People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad): a Study of Structures, Operations and Initial Government Reactions
PEOPLE AGAINST GANGSTERISM AND DRUGS (PAGAD): A STUDY OF STRUCTURES, OPERATIONS AND INITIAL GOVERNMENT REACTIONS.
Completed by: Anneli Botha (9705790)
Thesis submitted for partial conformation to meet requirements for the degree Magister Artium in Political Studies in the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy at the Rand Afrikaans University.
Study Director: Professor S Booysen
March 1999 PAGAD Mission Statement "PAGAD is a caring people's movement, proceeding from a foundation of truth , unity, justice, fearlessness, with the ultimate aim of eradicating the evil scourge of gangsterism and drugs from society. We propagate this eradiction on the basis of-and in accordance with the divine will of The Creator."
PAGAD's Vision "The People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) has a vision to bring about a just, social order, devoid of the evils of gangsterism and drugs. We will achieve this by raising the consciousness of the people, mass mobilisation and mass action." LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: PAGAD National Structure 28 Figure 2: PAGAD Western Cape Structure 31 Figure 3: Comparative Frequencies of Non-violent and Violent Actions: 1996 51 Figure 4: Comparative Analysis: Violent Modus Operandi 1996 52 Figure 5: Daily Comparative Frequencies: Violent Modus Operandi 1996 53 Figure 6: Time Comparative Frequencies: Violent Modus operandi 1996 54 Figure 7: Map of PAGAD Violent Activities: Western Cape 1996 55 Figure 8: Comparative Frequencies of Non-violent and Violent Actions: 1997 58 Figure 9: Time Comparative Frequencies: Violent Modus Operandi 1997 61 Figure 10: Daily Comparative Frequencies: Violent Modus Operandi 1997 62 Figure 11: Comparative Frequencies of Violent Modus Operandi: 1997 65 Figure 12: Map of PAGAD Violent Activities: Western Cape 1997 66 Figure 13: Diagram: PAGAD Modus Operandi 67 Figure 14: Zones of Public Action 72 Figure 15: Zones of Public Action: PAGAD 76 Figure 16: PAGAD Cases Registered 85 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANC African National Congress APLA African People Liberation Army CORE Community Outreach Forum GIA Armed Islamic Group IBA Independant Broadcast Association ICSA Islamic Council of South Africa IUC Islamic Unity Convention MADAM Multi Agency Delivery Action Mechanism MJC Muslim Judicial Council MYM Muslim Youth Movement NOCOC National Operational Co-ordinating Committee PAC Pan-African Congress PACAD People Against Crime and Drugs PADAV People Against Drugs and Violence PAGAD People Against Gangsterism and Drugs POCOC Provincial Operational Co-ordinating Committee SRCC Salt River Co-ordinating Council Against Drug Abuse WCACF Western Cape Anti-Crime Forum LIST OF CORE PERSONS CITED IN REFERENCE
Allie, G (Dr.). PAGAD Secretariat: Western Cape Boshoff, H.J (Lt-col). National Crime Prevention and Response Service: National Operational Coordinating Committee: South African National Defence Force. Cassiem, Achmad. Leader of Qibla and the Islamic Unity Convention. Clohesy, Christopher (Farther) Ebrahim, Abdurrazak. Amir of PAGAD. Ebrahim, Abdus Salaam. PAGAD National Chief Coordinator Ederies, Nadthmie Former PAGAD Organiser Esack, F. Academic, former lecturer at University of Cape Town (UCT) Gerber, J.C. (Adv.) Deputy Attorney-General : Western Cape Heylinger, Commander of the South African Police Service's Gang Investigation Unit Holtzhausen, W. (Supt). South African Police Service: Liaison Officer: Western Cape Jaffer, F. Former PAGAD Chief Coordinator Khan, F.W. Attorney-General: Western Cape Moosa, Ebrahim Lecturer University of Cape Town (UCT) Morkel, Gerald. MEC for Safety and Security. Parker, Ali Phantom Parker. Former PAGAD Head of Operations Rasool, Ebrahim. Western Cape Health and Social Services MEC Roberts, A. PAGAD National Secretary Sidique, A. (Sheikh). President of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) Spannenberg, (Supt). South African Police Service: PAGAD Task Team: Western Cape Sterrenberg, Johan (Senior Superintendent) Police Spokesman Toefy, Aslam. Former PAGAD National Chief Commander Vearey, Jeremy. Commander of Police Intellegence in the Western Cape (PICOC) Viljoen, W.C. Senior State Advocate: Western Cape Wessels, Leon. Western Cape Police Commissioner LIST OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
Research Methodology 3 2.1 Terminology 4
Historical Background and Emergence of PAGAD 7 3.1 Broad Historical Context 8 3.2 Fight Against Crime as Explanatory Condition 8 3.3 Ideological Context of the Rise of PAGAD 10 3.4 Division in PAGAD: September 1996 14 3.5 Introductive Relationship between Qibla and PAGAD 16 3.5.1 Strategy and Objectives of Qibla 16
Objectives of PAGAD 21
PAGAD's Structure 26 5.1 PAGAD National Executive Committee/PAGAD United 26 5.2 PAGAD Western Cape Structure 29
Modus Operandi 39 6.1 Violent Modus Operandi 39 6.1.1 PAGAD Modus Operandi: 1996 45 6.1.2 PAGAD Modus Operandi: 1997 56 6.2 Intolerance towards Muslim clergy and other opponents 68
PAGAD and the Government 71 7.1 PAGAD and the South African Police Service 80 7.2 Political Perspective on PAGAD 88 7.3 Evaluation of Governmental Reactions 92
Conclusion 94 9. Bibliography 97
ANNEXURE A: PAGAD Memorandum of the Minister of Correctional Services
ANNEXURE B: Interim Constitution of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs
ANNEXURE C: Demand for a Drug and Gangster-free Society: Minister of Justice
ANNEXURE D: PAGAD Western Cape 1996
ANNEXURE E: PAGAD Western Cape 1997
ANNEXURE F: Different Committees and Structures Involved in Managing the
Situation in the Western Cape
ANNEXURE G: Public Statement: 14 November 1996 1 I. INTRODUCTION
Since the establishment of PAGAD in May/June 1996, PAGAD has received extensive media coverage. This has not included in depth coverage of the modus operandi, and its relationship with the South African government. The objective of a case study of the organization PAGAD is to provide academic substance to fragments of media coverage, and to combine this with current research in order to provide an in-depth overview of the organization. There is a need for systematic research. This study is based on a qualitative analysis of information and interviews. It is primarily a case study of PAGAD as a politically driven, anti-crime organization. In this way this study strives to make an academic contribution.
The establishment of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in Cape Town and similar structures elsewhere may be assessed against the background of the high rate of crime nationally and the reaction against it. The following distinguishes PAGAD from other anti-crime structures, such as Community Police Forums: It is the initial publicity given to the organization after the death of Rasaad Staggie; its organised vigilantism; its initial anti-cooperation stance; its rejection of Community Police Forums and anti-crime forums; its perception that the government is unwilling and unable to curb criminality; and the insecurity being experienced by ordinary citizens because of the high crime rate.
One of PAGAD's main objectives is to serve as a broad anti-crime front. Under its banner groups, organizations and concerned citizens of diverse ideological, political and religious persuasions and interests express their active support for an anti-crime cause. In June/July 1996 the PAGAD campaign gained an organisational aspect and began promoting itself as PAGAD, with Farouk Jaffer as coordinator, Nathmie Edries as the organizer and Ali "Phantom" Parker as Head of Operations. It also established a military wing (the G-Force) which began with military-style operations against suspected drug dealers and their property. By this time PAGAD's support base had widened to include ordinary community members, the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) and even one or two individuals representing the Christian faith. The Islamic Unity Convention's (IUC) community radio station, Radio 786, is instrumental in promoting the movement and its objectives within the community.
Differences on how to use PAGAD as an anti-crime initiative and on the use of violence during actions taken against gangsters and drug lords gave way to strife in the Cape Town anti-crime initiative. The strife deepened and ultimately resulted in the formation of two different groups, popularly known as the 2
PAGAD moderate faction and the PAGAD Qibla faction.
The following two research objectives inform the current thesis: As a case study, I plan to focus on the establishment of PAGAD, its objectives and modus operandi. The sections on 'Muslim politics before the formation of PAGAD' and 'The Formation of PAGAD' will focus on this aspect. The aim of this section is to provide greater insight into the dual strategy (modus operandi) that is implemented by PAGAD. PAGAD can be described as an overt mass movement, but also as a covert structure within a structure. The latter has adopted a more hard-line approach, which includes the use of violence. PAGAD as an overt structure is "open" to all South Africans, although it has a clear Islamic character. A supplementary objective is to analyse the possible involvement of Islamic extremist elements in PAGAD. End of 1997 is the cut-off point for this case study.
Secondly, this study focuses on the reactions of the South African Government to the activities of PAGAD. The formation of PAGAD presented a challenge to the South African Government in posing the question as to how far protest and community action ought to be allowed before they become part of the problem in question, namely crime. This question will be addressed using the number of court cases in which PAGAD members up to the end of 1997 have been primary suspects. Within this discussion the focus will also be on what type of organization PAGAD is. Can PAGAD be described as a vigilante group, pressure group or just another gang? The classifications of these type of structures will be discussed, followed by the views of both PAGAD and governmental structures. These and related issues are explored in this dissertation.
The remaining of this study can be divided in three parts: A discussion on the research methodology. This will give an overview of the procedures followed to gather information as well as a discussion of the terminology used throughout this study. The second section focuses on PAGAD itself, its formation, its structure, objectives and modus operandi. The latter will distinguish between the modus operandi of PAGAD in 1996 and in 1997. The objective of this distinction is to indicate any similarities and changes in the modus operandi of PAGAD over this period of time. The third section focuses on initial governmental reactions to PAGAD. The first question asked concerns the classification of PAGAD (as a vigilante group, pressure group or a gang). Government reactions will be evaluated in terms of this classification. 3 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The establishment of PAGAD is a new phenomenon in South African history. It is therefore not surprising that there is still insufficient literature available on this subject. This study will use publicly available information from the South African Police Service, newspaper coverage, interviews and PAGAD documentation.
This study reports on an elaborate scanning of all print media coverage on PAGAD. It explores PAGAD's organizational formation and sociopolitical operations. Initial interviews with South African Police Service sources brought to light that a PAGAD Task Team was established after the death of Rashaad Staggie, and has since been tasked with all investigations regarding alleged PAGAD incidents. Interviews with members of the said task team revealed that many more incidents occur than those mentioned in the media. In the light of insufficient information in the media, I was dependant on referring to case dockets as supplied by the South African Police Service. It has to be emphasised that all information regarding incidents occurring during the period July 1996 to December 1997 was gathered along this way. Since "Operation Recoil" was launched during October 1997, the Crime Management Information Centre of the South African Police Service situated in the Western Cape is responsible for the evaluation of information gathered by the PAGAD Task Team on alleged PAGAD involvement in incidents of crime and violence. In order to substantiate my academic research I went to the Cape, and during my stay I had interviews with high-ranking officers, personally involved in investigating alleged PAGAD offences. The latter includes Supt Wickus Holtzhausen (South African Police Service Media Liaison Officer in the Western Cape) and Supt D Spannenberg (PAGAD Task Team: Western Cape). During my visit I obtained a list of cases in which PAGAD members were allegedly involved from the PAGAD task team and the Crime Management Information Centre.
Information on the formation of PAGAD, its activities and its relationship with the South African government is well documented in the media. Yet there is a clear gap in terms of systematic, in-depth academic research. This study works towards eliminating this gap, through interviews with Abidah Roberts and Dr Gulam Allie. Actual PAGAD documentation (as provided by Abidah Roberts) was also used.
In order to gain a broader perspective on PAGAD within the community in the Western Cape, I conducted interviews with Sheikh Achmad Sidique (the head of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC)) in 4
May 1998, Ebrahim Moosa (Islamic Studies at the University of Cape Town), in June 1997 and Farid Esack in March 1997. During this process, I felt it was necessary to include the views of Qibla, in particular those of Aclunad Cassiem (leader of both Qibla and the Islamic Unity Convention (IUC)). His views were relevant from two points of view: First as a member of the community and secondly to get his reaction to the allegations (made by the head of the MJC and members of the South African Police Service (SAPS)), that Qibla is the driving force behind PAGAD. However, repeated attempts to establish contact with Mr Cassiem, or any representative of Qibla or the IUC in order to ascertain their views, were unsuccessful. What became apparent in this process was, firstly that nobody was prepared to talk about Qibla and secondly, the defensive manner in which these individuals reacted to my request for an interview, although I had not even suggested that Qibla was involved in PAGAD.
Based upon information contained in registered cases, I established a framework aimed at distinguishing between violent and non-violent incidents. Violent incidents were then classified under the following heading: Modus operandi (were either explosives or firearms used or were both involved), geographic location, the date and time of incidents. The objective of this classification was to determine tendencies in order to create a case study on PAGAD. I have to emphasise that cases still are sub judice. During the interviews with the South African Police Service the impression was made that all members of PAGAD were involved in cases of violence in the whole Western Cape region as such. On the other hand members of the PAGAD top structure denied involvement. This compelled me to find the truth about the matter.
2.1 TERMINOLOGY
The following definitions will provide a basis for the terms used throughout this study. The aim of this discussion is not to comment in a philosophical manner on these terms, but rather to facilitate understanding when these terms are used throughout the text.
Covert: "Secret or disguised" (Thompson, 1995:310). "Secret or hidden; conducted with secrecy by design" (Carl, 1990:63).
Overt: "Unconcealed or done openly" (Thompson, 1995:976). "Open; done without attempt at concealment" (Carl, 1990:308). 5
Case study: "A detailed description of a person, event, institution, or community designed to create nomothetic knowledge. Any relatively detailed description and analysis of a single person, event, institution or community" (Landman, 1988:53). "The case study comprehensively examines many characteristics of one case, usually over a period of time. The unit examined in the case study may be a person, a group, a culture, or an event. The goal of this research strategy is to gather detailed information about the one case involved" (Lal Goes 1988:62). "Case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context" (Yin, 1989:13).
Cell structures: "A small group as a nucleus of political activity, especially of a subversive kind" (Thompson, 1995:210). Greyling (1987:10-11) describes a cell structure as follows: The organization consists of cells of which each consists of four to ten members. This strategy was first initiated by Sergei Gennadovich Nechayev (1847-1882). A cell structure is regarded as the basic unit of a covert organization. It usually consists of a cell leader and cell members. Cells may be organized on a geographic basis or on a functional basis. The cells may be highly centralized, with orders flowing from a high command through the organization. This tends to increase the efficiency of operations. The size of the operational cell also varies according to the phase of development of the organization.
Modus operandi or strategy: "A plan of action to defeat an opponent or to achieve some other goal. 'Strategy' usually refers to a comprehensive or long-range plan involving a series of moves directed toward some overall objective. 'Tactics' by contrast, consist of single moves or limited sequences of steps toward intermediate goals within a larger strategic plan" (Plano & Riggs, 1980:152).
Paramilitary: "Forces organized similarly to military forces, or a member of an unofficial para-military organization" (Thompson, 1995:991).
Pressure group: "A pressure group may be regarded as any group which articulates demands that the political authorities in the political system or sub-system should make an authoritative allocation. ...such groups do not themselves seek to occupy the position of authority" (Richardson, 1993:1).
Popular justice, also referred to as "informal justice", "community justice", "alternative forms of dispute resolution" and "neighbourhood justice" involves various forms of mediation, arbitration, conciliation and reparation. Sachs (1984) described popular justice as: "Justice that is popular in form, in that its language is open and accessible: popular in its functioning, in that its proceedings are based 6 essentially on active community participation; and popular in its substance, in that judges drawn directly from the people give judgement in the interest of the people."
Non- violent: Opposite of violent. This include peaceful marches, mass meetings and gatherings not resulting in violence.
Violent: "The exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on or damage to persons or property; action or conduct characterized by this" (Onions, 2359). Hereafter, whenever the term violence is used it will include shooting incidents, the use of explosive devices and any other means associated with violence. 7 3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EMERGENCE OF PAGAD
Any organization or structure over time has a historical background, a reason for existence, and an objective. In this sense PAGAD is no exception. The aim of the following discussion is to place the establishment of PAGAD within a broader historical and ideological context.
This section will be discussed under the following headings: Broad historical context. The objective of this heading is to state clearly that the establishment of PAGAD was not an one time only decision taken by a few disillusioned members of the community in the Western Cape. Indications are that the establishment of anti-crime forums had been present since the 1950s, each with different members, but always with the same purpose and goals. The main objective of this section is to indicate to the reader that the establishment of PAGAD had had a historical development. Fight against crime as explanatory condition. On the basis of the above-mentioned historical development, this section will be focussing on the socio-economical conditions prevailing in the Western Cape, in order to explain the development of so-called popular justice organizations. Ideological context of the rise of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs. The name of the organization already puts it against the background of tenn "popular justice". This section will attempt to put PAGAD in the framework of Muslim politics in the Western Cape. Division in PAGAD. This section will be focussing on the split in PAGAD during September 1996, on the ground of the ideological divisions in the Muslim community in the Western Cape. Although the split in the ranks of PAGAD occurred very early in the existence of the organization, it is very important to take notice of it, as the split was a result of the manifestation of ideological differences. There will be continuous reference to the said split in the cause of this case study as it altered PAGAD's objectives as well as its modus operandi. Relationship between PAGAD and Qibla and the strategy and objectives of Qibla. The objective of this section is to look into Qibla as such and to study Qibla's alleged role in the actions of PAGAD.
Discussion on the aforementioned should not be seen as isolated from each other, but that it should be interpreted as a totality. 8
301 BROAD HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Islamic upsurge in South Africa began in the 1950s. It was first formulated by teachers and professionals in the Western Cape. It derived its religious inspiration from modern movements in Pakistan and Egypt, and its South African political dimension from the variety of local political movements and trends (Tayob, 1996:32). In December 1970 the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa (MYM) was established. The Iranian revolution in 1979 led to the formation of the Qibla Mass Movement (an anti- apartheid movement inspired by the Islamic revolution in Iran) (Galant & Gamieldien, 1996:9).
The involvement of ordinary citizens in anti-crime structures began with the Salt River Co-ordinating Council against drug abuse (SRCC). The assumption that PAGAD was the first anti-crime structure or that it was a sudden reactive movement to crime is part of a misperception. Cape Town's first mass anti- drug march took place in April 1990 under the leadership of the SRCC. It also spawned similar community-based anti-drug initiatives in the Bo-Kaap, Wynberg, Surrey Estate and elsewhere on the Cape Flats.' PAGAD's emergence six years later was in all respects new and did not have any organic link with the earlier movements (Omar, 1996:49) with respect to individuals involved and strategy used. Neverless organizations such as Qibla and other Muslim organizations played a significant role in the establishment of PAGAD.
3.2 FIGHT AGAINST CRIME AS EXPLANATORY CONDITION
Although drug-peddling and drug-abuse, gang violence and high levels of violent crimes are found throughout South Africa, the situation in the Western Cape is unique in the sense that gangster subcultures have proliferated throughout the prison system to affect the entire region. The current situation in the Western Cape features an increase in drug abuse and peddling in suburbs inhabited mainly by so-called Coloureds, particularly in more middle class suburbs. There has also been an inter- gang violence among the working class. However, middle-class consumer markets and gangster activities are connected and overlap. Bigger drug-lords are also the gang bosses. Petty crimes are often the result of indebtedness or the result of having to procure substances (Jeppie, 1996:14-15).
Another prominent anti-crime initiative in the Western Cape is the Western Cape Anti-Crime Forum (WCACF). According to this structure PAGAD's intransigence could lead to further conflict in the province: "PAGAD should try to work with the authorities and other community-based initiatives. You can't fight crime by disregarding the law. You can only win the battle against crime by organising and developing communities (The Mail & Guardian, 6 December 1996). 9
According to Heyliger (the commander of the South African Police Service's Gang Investigation Unit), as quoted in the South African Survey 1996/97, there were at that time between 35 000 and 80 000 active gang members in the Cape, belonging to 137 gangs (Friedman, 1998:10). The following socio-economic factors, according to Chris Ferndale (founding chairperson of the Western Cape Anti-crime Forum) contributed to this situation: "A high population density with no social infrastructure, poor educational standards and facilities, and unemployment - which in certain areas is anything between 40 and 60%" (Van Zilla, 1998:12).
Seen in this light it can be concluded that former initiatives from the community in the Western Cape (as discussed in the previous section) led to the launching of PAGAD. Crime as discussed in the previous paragraph was one of the main causes of the launching of PAGAD, although the following causes contributed to popular justice, including PAGAD: A reaffirmation ofthe superiority of traditional values and their potential for establishing order within the community. A crisis of legality, due to an over-use of the law as a steering mechanism for the wider sosio-economic crisis. A crisis of management, expressed through the over-extension of law and through the overloading of courts. The crisis of overloading also fuelled the crisis of legitimation and effectiveness (Matthews, 1988:4-21). With regard to the situation on the Cape Flats it was established that both the police and courts received negative evaluation, especially among those people who had had personal contact with the police and courts (especially if it arose from being victimised by crime) (Africa, Christie, Mattes, Roefs & Taylor, 1998:2). The question of the legitimacy of formal legal procedures was asked in response to a perception in the community that the legal system was a class-based agency, serving the rich and oppressing the poor. The lack of equality before the law, the restricted access to legal forums and representation, and the predominance of an adversarial system of adjudication producing either 'winners' or 'losers' appeared unreasonable and inappropriate (Matthews, 1988:4-21). In a study done by IDASA on the communities perception of PAGAD it was established that people on the Cape Flats exhibited weak support for the rule of law and the extension of procedural rights to those accused of crimes (Africa, Christie, Mattes, Roefs & Taylor, 1998:2). Growing inadequacy of the legal process is experienced, based upon the continued growth of crime, the inconsistency of sentencing patterns, and the alienation of the 10
offender and the victim. Courts are also regarded as being too remote from the interests of the general public. The repeated claims concerning the 'independence of the judiciary' really mean an independence from public concerns and community accountability. Formal legality appears to be slow and cumbersome, built upon antiquated and incomprehensive procedures, in which law enforcement appears to be inconsistent and unable to provide substantive justice. ix) Diverse communities which include individuals from different religious backgrounds (especially Muslims, Christians and Jews) led to these communities preferring to be legally liable for their own legal systems. The return to their roots may be due to a breakdown in social relations and deteriorating socio-economic conditions (Matthews, 1988:4-21).
Johnston (1996:234) identified two main reasons for popular justice: The crime perpetrated in the community gives rise to a strong sense of vulnerability among members of the community. The local structure of the community encourages the involvement of the community, especially in socially and ethnically homogeneous communities that facilitate communication and trust between participants and which encourage identification with the victim.
The above-mentioned causes could be regarded as reasons for the establishment of PAGAD. In the case of the Western Cape homogeneous community exists with Muslims being the greater part of the population. The Muslim community is of opinion that they had always been left behind and that gave rise to the feeling that as nobody else would take care of them they would do it themselves.
3.3 IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF THE RISE OF PAGAD
The establishment of PAGAD was not the first indication in the Western Cape that the Muslim community was frustrated with the high levels of crime. According to Holtzhausen (interview, May 1998) intense frustration with drug peddling and gangsterism was already evident in 1995. During this period Neighbourhood Watches based in Surrey Estate and Athlone were engaged in separate acts of vigilantism against drug lords and gangsters, as well as engaging in a semi cooperative relationship with the South African Police Service. During a protest march in November 1995 by members of the Surrey 11
Estate Neighbourhood Watch against the availability of drugs in the community, two well-known drug dealers, Rashaad Staggie (since deceased) and Mark Abrahams were confronted and Staggie was wounded. After the incident, a meeting was held between the local police and community leaders, during which the Neighbourhood Watch members stated that Staggie and all other drug lords would continuously be targeted.
Out of this situation PAGAD was launched in November 1995 in the Western Cape. Although the situation (crime) was ideal for the launching of PAGAD, Muslims in the Cape were more inclined to engage in activism. The reason for this was their history as political prisoners and their working class origins. (Financial Mail, 16 August 1996:48). However, with the onset of a democratic government, the then existing structures campaigning for political and civil rights of communities (in the hegemonic battle against the apartheid regime) disappeared (Manjra, 1996:10). According to Moosa (19 August 1996): "The anti-apartheid struggle taught us to create 'alternative' structures of every hue to change conditions ourselves." Although the Coloured Muslim community in the Western Cape had always been involved in politics Ebrahim Moosa (interview, June 19, 1997) distinguished between two streams of "political Islam" in South Africa: The first is an exclusively Muslim struggle representing an uncompromising resistance to and confrontation with Western hegemony and its agents. The second represents a more moderate approach to the dangers of Western hegemony. In this vision Islamic values are to be shared with the community of nations. This approach can, however, only flourish within a multiparty political dispensation that recognizes, upholds and protects social and religious diversity. According to Moosa the latter version represents the dominant Islam faction in South Africa.
In order to substantiate the different ideological perspectives in PAGAD (Esack, interview, 27 March 1997), the following groupings formed part of PAGAD until the split of PAGAD in September 1996: Populist moderates that included Nadthmie Edries and Farouk Jaffer. Islamic political extremists symbolised by the involvement of Qibla. Populist militants with reference to the involvement of some G-Force members and Concerned citizens, in particular the larger Muslim community.
Sidique (interview, May 1998) was of the opinion that ideologically PAGAD's establishment in 1995 was directly linked to Qibla's inability to develop into a mass-based organization for the promotion of 12
militant Islamic extremism2. Mr Achmed Cassiem's (the Amir of Qibla and the chairperson ofthe Islamic Unity Convention - IUC) outspoken opposition to the ANC government contributed to Qibla's persistent denial of any ties with PAGAD. There are those in the Muslim community who believe that PAGAD is fully under the control of Qibla, although Qibla and the IUC have publicly distanced themselves from PAGAD (for example Achmat Sidique, director of the Muslim Judicial Council). "Whatever Cassiem's involvement with PAGAD, he remains - as the South African originator of a radical agenda based upon a revolutionary reading of the Qur'an - the movement's ideological father (Gevisser, 1996:13)". Qur'anic verses of struggle and slogans, first introduced by the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) from Egypt and Pakistan, were quoted at the end of PAGAD meetings. At the end of each PAGAD meeting the Qur'anic verse appealing for unity: "Hold on fast to the rope of God and be not divided" (3:103) was recited. Unity, togetherness and standing up for truth and justice was the drive behind PAGAD meetings. Although PAGAD has regarded itself as a broad inter-religious movement, it (PAGAD) has committed itself to the Shari'ah as a broad ethical code. The extent to which PAGAD was willing to commit itself to the Shari'ah was exposed by its ambivalence to commit itself to be the guardians of Islamic law in South Africa (Tayob, 1996:34-35).
Moosa asserted that while PAGAD's claimed mutation into a vanguard for an Iranian-style Muslim state in South Africa had been a victory for Islamic revolutionaries, their fundamentalism was bound to alienate the more tolerant Muslim majority in the country. "PAGAD has become a jackpot for Qibla, which for the first time in its history, has been able to grab an important historic moment to its advantage, launch a sustained challenge to the state and massively raise international consciousness about crime and violence in South Africa (The Citizen, 15 November 1996)."
In an article in The Sunday Tribune (Younghusband, 17 November 1996) the following suggestion was made: "PAGAD's original founders were used by Qibla only to establish community credibility. Qibla deliberately chose men with low political profiles and strong community ties to launch PAGAD. Once the organization was up and running under its anti-drugs and gangsters banner and was seen to be enjoying substantial community support, Qibla integrated itself into the movement, deposing PAGAD's pioneers."
2 Suspicions of alleged Qibla involvement in PAGAD were confirmed with a IUC initiated protest march in collaboration with the Surrey Estate and Athlone Neighbourhood Watches in March 1996 to the residence of Minister Dullah Omar. On 11 May 1996, members of the IUC, together with members of the Neighbourhood Watches marched under the auspices of PAGAD to Parliament in a protest march against the availability of drugs in the community. 13
Above-mentioned accusations against Qibla's alleged involvement in PAGAD contributed to a split in PAGAD's ranks. Academics in the Western Cape and high-ranking Muslims started asking questions. The mentioned split will be discussed in the next section. 14
3A DIVISION IN PAGAD: SEPTEMBER 1996
As mentioned in the previous discussion the following groupings formed part of PAGAD until the split of PAGAD in September 1996: Populist moderates that included Nadthmie Edries and Farouk Jaffer, the Islamic political extremists symbolised by the involvement of Qibla, populist militants (G-Force members) and concerned citizens, in particular the larger Muslim community.
During September 1996 PAGAD had been split by an apparent power struggle between Nadthmie Edries, Farouk Jaffer and Ali "Phantom" Parker (the populist moderates) and the Qibla faction. The division or split in PAGAD came about when PAGAD members began to question the idea that the fight against drugs deserved to be called a "jihad". According to Jaffer this faction (the original PAGAD) had another vision "through planning and constructive action such as the building of rehabilitation centres". PAGAD had planned to do something about the drug and crime problem in the Western Cape (Jaffer, presentation, 1997). According to Sidique (interview, May 1998) involved in negotiations between these two factions "Parker, Jaffer and Edries came out strongly against elements within PAGAD who they said were not interested in dealing with the authorities in the fight against crime. They claimed Qibla had an anti-state rather than an anti-crime agenda." The final break between these two factions came when Ali "Phantom" Parker claimed on 20 September 1996 that Qibla was in control of PAGAD. In this statement Parker made the following allegations against PAGAD: Qibla members within PAGAD were trying to assassinate him. Qibla was responsible for hijacking the PAGAD movement as they had a "hidden agenda". Qibla members blackmailed and extorted businessmen in order to raise funds. Qibla was trying to overthrow the government. Qibla members encouraged people to burn down mosques in order to "gain momentum for the cause".
These statements led to the suspension of Mr All "Phantom" Parker, Mr Farouk Jaffer and Mr Nadthmie Ederies from PAGAD, and the so-called split in September 1996. Although the full extent of the involvement of Qibla in PAGAD's formation may never be known, it appears certain that Qibla is a factor within the ranks of PAGAD.
After the split in September 1996 the following statements emerged from mass meetings. Before the split in PAGAD in September 1996 Achmad Cassiem and Qibla members almost never made public statements": Since September 1996 (after the split in PAGAD) Achmad Cassiem began to attend and 15 participate in PAGAD mass meetings. The reason for this involvement could be firstly as him being a member of the community in the Western Cape, however it could also indicate that Qibla was involved in PAGAD structures. During a meeting commemorating the death of Imam Haroon on September 27, 1996, Achmad Cassiem characterised South Africa as a country where "... streets are filled with prostitutes, murderers walk free and crime is on the rampage" and added that as a solution "We need to see that South Africa becomes an Islamic state." Similar statements were made by Abdurrazaq Ebrahim at the Al Quds Mosque (12 December 1996), when he said that the revolution was about to start and that PAGAD would liberate the oppressed of the country. Mr Achmad Cassiem appealed to PAGAD supporters at a rally held at Vygieskraal stadium, Athlone (12 January 1997), to support the "struggles" of their "brothers" in the rest of Africa, and in particular Algeria. He referred to the campaign of urban terrorism of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) with the objective to establish an Islamic state in Algeria. During a PAGAD march to Parliament, Abdurrazaq Ebrahim stated (Video material, 18 January 1997) that "... the government poses a definite danger to our community and the police are nothing but legal gangsters in uniform who are protecting the rights of illegal merchants in Parliament." Abdurrazaq Ebrahim equated the present circumstances in which PAGAD finds itself in relation to the government as "... the same scenario found in Bosnia, Algeria, Egypt, and all over the world where governments are discriminating against Muslims."
After careful evaluation of statements made in public (without referring to all) the conclusion is made that the character of PAGAD's political rhetoric differs from pre-September 1996 political rhetoric, which was essentially reformist in its objectives of forcing the State to improve its ability to deal with crime. In the post-September 1996 period the emphasis shifted from the State's inability to deal with crime to the necessity of establishing of an Islamic state by way of revolution. PAGAD still attracts supporters for mainly two reasons: PAGAD's ability to focus international attention on the escalating crime situation in South Africa, which in turn has highlighted the ANC government's inability to deal with the situation. South African Muslims are among the most religious in the world, and most are prepared to die for their beliefs and faith. Although moderate and progressive Muslim organisations such as the Call of Islam and the Muslim Youth Movement still play an important role in the wider Muslim community in South Africa, their influence appears to be on the wane due to a variety of reasons, the most important of which being a lick of funding and the inability to develop a theology of reconstruction after liberation (Moosa, interview, 19 June 1997). 16 305 INTRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QIBLA AND PAGAD
The aim of this brief discussion is to provide an introduction to the strategy and objectives of Qibla, based on the little that is known about this organization. The latter part of the discussion will focus on Qibla's links with PAGAD as perceived by first, members of the Muslim community (MJC) and second, members of the South African Police Service involved in investigating alleged PAGAD-related crimes.
In September 1996 tension between the key groups of which PAGAD constitute developed into factional polarisation which separated the Qibla Islamic political extremists from the moderate and militant populists. This polarisation was of such nature that the moderate and militant populist groups issued public statements to the effect that PAGAD had severed all ties with Qibla. The statements made by the PAGAD leadership, on one day, that they were "willing to die" for the "One Solution, Islamic Revolution" and on the following, that they were "sensible, ordinary people who are fed up with drugs" who dismiss the idea of an Islamic state as "laughable" were and are misleading. According to Esack (1996:26) "... this reflects the tension between a leadership position being exercised from a safe distance, and the ostensible one which is exposed to the public and, incidentally, one which has not had a historical or ideological relationship with Qibla." Although the PAGAD leader is called "Amir" (Arabic for leader) the followers of PAGAD do not display the ideological coherence which is characteristic of Qibla. On the other hand, PAGAD's core leadership are individuals who have a long-standing commitment to Qibla and who play an active role in the Islamic Unity Convention (IUC) (Esack, 1996:26), a known Qibla initiative.
3.5.1 STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES OF QIBLA
Qibla emerged in South Africa in the 1980s as a militant pro-Shi'ite fundamentalist force, inspired by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Qibla was created with the specific intention to promote the Iranian revolution and to propagate, defend and implement the strict Islamic principles associated with the revolution among Muslims in South Africa and to transform South Africa into a fully fledged Muslim 17 state (theocracy), under the slogan "One Solution, Islamic Revolution" (Jeenah, 1996:9). 3 The vast majority of Qibla supporters are attracted to the model of a single Khomeini-like charismatic figure, embodied by Mr Achmed Cassiem (the leader of both Qibla and the Islamic Unity Convention), who is being referred to as "Imam". The "misuse" of religious titles is a known strategy used by fundamentalist and revolutionary thinkers within Islam to legitimate one's own or the organization's actions within theocratic terms (Esack, 1996:9).
During the 1980s Qibla simultaneously supported Black Consciousness, in particular Pan Africanism, and the notion of an Islamic revolution for South Africa. Qibla's political philosophy reflects a complex fusion of militant Pan-Islamist and radical Pan-Africanist socialism bound together by the non-racial principles of Islam and the belief that the future of Africa lies in a mixture of Pan-Islamic-Pan-African unity (Gevisser, 1996:13). Qibla had a very good relationship with the PAC. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Western Cape strengthened the PAC politically. The connection between Qibla and the PAC was based on the fact that Qibla adherents believed that during the 1960s, a group of PAC members in Guguletu and Langa converted to Islam through the influence of Imam Haroun (a Muslim priest killed by the security forces in 1969 and martyr). Based upon this, an agreement was reached in November 1985, binding Qibla to support PAC insurgents inside South Africa in return for PAC- sponsored military training (Lodge & Nasson, 1991:197). The PAC has ties with extremist leaders and groups in Libya who were instrumental in arranging military training for Qibla members in several Islamic countries, including Libya, Iran and the Sudan (Lodge & Nasson, 1991:196-197).
Since the 1990s Qibla has continued to have close relations with militants in the PAC and AZAPO. In order to broaden its support base under local Muslims Qibla was alleged to have initiated three projects: i) Qibla played a key role in the formation of the Western Cape based Islamic Unity Convention (IUC), which was formed in March 1994 to serve as an umbrella organization for more than 250 Muslim organizations. Since Mr Achmad Cassiem had been elected chairman ofthe IUC in 1995 the IUC has become, for all intents and purposes, a front for Qibla (Sidique, interview May 1998 & Moosa, interview, June 1997), or "the umbrella Islamic Unity Convention, Qibla's parent body" (The Mercury, 18 March 1996:1). According to the intelligence community in a briefing
3 Cassiem steered Qibla towards the adoption of international Islamism (Tayob, 1996:33). According to Mr Achmad Cassiem no secular state can be legitimate, thus according to his convictions the current government is as illegitimate as the past one Gevisser (1996:13).
4 The phenomenon of the charismatic and supreme leader is synonymous to Shi'ah Islam (Esack, 1996:25). 18
to Cabinet (15 August 1996) the IUC had Qibla members in key positions including the national chainnan, treasurer and the assistant public relations officer (Qwelane, 1997:48). The role of the IUC is to promote Islamic unity in South Africa as a prerequisite for an Islamic revolution and the establishment of a full-blown revolutionary Islamic republic: "... he (Achmad Cassiem) has spent his adult life advocating two objectives: unity in the ummah (community) around his vision of non-negotiable justice, and - consequently - the rise of the "oppressed masses" of South Africa into Islamic revolution" (Gevisser, 1996:13). Qibla has been the driving force behind the formation and militancy of PAGAD. It is being argued that Qibla's militant engagement with less ideological allies in the IUC, and the fact that its radio station, Radio 786 is compelled to meet IBA guidelines, have led to some of its more militant elements to have been moving sideways without formally breaking away - those elements form the core of PAGAD (Financial Mail, 16 August 1996:48). The Islamic Unity Convention (IUC) is in control of Radio 786, and through this medium Qibla is popularising its message and mobilizes Muslims for its causes. Qibla's militant elements form the core of PAGAD. Qibla, PAGAD and Radio 786 remain under the ideological guidance of Achmad Cassiem (Esack, 1996:10).
The influence of Qibla in PAGAD was confirmed when PAGAD formed an alliance with the PAC in 1996. Allegedly, the reason for this alliance could be found in the relationship Qibla had had with APLA and the PAC in the period of the armed struggle against apartheid. "Qibla has strong relations with PAGAD, among them the fact that the two bodies share a number of their top leaders (Briimmer, 1997:8).
Esack (interview, March 1997) made the statement that Qibla members were supporters of an Islamic Jihad, and would capitalise on issues such as the high crime rate in the country, and the government's apparent inability to deal with it, as legitimate reasons for its militant actions in support of Islamic laws and values. As mentioned earlier, Qibla looked to Iran for spiritual guidance. Based upon this, Qibla's revolutionary model presupposed that a future Islamic state in South Africa could only come about through an Islamic Jihad, justified by the following convictions, according to Mr Achmad Cassiem: "The revolutionary spirit of Islam demands that we fight until the tyranny is wiped from the face of the earth" This is substantiated by the Quran 27:39: "To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because They are wronged; - and verily, Allah is Most Powerful for their aid (Cassiem, 1992:65)." "Islam minus Jihad means Islam minus Islam. Jihad means to enjoin what is good and 19
to forbid what is wrong with all the power at our disposal. Thus, Jihad is standing up with all the power at our disposal against all forms of oppression, exploitation and injustice. It is an effort, an exertion, a striving for truth and justice. Jihad is an effort, an exertion to the utmost, a striving for truth and justice. The purpose of Jihad is to stop, remove, destroy and eradicate injustice ... Jihad is therefore ceaseless, continuous, super- conscious and effective struggle for justice (Cassiem, 1992:66-67)." Under the heading: "Every Jihad must culminate in Revolution" the following is said: "Any social order which does not rotate on the axis of justice is not fit for survival. The minimum demand of the oppressed under the guidance of Islamic ideology is for a just social order. Anything less than a just social order is betrayal, is treason to the oppressed people and their glorious martyrs. The essence of Jihad (revolutionary struggle) is sacrifice. And this is necessary because a revolutionary is not merely an exponent of revolutionary rhetoric but one who attacks what is oppressive and exploitative in order to destroy and eradicate it. No revolutionary worthy of the name is therefore threatened and blackmailed - not even with death." This statement is substantiated from the Quran 2:193 : "And fight them on until there is no more tumult and oppression. And there prevail justice and faith in Allah; but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression (Cassiem, 1992:68)."
