struggle. Thus share of tied local level. The Karnataka HDR gives a fig- funds to untied funds may be a better in- ure of one thousand three hundred rupees dex of autonomy. Today it is quite adverse. for the annual per child expenditure on pri- This information on district allocations is mary education. Of this, 90 percent is on contained in a document called the Link salaries. A study of education finances at Document of the State budget. This Link the district level10 , reveals that, excluding document gives information on what has salaries, only seven rupees per year is spent been allocated to these bodies after the pass- at this level. But if the major chunk of ex- ing of the budget by the State assembly. penditure in a district is undertaken by department outside the purview of local The local body is a This figure is treated as the income side of elected bodies, then what kind of local gov- channel for directing the district budget. The expenditure side is ernment have we built up? expenditure, but it obtained from the ZP office after audit by has no discretion. the Accountant General has been com- Thus, the State spends on these subjects The result is that pleted. This often takes a long time, so the much more than would appear from a scru- money allocated may data is not for the current year. It is often tiny of the district budgets. The point is not get spent. If this delayed by about three years. This in itself made that we should not draw conclusions is to change, then reduces its utility. It is sometimes conducted about what is being spent in a district from flexibility at the local on a sample basis – an estimate of standard the panchayat figures. This may be true, but level is essential error is needed, but not available. This will then the question arises: what is devolved? be an important research subject in the near What role do these elected bodies play in future. the budget arena? Why is the money not being devolved? What advantages are there A study of ZP budgets in two districts has to this system? What are the advantages of shown that often the money allocated is not spent. centralised operation? Who takes decisions We can perhaps say that, money per se, is when the panchayats are not involved? not a (at any rate a major) constraint on local development efforts. When reasons for What we find is that funds are routed through non-utilisation were probed it was observed the local bodies. The administrative procedures that money was allocated in different for reapportioning, approval etc are com- schemes, and could only be spent in spe- plex, and at a level above the district. The cific ways after specific approvals. There is political bodies do not have much say in no flexibility in the system. If a particular these decisions. It is the State assembly that scheme is for some reason not relevant in a passes these budgets, and the cabinet and district, the money cannot be channelled the civil service that operates them. This is elsewhere and it lapses. If the amount to at best limited decentralisation. be spent is over a certain modest limit, then An important question from the Karnataka approval has to be sought from the com- experience in recent times relates to the role petent authority – which is often at the State 10 A. Indira and Vinod Vyasulu, “Education finances—A study in five districts”, A report submitted to the District Primary 55 Education Programme, GOK, 1997. of the civil servant. What power should he Officials are also being transferred to work or she exercise at the local level? Why should at this level. the CEO be vested with veto powers over Under the 74th amendment, there is a pro- the elected body? If the elected body takes vision for a District Planning Committee decisions contrary to law, then the matter (DPC). The State has constituted a DPC in should be settled in the courts. Why should all the districts. The composition is in ac- we assume that the civil servant exercising cordance with the provisions of the 74th a veto is a better option? Should not the amendment. A minister in the State gov- civil servant act on the orders of elected ernment has been given district charge – authority? If the answer is yes, then there is one for each district – and is the Karnataka must re-examine what it has done chairman of the DPC and the link between in recent years. the two levels of government. He is answer- Of funds, functions and functionaries, none able to the cabinet and the State assembly is fully devolved at the district level in on the one hand, and to the local authori- Karnataka. It is a case of change in form, ties on the other. The DPC has been em- not substance. This is a State that has felt powered to take decisions up to three crores the effects of a backlash to a quick opening of rupees at its level. Thus the powers have up. What lessons does this hold for other been devolved substantially to local levels. The State has begun States? To use a cliché: Make haste slowly! For example, primary education has been exercises to devolve handed over to the districts. This is referred more of departmental Madhya Pradesh to locally as the district government. funds to the Madhya Pradesh has been a pioneer in the panchayats, apart The State is also in the process of developing a cod- panchayati raj movement after the 73rd from the shares ing system for local finances. Just as the Comp- amendment was passed. Elections were held recommended troller & Auditor General (CAG) has ap- in 1993-94, and the second round has been by the Finance proved a system for the State, MP is plan- conducted in 1999. Those elected to these Commission ning a Part 3 document for the State bud- bodies have been involved in development get which will give all information about the projects from the beginning. The State district and lower levels in the same format. government’s Rajiv Gandhi Missions in the It is an elaborate format, designed for elec- social sector were all implemented through tronic data processing. At the moment, dis- the panchayat system. This gives an idea of cussions are underway with the CAG to get the structural shift being attempted. Fund- approval for this system ing at the panchayat level is then a means to facilitate a larger change in the way government func- Once that approval is obtained, this part 3 tions. will be a part of the State government’s budget presented annually to the Assembly. This So far as finances are concerned, the State is important because such an approval will has begun exercises to devolve more of make it difficult for individual ministers to departmental funds to the panchayats, apart make re-appropriations on whim. It will from the shares recommended by the enable one to trace expenditures all the way Finance Commission. Each department has down to the gram panchayat by item. Dis- been asked to identify the local component cussions on expenditures, on promises and transfer it to the district account. An made, can take place at the local level on allocation of functions has been worked out the basis of facts and figures. It will be a across the three local levels, and funds go major change in the way things are done to the appropriate level automatically.

56 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA today. The succeeding budgets are expected have a Gram Nidhi – its own consolidated to include this innovation. fund, and it will be operated in the same way. In the first year, the figures will be what the Like other States, UP has been implement- departments have decided, in the old pro- ing development and social sector projects cess. But over the years, the district gov- at the State level. The change of heart now ernments will be in a position to send in may have something to do with the fiscal their priorities, which will be used in fram- crisis of the State, and the consequent need ing the budgets. A process is about to be- to use available funds more efficiently. It gin in which, for the first time, local priori- could have something to do with political ties will play a role in what is decided upon. compulsions: devolving powers may both The process of transferring funds, functions and take pressure off the Chief Minister and functionaries has been initiated. This means a build a new base of support for him. Be downsizing of the State government as it that as it may, in the last year a number of exists today. We have to see how the sys- functions have been transferred to Gram tem will respond to the backlash that may [village] and Kshetra (taluk or intermedi- be expected. But a step forward has been ate) panchayats in Uttar Pradesh. The State taken. If things work out as planned, this government with a The Gram panchayats have been given the will be an important step in making local view to bringing in a responsibility for primary education, State government more meaningful in the State, sustained process of tube wells, handpumps, youth welfare, and its reorganisation into two States will decentralisation and medical and health, woman and child de- in no way roll this back. people’s participation velopment, animal husbandry, fair price in 1999-2000, have Uttar Pradesh shops, agriculture, rural development and accordingly devolved panchayati raj. For all these functions, funds UP is the most recent convert to the a large number of are being handed over to the gram nidhi, decentralisation bandwagon. The reason more specific which will be operated by the pradhan and could be the fiscal crisis of the State, which functions and powers the secretary jointly. The staff are also being has left it with no other alternative. Since to Panchayats to put under the control of the panchayat. The powers 1999, major steps have been taken to foster enable them to play are being given, not to the president or an office local self government. their rightful role in bearer, but to the panchayat as a whole. It can act the process of The State government with a view to bring- after meetings in which the issues are de- development ing in a sustained process of decentra- bated and decided. Given the reservations lisation and people’s participation in for weaker sections and women, these 1999-2000, have accordingly devolved a groups should have a voice in decision mak- large number of more specific functions ing. At least the structure is meant to facili- and powers to Panchayats to enable them tate this. to play their rightful role in the process of Further, sanction and disbursement of pen- development. Along with functions, assets sions will now be handled by gram and funds have also been devolved. School panchayats. So also will the distribution of buildings will from now on be the assets of scholarships, which will be done by the edu- the gram panchayats. Teachers and others cation committee of the Gram Panchayat. will work under the control of the gram panchayats. Funds required for construc- The financial powers are substantial. First, tion, maintenance etc will be directly given “all assets which are related to the functions to the gram panchayats. Just as the State has given to the gram panchayats and located a Consolidated Fund, each panchayat will in the village will be transferred to the gram

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action 57 panchayats on a date to be fixed by the dis- enough to curb gender dominance remains trict magistrate after wide publicity in this to be seen. But at least the instructions show regard. The amount which was so far being an awareness of a major problem and a spent by the concerned department on desire to deal with it. This is most positive. maintenance of these assets will be given The gram panchayats are expected to keep directly to gram panchayats.” Further, funds proper accounts, get them audited accord- will be provided to the gram panchayat for ing to norms to be set by the State govern- ll The works transferred ment, and to present these accounts in the gram sabhas every six months. All villagers ll The maintenance of assets transferred in a gram sabha area have been given the ll Paying salary of the staff transferred right to demand and obtain any document for a, prescribed fee – a modest one of five ll Payment of honorarium to teachers and rupees upto five pages, and a rupee per page new staff appointed by the Gram beyond that. In a similar way, kshetra Panchayat would be provided. panchayats – the intermediate level, have UP is the first State to have committed it- been given clear and defined powers, re- self to a non-discretionary transfer of funds. sponsibilities and staff. All block level of- Uttar Pradesh is the This has led to substantial resources becom- ficers will come under this body, which will first State to have ing avail to the gram panchayats in recent also be given funds to meet its responsibili- committed itself to a years. In 1996-97, the gram panchayats got ties. At the Zila panchayat level, the Pradhan non-discretionary Rs 20 crores. In 1997-98, it rose to Rs 255 has been made the Chairman of the DRDA. transfer of funds. crores. In 1999-2000, it is expected to be A Chief Officer will be posted as its secre- This has led to 328 crores of rupees – the devolution of tary to work with the Pradhan. The ZP will substantial resources 4 percent of tax revenues. work through six committees, and it is the becoming avail to the committees in which the powers are vested, Apart from this, rural development funds gram panchayats in not in the officers. recent years are being transferred to gram panchayats, as also funds as per the recommendations To co-ordinate work, the State has consti- of the Central Tenth Finance Commission. tuted District Planning Committees under The total for 1999-2000 is expected to be the 74th amendment. Four-fifths of the 1100 crores of rupees. This is a substantial members will be elected from among the amount. ZP and municipalities of the district to the DPC, in an election organised by the State The gram panchayats have also been em- election commission. One fifth of the powered to collect irrigation tax and deposit members will be nominated by the State the amount in the Gram Nidhi. They can government. This will include a minister impose a surcharge on land revenue and from the council of ministers, who will chair keep the money in the gram nidhi. the committee. The DPC will have a mini- Meetings of the gram panchayat are to be mum of 20 and a maximum of 40 mem- held on the second Wednesday of every bers. All MPs and MLAs of the district will month. Where women are pradhans, in- be permanent invitees of the DPC. “After structions have been given that their male properly considering the developmental relatives cannot attend any meeting. If they plans prepared by the ZPs and municipali- visit the woman pradhan’s office, this is to ties by taking into account their mutual in- be recorded in a register, giving the reason terest, specially regional planning, share in for the visit. Whether such instructions are water and other physical and natural

