Ostend and Zeebrugge, April 23

mr /. s J !!!'ii'> -;:a fit;:? i|i!|!i- mt mm::- 6 c y^c Y^ cs^ "L^t-^^i^^ ^OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE APRIL 23: MAY 10, 1918 Z^t 2Dtspatcl)es OF VICE-ADMIRAL SIR ROGER KEYES, K.C.B., K.C.V.O. And other Narratives of the Operations EDITED BY C. SANFORD TERRY, Litt.D. BURNETl-FLETCHER PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPE TOWN BOMBAY HUMPHREY MILFORD 1919 f^ •NOTE The publication of Sir Eoger Keyes's Dispatches of May 9 and June 15, 1918, at length affords an authentic record, by its organizer and leader, of an achievement which a French Admiral has characterized as ' the finest feat ot arms in the naval history of all times and all countries '. As a story of pure gallantry, it may be, the Dispatches do not add to the information already accessible. But they correct many glaring current inaccuracies, based on irre- sponsible statements and incomplete knowledge. Above all, they present us for the first time with an authentic exposition of the purpose and tactics of the operations, and permit us to view their incidents in proper perspective. For the first time, too, we realize the magnitude of the design, its colossal intricacy, its patient weaving. Narratives of both Raids were issued through the Press Bureau on April 26 and May 15, 1918. Having regard to their medium of publication, but on that' ground alone, these articles, written by an exceedingly competent and well-informed journalist, may be described as official. There has also found its way into the public press an unusual amount of first-hand information in the form of interviews with actors in the events. Much of it is unreliable, as statements hot upon the event generally are. But there remains a residuum which is valuable and worthy of recovery. 4 NOTE These materials have been explored and sifted here, by no means because they supplement the Dispatches on any material point, but because they exhaust the sources at present available for the record of deeds of which we would not lose the minutest detail. I am indebted to The Times for permission to repro- duce the plans on pp. 40 and 100 ; to the Editor of the Daily Mail for use of that on p. 8. The frontispiece is copyright of the Graphic. It will be understood that the photographs which illustrate the text of the Dispatches are not part of the official document. C. S. T. King's College, Old Aberdeen. CONTENTS PAOE I. The Occasion and the Plan ... 9 II. St. George's Day Raid, April 23, 1918 . 25 (a) Captain Carpenters Narrative . 36 (b) The Press Bureau Narrative . .50 (c) 'TJie Storming of Zeehruyge Mole . 67 (d) The German Admiralty's Account . 79 III. The Ostend Raid, May 10, 1918 . 81 (a) The Press Bureau Narrative ... 91 (b) The German Admiralty's Account . 104 [(c) TheEesult 107' IV. Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch, May 9, 1918 Ill V. Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch, June 15, 1918 178 VI. Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch, July 24, 1918 200 Index 217 ERRATA Page 37, n. 3 : for Dover read the Swin Page 39, ii. 2, 1. 6 : for clear the Mole read close the Mole ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE General View of the Operations, April 23, 1918 Frontispiece The Ostend-Bruges-Zeebrugge Canal System . 8 Block-ships joining Vice- Admiral's Flag off Good win Sands ...... facing 16 The Mole at Zeebrugge : General View . ,, 32 Plan of the Zeebrugge Raid, Ajjril 28 . .40 The Mersey Ferry-boats Iris and Daffodil facing 49 The Mole at Zeebrugge, showing the Viaduct] hettveen Zeebrugge Viaduct after the Attack . 64 and 65 J The Mole Extension and Viaduct, Zeebrugge] between H.M.S. Vindictive after the Raid, showing the j- 80 and 81 Brows ) The Canal Entrance, Zeebrugge . facing 96 Plan of the Raid on Ostend, May 10, 1918 . 100 Plan of Zeebrugge Harbour, showing Enemy Defences and position of Block-ships, &c. 110 Sea-plane View of the Zeebrugge Lock-gates, showing positions of the sunken Cruisers facing 113 Sea-plane View of the Mole, showing the Viaduct repaired ...... facing 128 The sunken Ships at Zeebrugge, September, 1918 facing 145 The sunken Ships in the Canal, Zeebrugge: a second view ..... facing 160 H.M.S. Wanvick with H.M.S. Velox lashed along- side, towed by H.M.S. WhirUvind, 4.30 a.m., May 10, 1918 facing 111 OSTEND AND ZEEBKUGGE I THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN On October 13, 1914, the unstemmed advance of the Germans forced the Belgian Government to evacuate Ostend. The enemy, already established in Zeebrugge, entered forthwith and remained in possession of the port until October 17, 1918. ' From either the naval or the military point of \iew,' The Times of October 17, 1914, announced with ill-founded optimism, ' the German occupation of