Based upon this ideological framework of Qibla, in particular that of Mr Achmad Cassiem (the leader or Amir of Qibla and the IUC) the post-September 1996 period has seen the influence of Qibla in the political rhetoric of PAGAD. A reason for this, according to Holtzhausen (interview, May 1998) is that Qibla has systematically (since the formation of PAGAD) begun to get involved in the organization to such an extent that most of PAGAD's top structure are members of Qibla. These allegations were substantiated by Sidique (interview, May 1998). The following Qibla teachings and slogans form the underlying principle of PAGAD's rhetoric (as used by the more militant faction within PAGAD before the split in September 1996: Qibla slogan: "One solution, Islamic revolution"; Achmad Cassiem: "The revolutionary spirit of Islam demands that we fight until the tyranny is wiped from the face of the earth" and "a revolutionary is not merely an exponent of revolutionary rhetoric, but one who attacks what is oppressive and exploitative in order to destroy and eradicate it." Qibla teaching: "Allah is our goal, and the prophets our example, the Quran our constitution and jihad our means, and dying in the path of Allah is the highest of our 20
aspirations."'
In conclusion to this discussion the involvement of Qibla in PAGAD could be summarised in the following statements:
According to Holtzhausen, Qibla forms the basis of PAGAD and that is reflected in their military type of background (interview, May 1998). According to Sheikh Achmat Sidique (leader of the MJC), the leadership of PAGAD, those who make the real decisions are all members of Qibla or, as they would say, the IUC. The reason why Qibla is using PAGAD and other organizations is to build support by involving its members. When one looks at the leadership hierarchy of PAGAD and other organizations (for example the IUC) the same individuals always feature as being, Qibla supporters. The reason for this is that Qibla developed a name for themselves over the years: "They have been labelled as a militant group. But their strategies and methodology could be found in that of PAGAD"(interview, May 1998).
Although the above-mentioned statements describe the sentiment ofthe South African Police Service and the Muslim Judicial Council, the direct involvement of Qibla in PAGAD structures and strategy is not clear. This issue should be regarded as an open question. What it all comes down to is the opinion of one side (the South African Police Service, the MJC and former PAGAD members) against the word of PAGAD members who deny direct involvement of Qibla in PAGAD.
5 Qibla's slogan compares well with that of Hamas Covenant. Sections 8 and 9 of the Covenant of Hamas state clearly that "death for the sake of Allah" is its credo, Jihad its path and the Qu'aran its constitution (Coetzer, 1996:17). 21 4. OBJECTIVES OF PAGAD
The reasons for popular justice was discussed in the previous section. Although PAGAD regards itself as unique there are clear resemblances: The high crime rate, moral decline and inadequate legal system PAGAD's objectives will be discussed in detail in the following section with reference to PAGAD documentation and statements made by senior members of PAGAD.
The objectives of PAGAD can be best described in their own words, as contained in the memorandum delivered to the Minister of Correctional Services on 28 September 1996 (Annexure A): "One ofthe most important functions of government is to see to the safety of all its citizens and non-citizens. Unfortunately, this is not the case.... We, The People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, have embarked on this mass demonstration to: Inform the people of South Africa of the escalation of drug addiction and gangsterism. Make the people of South Africa aware that something is being done about the cancerous growths of drug addicts and gangsterism. Alert the government that urgent and drastic steps must be taken to curb, stop and eradicate the upsurge of gangsterism and drug addiction. Galvanize the entire population to be prepared to take alternative steps if the situation does not improve in the near future. Inform the entire population of the extent of corruption within the Police and Judiciary."
Further to the objectives as put to Parliament, the following aims and objectives had been approved by the national body during March 1997: "To propagate the eradication of drugs and gangsterism from society, in accordance with the divine will of The Creator." "To co-operate with and to co-ordinate the activities of people and people's organizations, having similar aims and objectives." "To make every effort to invite/motivate/activate and to include those people and peoples' organisations who are not yet part of PAGAD." "To raise funds for the afore going aims." "PAGAD is a non-profit-making movement. Its assets, income and donations shall be used to carry out the aims and objectives of PAGAD" (PAGAD Documentation, 1998:1). 22
PAGAD's primarily overt function is that of an anti-crime structure (vigilantism). PAGAD concentrates on the following four factors: i) Initiatives to combat crime. PAGAD argues that its actions are a natural response of citizens feeling the brunt ofthe failure ofthe state to protect them, a fundamental right in any society and upon which a state's legitimacy depends. According to Father Clohessy (1996:78), one of the founding members of PAGAD, their frustration was based on the fact that the community realised that "a non-confrontational approach to this particular problem (activities of gangsters and drug dealers) is no longer a viable route - and that those who are empowered by law to confront these social evils are simply not able to function in a way that bears real fruit. There is no doubt, therefore, that PAGAD arose with an agenda that included both confrontation and force. In itself, force can be classified as extreme pressure, and is not necessarily violent." Initially PAGAD had a two-pronged strategy: Confrontation directed against government incompetency - if the government is not fulfilling the mandate of the people and is unwilling to be challenged or criticised, then people do have a moral right and obligation to defend their own lives and their property (Allie, interview, May 1998). Confrontation against those who perpetrate crime. PAGAD leadership realised that as pressure on the government was insufficient, the situation in the Western Cape should have been dealt with by themselves. A step in this direction was taken when PAGAD began to visit drug dealers and gang lords. During these visits, PAGAD members issued ultimatums to drug dealers and gangsters to stop their illegal activities or to face the consequences. In interviews with PAGAD members (Allie & Roberts, interview, May 1998), these individuals were not prepared to give a direct answer on which way the community would deal with drug dealers and gangsters if they did not comply to this ultimatum. The death of Rashaad Staggie could be described as one of the first public manifestations of PAGAD's strategy in issuing ultimatums. In this incident actions turned violent. Although PAGAD's strategy will be discussed in the following section, Spannenberg (interview, May 1998) revealed that in most cases drug dealers and gangsters were attacked by small groups between 22:00 and 03:00 after they had been visited by PAGAD. During those visits, these alleged drug dealers and gangsters received ultimatums from PAGAD to stop their activities or to face the consequences. The latter manifested in violent attacks in the form of shooting incidents, pipe bomb- petrol bomb, and hand grenade attacks. 23
Dissatisfaction with the way government deals with crime, with special reference to gangsterism and drug trafficking. According to Mr Aslam Toefy (PAGAD's Commander-in- Chief), PAGAD is a pressure group and will continue to put pressure on the authorities to rid the country and its people of gangsters and drugs. On the protest march to the Cape Town International Airport on Sunday 15 December 1996 (which turned out to be the bloodiest since the killing of Rashaad Staggie) Toefy said it had been organised because PAGAD wanted to put pressure on the authorities to step up security checks to prevent drugs from entering the country: "PAGAD is a pressure group and will continue to apply pressure to rid this country of gangsters and drugs." He also accused the authorities of being swift in their action against PAGAD, but at the same time doing very little to arrest the drug lords and to deal with the high crime rate in the country. PAGAD also alleged that elements within the police may be accomplices in crime and corruption (Cape Town International Airport, video, December 1996).
Issuing of ultimatums and mobilization. Initial phase : ultimatum (peaceful protest) PAGAD was launched in the early part of 1996 as an initiative of Muslim groupings to address the crime situation in the Western Cape. According to Farouk Jaffer, PAGAD's chief coordinator, PAGAD had its origins in October 1995. PAGAD came into the public eye early in 1996 when it petitioned the government and the police to take action against gangs that had targeted Muslim youths for drug sales (Jaffer, presentation, February 1997). PAGAD's actions also comprise pro- active offensive actions, including the attack on the residence of the Minister of Justice, Mr Dullar Omar in March 1996. A group of armed Muslims stormed the Minister's official residence in Cape Town (on 25 June 1996). The group subsequently delivered an ultimatum to the Minister in which he was given 60 days to deal with the deteriorating crime situation in the country, or face the consequences.
The programmes initiated by PAGAD revolved around directional campaigns in the form of "ultimatum marches". PAGAD would hold a meeting to discuss the problems of gangs and drugs. At this general meeting community members were called upon to identify known gang leaders in the community. The group would then organize a march against one of those gang leaders to deliver a 24-hour ultimatum.' The ultimatum demanded that all illegal activities by that particular person were to stop or that he/she would face the consequences. According to
6 During these ultimatum marches PAGAD members gave drug dealers and gangsters the following ultimatum: 'We are giving you 24 hours to clean up your act, or we will come back for you." Posters emphasise the seriousness of their threats: "al the Merchent. One bullet, one pedlar ." (Video material, South African Police Service Video Unit). 24
official figures (the police in the Western Cape), PAGAD had conducted 54 protest marches between August 4 and December 26, 1996. Later on, fewer protest marches were held and PAGAD's actions (that of a smaller group or groups within PAGAD) became more violent (Spannenberg, interview, May 1998). iv) According to PAGAD they have theocentric justification for actions against drug lords and gangsters. With the death of Rashaad Staggie, members of PAGAD were quoted as saying that they were prepared to die for their cause - to rid the Cape of its notorious gangsters. The name of Allah was often invoked. They were quoted as saying that they were in the throes of a jihad. According to Mohammed Ali Parker (after the death of Staggie on possible retaliatory attacks): "It is going into a jihad now. All the signs are there. Each soldier of Allah is equal to 5 000 gangsters. We are clean, God-loving people, and we are not afraid to die" (Video material, South African Police Serive Video Unit). For example, Aslam Toefy made the statement that Allah had told them to fight this war against drugs. Although Muslims make up 1,3% of the South African population, they respond with the Qur'anic text "How many a time had a small force not vanquished a large force with the permission of God, and "there will arise amongst you a band of people who will stand for what is right and oppose what is wrong ...."
According to PAGAD leaders, criminals and drug lords cannot fight the masses. Thus, PAGAD will continue to mobilize the communities against drug lords and gangsters (Allie, interview, May 1998). According to Mr Aslam Toefy PAGAD is planning to become a national pressure group, and to co- ordinate its actions on a national basis, by using its regional headquarters in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth and Kimberley. Cape Town would be the "Headquarters". On Wednesdays and Saturdays these structures would march to the residences of alleged drug-dealers (Roberts, interview, May 1998) 7.
The chief commander of PAGAD, Mr Aslam Toefy, announced that PAGAD would adopt a new approach that would not include conflict with the authorities, without abandoning its crusade (Mgxashe, 1996). Toefy said that in future the bearing of firearms by members would not be allowed, and the use of disguiks would be discouraged as it opened the way for agents provocateur and "bad elements" to infiltrate the organization's ranks. "While it (PAGAD) would remain a pressure group, PAGAD wished to change the public's perception that it was a confrontational rabble rouser." Toefy insisted that marches to the iftiuses of drug lords (overt marches) would continue, but that they would remain within the ambit
7 Also see Eybers (10 December 1996). 25 of the law and only with the presence of the police who would be required to provide safety and security to PAGAD members (Ensor, 1996).
In an interview with two PAGAD representatives, Allie and Roberts (Interview, May 1998), Dr Allie gave the following answer, when asked whether PAGAD was a vigilante or pressure group: "PAGAD could be regarded as both a pressure group (putting pressure on the government and the police during marches and meetings to apply to its {PAGAD's} demands) and as a vigilante group. My understanding of a vigilante group, is a person who reacts to a situation, and whose legitimate right it is to react to a situation because nobody else wants to. The latter is based upon the fact that PAGAD members as individuals and members of a structure (PAGAD) stand up to crime and drugs (wrongs) within the community. I will use my legitimate right to defend myself and by whatever means possible, whatever it takes."
Allie (interview, May 1998), summarised the objectives of PAGAD in the following statement: "We still need to mobilize all the people of South Africa to stand up and address crime in South Africa. We want to get rid of crime, totally." 26 5. PAGAD's STRUCTURE
In interviews with the South African Police Service it came to light that the police had the opinion that PAGAD was a force to be reckoned with solely because of their acts of violence. However, in order to see the bigger picture, one has to look at PAGAD's structures to find each structure's function.
The nature of this study is primarily to differentiate between PAGAD's violent acts and the governments response to it. It has to be stated that PAGAD's many deeds of upliftment in the community tend to be ignored, especially in the media, probably due to the lack of sensation. It is therefore necessary to have a closer look at the different structures in order to determine each one's role in the planning of acts of violence. In this regard, the reader will find the study focussing more on the Department of Security and Operations.
This discussion will be divided into two parts: The first will discuss PAGAD's National Structure. In response to PAGAD in the Western Cape other similar structures were formed, and these structures combined their forces under the direction of PAGAD in the Western Cape. The second part will discuss the structure in the Western Cape (the focus of this study) and each substructures task as a framework for the way other PAGAD structures should function nationally. All the information used in this discussion was provided by PAGAD Western Cape and in particular, by National Secretary, Ms Abidah Roberts. Documentation and interviews were used in this regard.
5.1 PAGAD NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE/PAGAD UNITED
During the period of this study, PAGAD's activities in the Western Cape contributed to the establishment of similar structures in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Northern Cape and Gauteng. Although it is impossible to discuss these structures in depth, it is important to refer to the formation of PAGAD United on 9 December 1996 and the First National PAGAD Conference in Cape Town from 21 to 23 March 1997. The following brief discussion will indicate that PAGAD in the Western Cape did not only contribute to the formation of anti-crime structures in other provinces, but that it was also acting as an ideological guide-post to these structures.
Anti-drug groups from Cape Town (PAGAD), Port Elizabeth (PADAV), Johannesburg (PACAD) and Kimberley (PAGAD) united to form a national anti-crime body known as PAGAD United during a 27 conference in Port Elizabeth on 9 December 1996, under the chairmanship of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim as the national co-ordinator. Aslam Toefy was elected as the national chief commander.' During the conference it was decided that PAGAD's executive would comprise of a representative from each of the regions. The most important feature of the conference was to set up a command substructure which would report to the executive (The PAGAD National Executive, 1998) 9.
This merger served various objectives in a process to more effectively deal with the eradication of drugs and gangsterism. The national executive also wanted to be able to negotiate at national level rather than at a regional level. In effect it would imply that PAGAD could co-ordinate their activities, especially when negotiating with the South African Police Service and the government. Another motivation for the merger was to unite in order to be able to effectively counter any possible attacks by the drug lords and gangsters (Allie & Roberts, interview, May 1998). According to Spannenberg and Holtzhausen (interviews, May 1998) the national executive not only co-ordinated their activities, this structure was also used to raise funds on a national level and also to counter threats from drug dealers and gangsters. Should PADAV in Port Elizabeth for example, came under attack from the drug lords, the national body would organise assistance from other regions to counter the threat.
The national office of PAGAD United is situated in Cape Town. Although PAGAD has a strong national identity, most of its supporters are based in Cape Town, as most of the National Executive are originally from PAGAD Western Cape (PAGAD History, 1998:2). PAGAD Western Cape furthermore, is more structured than elsewhere. Each regional structure has an executive member serving on the national body. Each regional structure will maintain its autonomy to carry on with its anti-drug and crime operations as before (Abidah Roberts, interview, May 1998).
4lwsee The Citizen (10 December1996).
9 Also see The Citizen (9 December 1996).
28 Figure 1: PAGAD National Structure
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE
National Chief Co-ordinator (Abdus Selman Modem) National Secnobtry (Abideh Roberts) Representatives from each region
amnions (5) Boland (5) North VVerst (5)
Western Cope (B) Natal (B)
National Chief of Seetativ (Sans nbeder) National Treanor. (Unseen Bemoan
The different PAGAD provincial structures held a National Conference on 7 and 8 December 1996. This conference was hosted by "People Against Drugs and Violence" (PADAV), and attended by "People Against Crime and Drugs" (PACAD) from Pretoria, PAGAD from Gauteng and PAGAD from Cape Town. During this conference the following two resolutions were passed: The use of the name PAGAD by all the provincial bodies will be maintained; and A PAGAD national body will be formed.
The second important meeting between the different anti-crime structures (under PAGAD United) was the First National PAGAD Conference in Cape Town from 21 to 23 March 1997. PAGAD Western Cape dominated the other structures. According to Esack (interview, March 1997) what was significant about this meeting was that questions about the orientation and direction of the organization were not subject to any discussion. All the covert dimensions to their work were not discussed on the open forum at all. While Aslam Toefy was the person to field the difficult questions, Abdus Salaam Ebrahim was the key figure who really was the decision-maker. This view was confinned by both the Commander of the Western Cape Command, General Chris van Zyl and Colonel Sparky Calmeyer stating that Aslam Toefy was only the leader in name, whilst the mastermind was Abdus Salaam Ebrahim (Die Burger, 1997:15). 29
Abdus Salaam Ebrahim defined the word "gangster" during this conference (PAGAD National Conference, 21-23 March 1997) as "a person or persons who terrorise, brutalise, victimise, rape, rob and murder, oppress or do any form of injustice to humanity, communities, societies or individuals. A person who commits any crime, may it be shoplifting, car hijacking, fraud, all these are included in PAGAD's campaign against gangsterism and drugs. Any policeman, lawyer, religious person, an employed or unemployed person who assists criminals committing these crimes, are gangsters" (Ebrahim, 1997).
During the above National Conference PAGAD adopted an Interim Constitution (see Annexure B). The Interim Constitution can be divided into two parts. The first deals with the National Executive, its structure, functions, powers and authority and administration. The second part deals with the Regional Executive (who will hold office for two years) and the Regional Sub-Committees and the duties and functions of both the Regional and Sub-Regional Executive.
5.2 PAGAD WESTERN CAPE STRUCTURE
Although PAGAD has a national structure, the structure in the Western Cape is used as a model for other regions in terms of its objectives and structure. In the next discussion the focus will be on the structure of PAGAD in the Western Cape and on each of the functions of the different departments. The aim of this section is to indicate that PAGAD has a broader structure than is generally realized through media articles. Although PAGAD is a well-structured organization, the question can be asked: Why does the Working Committee not have control over its members who are involved in acts of violence and crime? This section will also provide a basic framework for PAGAD's violent modus operandi. Within the discussion on the violent modus operandi of PAGAD the focus will almost be exclusively on the Security Department and its cell structures in particular. It is important to note that PAGAD's Working Committee and other substructures represent PAGAD's overt function, while PAGAD's covert activities are represented by the Security Council. Should this be a fact, this developments indicates a dual strategy with the same objectives (to place fear back in the hands of drug dealers and gangsters through violence), although PAGAD members are not prepared to admit to it. The main source of the information in this section was PAGAD documentation, as provided by Abidah Roberts.
Ott Value this researcher comments that with the establishment of PAGAD, PAGAD essentially was an initiative by a core group of militant anti crime activists, including those within existing 30
Neighbourhood Watches, who sought to organise those sections within the Western Cape Peninsula who were victims of criminality associated with gangsterism and drugs, under the banner of a popular anti crime cause. PAGAD was not structured as a formal organisation with a specific constitutional code of conduct or an organisational bureaucratic set of procedures. Consequently, PAGAD was neither organised around nor directed by a central ideological perspective or agenda, but sought to serve as a broad anti crime popular front under whose banner groups, organisations and concerned citizens of diverse ideological, political and religious persuasions and interests expressed their active for an anti crime cause. According to Holtzhausen (interview, May 1998) it was only in June-July 1996 that the PAGAD campaign gained an organisational structure and began to promote itself as PAGAD, with Farouk Jaffer as coordinator, Nathmie Edries as organiser and Ali "Phantom" Parker as head of operations. While the support base for PAGAD was initially located in Athlone, its support base also began to include other areas in the Peninsula such as the Bo-Kaap, Heideveld, Retreat, Mitchell's Plain, Landsdowne, Salt River, Kensington, Pelican Park and Manenberg. Although not as successful as in previously mentioned areas, PAGAD began to mobilise support in other areas such as the Strand, Clanwilliam, Worcester, George, Paarl and Beaufort West.
After the split in PAGAD (as discussed in section 3.4) PAGAD began to act more structured. PAGAD Western Cape consists of a Working Committee and nine substructures. The Working Committee is responsible for the entire campaign against gangsterism and drugs. The PAGAD Working Committee consists of approximately 30 members who include a chief co-ordinator, a chief commander and a chief of security, the co-ordinators and secretaries of the various subcommittees. According to a pamphlet on "PAGAD Regional Structures: Western Cape", the responsibility of the Working Committee is: "... to see to it that all substructures fulfil their duties to the community. At the same time they are collectively responsible to the people. Similarly they are directly answerable to the people" (PAGAD Regional Structures: Western Cape, 1997:1)." Each of the substructures is responsible for its own field, but is directly answerable to the Working Committee: "All decisions which affect policy or PAGAD strategy must be put before the Working Committee to be scrutinized and subsequently authorized or not" (PAGAD Regional Structures: Western Cape, 1997:1). (PAGAD News Bulletin, 1997:4). 31
Figure 2: PAGAD Western Cape Structure
PAGAD NATIONAL EXECUTIVE
SECURITY PAGAD WESTERN CAPE CENTRAL CO COUNCIL & CELL ORDINATION STRUCTURES Abdus Salaam Ebrahim SECURITY & OPERATIONS Salie Abadan SECRETARIAT LEGAL DEPARTMENT SOCIAL WELFARE Goolam Allie Cassiem Parker Zograt Kriel FINANCE Igsaan Samaai Womans Department EDUCATION Madelief Botha Maradiel Williams
MEDIA Farouk Salie MEDICAL UNIT Dr. Adiel Kamodien NETWORK & DISTRIBUTION Moain Acbmad
This organisational presentation has been constructed using the information provided by PAGAD, in interviews with Allie and Roberts (interviews, May 1998) and documents as provided by Abidah Roberts.
The eight PAGAD substructures are (PAGAD News Bulletin, 1997:4):
SECRETARIAT The secretariat primarily has an administrative function, dealing with the co-ordination of all the activities within PAGAD, including organising meetings, marches, mass rallies, prayer-meetings, conventions, advertising as well as community notices. It is also responsible for recording all infonnation entering or leaving the PAGAD movement (PAGAD News Bulletin, 1997:4).
LEGAL DEPARTMENT The legal team deals with all the legal matters which involve PAGAD and its members. In 1997, PAGAD's legal expenses amounted to about R500 000. According to Abidah Roberts stringent bail conditions and harassment, in the form of raids conducted by the South African Police Service, 32 contributed to high legal fees (Schroeder, 1998:10).
SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENT The Social Welfare subcommittee deals with educating the community about drugs and gangsterism at preschool, primary and secondary school levels, as well as in factories. It also provides recreation in the form of prayer meetings, outings and sporting events. It provides for the rehabilitation of drug addicts and support to their families. A support group exists which provides social support to PAGAD members injured or maimed during PAGAD activities. Other departments associated with the Social Welfare Department include the Women department and a desk responsible for the youth.
FINANCE DEPARTMENT This subcommittee is responsible for controlling the finances of the PAGAD movement, which includes investments, as well as major fundraising projects. Within the Finance Department the Fundraising department is responsible for collecting money at PAGAD meetings and mass rallies. It also organises minor fundraising activities.
SECURITY DEPARTMENT This department is in control of the G-Force (Allie, interview May 1998). The G-Force consists of approximately 200 to 300 people. "The G-Force was larger in the past. As things got tougher only the people with the 'heart' were left, who are responsible for protecting of PAGAD members and the community in general as well as places of worship. The safety of PAGAD members during mass rallies, marches and meetings is another function. Within the Security Department "cell" structures operate, that consist of security members. Every cell has a commander, who is accountable to the Security Department. Although no specific numbers are available, a cell consists of approximately 50 members and collectively amount to approximately 600 active security members. "Thus PAGAD is effectively protected and can mobilise at least ± 500 men within minutes, this is for active participation" (PAGAD Regional Structures: Western Cape, 1997:2). The cell structures are responsible for protecting the specific area its members reside in. Within the Security Department there is a "Special Unit" consisting of the most disciplined and well-trained members of every cell. According to Allie (interview, May 1998) "cells are groups of people living in the same area. Each area has its own structure and coordinator."
According to Jeremy Vearey (commander of police intelligence co-ordination in the Western Cape) in Brummer (1997:8): "PAGAD has in recent months formed its 'paramilitary wing' also called the G-Force, 33
into small cell structures at neighbourhood level, which have the capacity to operate undetected and independently from central organisational control. Some cell members are said to be veterans of armed Islamic campaigns in hot spots like Bosnia, Lebanon and Afghanistan. PAGAD seems not to be in any position to control the actions of its members. There is very little centralised control ... and the energy unleashed by the PAGAD cause could reproduce itself in a pattern of militancy with a life of its own independent of direct structural ties to PAGAD."
The above statement was confirmed by senior PAGAD members over a period of time. For example, during a PAGAD meeting (12 August 1996, Gatesville mosque) Mr Ali Parker stated that PAGAD would, in future, operate in cells and that every cell will have a commander who will be responsible for so-called "operations" against gangsters and drug dealers. This is in line with a statement made by Mr Abdurrazak Ebrahim (PAGAD meeting, 27 August 1996) that PAGAD members should establish street committees with their neighbours and create small cell structures to defend themselves against attacks by gangsters. Abdurrazak Ebrahim made a statement during a meeting at the Gatesville mosque (7 September 1996, Gatesville mosque) that the G-Force would be undergoing a complete restructuring.
Although investigations are still being conducted, the South African Police Service, through statements made by Spannenberg and Holtzhausen (interviews, May 1998), is of opinion that the Security Department by means of its cell structures is responsible for violent attacks on alleged drug dealers and gangsters. The following discussion on the Security Department's functions and responsibilities were compiled on information as provided by Spannenberg and Holtzhausen (interviews, May 1998). 0 Staff and Operations: Co-ordinating and overseeing the overall duties and functions of all security staff, including their roles during marches, events and campaigns. Co-ordinating and overseeing the various other functions such as commanding the security apparatus, structuring and development of the "G-Force". Acting on calls for assistance by membership and the public. Investigating and implementing any structures or activities as required by the "working committee". ii) Administration: Collating and processing all the necessary paperwork for all the various functions of the Council. Co-ordinating the setting up of all meetings of the Council and its substructures. Managing any finance relating to the Council or its substructures in conjunction with the 34
finance team. iii) Training and Resource Development Co-ordinating the necessary training programmes. Arranging the necessary facilities and equipment for perfonnance of training. Investigating the required skills and abilities of all security members and proposing the necessary training programme to the Council. iv) Disciplinary and Grievances Developing and enforcing an appropriate code of conduct for security members and members in general. Establishing a process of dealing with discipline and grievances. Dealing with all disciplinary complaints be it verbal, written or by media information. Developing a suitable "victim" support mechanism for security members. v) Surveillance and Information/Intelligence Department Co-ordinating the assembly and research of all information relating to high crime areas. Doing the necessary surveillance prior to marches, campaigns and special meetings. Gathering and collating any information relating to any illegal activities or suspect situations or persons. Monitoring all the activities of all the various drug lords and gangs in the Western Cape. Gathering information on the South African Police Service (planned operations and information gathering). vi) Public and Authority Liaison Co-ordinating meetings with authorities and organisations prior to marches, campaigns and events. Instituting the necessary legal procedures relating to marches and rallies. vii) Campaign Organisation Co-ordinating and accessing the necessary resources and structures required at all campaigns. Investigating the required venues and facilitating, advising and assisting the "Liaison group". 35
MEDIA AND PUBLIC RELATIONS The Chief Co-ordinator deals with all PAGAD newsletters, bulletins, pamphlets, memoranda, press statements and media liaison. The Network and Distribution unit could be associated with the Media department, although the former falls within the direct jurisdiction of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, the Western Cape co-ordinator.
MEDICAL TEAM Injuries sustained during PAGAD operations and events are attended to by the medical team. The medical needs of detained or imprisoned PAGAD members are also looked after by the medical team.
EDUCAHON DEPARTMENT According to the PAGAD Regional Structure: Western Cape (1997:3), the Education Department is responsible for developing a syllabus on the subject of Gangsterism and Drugs. The department is also responsible for assisting the educators by providing additional classes on subjects such as biology, science and mathematics.
Available sources do not indicate the number of PAGAD members, neither does PAGAD leadership have these figures at hand. They state the reason for this being that PAGAD's support is based upon an "informal" commitment to PAGAD. Regarding support levels, one may draw a distinction between two forms of support - active and passive. Active support would refer to actual involvement of individuals and organisations in the activities of PAGAD. This would include involvement within the structures of PAGAD or participation during its marches. Passive support would include spiritual or "in principle support". In interviews with the Muslim Judicial Council (the MJC headed by Sheikh Achmat Sidique), Holtzhausen and Spannenberg, the consensus emerged that although the community identifies with the objectives of PAGAD, the majority distance themselves from the modus operandi or strategy of PAGAD. The obvious way to calculate the support PAGAD has within the community, could be to evaluate the amount of support PAGAD receives during its marches. When PAGAD was launched in December (1995) it demonstrated the support of, in some instances, between 2 000 to 5 000 supporters (based upon attendance during marches). Later on these figures dropped. Holtzhausen is of the opinion that this decline in active support is because individuals within PAGAD began to misuse the organisation. These individuals began to launch attacks and with this modus operandi the majority of the community could not identify. In reaction to these statements PAGAD members are of the opinion that police officials have their own agenda in discrediting PAGAD. 36
With regard to the question who is more likely to support (active and passive) PAGAD, the following categories is provided by Africa, Christie, Mattes, Roefs and Taylor (1998:27): "Perceptions of social support: Those who felt that people who were important to them also supported PAGAD were much more likely to support the organization themselves." "Religion: Muslim respondents were much more supportive of PAGAD than Christians or those of other beliefs. The impact of being Muslim was independent of a sense of social support. Thus, Muslims were still more supportive of the organization than non- Muslims." "Perception of PAGAD's effectiveness: Those who felt it was or could be an effective crime-fighting organization were more likely to support it." "Attitudes towards collective action: Those who were prepared to join in collective citizen action against crime were more likely to support PAGAD." "Perceptions of whom PAGAD represents: Those who felt PAGAD represented their community or neighbourhood were much more likely to support it than others. Those who saw it as a sectarian Muslim organization were much less likely to support."
Through the study done by IDASA (Africa, Christie, Mattes, Roefs & Taylor 1998:24), researchers established an identikit of those who would support or join a radical (would use intimidation or violence) collective organization such as PAGAD. The following eight most important factors were identified: "Fundamentalist values: Those who believed in severe punishment, who felt that society should punish evildoers if the courts did not, and who believed in religious wars, were more likely to become involved in radical collective action against crime." "Gender: Men were more willing to participate in citizen action against crime than women." Although the following positions in PAGAD's top structure are held by woman (Abidah Roberts, PAGAD's national secretary, Madelief Botha PAGAD Western Cape's head of the Education Department and Maradiel Williams head of the Womens Department). "Perception of safety: Those who felt less safe at home or in their neighbourhood were more willing to join or support such action." "Legal values: Those who were less supportive of the rule of law and the rights of the accused were more likely to become involved in or support radical anti-crime action." "Religion: Muslims were more likely to get involved than those of other beliefs, whatever their beliefs about fundamentalism (might be)." "Perception of treatment by the police and courts: Those who felt that people like 37
themselves were treated unequally by the police and courts were more likely to support or join radical collective action." "Performance ratings ofthe police and courts: Those who disapproved of the overall and specific job performance of law enforcement institutions were more likely to become involved." "Age: Younger respondents were more likely to become involved or support radical collective citizen action against crime than older ones."
Although the following statistics are very interesting with regard to how a segment of the community in the Western Cape perceived PAGAD, it could not be used as a sure yardstick of PAGAD's active support.
According to a study done by IDASA with regard to support for PAGAD between September 1996 (500 respondents) and April 1997 (189 respondents), researchers found that public support for PAGAD decreased as their actions became more forceful "(ranging from 88% support for petitions demanding action on crime downward to 55% support for the use of violence against criminals). Yet majorities still supported the use of intimidation (70%) or violence (55%) to rid their neighbourhood of suspected criminals. Only one-quarter (24%) of the sample (respondents) opposed the use of marches to pressure or intimidate undesirable elements in the community, and only slightly more that one-third (38%) opposed the use of violence and force activities that are clearly illegal, dangerous and a serious threat to the rule of law and the democratic state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Furthermore, there were important increases in support for marching and the use of violence among panel respondents between 1996 and 1997. In terms of actual support for PAGAD itself, less than one-third (29%) of the sample (respondents) said they supported PAGAD. Thirty percent opposed it and 33% said they felt neutral towards it. Among the panel respondents, support for PAGAD dropped slightly from 36% to 33%. Willingness to actually join PAGAD was substantially lower. Only 1% ofthe sample (respondents) in 1996 saw themselves as a member of PAGAD and 5% said they would definitely join PAGAD if they had the opportunity. Another 17% said that they might consider joining PAGAD at some point. However, two-thirds (66%)said they would never join PAGAD. Yet, citizen organizations often trade on their perceived, rather than actual, levels of support. In this case, people tended to overestimate PAGAD's actual levels of support among their friends and colleagues. While 31% actually supported the organization, 46% felt that their respected friends or colleagues were likely to support it " (Africa, Christie, Mattes, Roefs & Taylor 1998:22-23). 38
Above-mentioned statistical analysis aims to illustrate the extend of community support for PAGAD. An interesting factor was that although a majority of the sample group supported community involvement in dealing with the crime situation, PAGAD did not received that much support, they thought they had. To conclude the researcher came to the conclusion that PAGAD do not represent the community in the Western Cape. The reason for this conclusion may be that a split emerged amongst members of PAGAD over the means to be used in dealing with gangsterism and drug abuse, that initially led to a split in community support. This is indicated by two factors:
A grouping under the leadership of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, wishes to confront gang leaders in a violent manner, and even eliminate some of them. The other faction wishes to cooperate with the South African Police Service in crime prevention functions. These members tend to reject militant strategies (Sidique, interview, May 1998; Holtzhausen, interview, May 1998 & Spannenberg, interview, May 1998).
Holtzhausen stated that the PAGAD leadership is aware of the covert, violent activities of the former group and that the Working Committee goes along with these activities. The reason according to him is that without these covert, violent activities (which will be discussed in the following section) PAGAD would no longer exist. The effect of PAGAD's violent actions could also contribute to the fact that although the community in the Western Cape support citizen action, support for PAGAD dropped (as revealed in the study done by 1DASA). 39 6. MODUS OPERANDI
The reference to PAGAD's Security Department (Section 5) forms the basis of this section's discussion on PAGAD's modus operandi (in particular PAGAD's violent modus operandi).
Through PAGAD's covert cell structures and low-intensity warfare on alleged drug dealers, the following discussion serves as a framework of this dimension of PAGAD's activities. The objectives and organisation of PAGAD's covert operations differentiate it from a pure vigilante group, and serves to discerns it from everything already known.
6.1 VIOLENT MODUS OPERANDI
The following brief introduction will serve as basis for a discussion on PAGAD's violent modus operandi in 1996 and 1997. The primary source of this information came from the public South African Police Service case dockets (PAGAD-related alleged crimes under investigation by the South African Police Service PAGAD task team) and, if possible, confirmed by news articles. Annexure D (PAGAD: Western Cape-related crimes and activities, 1996) and Annexure E (PAGAD: Western Cape-related crimes and activities, 1997) serve as a source of reference for the graphics used throughout this discussion. The objective of these graphics will be used to identify tendencies in the modus operandi of PAGAD in the course of this study.
The patterns of militancy evident in PAGAD activities indicate the prevailence of both paramilitary- styled attacks on alleged drug dealers perpetrated primarily by PAGAD G-Force members 10, and mass marches by PAGAD supporters which are intended to serve as a popular show of force when PAGAD ultimatums" are delivered to the drug lords. Through PAGAD's activities, PAGAD members were
10 From August 1996 to January 1997 PAGAD covert structures were responsible for 50 violent actions against alleged drug dealers and their property. Explosives have been increasingly used in these incidents (Friedman, 1997:5).
11 The conduct of PAGAD members and supporters during their marches to alleged drug dealers and gangsters and the issuing of ultimatums resulted in intimidation and in some cases assault. Private premises have also been entered in contravention of the Trespass Act, 1959 (Act No. 6 of 1959). The Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 makes provision for "violence" which includes the infliction of bodily harm upon or killing of, or the endangering of the safety of, any person, or the damaging, destructkih or endarrigering of property. 40 charged with crimes that include public violence 12, sedition'', attempted murder, murder and malicious damage to property.
According to Allie (interview, May 1998) "it is not the policy of PAGAD to attack people (drug lords and gangsters), but if people act out of command or the intention of the Working Committee, one cannot take responsibility for those actions." The next discussion will focus on attacks on drug dealers and gangsters. The question could be asked who is responsible for these attacks. According to the Working Committee they are not responsible, but they will not condemn people within the structure who commit these acts.' Allie added: "By whatever it takes (they would get rid of crime), by every means necessary. If the people would decide to take the law into their own hands, we wish them the best of luck." According to Allie and Roberts one of the reasons for PAGAD's success is the fact that they "took the fear that the community had (for gangsters and drug dealers) and placed it back into the hands of the
12 Public violence : Public violence differs from sedition, in that it is aimed at subverting public peace and tranquillity, whereas sedition is aimed at the authority of the state. In both cases a number of people have to be involved (Snyman, 1984:264)."Public violence is committed by all such acts as openly and publicly effect, or are intended to cause, a violent and forcible disturbance of the public peace and security or a forcible invasion of the rights of other people (Gardiner & Lansdown, 1957:1012)." Public violence overlaps with a number of other crimes, such as assault, malicious injury to property, arson and robbery, as at least one of these crimes is usually committed in the course of the commission of public violence. The following are instances of conduct constituting public violence : faction fighting, violent resistance to the police by a mob (provided that the police are acting lawfully), rioting, breaking up and taking over a meeting. The conduct may take place on either public or private property. It is not necessary that the participants be armed, but there must be violence or threats of violence (it is sufficient if the conduct is intended to disturb the peace or invade rights), having serious or dangerous dimensions. Various factors may cause the conduct to assume serious dimensions namely the number of people involved, the time, the locality and duration of the fight, the cause of the quarrel, the status of the persons engaged in it, the way in which it ends, whether the participants are armed or not, and whether there are actual assaults on people or damage to property (Snyman, 1984:269-271).
