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Part 3: Security Assurance Components Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4 CCMB-2012-09-003 Foreword This version of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC v3.1) is the first major revision since being published as CC v2.3 in 2005. CC v3.1 aims to: eliminate redundant evaluation activities; reduce/eliminate activities that contribute little to the final assurance of a product; clarify CC terminology to reduce misunderstanding; restructure and refocus the evaluation activities to those areas where security assurance is gained; and add new CC requirements if needed. CC version 3.1 consists of the following parts: Part 1: Introduction and general model Part 2: Security functional components Part 3: Security assurance components Trademarks: UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group in the United States and other countries Windows is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and other countries Page 2 of 233 Version 3.1 September 2012 Legal Notice: The governmental organisations listed below contributed to the development of this version of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. As the joint holders of the copyright in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Parts 1 through 3 (called “CC 3.1”), they hereby grant non- exclusive license to ISO/IEC to use CC 3.1 in the continued development/maintenance of the ISO/IEC 15408 international standard. However, these governmental organisations retain the right to use, copy, distribute, translate or modify CC 3.1 as they see fit. Australia/New Zealand: The Defence Signals Directorate and the Government Communications Security Bureau respectively; Canada: Communications Security Establishment; France: Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information; Germany: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik; Japan: Information Technology Promotion Agency Netherlands: Netherlands National Communications Security Agency; Spain: Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas and Centro Criptológico Nacional; United Kingdom: Communications-Electronics Security Group; United States: The National Security Agency and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. September 2012 Version 3.1 Page 3 of 233 Table of contents Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 10 2 SCOPE ........................................................................................................... 11 3 NORMATIVE REFERENCES ......................................................................... 12 4 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS, SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATED TERMS ...... 13 5 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................... 14 5.1 Organisation of CC Part 3 ..................................................................................................................... 14 6 ASSURANCE PARADIGM ............................................................................. 15 6.1 CC philosophy ........................................................................................................................................ 15 6.2 Assurance approach ............................................................................................................................... 15 6.2.1 Significance of vulnerabilities ........................................................................................................ 15 6.2.2 Cause of vulnerabilities .................................................................................................................. 16 6.2.3 CC assurance .................................................................................................................................. 16 6.2.4 Assurance through evaluation......................................................................................................... 17 6.3 The CC evaluation assurance scale ....................................................................................................... 17 7 SECURITY ASSURANCE COMPONENTS .................................................... 18 7.1 Security assurance classes, families and components structure ......................................................... 18 7.1.1 Assurance class structure ................................................................................................................ 18 7.1.2 Assurance family structure ............................................................................................................. 19 7.1.3 Assurance component structure ...................................................................................................... 20 7.1.4 Assurance elements ........................................................................................................................ 23 7.1.5 Component taxonomy..................................................................................................................... 23 7.2 EAL structure ......................................................................................................................................... 24 7.2.1 EAL name ....................................................................................................................................... 24 7.2.2 Objectives ....................................................................................................................................... 24 7.2.3 Application notes ............................................................................................................................ 25 7.2.4 Assurance components ................................................................................................................... 25 7.2.5 Relationship between assurances and assurance levels .................................................................. 25 7.3 CAP structure ......................................................................................................................................... 26 7.3.1 CAP name ....................................................................................................................................... 27 7.3.2 Objectives ....................................................................................................................................... 27 7.3.3 Application notes ............................................................................................................................ 27 7.3.4 Assurance components ................................................................................................................... 28 7.3.5 Relationship between assurances and assurance levels .................................................................. 28 8 EVALUATION ASSURANCE LEVELS .......................................................... 30 8.1 Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview ........................................................................................ 30 Page 4 of 233 Version 3.1 September 2012 Table of contents 8.2 Evaluation assurance level details ......................................................................................................... 31 8.3 Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested ................................................................. 32 8.4 Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested .................................................................. 34 8.5 Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked .......................................... 36 8.6 Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed ...................... 38 8.7 Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested ........................................ 40 8.8 Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested .............................. 42 8.9 Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested ...................................... 44 9 COMPOSED ASSURANCE PACKAGES ...................................................... 46 9.1 Composed assurance package (CAP) overview ................................................................................... 46 9.2 Composed assurance package details ................................................................................................... 48 9.3 Composition assurance level A (CAP-A) - Structurally composed .................................................... 48 9.4 Composition assurance level B (CAP-B) - Methodically composed ................................................... 50 9.5 Composition assurance level C (CAP-C) - Methodically composed, tested and reviewed ............... 52 10 CLASS APE: PROTECTION PROFILE EVALUATION .............................. 54 10.1 PP introduction (APE_INT) ............................................................................................................. 56 10.2 Conformance claims (APE_CCL) .................................................................................................... 57 10.3 Security problem definition (APE_SPD) ......................................................................................... 59 10.4 Security objectives (APE_OBJ) .......................................................................................................
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