58 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA resources and integrated infrastructure and such powers. Thus when Chief Ministers environmental development, the DPC will change, the system moves backwards. finalise the district plan at the district level itself”. Second, the experience of Madhya Pradesh What is very interesting about the UP model shows that a carefully thought out process is that the district plan outlay of the district will of devolution, in which the panchayats are be placed at the district level through the State bud- the vehicles through which a demand for get. Sanctions will be given by the DPC at social services is generated, begins to pro- this level. The need to travel to the State vide a base for a genuine local government. capital for everything is being systematically When the panchayat is a vehicle for airing reduced – true decentralisation, even if a demands, then a partnership is possible with first step in a larger scheme of things. the State government – but only if the State government responds positively. The first Summing Up steps are crucial. Today in MP the system This quick review of the current State of may last because the people have begun to decentralisation of local finances shows the see the benefits. This has also made it pos- following: sible to go further, and use the district planing committee as a vehicle to institutionalise First, decentralisation seems to take place a decentralised form of development when the State governments take an inter- When the panchayat project implementation. But it is still at an est for some special reason. In Karnataka, is a vehicle for airing early stage. in the first flush, it was the need to find an demands, then a important issue to fight the union govern- Third, the UP example tells us that change partnership is ment with. This resulted in far reaching leg- can be pushed through very quickly in times possible with the islation that perhaps its own proponents felt of crisis. This is what the World Bank calls State government – went too far. The result was a back-lash in “big bang reform”. It does not seem to be but only if the State subsequent years from which the State has a coincidence that the kind of government yet to recover. Local politicians speak wist- decentralisation that UP undertook was responds positively fully of the old system, but the fact remains done at a time of fiscal crisis. That is when that when it was being systematically dis- opportunities for experimentation open up mantled, there was little effective protest – and UP has decided to do so in a decisive from them. Until local people develop a way. The challenge will be to keep the mo- stake in self-government, such mentum going. decentralisation will remain at the mercy of From all this, it would appear that several the State government. things still remain to be done. And in this process of the ups and downs of The lead given by MP of having a part 3 to the panchayati raj, the delegation of financial powers, State budget, must be followed up. If MP gets and the actual transfer of funds played an impor- the approval of the CAG to its system of tant role in controlling the extent of decentralisation. accounts, then that is a model other States Apart from higher level politicians, the lo- can accept. Pending such approval, a start cal bureaucracy too resisted the process of can still be made. It should be put into op- decentralisation. In MP and UP too, the eration everywhere. One important impact impetus has come from the Chief Minis- will be that discretionary diversions by min- ters. We have the interesting situation in isters will become much more difficult when which higher level politicians push a the Assembly passes a budget in which de- decentralisation of functions. It is not the tails, rather than totals, are clearly given. result of local people making a demand for Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action 59 Diversions will then require cabinet sanc- Pending the adoption of this type of model tion and legislature approval, so they will of local budgets, access to information has to be have to be politically negotiated. ensured. In Karnataka, we found that there are many hurdles to getting information. It This will be a massive operation. Finance is not just a question of obtaining permis- departments in all the States will have to sion from senior officers – that is not diffi- gear up to the change. Other government cult. It is the structure of government functioning departments will have to adapt to the new in which facts are normally kept from the citizen – reality – from the departments of especially the poor and illiterate one. This Panchayati Raj to the Directorate of Eco- attitude will not be easy to change, espe- nomics and Statistics. Information will have cially in the lower bureaucracy. It is not just to flow in different ways, and be used in a question of passing of a Freedom of In- different ways and at different speeds. The formation Act. The existing Official Se- complexities of this should not be under- crets Act will have to be repealed, and gov- estimated. It will need careful preparation. ernment functionaries trained in a new set- A mechanism for resolving disputes and conflicts at ting. In the normal course, information this level is essential. Not all matters can be should be shared, not suppressed. It will be resolved at the level of a district. Issues of a massive task. the use of river water, sharing of costs on There are some other steps that seem de- projects that spill across districts, and so on sirable. If indeed functions, funds, powers will need to be resolved on a continuing and functionaries are devolved, then it will Information should basis. There seem to be two ways of deal- be necessary to put in place a certain disci- be shared, not ing with these issues. One is to refer them pline. As in UP, plans, budgets and accounts suppressed to the State government. This has the ad- must be presented at all levels of the decentralised vantage of familiarity of the process. This system – especially the elected bodies. is how things have so far been handled. But it is also true that not all are happy with this In UP, the system asks for six monthly pre- process. A second could be to constitute sentations of accounts to the gram sabha. an Inter-District Council (on the lines of This is a wonderful idea, but we have to see the Inter-State Council mandated by the how it works. What is the gram sabha? Is it Constitution) with the Governor as one meeting of all the people living in the Chairperson, the Chief Minister as area of a gram panchayat? Or is it a Convenor, and one of the Zila panchayat meeting in each hamlet that constitutes a president, by rotation, as Vice Chairperson. gram panchayat? Will they be held in a way The Planning Department could be the sec- that will enable women to participate freely? retariat of the IDC. This body should meet There are many questions that still need an at least twice a year, and it could work answer. through sub-committees. At the district level, a beginning has to be No State has tried this model. Yet, Madhya made by having a district budget presented to the Pradesh, for example, has a District Devel- Zila panchayat. The ZP should have a bud- opment Council, modelled on the National get session. The Chairman of the Finance Development Council. This experience Committee should present it formally. To- could be taken into account in working on day, the ZP may have no powers to amend this issue. But some such institutional arrange- it. But it should be discussed, and perhaps ment is desirable as a complement to monitored by the ZP members in a system- panchayati raj functioning. atic way. Once presented, regular reports 60 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA should be given. The existing system of 9. Accountability of Local MMRs – monthly monitoring reports – is Bodies totally inadequate – and often inaccurate as we found in our studies. A budget session The Constitutional Amendments in the will force improvements in the system. 1990s to revive local self government provide a major opportunity and avenue for Eventually, the DPC should be in a posi- empowerment of the people if we ensure tion to decide priorities and the State gov- that social audit constitutes the core of our ernment must respond to these priorities. concerns and is supplemented by audit of The experience of UP shows this can be papers – whether conducted by professional done. We are a long way in the country from auditors or Comptroller & Auditor Gen- such a situation, which should be treated as eral – instead of the other way round. Sug- a goal to work towards. Even the work with gesting a framework for such a system of the people’s plan in Kerala, generally con- accountability, in which both social audit sidered the most advanced in India, has not and that of auditors play their legitimate 11 gone so far . This will require many roles and complement each other, is the ob- changes in the attitudes and priorities of jective of this paper. local politicians and a massive dose of technical training for the officials concerned. In India, the citizen’s right to information Many agencies will have to be mobilised for exists; the problem is that direct access is this task. We have a long way to go. denied. A citizen can gain access only In India, the citizen’s 12 through the institutions of the legislatures Karnataka has yet to constitute the DPC ! right to information The leader has become the laggard. where questions can be raised, the press which reports on different issues, in Courts exists; the problem is The suggestion that panchayats be empowered to where evidence is summoned or through that direct access is levy a presumptive tax on agriculture needs to be reports of the Comptroller and Auditor denied pursued. The existing legislation permits this. General – never directly. The distortions But a suitable method has to be worked out suffered by information when thus and implemented. This is an idea which re- channelised as well as the frustrations of quires that local productivity be the basis the common citizen in the process are well for calculating the tax burden. A study of known. A good deal of the tyranny of clerks Dharwad has shown that the idea has and officials based on their custody of the promise, even if it requires political will to precious papers can be whittled down by implement. The tax will vary across districts the advent of information technology. More and crops, and provisions for dealing with can be done if the social movement for the crop failures and disasters can be built in. right to information gathers momentum. Finances then, are the lubricant to the system. What 9.1 Accountability and Constitutional we learn from the three States whose expe- Status of Local Bodies riences we have looked at here is this: local government has still to take root. It is a pro- Local bodies are distinguished from other cess to be nurtured slowly. Financial devo- instrumentalities of the State in India, like lution is like water – it can facilitate, or commercial public undertakings or strangle, this process. How to use financial non-commercial autonomous bodies, by the powers to facilitate decentralised local gov- fact that they have powers to levy and col- ernment is the basic question facing our lect taxes. They perform regulatory and de- States. velopment functions. Constitutional Amendments in 1992/93 ushered in a

11 This Statement is based on personal discussions with many involved in this process. 61 12 There is debate about who should chair the DPC in Karnataka. One view is that it should be the president of the ZP. But the developed municipalities feel they will not work under the rural ZP president. On such trivialities does the fate of the system hang in this State. framework for reviving them by means of required to perform with funds devolving conformity legislation by State Govern- to them from the Central and State Gov- ments. They are defined today as institutions ernments. of local self government with a develop- In the late 1980s, initiating the thinking ment orientation. The complexity of pon- which culminated in the 73rd and 74th Con- dering structures for their accountability is stitutional Amendments, Rajiv Gandhi due to the ambivalence in their status occa- noted the reasons for the impulse: “If our sioned by the agency function they are district administration is not sufficiently

BOX 8 Administrative and Financial Devolution: Strengthening Local Domains

Several experts and consultation reports lism in fund transfer and use must be finance must present a budget each year to point out that an index of decentralisation, avoided. State schemes must be given up in the general body—at gram panchayat, block such as decentralised expenditure ratio, could favour of local schemes. State finance com- parishad, zila parishad and municipality lev- be used by finance and planning commis- missions may be asked to consider the devo- els. This will help proper sharing of infor- sions in transfers of funds to the States. This lution of all funds with the State, not just mation and generate informed debate. Even has been attempted in the Report of the own revenues. if there is no need for “approval” of these Eleventh Finance commission. There is of It is necessary to document good and best budgets as in higher level bodies, such pre- course, a need to further refine indexing practices and disseminate information about sentations must be made routine. Over time, methodologies them. Care should be taken that best prac- this process must lead to a shift from scheme It has been argued that local bodies should tices should not be replicated mechanically based funding from higher levels to theme be recognised as local governments, al- as local adaptations are essential. There is based untied funds. though till now this has not been so. This need for greater debate and discussion, es- To facilitate this, data bases and management implies that para-statal bodies, whose func- pecially at lower levels. As a first step, work- information systems on budgets and devel- tions overlap with local government, should shops could be held at the State and district opment indicators must be created and not be there anymore. This would be diffi- level. maintained at all local levels. The data can cult in the existing context, but there was Planning, especially micro-planning, has to be passed on to higher levels for analysis and no point in talking of administrative be emphasised and encouraged. There is use, but analysis and use for local level bud- decentralisation if this was not accepted. For much to learn from the Kerala experience get and planning must be brought in. Data example, the District Rural Development in this regard. But successes that are also from these sources should be made avail- Agency (DRDA) and the District Urban De- elsewhere should be documented, so that able to all at nominal cost. Donors can sup- velopment Agency (DUDA) must be done lessons could be drawn for policy making. port the setting up of these databases, which away with. The Government of India has will require considerable effort in the begin- already so decided, and some governments, At each level, the finance sub-committee ning. NGOs could play a useful role in this like Karnataka, have done away with the must be concerned with budgets. It is es- respect and State governments should be DRDA. Bodies headed by locally elected sential that these bodies adopt accrual based encouraged to support this activity. accounting systems, which at present are not officials must also replace all bodies headed It was therefore recommended to: by collectors. This was a necessary condi- in place. Annual accounts—and one set of tion for decentralisation to work satisfacto- accounts for all purposes, must be prepared ll Abolish the functions of the DRDAs and rily. Functions like the issuing of certificates and placed before bodies like the gram give their money to the PRIs. sabhas and its equivalent (e.g. the ward com- of birth, of death and so on, must be given ll Revise the top down approach of plan- to these bodies. They could charge a fee for mittee). Priorities of micro planning must ning so that it is from below. come from the ward committee/gram such services and thus augment their re- ll To shift from tied to untied funds. sources. These bodies really depend on rates sabha. They must be more than just benefi- ll To encourage a system of maintaining a rather than taxes, and the number of activi- ciary selection bodies and the basic principle database at all these levels. ties where they could collect such rates for of audit, of hearing the tax/rate payer must clear services should be given to them. be brought in and extended at the local level. ll To shift to an approval based on account- Devolution of funds to these bodies must This may not be necessary in commercial ing system. audit, but it is essential in the audit of local be compulsory and not discretionary. Popu- ll To revitalise the gram sabhas and a need bodies. The elected official concerned with to set up ward committees.