13 „ Sedition : "A gathering which is unlawful, with intent (not necessarily hostile) to defy or subvert the authority of the State (Snyman, 1992:339)." According to Burchell and Milton (1997:683): "Sedition consists in unlawfully gathering, together with a number of people, with the intention of impairing the authority of the State by defying or subverting the authority of its government, but without the intention of overthrowing or coercing that government." The essence of the crime is the deployment of public opinion against the existing government and its agencies. In South African law, the crime is committed by persons gathering to protest or to engage in revolutionary activity (it is used as a chief means of suppressing revolutionary calls for political and social reform). To the extent that this renders punishable protest marches and other mass action the crime may well inhibit legitimate political action and the public's freedom of assembly and speech. For the crime of sedition to be committed, a number of persons acting together is needed. The number of people depends upon circumstances such as the time and place, and the behaviour and demands of the persons gathered together. A reasonable interpretation on the side of the authorities is that the gathering of people must be accompanied by violence or threats of violence - if people gather unlawfully but disperse peacefully at the request of the police they can hardly be guilty of sedition. A peculiarity of the crime is that not only those who take part in the gathering but also those who incite, instigate or arrange it are guilty of the crime, provided that the gathering or "riot" does, in fact, follow upon the incitement or instigation. The intention of the crime to be committed is in fact the aim of the people taking part in the gathering or causing it must be to defy, challenge or resist the authority of the state. It is not a prerequired fact that they should in fact succeed in breaking down the authority of the state: the intention to do so, or to challenge or resist the state's authority, is sufficient (Snyman, 1984:265).
14 Organizations may have a dual strategy and structure: First in this dual strategy the political arm is used in the "overt" activities, while the "military or covert" structure is engaged in violent activities. The objective within this strategy is for the overt thadership to dissociate itself publicly when the covert wing is engaged in violent activities. However, a danger of this strategy could be that the covert wing may begin to operate independently, and not under control of the overt structure. As a matter of fact individuals began to lose sight of the aims and objectives of the larger movement (Laqueur, 1997:9-10). PAGAD's modus operandi falls within this framework - openly deny their involvement and responsibility of violence, perpetrated by the cell structures. 41 gangsters/drug dealers." The divergent police perspective emerges in Holtzhausen's statement that PAGAD placed this fear back in the hands of the drug dealers and gangsters through acts of violence that include murder, through taking the law into their own hands, and by acting outside the boundaries as provided by the law (interview, May 1998).
It is a common perception that PAGAD's campaign led to a decrease in crime in the Western Cape. For example, according to Farouk Jaffer (Rossouw 1996:7) since the campaign set off in November 1995 till November 1996 crime in the Western Cape had decreased by 23%. Although it was a perception within the community that crime was on a decrease, IDASA in a study on the communities perception of PAGAD established that there was a slight increase in perceived safety within the community in the Cape Flats. On the negative side this study came to the conclusion that there were increased levels of support for the use of aggressive and violent forms of collective action (Africa, Christie, Mattes, Roefs & Taylor, 1998:2). The down side of this effect on levels of crime is the possibility that innocent individuals may have become victims of PAGAD. This is reflected in dockets opened as a result of PAGAD members' activities, media reports and interviews for this research project. It indicates the following possibilities: Some victims in PAGAD attacks had never been drug dealers or gangsters 15. For example, the following attacks were directed against members of the community, not involved in drug dealing or gang activities: Wolhunter attacked on 11 August 1996, Toffa attacked on 7 September 1996 in this incident (approximately 500 PAGAD supporters marched and a G-Force member was arrested for being in possession of a petrol bomb), Bawa attacked on 11 October 1996, Section attacked on 4 November 1996, Lewis attacked on 21 March 1997 and Rhoode attacked on 22 September 1997 (Rhoode residence is directly behind a known drug outlet). Some victims were resident in houses previously occupied by drug dealers and gangsters. For example, Lippert attacked on 12 August 1996 indicated that he was not involved in illegal activities, but the possibility existed that the former owner of the residence was involved in drug dealing (Annexure D). Some victims had retired from their drug and/or gang-related activities in the past. For example, Africa attacked on 11 August 1996 stopped dealing in drugs two years prior to the attack, Colbie attacked on 16 September 1996 stopped dealing in drugs five years prior to the attack, Hardien attacked on 10 October 1996 stopped dealing in drugs two
15 Mr Gary Lotz was killed in March 22, 1997 in a shooting after he was mistaken for his neighbour, a self-confessed drug dealer (The Tribune, 1997). 42
years prior to the attack and Brown attacked on 27 March 1997 stopped dealing in drugs two years prior to the attack (Annexure D & E). Attacks on family members of drug dealers were reported. For example, the residence of Gaya Evans (her ex-husband an alledged drug dealer) was attacked on 1 June 1997 by alleged PAGAD members. Shots were fired and a petrol bomb thrown on 14 June 1997 to the residence of Shanaaz January (mother of an alledged drug dealer). A second attack was launched on 24 October 1997, on the residence of Moerisiet Ely (her son was arrested for being in possession of mandrax) (Annexure E). Some victims were neither drug dealers nor gangsters but shebeen owners involved in the selling of liquor16. For example Adams (shebeen owner) was attacked by alleged PAGAD members on 12 October 1996 after being warned by PAGAD members. On 1 November 1996 six people were wounded in front of a shebeen during an attack allegedly launched by PAGAD members. The PAGAD Task Team is currently investigating an attack on Engelbrecht (a shebeen owner) on 7 September 1997. During this incident two persons were injured and one killed. Later in September 1997, three PAGAD members were arrested for their alleged involvement in this attack, after one PAGAD member was identified (Annexure D & E).According to Allie (interview, May 1998) owners of liquor outlets are not innocent as the use of alcohol forms the basis of social decline and it contributes to the forming of gangs and the dealing in drugs and crime. Alcohol is seen as a drug and is easily obtained by youngsters. Innocent PAGAD victims are being subjected to accusatory interrogations by the PAGAD leadership at the Gatesville Mosque as a result of incorrect information by informers. According to Holtzhausen, the more militant faction within PAGAD targeted mosques to gain more support within the Muslim community. In 1997, these more militant, Qibla supporters within PAGAD began to target Muslims who pose a threat to the objectives of Qibla and use the PAGAD structure to warn these individuals, or to get rid of them. This same allegation was voiced by Mr Ali "Phantom" Parker on 20 September 1996 before the split in PAGAD. According to Veary, G-Force attacks were not only carried out against gangsters and drug dealers but against former PAGAD members, at the behest of leaders of the
16 These types of attacks include the petrol bomb attack on Mr. Human's residence (his son is a shebeen owner) on November 14, 1996. During a PAGAD visit on July 17, 1996, to the same residence 237 shots were fired (Beeld, 11 November 1996). 43
organisation (The Cape Times 1997:3). An interesting conclusion is that most of the attacks against former PAGAD members took place in August 1997.
The question arises whether or not members of PAGAD really are responsible for acts of violence or is it merely a part of violence in general. In order to answer this question, one has to evaluate the following information as supplied by the South African Police Service PAGAD task team and Crime Information Management Centre (Annexure D & E). The following evaluation was done by the researcher, although it has to be clearly stated that it was done purely in context of this study and by no means intends to condemn the members of PAGAD who have been arrested and have not yet been tried. The following six reasons imply the possible involvement of PAGAD members in acts of violence: Drug dealers and members of the gang community were warned (through ultimatums) to stop their activities. By not complying to the ultimatum a first, second and in some cases even a third attack took place: For example in 1996 the following attacks were launched on alleged drug dealers after ultimatums were issued by PAGAD. On 16 September 1996, Mrs Colbie was attacked after she had received an ultimatum the previous night to stop her alleged dealing in drugs (she stopped five years before). In October 1996, Mr Hardien (10 October) and Mr Ebrahim (11 October) were warned before being attacked. Mr Khan was first attacked on 20 October 1996 and on 21 October 1996 for the second time. In November 1996 Mr January was attacked on 28 November 1996 after receiving an ultimatum from PAGAD three weeks prior to the attack and Mrs Kesner was attacked for a second time on 29 November 1996, after the first attack on 24 November 1996. For the month of December 1996, Mr Watney and Mr Pietersen were attacked on 6 December 1996 and Mr Titus (warned two weeks prior to the incident) was attacked on 29 December 1996, after receiving ultimatums prior to the attack. Extraordinary is the fact that Mr April was attacked on 27 April 1997 for the seventh time since October 1996 (Annexure D & E).
After police investigations have been completed, it came to light that similar explosives have been used in many of the attacks. For example, the device used in the attack on Rashied Staggie on 1 January 1997 was similar to the devices used in the attacks on Mr January (28 November 1996), Mr Watney (6 December 1996) and the explosive device found in possession of Shahied Bawodien (PAGAD member arrested on 12 December 1996) (Annexure D). The device used in the attack on Gallant on 22 April 1997 was similar to the devices used in the attacks on Jacobs on 2 April 1997, April on 2 April 1997 and Wright on 16 April 1997. The devices used against Mr April (referred in above incident) on 26 March 1997, 2 April 1997 and 27 April 1997 are 44 similar. In an attack on Hendricks (member of the SAPS) on 25 August 1997, investigations revealed that the device used was similarto the devices used in previous alleged PAGAD attacks (Annexure E).
In the following three cases a large number of PAGAD members were present at the scene: In the attack on Stemmet (third attack) on 29 May 1997 approximately 25 PAGAD members were involved in the attack. Shots were fired by PAGAD members on 21 September 1997 during an ultimatum march. Shots were fired on the residence of Marcus by approximately 150 PAGAD members on 4 October 1997.
During a PAGAD mass meeting held on 30 August 1997 at the York Street Mosque, Landsdowne, Cape Town, Fagrie Patel said that PAGAD was in the possession of illegal firearms and that they would use it against drug lords and gangs.
In 296 cases during the period July 1996 to December 1997 in which members of PAGAD were allegedly involved, 153 arrests have been made.
In cases of acts of violence against former members of PAGAD the attackers have been identified by their victims as being active members of PAGAD. For example, the following former members of PAGAD suspect PAGAD for being responsible for these attacks: Meyer on 7 August 1997, Mohamed (former G-Force commander) on 7 August and 26 August 1997 Venos on 10 August 1997 and Stevens on 21 September 1997. In the following three cases PAGAD members were identified for being involved in attacks: Two PAGAD members were identified for being responsible for a kidnapping and assault charge on 7 January 1997, one of the attackers on Van der Heide on 14 March 1997 was identified as a PAGAD member, and during an attack on the residence of Madat on 25 August 1997, eye witnesses identified the attackers as being members of PAGAD. 45
6.1.1 PAGAD MODUS OPERANDI: 1996
PAGAD's main objective since its establishment, was to form a pressure group to make the community aware of the crime situation in the Western Cape, in order to get something done by government and the community. Reactions on the part of the government was slow. With the establishment of the G-Force, PAGAD members began to adopt a more violent approach (that if the government would not do its job, they would do it for them). The next discussion will evaluate the evolution of PAGAD's strategy from that of non-violent protest to that of violence.
Figure 3 focuses on the period May 1996 to December 1996, and indicates violent and non-violent actions by PAGAD members. On 6 May 1996 PAGAD supporters marched to the residence of Minister Abdullah Omar (the Minister of Justice) to express their concern about the perceived failure of the criminal justice system in addressing criminality associated with gangsterism and drugs in the Western Cape. On 11 May 1996 approximately 3 000 PAGAD supporters marched to Parliament, where they handed an ultimatum to the Minister of Justice in which they demanded swift action against gangs and drug lords within 60 days. They warned that failure to do so within the specified 60 day deadline would prompt PAGAD to take the law into its own hands. In a letter sent to Minister Omar on 25 June 1996 (Annexure C) PAGAD made a number of suggestions on how to deal with the drug problem in South Africa. The most significant suggestion, which had a long-term effect on the violent strategy of PAGAD was that convicted drug dealers should be hanged or given a life sentence, because they were seen to be responsible for destroying the lives of innocent victims. Based on the fact that PAGAD demanded the death penalty for drug dealers, the conclusion could be made that when government did not comply with this demand, individuals within PAGAD decided to take the law into their own hands.
Although there were no reported PAGAD marches or violent incidents in June 1996 the reason might have been that PAGAD members were having meetings to discuss their plans in the event of the 60-day- ultimatum not being complied with. The split in PAGAD in September 1996 became associated with a steady increase in violent activities, and a decline in non-violent overt activities (this trend would continue in 1997).
PAGAD first turned to violence during July 1996 by exploding a pipe-bomb and through three shootings 46
to the residences of alleged drug dealers." The modus operandi evident in PAGAD's violent actions reflected the presence of a trained paramilitary extension of the broader PAGAD "structure". All non- violent marches during this period reflected an average involvement of approximately 157 PAGAD supporters who had been mobilized, via Radio 786 broadcasts, to attend PAGAD meetings at the Masj id Al Quds mosque, Gatesville, from where they would then depart to the residence of an alleged drug dealer.
On the basis of the docket information used in this study, August 1996 introduced the intensifying of PAGAD vigilantism in the form of 19 reported incidents, of which 9 were non-violent marches to the homes of alleged drug dealers, and 10 violent paramilitary styled attacks perpetrated by PAGAD's G- Force group. The most prominent of these marches that resulted in violence was the march to the residence of Rashaad Staggie on 4 August to deliver an ultimatum that he renounced his criminal activities. After a mass meeting at Gatesville Mosque people drove in a convoy to Salt River. The confrontation that followed resulted in the death of Rashaad Staggie, and ten PAGAD members suffered gunshot injuries. (The pattern of militant action during this period reflected a shift in the modus operandi evident in previous PAGAD militant actions towards the separation of paramilitary styled G-Force attacks from mass marches.) The PAGAD leadership had decided to maintain this separation of militant tactics following difficulties experienced in controlling supporters involved in groups participating in paramilitary attacks and those involved in mass marches in one protest action. Violent PAGAD actions primarily involved petrol bomb attacks, drive-by shootings and standoff shootings at the residences of alleged drug lords. The shooting incidents included:
PAGAD versus gangsters: A standoff on August 11 after the Vygieskraal march (The Mercury, 12 August 1996:1)". PAGAD versus the South African Police Service: On August 27 PAGAD members shot at South African Police Service members outside the Gatesville mosque (Spannenberg,
17 PAGAD members and supporters launched attacks on homes, inhabitants and vehicles, which involved the use of firearms and explosives. This would justify investigating cases of attempted murder, contraventions of the Explosives Act, 1956 (Act No. 26 of 1956) and malicious damage to property. Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969 : The prohibition of possession of firearms at any gathering or in any public place, under Government Notice No. 1487 of 2 September 1996, has been violated at various occasions by supporters participating in PAGAD marches and gatherings. Moreover, during these marches and after acts of violence PAGAD supporters were arrested for the unlawful possession and supply of firearms in contravention of the provisions of the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1969 (Act No. 75 of 1969).
18 Also see Annexure D. 47
interview, May 1998)' 9.
During this period the militant content of PAGAD's political rhetoric changed. The influence of Islamic extremist ideas was evident in the public statement by Mr Ali Parker on August 12, which stated that PAGAD had declared a "jihad" on drug dealers and gangsters and in subsequent similar references by Mr Farouk Jaffer.
The active public support for PAGAD marches declined in September 1996. This could be ascribed to the reaction of non-violent PAGAD supporters to the prevailence of violent tactics, through paramilitary style PAGAD actions in August 1996, culminating in the murder of Rasaad Staggie. September also marked the split between the pro-Qibla (Islamic political extremists) and anti-Qibla (populist militants and moderates) factions in PAGAD 20. During this period the MJC withdrew its support for PAGAD: "When they [PAGAD] began to adopt this militant type of attitude ... and this is where we differ. Too many covert operations happened, too many things went wrong". PAGAD even asked the MJC to promulgate a decree giving PAGAD "permission" to murder gangsters and drug dealers, since murder is not allowed in Islam'. From this stage the MJC supported PAGAD's goals and objectives, but they did not support their strategy nor modus operandi (Sidique, interview, May 1998).
The totality of PAGAD's factional split between pro-Qibla and populist groups manifested itself during October 1996 in marches associated with the respective factions to the extent that two independent PAGAD structures now existed, each having its own leadership, policies, operational fields and modus operandi. Although it is difficult to quantify the support base of either faction accurately, owing to confusion among supporters about who the real PAGAD is, it is noteworthy that marches organized by the pro-Qibla faction attracted less support than did the PAGAD marches before the factional split. It is evident that the pro-Qibla faction preferred to have their marches and meetings outside historical PAGAD base areas (Athlone) and has concentrated on areas such as Mitchell's Plain, Grassy Park, Sandfontein and Rondebosch East. Pro-Qibla marches have mainly been non-violent despite extremist calls for the killing of drug dealers at mosque meetings held beforehand, except for two incidents where the pro-Qibla faction had stand-offs with the police on October 26 in Athlone and October 30 in Parow. It was also the
19 Also see Annexure D.
20 One faction is led by the organization's original leaders Mr Farouk Jaffer and Mr Ali "Phantom" Parker, the other faction is led by "the militant Muslim group Qibla" (Rossouw, 1996:7).
21 See VVyngaard (1997:9).
48
first time PAGAD used M26 hand grenades in attacks on the residences of alleged drug dealers (Spannenberg, interview, May 1998) 22 .
On October 14, 1996 the populist faction of PAGAD met with the provincial senior management of the South African Police Service. The delegation consisted of Mr Farouk Jaffer, Mr Ali Parker and Mr Ismael Effendi (this meeting, attended by the anti-Qibla faction, clearly indicated the split in PAGAD). The following submissions were made: i) All past PAGAD actions in which violence was used was alleged to have been perpetrated by the pro-Qibla faction within PAGAD. PAGAD intended to strengthen existing neighbourhood watch organizations under its control and intended to develop similar neighbourhood watch organizations in other parts of the Western Cape. PAGAD-aligned neighbourhood watches would monitor known gangsters and drug lords in the area under their jurisdiction and then, provide any information emanating from this to the South African Police Service and conduct citizen's arrests, if necessary. Marches and all actions organized by the moderate PAGAD faction would not wear masks or cover their faces during such actions'. PAGAD would apply for municipal permits for all future PAGAD marches and provide the South African Police Service with full details on such marches. As in the case with the pro-Qibla faction, the anti-Qibla faction could not come to an agreement with the police not to bear arms in public (Rossouw, 1996:7).
From November 1996 PAGAD turned to more violent methods, which included increased confrontation with the South African Police Service (Annexure D). It formed part of Mr Aslam Toefy's intensified programme of action: "We are fighting the police's inability to deal with the problem of drugs and will apply pressure on them. We will show them how to deal with crime (Sowetan, 7 November 1996)." Although the verbal initiative was not of a violent nature, it turned into violence: i) On 3 November 1996 a confrontation took place with the police at the Waterfront, Cape
22 Also see Annexure D.
23 According to Mr Farouk Jaffer members of the anti-Qibla faction will no longer disguise their faces except for women and informers: "We have also explained to the police that sometimes members of the community assist us by pointing out dealers and gangsters. Such persons have to cover their faces for their own protection (Rossouw, 1996:7)." During PAGAD marches and gatherings, supporters cover their faces partially which amount to a contravention of the Prohibition of Disguises Act, 1969 (Act No. 16 of 1969) read together with section 8 (7) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993 (Act No. 205 of 1993). 49
Town when Agmad Najaar was shot and killed' and twelve PAGAD supporters and thirteen policemen were injured. This happened after PAGAD supporters ignored a warning by the police to disperse (Business Day, 4 November 1996) 25; On 4 November PAGAD members shot at South African Police Service members during and after the burial of Mr Agmad Najaar at the Mowbray Cemetery (he had been killed during the Waterfront confrontation). Even before the death of Najaar, Moosa (1996:69) warned that the death of any PAGAD supporter would play into the hands of the military faction within PAGAD that would evoke community sympathy as their being martyrs and victims in fighting a noble cause. According to a letter as reported in the media (in the possession of the PAGAD task team in Cape Town) the death of Mr Najaar was well planned by several Muslim organizations to provide "them" with a martyr. "It had been alleged on several occasions that sinister forces with hidden agendas are behind PAGAD and that the organization is being run by militant Islamic intent on overthrowing the government (Younghusband, 17 November 1996); On 10 November 1996 PAGAD members assaulted a member of the South African Police Service during a PAGAD rally at Vygieskraal. According to Achmad Cassiem "own source intelligence" indicated that three assassins have or would be imported to kill Western Cape Muslim leaders (The Pretoria News, 11 November 1996) 27; and On 30 November 1996 stones were thrown at South African Police Service members during a march in Paarl East'.
December 1996 marked the first time PAGAD used explosive devices (there were three incidents involving the use of explosive devices and two petrol bomb attacks). The explosive device used on 16 December 1996 in Heideveld was similar to the devices members of the police seized at the residence
24 Although PAGAD blames the death of Agmad Najaar on the police, he was shot by a 7,65mm calibre firearm. The police used only rubber bullets. The rumour has it that he was shot by his own people as an accident or to create a martyr (The Citizen, 4 November 1996). According to Commissioner George Fivaz (The Citizen, 5 November 1996) undisciplined elements within PAGAD were responsible for the death of Mr Achmat Najaar.
25 Also see Rudden (1996:1).
26 During his burial Najaar was certified as a martyr (Beeld, 5 November 1996). According to Sheik Thafier Najaar the death of his brother made him more determined: "My father says he has got four more sons and many more grandsons to give to the cause. I can proudly say it is an honour for the family to have lost someone in this way." Followed by: "It won't take bullets to destroy us. !man (faith) is our face. That is our bullet-proof vest (The Pretoria News, 5 November 1996)."
27 Also see Annexure D.
28 Also see Annexure D. 50 of a PAGAD member in Athlone. According to the police the devices consisted of a hand grenade tied to a petrol bomb. During the raid police members seized two explosive devices as well as two hand grenades (Beeld, 17 December 1996). In December 1996 seven bomb and petrol bomb attacks took place. On 29 December 1996, two petrol bombs were thrown at the Bishop Lavis residence of an alleged drug dealer (Van Zilla, 1997:1)29.
As far as the overt activities of PAGAD are concerned, a delegation of national ministers and senior police and justice officials met with a PAGAD delegation on 3 December 1996 : "The PAGAD delegation demanded exemption from laws, particularly the Regulation of Gatherings Act, which outlaw the wearing of masks and the bearing of firearms at public rallies. They also demanded that the authorities supply them with a list of all people detained in connection with drug offences: Those who had been convicted but received suspended sentences and those who had served jail terms for drug offences but had been released, in order to be monitored. PAGAD argued that masks and the carrying of firearms were part of the right to self-defence (Hartley, 1996)." 3°
During PAGAD's overt anti-crime initiatives since 10 December 1996, the organization's executive members applied for permission for marches (The Citizen, 10 December 1996). Although members of the PAGAD executive (including Mr Aslam Toefy) agreed that PAGAD members would not bear firearms, PAGAD members were, in fact armed with firearms, when a gun battle errupted outside Cape Town International Airport on 16 December 1996 between PAGAD supporters and the South African Police Service, after protesters had been given ten minutes to disperse (illegal gathering) 31 . They did not disguise their identity. The skirmish continued at the Bellville Magistrate's Court after 13 PAGAD members had been arrested and accused of attempted murder, obstructing police and public violence (Arde, 17 December 1996). 32 Some 250 PAGAD supporters gathered outside the Bellville Magistrate's Court (Also see Annexure D). After the crowd had praised Allah, they charged the police line and fired
29 Also see Annexure D.
3o Mr Achmad Cassiem said the wearing of masks were aimed at preventing crimes, such as assassinations, being committed against PAGAD members and their families, while the bearing of arms was for self-defence purposes only, in reaction to above mentioned meeting. Also see The Citizen (4 December 1996), The Pretoria News (4 December 1996).
31 According to a PAGAD member on the confrontation: "This confrontation is good for the people (PAGAD members) because it takes them to the point of going beyond the fear barrier (The Citizen, 17 December 1996)."
32 Also see The Pretoria News (17 December1996), The Pretoria News (18 December1996). 51 live ammunition at Public Order Police officers 33. According to a policeman on duty during the two demonstrations, they were shot at with bullets that could penetrate bullet-proof vests. "A cartage from a Russian Tokarev was also found (The Pretoria News, 18 December 1996)." From 4 August 1996 to 19 December 1996, 27 members of the South African Police Service were injured during 54 PAGAD protest marches (Beeld, 19 December 1996).
In conclusion, the following figures (based on information provided in Annexure D) indicate that for 1996 PAGAD initiated 49 non-violent protest marches, but that they had been involved in 76 violent activities (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Comparative Frequencies of Non-violent and Violent Actions: 1996
COMPARATIVE FREQUENCIES OF NON-VIOLENT AND VIOLENT ACTIONS:1996 DENTS CI IN R OF NUMBE
Jul-96 Aug-96 Sep-96 Old-96 Nov-96 Dee-96 DATE
❑ Non-violent ❑ Violent
According to information provided by the South African Police Service PAGAD task team, PAGAD was allegedly responsible for 65 incidents of violence. This included 42 shooting incidents, 20 incidents where explosive devices (pipe-bombs, petrol bombs and hand grenades) had been used and four incidents where both tactics were used (see Figure 4). The first incident where both tactics had been used occurred
33 Also see Annexure D. 52 in August 1996. During this incident a Caspir of the South African Police Service was attacked when shots were fired and a hand grenade was hurled at it. An alleged member of PAGAD was arrested (Annexure D). For the period July 1996 to December 1996 79 PAGAD cases of violence where PAGAD allegedly were involved were registered by the PAGAD task team.
Figure 4: Comparative Analysis: Violent Modus Operandi 1996
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:VIOLENT MODUS OPERANDI 1996
Aug-96 Sep-90
An analysis of the case docket database of this study also points to trends regarding the day of the week and the time during which of most of these violent incidents took place. In 1996, most of PAGAD's violent activities were committed on Sunday nights, followed by Fridays (Annexure). According to Spannenberg (interview, May 1998) a possible reason for the high number of attacks on Friday nights, could be that during prayer sessions on Fridays the most prominent persons (possibly involved in organising attacks) were together and may use these occasions as a planning session. Spannenberg also revealed that it was important to note that although each G-Force cell structure was responsible for attacks, planning was more structured than in 1997 (see Figure 5). 53
Figure 5: Daily Comparative Frequencies: Violent Modus Operandi 1996
DAILY COMPARATIVE FREQUENCIES:VIOLENT MODUS OPERANDI 1996 NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY
Equally, trends emerged regarding the time of the day most likely to see alleged PAGAD attacks. According to analysis of attacks as reported by the South African Police Service, most of these attacks in 1996 were committed between 00:00 and 03:00 (see Figure 6). 54
Figure 6: Time Comparative Frequencies: Violent Modus Operandi 1996
TIME COMPARATIVE FREQUENCIES : VIOLENT MODUS OPERANDI 1996 N F INCIDE NUMBER O
00 01-03 00 03:01.08:00 06:01-09:00 09:01-12:00 12:01-15:00 15:01-19 00 18 01-21:00 21 01-00:00 Unknown
Based on an evaluation of information included in Annexure D, this researcher was urged to determine the exact locations of acts of violence allegedly committed by PAGAD. One can easily be tempted to assume that the entire Western Cape region is affected by violence, allegedly committed by PAGAD. As a conclusion to this, this study has revealed that in 1996 PAGAD acts of violence were primarily limited to Athlone with 23 acts of violence. Of the 44 areas of which the Western Cape consists, PAGAD was active in 15 areas (see Figure 7). Map of PAGAD violent activities : Western Cape 1996 55
130 - 40 25 - 30 0 ATLANTIS 120 - 25 115 - 20 I 10 - 15 I 5 - 10 1 1- 5
3 cc_ Q TABLE VIEW 0 DURBANVILLE
06) S4C1 04 ( 0 i5O-N° , Goo ,p.se- 0 O 0 e 0 PAARL-EAST 0 o*` GP 01, 0 VENSMEAD 0 RONDEBOSCH° °BISHOP LAMS ATHLONE 0 CLAREMONT 0 MANNENBE 0 LANDSDOWNE 0 UGULETU 0 WYNBERG 0 PHILIPPI 0 IsNANGA 0 DIEP RWIER 0 GRASSY PARK 0 MITCHELL 0 KIRSTENHOF MAGASBAR 0 STEENBERG 0 SOMERSET WEST
0 STRAND 0 mAxl 0 OCEAN VIEW 0 GORDON'S BAY 0 N.,..$1 This section provides a month-to-month description of the frequency and nature of overt and covert PAGAD activities. Although it is difficult to make a comparison between the number of incidents of violence between 1996 (July to December) and 1997 (January to December) based on the docket database (Annexure E) of this study, it appears that the modus operandi of PAGAD changed dramaticly to that of violence. Since January 1997, PAGAD's marches and meetings were characterised by the open display of firearms by its supporters, the use of armed marshals and military-style discipline. PAGAD also engaged in offensive armed training and some of its members were involved in the procurement of legal and illegal arms such as firearms, hand grenades and explosives"' in contravention of section 54 (1) of the Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act No 74 of 1982) and section 13 of the Criminal Law Second Amendment Act, 1992 (Act No 126 of 1992). 36 During a police raid on 12 December 1996, licensed guns and explosive devices (including a home-made explosive device, a petrol bomb and a M26 hand grenade) were seized from PAGAD supporters' homes (The Citizen, 14 December 1996). According to Manjra (1996:45) clandestine hit squads against drug merchants are more appropriate in the face of unscrupulous gangsters. For maximum impact, hit squads need to be coupled with mass activity to mobilize all sections of the community - separating the political focus from the military strategy. This strategy formed the basis of PAGAD's strategy especially since it split up in September 1996. Figure 4 and Annexure E seems to confirms the analysis of Manjra. Based on an explanation of PAGAD activities (Annexure E) the assumption is made by the researcher (based upon information provided) that there is a split in PAGAD's overt and covert activities. During incidents when a large number of PAGAD supporters were involved their activities were non-violent. Acts of violence were committed by smaller groups. In March and April 34 Paramilitary training with a radical Islamic undertone has taken place in recent years in the Cape in the use of small weaponry, scouting, basic fitness and much ideological consolidation. The training is done by those who have acquired skills, often abroad, during the liberation struggle (The Financial Mail, 16 August 1996:48). 35 Also see Esack (1996:28-29) 36 Paramilitary training : The recruiting and training of persons in military and paramilitary techniques amount to the contravention of section 54 (1) of the Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act No. 74 of 1982) if it is done with the intent to overthrow or endanger the State authority in the Republic, or to bring about political change in the Republic. A Bill illegalizing military and paramilitary training has already been drafted and it is expected that the Bill will be approved by Parliament inl 997. The military and paramilitary training of persons, also constitute the contravention of section 13 of the Criminal Law Second Amendment Act, 1992 (Act No 126 of 1992). Section 13 of this Act contains a prohibition on organizing, training or undergoing training in any organization if the members or supporters of that organization are organized or trained in order to usurp some or all the functions of the Police or Defence Force. 57 1997 the number of violent attacks increased dramatically, the assumption is made by Spannenberg (interview, May 1998) that the increase in violent activities is partly due to the fact that PAGAD began to return to targets already attacked on previous occasions (see Figure 4 and Annexure E). In a press release Mr Abdus Salaam Ebrahim (National PAGAD Co-ordinator, 8 August 1997) said: "PAGAD is ready to defend innocent people against the scourge of gangsterism and drugs. PAGAD will take the necessary steps to deal with the problem as the need arises and the programme unfolds. PAGAD will not harm innocent civilians and will never destroy property belonging to the community. The people have to realize that a period of intense conflict is upon us. The fighting against the scourge of gangsterism has to intensify. The gangsters must not be allowed to subject the people to their tyranny. People must take the necessary preparations to protect themselves and their families for the period ahead" (Ebrahim, 1997). In this statement Abdus Salaam Ebrahim called on PAGAD supporters to prepare themselves for an intensification in the conflict against drug dealers and gangsters. This statement was necessary based upon the fact that drug dealers and gangsters began to defend themselves against PAGAD members, which led to an escalation in the violent activities in the Western Cape (Spannenberg, interview, May 1998) (see Figure 8). Gangsters organised under a central organization known as the Community Outreach Forum (CORE) who began to target several business and professional people, some of them alleged PAGAD supporters and others seemingly targeted because they were Muslim (PAGAD is regarded as a Muslim organization) (Africa, Christie, Mattes, Roefs & Taylor 1998:4). The most prominent examples (other incidents will be discussed throughout this section) in which PAGAD members were the target of gangsters and drug dealers include: On 19 January 1997 two gunmen opened fire on Siraj Parker, secretary of the Gatesville Mosque where PAGAD holds most of its meetings. A few hours later four people including a pregnant woman, were injured when a hand grenade was thrown into the Middle Road, Rylands Estate, belonging to Vegun Parker (a relative of Siraj Parker) (Aranes, 1997:10). On 6 April 1997 PAGAD supporters and gangsters clashed at a drug awareness programme organized by PAGAD in Manenberg, the heartland of Rashied Staggie and the Hard Livings Gang (Aranes, 1997:10). On 19 April 1997 PAGAD member Mr Toyer Abdullah died in a Hanover Park ambush (Aranes, 1997:10). 58 Figure 8: Comparative Frequencies of Non-violent and Violent Actions: 1997 COMPARATIVE FREQUENCIES OF NON-VIOLENT AND VIOLENT ACTIONS: 1997 ❑ Non-violent °Violent January 1997 marked the first time PAGAD used a so-called "PAGAD grenade" or "nail bomb" (a home- made hand-grenade with attached steel nails and a petrol bomb). The residence of Rashied Staggie was attacked on 1 January 1997 using this type of device37 (Van Zilla, 1997:1). From the beginning of 1997, it was clear that PAGAD's strategy (modus operandi) had changed. It included more violence through closed covert structures'', in contrast with Aslam Toefy's overt announcement on 31 December 1996. This type of strategy is familiar to organizations who have to answer to a support base (overt actions); and who disassociate themselves from covert operations perpetrated by a small covert military wing. In these cases no one usually claims responsibility for attacks. Aslam Toefy for example blamed a "third force" for the attack on Staggie's residence (Barnes, 1997:1). These covert acts of urban terrorism include a shooting incident at the residence of Mrs Fatima April, 37 After the murder of Mr Joe Saban, a member of PAGAD, an unknown telephone caller blamed Mr Saban for manufacturing nail-bombs, including the one used in the attack on Mr Rashied Staggie (Harmse, 14 January 1997). Also see Friedman (1997:6). 