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Microsoft Windows Common Criteria Evaluation Security Target

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Microsoft Windows Common Criteria Evaluation Security Target Microsoft Common Criteria Security Target Microsoft Windows Common Criteria Evaluation Microsoft Windows 10 (Creators Update) Security Target Document Information Version Number 0.06 Updated On June 14, 2018 Microsoft © 2017 Page 1 of 102 Microsoft Common Criteria Security Target This is a preliminary document and may be changed substantially prior to final commercial release of the software described herein. The information contained in this document represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation on the issues discussed as of the date of publication. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information presented after the date of publication. This document is for informational purposes only. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Complying with all applicable copyright laws is the responsibility of the user. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs- NonCommercial License (which allows redistribution of the work). To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd-nc/1.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 559 Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 94305, USA. Microsoft may have patents, patent applications, trademarks, copyrights, or other intellectual property rights covering subject matter in this document. Except as expressly provided in any written license agreement from Microsoft, the furnishing of this document does not give you any license to these patents, trademarks, copyrights, or other intellectual property. The example companies, organizations, products, people and events depicted herein are fictitious. No association with any real company, organization, product, person or event is intended or should be inferred. © 2017 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Active Directory, Visual Basic, Visual Studio, Windows, the Windows logo, Windows NT, and Windows Server are either registered trademarks or trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. The names of actual companies and products mentioned herein may be the trademarks of their respective owners. Microsoft © 2017 Page 2 of 102 Microsoft Common Criteria Security Target TABLE OF CONTENTS SECURITY TARGET .........................................................................................................................1 TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................3 LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................................6 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................8 1.1 ST REFERENCE ........................................................................................................................8 1.2 TOE REFERENCE......................................................................................................................8 1.3 TOE OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................................8 1.3.1 TOE TYPES ....................................................................................................................................... 8 1.3.2 TOE USAGE ...................................................................................................................................... 9 1.3.3 TOE SECURITY SERVICES ..................................................................................................................... 9 1.3.4 NON-TOE HARDWARE, SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE IN THE EVALUATION ....................................................... 10 1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................. 11 1.4.1 EVALUATED CONFIGURATIONS ........................................................................................................... 11 1.4.2 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND TOE BOUNDARY ................................................................................... 11 1.4.2.1 Logical Boundaries ...................................................................................................................... 11 1.4.2.2 Physical Boundaries .................................................................................................................... 12 1.5 PRODUCT DESCRIPTION .......................................................................................................... 13 1.6 CONVENTIONS, TERMINOLOGY, ACRONYMS ................................................................................ 13 1.6.1 CONVENTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 13 1.6.2 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................................ 14 1.6.3 ACRONYMS..................................................................................................................................... 17 1.7 ST OVERVIEW AND ORGANIZATION ........................................................................................... 17 2 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ............................................................................................... 18 3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ........................................................................................ 19 3.1 THREATS TO SECURITY ............................................................................................................ 19 3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ......................................................................................... 19 3.3 SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS .................................................................................................. 20 4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ....................................................................................................... 21 4.1 TOE SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................... 21 Microsoft © 2017 Page 3 of 102 Microsoft Common Criteria Security Target 4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .......................................................... 22 5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................. 23 5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 23 5.1.1 SECURITY AUDIT (FAU) .................................................................................................................... 24 5.1.1.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1) .......................................................................................... 24 5.1.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT (FCS) ....................................................................................................... 25 5.1.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS_CKM.1(1)).......................................................................... 25 5.1.2.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (FCS_CKM.2(1)) ..................................................................... 25 5.1.2.3 Cryptographic Key Destruction (FCS_CKM.4) ............................................................................. 26 5.1.2.4 Cryptographic Operation for Encryption / Decryption (FCS_COP.1(SYM)) ................................. 26 5.1.2.5 Cryptographic Operation for Hashing (FCS_COP.1(HASH)) ........................................................ 26 5.1.2.6 Cryptographic Operation for Signing (FCS_COP.1(SIGN)) ........................................................... 26 5.1.2.7 Cryptographic Operation for Keyed Hash Algorithms (FCS_COP.1(HMAC)) ............................... 27 5.1.2.8 Random Bit Generation (FCS_RBG_EXT.1) ................................................................................. 27 5.1.2.9 Storage of Sensitive Data (FCS_STO_EXT.1) ................................................................................ 27 5.1.2.10 TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1) ..................................................................................... 27 5.1.2.11 TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2) ..................................................................................... 28 5.1.2.12 TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.3) ..................................................................................... 28 5.1.2.13 TLS Client Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.4) ..................................................................................... 28 5.1.2.14 DTLS Implementation (FCS_DTLS_EXT.1) ................................................................................ 28 5.1.3 USER DATA PROTECTION (FDP) ......................................................................................................... 28 5.1.3.1 Access Controls for Protecting User Data (FDP_ACF_EXT.1) ...................................................... 28 5.1.3.2 Information Flow Control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1) ................................................................................ 28 5.1.4 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA)....................................................................................... 29 5.1.4.1 Authentication
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