62 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA responsive, it is because it is not sufficiently appreciation of the nature of the corpo- representative”. The rationale for the rate character of local bodies, their finan- Amendments, therefore, was to generate cial viability and the old existing relations greater accountability of government. Lo- of the State Governments and Panchayati cating representative institutions of govern- Raj institutions, such a dialogue may prove ment closer to the people was considered difficult. necessary for empowering them. The Accountability is a much larger issue than Amendments elaborated the framework for the maintenance of accounts or audit. To relations between State Governments and begin with, it must be borne in mind that institutions of local self-government, a task the Constitutional Amendments, in spite of left incomplete when the Constitution was their sweep, nevertheless remain a part of adopted in 1950. Nevertheless, in the per- the Directive Principles. It is doubtful if they ception of State capitals, the agency func- are justiciable in the same way as matters tion of local bodies for implementing de- relating to fundamental rights. They only velopment schemes still overshadows the provide a framework for conformity legis- responsibility for self-government. lation by States. Actual translation of pro- This perception of State Governments is visions in conformity State Acts into devo- understandable but not acceptable in the lution of powers for local bodies to carry context of the current discourse on good out the functions is likely to progress at a governance. The perception emerged as a different pace in different States. The pro- Accountability is a result of the chequered career of panchayats cess of devolution of powers to tax, plan, much larger issue since 1860. During 1860 – 1950 which vil- manage finances and implement than the lage panchayats were transformed, from programmes – initiated by the Centre, en- maintenance of being judicial bodies dispensing customary tailing a transfer of powers from the States accounts or audit law, to self-financing local bodies; and fur- to local levels – is being mediated through ther, since independence, to simply serv- political structures of parties/government ing as agencies of State Governments for and public administrators. The propensity development. The Constitutional Amend- to retain controls by providing for caveats ments in 1992/93 reversed this trend and at every step, in the name of accountability, sought to empower people by bringing in- could create a labyrinth of rules which ac- stitutions of government closer to them. tually diffuses all responsibility. On the other hand, populist decentralisation without 9.2 Transfer of Financial Powers and thinking through systems of accountability Desirable Structures of could prove financially disastrous. Accountability The paradox, of systems of trust making A dialogue between the Union and States for greater accountability and systems of on issues related to devolution of powers distrust with obligatory checks and balances to local bodies and desirable structures of ending up in a saga of collusive corruption, accountability is essential because the fact is well known. There are many Sarpanches that empowerment is the core of develop- of the informal single-village (not the offi- ment is not sufficiently appreciated by them. cial gram panchayat) who enjoy the trust of Their apprehensions about an apparent a village and are public spirited. In several trade-off between efficiency of service de- villages the funds collected within a village livery and empowerment of the people, are kept with a resident and popular school needs to be allayed. However, without an teacher or a retired soldier who serves as

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action 63 the treasurer, invests it prudently with a lo- scholars and civil servants have argued that cal bania , draws and disburses money when- harnessing the services of NGOs to ginger ever required, and all is well for decades. up the implementation of social On the other hand we have the official sys- programmes can help to wear down the tems, private or public, where all too often stranglehold of local elites on local bodies. collusive action defeats all conceivable de- Similarly, there is scope for augmenting the signs of checks and balances. finances of panchayats with greater assign- ment of taxes by State Governments to Without rewards and punishment, account- them. The system of accountability to the ability collapses into a dead heap of proce- people can find its feet only within such a dures on the one hand or pure sophistry perspective. on the other. For instance, surety of punishment whenever a fraud is detected is Rationalising Bureaucracy: Integration important for sustaining any system of ac- of DRDAs with Zila Parishads countability. Instead of severe punishment The merger of District Rural Development being meted out, there has been a growing Agencies (DRDAs) and similar district tendency, perhaps an imperative of large- agencies (which act as conduits for finances scale organisations in a ‘soft State’ context, from the Centre and States to the districts) to treat the errant person with kid gloves with the panchayats is important for an Without rewards and prescribe more rules/regulations to uncluttered system of social, administrative and punishment, foreclose the possibility of its recurrence and financial accountability of local bodies accountability in future. It is important to bear the notion to emerge. Since local bodies perform regu- collapses into a of trust and eschew half-hearted delegation latory functions and are to undertake the dead heap of of powers while contemplating structures responsibility for implementing social sec- procedures on the of accountability of local bodies. tor programmes – spanning education, one hand or pure Existing Local Structures of Accountability health, employment and environment – sophistry on delivery of services is a critical concern. If the other In theory, local bodies should be account- systems for financial accountability pose able to their electorate or ratepayers. How- problems for the flexibility of local bodies, ever, the twin infirmities, of domination by which could be their basic strength, then local elites to the extent that a panchayat surely a change in financial systems is nec- is often identified with the office of a essary. Sarpanch and that panchayats are dependent on higher tiers of government for finances, Local Audit Systems renders the design of structures for their The format of accounts of local bodies accountability rather complex and problem- were prescribed by State Governments and atic. It creates an anomalous situation where audit was conducted by Examiner/Direc- elected bodies become accountable not to tor of Local Fund Accounts Department a higher tier of government but to bureau- (LADs) acting under provisions of old, ex- crats who oversee their functioning. In the isting State Acts for local fund audit. Con- past, these infirmities were accepted as formity legislations by States show that, by ‘given’ and we chose to accommodate the and large, the system would continue to be distorted structures of accountability that relied on. The only exception to the LAD followed. The perspective needs to change. system of audit today is in Karnataka where The Amendments provide a framework to the Panchayati Raj Act of 1993 provides for overcome these infirmities. Several external audit certification and transactions

64 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA audit of Zila Parishads and Taluk any assurance by way of annual published Panchayats by Comptroller and Auditor performance and financial Statements General of India. Gram Panchayats are to certified to say that apart from the points be audited by Controller of Accounts of noted by auditors, all is well with the fi- the State Government. nances of the local bodies. For such an assurance to taxpayers/ratepayers at any level For several reasons, the extant LAD frame- of the people/their elected representatives/ work in all other States is not adequate in or of government, the State Acts must stipu- the changed scenario since 1993. The sole late a system of annual certification of ac- concern for regularity in expenditure to the counts and publishing performance reports exclusion of an eye for service delivery as- of local bodies. pects is not suitable in the present context. Reporting audit results only to bureaucrats A Professional Cadre rather than the legislatures is unacceptable. Accounts of local bodies at sub-district lev- The opaque culture of internal audit, and els could be audited by professional accoun- the ineffectuality of the system of disallow- tants and a Court of Audit procedure could In view of the large ances and surcharges under the LAD sys- be established by CAG at the district level, quantum of funds tem, render the system inadequate to deal based on suitable amendments to Comp- to be spent by local with securing accountability for very large troller and Auditor General’s (Duties, Pow- bodies, especially sums of money. Besides, the scope of the ers and Conditions of Service) Act 1971, in the light of functioning of local bodies has changed. to hear comments and complaints of tax/ recommendations of Apart from the funds to be granted on rec- ratepayers before certifying Zila Parishad the Eleventh Finance ommendations of the Eleventh (Central) and Municipal Council accounts. The Commission, Local Finance Commission for non-plan require- Courts of Audit must follow summary pro- Accounts ments, approximately 40 per cent of total cedures on the lines followed in France at Departments and the Plan funds of the Centre and States put to- the national level. Comptroller & Auditor gether (ie. about Rs 30,000 crores) are ex- General are likely pected to be spent annually by local bodies Requisite Amendments to gear up their for ‘district schemes’. Since not much thought was given by State respective internal Challenges of Fiscal Devolution Governments while enacting conformity and external audits legislations to provisions for accounts and In view of the large quantum of funds to audit of local bodies, the decision of the be spent by local bodies, especially in the States to continue with the old LAD light of recommendations of the Eleventh systems bears review by them. Amendment Finance Commission, LADs and CAG are to the Central Act governing CAG’s pow- likely to gear up their respective internal and ers and advocacy for introducing appropri- external audits. CAG’s reports to the legis- ate provisions for accounts, audit and fol- latures on performance of social sector low up action on audit observations in con- schemes might lead to some refinements formity State Acts, needs to be undertaken in policy or design of schemes, but the ir- by Government of India. regularities in transactions pointed out by him are rarely acted on despite recommen- Apart from the issue related to whether dations of Public Accounts Committees political structures or developments will (PACs). Therefore, the internal (State support panchayats or not, the question as LADs) and CAG’s audits of the transactions to their remaining largely development of local bodies will not result in providing agencies implementing Union/State spon-

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action 65 sored programmes with tied funds or as- ters fully. The logic given to justify this situ- suming the mantle of local-self government ation was not sound, as noted by Karnataka, will depend on their ability to gather finan- which abolished the DRDAs and trans- cial strength. ferred the functions along with staff and funds to the respective Zila Parishads. It is noteworthy that accomplished admin- Similarly, the District Industries Centres istrators have argued for the abolition of dealing with small scale industries in urban existing bodies like DRDA, DDA, DDCs areas need to be merged with PRIs. and so on. Powers of revision of individual decisions and for issue of ‘stay” should not The experience with substitutes for local be retained by government or other levels. bodies, like district level agencies for devel- Monitoring should be only through published An- opment, which in theory were not suscep- nual Performance Reports and through audit. In- tible to political influences, has been far dividual decisions should not be subject to from satisfactory. Commentators are by and review or revision by the bureaucracy or by large in agreement that they are influenced the Ministers at the State level. by political structures, their record of delivery of services is very poor and the waste The fact that most of the funds for local of national resources in implementation by bodies devolve to the district level from the them is enormous. Above all, they are sin- Union/State levels distorts the powers for gularly deficient from the point of view of self-government. The ambivalent status of Individual decisions accountability. This is because, as agents of local bodies is highlighted by the 1999 should not be subject State Governments, they are neither respon- Guidelines for DRDAs of the Ministry of to review or revision sive to the voices in the district/taluka/vil- Rural Development. It has been clarified by the bureaucracy lages nor to the demands at the highest in the Guidelines that the role of DRDAs or by the Ministers at level of Public Accounts Committee of is not to implement programmes but to the State level Parliament ‘oversee’ implementation by way of monitoring and technical support. Chairperson Performance Audit Reviews of the Zila Parishad would be ex-officio Results of performance audit reviews on Chairperson of the Governing Body of the rural development programmes imple- DRDA and would preside over meetings of mented by such district agencies of State the Governing Body of DRDA to decide Governments have been reported over the policies, approve the annual plans and past two decades to both Parliament and schemes and monitor/review implementa- State Legislatures. Deliberations of Public tion. However, the executive and financial Accounts Committees have led to many use- powers should vest in the District Collec- ful recommendations for refinements in tor/DM/Deputy Commissioner who may policies and guidelines for programmes. be designated as the Chief Executive Of- Union Government has sincerely acted on ficer or Executive Director. They would such recommendations to effect improve- sanction and execute projects. ments in them. However, innumerable ir- Even States which had boasted of stabilised regularities pointed out in such reviews have Panchayati Raj in the past, such as not been acted on with the same serious- Maharashtra, Gujarat and West Bengal, had ness. Despite protestations of Departments chosen to keep separate identities for of Union Government to monitoring of DRDAs though the respective PR legisla- programmes, the fact is that they have tions had enabled PRIs to handle the mat- little control over departments of State