38 Mr Aslam Toefy first acknowledged the existence of a network of cell structures, the G-Force, in reaction to the bombing of a mosque in Rustenburg in January 1997. According to Mr Toefy these structures should also be used to protect mosques from possible attacks (Beeld, 7 January 1997). See also Breytenbach (1997:7). 59 estranged wife of Mr Ismail April (alias "Bobby Mongrel"), alleged former leader of the notorious Mongrels gang (six people, including a 13-year-old girl, were wounded). Also on 7 January 1997 a gun and petrol bomb attack occurred on a home in Balvenie Ave, Ravensmead (Schronen, 1997:1). On January 19, 1997 (also known as "Bloody Sunday") war broke out between PAGAD and gangsters: Two attacks were directed at people linked to the Gatesville Mosque where PAGAD held regular meetings. PAGAD cell structures fired shots at alleged drug merchants in Retreat, Bishop Lavis, Athlone and Strandfontein, petrol bombs were thrown at a house in Rocklands, Mitchell's Plain and another in Bishop Lavis (Smith & Aranes, 1997:1). 39 In January PAGAD members were involved in 13 acts of violence. Six were shooting incidents, in four incidents explosive devices were used and in one incident both tactics were used. The other two incidents were charges of assault, the most serious taking place on 13 January, when a group of PAGAD leaders threatened and assaulted a South African Police Service member at the Bellville Magistrate's Court (information provided by the PAGAD Task Team). Overt activities of PAGAD included a PAGAD meeting at the Vygieskraal Cemetery, attended by approximately 1 000 PAGAD supporters. Followed by two PAGAD mass meetings, the first at the South African Police Service offices in Wynberg, attended by approximately 600 PAGAD supporters. The second gathering was at the Gatesville Mosque, Athlone. Mr Abdoes-Salaam Ebrahim announced a new strategy to counter government attempts to stop members marching to the houses of drug lords and gangsters. The plan involved driving in convoys, hooting car horns and shouting anti-drug slogans (Smith, 1997:1). According to police sources approximately 20 individuals stormed and fell down in front of South African Police Service vehicles and shouted unknown slogans. Other overt activities during January 1997 include the following: An illegal gathering and march on 10 January 1997 attended by approximately 250 PAGAD supporters led to Cape Town Central Police Station by Mr Aslam Toefy and Mr Abdus Salaam Ebrahim to surrender themselves. This was followed by a gathering of approximately 60 PAGAD supporters at the Bellville Police Station (10 January) and a gathering of approximately 20 PAGAD supporters at the Bellville Magistrate's Court on 11 January in support of Aslam Toefy and Abdus Salaam Ebrahim. Approximately 500 PAGAD supporters gathered for a PAGAD rally at the Vygieskraal Stadium and were addressed by Gulam Allie. On 18 January 1997 PAGAD supporters marched to Parliament. 39 Also see Thiel (1997). 60 At a gathering at City Park Stadium on 9 February 19974°, the National Chief Co-ordinator of PAGAD, Abdus-Salaam Ebrahim made the following statement: "To the gangsters like Staggie, Kapdi, Naan, Pot, Pik, Narker, Zaks, Colin, Glen Khan and the countless other gangsters, we say to you on this Day of Eid, this is the year, 1997, if you don't stop your illegal activities, then the People are going to wipe yourself and your activities from the face of the earth. For this is the year that we will use all our energies, forces and power which Allah (SWT) bestowed on us to eradicate gangsterism and drugs by any means necessary from society." In the period subsequent to this speech acts of violence in the form of explosives and shootings increased sharply, while non-violent actions decreased. On 15 February approximately 550 PAGAD supporters gathered at the Eik Hall in Cloetesville, from where they marched to the residences of drug dealers. In February PAGAD's covert activities declined steeply to four acts of violence (two were shooting incidents, in one incident an explosive device was used and in one incident both tactics were used) (information provided by the South African Police Service PAGAD task team). Ramadaan was celebrated in February, which could explain the decline in both covert and overt activities (Annexure E). Based on an analysis of incidents gained from police dockets (see summary of PAGAD violent incidents Annexure E) it can be deducted that, although violence was still preferred in March 1997, the tactical modus operandi had changed, in the sense that more than one explosive device including a petrol bomb and home-made explosives were used in each incident. The number of incidents involving explosives increased from four incidents in January and two incidents in February to thirteen incidents in March. Spannenberg (interview, May 1998) made the allegation that these violent actions were committed by small groups of G-Force members who operated in closed cell structures and were committed during the late night and in the early morning hours (23:00 to 02:30) (see Figure 9), excluding larger communal support and involvement. Thus the modus operandi changed from intimidation (in the form of memoranda presented by a large crowd of supporters) to intimidation in the form of acts of violence. In March the following overt PAGAD activities took place (information provided by Public Order Policing who are responsible for monitoring marches and gatherings as a form of pro-active policing 41): A group of approximately 300 individuals gathered outside the Civic Centre, Main Road, Sea Point at 3 March 1997 and held an illegal placard demonstration. On 6 March 1997 at 20:00 a group marched to the residences of 5 drug dealers. ao Gathering at City Park Stadium, on February 9. 41 See Annexure E. 61 A group of approximately 700 PAGAD supporters attended a meeting at the Alexander Sinton School on 12 March 1997. On 15 March 1997 at 22:10 a group of approximately 450 PAGAD supporters marched to the residences of four drug dealers. On 22 March 1997 at 21:00 a group of approximately 800 PAGAD supporters marched to the residence of Rashied Staggie. Figure 9: Time Comparative Frequencies: Violent Modus Operandi 1997 TIME COMPARATIVE FREQUENCIES : VIOLENT MODUS OPERANDI 1997 60 O U 50 LL 0_ re 40 2 z 30 06:01-09:00 09:01-12:00 12:01-15:00 15:01-18:00 21 01-00 00 Unknown After analysing Annexure E it is interesting to note that most of the attacks allegedly initiated by PAGAD were committed during Monday nights (42) and over weekends (see Figure 10). A logical assumption could be that most of the PAGAD supporters who are thought to be involved are ordinary working class citizens. 62 Figure 10: Daily Comparative Frequencies: Violent Modus Operandi 1997 DAILY COMPARATIVE FREQUENCIES: VIOLENT MODUS OPERANDI 1997 45 40 35 30 25 INCIDENTS F R O 20 NUMBE 15 10 MONDAY TUESDAY WEDNESDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY PAGAD Violence: Days 1997 Sunday (18.23%) Monday (21.88%) Saturday (20.83%) Tuesday (11.46%) Friday (6.25%) Wednesday (11.98%) Thursday (9.38%) In April 1997 the "PAGAD grenade" was still the most favoured method. The "PAGAD grenade" was used in eight incidents, compared to three petrol bomb and one hand-grenade (M26) incidents. These incidents included a home-made bomb directed at Hendrik April's residence on 27 April 1997. Similar devices were used in two further incidents on 28 April (The Citizen, 29 April 1997). With regard to PAGAD's overt activities as a pressure group, only two incidents were recorded (Annexure E)): A group of approximately 220 PAGAD supporters gathered at the Gatesville Mosque on 12 April 1997, from where they marched to the residences of 7 drug dealers. On 13 April 1997 a group of approximately 55 PAGAD supporters gathered in Hutchinson Street, Malmesbury. 63 In May and July 1997 PAGAD's overt activities came to a standstill, although its covert activities (acts of violence) reflected a steady increase. In August 1997 PAGAD held two meetings: one at the Mountain View Mosque on 7 August 1998, and amass. meeting at the. York Street Mosque in Landsdowne. The. most prominent speakers. during this meeting were Aslam Toefy and Fagrie Patel. During this meeting Fagrie Patel said, inter alia, that PAGAD was in possession of illegal firearms and that it would use it against drug lords and gangs. From the establishment of PAGAD up to this meeting PAGAD members used legal firearms in order to prevent prosecution for the possession of illegal firearms, in particular during marches. The. use of illegal firearms had the implication that it would be impossible to link a firearm to an individual and an incident through ballistics tests. In August 1997, violence peaked to 27 allegedly PAGAD-initiated attacks (nine shooting incidents, in eleven incidents explosive devices were used and in seven incidents both instruments were used). According to Spannenberg (interview, May 1998) during August PAGAD also initiated two non-violent activities, the first since April 1997. These two incidents included: On 7 August 1997 PAGAD supporters attended a meeting at the Mountain View Mosque and on 30 August 1997 PAGAD held a mass meeting at the York Street Mosque. Although the mass meeting at the York Street Mosque did not directly lead to violence, the statements made by Fagrie Patel (that PAGAD was in possession of illegal firearms and that they would use it against drug lords and gangs) led to an increase in attacks by drug lords and gangs on members of PAGAD during September and December 1997 (Annexure E). In the period September to December 1997 PAGAD did not have any public, peaceful actions, for instance, mass meetings, gathering or march, but its violent activities were on the increase. Drug dealers and gangsters increasingly began to target PAGAD members. The following incidents are examples of this war: Early on 1 September the residences of four PAGAD members were damaged by a hand grenade, petrol bombs and gunfire. PAGAD spokesman Cassiem Parker said, (in reaction to these attacks), that they were an indication that their programme was making life difficult for gangsters: "We will not be deterred from our fight against gangsterism" (Schronen, 1997:5). The escalation in violent activities against drug dealers since 21 September were said to be in reaction to the death of Mr Moegamat Nur Booley, a PAGAD member (The 64 Citizen, 1997:9). In reaction to the death of Mr Mogamat Ryklief (PAGAD member) and the shooting on Mr Shaheed Toefy, PAGAD reacted by increasing its violent campaign against drug dealers and gangsters. On 6 October 1997 PAGAD attacked the residences of at least five drug dealers between 00:30 and 03:00 (The Cape Times, 1997:6). 42 Figure 11 provides a summary of trends in PAGAD's violent activities for the period concerned in which this study. Figure 11 indicates an increase in the use of explosive devices during PAGAD's covert attacks on alleged drug dealers. According to Spannenberg (interview, May 1998) the explosive devices used by PAGAD also indicated a development from small devices in the beginning to the larger devices used later on. The shrapnel used in those devices indicated a similar development. Similarities between the devices used indicate the same trend. With reference to Annexure E, attacks took place minutes apart, which indicates that more that one cell or grouping are responsible for these attacks. The number of PAGAD violent activities for 1997 totaled 190 attacks. Of these 190 attacks, 77 involved shooting incidents, in 65 cases explosive devices were used and in 34 incidents both explosive devices and firearms were used. Assault and intimidation comprised the remaining 14 incidents (Annexure E). 42 Also see Adams (1997:2). 65 Figure 11: Comparative Frequencies of Violent Modus Operandi: 1997 COMPARATIVE FREQUENCIES OF VIOLENT MODUS OPERANDI: 1997 Jan-97 Peb-97 Mar-97 Apr-97 May-97 Jun-97 Jul-97 Aug-97 Sep-97 Oct-97 Nov-97 D e.97 loShootIng oExplosives °Both In 1997, PAGAD allegedly launched attacks in 23 areas. With the launch of "Operation Recoil" (for more information on Operation Recoil, see Section 7) in October 1997, the number of PAGAD flashpoint areas for both November and December 1997 were contained in four flashpoint areas, namely Athlone (28), Grassy Park (21), Mitchell's Plain (35) and Woodstock (24) (Annexure E). Figure 12: Map of PAGAD violent activities : Western Cape 1997 66 130 - 40 25 - 30 20 - 25 I 15 - 20 I 10 - 15 5-10 I 1 - 5 ...od" ,....0" odo 10'(- 11 0 ° G 0 vo -0\ -vt. 9 t-S°\51\A 0 PAARL-EAST DO° 0— 0 e ,,„ 0 s)- 0 O 0pIN D., ,otcz Qv PO 0 vENs„,,,,AD 0 RONDEBOSCH° 08/stion ' 14114,9 0 ATHLONE 0 CLAREMONT 0 MANNENBE LANDSDOWNE 0 0 UGULETU 0 WYNBERG PHILIPPI x._}rm 0 NIYANGA 0 DIEP RIVER 0 GRASSY PARK 0 MITCHELL •LAIN 0_,K1RSTENHOF L.) STEENBERG MAGASBAR 0 SOMERSET WEST 0 STRAND 0 vN-4rAg 0 OCEAN VIEW 0 GORDON'S BAY 0 -10,:ow.'at.% 67 On the question if PAGAD was responsible for acts of violence against drug dealers and gangsters, Dr Gulam Allie (interview, 4 May 1998) answered: "Thousands of people are members of PAGAD, you can't take responsibility for what every one of that thousand are doing. You can't expect the PAGAD leadership to take responsibility for each person's actions, or to know about it." Based upon above PAGAD activities, the information provided indicates a change of PAGAD's modus operandi over time, reflected in the following diagram (Figure 13): LAUNCH OF PAGAD : MAY 1996 POST SEPTEMBER 1996 SPLIT Mass mobilization through marches to alleged Mass mobilization through marches directed at drug lords' and gangsters' houses. Extensive use venues such as the Waterfront and Cape Town of Radio 786 as a propaganda vehicle for International Airport. mobilization. Spontaneous acts of urban terrorism Guerilla-styled acts of urban terrorism undertaken during mass marches to alleged undertaken by cell structures. drug lords' and gangsters homes. Reformist confrontationalism with institutions Public confrontation with institutions of of government (will be discussed under Section government (will be discussed under Section 7) 7). A non-ideologically motivated political Ideologically motivated political rhetoric and rhetoric. ideologically motivated confrontationalism. A non-confrontational attitude towards the A confrontational attitude towards the Muslim Muslim clergy (will be discussed under Section clergy (will be discussed under Section 6.2). 6.2). Ad hoc co-operation with the South African Violent attacks on South African Police Police Service. Non-violent objections to the Service members. way the South African Police Service deals with the escalating crime situation. The aim of the above discussion was to give an overview of trends within PAGAD's modus operandi, from May 1996 to December 1997 as the primary focus of this study. 68 6.2 INTOLERANCE TOWARDS MUSLIM CLERGY AND OTHER OPPONENTS The following discussion should not be regarded as a separate section, but rather as a part of a discussion throughout this study. In the media the perception was created that PAGAD was a Muslim-based organization. Although it is true that most of PAGAD's members are Muslims following Islamic principles it is important to refer to the relationship between PAGAD members and the Islamic theological community. The period-post September 1996 to date has seen the involvement of Qibla members within PAGAD in direct physical and public attacks against the Ulama (Muslim clergy) and the labelling of the Ulama who do not support PAGAD's militancy as "munaafiqs" (traitors) (Sidique, interview, May 1998). Although PAGAD places great emphasis on democracy and freedom of speech, according to Sidique (interview, May 1998) the actions of PAGAD members contradict this statement. Anyone who says anything against PAGAD, or who criticizes its modus operandi is said to be pm-drug lords and gangsters or are labelled as "munaafiqs" (traitors). On 10 January 1997, PAGAD supporters disrupted a Jumu'ah (prayer meeting) at the Muir Street mosque in Cape Town and assaulted Sheik Mohammed Moerat while he was engaged in a "tafseer" (congregational prayer) from the Quran. PAGAD supporters accused Sheik Moerat of being a munaafiq because he had been one of the signatories together with Mr Ali Parker, when PAGAD was registered as a section 21 company (Ferreira & Wyngaard, 1997:1) 43. This incident led to 60 sheiks, imams and moulanas in the Western Cape publicly denouncing PAGAD's behaviour in the mosque. They demanded that PAGAD, the IUC, Radio 786 and Qibla condemn the behaviour of PAGAD supporters at the mosque. They also criticized Mr Achmad Cassiem and Radio 786 as "... (being) responsible for creating an atmosphere of belligerence, militancy and intolerance in the community as a result of their inflammatory statements and programmes. As a result of this, the image of Islam and Muslims has been tarnished and damaged (Salle, 1997:1) 44. Sentiment aroused that PAGAD's actions were on the brink of fascism in their intolerance of opposition. According to Muslim leaders PAGAD had lost sight of its founding objectives (to rid the community of drugs and gangsters) and instead taken on the state and its institutions (Manjra, 28 February 1997:1). 43 Also see Die Volksblad (11 January 1997). 44 Also see Bowyer & Ludski (1997:1) and (The Citizen, 15 January 1997). 69 Militancy within PAGAD provoked concern and criticism among Muslim scholars and Muslim organizations, including the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM), the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), the Islamic Council of South Africa (ICSA) and the Muslim Women's Federation of Southern Africa, 22 signatories representing eight Muslim organizations and one radio station which made a combined public statement on 14 November 1996 (Annexure G). These organizations, supported by Muslim leaders and academics, stated that although they had welcomed the emergence of PAGAD some months before, they then were deeply concerned about the level of militancy displayed by the organization and that its confrontational and intolerant approach was putting ordinary citizens at risk's. "PAGAD also claims to speak in the name of Islam and Muslims. As part of a multi-religious society in which every religious tradition enjoys constitutional protection, it is evident that the public conduct on the part of some persons claiming to be aligned to PAGAD has compromised the image of Islam and Muslims. The call on Muslims and people at large to arm themselves is particularly alarming. The militarisation of a society in which criminal violence is already endemic is a dangerous and irresponsible path suggested by the PAGAD leadership. The majority of our people, Muslims and non-Muslims, are law-abiding citizens and do not advocate the use of violence for political ends in a democratic dispensation that upholds human rights. The recent public representation of Muslims as armed, angry and masked persons does very little credit to the Islamic values of justice with compassion, love, respect and integrity of all people. We urge PAGAD to re-dedicate itself as a united front against drugs and gangsterism and mobilise public awareness for this cause without violating any laws" (Public Statement, 14 November 1996). According to Ebrahim Moosa (Younghusband, 1996) the militants in PAGAD were a small minority of people who were trying to set the community on a course of conflict with the rest of South Africa. After PAGAD's split in September 1996, as mentioned in Section 6 (PAGAD modus operandi: 1996), both structures established their own "structures", the difference being that the pro-Qibla faction became more active and successful under the chiefco-ordinator, Mr Abdoes Salaam Ebrahim. The latter criticized the former PAGAD leaders, Mr Ali "Phantom" Parker and Mr Farouk Jaffer at a meeting in Athlone on 9 January 1997, accusing them of "selling their souls to Satan" (Smith, 1997:1). With regard to PAGAD's relationship to the MJC, Allie (interview, May 1998) made the following statement "In the past they (MJC) supported us (PAGAD), they still support the aims and objectives of PAGAD. On some issues they support us, on other issues not." According to Sidique, after the initial 45 Also see Rossouw (1996:45). 70 establishment of PAGAD it needed a broader support base. In order to achieve this, they approached the MJC and other organizations. The MJC initially supported PAGAD because the MJC could identify with the objectives of PAGAD, namely to combat gangsterism and drugs in the Western Cape. However, since the launch of PAGAD, the MJC has had its reservations, believing that PAGAD is a Qibla initiative. This belief is based on the fact that Qibla (in particular, Achmat Cassiem) was always anti-Ulama and wished to overthrow the MJC (interview, May 1998). This view was confirmed by the intelligence community during a briefing to Cabinet: "The IUC (Qibla) at present is pursuing the goal of replacing traditional Muslim organizations such as the Muslim Judicial Council and the Muslim Youth Movement as 'sole guardian's' of Muslim interests in South Africa" (Qwelane, 1997:48). 71 7. PAGAD AND THE GOVERNMENT Based on information included in the previous section, it can be accepted that PAGAD is being investigated by the security community. Although the Government, and in particular the South African Police Service encourages community participation in dealing with crime, the most important question to be answered is how far the communities' involvement can be allowed. In order to provide a reasonable explanation the following diagram can be consulted. On ground of this framework PAGAD can be evaluated to see it in the correct context. The second part of this case study deals with the relationship between the Government and PAGAD. The following framework can be regarded as a reference and introduction. The conclusion can be made from a document that was leaked that PAGAD indeed is being investigated by the intelligence community. According to recommendations made to Government by the Intelligence Community on PAGAD during a briefing on 15 August 1996 at the Cabinet Committee for Security and Intelligence Affairs (leaked document), the following basic criteria were being applied to determine at what point Islamic militancy might become a security concern: "The propagated, planned or actual use of violence as a means to achieve objectives" "The propagated, planned or actual use of unlawful or unconstitutional means to achieve objectives" "Covertly organized threats" "Foreign involvement in or manipulation of persons, groups or organizations to further objectives of a foreign state" "The potential for conflict and violence in society originating from whatever source" (Qwelane, 1997:48). In the above-mentioned document, the intelligence community identified at least five organizations in South Africa as being militantly Islamic. This included PAGAD, Qibla and the IUC as being militant and of concern in terms of security (Qwelane, 1997:48). The following characteristics place PAGAD in a more sophisticated, organised and distinctly different position than any other vigilante group known at present in South Africa: i) PAGAD has adhered to different practices such as adopting a military orientation (including aimed offensive capabilities and misdirected targeting). 72 It has articulated a particular hatred discourse - war on drugs- through a jihad (organised vigilantism); PAGAD has defined a bipolar confrontation - the "community" versus the drug dealers and gangsters and is not aligned with mainstream political parties or groups (Nina, 1996:2). PAGAD, in contrast with other community forums, distrusts community police forums and the criminal justice system. In order to evaluate PAGAD's activities in the Western Cape, which range from peaceful demonstrations to acts of violence, the following discussion on the zones of public actions (based upon Figure 14) serves as an introduction to the following discussion on PAGAD (Figure 15). Both these figures are important, the first providing a framework for a practical analysis (Figure 15). Figure 14: Zones of Public Action ZONES OF PUBLIC ACTION MILITARISATION ANARCHY SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION TERRORISM CRIMINAL VIOLENCE VIOLENCE EXTREMISM ORGANISED CRIME INTER-COMMUNIAL CONFLICT . COVERTLY ORGANISED SOCIO-ECONOMIC THREATS DESTABILISATION SUBVERSION 1411HD■ CRIME 11111111111.10SOCIAL CONFLICT DISORDERLY CONDUCT ZONE. OF AMBIGUITY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE LEGITIMATE DISSENT & COMFORT ZONE PROTEST SOCIAL CHANGE ONSTITUTIONAL ORDER The first level of the zones of public action reflects Constitutional order (Figure 14), with a basic level 73 of stability within a democratic society. The following section needs to be seen as part of as the previously discussed one: The second level of the zones of public action is the comfort zone of usual activity, involving legitimate dissent (Figure 14) and protest, both within and outside Parliament. According to Wilkinson (1986:29) protest is more than just a safety valve, it should be regarded as a valuable mode of political communication, criticism and democratic consultation in its own right. In a liberal democratic government, peaceful protest and agitation should be regarded as a legitimate and vital part of the engine of social reform.' Modes of conflict exist which are essentially non-violent, un-institutionalized and spontaneous, and which can provide even the most disadvantaged groups in society with powerful levers of political, moral and even economic pressure on government leaders and elite groups. Such means include, for example, strike action and go-slows. Time-honoured and powerful modes of political and moral pressure include the mass campaign of marches, processions, demonstrations and mass meetings, inevitably coupled with massive media publicity and pressure on government personnel and political parties. As discussed under terminology, a pressure group can be defined as "any organized group which attempts to influence government decisions without itself exercising the formal powers of government. The latter part of the definition is usually intended to distinguish a pressure group from a political party or conspiratorial group, while the stress on organizations distinguishes it from a mob or other spontaneous collection of individuals" (Moodie & Studdert-Kennedy, 1970:60-61). Open action includes, first of all, a demand for the fulfilment of promises made by candidates during election campai ns. These actions include the sending of delegations to parliamentary groups, to government commissions and to ministers of State representing the most open, most public manner of exerting pressure at the level of power (Duverger, 1972:121-122). According to Moodie & Studdert-Kennedy (1970:67-68) the better the group is organized, the more effective it is likely to be, whatever its membership or purpose. The greater proportion of the population the group represents, the greater the group's impact. With respect to ideas and beliefs, it has an effect in three different ways: "Certain groups are organized around a particular set of beliefs. Secondly, any group gains in cohesion, and hence is strength, where there is a sense of mission, a distinctive rationale or a 46 According to Franks (1989:6) there is a tension between the forces for change and the desire for change. Among the most important forces for change is dissent by individuals and groups who disagree with government either because they want more change, or because they want less. But there are limits in all states to what those in power consider to be acceptable dissent. These limits vary from country to country. 74 strong sense of commitment on the part of the members. Thirdly, a group will be stronger or weaker depending on whether it is swimming with or against the tide of socially acceptable standards and beliefs." The third level of the zones of public action encompasses the zone of ambiguity (Figure 14). This can be called a "grey" area where contentious issues in society and the behaviour of individuals and groups result in disorderly conduct and acts of civil disobedience and conscientious objection, although the initial objective does not involve a comprehensive rejection of legal authority. Although it is a non-violent means of individual resistance to authority it may, on occasion, stimulate a repressive response by the authorities or by members of the community hostile to the objector's position (Wilkinson, 1986:26-27). Peaceful acts of civil disobedience may on occasion be infiltrated or even be taken over by those who have no inhibitions about the use of violence, or who have an ulterior motive. In other cases the demonstration, however peaceful in intent, may provoke a violent counter-demonstration of response. Therefore a peaceful campaign of civil disobedience can result in violent confrontation, especially if one bears in mind that "protesters" may be swept into more dangerous and destructive emotions and actions. There is a tendency for such demonstrations to become more aggressive, partly because of the rising threshold of shock needed to attract media attention, and partly because, when peaceful demonstrations fail to achieve results, frustration usually leads to more violence (Clutterbuck, 1986:41). According to Wilkinson (1986:35) collective rage and violence are not necessarily a summation of individual frustration but may, in a large part, be a function of changing ideologies, beliefs and historical conditions which materially affect social conceptions of justice and legitimacy. A sense of sudden worsening deprivation, injustice or oppression, is often a major precondition of political violence. This is not the objective of the whole structure. Nevertheless individuals within a structure will use the structure to further their own objectives. "Vigilante groups are by no means static entities. They contain the potential to splinter into violent and less violent factions.... Such divisions are often the result of conflict between opposing factions - one seeking greater accommodation with the State to demonstrate to any constituency that recognition has been won - the other seeking even greater violence on the grounds that more can be achieved by such means (Shaw, 1996:6)." According to Father Christopher Clohesy: "I won't deny there are elements in PAGAD who thrive on confrontation, who need to be constantly at war. But they are the minority (Rossouw, 1997)." An example of this is the involvement of Qibla in the formation of PAGAD in the Western Cape and the later split within PAGAD between the more militant pro-Qibla faction and the more moderate anti-Qibla faction. 75 The fourth level of the zones of public action is the security zone (Figure 14), a level of disorder where the potential or actual occurrence of crime, conflict violence and subversion pose a threat to society or the State. An escalation of the problem could lead to conditions of anarchy, militarization and social collapse. Internal violence can be divided into two groups based upon their prime objectives. The first directly endangers the survival and stability of the Constitution itself; the second indirectly and cumulatively undermines the State's authority and support by major defiance of law and order and by endangering the lives of citizens to the point where confidence in the authorities is eroded. PAGAD's conduct in its severest actions can be seen as a manifestation of the latter category. The problem with a system based on popular justice (including PAGAD), is the fact that these structures are formed without differentiated roles, the lack of rules (violence is not ruled out), norm dissent, no exclusive focus on the past (as the law) or the future (as mediation for problem solving) and without the restructuring of social pressures (whether of formal authority or public opinion). This situation can lead to anarchy: These structures are preoccupied with maintaining control and thus "forget" about individual freedom (including the right to a fair trial). Within popular justice there are no safeguards - these structures may legitimize more severe penalties than were necessary (on the basis that they are under the assumption that the crime was more serious or that the offenders are unrepentant) (Marshall, 1988:25-36). In conjunction with the above elements vigilantism is disorderly and unpredictable. Vigilante punishment has the potential to be worse than the crime itself, and thus vigilantes become criminals themselves.' Ironically, the original motive or objective of vigilante action is to strengthen state institutions. However, it often has the opposite effect: "the further weakening and undermining of official criminal justice channels and the creation of alternative centres of power - and by definition coercion - outside State security apparatus." (Shaw, 1996:5). Vigilantism evokes State sovereignty through the former's punishment of alleged criminals. Individuals within these organizations are often charged with, among other things, sedition - the action of reproducing State authority by other means (Nina, 1996:3). As the term "pressure group" implies, some kind of sanction will be applied if a demand is refused. However, according to the literature these groups seldom use force. The strength of pressure groups begin with control over the means of force and violence. With regard to PAGAD, PAGAD represents in one or the other way each and every individual within the South African community. Even the MJC and the South 47 According to Vish Naidoo (police liason officer) in reaction to two incidents of mob justice: "lt is despicable for people to behave like this. They are committing a crime to solve a crime (Gibson, 22 February 1997). 76 African Police Service during interviews supported the objectives of PAGAD. Within the implementation of the above diagrams on PAGAD, PAGAD finds itself on different zones. The zone oflegitimate dissent includes the statement made by Father Christopher Clohesy (one of the founding members of PAGAD): "I am very doubtful about a democracy where protests are deemed illegal, I am very doubtful about a democracy where one has to go to the authorities for permission to protest against them. In a democracy people have the right to protest wherever they want without being baton-charged by the police (Rossouw, 1997)." Figure 15: Zones of Public Action PAGAD Flionv Is . . , QIBLA SECURITY . GANGs , -1- ZONE 7 zeil y7E- oF ' ---0, , ,..., ,4.44- AIOUITY- ,-. ,„,„4,...-?-7,-, , , : , . , . _ , 4 , ,-, PAGAD ''''`' 4 '''' r,:i '; '07 .:-'::::: .; '.-='..,,',' t. :.:4::. -:',',,, IP.-'-':':."Ig'-' ,,.-- ':: ',. ,.1.. '';-.'''' 'iM, F.4...;4;,-;.4,;;; '.--::';',7=,-,7:.:•:4-. ., , :N. -: :::7--,:::.7.- -it -, ,....„, CONSTITUTIONAL . ORDER . . .. On the basis of the above discussion the conclusion can be made that the overt activities of PAGAD fall within the framework of a pressure group. Through protest marches, the issuing of ultimatums to the government and the South African Police Service, PAGAD's aim was to put pressure on government to take a harder approach on crime and drugs in South Africa, in particular in the Western Cape. However, the covert activities of PAGAD cell structures (the G-Force) and individuals fall within the framework of vigilantism and violence. It is a basic principle of democracy that one cannot rule without the consent of the people. The public is naturally averse to organizations which are seen to promote chaos on the streets. Peace is a universal aspiration and in normal circumstances the banishing of guns and flaunting of masks is almost guaranteed 77 to rob an organization of support. The fact that PAGAD continues to flourish, points to a depth of feeling which demands recognition for. Recognition was denied twice by the authorities: The authorities refused PAGAD supporters permission to demonstrate at Cape Town International Airport. The statement by the police in the wake of the airport and Bellville clashes - that they will no longer have talks with PAGAD, but will treat it as "just another gang (Mail & Guardian, 20 December 1996)." These incidents and the split in PAGAD led to individuals within PAGAD to become more frustrated and it manifested in members being uncooperative with the police (for more information see Section 7.1). In turn, PAGAD's operations were divided between overt actions within the zone of legitimate dissent (see Figure 15), e.g., public meetings and the issuing of ultimatums and covert actions within the zones of ambiguity, and security (see Figure 15) e.g. the formation of covert cell structures and attacks on alleged drug dealers. This strategy was confirmed in an article in The Cape Argus (Aranes, 1997:10): "They marched on the homes of dozens of known drug dealers, and staged protests at the city's points of entry, saying there were not sufficient control mechanisms in place to stop drugs from entering the country. Later the police alleged that smaller PAGAD units were bombing and shooting up drug dealers' homes."On the question as to whether PAGAD has a covert and overt structure that almost functions separately, Spannenberg asked the question why PAGAD has so many changes in its top structure, especially the current involvement of Mr Abdus Salaam Ebrahim who is in charge of PAGAD's activities without the consent or knowledge of the PAGAD leadership or broader PAGAD structure (confirmed by Sidique, interview, May 1998). PAGAD cell structures (each area has its own cell structure) are responsible for acts of violence, each under the leadership of an Amir who reports to a broader structure. According to the provincial Police Minister Gerald Morkel, PAGAD's G-Force is "highly sophisticated" (Aranes, 1997:4). In the period between May 1996 and December 1997 PAGAD supporters marched twice to Parliament. On 11 May 1996, approximately 3 000 PAGAD supporters marched to Parliament where they handed over a 60-day ultimatum for the government to combat crime, after which they warned that PAGAD would take the law into its own hands. On 18 January 1997, approximately 700 PAGAD supporters marched to Parliament, where they handed a memorandum detailing their demands to a representative of the Minister of Justice. PAGAD stated that the memorandum was not an ultimatum, that its aims and objectives were still the same and that it would not deviate or be distracted from its aims. Apart from the memorandum's confrontational stance against the government and its institutions, Qibla members also made inflammatory statements against the government. For example, Mr Abdurrazak Ebrahim (the spiritual leader of PAGAD), said that the government posed a definite threat to the community and that South African Police Service 78 members were nothing but legal gangsters in uniform, who were protecting the rights of the illegal merchants sitting in Parliament. He equated the situation in which PAGAD found itself in relation to the South African government with that experienced by Muslims in Bosnia, Algeria, Egypt and elsewhere, where governments discriminate against Muslims (extremists). Mr Achmat Cassiem (leader of Qibla and chairperson of the Islamic Unity Convention) demanded the immediate release of PAGAD members from jail and threatened that there would be no peace until this demand was met (also see the section on the split in PAGAD). Based on the study thus far the conclusion can be made that PAGAD's actions can be divided between overt and covert actions. A deduction can be made that PAGAD crossed the border of legitimate dissent to the zone of ambiguity and security zone 48.This is probable on the covert level with the establishment of the G-Force and cell structures (responsible for attacks on alleged drug lords and gangsters). On the other hand, on the overt level the PAGAD structure can be seen as moving away, past the limits of acceptable protest and to the status of a vigilante group. In the Cape Town International Airport incident it was followed by a skirmish between members of PAGAD and the South African Police Service at the Bellville Magistrate's Court on 17 December 1996. Although PAGAD never hesitates to use violence against gangsters and drug dealers, PAGAD supporters regard the police as fair game, as far as the police is concerned. This statement is based on several clashes between PAGAD and the police. Sterrenberg made the following statement after the shooting of five policemen during the Bellville court battle: "This is the highest number of police shot in one day in one incident in the Western Cape. It is cause for great concern" (The Pretoria News, 18 December 1996). 