Ostend is of no more account than the German band which played in the square at Bruges on Thursday night.' In fact, possession of the Ostend- Bruges-Zeebrugge canal system gave the enemy control of ' a stretch of coast outside his wet triangle ', the Bight of Heligoland, which provided, in Bruges, an invaluable and protected base for the submarine offensive on which he relied to neutralize Great Britain's superiority in surface craft. Both Zeebrugge and Ostend are connected with Bruges by canal, and Bruges itself with Germany by rail. Submarines could be dispatched in parts overland, be put together at Bruges, and find their way into the southern waters of the North Sea through the canals connecting their inland d6p6t and the coast. At a bound the U-boat bases were advanced 300 miles nearer to the British lines of communication with the Continent. The Zeebrugge-Bruges-Ostend system forms a triangle with two sea entrances. The eastern side is the canal from 10 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE Zeebrugge to Bruges, and is eight miles long. The southern side, the smaller canals from Bruges to Ostend, is eleven miles long. The base, facing north-west, is the twelve miles of strongly fortified coast between Ostend and Zeebrugge.^ No time was lost by Germany in developing her acquisi- tion. Artillery of heavy calibre was mounted on the coast between Nieuport and the Dutch frontier. Between Zeebrugge and Ostend alone at least 120 big guns were concentrated, in addition to batteries of smalle)' ordnance for dealing with inshore raids.- As Lord Jellicoe remarked in August 1917, the Germans applied to this length of sand-fringed coast the principle of intensive fortification already adopted higher up the North Sea and on the island of Heligoland, and studded it with heavy pieces, in themselves infinitesimal targets at a range of more than 20,000 yards, on which a bombardment needed to be carried out." That ships cannot engage land forts successfully is an axiom of naval warfare ; the fortified Ostend-Bruges-Zeebrugge system rested seemingly secure behind the disqualifica- tion. While the ports sei'V'ed as lairs for destroyers and submarines, the country behind them was soon planted with aerodromes, whence with facility London and other cities became targets for German aircraft. Britain's insularity was doubly challenged. Of the two ports Zeebrugge offered the greater utility to the enemy. It was more distant from challenging ' Sir Roger Keyes's Dispatch of May 9, General Summary, para. 4. 2 Percival Hislam, Uoto we Ticisted the Dragonh Tail (.1918), p. 36. ' Between the Dutch frontier and the German right flank fronting Nieuport 225 guns were in position, 136 of which were of from G-inch to 15-inch calibre. The latter ranged up to 42,000 yards (21 miles).—Sir Rogei* Keyes's Dispatch of May 9, General Summary, para. 4. THE OCCASION AND THE PLAN 11 Patrols on the Thames estuary and at Dunkirk, more difficult to approach, and, by reason of its protecting Mole, more difficult to attack. Its canal permitted the passage of destroyers and submarines of greater draught from Bruges to the sea. The Germans therefore concentrated their chief care upon it, equipped it with seaplane sheds, ammunition and store depots, floating docks and armoured shelters for submarines, and made it the principal outlet for their submarine, surface, and aerial operations in the lower waters of the North Sea. Ostend, on the other hand, lacking the protection of a defensive Mole, lying within range of the 15-inch batteries of the Royal Marine Artillery in Flanders, and connected with Bruges by canals inadequate to carry vessels of heavy draught, was subsidiary to its eastern neighbour. Originally a destroyer and submarine base, continuous bombardment caused the enemy to transfer its plant, docks (except one), &c., to Bruges. Ostend remained merely an emergency harbour for mosquito craft in difficulties. While the Germans employed their ports at Kiel and in the Bight—Wilhelmshaven, Emden, Bremerhaven, Brunsbiittel, and Heligoland itself—as the bases for their Atlantic and distant operations, they proceeded to equip the Flemish ports expeditiously for a more localized service. Before the end of October 1914 Antwerp's shipbuilding yards were appropriated and skilled German workmen were introduced. Sections of small submarines dispatched by rail were assembled there, the completed vessels passing by canal to Bruges. By the end of November, six weeks after the occupation of Ostend, Zeebrugge had become an effective base of operations. In the same period surface torpedo-craft or outpost-vessels, small and of indiff'erent quality, were built at Antwerp and sent ^ 12 OSTEND AND ZEEBRUGGE through the canals to the coast.

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