66 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA Governments. The only instrument in their l Urban poverty alleviation and hands is the power not to release funds and l Environmental protection this is also compromised by the need to exhaust budgeted amounts by the end of There are also significant omissions in the the financial year. References of Union de- 12th Schedule – eg. basic health care and pri- partments on audit observations related to mary/secondary education – although these irregularities go unheeded by State depart- responsibilities are suggested for delegation ments. Thus, such district agencies for de- to the rural panchayats under the parallel velopment elude accountability both to the 11th Schedule. It is up to the State Govern- people in a district as well as to the State ments to delegate functions for the munici- Government. palities beyond those indicated under the 12th Schedule. Moreover, even when a func- 9.3 Municipal Finance Reforms tion or sub-function is delegated to a class The legislations by States passed in 1994 in of municipality , the State Government does conformity with the Constitutional Amend- not vacate its operative jurisdiction from that ments dealt with the mandated institutional area with the result that all municipal func- Even when a structure of the municipalities, leaving as- tions in effect become concurrent. There is function or sociated management aspects unchanged. no municipal tax list along with the indica- sub-function is tive functional list; this has been left to the Apart from the electoral composition of the delegated to a State Finance Commission to recommend. municipal councils, the 74th Amendment class of municipality, provides for additional membership from The Municipal fiscal structure is the State among: characterised by three distinct patterns as a Government does legacy from the three presidencies in the not vacate its l Sitting members of the State legislature British period: operative jurisdiction and Parliament whose constituencies from that area with cover the municipal area. l Predominance of octroi – a municipal the result that all import duty – and a subsidiary property l Chairpersons of the ward committees of municipal functions tax, with nominal State transfers (Bombay municipal corporations with a population in effect become pattern covering western and north west- of 3 lakh and more. concurrent ern States). l Nominated experts without voting rights. l Property tax as the major tax, supple- The creation of the wards committees at mented by entertainment and show taxes, the ward and zonal levels in the larger non-tax revenues and limited State cities is a novel feature. It provides op- transfers (Madras pattern covering Tamil portunities for decentralisation of mu- Nadu and Kerala). nicipal services and larger involvement of the citizens in municipal affairs. l Property tax as the main municipal tax and major dependence on State transfers The 18 functional areas for possible devo- (Bengal pattern, covering the remaining lution to the municipalities do not always States). correspond to the Central, State and their Concurrent subjects listed under the 7th Due to the abolition of octroi in Andhra Schedule, eg. Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and l Slum improvement Kashmir, the State composition of fiscal l Cultural promotion structures have undergone change in recent

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action 67 years. Exploitation of municipal property It is difficult to gauge at present to what taxes is problematic due to frozen valuation extent the capital required for municipal base on account of rent control; this is development would be sourced from the sought to be neutralised by a system of pre- market rather than from directed credit of sumptive tax with the municipal role lim- plan assistance. Credit-worthiness may be ited only to tax collection. Non-tax revenues a problem, especially for municipal coun- may not increase due to the perspective of cils and nagar panchayats. Therefore, capi- privatisation of municipal services. The fu- tal grants from plan assistance is likely to ture of municipal finances would be mainly be a growing proportion of total receipts influenced by : of municipalities.

l Compensation arrangements for octroi It appears that the emergence of a munici- abolition pal political executive can be expected as a clear implication of the Constitutional l Pace of reforms in rent control Amendments and conformity legislations l Rationalisation of State transfers by States. The nature of State Government– Municipal relations are changing. Apart The District and Metropolitan Planning The District and from administrative breakdown, like ‘con- Committees, provided for by the Constitu- Metropolitan stitutional breakdown’ in the context of tional Amendment are expected to plan for Planning Centre-State relations, dissolutions or su- matters of common interest between Committees, persessions would be difficult and are likely panchayats and the municipalities, especially provided for by the to be subjected to judicial scrutiny. Constitutional planning of physical and natural resources, Amendment are infrastructure development and environ- State control of municipal finance is exer- expected to plan for ment conservation. The State Governments cised through the State examiner of local matters of common are to identify the functions for these plan- fund accounts except in Bihar and West interest between ning purposes. If these planning functions Bengal where this operates under the CAG’s panchayats and the are more than the municipal revenue func- administrative control. Municipal audit is municipalities tions, then there would be need for major conducted at present from the point of view assistance by State and Central Government. of ascertaining authorisation and regularity The existing separation between urban de- rather than that of propriety. The general velopment and municipal maintenance tasks impression about the functioning of the ex- may have to be re-considered. aminers of local fund accounts is that they are not effectively checking accounts from While the reliance on State and Union Gov- the point of view of detecting frauds in re- ernment for assistance is likely to increase, ceipts, misappropriations and errors of clas- the composition of district and metropoli- sification. Performance audit is important tan planning committees is heavily weighted in the context of urban development. The in favour of elected members of panchayats proportion of population in urban areas has and municipalities. The State and Central increased significantly over the past decades; Government representatives would find it though metropolitan growth has slowed difficult to contain over ambitious planning. down, municipal council areas are still bur- The States attempted to create separate dis- geoning. With greater involvement of Cen- trict urban development authorities tral finances in poverty alleviation schemes (DUDA) but in the new legislative scenario (eg. employment generation/slum improve- these may lose their significance. ment) in urban areas, it is necessary that

68 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA certification of accounts, transactions as The requirements are simple when a local well as performance audit of municipal body depends only on its own resources. councils by CAG be introduced. Where it depends on State funds or centrally sponsored schemes, the donors Constituency accountability requires greater naturally impose own requirements of ac- involvement of the citizens in the activities counting which can make the accounts for- of the municipalities. Information sharing mats voluminous, if not complex. It is re- to be stipulated by legislation, citizen’s ac- ported by several States that the accounting cess to municipal services by specifying their formats are cumbersome and the prescribed entitlements and involvement in decision number of registers and other books of ac- making by providing opportunities to citi- counts are so many that accountants find it zens are ways of fostering such account- difficult to cope with the work. Moreover, ability. The creation of ward committees in there is paucity of staff; often, one accoun- the larger municipalities should help in this tant works for a number of gram direction. Such provisions for municipal coun- panchayats. cil areas and nagar panchayats may also be tried to uphold the neighbourhood principle. The point of departure for a discussion on accounting and audit issues must be a rec- 9.4 Accountability, Accounts and ognition of the fact that the framework of Audit audit concerns and methodology have un- Constituency Accountability is a much larger issue than dergone a sea-change in the last fifty years. accountability merely a matter of accounts and audit re- In the pre-1950 days, audit of local authori- requires greater ports. Unless these reports are acted on by ties was globally distinguished from audit involvement of the appropriate fora to judge the delivery of of commercial concerns. Audit of local au- citizens in the services or bring errant officials to book and thorities was primarily concerned with de- activities of the the community or community/country ben- tection of fraud, misappropriation and municipalities efits from the audit exercise, accountability misclassification. The need for gauging per- is not secured. The ability of households formance in providing regulatory or devel- of a village or a few villages to decide on opment services was soon felt. Techniques the merits of their elected representatives to evaluate performance were developed. and to bring them to book in case of mal- The framework of concerns shifted again feasance or inability to deliver appears at and auditors started stressing certification first sight to be simpler than the elaborate of annual financial Statements to provide processes of accountability at the district, an assurance to the citizens/tax-payers/ State or national levels. However, this de- ratepayers that systems of control were in pends, first of all, on structures of domi- place and the figures in financial Statements nation which might stifle the voices of the presented the ‘true and fair’ view. In other underprivileged sections in a village. For all words, the difference between audit of com- practical purposes, the panchayat is identi- mercial concerns and audit of local authori- fied with the office of the Pradhan/Mukhia/ ties is no longer viewed as very important. Sarpanch/Adhyaksha. Second, it depends on The published financial Statements remain whether the format of records and accounts the single most important vehicle by which to be maintained are easy to understand or local authorities/bodies can demonstrate so complex that unraveling them becomes a accountability for the stewardship of pub- matter of special education. lic money , ie. how the various resources available to the authority /body have been

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action 69 applied and whether it complied with its programmes devolve on them from the statutory obligations, and for performance Union/States. Audit certification for such in the provision of services ie. how the re- an annual report should meet the require- sources have been actually used. ments. Local Funds and Public Knowledge The system of accounts prescribed in 1950s in all the States for Panchayati Raj institu- It was generally agreed that as wide public- tions was the government system of not- ity as practicable should be given to the ac- ing receipts and payments and maintaining counts of local bodies and that they should primary books of accounts. Most States had be published in such form as to be intelli- separate Acts governing the audit of local gible to ratepayers of average ability but funds which provided for an ‘independent’ without special knowledge of accountancy. departmental auditor, usually designated as There should be an obligation on local bod- Director, Local Fund Audit. The audit of ies to devise a means of providing the elec- local bodies was not vested with CAG un- torate with financial information about ser- der the CAG’s (DPC) Act, 1971. Except for vices in reasonably simple and straightfor- Examiners of Local Funds working under ward terms. Local bodies should be required CAG’s administration in West Bengal and to maintain a variety of separate funds and There should be an Bihar on an entrustment basis, the audit of accounts for different functions and activi- obligation on local Panchayati Raj institutions was not vested ties. In many cases all that is entailed is the bodies to devise a in CAG. means of providing need to maintain a separate record of in- the electorate with come and expenditure for control purposes. The Constitutional Amendments in 1992/ 93 left the provisions regarding accounts financial information The financial accounting and reporting of and audit of panchayats and municipal au- about services in local authorities should be governed by a thorities to be decided by State Legislatures. reasonably simple framework comprising statutes/regula- The State legislations show that by and large and straightforward tions/orders, forms of accounts to be pre- the old framework of concerns of the 1950s terms scribed by the State and any other profes- has simply been re-iterated. The concept of sional guidance body. The most important the annual performance report with its fi- requirements in this context should be those nancial Statements has not been introduced. that relate to the preparation, audit and pub- Karnataka is the only State which has pro- lication of Statements of accounts. The provided in the State Act for audit certification posed Regulations/orders should cover four of Zila Panchayats and Taluk Panchayats by main areas: the keeping of accounts; inter- CAG. In fact, very little discussion on this nal and external audit matters; the public’s subject has occurred in other States though right to inspect the accounts and question the question of putting in place a system the auditor; and the publication of State- of accounts and audit in keeping with best ments of accounts, in addition to the prepa- practices across the world is an important ration of the Statement of accounts them- one. selves. Moreover, audit has been vested with de- It is increasingly being realised in India that partmental auditors of State Governments. apart from an annual performance report The comparative advantages/disadvantages including a financial Statement, there should of departmental versus professional audi- be no demands on panchayats to send in- tors have long been recognised and may be numerable returns and reports even where summarised as shown alongside. a large quantum of funds for social sector