49 The then acting National Commissioner, Zoli Lavisa said: "PAGAD's aggression, especially against the police, shows quite clearly that it has embarked on a policy of deliberate criminality. As far as the South African Police Service is concerned, PAGAD has degenerated into just another gang and is now firmly part of the crime problem in the Western Cape (Stan, 18 December 1996)." Lavisa further commented saying it had became clear that PAGAD had distanced itself from its original goal of combatting crime. PAGAD's aggression, especially towards South African Police Service members, indicated that it had openly embarked on a policy of deliberate criminality. President Nelson Mandela's spokesman Parks Mankahlana accused the organization of undermining South Africa's sovereignty and of abusing the rights enshrined in the Constitution. Safety and Security Minister Mufamadi's spokesman, Maxwell Mulaudzi, said that the Minister was concerned that police attention was 48 Ali "Phantom" Parker made the following statement to the Daily News (12 August 1996:1) after declaring a Jihad on drug lords and the police: 'We have moved from civil disobedience to civil unrest." 49 Also see Star (18 December 1996). 79 being diverted from dealing with crime, which PAGAD purported to be concerned about (Ensor & Bothma, 1996). 5° In an interview with two PAGAD representatives, Allie and Roberts (interview, May 1998), Roberts gave the following answer in reaction to a question on the relationship between PAGAD and the government (including the police): "PAGAD is not anti-police or anti-state. The police is not our enemy, we know who our enemies are. All we want is to put pressure on the police and State to deal with the problem. The same kind of infrastructure they had during the apartheid era should be used to get rid of gangsterism and drugs." Allie said: "I believe the police themselves have an agenda. The top of the police are of the old guard, they have an agenda to get rid of PAGAD. We would obey whatever law, provided that it is just, and provided that it is applied justly and correctly to the full application of the law. We do not want a selective application of the law when it comes to PAGAD." The statements made by these two PAGAD members contradicts a statement by Sidique. According to Sidique PAGAD is anti-government and anti-police: "They (PAGAD) even went to call the government an illegitimate government, they later had to withdraw this statement. This type of thing creates animosity and conflict" (interview, May 1998). In an interview with Holtzhauzen, the South African police liaison officer in the Western Cape, it was said that the South African Police Service at present does not have any relationship with PAGAD, as the South African Police Service cannot have any relationship with any organization that operates outside the law (interview, May 1998). Police Commissioner George Fivaz's spokesperson, Andrew Lesch, said that the PAGAD question was no longer about crime: "There is now a threat to the State and the Constitution. Top-ranking officials in the departments of Safety and Security, Defence and Justice, as well as the police and National Intelligence Agency (MA) have decided to adopt a 'zero-tolerance' approach to the situation in the Western Cape" (Van Zilla, 1997:3). 50 Also see Ferreira (1996). 80 701 PAGAD AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE PAGAD's decision to do something about the situation in the Western Cape potentially placed PAGAD in direct conflict with the South African Police Service. PAGAD members themselves had committed crimes against the state in the form of sedition, against individuals (murder, attempted murder, intimidation and assault) and against property (malicious damage to property and arson). The following discussion will also focus on initiatives initiated by the South African Police Service and the process of negotiations between PAGAD and the South African Police Service. Following on an interview with Holtzhausen (interview, May 1998) the assumption was made that the South African Police Service had followed a moderate approach regarding PAGAD. The reasons for this being firstly that the South African Police Service was in a transitional phase and secondly the South African Police Service did not want to create a martyr. This moderate approach had changed since October 1996 up to the point of a current approach of zero-tolerance (as referred to in the previous discussion). The reasons for this being as follows: Since the establishment ofPAGAD, members of the South African Police Service always accompanied members during marches in order to prevent violence. Prior to October 1996 PAGAD members disregarded orders issued by the South African Police Service and attacked alleged drug dealers in the presence of the South African Police Service. For example, on 1 August 1996 a group of approximately 300 PAGAD supporters marched and petrol bombed the residence of Richard Stemmet. Members of the South African Police Service monitored the procession but no police action was taken due to the fact that the police were outnumbered and more support was not available (Annexure D). During the second incident on 4 August 1996 a group of approximately 5000 PAGAD supporters marched to one of the residences used by the Hard Living Kids gang. Members of PAGAD were veiled and heavily armed. Whilst the PAGAD leadership were in discussion with the South African Police Service, the more militant faction within the group attacked the residence. During this incident one individual was killed and seventeen injured. Although members of the South African Police Service tried to negotiate with PAGAD supporters during a march to the residence of Glen Khan (alleged drug dealer and previously attacked on 20 October) PAGAD members attacked this residence (Annexure D). Other incidents directed against members of the South African Police Service included a shooting incident by a group of veiled people and another hand grenade attack by a group of veiled people on police members on patrol. Both incidents took place on 11 August 1996. On 27 August 1996 shots were fired at members of police outside the Gatesville Mosque. An escalation 81 of alleged PAGAD violent activities contributed to the fact that the South African Police Service started to put an end to marches by PAGAD. For example, on 22 October 1996 members of the South African Police Service stopped a demonstration in Atlantis. The same strategy was used when PAGAD members marched to Sea Point on 23 October 1996. During a PAGAD march on 26 October 1996 in Atlantis, members of PAGAD disregarded police orders to disperse (during this incident nine PAGAD members were arrested). Above-mentioned period introduced a period of stand-offs with the South African Police Service. For example, on 3 November 1996 a skirmish took place between the South African Police Service and PAGAD at the Waterfront (thirteen PAGAD members were arrested) followed by an attack on members of the South African Police Service during the burial of Agmat Najaar (who died during the stand-off at the Waterfront). Aslam Toefy assaulted a police member during a PAGAD rally at the Vygieskraal Stadium on 10 November 1996. On 16 December 1996, three violent stand-offs took place between PAGAD and the South African Police Service: During a march to the Cape Town International Airport PAGAD members threw stones at members of the South African Police Service. In reaction to the arrest of PAGAD supporters, a group of 400 PAGAD members fired shots at police members at the Bellville Magistrates Court. Later that same night a group of 180 PAGAD supporters surrounded a police vehicle after it had been forced off the road. During this incident PAGAD members intimidated and assaulted police members (Annexure D). It can be concluded from statistics (mentioned in Section 6) and the above that actions against the South African Police Service usually took place during day time. In contrast with this, actions aimed against alleged drug lords and gang members took place during the night. The reason for this could be that the victims would be at home and the impact could be greater. On the ground of the previous discussion, the police started to prevent PAGAD marches. Legislation against the wearing of facial covering and the bearing of firearms, although it had previously existed, was enforced in an increasing way. In the past the police sometimes were surprised by the large number of PAGAD supporters at potentially volatile gatherings and were then outnumbered. This led to the enforcing of the law that PAGAD members had to apply for the right to march with at least seven prior to the intended date (Holtzhausen, interview, May 1998). PAGAD's reaction on the government's lawful banning of the wearing of facial covering and the bearing of firearms during marches, resulted in the following statements: "We had to apply 7 days in advance; we had to march without our legal firearms and facial covering. We found this new Act to be unconstitutional 82 because it infringed upon our rights as entrenched in the Bill of Rights. We say that we live in a new democratic dispensation and as South African citizens, we claim the right to Freedom of Movement, Expression, Association, Religion, Belief and Opinion. We also claim the right to equality before the law" (The PAGAD Marches, 1997:1). Although PAGAD called upon the Bill of Rights in the New Constitution it is important to note that although the Constitution did make provision for all these rights, it also stipulated under Chapter 2 (17) that each individual had the right to meet or march in "a peaceful" and "unarmed manner" (Act No 108 of 1996). In reaction to the Constitution (Bill of Rights) the South African Police Service reacted as follows: "The South African Police Service respects every individual's right to organize and participate in any gathering, march or demonstration but find it difficult to understand why PAGAD's marches have to take place at night. We believe that the South African Police Service, the community and organizations such as PAGAD should enter into a partnership against crime. Only then we will be able to eradicate crime and gang activity. PAGAD should be willing to afford the South African Police Service the opportunity to focus on combatting crime. Valuable resources and manpower are at present wasted on the management and investigation of crime committed by elements within PAGAD, as well as the policing of marches and demonstrations: pipe-bomb and firearm attacks on alleged gang members and drug dealers must stop to enable us to focus on the real problem of criminal gang activity" (South African Police Service, 1997:2). In support to above statement Sterrenberg, said in an interview to The Cape Argus that the police had had enough of wasting manpower and resources on policing PAGAD: "A serious dilemma facing the police was that they could not treat PAGAD as a 'law-abiding' community group exercising the right to protest, as its 'record' of breaking promises to authorities spoke for itself. They are actually hindering us by keeping us busy. It costs money to keep policemen where the demonstrations are and with the police budget already drastically cut, we've got to do more with less money" (Smith, 1997:3). In reaction to a PAGAD application to march through the streets of Athlone on 8 November from 21:00 to 00:00 (after PAGAD suspended night marches for four weeks), the South African Police Service issued a media statement on Friday, 7 November 1997. This media statement provided the following reasons why the South African Police Service was in not in favour of night marches between 21:00 and 24:00: 1) "Tension between PAGAD and criminals (gang members) seem to be heightened during night marches. 83 Night marches provoke further violence. The monitoring and management of marches at night are extremely difficult as criminals always favour operating under cover of darkness. The risk of physical harm, injury, damage to property as well as to PAGAD members, civilians and security force members are greater at night. PAGAD members have carried firearms and have disguised themselves with scarves at previous gatherings, despite undertakings given to police that this type of behaviours would not occur, this, besides the fact that this type of conduct is prohibited by Law" (South African Police Service, 1997:1). Local authorities in reaction will provide permission for gatherings/marches that take place between 08:00 and 17:00. No permission will be granted for any gathering, march or demonstration outside these hours" (South African Police Service, 1997:2). Police spokesman Simon Mpembe said "We believe that the general situation on the Cape Flats still is very volatile and marches at night will only intensify the situation and put people at unnecessary risk." In reaction to this decision an executive member of PAGAD, Mr Sedick Jacobs said that the police did not want them to march at all (Aranes, 1997:2). This researcher came to the conclusion after interviews with both PAGAD (Allie & Roberts, interview, May 1998) and members of the South African Police Service (Holtzhausen & Spannenberg, interview, May 1998) that the above mentioned incidents led to animosity between the two parties concerned. Allegations were made by PAGAD that the police supported and protected the drug dealers and gangsters. On the other hand the South African Police Service accused PAGAD of being part of the problem and obstructed the efforts of the police to maintain law and order. In an estimate provided by Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi, PAGAD had cost the Government nearly RI million since the murder of Rasaad Staggie in August 1996 to 12 December 1996. During this period, detectives investigated 53 PAGAD-related case dockets. These cases included attempted murder, assault, public violence, the illegal bearing of dangerous weapons and unlawful possession of explosive devices (Vapi, 12 December 1996). 5' Over a period of a year (up to 5 August 1997) South African Police Service spent almost R8 million on monitoring PAGAD demonstrations. According to Western Cape Police Commissioner Leon Wessels: "Our crime prevention operations are affected because members involved in normal policing functions aimed at crime prevention must monitor these PAGAD marches." He called upon PAGAD "to rather work with the police in gathering information" than force the police to spend millions of rands and precious 51 Also see Bothma (12 December 1996). 84 resources on monitoring PAGAD marches. Two reasons are given: Firstly, to keep opposing factions such as PAGAD and CORE from engaging in violent confrontations and, secondly, because PAGAD members were guilty of criminal activity by attacking innocent bystanders, openly displaying firearms and by covering their faces (The Cape Times, 1997:3). Thus, PAGAD members and supporters organize anti-crime campaigns during which marches are held to the houses of persons believed to be involved in criminal activities to serve as a deterrent. The State has authority to enforce its laws by means of the police, the Attorneys-General and the courts. The police do investigate cases against alleged so-called drug lords. These investigations take time as the police have to investigate a case docket fully before the prosecuting authority can make a decision as to whether to prosecute or not. If the actions of the members of these extremist groups are intended to impair, defy or subvert the State in enforcing its laws, the crime of sedition is committed (interview with Attorney Kahn - Attorney-General: Western Cape; Attorneys Gerber and Viljoen, May 1998). Thus, civil disobedience could become "uncivil" disobedience "by way of carefully chosen and limited means that exclude measures that could cause personal injuries or even the loss of life". Uncivil disobedience thus refers to any act of disobedience or resistance that does not recognize the limits, as provided by the law (Bay, 1989:42). On account of cases that have been registered since September 1996 the conclusion can be made that the border to uncivil disobedience has been crossed. Although this statement seems far-fetched, it should be seen against the background of the fact that, with the split in PAGAD in 1996, the movement became more militant. The police is of opinion that PAGAD has come to show total contempt of the law, even usurping and defying the State and made the police the enemy of the movement (Holtzhausen, interview, May 1998)52. 52 Also see Saturday Argus (1997:21). 85 Figure 16: PAGAD Cases Registered Types of cases 1996 Public violence (1.27%) Malicious damage (15.19%) Illegal possession (17.72%) Murder (1.27%) Attempted murder (64.56%) PAGAD: Cases Registred 1997 Public Violence (2.67%) Assault (1.78%) Illegal possession (7.11%) Malicious Damage (14.67%) Murder (7.11%) Attempted murder (66.67%) Continue on following page 86 Figure 16: PAGAD Cases Registered PAGAD CASES REGISTRED Public Violence Assault° Illegal Possesion Malicious Damage Murder Attempted Murder TWA — 20 60 80 100 120 140 160 NUMBER ❑ Jul-Dec 1996 ❑ Jan-Dec 1997 In reaction to the involvement of PAGAD members in criminal activities, particularly the Staggie incidents as set out in above graphics (Figure 16), the PAGAD Task Team (special South African Police investigating team) was initially established at the beginning of August 1996. There have been other acts of violence since July 1996 (although no one was killed during these incidents). After the Staggie incident there was an increase of acts of violence, although the majority of PAGAD's actions took the form of protest marches (during which they presented ultimatums to drug dealers). There were isolated acts of violence. The PAGAD Task Team, in collaboration with Internal Security focussed more on the criminal activities of PAGAD than the organization itself. During the period 5 August 1996 to 11 August 1997 the PAGAD Task Team had investigated 135 cases. Approximately 103 PAGAD members had been arrested for being in possession of illegal firearms. A further 43 cases had been investigated by the Task Team in September 1997 resulting in the arrest 28 PAGAD members and the confiscation of 59 legal and illegal firearms (Die Burger, 1997:2). According to a member of the PAGAD Task Team (Spannenberg, interview, May 1998) the majority of PAGAD cases have been attempted murder, although the intention was difficult to prove. However, the nature of the attacks reflected the intention of murder. During the latter half of 1997 (since October 1997) it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between acts of violence committed by PAGAD, and those of the gangs. According to Spannenberg, PAGAD has its own modus operandi that 87 distinguishes it from that of the gangs. Pipe-bombs are exclusively (with the exception of one or two cases) the hallmark of PAGAD53. Reportedly what makes the investigation of these actions difficult is the fact that the PAGAD leadership distance themselves from these actions and nobody ever takes responsibility for these acts of violence. With regard to the relationship between the PAGAD Task Team and PAGAD, Spannenberg (interview, May 1998) was of the opinion that PAGAD regarded the Task Team as a threat, which has resulted in direct and indirect threats made by PAGAD members to members of the Task Team. Threats included surveillance of members of the Task Team, threats' made at court and intimidation. Another problem, as mentioned by Spannenberg, is the insufficient manpower and finances to deal with problems (gang activities and violence by PAGAD members). These problems are magnified by mismanagement, based upon the fact that that there are clear threats within the Western Cape, and that available resources are not being used to deal with these problems (Spannenberg, interview, May 1998). South African Police Service relations with PAGAD began to deteriorate with incident of threats made against investigating officers, the prevention of normal police and judicial process functions, and the involvement of PAGAD G-Force members in crime. According to the South African Police Service these incidents contradicted the policy of PAGAD. PAGAD, through targeting individuals who were not involved in drug dealing, became just another gang. Commissioner Wessels stated in this regard: "It was evident that PAGAD had no respect for law-abiding citizens or their property. The police were committed to protecting law-abiding citizens and would not hesitate to act" (Barnes, 1997:1). After the South African Police Service suspended talks with PAGAD, The Cape Times (1997:1) asked the MEC for Safety and Security, Mr Gerald Morkel, what would be necessary to resume negotiations: "Until PAGAD can give us the assurance that it is able to control its members, especially the G-Force, it would be difficult for us to have dialogue." 53 With the establishment of PAGAD, it was the first time the South African Police Service in the Western Cape was confronted by the use of pipe-bombs. According to Spannenberg gang violence is as old as the Cape itself, but the establishment of PAGAD introduced the use of pipe-bombs. 54 Two PAGAD members were arrested for attacking people in Woodstock with baseball bats, shooting at them and robbing them. When these two PAGAD members appeared in the Cape Town Magistrate's Court on 28 July 1997, they totally disrupted the court proceedings and made remarks to the investigating officers, including death threats (Barnes, 1997:1). 88 702 POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PAGAD The question can be put what the government's view on PAGAD really is. Seeing that the initiative of an organization of PAGAD's character was in nature a new concept to the current government, an evaluation of statements by government officials and actions taken, should be made. On the other hand, this applies to the situation as a whole in the Western Cape and not only to PAGAD. One should further look into the extent of cooperation between the different departments (South African Police Service and the South African National Defence Force) with regard to the situation in the Western Cape. Probably the best example and a step in the right direction is "Operation Recoil", and through this initiative, the implementation of a "Multi Agency Delivery Action Mechanism (MADAM)". Although it is too soon to evaluate the success of these initiatives, it is still important to note these programmes that will be discussed throughout this section. On 16 October 1997 a meeting took place between President Mandela, several Cabinet Ministers as well as the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service and the Head of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) about the security and crime situation in the Western Cape (specifically the Cape Flats). Through the National Operational Co-ordinating Committee (NOCOC) and the Provincial Operational Co-ordinating Committee (POCOC) (Western Cape) "Operation Recoil" was launched. The objective was to stabilize the security and crime situation in the Western Cape (Cape Flats) as from 27 October 1997, by the conducting of intelligence-driven high density and crime prevention operations (NOCOC, 1997:1-2). See Annexure F for a diagram explaining the different committees and structures involved in managing the situation in the Western Cape. In reaction to an escalation of PAGAD's unconstitutional activities the following statement was made "The South African Police Service and the National Defence Force have launched a special operation in the Western Cape, under the name of 'Operation Recoil'. This operation will target drug trafficking, criminal activities perpetrated by elements within PAGAD and crime in general, through search and seizures conducted in terms of the Police Act of 1996. Tactically this operation includes an increase in police roadblocks, the cordoning off of particular street(s) and/or residential areas, as well as the searching of individuals, vehicles and houses" (South African Police Service, 1997:2). The primal focus of "Operation Recoil" could be summarised as directly quoted from the NOCOC 89 operational strategy document: a) "The operation will be intelligence-driven and comprise of the following intelligence focus areas: Crime patterns to determine hot spots for higher density and crime prevention operations. Tactical intelligence for the purpose of high-density and crime prevention operations. Intelligence for the purpose of court-directed investigations; and intelligence provided by Specialised Investigation Units which could be used for any of the above purposes. b) High-density crime prevention and visibility operations to be conducted by: Crime Prevention Task Team (crime prevention and visibility) Visible Gang Unit (crime prevention) Public Order Policing (high-density operations) SA Army (high-density operations). c) Investigations to be conducted by: Gang Investigation Task Group (concentrating on inter-gang conflict) PAGAD Investigation Task Group (concentrating on PAGAD activities) Specialized Investigation Units (concentrating on issues emanating from gang activities, conflict between PAGAD and gangs, etc)"(NOCOC, 1997:3-4). With the implementation of "Operation Recoil" on 27 October 1996, Simon Mpembe, in command of the Visible Policing Component of the task team assembled to crack down on the violence between gangsters and PAGAD, led about 100 Defence Force and police personnel on a raid of 10 properties. According to the police the first nine-hour operation was successful as large quantities of drugs and alcohol were confiscated and people arrested (Aranes, 1997:2). To conclude, the aim of "Operation Recoil"' was to establish stability in the Western Cape, through tactical and intelligence operations that include roadblocks, cordon operations and search operations. Although these measures focused on the security situation in the Western Cape, those parties involved realized that gangs and PAGAD were a manifestation of a bigger problem, namely that of poor socio-economic conditions and that the security and intelligence community are not responsible for the management of these situations. Under the management of the Minister for Community Security a Multi Agency Delivery Action Mechanism (MADAM) was initiated on 24 April 1998. The most important role-players (excluding South African Police Service and the SANDF) included the office of the Attorney- General in the Western Cape, the Department of Education, etc. In co-ordination with the South African Police Service the objective 55 PAGAD's reaction, as revealed in an interview with Dr Gulam Allie and Abidah Roberts was that: "People have always died on the Cape Flats, and we never had this "Operation Recoil". We agree that they should have "Operation Recoil", but they should do it properly" meaning that the main problem was the current crime situation, and that should be dealt with. 90 included a more suitable witness-protection programme and to evaluate and improve the current bail and detention mechanisms (Boshoff, interview, May 1998) (NOCOC, 1998:3). Other objectives under MADAM were to bring on board welfare, education, housing and local government to thrash out long-lasting solutions (Bateman, 1998:11). Government was briefed by the Intelligence Community on PAGAD on 15 August 1996 at the Cabinet Committee for Security and Intelligence Affairs: "The intelligence community views the Western Cape PAGAD-led events so seriously as to say they were 'in part driven by the phenomenon of Islamic militancy'. President Nelson Mandela and 10 members of his Cabinet, plus five deputy ministers, have been briefed on the activities of PAGAD with reference to Islamic militancy within the country. The intelligence community told the Cabinet: 'What happened in the Western Cape with the establishment of PAGAD was in reality the coinciding of different interest groups' agendas, co-ordinated and propelled by Islamic militants, but also supported by a broader group of people in society. A community's legitimate concerns about the high crime rate - and gangsterism and drug trafficking in particular - became the vehicle for militants to gather support and promote their cause. The security issues that were highlighted by these events included vigilantism and people's justice, the carrying of firearms and evidence of armed training, and extreme acts of violence" (Qwelane, 1997:48). On the basis of information provided by South African Police Service, the ANC government made the following statement: "If police reports are correct, then PAGAD has gone from an organization with a noble cause to just another gang intent on breaking the law at each and every turn. Far from curbing the growth of crime they have become part of the criminal problem in the Western Cape" (The Citizen, 1997:5). The Minister of Justice, Mr Dullah Omar, gave the following statement in reaction to the involvement of PAGAD members in criminal activities: "... no one is allowed to take the law into their own hands and authorities are duty-bound to take action against these people. We cannot tolerate a situation in which innocent people are losing their lives (or) being maimed" (The Cape Times, 1997:1). On the questions of solutions to the situation in the Western Cape the following government officials have the following to say: President Nelson Mandela (through his spokesman Mr Parks Mankahlana): "Obviously it is a serious problem. When the national crime prevention strategy is fully implemented, it will have the potential to address the problem" (The Cape Times, 1997:1). Deputy President Thabo Mbeki (through his spokesman Mr Ricky Naidoo): "It is essentially a provincial issue. If the province cannot handle it, then central government will have to take the necessary steps. It is absolutely incorrect that central government has not been involved" (The Cape Times, 1997:1). If there was any good to be gained from the deaths and 91 devastation on the Cape Flats, it was that revulsion at the violence was increasingly turning the community against PAGAD. Western Cape Health and Social Services MEC, Mr Ebrahim Rasool had the following to say: "The death and maiming of innocents revolt people and they recoil from it - enough, I think, to drive the community away from PAGAD and to co-operate with authorities. It is beginning to happen more and we should encourage it" (The Cape Times, 1997:1). PAGAD's negotiations with the South African Police Service before the South African Police Service decided to suspend talks was defended by Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi, who said that the central government would provide whatever support was needed to stop the violence. However, he emphasized that the problem would not be solved overnight. "The intention of the talks was to ensure that PAGAD members stuck to the 'stated aims of the organization'. While some PAGAD members 'may have started to lose focus', it remained important to reach out to those members who are genuinely 'wanting to make a contribution to ending crime" (The Cape Times, 1997:5). Before the implementation of "Operation Recoil", Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi said that, based upon the fact that gang-related criminal violence was not a new tendency in the Cape, law enforcement was only one way of dealing with the violence, which had been deeply embedded in the culture of communities. Other approaches are required. Measures to extend the South African Police Service' capacity in the Cape included the following: 35 Free State police members had been sent to the Cape to form part of the Public Order Policing unit in August 1997; 26 had joined them from the Southern Cape; the National Defence Force was asked to send 200 members, including parabats; and 96 new police members were deployed in Bellville. In October, the South African Police Service had the following successes: There had been 103 arrests and 103 illegal and legal firearms were confiscated in PAGAD-related cases (The Cape Times, 1997:5). Other solutions to the current situation in the Western Cape could include, according to the MEC for Safety and Security, Mr Gerald Morkel even a state of emergency: "If it is necessary, a state of emergency will be declared in the province, but I am leaving that door open. Although we don't have as many people on the ground as we would like, I believe we can cope. If things deteriorate, we will have to reconsider that option (state of emergency)" (The Cape Times, 1997:1). 92 703 EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENTAL REACTIONS The previous section dealt with government reaction, and in particular initiatives launched by the South African Police Service and the South African National Defence Force (Operation Recoil and MADAM). The objective ofthis section will be to evaluate the reaction of the South African Police Service on PAGAD since its establishment. Some of the aspects have already been discussed in the section on the relationship between PAGAD and the South African Police Service. The South African Government and the South African Police Service were caught in a difficult situation. Both these structures acknowledged the fact that the objectives of PAGAD were genuine, but with some of PAGAD's modus operandi none could identify. The South African Government as the protector of democracy did not act immediately with authority, and this gave the impression that when they did act they were not serious. The lack of total commitment on the side of the government was strengthened by the fact that the South African Police Service was, and still is, in a process of restructuring that introduced a total different strategy to combat crime and any other threat to the internal stability of South Africa. The new strategy to combat crime is centred around a softer approach, through community involvement and negotiations. When one evaluates police reactions to PAGAD, it is clear that the South African Police Service used a "soft" approach to PAGAD which was a change in the customary policing, used during the previous regime. In the past, a much harder approach would have been taken in order to curb violence. The South African Police Service did not want to create a martyr, as this would in fact contribute to an escalation in violence, especially violence directed at the South African Police Service. The South African Police Service recognizes the fact that the only long-term solution to the situation in the Western Cape is co-operation with the community, including PAGAD. On the other hand this "soft" approach may have strengthened the perception among PAGAD members that they are almost untouchable, and based upon this perception these members of PAGAD could not be distinguished from drug dealers and gangsters, those they wanted to combat. Academics that included Schrire said in response to the meeting between top government officials and PAGAD on 3 December 1996: "It was an admission of weakness that the government spoke to PAGAD on PAGAD's terms and the perception was created that the government was on the run. There are many advantages to negotiations but the ground rules should have been quite clear ... that the State retained 93 supreme responsibility for law and order, that no vigilantes would be tolerated and that the only matter for negotiation would be how PAGAD could assist the government in maintaining law and order. Instead the impression was created that PAGAD was a legitimate player in maintaining law and order. In that sense the meeting threatens government legitimacy and reinforces the perception that it has no answers to the break- down of law and order (MacLennan, 1996-12-08:)." In an interview on 12 December 1996 Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi said he was concerned that the escorting of PAGAD marchers by the police tended to reinforce public perceptions that PAGAD was above the law and its organised vigilante actions were socially and politically acceptable. "The Ministry of Safety and Security welcomes any community initiative to fight crime, provided there is co- operation with the police and provided that anti-crime drives take place strictly within the ambit of the law" (Vapi, 12 December 1996). According to a member of the PAGAD Task Team it is not a solution to ban PAGAD, as the South African Police Service has, to a large extent, control over the broad PAGAD structure; it is the smaller splinter groups within PAGAD that pose a threat. A second proposal is legislation, including tougher bail conditions. In the third instance there should be better co-operation between the offices of the Attorney- General and the South African Police Service. This implies that a legal representative should be part of the investigating team from the beginning of the investigation. There should be less criticism and more co- operation (Spannenberg, interview, May 1998). In retrospect, it is the view of police officials, including Holtzhausen, that the South African Police Service should have adopted a harder approach against PAGAD from the beginning. These measures would include the prosecution of every case where PAGAD members broke the law, for example the bearing of firearms in the open. 94 8. CONCLUSION At the beginning of this study, the question was put exactly to what length the community may go in protest before they go too far and become part of the problem. At the end of this study the answer is as follows: Crime is the boundary. As soon as an individual or the community get involved with crime they will cross the boundary still within the framework of democracy. Each person disposes of rights and limitations (the principle this researcher links to freedom). It has become clear that individuals do have the right to draw both the population's and the government's attention to the problems experienced by the community, but PAGAD did not remain within the limitations of the law. The fact that PAGAD became involved with crime put the organization in direct confrontation with the South African Police Service and the government. On grounds of the South African Police Service's handling of the situation regarding PAGAD it can be concluded that neither the government nor the South African Police Service was prepared for an organization such as PAGAD. As soon as PAGAD became involved with crime, the South African Police Service did not really know how to cope with the situation. The assumption can almost be made that the South African Police Service not really had clarity about its own duties and limitations. A clear example was the death of Rashaad Staggie when the South African Police Service was not prepared for crowds of that proportion. At that occasion the fear existed that should they open fire, the situation could become unmanageable. The same situation repeated itself on more occasions until the South African Police Service started to place restrictions on PAGAD marches. In conclusion, what became clear throughout this study is that although PAGAD splintered in two in September 1996 that is, between the more militant and moderate factions, another split is at hand - even though this time it will not be as clear as with the previous split. Within the PAGAD structure there are a few PAGAD members having their own agenda, over which the open structure does not have control. Seeing that a pressure group is only as strong as its control over its members, PAGAD is faced with another problem. What makes this situation more difficult is the fact that the formal PAGAD structure does not condemn actions taken by its members. The question to be asked is whether these covert and often violent activities of PAGAD members are not keeping PAGAD as an organization alive. The reason for this assumption is that PAGAD never organized marches and gatherings, some of the activities associated with a pressure group in the latter half of 1997. PAGAD had placed the fear often suffered by innocent members of the community, back into the hands of the drug lords and gangsters through violence. The occurance of violence came about because of frustration on the part of the community and secondly, because the culture 95 of violence in the Western Cape is the only "language" understood by gangsters and drug dealers. However, through these acts of violence the question could be asked whether PAGAD had not descended to the level they are actually opposing. Indeed the perception among the South African Police Service is that PAGAD can be regarded as just another gang. In the cause of research for this study, the researcher experienced good cooperation from PAGAD, although she got the impression that the members of PAGAD interviewed were not fully prepared to discuss certain aspects. For instance, the role of the G-Force, the possible involvement of members in violence, the involvement of Qibla in the top structure as well as the planning of PAGAD activities. Roberts was prepared to reveal both the national and Western Cape structure of PAGAD without any hesitation, but when the question was put who the founder members of PAGAD and the G-Force had been, and the founding date of the latter, she first had to consult with the Working Committee. Roberts afterwards informed the researcher that PAGAD was not prepared to reveal that information. The question anises whether the organization might have something to hide. The following deductions can be made: There are many undercurrents within Muslim politics that Westerners have no knowledge of, and that the Muslim community indeed is very closed as far as internal matters are concerned. Information provided throughout this study indicates that while the broader PAGAD structure is involved in community activities through information programmes and groups formed to support the relatives of addicts, its covert structure not only protects the community in a defensive manner but also through offensive attacks. However, these covert activities centralized from a few areas in 1996 to only four "hot spots" in 1997. The conclusion reached is that the covert activities as enforced through cell structures, are only active in these four areas, and that the cell structures in the other areas or neighbourhoods are not as active. Only a few people (PAGAD Working Committee) are involved in community activities (overt) and only four cell structures are involved in covert activities, which could indicate that PAGAD's active support is on a decrease. On the other hand, an increasing number of PAGAD related cases are being investigated and indications are that it is going to take much more time and energy from both the government and the South African Police Service to resolve problems regarding the investigation and curbing of violence. Although radical Islamic fundamentalism and organizations such as PAGAD are currently too small and too divided to present a real threat to the security of the State, history has shown that people often are more easily and more effectively united around religious and common causes such as crime than pure political 96 ideology. This is particularly the case when peoples' cultural and religious identifies are threatened by the State's inability to adequately protect them. When one listens to Radio 786 or talks to members of the Muslim community in the Western Cape, it is clear that although the community does not always agree with PAGAD's covert and militant actions, it will not turn against PAGAD. The only way in which the government can deal with PAGAD successfully is to remove the reason for its existence, namely, to reduce the crime wave in the country and to effectively address socio-economic problems. Until that has happened, PAGAD will remain popular among South Africans. Keeping this in mind, one has to acknowledge that although PAGAD is a rather unique phenomenon in South Africa, the history of militant Islamic growth in the Middle East and in North Africa has repeatedly shown that poor and ineffective government almost always is the most important factor for the rapid growth and development of Islamic militancy. Thus, for many, PAGAD is a militant Islamic fundamentalist organization that has found a useful excuse in the government's inability to deal with the country's escalating crime rate and general lawlessness to promote the cause of Islamic fundamentalism in South Africa. The following deficiencies were identified in the course of this study: As mentioned, there are many undercurrents in Muslim politics. This researcher is of opinion that in order to fully comprehend PAGAD and to put it in the correct context, a future thorough study will be needed. Although this case study spans a period of less that two years, this researcher identified several developments within the actions of PAGAD, among which the most important was the alleged involvement of PAGAD members (G-Force) in acts of violence. Further more, this researcher identified another deficiency in the fact that police investigations regarding these allegations have not been completed. 