70 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA A qualified cadre of accountants and audi- Governments are not reduced to being tors for the express purposes of account- merely political slush funds13 . We cannot ing and audit certification of panchayat look at the modalities of audit only from samitis and gram panchayats needs to be the point of view of devolution of funds created for deployment by professional to panchayats for sponsored schemes of firms of chartered accountants. Union/States because they are envisaged not just as development agencies but as the Zila Parishad Audit third tier of government as well. Local Social sector We now turn to the audit of Zila Parishads. bodies need to be helped to secure programmes are Social sector programmes are critical not accountal of their revenues and develop a critical not only for only for local but also macroeconomic growth. culture of accountability to the people they local but also Adequacy of finances for rural/urban de- serve in their areas. Since accounts of ex- macroeconomic velopment would require large doses of penditure and activities undertaken by growth funds to continue to devolve from the panchayats below the district level should Union and States to the district and sub- feed into district level accounts (however, district levels. CAG has a mandatory re- in Madhya Pradesh this is not likely to be sponsibility to watch expenditure out of so – gram panchayats are shortly being di- Union or State funds. rectly funded by State Government), their At present, funds for social sector veracity is extremely important. It is not programmes from the Union and States Against professional auditors For professional auditors flow to registered societies at the district levels, be they DRDAs/Saksharata Samitis/ 1. Professional auditor does not have Local bodies do not feel they are under Fisheries Development Agencies/ Women’s the judicial/executive powers of control of a government department Development Agencies etc. The arrange- the departmental auditor which is ments for their audit and accountability are sometimes necessary to make an audit effective unsatisfactory both from the point of view of local residents as well as Union and State 2. Panchayats may not be able to Has comprehensive experience of com- Governments. While their accounts are cer- afford the fees mercial practice in accountancy and his tified by chartered accountants, transactions knowledge in this respect can help the audit is conducted by CAG. This disjunc- local authority to adapt their accountancy methods to modern commercial usage ture is not conducive to proper audit, comprehensive reporting and accountability. 3. Does not have complete indepen- A professional auditor can usually arrange The possible merger of these district dence to commence his audit during the period agencies with Zila Parishads to implement of the year for which the accounts are being prepared and the audit can then be what the Planning Commission termed ‘dis- closed within a short period after the con- trict schemes’ involving approximately clusion of the financial year. Useful for 40 percent of total Plan funds would re- detection of errors/ frauds and timely quire putting in place proper arrangements conclusion of audit. for CAG’s audit of expenditure on spon- 4. Seldom has advantage of auditing sored programmes implemented by local accounts of more than one or two local authorities and cannot com- bodies. pare the systems and operations Certification and transactions audit of the prevalent in the field accounts of Zila Parishads and Municipal Councils by CAG is essential to ensure that 5. Not so well versed in municipal or panchayat financial transactions social sector expenditure by Union and State

13 Vijay Joshi and IMD Little, India’s Economic Reforms, OUP, 1994 71 sufficient for panchayat samiti/gram l First, the Panchayati Raj Institutions panchayat accounts or utilisation by them (PRIs), especially Gram Panchayats, of funds granted by Zila Parishads/Munici- should display all vital information per- pal Councils to be certified by State Gov- taining to development projects, espe- ernment appointed auditors (departmental cially receipt of funds and how they are or professional). Complaints or comments being spent, in the Panchayat Offices or of local taxes/ratepayers at Gram Sabha on a prominent board outside the school, level, where accounts of gram panchayats for the information of the public. are to be authenticated must be heard by l Second, all relevant records should be CAG before certifying accounts of the Zila open to inspection. Parishad/ Municipal Council. l Third, members of public should also be While CAG is able to hear the complaints able to obtain photocopies of documents of citizens voiced through legislatures or pertaining to development projects as the press and take these into account in the also matters of general public interest by course of audit of State and Union Gov- paying a nominal charge. In particular, ernments, the voices of persons below the all bills, muster rolls, vouchers, estimates district level on matters of development and measurement books, the criteria/ expenditure do not get well reported. The procedure for selection of beneficiaries, intention of the 73rd Amendment in laying Proper functioning of as well as list of beneficiaries should not down functions of Gram Sabhas and pro- the Gram Sabha only be available for inspection, but pho- visions of State legislations which require could ensure a tocopies of these relevant documents Sarpanches/Mukhias/Adhyakshas/ vibrant democracy should be given on demand from a con- Pradhans to place the accounts of gram with a great degree venient place, such as Block or Tehsil panchayats before the Gram Sabhas for of transparency and Office. accountability authentication would be diluted if it is not recognised that the extent of their dissatis- The Constitution (73rd Amendment) makes faction with the accounts must be indepen- a provision for a Gram Sabha in each vil- dently heard by CAG. lage, to exercise such powers and perform such functions as the legislature of a State An important factor for the success of the may, by law, provide. This is a provision of Panchayati Raj system is the need for trans- great import in so far as the Gram Sabha parency in the functioning of these bodies. constitutes the entire electorate to whom Panchayats being closer to the people, their all elected representatives in the local bod- right to information and accessibility to the ies, State legislature as well as Parliament are Panchayats must be ensured. This issue was accountable. Proper functioning of the discussed in a meeting of PR Secretaries Gram Sabha could ensure a vibrant democ- of States and it transpired that except in a racy with a great degree of transparency and few States such as Himachal Pradesh, accountability. However, several States have Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, orders given short shrift to the institution of Gram emphasising transparency have either not Sabha and vested them with only ritualistic been issued, or these are incomplete. It was powers of consideration of annual ac- decided in the meeting that each State may counts, administration reports, audit notes, consider passing orders highlighting three etc. of the Gram Panchayat. Even the sug- different aspects of transparency. gestions and recommendations made by the

72 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA Gram Sabha could be ignored by the Gram As noted earlier, it is necessary to distin- Panchayat. For this to be averted, it is nec- guish issues related to irregularities from essary to mobilise public awareness and propriety or performance issues. The demand that accounts be made available to former need to be treated swiftly and in the citizenry. The national people’s Cam- summary fashion at the district level itself. paign for the right to Information (NCPRI) The latter can be reported to Zila has been an important experiment in this Panchayats/Municipal Councils or State and report, building up from local mobilisations Union legislatures for discussion on the for public accountability in Rajasthan (see Box 9 on Jan Sunvai). BOX 9 Public Hearings and Accountability on Demand: Jan Sunvai Keeping the twin requirements of watch over funds for schemes sponsored by The experience gained from the experi- transparency and accountability. In some Union/States as well as receipts and expen- ment on Jan Sunvais (Public Hearings) villages Sarpanches were not willing to diture of panchayats as institutions of self in Rajasthan is instructive in this con- be chastened. Criminal cases had to be government in their own right, we suggest text. In 1987, some social activists sought to be registered by MKSS and started working with rural workers en- these involved them in harangues with an amalgam of audit arrangements. State gaged in drought relief works at a vil- the police, Collector and so on. Legislatures may provide under the lage named Devdungri, near Beawar in It is not as if people were unaware in Panchayati Raj Acts for internal audit by Udaipur District. They registered them- the past that muster rolls are fudged and LADs concerned only with checks against selves as a society called Mazdoor Kisan materials misappropriated; but these fraud, misappropriation and misclassi- Shakti Sangathan in 1990 to fight cor- were general doubts and fears and in the ruption related to departmentally imple- absence of access to hard facts they were fication. Certification of accounts of gram mented public works programmes. They unable to take any preventive or reme- panchayats/panchayat samitis/nagar supported struggles of rural workers on dial action. The Jan Sunvais changed this. panchayats should be a task performed by issues of non-payment of full minimum Public officials like Sarpanches or professional auditors. Certification of ac- wages. Soon they went on to raise simi- BDOs/DRDA officials were always in- counts of Zila Parishads should be vested lar issues about fabricated muster rolls vited to defend themselves. While the in works implemented by gram fair practices required for meaningful Jan in CAG. panchayats under Jawahar Rozgar Sunvais have been established through Courts of Audit should be set up in each Yojana, a centrally sponsored scheme. the experience gained by the experiment district by CAG to check whether accounts In 1994 their work entered the phase in social audit, the stand taken by many of a movement for Jan Sunvais in vil- officials appearing as defendents is that of sub-district levels are properly feeding lages to fight corruption in gram they are accountable not to the mostly into Zila Parishad/Municipal Council ac- panchayats and educate people to de- illiterate gathering of village folk but to counts, hear complaints of Gram Sabhas mand accounts as well as accountabil- their superiors in a hierarchy of com- against certified accounts of Gram ity. The movement, though local, had mand or to government auditors. This Panchayats or to note comments by pro- State-wide repercussions. is significant because it highlights the fact The mode of public hearings initiated that clarity about the notions and mecha- fessional auditors, and then certify the dis- by MKSS commences with the gather- nisms of accountability pose a major trict bodies accounts. They may order re- ing of people in a village by beat of problem at an operational level. coveries/disallow any items from being re- drums and then a demand for all docu- Public officials, including Sarpanches, are imbursed by State Governments/ Central ments related to works undertaken with naturally accountable to the people they Government. They may exercise powers of public funds. Muster rolls and bills/ serve, to the hierarchy of officials con- vouchers related to materials and trans- trolling them as well as to elected bod- attaching the property of any person found port are read out to the people gath- ies of people’s representatives within a guilty of fraud or misappropriation. Sum- ered. These are questioned by the vil- framework of law/rules/regulations. In- mary procedures should be devised for this. lage residents and often found to be fic- stitutional arrangements that provide for Such powers must be laid down in amend- titious/incomplete. The Sarpanches in accountability in the context of ments to the CAG’s (DPC) Act,1971 and several villages have paid up the recov- panchayati raj, therefore, need to be de- eries demanded by the people and Jan fined and spelt out with a judicious eye not the in the conformity State Acts. Sunvais have been highly effective in to meet these requirements. mobilising villages on the issues of

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action 73 subject and appropriate recommendations planning in India has been implementation and action by governments concerned. failure. (Chakravarty, 1987) 10. Women in Power (Security It is difficult to wash away the imprint of through Leadership) decades of centralised planning and bureaucratic implementation of these plans. But it Where Do We Go From Here ? is surely even more difficult to accomplish The available evidence suggests that it is this through elected institutions which are hard to disaggregate the impact of women inadequately endowed with the necessary representatives on the functioning of authority, which subsist in the shadow of panchayats, overlaid as it is with a wide range existing parallel structures of development of limiting factors : from the social reality administration, and many of whose mem- of caste and class inequalities, on the one bers belong to socially disadvantaged hand, to the institutional imperfections of groups, with neither the expertise nor the the panchayat structure, on the other. None- training to be able to assert themselves. theless, it is clear that both participation and A reconsideration of the technocratic and exclusion, as detailed in the foregoing pages, As local-level centralised model of development has not, have had a significant impact, in terms of planning remains of course, been a serious governmental pri- both the subjective dimension (viz., the way ority, but the new direction being shown largely neglected, in which women see themselves in their new panchayats have by women-dominated panchayats should roles), as well as the objective dimension tended to function certainly draw attention to the many inad- (viz., the actual developmental impact). chiefly as delivery equacies of the traditional approach to plan- systems, intended to 10.1 The Developmental ning for development. Primary education and health receive much more attention at more effectively Consequences of Women’s implement existing, Representation the hands of women. So also do the con- often centrally servation, as well as sustainable use, of com- The new panchayats are designed primarily devised, mon property resources like forests and for the planning of programmes of eco- development ponds. nomic and social justice, and the implemen- programmes tation of schemes that are entrusted to Few studies of the post-1992 period have them. They also contained provisions for attempted to objectively evaluate the devel- the representation of women, but the seeds opmental impact of women in panchayats. of their ‘failure’ or inadequacies can hardly More often than not, they poll the women be blamed on the inefficacy of women rep- representatives themselves for their percep- resentatives. tion of the improvement in basic services, the performance of poverty alleviation They appear rather to be contained in the programmes, the successful completion of fact that the implementational aspect of the development work, and so forth. founding charter has taken primacy over the planning aspect. As local-level planning re- On the whole, the responses range from a mains largely neglected, panchayats have feeling of satisfaction about moderate im- tended to function chiefly as delivery sys- provements to dissatisfaction with tems, intended to more effectively programmes like the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana implement existing, often centrally devised, or the Indira Awas Yojana. The more im- development programmes. The assumption portant conclusion that is suggested by such underlying this coheres with the orthodoxy data is that panchayats are not particularly that the only flaw of rural development involved in the processes of planning or

74 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA decision-making in such development between strategic gender needs and practi- programmes. Even as development cal gender needs. Caroline Moser has ar- implementors, their role is fairly limited. gued that strategic gender needs are the needs This is less a function of low levels of that women identify because of their sub- awareness, and more that of inadequate ordinate position to men in society. devolution of powers and resources. After Through issues like the division of labour, all, it is not as if there are no claimants for power, domestic violence, and women’s programmes of poverty alleviation or control over their bodies, they challenge women and child development. With little women’s subordination to men and enable financial or administrative autonomy, them to work towards achieving greater panchayats can at best aspire to being equality. Strategic gender needs are con- implementors of development schemes trasted with practical gender needs which are a conceived at the central or State capitals, response to immediate perceived necessity. hedged in by all the conditions and proce- They address issues like water scarcity, dures that go with these. As such, their de- health care, employment, and do not chal- velopmental impact is likely to be limited. lenge the subordination of women to patriarchal structures in society. Several studies Success Stories (Moser,1993) What does the evidence on which have surveyed Despite these limitations, impressive suc- women in panchayats suggest in this regard? the changing cesses – in terms of schemes for drinking perceptions People’s Perceptions water, playgrounds, and schools - have been of women recorded by those panchayats in which Several studies which have surveyed the representatives, have women are active participants. Pre-Amend- changing perceptions of women represen- found that they are ment all-women panchayats in Maharashtra tatives, have found that they are conscious conscious of, and already had a fine record of adopting need- of, and pleased about, the perceived en- pleased about, the oriented, ecologically sustainable hancement of their status in the family and perceived programmes, outside the purview of tradi- the local community. A sixty year old enhancement of their tional politics. Thus, addressing water scar- sarpanch of a gram panchayat in Haryana status in the family city was the first priority, with extra school- said, “I feel honoured when people call me and the local rooms, community toilets and smokeless `Sarpanch Saab’. They give me a lot of re- community stoves being the other major efforts. (Datta, spect.” (MARG, 1998:169) Many women 1998:114-15) In the post-Amendment have said that their husbands and family phase, too, the all-woman panchayat of members too have gained in prestige. In Kultikri in West Bengal has played a lead- fact, relationships within the family are geting role in the literacy campaign of the dis- ting transformed as their husbands have trict, effected a substantial improvement in now begun to seek and take their advice, the primary health infrastructure, raised a which is a radical departure from past prac- large sum of money by leasing some vil- tices. Even outside the family, they are now lage ponds for pisciculture, and set up train- consulted on village matters. In some cases, ing-cum-production centres for women. they find a new identity as they come to be (Mukhopadhyay, 1995:1284-85) known by their own names rather than those of their husbands. The perception of 10.2 The Emancipatory Impact of change in status varies. The more patriar- Women’s Representation chal the society, the more likely it is that the In the literature on women and develop- woman’s role would continue to be defined ment, there is a well-established distinction by men. Nevertheless, 72 percent of women

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action 75 representatives in Madhya Pradesh and al- It is not, therefore, surprising that a high most 90 percent in Rajasthan perceive an proportion of women representatives say enhancement of status. However, the over- that they would like to contest elections whelming majority of these perceive their again, and a few even assert that they would enhanced status in terms of the holding of like to contest for positions of a higher level the post, rather than in terms of the power than the ones they presently hold. The lev- it gives them to work for the benefit of the els of aspiration in this respect are even local community. One panch in Haryana higher for dalit and tribal women, which is said she had sat in a car for the first time in surely a positive sign of empowerment. her life, something that would never have Community responses are also encourag- happened if she had not been a panch! ing, as the involvement of women in Many women also perceive a change in the panchayat work is seen to have effected a attitude of people belonging to their own reduction in corruption and favouritism; a as well as other castes: thus, OBC women greater awareness of education; and even a point to the number of invitations they now greater recognition of women’s rights. In get to weddings as an indicator of their new Bilaspur, in particular, 68 percent of those status. SC women do not perceive much surveyed said that the most positive impact change in the behaviour of people of higher has been in terms of the greater importance castes towards them, though one scheduled that is now attached to education for girls. Many women also caste sarpanch in Jhabua district in Madhya 50 percent claimed that untouchability has perceive a change in Pradesh, said that people no longer expect decreased or disappeared, consequent upon the attitude of people her to sit on the floor, but offer her a seat at large numbers of scheduled caste women belonging to their the same level as themselves. A new sense coming into the panchayats. of self-confidence is perceptible, and con- own as well as other Strategic Gender Concerns castes sequently a change in lifestyle and behaviour patterns. The evidence on gender and decentralisation in India thus suggests that while Perhaps the greatest potential for transforma- women have played a positive role in ad- tion is being wrought by the experience of dressing, or attempting to address, a range women in panchayats, as they come to of practical gender needs, their impact on recognise the handicap of education and lit- strategic gender needs is not remarkable. eracy. This has an impact on the family, the However, even in respect of strategic gen- importance of which cannot be underesti- der needs, we find some positive and prom- mated. The three-State CWDS study records ising shifts. We have seen already that many that many women report a change in the cus- women entering panchayats have given up tomary practices relating to the education of the veil. Family relationships, as also the children, especially girls; the age of marriage; division of labour within the household, are and dowry. Tribal and dalit women are seen increasingly being renegotiated. Women to manifest such attitudinal shifts more now find that they and their opinions strongly than others. There is also a positive receive greater respect both within and with- impact on the way in which the division of out the household, and that their influence labour within the household is organised. With on decisions regarding the age of marriage women taking on responsibilities of panchayat for their children or dowry has now in- work, there is a greater sharing of household creased. The recognition of illiteracy as a and livelihood responsibilities by husbands as handicap leads to a greater awareness of the also other members of the family.

76 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA importance of girls’ education and higher One way of doing this is to effect a shift levels of aspirations for girl children. The from sectoral planning to area planning. same women who needed to be virtually Area plans should be formulated by the coerced to contest the election are today panchayats at the village level, integrated by eager to attend panchayat meetings them- the panchayats at the two higher tiers, and selves, and to participate in processes of finally harmonised with sectoral plans at the decision-making. State level. (Jain,1994:132-33) This will undoubtedly shake up the entire structure 10.3 Policy Reform and (from the local to the central level) of plan- Capacity-Building ning as presently constituted, but may be The issues not addressed in the Constitu- the only way in which to realise the prom- tional Amendment, and the deficiencies and ise contained in the Constitutional Amend- lacunae in the Conformity Acts of the States ments. have already been discussed at some length. These appear to be the minimally neces- It is clear that there is a need for greater speci- sary conditions for effectivedecentra- fication in the powers and functions of the lisation. The tasks of democratisation are Gram Sabha, as also in the division of pow- equally challenging, though they cannot be ers and resources between the three tiers and attempted exclusively through legislative fiat their inter-relationship. There is a need for There is a need for or policy reform. Having guaranteed the greater devolution of powers, for more greater devolution of entry of women, as well as members of the clearly stipulating the relationship between powers, for more scheduled castes and tribes, in the new the State administration and the panchayats clearly stipulating panchayats, the task of capacity building, at various levels, and for freeing elected bod- the relationship so as to strengthen their participation in ies from the control of State departments between the State these institutions, remains to be taken seri- and functionaries. The relationship between administration and ously. functions and finances is another area that the panchayats at has suffered greatly from neglect and inat- Training Programmes various levels tention. In functional terms, responsibilities Though many training programmes have are entrusted to panchayats for local devel- been conducted for women representatives, opment works, but the funds which could they appear to be severely wanting in their be deployed for development are distributed conceptualisation, designed chiefly to between centrally sponsored schemes, State familiarise women with the procedures and governments, and Members of Parliament laws relating to panchayats. The absence of (under the Member of Parliament Local Area literacy and formal education, however, re- Development Scheme). Clearly, there is a mains a major obstacle. So does the absence strong case for more untied funds being of any consciousness-raising component made available to the local bodies. Above all, that can help women to identify patriarchal there is a need to recognise the minimum practices, discern the gender biases in policy, entailed by the principle of decentralisation, and build alliances and networks with and so to create the conditions under which women’s movements and organisations. the panchayats can actually be involved in Conscientisation about caste discrimination their constitutionally mandated task of pre- is also necessary. Even male representatives paring plans for economic development and – of all castes and social backgrounds – social justice, instead of being confined to need to be trained in terms of gender-sen- the identification of beneficiaries for cen- sitivity. There are, of course, limits to the trally sponsored schemes.

Revitalising Public Systems through People’s Action 77 efficacy of even the most well-designed their powerlessness have, for the first time, training programmes, for women represen- squarely recognised it. It is true that, as of tatives labour under multiple constraints, now, this recognition pertains to powerless- patriarchal and social, not all of which can ness in the domain outside the domestic, be redressed by training. These constraints but it is surely only a matter of time before can only erode over a period of time, and powerlessness within the walls of their the most effective source of such erosion homes also begins to get recognised. Like- will, slowly but surely, be women them- wise, the recognition of illiteracy as a handi- selves. cap is the first step towards combating it. The transformatory potential of such As such, policy reform for more effective trends is unmistakable, and their importance decentralisation must be accompanied by efforts to cannot be underestimated. enable and ensure the more meaningful participation of women and other groups disadvantaged by The attempt to empower women through their caste or class location. For women in par- quotas in local institutions clearly does not The participation ticular, this entails two pre-requisites : edu- alter the pre-conditions in terms of, say, pro- of women in cation and political mobilisation. In the tasks viding women with access to land, but it panchayats, as much of political mobilisation, political parties does provide them with a non-material po- as their frequent may have a less useful role to play than the litical resource through which they can, over exclusion from the women’s movement and even some types time, bring about a change in the norms actual proceedings of non-governmental initiatives. Thus, an and values governing the distribution of in these bodies, organisation in Himachal Pradesh has material resources. Their recognition of the has created an worked with over 300 Mahila Mandals, and importance of education for girls and a awareness of sought to bring them on the same platform later age of marriage, for instance, may be alternative roles and as the panchayati raj institutions. (Sharma, the prelude to the assertion of other kinds a more positive 1998:40) Similarly, SEWA’s recent campaign of equality-claims. Similarly, the participa- self-image than on water in Gujarat has worked, in the first tion of women in panchayats, as much as those internalised instance, through the Gram Sabhas, to iden- their frequent exclusion from the actual pro- over a lifetime of tify the water sources in the village, and then ceedings in these bodies, has created an patriarchally-defined mobilised and trained the women of the awareness of alternative roles and a more gender identity villages for the development and sustain- positive self-image than those internalised able use of water resources. (Mishra, 1999) over a lifetime of patriarchally-defined gender identity. Just as democratisation is a pro- 10.4 The Long, Slow but Irreversible cess, so is empowerment. Neither agency nor Route to Empowerment entitlement – however circumscribed by male domi- Despite the many negative trends (such as nation – are given in perpetuity. They can be nego- surrogate representation and tokenism) ex- tiated and altered by political action and social hibited in the practice of women’s change. The participation of women in representation in panchayats, it is clear that panchayats is certainly one mechanism panchayats are performing a transformatory through which such change can take place, role, albeit one that is slow. The conscious- and the strategic gender interests of women ness-raising function of the new PRIs is advanced. indubitable. Even the women who speak of