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Yin, R.K. 1989. Case Study Research: Design and Methods London: Sage Publications. Younghusband, T. 1996. "Now it's the people against Pagad" The Sunday Tribune 17 November 1996. Younghusband, T.2 1996. "New twist on Pagad" The Sunday Tribune 22 December 1996. 109 Interviews: Allie, G (Dr.). PAGAD Secretariat: Western Cape. 4 May 1998 : Cape Town. Boshoff, H.J (Lt-col). Interview on 20 May 1998. Pretoria. Esack, F. 1997. Interview with Farid Esack on 27 March 1997 in Pretoria. Gerber, J.C. (Adv.) Deputy Attorney-General : Western Cape. 7 May 1998 : Cape Town. Holtzhausen, W. (Supt). South African Police Service: Liaison Officer: Western Cape. 7 May 1998 : Cape Town. Jaffer, F. Presentation: Institute for Security Studies, 28 February 1997. Khan, F.W. Attorney-General: Western Cape. 7 May 1998 : Cape Town. Moosa, E. 1997. Interview with Ebrahim Moosa 19 June 1997: Cape Town. Roberts, A. PAGAD National Secretary. 4 May 1998 : Cape Town. Sidique, A. (Sheikh). President of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) 6 May 1998 : Cape Town Spannenberg, (Supt). South African Police Service: PAGAD Task Team: Western Cape. 7 May 1998 : Cape Town. Viljoen, W.C. Senior State Advocate: Western Cape. 7 May 1998 : Cape Town. THE PEOPLE AGAINST GANGSTERISM AND DRUGS MEMORANDUM 28 September 1996 The Minister of Correctional Services Parliament Buildings CAPE TOWN 8001 Dear Sir One of the most important functions of government is to see to the safety and security of all its citizens and non-citizens. Unfortunately, this is not the case. We are all aware that the government has to deal with the legacy of apartheid; we are also aware that the legacy is going to be with us for decades but the fight against drugs and gangsterism must be dealt with as a matter of urgency. Like we previously indicated, the situation in South Africa is deteriorating rapidly. Your departments should have kept you up to date on the spiralling crime statistics. We, The People Against Gangsterism and Drugs have embarked on this mass demonstration to: 1. Inform the people of South Africa of the escalation of drug addiction and gangsterism. Make the people of South Africa aware that something is being done about the cancerous growths of drug addicts and gangsterism. "Big Crime Moves to South Africa" - 25/1/95. Police identified at least 278 major crime syndicates. There are an estimated 127 groups in the Western Cape with a membership of 80 000. Alert the government that urgent and drastic steps must be taken to curb, stop and eradicate the scourge of gangsterism and drug addiction. Galvanize the entire population to be prepared to take alternative steps if the situation does not improve in the near future. Inform the entire population of the extent of corruption within the Police Service and Judiciary. We, the People, vehemently protest against the allegation that PAGAD is controlled by "fundamentalist Muslims." PAGAD is and still is a people movement, representing every sector of South Africa's population. What drives us, is opposition to Drugs and Gangsterism. We, as ordinary law-abiding citizens, deserve to enjoy the benefits of our newly achieved democratic status and therefore should enjoy the fruits of the Bill of Rights. We acknowledge that the Minister of Justice, Abdullah Omar, has in the past few months made concerted attempts to close the legal loopholes in order to curb drug trafficking and gangsterism. However, much still needs to be done as even been admitted by the State President himself. In the "Socialist Worker" newspaper (21 - 22 September 1996, Issue 45, Page 8), it is stated that "PAGAD targets a few individuals, but cannot wipe out the conditions that breeds drugs and gangs." We humbly submit that it is the popularly elected government that should address the conditions as a matter of urgency. - 3 - We. The People Against Gangsterism and Drugs are ordinary law-abiding, peace-loving citizen. who are daily being exposed to great danger, whether it is in our homes, on public transport or at our place of employment. Our schools are vandalized and even our places of worship are desecrated (e.g. a church was vandalized in Lansdowne a few weeks ago). We therefore call on the Police and Justice system to seriously investigate cases such as Faizel Rykliff. DEFENCE OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AS A NATURAL RIGHT We, the People, say that defence of legitimate rights is a natural right. Justice is a legitimate right. It's defence is a natural right. This is a matter of honour, not of shame. This natural right can never be illegal, unreasonable, illogical or illegitimate. We say that Justice is a pre-requisite for Peace. We, the People, declare that enough is enough. We, the People, will remain focused in our campaign to eradicate gangsterism and drugs from our society. THE PEOPLE AGAINST GANGSTERISM AND DRUGS CONSTITUTION OF PEOPLE AGAINST GANGSTERISM AND DRUGS 1 NAME The movement shall be known as People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, Hereinafter called "PAGAD". 2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 2.1 To propagate the eradication of drugs and gangsterism from society, in accordance with the divine will of the Creator. 2.2 To co-operate with, and to co-ordinate the activities of people and peoples' organisations, having similar aims and objectives. 2.3 To make every effort to invite/motivate/activate and to include those people and peoples' organisations who are not yet part of PAGAD. 2.4 To raise funds for the foregoing aims. 2.5 PAGAD is a non-profit making movement. It's assets, income and donations shall be used to carry out the aims and objectives of PAGAD. 3 MEMBERSHIP 3.1 Membership shall be open to all people and peoples' organisations with similar aims and objectives. 3.2 The secretary shall keep a register of all Members and organisations. 4. COMPOSITION 4.1 PAGAD shall comprise of the following: - 4. 1. 1 National Executive 4.2.2 Regional Executive 4.3.3 Regional Sub-Committees -2- NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMPOSITION OF NATIONAL EXECUTIVE:- The National Executive will consist of the following:- 1.1 National Chief Co-ordinator 1.2 National Chief Commander 1.3 National Chief Security 1.4 National Secretary 1.5 National Treasurer 1.6 One Representative of each area 1.7 (Amended) Five (5) Representatives of each region The National Chief Co-ordinator will act as Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson shall be appointed by the National Executive, at full sitting of the National Executive. Internal Arrangements:- National Executive may:- 1.(a) determine and control its internal arrangements, proceeding and procedures (b) make rules and orders concerning its business, with due regard to representation and participation, accountably transparency and public involvement. Meetings of National Executive:- The National Executive will meet 3 - times, annually. The National Executive may determine the time and duration of its meetings and its recess periods. The National Chief Co-ordinator may summon the National Executive to an extraordinary meeting of any time to conduct special business. The National Secretary shall inform each National Executive member about such meetings, at least twenty one days in advance, in writing. -3- 5. FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE:- The National Executive shall: 5.1 Deal with any matter related to Drugs and Gangsterism. 5.2 Execute all trusts handed to it by the people in accordance with the Aims and Objectives of PAGAD. 5.3 The National Executive shall open and operate banking accounts on behalf of the people. 5.4 Approve the audited financial statement to be presented at the Bi-Annual and General PAGAD. 5.5 Be accountable to the People and to maintain the aims and objectives of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs by means of:- 5.5.1 Arranging and organising lectures. 5.5.2 Distribution of literature 5.5.3 Formation of support groups for victims 5.5.4 Facilitating rehabilitation programs 5.5.5 Mass mobilisation 5.5.6 Having dialogue with authorities namely : Minister of Justice Minister of Police Minister of Correctional Services Minister of Transport Minister of Finance Minister of Social Welfare Minister of Education Premiers of all Provinces All role players 5.6 Take into account all factors giving rise to gangsterism and drug dealing and thereafter develop and maintain a National Framework for eradicating gangsterism and drugs. 4/... -4- 5.7 Review and subsequently approve/reject any proposed plans by the Regional Executive relating to the eradication of Gangsterism and Drugs. 5.8 Identify deficiencies and points of overlap in relation to the activities of other regions. 5.9 Establish the optimal use of available resources and ensure an integrated and holistic approach for the eradication of gangsterism and drugs. 5.10 Prepare integrated reports from Regional Reports and motivate plans for the National movement. 5.11 Set performance standards and hold regions accountable for their achievements. 5.12 Be responsible for policies concerning Gangsterism and Drugs and to implement such policies, nationality. 6. Powers and Authority. The National Executive may :- 6.1 Summon any PAGAD member to appear before it, to assist in disciplinary enquiries. 6.2 Attend meetings of any Regional Executive or Sub-committees 6.3 Lease, hire or purchase property, to further PAGAD's Aims and Objectives, nationally. 6.4 Confirm the employment of any person/s upon such written contract specifying the conditions of employment, such conditions may be determined by the National Executive. 6.5 Delegate powers and responsibilities to the Regional Executive as required. 7 Administrations 7.1 The National Secretary shall be responsible for the administration of the National Executive. 7.2 All correspondence shall be directed to the Secretariat. 5/ .. -5- PAGAD WORKING POLICY Administrative of Finances: - The Finance Department shall be responsible for handling all money matters. The co- ordinator Igshaan Samaai. Should any Sub-structures be interested in collecting or raising funds, such request should be directed to the Working Committee. This request shall then advise the Finance Committee accordingly. All monies collected by any Sub-structure must be deposited in the PAGAD account within 24 hours. The Sub-structure shall keep proper record of all monies collected and deposited into the PAGAD account. This money can be obtained on request via a Sub-committee meeting after which a written request shall be lodged with the Working Committee. Upon due consideration by the Finance Department and the Working Committee, the Working Committee shall advise the Finance Committee accordingly. All monies only used to carry out the aims and objectives of PAGAD. No member of PAGAD shall be able to collect or raise any funds without a letter of authorisation by the Finance Department and approved by the Regional Executive. This copy shall be signed by the Finance Co-ordinator and the Regional Co-ordinator. A monthly report shall be submitted to the Working Committee in the form of a financial statement. An annual statement shall be submitted at the National Conference (November). Media: - No unauthorised member of PAGAD may at any time conduct interviews of behalf of PAGAD. All press conference and interviews is to be accompanied by a written / typed copy. If any interviews is required, the relevant sub-structures shall propose a spokesperson subject to the approval of the working Committee. Should such appointment not be made, the Regional Executive will act as spokesperson for that specific Department. We encourage a healthy relationship with the media. 6/... -6- All press releases and details of interviews will be forwarded to the Media Liaisons Office and the Co-ordinator for perusal. The Co-ordinator together with the Executive may appoint any member to conduct interviews with the media of whether required. No member shall discuss issues outside the portfolio and PAGAD policy. Police: - No unauthorised member of PAGAD may consult with the Police or enter into dialogue without being appointed to do so. Interviews, consultation and dialogue with the Police shall be handled by the Legal advisor or a person appointed to do so by the Co-ordinator and the Working Committee. We encourage a healthy relationship with the Police. This relationship should be in accordance with the aims and objectives. Political Parties / Government : - PAGAD is non-aligned, non-affiliated nor a sub-structure of any political organisation or movement. PAGAD will enter into dialogue with the political parties and the Government only to further the aims and objectives of the PAGAD movement/ Should any organisation, movement, political party, Government of business request meetings, such party should forward a typed copy of the agenda to the secretary of the National / Regional Executive. The Co-ordinator shall inform each and every executive member, should any urgent meeting be requested. Should all executive members not be available to make a decision on meetings with any political party, such decision shall be taken by at least six executive members. THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE The Regional Executive shall hold office for two years. -7- Composition of Regional Executive The Regional Executive shall consist of the following : - 1.1 Regional Co-ordinator 1.2 Chief Commander 1.3 Chief Security 1.4 Secretary 1.5 Treasurer 1.6 Legal Advisor 1.7 Spiritual Leader 1.8 One representative from each Sub-structure The Regional Sub-Committee : - The Regional Sub-Committee shall consist of the following: 2. 1 Secretarial Department. 2.2 Media Department and Distribution 2.3 Medical Department 2.4 Legal Department 2.5 Social Welfare Department and Sports and Recreation 2.6 Finance Department and Fundraising Department 2.7 Security Department 2.8 Education Department Internal Arrangements:- Meetings of Regional Executive The Regional Executive will meet at least twice per month. The Regional Co-ordinators may summons the Regional executive to an extraordinary meeting at any time to conclude special business. Chairperson The Regional co-ordinator shall act as Chairperson and Deputy Chairpersons shall be appointed by the Regional Executive. 8/.... -8- Duties and Functions of the Regional Executive The Regional Executive may:- Determine and control its internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures with regard to representation, participation, accountability transparency and public involvement. Deal with any matter related to Drugs and Gangsterism Attend any meeting of the Regional Sub-Committees. Propagate the eradication of Drugs and Gangsterism, this by means of: 4.1 Arranging and organising lectures 4.2 Distribution of literature 4.3 Formation of Support groups 4.4 Facilitating rehabilitation programs 4.5 Mass mobilisation 4.6 Having dialogue with the necessary authorities 4.7 Any other approved means necessary. Prepare integrated reports from Sub-committees accountable for their duties and functions. 6. Set performance standards and hold Sub-committees accountable for their duties and functions. 7 Delegate powers and responsibility as required. 8. Submit typed copies of minutes to the National Executive after each Regional Executive meeting. Such copies shall reach the National Executive within seven days of such meeting. -9- THE REGIONAL SUB-COMMITTEE Composition of the Regional Sub-committee:- The Sub-committee will consist of the following : 1.1 Co-ordinator 1.2 Secretary 1.3 Any number of members The Co-ordinator will act as Chairperson and the Secretary will act as Deputy Chairperson. The committee will meet twice per month or when necessary. Duties and Functions of Regional Sub-Committee : - The Regional Sub-committee shall :- Be directly accountable to the Regional Executive. Forward all proposals to the Regional Executive for approval. Prepare reports and motivate plans concerning its specific field and function, and forward it to the Regional Executive for approval. Forward a typed copy of minutes to the Regional Executive after each Regional Sub- committee meeting, such copy shall reach the Regional Executive within seven days of such meeting. Execute all duties and functions for which it was established e.g Secretarial - responsible for all administrative etc. BASIC VALUES AND PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION NATIONALLY AND REGIONALLY. 1. Public administration shall be : - A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained. Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted. Public administrators must be development orientated. Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias. 10/... -10- People's needs must be responded to and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making. Public administration must be accountable. Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information. Good human-resource management and career-development practises, to maximise human potential, must be cultivated. Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practises based on ability, objectivity and fairness. The above principles must apply to the administration of every sphere of the movement. Election of Officials : - Nominations : - A person presiding at the National Conference must call for nomination of a candidate at the meeting. A nomination must be made by any regional representative. A person who is nominated must indicate acceptance of the nomination verbally or by written notice of any other confirmation. Such names must be announced by the presiding officer, but may not permit any debate. If only one candidate is nominated, the person presiding must declare the candidate, elected. Election procedure If more than one candidate is nominated : a vote must be taken at the meeting this vote shall be counted by show of hands each member present may cast one vote only [a member - a person who forms part of regional executive] The Minister of Justice 25 June 1996 Ministry of Justice Plein Street CAPE. TOWN 6001 Dear Minister Abdullah Omar RE: DEMAND FOR A DRUG AND GANGSTER - FREE SOCIETY Thank you for your letter dated 20th May 1995. We, the above - mentioned organization, have taken note and welcome the government's belated NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY programme. However, we would jealously guard our role to monitor the real effect this campaign will have on the lives of people at the grassroots level. We have also noted with concern that the Nedcor Project on Crime, Violence and Investment findings, in which they refer to THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE FUNNEL "TCJF" where, out of every thousand crimes, only eight convictions served 2 years or more. It is against this background that we set the following demands: those who are convicted of drug dealing should be hanged or given a life sentence; i) those who are suspected of drug dealing should be monitored constantly and strict surveillance must be kept on them; ii) no search warrants required for searching their properties; current list of business people who have been convicted of drug dealing must be made known to the community; i) all assets of guilty dealers must be frozen and property confiscated; ii) all such properties and monies to be used for rehabilitation purposes; the public must be kept informed about the recent 4 million rnandrax drug bust in District Six and elsewhere; (1) all drugs must be publicly destroyed; i) the public must be ikrt6r-tri-6d about drug dealers linked to inte.mational organized crime via the media; we demand to know about the type of drug routes and modus operandi of drug dealers in this country; iii) across border points harbours and airports to be more strict; full press coverage must be given to drug dealing cases; (1) i) stricter bail conditions must be seriously applied for drug - users; ii) no bail conditions for drug dealers; drug - users must be given heavier sentences regardless of age; ii) severe sentences for first timers; (k) witness protection programmes must be implemented to ensure general public participation; (I) 0 we remain focused on our 60 day ultimatum, which ends on the 11th July 1995; ii) 10, 000 criminals that were pointed out. Stricter sentences should be given to first 10, 000 criminals. The prisons have become breeding grounds for criminal activity. This needs to be investigated. If there is no marked improvement in the lives of the exploited people at the grassroots level, we will have no option but to implement our own programme. With concern and wishes. Yours sincerely G ALLIE A EBRAHIM A TOEFY SECRETARY CHIEF CO - ORDINATOR CHIEF COMMANDER VIOLENT OR BACKGROUND CAS NUMBER COMMENTS NON- VIOT PINT .., Non-violent 996-05-06 March by supporters to the residence of Minister OMAR, Minister of Justice (concern a bout perceived failure of the criminal Justice) Z 4 O N 0 ? CT 9 •1 CA e....1 .-4 71 March to parliament by 3000 PAGAD supporters (60 day ultimatum - PAGAD will take law into own hands) Cape Town CAS Sedition 1469/07/96 Violent Shooting incident 1 996-07- 12 Athlone CAS 294/07/96 Atte mpted Murder. An attack was (Friday) launched on a house at 5 Gatesville Street, Rylands. Residence of Irrfaan KASKER. Violent Shooting incident 1 996-07- 1 8 Athlone CAS 221/07/96 Attemp ted Murder. An attack was (Thursday) launched on a house at 72 Appeldine Road, Silvertown. Residence of an alleged drug dealer, Farrel HUMAN. ) r'.. ■ 00 9 C3 " I , ) g Athlone CAS 223/07/96 ...1 .. >1 lel O C S i t t t den iden i iden inc inc .0 inc E ing ing 0 ing t t ..0 t .4al Shoo Shoo Shoo t t t t len len len len t io io t t t io v Vio v -v - - - len len len len Non Non Vio Non Vio Vio Vio Non f d t o e t CV kson 2) ler. f bou war h lleg ons ( t A f it h fron o in ton a Jac d t e. eople ty. o was ers dea k was k was 569 was berg. ce r w of a 4t f An two e an d in f an 6, o been he ttac ttac hlon 00 p bus 00 p LM. o ttack iden 4 roup he 751- t a a f t 19 Come 1 35 Mur idence 1 here a d drug 30 Por t s At t a t e Prop STEMMET. t g hlone o ly ly Manen es a PA An d res An THOMAS, a a b) a e t idence te, CA te r to e g An te, he Micro At A lleg e iem ta r. r. t ta leen ia, lease us le, ber a lleg en imate ima v hma de de bom residence Es ion, he ing. a Res a r r rder. t re e r r house ox house um h to an eop ln rox r he Ac f Cass a ho a lg f S he a ROLD. n he an t p Mu Pip t Mu Sta Damag lkswag d t ( d wer, d lands. ler, App d Mu App ion Be Marc 80) ce o ce t Ga d on d on a d on d on HA d to ht te te te de e. lice ( Linco Surrey Es Surrey h: Vo h: ig Bo h: hed to hed he he he a l t, tra he • ts. t, Ry l dea ille c c c iden rc idence o idence is hty Po rc ee a hlone. hlon ar t temp lim ar hite ig eg he hug Illeg e t sus deman m At Ma Malicious w r se Avenue, Nev Marc At m launc Str c laun Stree Res Attemp Res At launc Way, ISMAIL. Sa Attemp Ma 07/96 7/96 /07/96 323/ /07/96 50 S 57/07/96 224/0 2 3 362/07/96 S S S S S 221 CA CA CA CA CA e e berg e hlone CA hlone hlon hlon hlon At . At . At Manen Athlone At 9 0 ) 1 ) ) 2 ) 21 23 27 ) 27 30 28 ) ) ) 7- day 0 day day 07- 07- 07- 07- 07- 07- 07- day day day iday tur tur tur 996- Fr 996- Sa Sun Tuesday Sa Sa Sun 1996- Tues 1 1996- ( 1996- 1996- ( ( 1 1996- ( 1996- ( ( ( ( N ---. 9 .- > " .4 0 0 Phillipi CAS 10/08/96 Malicious Damage to Property ; Arson A group of approx 300 people marched ....., - Petrolbomb 7>• & Pointing of Firearm. A blue and petrol bombed the residence of an Toyota Minibus with registration alleged drug dealer. Members of SAPS number CA 733-334 was set alight at monitored the procession but no police 56 Lyston Walk, Hanover Park. action was taken due to the fact that the Residence of Richard STEMMET. police were outnumbered and more One of the PAGAD leaders, support was not available. Mohammed Ali Parker threatened an occupant of the residence with a firearm. N oo 9 —. ..-- 'Tr i x 00 kin 0 U Cr) 00 ON ,.0 < th > cn ..0 . .5 73 -a' .4 0 . 5 O to5 5 0 Murder, Attemp ted Mu rder, and A group of approx 5000 people (,) >-, Malicious Damage to Prop erty. An marched to the residence of a drug attack was launched on a house at 20 dealer. The procession was veiled and Londen Road, Soutrivier (Used by the heavily armed. Firearms were openly Hard Living Kids Gang). One ( 1) displayed, and the general impression person was killed and seventeen ( 1 7) was that the group had no regard for the others were injured during a shooting limited number of SAPS members. incident in front of the house. Whilst the then more moderate PAGAD leadership were in discussion with the SAPS, the more militant faction within the group attacked the residence. 1996-08-06 Athlone March: Approximately 5000 persons Non-violent (Tuesday) marched to the residence of an alleged drug dealer, Farrel HUMAN, Athlone. 1996-08-09 Manenberg Attemp ted murder: Shooting incident Violent Shooting incident (Friday) at a game shop of Rashied STAGGIE, Manenberg. N c ■ i 1996-08- 11 Kensington CAS58/08/96 Attemp ted murder. Various shots A group of approx 13 veiled people Violent Shooting incident (Sunday) were fired from a vehicle at the carried out the attack. residence of Errol AFRICA at 23 Africa ceased his drug dealing activities Tfoon Street, Factreton. two years prior to the attack. N c ■ i 1996-08- 11 Kensington CAS 59/08/96 Attemp ted murder. Various shots This attack is attributed to PAGAD due Violent Shooting incident (Sunday) were fired from a vehicle at the to the testimony of nearby residents residence of Wayne Wolhunter, 129 who are too afraid to make statements. Bunn Street Kensin , ton. Wolhunter is not a dru . dealer. Violent Shooting incident and PhilippiCA S 1 1 6/08/96 handgrenade thrown to the SAPS. Mogamat Z ISAAC arrested III Cq [:": .—I le launched an Violent 1996-08- 11 Philippi CAS 1 1 9/08/96 Attemp ted murder. Various shots A group of veiled peop two police Nyala (Sunday) were fired at SAPS members busy with armed attack on policing actions in Balmore Way, armoured personnel carriers. Hanover Park. 0,3 (r) 0 SA .--4 Violent Handgrenade thrown to a 1996-08- 11 Philippi CAS 1 1 7/08/96 Attemp ted m urder & Public violence. (Sunday) A handgrenade was lobbed by a person amongst a group of veiled people. 00 ■ 9 ON ON t .o ing inciden Attemp ted m urder: Shooting incident Violent Shoot at the residence of alleged drug dealer, Mr KARELSE, Kensington. O ler. The previous owner Violent Shooting incident 1996-08- 1 2 Athlone CAS 1 40/08/96 Malicious damage to property. Not a drug dea involved in unlawful (Monday) Various shots were fired at the might have been residence of Nawaal LIPPERT at 1 9 activities. CashelWay, Athlone. 0 0 Violent Shooting incident 1996-08- 12 Manenberg CAS 123/08/96 Attemp ted m urder. Various shots A drug dealer (Monday) were fired at the residence of Geraldine GEORGE at 1 35 Jupiter Way, Surrey Estate. C.) N en 0 drug dealer Violent Shooting incident 1996-08- 1 2 Manenberg CAS 1 32/08/96 Atte mpted Mur der. Various shots were A known (Monday) fired at the residence of Janet ADAMS at 91 Taurus Way, Surrey Estate. 1996-08- 1 3 PhilippiC AS 147/08/96 Drug dealer k PhilippiC AS 10/08/96 (Tuesday) First attac ( 1996-08-0 1) 0 cs ,--. o, o ,,o 9 oo kn ∎ Table View CAS 1 08/08/96 Posing as Police Officials. Two males, falsely posing as police officials at table View Police Station, requested that the suspect (Sedition case) be released from custody for his appearance in the Magistrate's Court. They were later arrested...... o = a) , 1996-08- 1 7 4 Approximately 2500 persons marched Non-violent (Saturday) to the residence of an alleged drug dealer, Mr SALIE, Athlone. 1996-08- 17 Athlone March: Approximately 2500 persons (Saturday) marched to the residence of an alleged drug dealer, Shakied TJOLWIN, Athlone. . cr. i29 cs ob oo , Athlone CAS 206/08/96 Attemp v) - ted mu ...." rder. Attack on a drug c) S as Violent Shooting incident peddlar in Athone. a. t..7 < 0 1 996-08-22 Woodstock < Marc h: Approximately 800 persons Non-violent (Thursday) marched to the residence of the brother of an alleged drug dealer, Nazier KAPDI, Woodstock. vs .4 . S .5 ..o '5 1996-08-22 5 ta Manenberg CAS 269/08/96 Attemp ted murder. Various shots were C.) Violent (Thursday) fired from two vehicles at the residence of Moegamat BROWN in 28 Heideveld Street. ta. (.., < Ca 1996-08-24 Paarl East < March: Approximately 3500 persons Non-violent (Saturday) marched to the Paarl East SAPS. 1996-08-27 Athlone March: Approximately 500 persons Non-violent (Tuesday) marched to the Athlone Police Station. Athlone Violent Shooting incident on SAPS members. 0 0 — —O O— 0— O 0 ? ? 0 0 0 z z0 z0 z0 O as g /96 437/09/96 84/09 83/09/96 328/08/96 in in CAS Pla CAS CAS t t Pla CAS lls lls 0. he he Town l Eas l Eas 0 e O hlone itc O At Mitc M Paar Paar Cap 6:1 ZZ. N r•■ O O O ON ON ON t:n O O O O vo 0\ vo ‘.0 ON to‘ ion ion t ion t ion t t t fac fac fac fac iden ibla ibla ibla ibla inc Q Q D-Q ing 0 t GAD-Q a. a. GAD- Shoo PAGA PA PA PAGAD- 0 • 0 O a) • 0 0 0 O z z "53 lers, he t ersons dea to d 000 p he c 1 hony d drug t k. e ly te ar mar An ) lleg d . a ima ion t an an rox f Fac o App ibla f APRIL h: Q rc idences hra ro Ma (p res As KRUGER Grass 6 6 85/09/9 1 i S 330/09/9 47 CAS cn ) l CA 1 .4 hlone C.) At Paar ) 11, 29 ) 02 ON day 09- 10- 9 day dnes 996- Mon 1996- We ( 1 ( O tu) .5 0 0 .24) 0 0 0 .04 z0 z z ler 2 dea drug a 8 Irs 5 t < b .2 No 0 0/96 0/96 0/96 t in 109/1 S 94/1 h Eas S 110/1 Pla lls CA CAS bosc CA he de hlone hlone Mitc hlone Ron At At At O O O it ON a ON O O (6; O O 0 0 0 1996- 10- 1 2 Mitchells Plain CAS Attemp ted murder: Petrol bomb attack Shebeen Violent Petrolbomb (Saturday) 630/1 0/96 was launched on the residence of an He was warned by PAGAD. alleged drug dealer, Mr Victor ADAMS, Strandfontein. 1996- 1 0- 12 . March: Approximately 4000 persons Non-violent PAGAD-Qibla faction (Saturday) (pro Qibla Faction) marched to the residences of alleged drug dealers, Mr AMERICA, Mr HENDRICKS and Neville MASTER, Strand. ON (/) ON Y .--• CNI _, - Z • 0 0 .. o a) 4 . ■ March: Approximately 4000 persons PAGAD -0 s....., /..": t cd i . • (Populist Faction) marched to the residences of alleged drug dealers, Mr PRENTJIES, Mr MARTINS, Mr WITTON, Mr PIETERSON, Mr OJAM, Mr BALIE, AmatiKA RELSE and Canis BONZAAIER and an unidentified drug dealer, Kensington area. Csi V") C4.1 ,ZI- ,.= C/) 1:3' o 04 1996- 10- 13 Steenberg CAS 1 37/1 0/96 Attemp ted mu rder: An armed attack Drug dealer Violent E (Sunday) was launched at the residence of Hilda van Neel, 1 8 Second Ave, Retreat. 0 tel 0 ,--4 1996- 10- 14 Grassy Park CAS Attemp ted mu rder: An armed attack Drug dealer Violent Shooting (Monday) 207/1 0/96 was launched at the residence of Hendrik April, 236 Seventh Ave, Grass Park. ,--. Cl CT — 6 N.0 ,--I . z -E o 0 o a.) . ■ Marc h: Approximately 300 persons PAGAD 4 411C' zis .., ›N .., , (Populist Faction) marched to the residences of alleged drug dealers, Mr BROWN, Shaun BOOYSENS, Miriam JAFFER, Camella JONGIE, Moegamat LEE and Naziem VAN HYDEN, Heideveld ion tion t tion c fac fac fa la ibla ibla Q Q Qib D- D ing t o GA GAD- GA ho PA PA S PAGAD- PA t t t t nt 44 len len len a) le len t io io o io . ,_, io v v Vio - -v - -v - len O 0 Non Non Vio Non Non Z Non d ro ls t he d) 0 d s ima (p t e t 12 H t he ig, idua ue, he iden t lias ttende ls t iv t lacar he ersons d a Fa lers, lleg lers, a a ffer, fe 00 erson t ersons inc ) te l. TITUS, ins 22 ersons in d TOTI, f a 34 hers a 30 d (p Ja t dea her d. la tra Ta Mosq dea ion l t o t ing d to t te hed to 00 p t dley lle ly ag 300 a ug ve St., St., he iam 2500 p ille 500 p 60 p 3 bdu tra heuwe fac he a TITUS, v ate ly Bro ly ion ly ly ly te ROODE, ic ide t Bra A te te d drug te d dr te marc tes im demos Shoo ias e S, iem ) e ) idences a l ibla f Mar marc r: ) Sta He d M CORE) ima ima Bon imate ima rox GGIE) im 7 Susan Ga -Q o aham ion ion lleg de lleg 21 Nin t t res ( Jas e OOLEY bro demons VID in. ion 2 ) ro lice he t in rox rox rox rox TA f a rox he f a B c t App Ave, St. t t d Gr Pla ion (p Fac o Fac : k o Po he t DA OOI, St., a i denc ls d mu r Fa lers 's App R S t an App Town App App PIETERSE, App B ces te d to TRONG, ton ll ing ibla ibla hoe e e. JACOBS a is ing lberg r ross l ia t h: of t h: h: h: res ky berl. Fac t er idua he der ica he dea lberg Q Q ic ee die he rc rc ker rc rc rch: he iden iv idences ing t fe tr iln ro hlon idde ro Cap ibla hun t RMS d OREHAND an t es m es Popu Steen (p r Fer C Ma (p M Ma (mur a arres Ma Jon Q in ( Mon Ma Ta Attemp r Ca Pa F A Ga Ma marc M Mitc drug in a At S 64/10/96 1 CA in CAS Pla lls berg en he 052/10/96 1 Man Mitc ) 7 ) VD ed. 7 8 ■ ON ON ) .-- 1 1 714, 1 6 r, 19 ) 0- 0- day 0- day <7 1 . 8 c:':) 1 1 10- 1 ,b .a.1 ,s a day 6- iday tur ON 'D hurs hurs ON vs CI N ed 996- ON 996- ON 99 T cf) T Fr ON ce) Sa 1 1 1996- ■ ( 1 —. ( ( •—. ....., .---, .--, ( 0 0 C■1 0 N ( M kr) cr CA V) cn ■ O 4 Jo 2 .-. o to i ∎ Mitchells Plain CAS Attemp ted Murder. A large group of Handgrenade ,-, 0 64 >-. 1 052/1 0/96 Muslims gathered in front of the home of Mogamat MADATT at 49 Eurika, Tafelsig, Mitchells Plain. A handgranade exploded at the back of the residence. It was situated opposite an undevelo , 4 site. 0 Cr; 0 0 1996- 10-20 Grassy Park CAS Attemp ted murder: Shooting at the Violent Shooting incident (Sunday) 31 8/1 0/96 residence of alleged drug dealer and leader of the Firm affiliated Mongrels _gang, I APRIL. CA 0 C7N v:, 40 c c) - v) ■ 7 o o 5 oi) . 4 . 4, Attemp ted murder: Shooting at the Violent = 0 >44, residence of Mr DAVIDS, Tafelsig. 0 .6 0 .5 v) 4 to 0 1 996- 10-20 Mitchells Plain CAS Attemp ted murder: Shooting at the Drug dealer Violent (Sunday) 1 202/10/96 residence of Glen Khan, 22 Middelburg Ave, Tafelsig, Mitchells Plain 1 996- 1 0-21 . March: Approximately 15 persons (pro Non-violent PAGAD-Qibla faction (Monday) Qibla Faction) demostrated (placard) in Cape Town. 0 O t'n 0 1996- 10-21 Mitchells Plain CAS Attemp ted mu rder: Shooting at the Although SAPS members tried to Violent Shooting Monday) 1049/1 0/96 residence of Glen Khan, 22 negotiate with PAGAD supporters they Middelburg Ave, Tafelsig, Mitchells acted. Plain Previously attacked see Mitchells Plain CAS 1202/10/96 ( 1996- 10-20). 1 996- 10-22 . March: Approximately 150 persons Non-violent PAGAD-Qibla faction (Tuesday) (pro Qibla Faction) demostrated in Atlantis. (March was stopped by SAPS) .... z 4 o 0 ? o a) 0' 1996- 10-22 . March: Approximately 20 persons (pro PAGAD-Qibla faction (Tuesday) Qibla Faction) marched to the residence of an alleged drug dealer, _ Mr PYPERS. ion ion ion ion t t t fac fac fac fact bla ibla i ibla C ibla Q Q o • .-• Q D- D- D-Q D "el D- (.5 PAGA PAGA PAGA A a¢.. PAGA PAGA / t t t 44 t t len len 0 len len len t io io o io io io t v v -v -v -v - - len len n C io Non Non No v z Vio Non Non in t d te Ac 4) 2 ( arres d) ion t ene op h Sec it es w (cas le 68 dance or 71/19 9 Peop acc f d ro o d) ff N is ly to tan (p h d he d d d in te ler, d o s t lacar ) te he ias t he ce top lers, l d by an ersons ersons d drug ersons t ersons ima e s tra dea ion d a N ZYL, t ersons d a e for 0 p ifie t rox d to ted (p drug 50 p marc 00 p 50 p Leonar al carry ing d to topp an her he d 6 p 50 1 VA Mr 1 4 T, Fac t s tra lly e was den is. d drug a i a ly ly ly t ly ly e RTUNE, App ius Illeg te LD d drug dea d drug te te ibla demons g ies. lleg e ) un car lan ht. ) warne leg it marc h was lleg ) a & ) FRIKA Q FO ons: f imate ima imate ima iv o ion ton. dealers, ion Mar t At lleg r t f a t demons A l d an c ion o ion hose ing ) ox was o t T, t EN, r rox rox r roxima inI rox f a Marc (p PS, ho terwac wn. NGEVE an ces d a ion weap he Fac o Fac t. ( t s t ion MA te t. Fac He Fac lco ONS, t App a t t To App App App App la in WAG LA d. iden ibla a e Ruy ibla h SA Kens da l fron lis lis h: h: i h: ersons Fac h: it t, a a l g u re OM CHIM u ius a Q Q Po rc ter rc rch: PS) PEERS w im roa res idences t ro Cap ro ibla ff w Pop he Pop he in SA Mr (p Sea Marc Q MOEGA In ( Marc Mar t Ma illeg ( SOL Illeg o drug t 700 p res CRUY (p JOA dealer, dangerou Ma On: Ma Wa 398- S CA e 0/96 hlon At I I I I 406/1 I I ) ) >1 03 6 \0 M ) ) ) 22 23 23 2 26 day day C‘.1 1 0- 0- 0 0 0 M 0- 1 10- 10- ■ day 1 I I ,I 1 day day ,. 7:3 vl, 'A dnes dnes 6- 6- es 6- tur tur CA C3 CA Tu We Sa We 3 Sa 199 1996- 199 199 1996- ( ( ( ( I.".• `,..., ( VI (NI ion t t fac iden ibla b inc Q Oh D d- 5 ing lbom 0 t 0 GA tro hoo PAGA PA Pe Cl) S / t t 40 0 len len t 0 t ■ t ••• io io t v -v - len len len 0 len 0 io Vio Non v Vio Z Vio Non d f the te o t fron f attemp d in o es injure 6 Charg were ( le op der). been. Pe he s 6 mur ld e t t ve d e e s a t b t h a d iden ide ld. a sons idences ia 0 he l t lleg l hlon ve damag hic me t er Mr ler d HAMS, inc Bom a He erson Ju wor 12 f a res lia l d w ide At Grassy bdu ion he dea t he o ing he ting d on t T an t C De tro t He BRA fter t f A wn, te 67 p licious Parow. d t 200 p fac Str, a Pe a tween t t o ly in BA hoo to A ly d drug e a S an Mrs. d to ue te lers, RON an e Ma Shoo be PS, PAMA, d idences iep f le RA me he MIN e r; idg ) c o es imate Galan lon rayp dence e der: i dea lace de SA der: Br x HA ibla r h Mr r Ms ion r mosq Arson: t es ll. p sp Mon he roxima he Q d, 13 k At r f alleg s, t & d mar Mr ille t, drug mu idenc d t BENJA s in wa v o ty d he Fac d mu d mu r ler d The t roa Appro an t e App te er MEL, N te d to te t an ter tes ff too lis aaz h: h: ue h: le a dea he u leg t c he res he venor l do rop k. rc ime rc GAD was CA Ga lkoen t hic osq p - r f a Pop tan he on Gra Par ( Attemp Ma m o CORNELIUS, GEORGE, FA RRIET. s Mar attac PA t OSMA ve residence Ka to Shanl marc Mr Attemp Ma drug Attemp 6 6 /9 /9 S 0/11 S 1/11 S 1 k CA CA CA Par 0/96 hlone hlone Grassy 430/1 I At i At i ›..• ) C) A. ) 30 01 01 02 ■ day ) 1 -lig e•- ) ) 0-27 c)t 0- 1 1 11- 11- .-. ,-. 11- day .- day ,6 i3 dnes iday iday O\ tur 996- 0 \ 996- Sun 996- Fr Fr We Sa 1996- 1 1 ( 1996- 1 ( ( ( ( C. 0, 0 k) fn kr: 0 0 CV en cn D < ., .-, Id. ,1.. a; (..., a.) = GA < . $.) g '' 5 8 75 • —, a.) u., lice. a a. 1 . 5 5 0 ,,, z z PA 8 0 4.1 Po ...., "S 1g '2:4 .< r 0 >. e cn @ till va he x ,,, tween a I-. 2 mg' c„c' `,.4 . a' t t a) 'Ea) o .-o len len •-> > Vio Vio ts x is h im. e hone te ity a lep il terdien terdien in te ib Sa lim wrong ing oss he him p ld e ten d t te The hrea e Ebra t " wou t ler. iden ibla ious dea "Q inc l. t d var he drug ha t idua t ive a PAGAD targ iv t t lls d fter ha No in A rece ca t f 2 6 l o u., .., 1 t A a © by Oa 0 sa ly ing tary. r: ma e, lv t 1 Pr; 'I ....g d Illeg Persons de h. idence for " t g >, — r 0 0 ,,,, DIEN f Ag 0 — , g S an ty, be ty invo la cO 1,„ 1_, r Ceme r res P Mu roxim ita bosc Oh 1-4 • .-1 l o 00 e ay d ia TAB cll rn 0 . ,.= he to I. ,4 co2 4.-+ de te SA br rope a) ., rop d t aZ :a g .a' dences e SA p bur p i k p lace E o... _2 Ron d PAGAD he ir. < a) 5 a) to to IMS (app tween h im ins t Mow u) 0-= too 5 a. t ry ry o; lha , -4 = .73 he ..4 rzi be ju d Attemp ju fter len m 0 o 0. . t FY an Be ters t d damag Ebra .-c — io ,-- I- ion In In an or t .c) (.) t © ac d a /MUSL 0 f v `,-,: < a) 0 .4 on d an D ters, ing n ta SECTION, an TOE lt upp ious ious t.) ('-' c's >, :7.4 o he or :... as 1 .0 0 s fro lic ing lic her ies lam t .-5 0 N ,-.,_, 1. k-.) t a er immy Ma s PAGA con 000) NAJAAR a g marc As supp 4 CY . dur Ma 2 v, 2 3 J Assau rn < U /11/96 I.. z 65/11/96 S 29 781/11/96 o S 23/11/96 -E S 0 CA CA CA x h k k CAS sc 0 ,.0 wne a) a. toc bo do ds — dstoc de -- ds az4.)a ;:,:-, Ron E— — Woo Lan Woo ) ) 04 9 04 11- ' — 11- day day 1 1 6- OZ = O ) Mon Mon 199 1996- ( •...., ( 0 0 CD 0 0 fn Vri C;-; 6 c, c.1 PS PS h SA h SA PS it it SA ff w t ff w t PS a d-o d-o iden SA c t tan b b tan b a in hrown D s D t A ing ing lbom lbom lbom t ¢ t o GA (.7 tro tro -ft tro Sho Stones PA Pe Pe PAGAD s Pe a Shoo PAGA t 44 len o t t t t t t t io • — v 151 > - a> len len len len len len o len 41 io ..... o Vio Vio V Non Vio Vio Vio > Vio z s orter t. iden c in GAD supp is h t ler 20 PA in 5- d dea f 1 lve o vo drug up in ro g A were Known t t h. k a t lly a In lex. d t e ttac ik ersons a he he Cour lam Stones Sou fir t es he : : t he b a d t tes t in ler, comp w ille t ty ty As 00 p t a 600 ton r le r 1 tra e in e 1 llo llv by s on Kw on ing is were itore lbom dea ly t hic ly fron k w k on lly ts c rop rop a f fe te PAGAD Ra Be tro ber ate ter ve ho TOUTIE, p p hre o ttac tta KRUGER, he t hlone. S mon Mag Pe Shoo t D r t ima t PS to to t hop, d drug or Najjaar. Najjaar. f A b a b a he t Wa e e r: e r: ha r: s t ters o GA rox t d a SA de de t e N, At N, or r de lleg hma i lbom supp lbom way a PA l. le. App Approxim ts bers f William her l Sta dium. Town k. a t murde a : in : tro e damag a damag tro idence t wn a f SAPS mem of a o d hic d mu r d mu is supp ke o t a es d. Pe te g d ou te ing ce ce te ing Pe kra D Par l of Ac hro r lt ious ta r mem heuwe l HUMA Cap lan t lan bers. e ies te he ds he it PS ve EFY PS he here iden ther iden t sau t t At t a t SA PAGA funera SA Attemp were Ma Malic Malicious Ga in Foo g on TO Bon Farr mem Attemp Vyg res res Ga Arson: As persons a Arson: Grassy Attemp 6 6/11/96 3/11/9 S 2 67/11/96 S 9 S 7/11/96 S CA 98/11/96 h 12 CA t CA S is CAS k CA k Sou c - CA CAS Par to /96 Lav /96 e bosch ille ds de ssy /11 hop llv hlone hlon is 29/11 81 Ron 1 Woo 1 Be B At At . . Gra ) ) ) ) ) 6 3 ) 0 7 1 ) 1 13 04 ) 1 04 06 06 07 0 day day day day ) ) es es 11- 11- 11- 11- 11- 11- 11- 11- 11- 11- day day dnes dnes dnesday dn dn 6- 6- 6- 6- 96- 996- 996- Monday Monday We Thursday Sun We We Sun We We 1996- 199 199 199 1996- 1 199 1 1996- ( ( ( 19 ( ( ( ( ( ( ( 0 ■.o 0 lel co 0 0 nze tr) cn -et en en 0 00 C:t — c:si 4 8 Csi "" 0, 0 O 0 F O pp ..0 O $.. • aoi 0 z 0 -a 2.1) E E E o a g "8 4 al .s.), - 8 •E 6 6 9 /9 / 1 1 /1 96 / 7/1 2 59 5 /1 46 2 U S 6 AS CA C k k CAS i toc p toc — ds ip o S.0 il o ds h P Wo Wo O O kr) O O O O O O M N C■1 O O O cs1 C) ice, _ d 40 6; _ 52/10 k _ d. 10 use loc te S ive dev ive PS G t t 94/10/9 los fisca were CA ice d a SA renade, in h iden iden ices it exp dg con CAS dev b an CAS 83/12/96. CAS t e de Pla inc inc ff w dev ive lls 6 han Eas ing -ma ing t lbom hlon l were t he l los d-o ilar to ar tro itc At M2 is Exp Shoo A Sim in home pe p M Pa Stan Shoo v.Z o w a 0 t 2 len t t t 0 t t 4 13 o io len len len -v len 0 : 3 len t .. < Vio Vio Vio Vio Vio a cc, Non by d by d e warne warn ly ly us ious io ev rev r p p ler, ler, dea dea GAD. GAD. Drug PA Drug PA t t f a tla t 0 o d a d a a N s he tse t 1 fter t t—I t t fire fire a ber a e dence An Pon l d a i tersen e ives Stree fi res id wer los were h. 20B Pie SA PS, v ts hrown kers c ts he t d Arson: he t les Stan Arson: exp iver. tney Da Sho GAD mem f t Sho ion. f lin an t & ltr har r o debos a r: o k on r: t. ler, PA were Wa Wanna C Co ig de der de f t Sa ion de f r r ice ttac Ron r Eas bers 1 o dea v o l f Jan d. b a ug lence: inves de o d mu d mur d mu Way, R ossess d mu dr io te e te te dence idence te ive Paar d mem i d v ir. l p lbom t, e tor a ke los idence ee res lha tro in blic res l llow-up lleg ttac he Pe a Attemp CROWDER, Ba exp res Str he Attemp t 74 Burns Attemp Illeg Pu a fo t Ba Attemp 6 /96 2/9 83/12 68/1 S 84/12/96 CAS 163/12/96 1 h t CAS CA t t CAS CAS Sou e Eas ille l Eas l lv hlone hlon Be 99/12/96 Paar Paar At At ) (NI ..... 2 06 06 06 v•-•4 ›N 1 13 ) ) ) 2- ) 2- 2- 12- N day 1 12- 4 1 1 iday iday iday ,t1, N 6- F:p g iday hurs 996- Fr Fr Fr 996- 1996- 1 T ( 1996- Fr ( ( 1 199 ( ( 71.'11 cD (4-i cp 1 a c.14 u a u 0 gi4 (1, 0 u 0 0 aa a 0 (,) < 41 a (1) z '&3 x E. o a M = ea Cl) a v) 1:7 0 14 CI) 4 = 04 ive .... 2 < 4' -g g 0 h e ' d•S •-•C ia.g >"= los . E : 5 A — 1 0 c4 . 1:4 '8 ■ ■ 5 t, .2 A E 4 2 _c bl — 0 0 a) 0 7 - 7 A JD •F 0 • — • ..., :p 7 0 t- .5 al —0 o Exp r. 2 2-40 < u) o3 2-4 >‹22« 2 -t 2 0 0 0 "*".. co r1 .0 112 S 256/12/96 489/12/96 S k CA CA toc ds ille llv Woo Be ON ON O O O 0 O 0 PS & SA a) - t 0 lbom b len tro Vio Pe 0 at.7 A § § 0 e 0 V) "‘ 0 km /96 2/96 /1 291 CAS 221/12 CAS e hlon hlone At At C‘I 1. The following cases were registered with the Sout h African Police Service between January 1997 and December 1997: DATE CAS NUMBER TYPE OF INCIDENT VIOLENT COMMENTS / NON- VIOLENT 1997-01- 01 Sea Point CAS 3/01/97 Wednes ( Attemp ted Murder. An a day) ttack was launched on a Vio house at 3 Conu lent Explosive device fer Way, Sea Point. A home made explosive This device is similar device detonated in front of the to those use house. One person dhe llsinMitc Plain CAS was injured during this attack. 6,1568/11/9 Paarl East 83/12/96 and Athlone CAS 1997-01-07 163/12/96) Mitchells Plain CAS 371/01/97 (Tuesday) Kidnapping and Assau lt: Anton Julies, Clint Violen Delmarkus, Sa t Mustapha Jacobs & bastiaan Delmarkus and Donovan Fizal Kossain Olivier were (PAGAD members) picked up by 8 individuals in 3 were identified. vehic les lcidna ) ed and assaulted. 1997-01- 07 Ravensmead CAS 82/01/97 Tuesday) ( Attemp ted Murder. Two s hots were fired and two Violen petrol bombs t Petrolbomb (2) an were thrown at the residence of d Shooting Lindie AMOS, a known drug dealer at 123 Be llvinie Avenue, Ravensmead. 1997-01-07 (Tuesda ) Gathering; Approximately 1 000 PAGAD Non-violent su I I + hers gathere d at the V gieskraal Cement . 1997-01-08 ednesda Gathering: Approximately 600 PAGAD Non-violent sue, e hers gathered a t W nber . Police Station. 1 997-01-08 Grassypark CAS 91/01 /97 Attemp ted Murder. An attack was launched on Violent Shooting incident (Wednesday) the residence of an alleged drug dealer at 3 Previously warned by PAGAD. Conrad Street, Ottery, Cape Town. Five children were injured in this attack. Spent 12-gauge and 9mm cartridges were recovered at the scene. 1 997-01-08 Gathering: Approximately 500 vehicles gathered Non-violent (Wednesday) at the Gatesville Mosque - 20 individuals stormed and felldo wn in front of SAPS vehicles and screamed unknown slogans. 1997-01-09 Mitchells Plain CAS 412/01/97 Illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. A Arrestation of PAGAD member (Thursday) prominent PAGAD member was arrested at 57 Hoekstreet Lansdowne, Mitchells Plain for the illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. 1 997-01- 1 0 Cape Town CAS 681 /01 /97 Illegal gathering and march: Approximately 250 Non-violent (Friday) PAGAD supporters led to Cape Town Central Police Station by Aslam Toefy and Abdussalaam Ebrahim to give themselves over. C. r-- c..) c) __, .-- Gathering: Approximately 60 PAGAD supporters Non-violent • i.. 77J ...-..., > " ..., , gathered at the Bellville Police Station 1 1 997-01- 1 1 Gathering: Approximately 20 PAGAD supporters Non-violent (Saturday) gathered at the Bellville Magistrates Court. 1997-01- 11 Belville CAS 261 /01 /97 Murder: Yusuf Saban shot dead (after being Violent Shooting incident (Saturday) banned from PAGAD for using PAGAD 's money 1 997-01- 12 Gathering: PAGAD public meeting at Vygieskraal Non-violent (Sunday) Stadium. 2000 PAGAD supporters attended the meeting. .5 ci) 4 o OA 1 997-01- 1 3 Grassy Park 186/01 /97 Atte mpted murder: Shooting incident at the Violent "6" (Monday) residence of Mrs. Desiree Meyer, 36 Cuckoo Str, Parkwood Estate. 1 997-01- 1 3 Assau lt: PAGAD leaders threatened and assaulted Violent PAGAD-assault on SAPS member. (Monday) a SAPS member at the Belville Magestrate Court. 1 997-01- 18 March: PAGAD supporters march to Parliament. Non-violent (Saturday) • 1997-01- 1 9 Steenberg CAS 1 85/01 /97 Attemp ted murder: Shots were fired at the Violent Shooting incident (Sunday) _ _ _ residence of Shaun Hendricks, a drug dealer • .. > 4 1997-01- 1 9 Athlone CAS 329/01 /07 Attemp ted murder: A group of 20 Muslims 0 a) M26han dgrenade (Sunday) gathered for a prayer meeting at the residence of Amien Parker at 99 Middleway, Rylands, Athlone. An explosion (M26 handgrenade) took place. 1 997-01-20 Steenberg CAS 1 85/01 /97 Attemp ted murder & Malicious damage to Violent Shooting (shotgun) (Monday) property: Shooting incident on the residence of Not previously warned by PAGAD. Shaun Hendricks, 29 Schottsville Str, Steenberg. [ 1 997-01-20 Mitcells Plain CAS 998/01/97 Arson: Petrolbomb attack on the residence of Violent Petrolbomb attack (Monday) Kaldumalla Madat, a known drug dealer and Previously warned by PAGAD) member of CORE. 0 \ 0\ N 9 kr) .—• ,—. Gathering: Approximately 500 PAGAD Non-violent supporters gathered for a PAGAD rally at VygieskraalSta dium. Goolam Ali (PAGAD supporter and Qibla member) addressed the meeting. 1 997-01-27 Mitchells Plain CAS Possession of unlicensed firearms. A suspect Arrestation of PAGAD members (Monday) 1406/01 /97 vehicle (no number plates) with four occupants was stopped by members of SAPS at A2 Berman Way Lentegeur, Mitchells Plain. An unlicensed firearms and ammunition was seized. D. t ly GA us den io s PA i ev by r ber inc d e d p ing t o an D. Warn ho PS mem t t ler 6. ice SA v 99 t k. iden dea 1 PAGA de de b and s a inc d a ttac inciden by drug re en ber ive r fi d d a ing to t ting wn dg los ts Oc trolbom hoo Secon Shoo warne Exp Kno Pe In Han Sho S t t t t a) 4 len len len 2 0 len Vio Vio Vio > > Vio t e r ho in ug t ha hes d a s n 53 s t, D is hous e de l D e PS he d on do a of m 1 d dr d a ee ite t e " lig Cla was h tro he GA ce en t ing SA GA k e r in t an S a Str The w Lang ts ho lleg ice p k. d wer PA dg he den PA e Neg k. or i wn ddress. s d searc ec a he n hoo t d launc Ker d illy t a A es s dev n lm VEN ha B ion Par Par hro is her t T an r an a t t d a a d an h iese t E Be Susp e. A lla l e ton. e in ive e en t and a t d ija to d a d o k was d bers assy lha f the se s e in. h c cap m fir los ing a ty. ty. o s VIDS, topp te r o wer lve Gr d' t tta wn. em Ba er e ll an lso es fir es s Va es f hou sons a Reckless ts exp Ap t, a on fon do m to itn fha o t Kens er he fr d r k DA ho ton ds An An t, we in vo Prop t ce w n S p Prop t ang s teen in Way, ee an te a were g he Stree 85/08/96 an r. r to d Tu to Lan ta ttemp lks was ts hen iden "Nu S ce der. de ry f Fra ry de der: wn Klip s Str r T r r r ho in Ka he ida do o here 12 PS members S he t d w e res Joy d, t tween it. 34 a an hro t t e t t a c he a Nu d k CA k t Inju in ear 2 SA t be a 72 s d mu g t d Mu c d mu t d mu ag ity. d a for d d a t n Cress d den wn. te Ro te te t an a e i in te te a ious iou le ta ic dsto do bers es fir ier b was ing. o dam ic d. tton lic ler lic king r iden iv tona tona curre h iv PRIL a re he v he A was was loo de We Ma Woo mem bers t dea fi Ma Ol oc Lans Toy inc Attemp Attemp de t dr ve mem bom Attemp Attemp te 7 7 97 /97 7 02/ /9 /02 /01/9 /02 333 326/ 483/01/9 319 92 S S S S CA CAS CA CA CA e is k v vis wn ton Par La La do ing s ds hop hop is is Lan Grassy Ken B B 8 ) /2 9 4 5 5 5 ) ) ) 1 1 1 1 ) 27 2 day ) es day day day 02- 01- 02- 02- 02- day n dn day 7- 7- 7- i tur tur tur 997- 997-01- 99 997- Mo We Sa Fr Sa Sa 1 199 199 1 1 1 ( ( ( ( ( ( 1997-02- 15 March: Approximately 550 PAGAD supporters Non-violent (Saturday) gathered at Eike Hall, Cloetesville from where they marched to drug dealers. l"-- ON ON VI 1■ Claremont CAS 455/03/97 Illegal possession of a firearm (Salie ABADER) Arrestation of PAGAD member II 0., 0 r-- 9 ON C:7 \ C•1 C'l I ■ 1 Sea Point CAS 86/03/97 IllegalPla card Demonstration. A group of Non-violent approximately 300 persons gathered outside the Civic Centre, Main Road, Sea Point. Several placards were displayed. C) CA CA N S' A VD I ■ 1 March: PAGAD supporters marched to the Non-violent residences of 5 drug dealers 1 997-03-08 Milnerton CAS 17/03/97 Atte mpted murder: Explosive device thrown at the Violent Explosive device (Saturday) residence of Benita Pisanidis N 9 •• 87 \ ON cn .— C•4 ■ . ■ I Meeting: Approximately 700 PAGAD supporters Non-violent attended a meeting at the Alexander Sinton School. 1 997-03- 13 Lansdowne CAS 1 55/03/97 Attemp ted Murder. A drive by shooting occurred Violent Shooting incident (Thursday) in front of the residence of P L HERBERT at 8 Known drug dealer and warned by Denton Way, Kenwyn. Shots were fired at the PAGAD. house. • .o 1 997-03- 1 3 Woodstock CAS 244/03/97 Attemp ted Murder. Unknown persons threw a o a) Explosive device (Thursday) home made device at the residence of Fred Previously warned and attacked by ANDREWS at 1 8 Pitt Street, Woodstock. The PAGAD. device detonated on the roof of the house. 1997-03- 14 Manenberg CAS 149/03/97 Attemp ted Murder. A drive by shooting occurred Violent Shooting incident (Friday) in front of the residence of GVA NDER HEIDE Previously warned by PAGAD. at 27 Zuurberg , Heideveld. Shots were fired at Identified one of the attackers as being the house. a PAGAD member. 1997-03- 15 March: Approximately 450 PAGAD supporters Non-violent (Saturday) marched to the residences of 4 drug dealers. t t ) ) iden iden wn. ice ice v inc D. inc kno dev de ing t ing GA un t ive ive hoo PA los los ing Shoo eason d s t by r & d (exp an e hoo ler, de (exp de de ice a & S en dea warn r rena renade dev b ly ive D g D g D g bom drug l ious o los a v GA GA t tr e Pe PA Pr PAGA No PA a., Exp t len t t t t -40 •a• io a) -v len len len o 9. len Vio Non > > Vio Vio Vio er t f de he d d ) bers un e e f t klyn. ters lipp 67B Way ils fron tg ma s o em fir ie. was C to to e 1 t or ing ls) t lleg e e k, i ho t e tz dila wner o wner ing m a on S a used a 8 h na Broo d in o fr de. it hom e de K hoo Lo in d. h n ang lo wer d Par way ) it a iver, ts, D supp d Stagg (w of Fa de d s ena dam ag damag t. w w d in ie EN an d g un s The ive Ol ccurr e ce e ( h Fla ice l. exp woo Gary t tg e Way ate v o cene. hr s b an o d dr d gr ious iou iden d. ice we den t a ho s lleg c her woun i s v Ras ing he ton de Jan lic lic t f in a he es S t (s f Roa lly 1D llan o de heu lbom de Pag t o 2) ive r e, in is s King did n ta o 800 PAGA o Ma te e ho e ( d h ce de erson k tr fa he hots ts, d d Ma los ic t ly ing VERMEUL S t s p d on v t vic Pe Fla two d an an Bon an K ing i den by a t de de e idence truc wn - ) exp r: Avenu in. hen d t o es he a foun der der. ils te dur de d a t de r he ive fir r rder r t kn r res TZ was The home ma home d ts Way, Step Firs der roximate a he T l Roa fon Desmond Ho dr fire he ma s t h na 1 Mu d LO ho e t A it were wn is t A S we t Un for d s d Mu k ille d mu d Mu ler. d un ing G e a k App klyn. d to te te t d te ty. ty. berg. r. r: K ly (w hro r r heu Stran h: uc dea e hom were e oo e he de t idg e. en de de Mr te ts ic r he rc tr tr WIS a iden Br us d d a ten f t he • Prop Bon Man in LE Sho inc Ave, Attemp detonate i n t drug Prop dev ho Mur wrong an were o an car Mu Attemp te Ma marc Attemp Attemp 7 /97 /03 03/9 387/03/97 52 6/ 2 S S 44 446/03/97 CAS S S in MA is la MA v CAS CA P d MA lls La berg ton ton er lan en he it hop 26/03/97 iln ilner itc is B 14 Man M Ma M M ) ) ) ) 21 ) 21 22 22 22 24 ) ) day day day day 03- 03- 03-22 03- 03- 03- 03- 7- 7- 7- 7- iday iday tur tur tur tur 9 99 997- 997- 99 997- Sa Sa Fr Fr Sa Sa Monday 1 1 1 199 19 1 1 ( ( ( ( ( ( ( 1997-03-25 Claremont CAS 455/03/97 Illegal possession of firearms: 3 PAGAD (Tuesday) supporters arrested for being in possession of illegalfir earms. 1 997-03-26 Grassy Park CAS 500/03/97 Atte mpted Murder. Unknown persons threw a Violent PAGAD grenade (explosive device) (Wednesday) home made device(with nails) at the Business Warned by PAGAD in November premises of Mr H APRIL at 237 7th Avenue, 1 996. Grassy Park. The device detonated on the pavement in front of his shop. 1997-03-27 Manenberg CAS 351 /03/97 Attemp ted Murder. Unknown persons threw a Violent PAGAD grenade (explosive device) (Thursday) home made device (with nails) at the residence of Visited by PAGAD in Aus 96. an alleged drug dealer Mr HBRO WN at 28 According to her she stopped dealing in Bambooberg Way, Heideveld. The device drugs 2 years previously. detonated in front of the house. 1997-03-27 Mitchells Plain CAS 351/03/97 Attemp ted murder: A petrolbom b and home- Violent Petrolbomb & home-made explosive (Thursday) made explosive device were thrown at the device residence of Aaron Mariko 1 997-03-27 Mitchells Plain CAS Attemp ted Murder. Shots (shotgun) were fired, a Violent PAGAD grenade (explosive (Thursday) 1 534/03/97 home made explosive device (with nails) and a device) petrolbom b were thrown at Business premises Petrolbomb (Smuggling Tavern) of Aaron MARIKO alias Shooting incident Arries at 5 Cavalry, Mitchells Plain. 1 997-04-01 Manenburg CAS 2/04/97 Attemp ted murder: AM2 6 handgrenade was Violent M26 handgrenade (Tuesday) thrown at the residence of Nadthmie Edries (a former leader of PAGAD) 1997-04-02 PhillipiCA S 24/04/97 Attemp ted Murder. A home made device Violent PAGAD grenade (explosive device) (Wednesday) detonated in front of the residence of Mr S Previously attacked by PAGAD. JACOBS, an alleged drug dealer at 23 Sundown Street Hanover Park. Nobody was injured. 1 997-04-02 Grassy Park CAS 27/04/97 Attemp ted Murder. An attack was launched on Violent PAGAD grenade (explosive device) & (Wednesday) the shop of Mr D APRIL an alleged drug dealer at Petrolbomb 236 7 avenue, Grassy Park. A home made 1997-02- 10: First warning explosive device and a petrolbom b were used. 1997-03-26: First attack > 0 cn cz ' g. , cn o cu -• ZI , - ■ , Athlone CAS 37/04/97 Attemp ted Murder. A home made device PAGAD grenade (explosive device) ....- e•—. cd >-, detonated in front of the residence of Ms L 1997-03-26: First warned by Aslam SEPTEMBER at 9 Alwyn Street, Lincoln Estate, Toefy and Sharif Khan. Athlone. She alleged that the reason for the attack was that she was employed at a Law Firm that defended some of the gang members in the area and that threats have been made in the past by PAGAD against her and that they were responsible. 1 997-04-06 Manenberg CAS 65/04/97 Attemp ted murder. An drive by shooting Violent Shooting incident (Sunday) occurred near the Alettahof Flats in Manenberg Road. A vehicle was observed near the scene by members of SAPS and later found in the vicinity. 1 997-04-06 Athlone CAS 91 /04/97 Attemp ted Murder. An attack was launched on Violent Petrolbomb and Shooting incident (Sunday) the residence of Laura SEPTEMBER at 9 Elwyn Second attack Way, Sunnyside, Athlone. A petrolbom b was used and shot were fired. • " > ' o a) a ' 1 997-04-06 Athlone CAS 92/04/97 Attemp ted murder. An drive by shooting Shooting incident (Sunday) occurred at Rylands Estate in an open field. Shots were fired from a White Skyline at two pedestrians. 1997-04-07 Steenberg CAS 62/04/97 Murder. An attack was launched on the residence Violent Petrolbomb and shooting incident (Monday) of Ishgad ENGLISH at 1 30 Florastreet, Retreat. One person was killed and two others injured. A petrolbom b, shotgun and handguns were used. on ON 9 0...... r"."-• . 1" I Mitchells Plain CAS 304/04/97 Atte mpted Murder: Shots were fired at the Violent Shooting incident - ›, o = o cI4 residence of Fransiena Joseph. 1997-04-07 Mitchells Plain CAS 306/04/97 Malicious damage to property : Smokegrenade Violent Smokegrenade (Monday) was thrown at the residence of Cedick Martin, 31 Nercisse Str, Lentegeur, Mitchells Plain. 1 997-04-07 Athlone CAS 95/04/97 IllegalPosse ssion of Firearms. A vehicle was Arrestation of PAGAD member (Monday) stopped and searched by members of SAPS in College Way Athlone. A 45 calibre pistol and a 9mm pistol were confiscated. (The mentioned firearms have been reported missing and the identification numbers were removed) 1997-04-07 Athlone CAS 96/04/97 IllegalPosse ssion of Firearms. A vehicle was Arrestation of 6 PAGAD members (Monday) stopped and searched by members of SAPS near NDB, Parliament, Cape Town. A loaded pistol, (a . 38 special) was confiscated, which was thrown out of the window by the occupants when the vehicle was spotted by the SAPS members. (It has previousl been re. rted as stolen) 1 997-04- 10 Milnerton CAS 1 62/04/97 Attempted Murder. An attack was launched on Violent Petrolbomb and Shooting incident (Thursday) the residence of N ISAACS, an alleged drug Warned by PAGAD in Febr 1 997. dealer, at 39 Luanda Street, Brooklyn. Shots were fired at the house and a possibility exists that a petrol bomb was also used in the attack. 1997-04- 12 March: Approximately 220 PAGAD supporters Non-violent (Saturday) gathered at Gatesville Mosque and marched to the residences of 7 drug dealers 1997-04- 1 3 Gathering: Approximately 55 PAGAD supporters Non-violent (Sunday) gathered in Hutchinson St, Malmesbury. 1997-04- 16 Mitchellsplain CAS 838/04/97 Attemp ted Murder. An attack was launched on Violent Petrolbomb & PAGAD grenade (Wednesday) the residence of Louis WRIGHT at 1 72 Blombos (explosive device) Street, Maitland. A petrolbom b as well as a explosive device (pipebomb) were used. d e k. in us c k 4/97, d d se ar /0 tta e ho 7. 92 wn. 7 an us h a t t S assyp to kno 04/9 r ven 03/9 hose CA e 8/ t Gr ila e s ing k un 83 to im 500/ he lon S tac arn s t S 4/97, h t ilar is 0 a w CA t 4/ de d de im At CA de de he a a 2 was 7. irs 7, s k t na 9 9 r S F en en ena / lain his use ar r is r r re e P fo t 0: 04 CA ic ice syp D g v 7/ D g i 0- lls D g on v 7/04/ D g Oct 1 2 p 2 as A de as he de ip 6- S GA GA GA Gr il Re he ince 99 1 PA PA T in CA S PAG * Mitc Ph The CAS PA . . . . t a '4 4a) a' "a) a' a) a) len — io V ive he t d ce 12 Way, t d f t lte los " a l e home h was d on d on a d on u e o An i den s ic ) he he he k. h e lleg c es c ssa exp ide in ha A de ic LZIE a r s w d. a de un un ne. am Par dealer, a le se as he 9 C launc la he ena j dev an 1 r la ic t t "GA u m hlo h t e k w Ben ive T EN, drug D g : I ve d on At e. N was k was d k was k was Par los Grassy ) ty ET a hom e c d near he r GA h a P c O e t de sy ttac tta ttac ate LLA Way, lleg exp hous PA iver, A a a a HARD LIP rop n ( laun a R D se. rnea de ton ry. GA Gras u p An An lto Z A f the ice de de an An R tus GA v to ma ) homema ho o r. e r. Otte e t Me Me H is ( de Lo k was n de PA 7 Bo m d un f e der. f h t, c f ag RIL, r de t rde f te ic h Ave, P o o ta fro ho o ee ive t a o 348 to rena s ce t 7t a dam in Str dev los nce tona C A d mu d mur s ler, ex A d Mu ue d ks, d ber D g An den te te e. i idence te te ide de ive ic H iou d n exp lan es dea dr ice los ke r de res res hlon ey son. Aven tona temp AGA r temp v mem Mr a temp t f a P he he he ( house. At t de At drug m 1s At t o Gr de p Hen exp Malic by Ar t At 7 7 4/9 4/9 7 0 /9 S 50/ 406/0 3 /04/97 /04 /04/97 CA 2 S S 381 35 351 RK CA S S S k k CA A PA CA CA C e e e Par Par 4/97 SSY sy ssy /0 hlon hlon hlon as At At At 351 Gra GRA Gr ) 0 r-- 00 00 3 day ) N c-q --, ci'll ›... (-ZI ■ >-. s .cr 0 -1- >, ::r 0 4- 0 04-22 day 0 c) -to o -0 9 -to 9 '1::J . r„, , 0 0 dne c--- r-- 0 7- r-- a) = o 0 \ 97- 99 We 9 1 Tues ■ .--, , ■ ( 1 — ,-- s....., ( --, ...., ....., 1 997-05-01 Cape Town CAS 8/05/97 1 Attemp ted mu rder. An attack (explosive device & Violent Shooting & Explosive (Thursday) shooting incident) was launched on the residence of Mr Mogamat JARDIEN at 72 ChappiniStree t, Cape Town. Spent cartridges of a shotgun and 9nun pistol were confiscated at the scene. 5 0 *4 1997-05-01 Cape Town CAS 9/05/97 Malicious Damage to Prop erty. The vehicle of a) PAGAD grenade (Thursday) Mr D DAWSON was damaged during the attack on the residence of Mr Moegamat JARDIEN. 1997-05- 11 Cape Town CAS 1 74/05/97 Attemp ted Mu rder. An attack was launched on Violent PAGAD grenade (Sunday) the residence of Fatima APRIL, a well known PAGAD attacked this residence in drugdealer at 3 Hohonehof,Ottery. A home made January (shooting). explosive device similar to the (PAGAD) grenade was used. . > 4 1997-05- 19 Phillipi CAS 231 /05/97 Attemp ted Murder and Malicious Damage to 9 a) 4 Shooting incident (Monday) Prop erty. An attack was launched on the This was the third attack that was residence of Richard STEMMET alias POT, an lauched by PAGAD. alleged drugdealer at 56 Lystoneway, Hanoverpark. Shots were fired at the house of STEMMETby approximately 25 PAGAD supporters. 168 spent cartridges were recovered at the scene. 1997-05-21 Cloetesville CAS 1 26/05/97 Attemp ted mu rder: Shooting incident at the Violent Shooting (Wednesday) residence of Pieter Williams, 83 Eike Str, PAGAD Arrest: Cloetesville. IsmailDO LLIE 97- 11-25 e wer s s ber ber ber em em em D m D m D m k k c GA GA GA ttac tta ler a PA de PA PA f f D a 5 his dea 2 ena o o t r ug GA in ± ion ion dr t t d PA lt ing ta ta t u s lve d wn e GAD g o ir vo h hoo Arr Assa S in Kn T Arres PA t t 4a) a' len o Violen Vio t 6, ter ter it l d. u f -up by te ing d f d Pie tro hes Way, o w d o m no e c o ice lte d on was Rd, here n t te dur ie He v an fisca he t. e (p in tea hop d to c ber, follo fro o Win e l har e e de -up S ice ton rms ion Eas in p in idence in v assau em t t, con s ag Be him ive l a n ta a SON w A d es d laun wer ee rea m llow ig de 73 Bess te r los tr le t ce Ly e was was ive, fo PS. ) dam sus la he iv es a d fi ang Paar f Ebr hic e t ice in t, in k was p t ies s exp 56 g Dr o ang t los invest SA t P PETER n arres ious bomb was bomb d a ve ke CNI t de a t g ce l 7 a jur he t ttac en D dev te n lic a o was a lice MITH, d die ) exp a 23. f t 99 tr was Po ma 1 ica f un iden GA e de ing o Ed ermar rres s an un an Vinc Ma s 05- a er o C S inciden f f d An a lias emade lt PA 7- A p e & re St en ion erson o o r. u hom ber r a May keep Am it Sup t 7 he ere p he ing es t. de 199 f me de 5 t e ion hom ion T r f d gr r r f t w A afe 12 o n 1 MS an t he l. a e k. mem he ess ffson o s hoo ns c o Han On On S d. ar ssess ss d t ions. by HA ion. d Mu d mu N a t ns Stemme for e. o o : T NDER ( ammun k. te Ga d as it a D bers d te te e. io r. erso iden ty d erp ie ft an t ca ig l p l p heuwe he r un, v he d ttac a a le es e p de b) t BRA c GA ra fis r o NGA tg har hous r a n te e hlon vest mem LEXA ter ic leg rop ear ho PA he he At s s Bo ( la Il to R A was op ammun RA con her Mu A in R Hano bom Tw Illeg Attemp t near t Atte mp p 7 7 /9 /05 97 05/9 7 H) 641 /05/ 5/9 5/97 NC S 544/ /0 02 /0 S 3 33 BRA 1 231 TED BY h CA t CA S S is VE v CAS IGA t Sou CA CA i La Eas ne ille- l- VEST hop llv ar hlo ETECTI is hilipp IN ( At Be B D P Pa 0?3 5 6 %.o cn ) ) ) 2 29 24 2 ) 5- 5- day day 0 05- 0 I 8 day 7- 7- 7- tur tur ON CT 97-05- ON ON ..., 99 99 Mon Sa Sa Sunday 199 1 1 19 ( ( ( ( t o ive n t t. los does ler. iden iden t c exp dea inc in bu de a ug ing ler, t -m dr e a hoo hooting dea is t t t S ce. ug Hom d d S d dr iden iden & den c i ban b an b b an a es in inc inciden is hus r - ing ing ing lbom lbom lbom t t t his o ex son ice t tr tro tro v e hoo hoo Pe Her Her Pe Pe S Shoo S de us t t t t t t .a)a' len len len len o len Vio Vio Violen Vio Vio Vio d ier ue, l d a l b 1 u & l e. lte l t era d on d on he d on known t he bom tro t A a Pop t he he ll he he he he t l en t c h Aven house. t t t 7 vera Em t t t h Ave ille. d a 6t assau tro Pe RY, unc we he 3 e he scen he d a a a a 41 v t t t t 2t 221 Sp t la t t t a d se 1 t 9, t launc laun a p e d. tes fir a bers fire a f 4 t iden iden iden ler an d a d a hlone. es. o loe c c ler e em a use JANUA k was k was un, k was e dea and a C inc in in At were fire z ver dealer NS tg t, were l, Cer dea M ts KOKER, D m ice ttac ttac ttac ts ing ing lso ,1 ee ho t da ting t ta, wer corner ho VA a a a drug a ho s reco drug bs Str drug dev e he E DE d S hoo An An t a Shanaa e d Vis d s d Shoo ta An e PAGA S Shoo ive lla were Hazen leg in. on r. r. r. Be l were l bom Hans Me 2 Bor t, ts d an los llege lleg der. der. hs hlone. der. e f Gay f f a de de de der: t r 1 r Be Pla r r r r 22 r tro a a ho o o o e t Str. ou an At e use e f a libres exp lls f c Mu c a S Stre in Mu Str, f an f an o rie e o de 5 y he d Mu d d d p d. d mu d mu d mu d mu ca o ler o es. ie es ia t e f or te te te te ce te te te idence iden iden k itc were an o en ma us idg lm e boom es es rav dea e den o M Cer tr up res r r idece idece i lg kma ug ffer ro es es es he he he Be car t di hous t home wer Attemp Attemp dr t Wo house. r Keer r Rd. Attemp bombs r Str, Bo Attemp Attemp Attemp g Attemp /97 7 44/06 06/9 / S 9/06/97 52 52/06/97 2 3 MA S 1 S ille CA CAS CA v e e tes e es es hlone hlon hlon At Clo At Cer Cer At 4 4 4 ) ) ) ) ) 1 14 1 1 08 01 21 ) ) 6- 6- day day day day day 06- 06- 0 06- 06- 06- 0 day day 7- 7- 7- tur tur tur tur tur 997- 99 997- 997- Sun Sun Sa Sa Sa Sa Sa 199 199 1997- 1 1 1 1 ( ( ( ( ( ( ( 1997-06-25 Woodstock CAS 664/06/97 Attemp ted Murder. An attack was launched on a Violent Shooting incident (Wednesday) cafe of an alleged drugdealer, mr Fred ANDREWS, at do Pitt Street and Rochester Way, Soutrivier. One person was injured during this attack. ONo l"--- 9 ON VD NS oo > ...., —• t o to Grassy Park CAS 498/06/97 Attemp ted Murder. Ricardo ANYMA M, Kevin Shooting incident ...., c a r 03 s ) HENDRICKS and Frans P AFRICA arrived at 26 Victoira Way, Grassy Park (drug smuggling) in a vehicle. They were confronted by members of PAGAD. One person was assaulted by these PAGAD members and it ended in a shoot-out and the injuring of two of the accupants. A person, Mogamat A SLAMIE told the Members of SAPS that he shot at the persons in self defence. > ..... o cp 1997-06-29 Mitchells Plain CAS Attemp ted Murder. An attack was launched on .-. = Shooting incident (Sunday) 1 792/06/97 the residence of Selwin DAVIDS, an alleged PAGAD warned Davids twice to stop drugdealer at 20 Tunny Crescent, Strandfontein. his activities. Shots were fired at the house of DAVIDS. A shotgun and a 9mm pistol were used in the attack. A visitor to the residence were injured and a vehicle was damaled. > 4 o -.4 co a 1997-06-29 Woodstock CAS 751 /06/97 Attemp ted Murder. An stuntgrenade detonated at - Explosive device (Sunday) the residence of Gaimoodiem GAIBIE of 26 PAGAD supporters met earlier that Shelly Street in Woodstock. Nobody was injured evening at the Mosque behind the during the explosion. It is possible that PAGAD residence. These supporters were was responsible for this explosion as they armed. previously attended a meeting at the mosque and gathered at a o -n field at the back of the house. CT ON O cD VD r CT --, > • .— i 0 cl) 4 . l ■ "0 ,....." v) = = 03 >-, the residence of Frank Sydney DAWIDS, an incident. alleged drugdealer at 72, Twelve Street, 5 People were arrested Kensington. The owner and a pedestrian were injured during the attack. A petrolbomb as well as an explosive device (pipebomb with nails) were used. Spent cartridges of a 1 2 Bore shotgun, a Tokarev and a 9mm s ista! were recovered at the scene. CT C-- 9 VD Mountain Rise CAS 347/06/97 Murder. Violent PAGAD Arrest: Ismail DOLLIE - 1997- 11-25 04 Bishop Lavis CAS 53/07/97 Attemp ted murder: 4 Petrolbombs were thrown at Violent 4 Petrolbombs the residence of Mrs. Mitchell, 56 Apricot Ave, Bonteheuwel 04 Kensington CAS 10/07/97 Illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. The PAGAD residence of Solaiman ISMAEL at 90, 7 Avenue, SUSPECT: Kensington was searched by members of SAPS SILAIMAN ISMAEL and firearms were confiscated. It was suspected that he was involved in a attempted murder case - Kensington CAS 1 78/06/97 refers. 06 Athlone CAS 61 /07/97 Attemp ted Murder. Shots were fired at the Violent Shooting incident vehicle of Glen M JOHNSON alias Glen KHAN ARREST: who stopped at a red robot on the corner of Mogamat MSMITH Vanguard and Klipfontein Way in Athlone. 1997- 10- 1 6 JOHNSON was injured in the attack. 1997-07-06 Athlone CAS 1 27/07/97 Illegal possesion of unlicensed ammunision. The PAGAD (Sunday) residence and vehicle of Yusuf A JOGEE at 19 SUSPECT: Ravenscraig Way, Woodstock were searched by Yusuf A JOGEE (It is suspected that he members of SAPS and a 9mm cartridge was was involved in an attempted murder confiscated. case -Athlone CAS 61 /07/97 refers) ible. PS k. c SA ons tta he a t t resp s he N t in a in bers d RDIE ag em t ce lence m use io iden len bs v ibla io Q inc SATAA ang lbom D D v D- ing t him d-g tro a GA GA Pe PAGA Ebra PA Shoo PA 2 Pag to t to t to . o .o > 79. 9, Violen > > > f f ts f e. k. ed o PS wn mr 00 e o o ho do It e 2 ag s tary wn ts PS ttac he R to ing dly d he No SA kno t d s t h. a do t e le ( hem bor t t ber mu c d. t e he tween ex SA he ds dam an he 2- un t, an Secre d t hic a ke t hoo 1 9mm em he caus he t lleg d a n t he e d t l be T s Klap in d a he ssy l mar ve f t m was Lan hous ttac d by a / ue d a a ta d f t e foun down le was o Stree iona ba a an hone h dace. he in in hite le o d ls fir ilt t EN. d by d p les fire d warn leg k hic use Vis Em e es to e ue, Nas w we a ke de hic was i Mosq l councillor bosc ibu is lla ig hic l an ve d to ibla were lo RDI e er too tr he he ■ p .0 ing ve Th it ttac s he wer wer llen t t were Be loca t H f Q wn, uns Mosq t wn ts 5 e ts a he TEL a t wn. 7, woun bs car N, a Isra he o t TAA t Ste o t dur 1 a ho cause ho t ha ), for To dly lly S he an S hotg en e ts, e 41 h 9mm a PA kno SA he t ou hen ta o d t s it kway t Several ve bom be t e KHA been ce e l E to blue o r. n ke w lleg was e o fa f ear Sp ( he tes Cap kesm n der. on d w tr Yor ver ie a Stree bor d. r o PATEL, rde s ce. e use iden e mr him d n bro is inu in t t e a was p he der t d in es har sp len Mu lights t jur Mr S was d a damag en cording m t t to D) Ple d 12- arme Ho lea disco d Mu in f d a d A r k, A a ts e its d t te um umen te o ing ive Vio D ter marchers. an Squa GA Two damag s Ac d N an uns. le ls der. ttac fir an e. emon 00). ilan he la d. r e was tg ing iden he arg arg a GA blic to a in ten t long hic ibla. f PA ly is ho cen he he inc An KHA Mu o t Pu were Sp was s by ass s Attemp be one p Clar Q Ex F Arson. 000, ve PA Roa wer t flas Attemp him. 7 7 7 07/9 07/9 /07/97 TERED 09 193/ 1164/ S 1 284/07/9 S REGIS S CAS CA CA h CA t wn wne bosc do OCKET To emon e ds llen Lan Cap NO D Clar Ste ) 3 4 4 ) 12 1 1 09 1 ) day ) ) day 07- 07- 07- 07- 07- day day day dnes 7- 7- 7- 7- 7- tur 99 We Sa Sun Mon Mon 199 199 199 199 ( ( 1 ( ( ( ing t Shoo t & ice iden v de inc D A ive ing t ing ¢ t 0 los ¢ Shoo PAGA Exp a Shoo t t t t len a) len Vio Vio Violen Violen ts er wn f da hit is d 221 3 D d h o o o f wn t. one kno & ex one known A The n k. n use an o hic GA a e e. t Ave, karan iem he ice roup un un he w ersons ttac t d. in d were ho No No t g MS) PA le by ibility p t a Kar s were hous dene in. house a l dev hous 8 Ja d ( ic on es. house o house an d t t f d by t t t ha h e le his oss her lso to ies. a t a t he o a he injure ive by Pla t is it a fir p s ls fire ls ts t t den ve e den t Cer t i i lhar. iv because is lo e to to ille WIILIA t c in for 5 p llls warne A v k is is d a d a 6 ly inc k. e ex in Be idence k. in a in M ta he wer p te were p VENS, l ac N 72 App Two o Two were ts wer ( 7, a ibile ttac etes he ity ,-1 es, ing ts s ts fir k (exp ttac ly ht. t Vis ttac il TE ious t res an an, a t o Mitc d a v a ig ho a BLE) is ho 9mm on ib 9mm l Cr he illeg direc Clo S lla ing h S re t, h S a tan ho e iveway t h he h he t a t Attac l an S t oss it were it r t p t ee in ) ins r. l Hum r. be ing Be ts to dr resp occup on fo her r: se t, wer is d t) ing ing d dur de de t d w d w he iza Str e der: r de was t e hlone. tore ter p top t r r ha Sho was s Farre The p The die he s ibile jur iden t f El Two la D f At k. c Stree d dur Mu d dur s ur R CONSTA 24 Ser ts d in t arme e arm to e o in d Mur o d 9mm ) ( ons d mu d mu hem ts ts in ke GA ho te ha te d Stree ttac was te l te lso jur d men. f t s t ar her town, a le t(liq boom un, ing injur t a ilan hams, ilan VENS. t ke o in PA p he era resp tg t idence he e o ims idence o idence hic t bruary t bra es ilver la ha ho he hoo es Keer assa was assa Em Attemp Attemp was t r Stree STE mas was On t were ve s in by was Fe c s A S r Attemp Attemp N- Ct N L--- 7 TERED 0 C•1 430/07/97 —• S CI) REGISTERED < 279/07/9 h CA U t S •-, Sou > CA En N ille DOCKET 113' O llv hlone NO DOCKET REGIS NO U Be At 4 4 CON 0 1 1 ) ) 2 ) 21 1.