78 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA PART III

Possible Directions for International Support

11. Strengthening Decentra- 11.2Towards Decentralisation: Results lisation: UN Initiatives from a UN Decentralisation Mapping Exercise 11.1 National Priorities A decentralisation mapping exercise was Decentralisation of development respon- carried out in 1999 to benchmark and evalu- sibility is a basic tenet of Cooperative Fed- ate the status and prospects of UN system eralism and the Ninth Five Year Plan. Given support to decentralisation in India. The the ongoing consolidation of the institu- issues covered in semi-structured interviews tional framework of Panchayati Raj laid and groups discussions included the follow- down by the 73rd and 74th Amendments, the ing: The challenges challenges before us now are the correc- before us now are l The approach to decentralisation tion of imbalances in local, patriarchal the correction of power structures, and building capacity for l Current status of programmes related to imbalances in local, local governance through adequate devo- decentralisation / community based ac- patriarchal power lution of funds, functions and functionar- tion. structures, and ies. In this light it would also be necessary building capacity for l Experience with participatory program- to refocus international cooperation to- local governance ming, monitoring & evaluation; concerns wards decentralisation imperatives. In this through adequate regarding decentralisation; blueprint for context, a “Convergence Approach” for so- devolution of funds, the future, especially with regard to the cial service delivery by linking user groups functions and forthcoming United Nations Develop- for sector interventions with PRIs/ULBS, functionaries and indeed decentralisation within UN ment Assistance Framework (UNDAF) organisations would be the key bridges be- and operationalising joint action. tween current initiatives with future inter- Salient issues arising from discussion were ventions. as follows:

The key elements of a strategy for interna- l Every UN agency is committed to tional support to decentralisation would be decentralisation, yet there was then no the placing of gender concerns at the fore- common definition or approach to front, and support to initiatives such as the decentralisation. For some agency Right to Information which enable in- decentralisation involves working closely creased participation of the poor in local with PRIs and ULBs (e.g., UNICEF, governance and management of commu- UNCHS) ; for some it involves working nity assets and institutions. with community level groups (e.g., WFP, UNIFEM); for some it involves engagement with district planning and implementation (e.g., UNFPA); for others it involves a broad focus on

Possible Directions for International Support 79 governance and partnerships with NGOs in the villages and contribute to livelihood and CBOs (ILO, UNDCP). For some security for the poor. agencies, deconcentration or location of Some of the suggested areas for interven- offices in States is a part of decentra- tion: lisation. For most it involves a mix of these. In essence, while the concern for l Development of a common knowledge decentralisation is shared, there is a plu- base and data inventory for Decentra- rality of approaches. lisation which would pave the way for joint programming and convergence of l For each agency, the approach to various initiatives. decentralisation, as with other things, is also based on the dynamics and direction l Inter-linkage of gender and of the government counterpart ministry/ Decentralisation initiatives. agency. l Training programmes for women repre- Examples of direct involvement with sentatives in PRIs and ULBs. decentralisation include training of repre- l Support for networks of women in PRIs sentatives of PRIs and ULBs (especially and ULBs and community organisations. women members), development of training modules for district planning, direct l Support to district planning through development of manuals, modules and The respondents felt engagement with district planning, work- workshops. that Decentralisation shops and seminars on decentralisation issues, etc. Examples of indirect linkage with required gap filling l Linkage with State Finance Commission Decentralisation include community based and creation of in effecting financial devolution. programmes in education, urban basic ser- capacity in the l Linkage with NGOs and CBOs as props several areas vices, reproductive health, forestry, ICDS, etc. In most of this the “user group” is the for more effective Panchayati Raj. basic unit. The content of the programme l Development of database and informa- ranges from training modules to organising tion system for decentralised planning workshops and training programmes and implementation. abroad, participatory planning as well as provision of equipment and materials in 11.3The Decentralisation Imperative some cases. While the decentralisation of governance The respondents felt that Decentralisation in India launched through the 73rd and 74th required gap filling and creation of capac- Constitutional Amendment seem to have ity in the several areas: more effective devo- become an irreversible feature of far-reach- lution of authority including financial pow- ing consequence, it is an unfinished agenda ers, improvement in quality of participation to the completion of which the UN will especially by the poor through training in contribute: the challenge now is to create participation and leadership for represen- an enabling environment for qualitative par- tatives, especially women and the ticipation of all groups of the local com- marginalised communities, support to munities and a decentralised system of gov- people’s networks especially for advocacy ernment that has –at all levels- the capacity and experience sharing, as well as and the resources to meet the needs of the programmes that help create social capital people.

80 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA Strengthening Local Governance service providers can be improved by giv- Institutions ing local governance institutions authority to monitor performance and impose sanc- In a decentralised system, the proximity of tions. Given India’s diverse and segmented decision-makers to the local community social structure, rights of vulnerable sec- provides a powerful opportunity for com- tions can be best assured by giving voice to munity insistence on greater accountabil- the least advantaged. People’s sensitisation ity, transparency and efficiency in the use to their rights, including knowledge of pro- of public resources earmarked for devel- cedures and the responsibilities incumbent opment. However, in order to make the on local governance authorities, requires in- most of this opportunity, it is essential to formation dissemination to the public at create awareness in local communities and large. interest in decentralised institutions that offer avenues for active participation. BOX 10 Several factors arising from economic and UN Assistance to Strengthening Local Government Institutions social inequalities seriously inhibit the full institutions for more effective training participation of people, especially women, l UNCHS: Urban Management Programme of officials and elected representatives in local governance institutions at present. Building and strengthening the of PRIs. Apart from specific quotas and training capacity of local government and l UNICEF: Rural and Urban Convergence programmes designed to develop leader- other stakeholders (Civil Society Projects on Capacity Building in local ship, it is important to implement policies and Private Sector) to address governments that would reduce the economic depen- critical urban problems. [Surat, Programme Support to facilitate the Bangalore, Hyderabad] building of effective community dence of large sections of people on a few l UNDP: Capacity Building Programme processes and to train members of powerful individuals. Local governance Building capability of State-level panchayats and nagar palikas (ULBs). institutions are much more participatory and effective in regions where State government policies have succeeded in enabling BOX 11 people’s participation in the management UN Assistance to Community Management of Basic Services of natural resources (land, water and forest.) and creating conditions for gainful em- l UNFPA: Capacity building in district the Workplace in partnership with health administration Industry Associations, Trade Unions ployment. Capacity building in districts for and selected entrepreneurs Community Management of Basic participatory planning and l Joint GOI/UN System Education implementation of Integrated Programme: Services Population Development Progra- Promote community ownership and Decentralisation provides closer correspon- mmes in close collaboration with management of village schools [8 other Government Departments, States]. dence between the actual needs of people NGOs and the Private Sector. [In l Water and Sanitation Programme-South and the provision that is made by govern- 38 districts in Rajasthan, Asia : Support to Sector Reforms in Water ments to meet those needs. “Planning from Maharashtra, Orissa, Madhya and Sanitation below” and contextualised resource allo- Pradesh, Gujarat and Kerala] Transfer of piped drinking water cation for basic services would be more cost l WHO: Focus on community participation scheme in Meerut district (UP) from in Primary Health Programmes Public Health Engineering Depart- effective and produce better outcomes. Yet Improvement of Health Seeking ment to registered Water Users’ the quality of basic services provided to Behaviour of Women and Tribal Society. local communities is directly proportional Communities l WFP: Project on Initiating Early to the degree of community control and l ILO and UNDCP: Joint Project on Complementary Feeding and supervision. Responsiveness and account- Community Based Rehabilitation Increasing Community Participation and Prevention of Drug Abuse at [Banswara District, Rajasthan] ability to the community on the part of

Possible Directions for International Support 81 Extending Services to the Most 11.4 Decentralisation of Development Difficult to Reach Responsibilities – The Challenges Apart from social mobilisation and gender Considerable headway has been made since sensitisation of local communities in gen- the enactment of the 73rd and 74th Amend- eral, it is essential to focus attention on those ments, which have created PRIs as tiers of who are excluded from full participation in local self-rule. Today Conformity Acts have the decision making process of the com- been passed in all the States for which munity. Democratic decentralisation and Panchayati Raj was mandated. Many States processes by themselves cannot correct have devolved functions and powers to lo- deep-rooted social and economic inequities. cal authorities, State Finance Commissions The poor and disadvantaged must be em- have been constituted and have made rec- powered through social mobilisation, access ommendations for resource allocations to to information, and training in development PRIs. The second round of elections to administration before they can take advan- PRIs are being held and in many States tage of reforms which seek to bring gov- people’s planning and district government ernment closer to the people. (see Box 13) are now in place. Administrative and democratic decentralisation have been made man- BOX 12 datory, and, consequently, most States have UN Assistance to Empowerment of Community made arrangements for periodic elections Groups in Local Political Processes to local bodies, and have also indicated subjects over which local authorities would have l UNIFEM: Support to Networking Sustainable food security schemes aimed of Women’s Groups and their at self-reliance of people from Scheduled a say. There are large differences between linkages to Urban Local Bodies in Tribes, Scheduled Cases and other States in the degree to which these Amend- backward casts, with active participation Maharashtra ments have been implemented. States like of village communities [Orissa, Bihar, Kerala, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh l WFP: Tribal Development Sub- Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and programme Rajasthan] are among the front-runners. The Ninth Five Year Plan document has recognised the importance of decen- BOX 13 tralisation in the context of development Grassroots Concerns for Panchayati Raj and made the principle of “cooperative fed- The panchayat members of the Alwar faced problems as the Patwaris and eralism” as the cornerstone of its develop- district in Rajasthan reinforced the members of the cooperative societies did ment strategy. In a system of cooperative issues raised during a December 2000 not give importance to the Sarpanch. In federalism, the national and State govern- workshop on strengthening Decentra- addition, the approval of the programmes ments devolve powers to and strengthen the lisation. Mrs. Leelavati Goel, Gram and of the grants has to be given by the Sarpanch, said that there is very little Tehsildar and District Collector. Mr. authority and competence of local govern- development work under way as funds Ramlal Meena, a Gram Panchayat ments at the district, block and village level. are extremely limited. Problems of member, pointed out that powers have Given the repeated failures of vertical gov- that area are related to roads, water and been given to the panchayat institutions ernment programmes to achieve the desired women’s development. Mr. Rahguvar only on paper and not in reality. The results, the Ninth Plan document (vol. 1. Dayal Meena, Pradhan, emphasised panchayats have very little funds and that that there are very strong panchayat they have no other source of revenue. Ch. 5) proposes to place the panchayats at traditions in the Rajasthan villages, and The MPs and MLAs have their quotas to the very heart of development planning and spelt out the need for finances. Mr. spend in their constituencies but here action. PRIs are the agency of change and Ashok, the Deputy-Sarpanch of Karar favouritism and politics are in play. Thus, loci of decision-making, not merely vehicles panchayat in Alwar, mentioned that in a lot of debts have piled up over the years for performing delivery services that a dis- the last five years panchayats have in each of the village panchayats. tant bureaucracy cannot fulfil.

82 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA One can argue that despite the problems authority, powers, responsibilities, has not of corruption, incapacity, non-participation made much headway. There is a large agenda of the poor and local conservatism, to be addressed for strengthening the rev- decentralisation is the key strategy for In- enue base of the third tier of governance. dia today. PRIs are now mandated by the Similarly, more attention is needed to cre- Constitution, and the ills they suffer from ate conditions for more synergy in the op- are also found in the erstwhile bureaucratic- erations of the central and State govern- parliamentary dispensation. However, it is ments, while strengthening the capacity of important to address the remaining chal- local governance institutions to progres- lenges in decentralisation, which are out- sively overcome the challenges posed by lined below, through a series of initiatives, poverty and social inequalities. In this con- which create an enabling policy environ- text, the Ninth Plan document (vol. 1., ment and macroeconomic framework ch. 6) mentions support to State Finance where the poor and marginalised groups are Commissions and support to District Plan- able to participate more actively in the func- ning as two critical areas for strengthening tioning of local democracy. Panchayati Raj. Correcting Imbalances in Local Power Refocusing International Cooperation Structures Towards Decentralisation Imperatives A main challenge There is also considerable scepticism about In the light of the emphasis placed upon ahead is creating the ability and feasibility of PRIs as a ve- decentralisation in India’s national plans, in- linkages between hicle for progressive social transformation. ternational cooperation must seek to iden- user groups and It has been argued that transfer of respon- tify areas of intervention that help lend appropriately sibilities and authority to local institutions more substance and credibility to Panchayat strengthened local strengthens local prejudices and the local Raj and Urban Local Bodies. There is a need bodies and elite. PRIs are seen as agents of caste domi- for interventions that help counter scepti- community nation and gender oppression and subject cism and promote local democracy, which organisations to surrogate representation, where the is consistent with the objectives of sustain- elected representatives are actually con- able human development. Many UN trolled by local “big men”, and women rep- organisations have already taken the lead in resentatives are a front for their husband, training and leadership development for father or son. In many cases, economic de- community based development action. pendence is the root of this problem, pre- While international agencies, especially venting people from using their political multilaterals, face many constraints in work- freedom. Consequently, the Ninth Plan ing flexibly with communities and civil so- document (vol. 1, ch. 1-4) has outlined the ciety organisation, it is also true that many national thrust improving livelihoods and progressive principles of community in- food security and empowering women volvement and participatory planning have through improved access to land, credit and received a boost in internationally assisted common property resources (pasturage, wa- projects pertaining to forestry, education, ter, fuelwood, forest produce, etc.). reproductive and child health, etc. A main challenge ahead is creating linkages between Adequate Devolution of Resources, user groups and appropriately strengthened Authority and Responsibility local bodies and community organisations. Fiscal decentralisation, an essential precon- Many international organisations have dition for adequate devolution of started to assist convergent community

Possible Directions for International Support 83 action, aiming at supporting the local po- following, are regarded as most conducive litical systems to address development is- to leverage strong UN support to sues in a cross-sectoral way. decentralisation. The trend towards projects and Capacity Building at the Local Level programmes that directly involve people at Capacity building in local political systems the grassroots level increasingly demands a is regarded as the area of highest relevance decentralised management of activities in for UN interventions in decentralisation. At International Development. Many the same time, this is the area in which the organisations are responding to this chal- UN organisations have already conducted lenge by decentralising their own structures, numerous activities and hence can draw on such as UNICEF, WFP and UNFPA by es- different experiences. Traditionally capac- tablishing State offices. Further, the devel- ity building focused on planning, implemen- opment of State and district level tation and monitoring in local political and programmes with project management administrative bodies. Capacity building of counterparts at the State and district levels, elected members of local bodies is impor- Through a process of such as Joint GOI/UN System Education tant, particularly for representatives, espe- dialogue with civil Programme, UNFPA’s Integrated Popula- cially women, who are entering the public society and State tion and Development Programme and the and political sphere for the first time. An- government partners, World Bank’s District Primary Education other key area is support to district and international Programme (DPEP) is a step in this panchayat planning through training of development direction. organisations can PRIs/ULBs and district planning commit- formulate a 11.5 Key Elements of a tees. Yet, capacity building should not be concerted strategy Decentralisation Strategy confined to formal political and administrative institutions, but include the “demand on decentralisation Through a process of dialogue with civil side” (rights awareness) in local processes and thereby provide society and State government partners, in- – the communities that formulate their substantial inputs to ternational development organisations can needs and exert control over the perfor- the national formulate a concerted strategy on mance of the local governments, line de- decentralisation decentralisation and thereby provide sub- partments and service delivery. Here, the efforts stantial inputs to the national UN System has an important role to play decentralisation efforts. This will involve through strategies such as support to aware- coordinated initiatives of individual UN ness campaigns about legal, political and Organisations and Specialised Agencies as economic rights and obligations and well as joint initiatives. The strategy will use strengthening the position of Civil Society the experiences and expertise of each Organisations (see Box 14). organisation and the comparative advantage of the UN System of operating close to the The mapping revealed that the UN ground and its close working relationships organisations feel the need to approach ru- with the Government, Civil Society and ral and urban areas in a different way. While other partners. in rural areas the governance structures are relatively clearly demarcated and receive In a mapping exercise on decentralisation, support from different development conducted among all resident UN organisations including from international Organisations in India, key elements of an organisations, the urban areas are UNDAF strategy on decentralisation were characterised by unclear division of identified. These elements, presented in the

84 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA responsibilities, a lack of resources and little roots level, collaboration with the State Fi- awareness about existing problems. nance Commissions and with various citizen’s fora is equally important. Advocacy Gender and Decentralisation instruments such as the State Human De- As in Part 2, Decentralisation can be re- velopment Reports and the India Develop- garded as an important means for address- ment Forum should be used to flag key con- ing gender inequality and empowerment of cerns regarding decentralisation. women. Likewise, a focus on women in ca- Information pacity building efforts is a powerful strategy to achieve more quality in participation: Access to information is a crucial success firstly, through improving the involvement factor for a decentralised system. This holds and the clout of women in local political equally for planing in district administra- processes and secondly through altering the tions as for participation of marginalised Decentralisation can traditional forms of leadership by support- groups in local political processes. The pro- be regarded as an ing the emergence of women leaders. motion of IT for information of people important means for Women should therefore be at the heart of about their rights and obligations is a prom- addressing gender capacity building efforts at the local level. ising field. Strengthening district and com- inequality and munity level data systems and training the empowerment Advocacy for Adequate Devolution of users is another area where a concerted of women Resources, Authority and Responsibility international strategy could make a differ- In order to contribute to the national ef- ence. The State Human Development Re- forts of improving quantity and quality of port initiative led by the Planning Commis- participation, service delivery and empow- sion and the DevInfo developed by the UN erment through decentralisation, the inter- Inter-Agency Working Group on Common national community has to target its advo- Database are promising steps in this direc- cacy efforts at micro-, meso and macro level. tion. It would be important to ensure that Support to people’s networking at the grass- these initiatives become relevant for PRIs/ BOX 14 Issues for User Groups: Linkages with Communities, Civil Society Organisations and Local Bodies Interest groups are activity and service type of civil society groups, the issue of important to understand how high- income oriented. As they are social formations, their being accountable to the poorer groups is corporate groups access resources and definition has to be situational due to the important. Given the quality and capacity influence policy. Local level groups do not heterogeneous nature of the local society. of decision making in PRIs/ ULBs, there is usually have access to levels of decision Bypassing local bodies have weakened them a need to improve their capacities in view making at the State and national level or and not helped them build any capacities. of increased responsibilities. However, this forums to influence this. Moreover, if all funds were routed through should not be a constraint on local level The recommendations that emerged are: the local bodies, it would only reinforce democracy. l Elected representatives should also be held corruption and restrict the opportunity At the PRIs/ ULBs levels, not just the accountable. available for civic groups. Elected people president, but others, viz. the ward members l The civil society should be empowered to should be made more accountable, and party and the counsellors, matter. Democracy is be more responsive to local issues. affiliations that come in the way should not more broad based. Nevertheless, it would l The capacity and quality of decision- be taken into consideration. be counterproductive to depoliticise the making of the PRIs/ULBs has to be There is “patronage” at various levels. State inherently political issues. At times, untidy improved. politics opens up space for pro-poor level groups often bypass local level patrons, l More time and resources should be raising issues of exclusion and also that of processes to evolve and operate. allocated to the PRIs/ULBs. Participatory structures and processes are rights in a democratic structure. There is l There should be a system of right to need to empower civil society to be more different when influencing policy vis-à-vis recall the elected representatives of the responsive to local issues. Given the varied enabling groups to access resources. It is also PRIs.

Possible Directions for International Support 85 ULBs and decentralised programmes at the Decentralisation within the UN System district and community levels. Decentralisation of structures within the Convergence Approach for Social Service UN System is an area which offers a large Delivery scope for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. Equal to any Many international agencies are already sup- other decentralised systems, there is a need porting programmes that involve commu- for a balance between devolution of re- nity mobilisation, participatory planning and sources, authority and accountability within links with PRIs. It is now important that the different layers of UN Organisations some of these interventions go beyond the (e.g. Headquarters, Country Offices, State “user group” approach, and forge more ef- Offices). Enhanced international collabo- fective partnerships of accountability to the ration at the State or district level could lead communities at the sites of intervention and to great value addition. Inter-Agency Work- transparency, moving away from the “ver- ing Groups at the State level as could serve tical intervention” approach. (see Box 15) as fora for exchange of information and ex- The procedural dimensions of this would periences and for joint activities such as need to be worked out in close consulta- training, documentation and advocacy. tion with the Government of India and State governments. BOX 15 Community Driven Management: Avenues for Decentralisation

Panchayats at the village, block and district communities makes it easier to promote l Harassment by block level officials. level represent the community, which also community participation and fosters NGOs’ l Elected members behave more or less as includes user groups, self help groups, action. contractors. traditional and self initiated groups and Development projects can be successful only l Despite excellent work by some village NGOs. He explained that the community if they can devote significant resources to level panchayats, many panchayat elected acts as a unit of management by virtue of people’s participation, and recruit staff that leaders as well as officials see development the fact that water, forests and uncultivated has skills in social organisation. Project programmes as an opportunity to make lands are held as common property leaders have to be committed and the donors themselves richer. resources. Community control over local or senior officials need to exert pressure to Inadequacies of State Acts: government functionaries has improved adhere to participatory approaches. l Most States view PRIs as agents. accountability. Incentives for staff members to ensure l No autonomy to PRIs to function as The problem of implementation in drinking participation and community influence on institutions of self-government. water, watershed, irrigation and forestry the work of the field staff could also help in l Political reluctance to give up control over programmes arises because participation of the implementation of these projects. implementation and funds. the local people is poor, and there is no felt The limitations of the legislation facing the l Finances of PRIs remain fragile. need, pressure to spend substantial resources PRIs are: The correct approach to the question by a fixed deadline, unclear criteria for Inadequacies of 73rd Amendment Act: “Should the panchayats get a share in taxes selecting areas and villages, and poor l The powers and functions of gram sabhas or have the right to levy and collect taxes?” maintenance. are not defined. would be to provide PRIs with revenue To illustrate challenges that India is facing, l Actual devolution of powers to raising powers. PRIs also hesitate to levy and he referred to the situation existing in Central panchayats are left to the discretion of the collect taxes. India, where there is a single cropping State governments. There is need for a large multi-sectoral system. Because the land productivity is low l The expression ‘institution of self- project on rural livelihoods based on and vast areas are uncultivated due to soil government’ is not elaborated. community management with a mandate to and water erosion, the tribal population l Re-election is not dependent on the good operationalise the Scheduled Areas Act. faced tremendous hardship leading to work done by the office bearers. Effective panchayats/user groups would forced/distress migration. It is therefore l There is no provision for nyaya panchayat. require an effective district and block level necessary to integrate land and water Inadequacies of PRIs: administration, hence need for greater management. Social cohesion in rural l Meetings of the gram sabhas are held rarely. coordination and better governance. Source: Dr. N.C. Saxena 86 DECENTRALISATION IN INDIA SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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