--._ , '...,ct ) 07- 07- day 1:i day C) 07- 07- t..!.. 1; day day ON ft 7- 997- 997- Mon Mon ON cn 1 1 Sun Mon ( ( 1997- —• ...../ 199 ( ( CT ON t... .—, 9 N ■ > .o 4 o a) . . '....., (.4 5:: et as 6. unknown persons at a soccer field at 34 Marsden Way, Walmer Estate near the Walmer primary school. Bernard BECOVICK, Quinton ADAMS, Jason VAN NIEKERK and Darryl Tutternd were attacked with base ballba ts and were allegedly searched by their attackers. The reason for the attack is not known. It is not known either whether PAGAD members were involved in this attack. CA CA 9 (--- N.0 ,—. C.,4 > o a) — ›.. C4 "?...... " ct as propety: Mark D KAMMIES residing at 91 Taurus Way Surrey Estate, Athlone allegedly parked his vehicle, a microbus in front of a house at 67 Upper Cinventry Way at the Walmer Estate. Approximately 30 persons approached the vehicle, and the owner managed to flea from the scene. > . — 1 997-07-26 Woodstock CAS 638/07/97 Attemp ted murder, Assault(GBH) and Robbery. o a) Assault : ARREST: (Saturday) Claude JONES residing at 67 Upper-Coventry IsmailDO LLIE Way, Walmer Estate and a friend, Allen 1 997- 11-25 MCCLOUD were walking from the Holiday Inn Hotel to his house in Coventry Way, when three (3) unknown persons assaulted them. They were also robbed of R8000-00 in cash. Shots were also fired at MRJONES when he fled from the scene. c.) 4 1997-07-26 Woodstock CAS 642/07/97 Malicious damage to property : Shooting incident Violent o 5 5 an (Saturday) on the vehicle of Mark Denver, 91 Taurus Ave, Surrey Estate, Athlone S ille v ie us CA ll tes e io 7; e v is Do e r R il Clo a 8/5/9 in 2 p S ta Ism un t s CA D on in 44/6/97; Mo a wn t t S GA ag 7 & To den DER i es e CA PA 5/9 inc BA ille inciden A harg v d by on Cap IL DOLLIE 126/ ing ing • ing ions. de t t t tes M 6/97. Z) t lu o c her 7/ loe hoo hoo -=I cca Ot inc 34 SUSPECTS: ISMA SAL C CAS S Shoo v) Attacke o S t t t 'a' t len a) len o len ..... io Vio Vio Violen V S 6 wn he k. try e c t e 2 ia, t e dence lie de i CA kno tta ven hey a k ) free man. a c rav t lau wer wn he he wer f the res un ts lg to ler scen to he t t d. wn t t C t o & Sa t he t ds ho kno he a a hicle sons t t t D) Be dea t d by t 67 Con t kno d a Way, ing er bers S a Injure ttemp f un a er Woo GA l p ls fire iden iden un fire dur d to a PS. c drug Ave, to iln 2 t e iva a d PA to ( he is mem an t e inc in Two in ( oup o oup SAPS ve SA 7) p r us ion ur were arr ing t j 1 M ing ing wer he he t llie g 01 1s t t lt ts hlone. d rus ts t a in bers f t 1 eac t au ho ions. w Do ho lan On t At S r o h Aug ld, h 9mm S ha it Shoo Shoo il WS a ec in sa it ia a was ass ide, r. e r: d t 638/07/9 tate. r: s bers Ma D) dir ve de de Ism kers der: de t PS mem r on r Es r r busy c f NDRE Jerem o GA d in tta f R Haro f mem bser SA k CAS No A ua a armed w o d mu PA 7 o d Mu d mu d mu by he ion toc ts d, Sunny d, t were ( ien he ier. t differen te te te d t Sq 7/9 t ta ds iv Warner te bers in der ilan d R tr es. dence o dence ing d a sons idence i d hen hlone. em ba re er f Arm Woo es es hem. A 638/0 ( Fly Attemp te Jon Arres Way, m p W fle arres fi assa o Sou t r At r Hoo Attemp Attemp Attemp 7 7 7 07/9 07/9 7 8/ 97 63 633/ 645/07/9 08/9 S S S /8/ 3 52/ S S CA k CA k k CA c c CA CA to toc e dsto ds ds hlone hlon Woo Woo Woo At At 7 ) ) 2 01 ) (-1 ) N ct ) da day 07-26 07-26 07- 08- O. 7 08-04 2 day day 7- day 7- 7- tur tur ON pa i 997- CA (,) 997- Sa Sa Sun Fr Mon 199 1 ( ( 1 199 199 ...., ( ( —. ( t ec be YOGI susp ce D to For GA k. ing GAD, t YUSUF G- PA ttac ias hoo ts l a f PA k T S c k ec t o he & tta t former ttac usp ber a iden bs a s for de em JOGEE a SUSPEC d is inc der e ible o4 m lbom bs D rena ing m er .5 ing lbom b a t t trolbom tro o ons dg 0 m ha GAD. GA 0 tr Pe Pe hoo = hoo esp PA S For 2 Pe Mo comm an r 2 S Han co PA JOSEPH t len t t t t t io v *5 - len len len len a) len 0 Vio Vio Vio Vio Non Vio ts 2 t in 56 t ho ing he p t bers a lton t 2 S t were ty ld no Dead, Dead, ide. ls 9 f de he h & ke he fe em a scene. JOGEE 1 l a it s ie t 1 o t m ee t lk, bs t ft h he sa m cou w hac e. iva ren a le t it on ep d a idence. t k on er t ), he lbombs lbombs t d fron dg c Wa l Dan ang lbom es de arr in. hlon Jos d t d a ie o tro sy ber g tta r 33 Sc den bu t te i f t in han te tr own On c tten e an le At o em ha d, d ca b a lers in fon he 2 Pe e a k. in de s ce arm an arm iden f Dan 2 p Lamp d t fis ip hic c 0 ft d t o te D m toc ing lleg ter Pla dea in lbom k ( town, le hame N t den ve rena ue Kl i ce e o ec a or ds lls con ug a GA foun tr 13B t es dg his hoo idg he his Arson: r den t l Mo Attac Pe i er, PA S An dene, d a d dr susp ie han & he Woo e es Br r. r: on r: r: bers r t tts for D supp r t ds Mitc de de de de de le fire 4A2 was em lleg r was r r r he d. ts F Mey d a it ib k. Way, ds, t a M26 Sco Ave, View Mosq View YOGI ( d. f e 852 ho Mu a e f ig fire in f ons S o of Sham an ion PS m a on d mur d mu d mu PAGA d mu t d l woun Par ) t klan : ta tag M o te te te te te a k Str, lso ne s firm esp SA d. ing ing e ona a t der: r k occure t over Yusu e e his idue Roc idence idence h no. venscr con hrap lipbo Moun it hoo es t ttac lias hrown Mur Corr Injur K r Han s res Str, Attemp Attemp Mee a Attemp t wer a Ra scen sc Res a Attemp Attemp w At t were be 7 1---- /08/97 ON 00 7 324 C0) 369/08/97 4/08/9 Vi" S S 21 S 08/97 .-. CA CA V) 53/ 59/08/9 in in < CAS S U in ... Pla Pla te CAS C.) CA i 0 lls lls ifon he he 1 hlone itc itc o hilipp At P Kraa M M . ) ) 00 ) ) ) 04 07 07 08 R ) day day day day ^ 08-07 o 08- s day 08- 08- >, 7- 7- iday cr, cA 997-08- 997-08-07 ;F 997- 99 Mon Thurs Thurs Thurs Thur Fr 1 1997- 1 •-• I.. 1 ( 199 ( 1 ( ( ( ( 1997-08-09 Grassy Park CAS 1 33/08/97 Attemp ted murder: Petrolbomb attack on the Violent Petrolbomb (Saturday) residence of Christina Gravenorst (Drug dealer), Previously warned and attacked by 13 Galant Str, Grassy Park. PAGAD. 1997-08- 10 Woodstock CAS 229/08/97 Attemp ted murder: Attack (shooting & grenade) Violent Explosive device & Shooting (Sunday) on the residence of Godfried Jacobs, 27B London Str. 1997-08- 1 0 Manenberg CAS 1 48/08/97 Attemp ted mu rder: Attack (petrolbomb & Violent Explosive device & Shooting =(Sunday) shooting) on the residence of Jubayda Venos, 70 Former member of PAGAD, suspect Sirius Str, Surrey Estate, Manenberg. PAGAD of the attack. ... > t 0 o 1997-08- 1 1 Mitchells plain CAS 51 3/08/97 Attemp ted Murder. An attack occurred on the Shooting incident (Monday) house of Andrea Lategan at 1 3 Turksvy Street, A 5 liter can of petrol, 36 X 9mm Mitchells Plain. Shots were fired at the House. cartridges and 24 Shotgun cartridges According to Lategan, she stopped dealing in were found at the scene. This incident drugs two years ago. is similar to the modus operandi of Pagad members. 1 997-08- 12 Grassy Park CAS 184/08/97 Atte mpted Murder. An attack was launched on Violent Pipe Bomb (Tuesday) I the residence of David ISAACS, a well known smuggler at 1 7A Gullway Grassy Park. A pipe bomb was used in this attack. > 4 0 0 ... ) 1 997-08- 1 2 Grassy Park MAS 185/08/97 Attemp ted Mu rder. The owner, Fuaad MARCUS Shooting incident (Tuesday) of 36 Cuckoo Cresent, Parkwood heard shots Previously attacked on 1997/01 /1 3 outside his house. Kenneth FOURIE, was shot at and was killed as he was approaching the front door. MARCUS returned fire and a white Ford Sierra fled from the scene. 1997-08- 1 7 PaarlEas t CAS 278/08/97 Attemp ted murder: Explosive device was thrown Violent Explosive device (Sunday) at the residence of Moosa Abrahams, 124 Magnolia Str, PaarlEa st. 1 997-08-25 Landsdowne CAS 287/08/97 Arson. Damage was caused to property when Violent Petrolbomb (Monday) unknown assailants threw a petrolbom b at the residence of Rashaad Staggie. The house belongs to the brother of the late gang leader. The house is currently empty. N v.) cn ON r--- 9 1 oo m • S a. I = co U 00 < • —, > 0.4 0 ..n ti ct t o ;12 o o a) 0 E . Arson, Public Vio lence and Attemp ted Murder. ,f; 0. —4 - >, - A attack was launched on a townhouse complex at Cyelone Close Rocklands, Mitchells Plain. Three houses were damaged in the attack. During investigation on the scene it was found that the attack was aimed at house of Koloniola MADAT at 1 8 North west way. Petrolbombs and firearms were used in the attack. The house of Richard MULLENS of Cyelone Close (nr 2) was also damaged in the attack, as well as another house (nr 6) belonging to Ivan R HARTZENBERG. Eye witnesses at the scene indicated that the attackers were members of PAGAD. <7\ ON (.....9 oo v.-) , 0 c >, t residence of Ferdie JACOBS, a wellknown drug dealer at 1 6 Harmonica Street, Steenberg. Various calibre cartridges were found at the scene. Another house opposite JACOBS ' house was also damaged as well as two vehicles which were parked in the drive way. One of these vehicles was also set alight. 1997-08-25 Elsiesrivier CAS Attemp ted murder. A home made device was Violent Home-made explosive device (Monday) thrown at the residence of Phaldie Meyer at Ruyterwacht. It is not known whether PAGAD was responsible for this incident. PAGAD. t ing t ec hoo usp s _ d ber, k and s t em use ttac iden c . b . b a D m in lbombs t GA bom o ing l lbom t tr o den PA i tro - tr Pe c Pe Pe in 2 Shoo Ex i t `44) t tio 4 0 -6 o o > > >..-, ...> l- bs d t 7 a t m d on 1 ha ha t s n ble ha her ce Paar scene. t a d t t, t l bo is to he ton. t, A o foun t o e he en on was tes k wa e. tr e iden by t d by k ha tene e t drug es as sing 9mm d es ica e ke esp d p GGIE, ttac Stre d t d der. e r d a ttac t. A r ke Cr wer scen a hrea te er Kensing a ttac in k. he as Ken t es sam ta he MMED (ex tac two deem lleg STA ton t, T t t An a he p foun t e s was t ion he a d idg ttac a An t ha d Mur kle he D er t a ty. tr w ho a c f Na f a t te r ty. d 7 Harp of t was Stre d t iga e haa r der. 4 t o in he o im GA e r te l h MOHA b was Car in dica l bom used was d Attemp to ha mem te ttac reco ls a his e ts. es Sham to ) h a t ife 11 PAGA a it us ice a e tro t Lans it r f res he ts Mey ion an lso is v is t w he ilen is ber w o a he he by mag a w itc p e S a ttemp de t t k. he t t ig ce d t em ill v ersons. a in ex f a Way dre e en lence M da f t CK CKS d damag ttac assa p d o io The ds e. o e was e d on e ves iden d on us a hill D w An D m t) was bomb v an wn uem wn ins ious ius e he es he l idg us In iblility his c klan e ices r NDRI t. lic lic PS. can tr t blic dg kno v kno tro arg unc le oss e he scen he laun HENDRI HE Rema SA Arson (va S la de Ma p car Ma Eas p for wer PAGA un dealer, an The PAGA Roc Pu un t 97 S 39/08/97 287/08/ CA 1 S /08/97 in 400 CA Cas S Pla ton wne lls CA ing do he l itc 443/08/97 Kens 1 Lans Paar M 5 5 6 ) ) ) 2 ) 2 26 2 08- 08- 08- 08- day day 7- 7- 7- es 97- 99 Mon Monday Tu Tuesday 19 199 1 199 ( ( ( ( d e in t an ha ie wer ds rs t t d t D was lor Japp be an GA iden iden c iem drug ie t s PA in inc t llissen earms D mem ins o a Has Rass fir ting ting tersen l GA d d a id tha Pe ag t f Car hoo f it Shoo S ; PA e ame ame ie illeg l (sa fy iden & & f te ing us b b b o inc w Mog Mog Shar Cashie ld Pa Toe u llo ion ie ing bom lbom ing r l lbom t ted: ted: t s. lam wo fo tro tro tro hoo ang osess Fag As hey Pe S The arres Speakers: - - t p g Shoo Pe Pe t 0 t t .4 - ,40 t 0 0 len .- .- 0 0- Violen > > z Vio d t 's t k l l he ing d t D k is ce o d a tro tro ts known bl e e Yor k an ho he tte ta For k was Yor o t s t he he un d p d p t sho es t t wn. a t t Par G- is a his ttac sp de ) an an It a t t t GEDULD a f GEDUL a ing d a To t. t ler was e o f the isa ing ing re was An den t i iden u It o den dea c fi lla i s ee Grassy Ave. mee tor para tor c in Cap ty. e, o ille. inc k area. f Lo d dur r m ber v in ass e e .r. tten a o drug m d on top d on ing ing N were Coro Par t t wne, em tes hlon ( is m te ts o rop ta We h fter f the o do m t loe p ho injur ho A & o f At in tona ds S idence e S GAD Shoo C to ing Evens o ta ld e t, r. es de r: Toy Grassy r: r: im ts was PA r fie b t de de Lan de de Dur dy : cer r r he r r hite he e, he t Lora t u ue bo t Stree f stree bom ing w t h. in k. t mu damag c Mans in e o s a he d d d Mu d mu d mu f e e any A d on ip te ttack. ttac te He t. te o bos d t Mee iou Mosq Mosq le. t t fir er her de b a b a t a p a lic t scen idence llen ee iden h ic temp Van c he ara es ha he launche 7 Ma t ve t corn r At Str Mass Stree Ste p were w in Attemp bom Attemp te Attemp bom 7 7 08/9 08/9 /08/97 / 7/ 82 44 S S 309 S 1 in in CA CA e k MA Pla ille Pla wn v Par lls lls do tes he he ds e itc itc Clo Lan Grassy M M ) ) 7 7 0 ) ) 2 2 30 3 day ) day 31 01 ) es es day day 08- 08- 08- 08- 08- 09- day dn 7- 7- 7- 7- 7- tur tur 997- We dn We Sa Sa Sunday 199 199 1 ( ( 199 199 ( 199 ( ( (Mon 1997-09-01 Athlone Attemp ted murder: Shooting incident and petrol Violent Petrolbomb & Shooting incident (Monday) bomb attack. > 4 ,..• 0 0 a . 1 997-09-03 Paarl-East CAS 45/09/97 Malicious damage to property. An attack was Home-made explosive device (Wednesday) launched on the house of Katriena KRUGER at 145A AMSTEL Court, PAARL . A home made device detonated at her home. The remains of a home made device conscisting an AQUA VELVA deodorant can was found on the scene. ON ON N 0tt 9 r--- ,-. > 4 ,-• 0 0 4 I Mitchells Plain CAS 348/09/97 Murder. An attack was launched on the house of Shooting incident v) . ,...../ 0 0 0 Piet ENGELBRECHT, a wellkno wn shebeen PAGAD ARRESTS: owner at 19 Nina Street, Tafelsig. Shots were 1997-09-08 fired at the house by unknown persons in a white ABDULLA HEUVEL (ID Toyota Corolla. Wesley PIENAAR, Brandan 56051251 82026) BOTHA and Nadia ZEEMAN were standing in NAZEER KARELSE 2 1 YEARS front of the house. BOTHA was killed and the 1 997-09-22 other two were injured in the attack. Moenieb PIETERSEN (pointed out) Approximately twenty (20) shots were fired. 1 997-09-08 Mitchells Plain CAS 465/j09/97 Illegal possession of unlicensed firearms A PAGAD members arrested Nizaam (Monday) suspect vehicle was pulled over by members of ABRAHAMS SAPS. The vehicle and occupants of the car were Safadien BESTER searched. 6 X glass bottles filled with petrol AbdulKA MIELDIEN (petrolbombs) and licensed firearms were seized 1 997-09-08 for ballistic tests. 1997-09- 1 2 Bishop Lavis CAS 273/09/97 Illegal possession of unlicensed firearms. The following PAGAD members were (Friday) Information received led to the search of the house arrested: Ismail ABRAHAMS and of IsmailA BRAHAMS at 88 Netreg Way 88, Shahied ABRAHAMS Bonteheuwel. 2 X Zipguns (homemade weapons), 11 X parts of homemade firearms, metal pipes, tools for the manufacturing of devices and wea I sns were seized. t ion: inciden osess ing MS t p in N HA Shoo UI IEM RA d bers LLIE B A bs em b an OOK B A lbom D m HIM o R C lbom tr EEM HASS ENIE to RA Pe Per RUSHDI FORT EB MO PAGA OMA JAS 2 t a) a) len ...,o . o,.., > > Vio t t, wn a ion l he ee ing lso ing t. e ie d un d ls l wn f t 9mm a kno for es fo e to br An o l Str osses ll d known he is hro two idua idg h was wer Stree p Dur t ll lso p Ga Ste ts f mr ic as l 24 ime wer we berg sen h a in t Accor t o The ts 32 X were ho im l. a by ler. we indiv e k. a S w cartr he ). Der h 9mm ken LLIE. a were t ig t we was ion. was t was de ) tr ler, ttac iven bs a dea her der Ste der A lac Tes to le in. -rsons. a t idence s ka Vio lence. los a 9mm m B e 3 X ed ed Van ug c o dr I ber 5 mm r HAMS, ugg hic car s teheu ing. he him us 0 6 fi dr t d. lbo Van res V) blic 1 d. long em firearm 8 X 7. blo e e te d five ve 0 sm b exp ho he wa e a tro e ( 1 tes BRA d two ite Bon be t le 5 mm his he Ebra he ic t, tin og Pe D m leas The t 6 e os A e t wer lleg bom e d t an nr ime of t ime f t use hic 2 is Strandfonte ou ts l earm d on r and Pu and a t scene 7. ll in terr known GA on o r ite e an e r: Stre ho fir opp ve ho he he in tro he ama ll a ba X ds tody. os der e is t t PA de f an d e r t t in ber, r h e p ( wer um d 1 o wer a for we venue, han d house cus a launc The em ce T te ts. house d d opp an in in ion t. e ons he d Mu f Moeg lueg berg d wer t d mu icens he TNEY s es ler. he l es t a d iz d B te ark a t den o te ersons tes D m i t e e CKENBERG, ers scene. TNEY a Eas ig foun lp ken le d t ic t p un ine idg in s k was on N arr l k an dea es t c p e he e e e d a tr r WHA e t hic l d lis tac her asse ttac f an t t he a ERASMUS, App fir Paar Five Attemp damag car on inves to p PAGA wer wer ve drug WHA a BLA were don Attemp t he Blan o rema o ba 7 N ON CA 770/09/9 0 S (--- S (..) CNI CA V) CA < in U Plain 7 -..0 Pla 0 lls 1-1-1 lls 09/9 / he 71 he itc 0 itc 029 1 M r1-1 M ) tr.) 7 oo ,-, ) 13 1 ■ ›, day i 0 ON 0 es 01 . 0 day 09- 0 ^0 09- 0 cn I-, dn tur 0 ON 97- ON 997- Sa CA We 1 o_. 19 ( ( ce len io t GAD. PS v PA SA b inciden D - d by ing e lbom t o tr Pe PAGA Warn Shoo 4 ce len lence ....0 lence Vio Vio > Vio l le in d her ia t d in he hic lle were o he t ind. u an hem. ts bur PS. kers t h d as t in use was he t l area. d p res k was he CS, in fie a PS ve D be a t ttac SA d t i m arch t ts ip ar d t a was bo dy a he ttac f an om were l ic hoo SA l an ho de a n fr iden d t bs ing s Way, s ISAA The ita No PAGA An He No ten An t imse f ing d. mu k. dur 20. bom o tacte a c h o a ty. l 2 d two lkoen hosp r d was ersons ho N kers. e in in of Ivan tro kwo p dsto warn bers free fire w o op d ttac r 8 Ka 997-09- em a he d Arson. Pe Par occure d p two con d he d to 2 die Wo t n t 1 e rearm imatum. d idence d two m decease in to lt a e ersons e ag fi e f the EY. d an d by an iden u p fir rea, a kers ler e res hlone. c an o der a der t ke f r a d The t in an he red by red h im jur ttac e dea on hous At t d by fi t in e an ttac 's damag a ing. ug fr ing o ing a BOOL d a d mu t on ag e he k. ir in SON m dr issu Stree d iss This te t town, BOOLEY on ien f ie dly d ious d l f e d. he to were e e ttac m ama fr a o t firearm ts dam h were lic TER dg e a de. t mp i oun a der ill cam a E jure r lleg ho lleg f Nur t lleg he P to a his g s Bo Mog launc Br On wen a t was S Attemp Ma o m in I Gy or 7 /9 7 /9 /09/97 ) • 60 463/09 S 4 S bbery 241/09 S Ro k CA k CA CA rn /97 ( toc e toc rn ds ds hlon 327/09 At Woo Woo N U a) _c I - O 153 CT 0 ) ) 4.) 2 20 21 Lr) o> ..--. ) day day 09- 09- • >,ct 09- 7- tur CT a tur 997- 99 ON 1.4 997- Sa Sunday Sa 1 1 1 ...... ( ( —• ( t den i c D in ing t PAGA f ting hoo o hoo d s ber idence b an inc b & S b m em ing er lbom t bom bom e e tro ip hoo ip S Pe P Form P a) t t t c.) t )=1 a) len len len 0.••• Vio Vio Violen Vio d 2 k. Nur his t 23 fire ffar, d t s t d on dor e kblom ttac To ha he ain a is Way, d an heo d bby A f Nur d t he wer ie ag 89 In T Mr. t Bo e d ts te an t Klip Viljoen, t f h o launc t ec s. arage o Sho d in lias fan g Way, 234 ce Arson: he cas he dea k Mnr. t he f Mr In susp t k was hooting ty. & a he wne VENS a f t ) iden te. co er ttac r in injure o ttac PRIL a ce o ce do k (s ta a es was s de ber 9. of t a ess r rop r 1 he Es il A It em il STE p iden t itn ion he An wner a tein. t Attac Lan d. ey 09- t es o m to ia w d mu ing l e r. r de in fon Ism PRIL was te a LEY. e ta '. o f ang ag de he f Isma der: k on un d LLIE. Surr 1997- r r c ls t o re The o Dur A teen a e. tta k. BOO wo s Str, d A in on mu lks dam e Attemp d d mu wn b) b a er injure us te te Par idence idence r; k Ave. Ka do ious BP Garag k was t, k was es de Oze NGREL (g NGREL bom bom bo ds lic hamm r t he Taur res e r d PRIL wa t ipe ip ttac t hildren he he MO BOOLEY on t Grassy A a Ma Lan Mo Stree an a t Rie Maro Attemp p Attemp Mu p 93 c 7 4 7 7 7 /9 /09 09/9 • N 538/09/9 N 377 N N 311/ 249/09/9 S 0, S 0, 0' CAS is CA CAS k CA C e v (1) N wn Par La burg U U do (1.) s 11) hop _C assy C Lan Bis Gr Manen a) a)C U t U ro C ro Oa 0 O 21 ) ) 21 22 U) (...1 ) ) ON >,. 09- 09- 09-22 (0 Ct 09- day day "10 day n 7- r's = 7- 997- 997- Sun Sunday Mo g: ,p, Mon 1 199 1 199 ( ( ( - - ( 1997-09-22 Steenberg CAS 279/09/97 Attemp ted mu rder: Pipebomb attack on the Violent Pipebomb (Monday) residence of Regina Rhoode, 16 Harmonie Str, Possibility that the wrong residence Steenberg. was attacked - the residence behind is a known drug outlet. 1997-09-22 Grassy Park CAS 374/09/97 Malicious damage to prop erty : lx 1 000ft flare was Violent (Monday) thrown at the residence of Mrs. Claudia Loggenberg, 45 Kudu Str, Loftusrivier. > • —• .4 1997-09-22 Grassy Park CAS 375/09/97 Attemp ted mu rder: Pipebomb attack on the o a> Pipebomb (Monday) residence of Mr. Ismail April alias Bobby Drug dealer Mongrel, 234 Klip Ave, Lotusrivier. Previously attacked on 1997-09-22. ON on N O cn O > - .— o a) .-• = N ■ Woodstock CAS 1/1 0/97 Attemp ted Mu rder. An attack was launched on Shooting incident [-I 7,,' ,--.• ..-, = a) PS the residence of S BOONZAAIER, an alleged drugdealer, at 73 Wright Street, Woodstock. Shots were fired at the house. Nobody was injured in the attack. According to BOONZAAIER she had no connection with any drugdealers or gangs in the area and she was also not threatened or warned by any of these groupings. Shotgun cartridges and 9mm cartridges were recovered at the scene 1997- 1 0-02 Athlone CAS 1 4/1 0/97 Atte mp ted mu rder: Explosive device was thrown Violent Explosive device (Thursday) into the residence of Yolande Brand at 1 8 Statice Shebeen Plain, Kewton. 4 Individuals were injured. First time the explosive device was thrown through the window. Received a . revious warning. cn O o's v. (...... ---, O 9 ...4- '4 a) >-. Grassy Park CAS 72/1 0/97 Attemp ted murder. Shots were fired at the ....- v Shooting incident a c i ct t ) • residence of mr Fuad MARCUS at 36 Approximately 1 50 PAGAD members Cuckoostreet, Parkwood. This house was a well were involved in this attack. known smuggle house. Approximately 1 50 PAGAD members were involved in this attack. Two arrests were made after the attack and the following weapons were recovered as evidence: 1 X 9mm Luger pistol nr 413371 and 6 X 9mm rounds of ammunition, 1 X Maverick shotgun nr MV04192C, 1 X SSG cartridge and 1 X spent cartridge. • — 0 4 1997- 1 0-04 rassy Park CAS 75/1 0/97 Attemp ted mu rder. In the attack that was a) 4 Shooting incident (Saturday) launched on the house of Fuad MARCUS at 36 PAGAD 's National Commander Cuckoostreet, damage was also caused to the Aslaam Toefy was arrested for this residence of mr P NOBLE at 39 Cuckoostreet, incident. Parkwood. Nobody was injured. Shotgun and 9mmj cartridges were recovered at the scene. > 4 1997- 1 0-05 LCape Town CAS 334/10/9 7 Attemp ted murder. Shots were fired at mr ,- o a) 4 Shooting incident H(Sunday) George ERASMUS a well known drugdealer and two of his friends as they were leaving his residence at 60 Francesstreet, Woodstock. Beverly LEONARD and Shaeed MAJIED were injured in this attack. A red Ford Sierra was used in the drive b shooting. > 4 o a) 1997- 10-05 Mannenberg CAS 90/1 0/97 Attemp ted Murder. Several shots were fired at .. 4 Shooting incident (Sunday) the residence of mr April LEWIS a drugdealer at Sherwood Park, Mannenberg. Approximately 50 shots were fired at the house. 9mm pistols, shotguns and a .22 were used in the attack. Several calibre of cartridges were also recovered at the scene. .... > "a 1997- 10-05 Milnerton CAS 68, 69 /1 0/97 Attemp ted Murder. Several shots were fired at o 0 Shooting incident (Sunday) the residence of mr Anthony GREENTREE a 4-6 PAGAD supporters participated in drugdealer at 8 Kings Flats, Milnerton. the attack. Approximately 4 - 6 persons approached the flat ± 50 shots were fired. on foot and a 9mm and shotgun were used in the attack. They fled by car that was parked nearby. > .... 'a 1 997- 10-05 Mitchells Plain CAS 243/1 0/97 Attemp ted Murder. Several shots were fired at 0 o Shooting incident (Sunday) the residence of mr Anthony SLOT a wellknown smuggle house at 5 Westridge, Mitchells Plain. John LINKS, Jeremy DECROFT and Gadidja ABRAHAMS were injured in the attack. 9mm pistols and shotguns were used in the attack. Approximately 1 2 - 15 shots were fired at the house. 1 997- 1 0-05 Manenberg CAS 60/1 0/97 Atte mpted murder: Shooting incident on the Violent Shooting incident (Sunday) residence of AprilLew is, 1st Ave, Sherwood Drug dealer Park, Manenberg. — cr, CD VD ^' ^0 . > — •a' C3 o ". . Mannenberg CAS 71 /1 0/97 Attemp ted Murder. Shots were fired at the Home-made explosive device & ,...., ° z ct >a vehicle of Richard REDEWAAN as he was shooting incident travelling to his house at 50 Comet Way, Surrey Drug dealer Estate. According to mr REDEWAAN a grey Previously attacked on 1 997- 10-04 Toyota Corolla with 3 occupants fired two shots at (Milnerton CAS 69&69/10/97). him as he was driving. They followed him to his house and a home-made explosive device was thrown through the window by one his attackers. This device did not explode and was recovered at the scene. ' ly e am ious v s e r he p t t D a k was c t t t. GA l. den iden iden i PA Atta he c t 4: inc by 0 inc in bro d 0- 1 ing ing ing he t t t c wn 7- un 99 ddress. 1 la Shoo a Shoo Kno Shoo 0' E V) tio t I- o o o a_a.) > > 3 t O e in a f 1 t t ro d in d bu o door e s e t a he IER t hous a.) t ersons d on (..r) on ise us ing in hear p t, IER a he fr fron hom e t ersons no t 8 K by p t were d by his d in d a her was HYBERT d a k. launche Stre e tte te d un _c ne him ht e a o t fir tg fire ttac OD k on BOONZAA ig ig en LOTTERING his t e a BBIT, sp ho • C d a by two by k was t e to Wr Way ttac he HYBERT he ves a CN d s Me t were t 3 a wer HA fir ttac 1 C-`1 to 4- k. ts in e ts 6 was 1 -0 ding he 7 ho son an t and op ha a fter t OTTERING a t ho s toc 0 his a S ding Sho An an L _C e r wer ing XR Shanaaz BOONZAA Shanaaz h ts a e 9mm house r. r. SMIT ene d was Accor hic m der. dur Sam de f ierr scen Woods t A r his r w Sho an bies Eug Acco o t, he d Sierra. _C ie te f d S klyn. te. HYBERT a d. t a t de Mu esen ture. a k in i o S r a erson, d oo d mu d mu rde N g e ig k. ts t t p te jure p te te toc u t Stree idence Even d For us Ven A re in Br e ht ttac o d mr ds e. 0 her e r no ts, ts t BBIT ig ho fron a res ien a in ves f mr ho he he he he Fla t fr Attemp t wh ite t o wer s in Attemp Woo to was t Wr ano HA Attemp hous v a) ro 7 8 0/9 /97 L c 0 0/97 F.74. /1 88/1 /1 79 S S S CA CA CA ro ton tock dstock ds C ilner u or M Woo Woo c r ro O -0 OD 0 v•I ) L, 06 ) 0-06 0- 0-06 co 1 1 1 day day day 7- 997- 997- Mon Mon Mon 1 1 199 ( ( ( L ON t 9 .. 2 N .— > - o - Athlone CAS 85/10/97 Attemp ted Murder. Shots were fired at the Shooting incident E. 4 s.—, = a) ct residence of mr ELY at nr 12 Blue BellSq uare Bridgetwon, Athlone. According to mr ELY he had no connection with any drugdealers or gangs in the area and he was not threatened nor warned by any of these groupings. 6 X Shotgun cartridges, 5 X .22 cartridges and 7 X 9mm cartridges were recovered at the scene. .— 1997- 10-07 Mannenberg CAS 90/1 0/97 Attemp ted Murder. Several shots were fired at > 0 Shooting incident (Tuesady) the residence of me F LEWIS, a drugdealer at nr Previously attacked: 1, 1st Avenue, Mannenberg. This was the second Manenberg CAS 252/03/97; attack on me LEWIS. 7 X spent shotgun Manenberg CAS 60/1 0/97. cartridges, 2 X shotgun cartridges, 6 X .22 cartridges and 7 X 9mm cartridges were recovered at the scene. A possibility exists that PAGAD was responsible for this attack. 1 997- 1 0-08 Woodstock CAS 1 35/1 0/97 Attemp ted mu rder: Shots were fired at a residence Violent Shooting incident (Wednesday) at Gjempie Str. 1 PAGAD member was arrested at the scene. > .— 1 997- 10-08 Paarl East CAS 1 56/1 0/97 Attemp ted murder. Shots were fired at the o a) Shooting incident (Wednesday) bussiness premises of Yusuf ABRAHAMS at Previously attacked Parkade Take Aways in Paarl East. ABRAHAMS was a family member of Gampie ABRAHAMS an alleged drugdealer. A . 38 revolver was used in the attack. .— > 1997- 1 0- 1 0 PaarlEas t CAS 1 84/1 0/97 Murder. Shots were fired at Yusuf ABRAHAMS o a) Shooting incident (Friday) and he was fatally wounded near the Mosque at Previously warned Abottoir Way PaarlEas t. ABRAHAMS, a drug PAGAD member arrested: dealer was apparently leaving the mosque and was IsmaelGE DULT shot at by an unknown assailant on foot. A . 38 1997- 10-21 was used in the attack. • ,-. 0 4 1997- 1 0- 14 Paarl East CAS 255/1 0/97 Attemp ted murder. An explosion occurred a) Explosive device (Tuesday) (pavement)near the residence of mr November at 51 Solomon Street, Paarl East. Fragments of an explosive device and nails were recovered at the scene. The possibility exists that this attack was meant for a well known drugdealer. He lived in a shack on the do Solomon and Jacob Street. 1997- 1 0- 15 Kuilsrivier CAS666/1 0/97 Attemp ted Murder. An attack was launched on Violent 2 Pipe bombs & shooting incident (Wednesday) the residence of Claudia JOICE a wellkn won drug dealer at 8 Doraat, High Places, Eersterivier. A pipe bomb was used in the attack. 1997- 10- 1 6 Mitchells Plain CAS 865/1 0/97 Attemp ted Mu rder. An attack was launched on Violent Pipe bomb (Thursday) the residence of mr Cecil MAJIET at 41 Jubilei Street, Mitchells Plain. A pipe bomb exploded on the balcony of his house. g., r-- 6 VD i , g _ -- ...-. .5 z 4-, 2 , arrest of Mr M M SMITH (J50) for his alleged Mogamat MSM ITH involvement in a attempted murder investigation 1997- 10- 16Mogamat N ALLIE (Athlone CAS 61 /07/97 refers), unlicensed firearms were seized in his home by members of the SAPS. A vehicle (parked in front of the house) was also searched and a number of magazines, rounds of ammunition, licensed firearms and an unlicensed firearm were seized. 1997- 10- 16 Lansdowne CAS 1 97/1 0/97 Possession of an unlicensed firearm. The house PAGAD member arrested: Ebrahiem (Thursday) of Mr E LATIEF at 58 C HanallWa lk. Hanover LATIEF park was searched according to a search warrant 1997- 10- 16 and unlicensed firearms were found in his possession. The unlicensed firearms were seized b members of the SAPS. he t t was f t iden o was son is ion den inc i his c bs Th ing t in k - bom ELY ( ing hoo t p ossess l ttac in a tro d S Mr t t hoo t t t s Pe ing an 2 den iden iden i iden 2) k on Fir c c b & S & b ( b ta ler inc t inc ). in inc b for be for 0-07: d bom 1 ing ing ing dea ing d a bom l te t t t bom drax bom 7- e e e tro an hoo econ 199 Pip Shoot Pip s arres Shoo Shoo m S Pe Pip Drug t t t t t t w t N len len len len len 0 len Vio Vio Vio Vio Violen Vio > Vio d te, er ed s ia, ta he i) ll v t b was vere d on ing d on be d on Fr ra d on Es tax m k was Mey ( lg he he t, he he ey d in bo bore 9 K S reco ttac Be Mr. e t t 2 2 Blue a use ip Surr a launc launc d a d k on 1 launc launc 01, p X 1 t An lso d, lyn. were m in ibus re 1 ire k a a es 19 ttac A fi f r. Roa e k was k was k was k was idg de b a t. r LU tr HERON Stree Broo tac WET a ee ELY, ttac ttac ttac t t were hlone. wer cn in bom a a Mu a ts ie a ton. ts la Rd, e 18 Str is t d P At DE ho bomb was bomb An An An An a te e S Sho Pip 1ST Avenue lling hoe lls t den ip wn, r. r. 9MM car r: r: 50 COMET k. he p We t der. 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A bra b Swar S t la r ts k, k was an ty : hey b a ve tc e de wn o c ing f he r d. hic ttac dam r t ho e k. t. e t h. t ven him itt d. o ttac tta a bom a Wa s hro The e fron ve ils bom s te Mu a a jur in c toc t Prop Ang e rop Ste ttac h was h is br in de e d l Eas ( in t ip ds a in p ies An The d her My Vrou My w E ler t it. l N/ o To te t P den t is t in ly i d m a were to ke h us ie e du wer a e detona r. d e es ve k. t dea e ar ho Paar erson Mr. h Wo r ter ano de s. loca ious de in der: ug p r toc r p ing h mem bers ic 50 P w jur he hom mag d e he Attemp bser Rd. ll fer tc t dr ena e ds t d to in e ser o hrown d by Str, r Eers d f t Mu o Damag da a wh in t tr A ht ke e s d mu d a o dg 7 r h was d on wn te her i, s an ig t d on ersons te te p r /9 le was was N/Wa Woo own lin rag iou ious an p he han t, kno damag a (owne ber le Wr de terus. b was burg ine be kens lic lic r in v 6 t he son Br he ll fe g 6 d ano 2 em le t f t t eop t he Ca Dra we Hey Stree were Ma Ma a launc Mr Eers Attemp bom Mu t a house an K rou M 372/11 Attemp m p o p er can 7 7 7 7 /9 /9 7 1/9 /9 /11 46/11 372/11 /9 371 3/11 S S 46/1 S S S CA CA CA k CA k CA t c ier ier to toc iv iv ds ds l Eas ilsr ilsr Paar Ku Woo Ku Woo CA ) ) ) 03 01 04 08 ) 4? >, day 11- 11- 11- 11- day day cz day . ..c, 7- e tur tur r-- = crs = 997- 997- 997- Sa Mon Tu Sa ON (4 1 199 1 1 ( ( ( ( ■-. ....., in d 7 /97 t 0/9 use /1 ce: iden 46/11 ice c S 1 S den i in dev es CA CA ing t r ive k k c c t his los to t dsto ds d shoo iden Exp t. k on & Woo Woo inc .0 b an den ttac i E ing c 0 ing t bom .0a) d a o e in el. ho hir ip is: hoot he t S P T ' S t a) a) a) 73 o o > Violen > > k. he t d t l t n t lley, he ice he A lley, d a ttac l an v t t Rd, ive t d a Va d on d on d a a ( ve to was house e d He 3 l. Va r illega ion is de ing e 1 he he er los d a h is he d. it c che c don Beaco ita by t e p fi t t R an bs ive k an con t, t e he lleg un d un in fire dur o exp any jur t ee la la mun a d a d laun in Beacon bac e de in Bea wer to Hosp NDE Str xplos is un ds t, d 7B Lon Am ts was t fir e e use eet, were h d a 9mm d a warne use. ing o 2 ema e ho lve t k was k was d k was ts de huur ly wo ZAAIER a t PER an c in an ho Str vo N LEXA ho P S d a ta h l Stre ds lle ttac Sc ttac Peug t t wer b was in ma he Hom Cn un ious k. t te A e u t te a losives: a t a S v t bu tg OON f SKI fba o NDER was 86 e ho toc So r Accor d in. t S bom An An oo An ho B hite canopy hite T n e Ivan fisca exp k o 6 woun ds d. p e t s hom a t ttack. c in f Gr w Kor Pla r. r. 11 aaz r. EXA ip a o lle ta Me was L t 47 ler, con ls ba A no use A de der. de p de h a he l f f mr Woo r r us r r bu his han a it 1 he t ion A he in. in. t o o lso S t t, he r s s t la t w t a f ido in a ses ee itc Mu were s Pla d was d to ie and a and P o ). d Mu d Mu d d d Mu d m os te e d a d two drugdea inen kk te te lls te ce lls M te an Str D. idence idence te wa ersons ives Cup iver. or d l p an la a e s ht ine use e he he e es cene a k. dealer, R p mp ba hous c lo GA ig ta ions r res iden s Me vic itc lt ton t f lue lleg tta lleg es he he he he M were PA comp ac t Mitc sus o de de t a hous Two Attemp Attemp drug r Atte Va lley, transp t t a I exp Wr Sa b Attemp /97 /97 1/97 /11 /97 /97 621 624/1 625/11 S S S 239/11 282/11 S S CA CA CA in in in k CA k CA Pla Pla Pla lls lls lls toc toc he he he ds ds itc itc itc M M M Woo Woo 3 — — ) .1- 11 —, ,--, ) — ..--, 1 . >•., day 11- 11- day -0 ,_, >, . ce t--- -ci hurs 997- Ch H 997- 0 .T., Tues T \ 1 1 ( --. ....., ( —. ....., k. c tta a his t d in e us 0 bs b b 0 b .... b cd bom bom 1 bom bom bom e e ip e e .5 e ip Pip Pip 2 P P 1". 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CA ON 0 cl t — -8 —. -,i • 0 . 4 Athlone CAS 333/11 /97 Murder and Attemp ted Murder. Shots were fired PAGAD-GANG VIOLENCE ,...... , v) a ,. >1 during a skirmish between members of PAGAD Suspects: and GANG members at the Steers Restaurant at Nazeer BAHOUDIEN, Abubaker the c/o Hazel and Klipfontein Roads, Gatesville, WILLIAMS alias Whitey, Mogamat Athlone. '° GALLANT, Allie BLANKENBERG, Arrest: FaizelKOSSA IN - 98-01-28, Anwar van SCHALKWYK, Mogamat GEORGE. > ..-. 1997- 11-29 Bishop Lavis CAS 858/11/97 Attemp ted Murder. An attack was launched on the 0 a) Home-made explosive device (Saturday) residence of Shamawoodien STEMMET at 24 PAGAD members arrested:Donovan Angola Way, Valhala Park. The assailant SAMEUELS (Donovan SAMEULS) was in the process of Priezamo HOLLAND throwing a home made explosive device at the Moeniel HOFMEYER house when it exploded in his hands. The assailant was rushed to hospital by two other accom dices who were later arrested . > 0 cu 1997- 11-30 Mitchells Plain CAS Attemp ted Murder. An attack was launched on . Home-made explosive device. (Sunday) 1956/11 /97 the residence of Jonathan MAART at 5 Pikkewyn Street, Rocklands, Mitchells Plain. A home made explosive device was hurled through the kitchen window where it detonated. One person was inured in the attack. O Cr, r ,--. ,--• „ . . ... \ Conville CAS588/11 /97 Intimidation and Assau lt. 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Like many South Africans, we welcomed the emergence of the group People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) some months ago. We celebrated a public initiative that put criminals and drug dealers on the defensive. However we are deeply concerned at the level of militancy that is now being displayed by PAGAD, its confrontational and intolerant approach in public which puts ordinary citizens at risk and the social disruption it is creating within our communities PAGAD also claims to speak in the name of Islam and Muslims. As part of a multi-religious society in which every religious tradition enjoys constitutional protection, it is evident that the public conduct on the part of some persons claiming to be aligned to PAGAD has compromised the image of Islam and Muslims. The call on Muslims and people at large to atm themselves is particularly alarming. The militarization of a society in Which criminai is already endemic is a dan gerous and irresponsible path suggested by the PAGAD laciership. The majority of our people. Muslims and non-Muslims,. are law-abiding citizens and do not advocate the use of violence for poiitical ends in a democratic dispensation that upholds human rights. Muslims in South Africa are an integral part of the national culture. Persons belonging to this faith occupy the highest public offices and play a role in all sectors of our society. As a community Muslims have a proud record of struggle and have made a major contribution to our national culture. The recent public representation of Muslims as armed, angry and masked persons does very little credit to the ibhiaiii4: v due ofju.tice with compassion, love, respect and integrity of all people. In the light of the above we make the following urgent appeal to all sectors of our society: 1. We urge PA GAD to re-dedicate itself as a united front against drugs and gangster-ism and mobilise public awareness for this cause without violating any Taws. Wp urize the police to show restraint and defuse volatile situations by using such means that will nor increase tension in the region. We cannot witness the brutalisation of mothers. women, children and unarmed protesters. 3. We call on all sectors of government — national and regional — to seriously engagement in the fight against crime and drugs in order to ensure the safety and security of all citizens. We call for the speedy investigation into the cause of death of Mr Achmat Najaar. We call on the authorities to investigate allegations of foreign hit squads intent to assassinate Muslim leaders in the Western Cape. We urge all level: of .zovornmant to crtgaga urgzo.tly i,, itl611 Icvc1 with representatives of the Muslim and religious communities in order to dispel rumours and allegations of lack of resolve on the part of the State to fight crime and drugs in our country. We urge the authorities to show eater transparency in their fight against crime and rapidly proceed with the transformation of the police service. Signatories: Dr Ebrahim Moosa, Religious Studies UCT & Director Centre for Contemporary Islam Dr Abdulkader Tayob, Religious Studies. UCT Imam Abdurrashid Omar. Imam, Claremont Main Road Mosque Archbishop of Cape Town, Most Revd Njongo Ndungane Dr Farid Esack, Religious Studies, UWC Dr Sharniel Jeppie, UCT Research Fellow Mr Ebrahim Rasool, MEC Health and Welfare. Western Cape Government Shaykh Muhammad Nloerat, Imam Zinatul Islam Mosque, District Six Mr Muhammad Haron, Arabic Studies, UWC The Very Revd. Rowan Smith, Dean of Cape Town The Revd Christopher Ahrcnds, Director of St George's Cathedral Professor John de Gruchy, Religious Studies, UCT Mrs Rahmat Jaffer, Member ANC Women's League Rev Douglas Bax. Minister United Church. Rondebosch Shaykh Tahir Sitoto, ex-president Muslim Youth Movement Mr Eghsaan Behardien, Teacher and Community Worker S'naykh Amin Amod, Lecturer Islamic College of South Africa Dr RAM Saloojee. President Islamic Council of South Africa Mr l•trraii Schrnerip.r chairman Mnjlistts Shura Ctrs Fatima Khan, Director & President, Muslim Women's Federation of Southern Africa Mr Adam Jaffer. Businessman Dr Sorour Solomon, Medical Practitioner Organisations: Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) Islamic Council of South Africa (ICSA) Majlisus Shura al-Islami Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa (Western Cape) Call of Islam World Conference on Religion and Peace Muslim Women's Federation of Southern A 6-ica Claremont Main Road Mosque Bush Radio