Mitigating ICT Supply Chain Risks with Qualified Bidder And

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Mitigating ICT Supply Chain Risks with Qualified Bidder And CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY MITIGATING ICT SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS WITH QUALIFIED BIDDER AND MANUFACTURER LISTS Recommendations on the Use of Qualified Lists and Considerations for the Evaluation of Supply Chain Risks April 2021 CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY This page is intentionally left blank. i CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY MITIGATING ICT SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS WITH QUALIFIED BIDDER AND MANUFACTURER LISTS Recommendations on the Use of Qualified Lists and Considerations for the Evaluation of Supply Chain Risks Executive As Information and Communications Technology (ICT) products and services Summary evolve to provide increasing functionality, the supply chains that deliver them continue to grow more sophisticated and complex. Often hundreds of entities in multiple countries contribute in some fashion to a final product, from the mining of rare earth metals to the production of processing chemicals to sophisticated integrated circuits and software. The complexity and, to a degree, the proprietary nature and obscurity of ICT supply chains have made them increasingly at risk. This includes risk of exposure of sensitive or classified data that may imperil an organization’s mission. There are currently no uniformly agreed upon and broadly adopted security standards, assurance standards, or criteria to evaluate the ICT products or processes to develop and produce them. The scope of this working group centered primarily on security and cybersecurity risks, not general risks (e.g., assurance of supply and labor compliance). Cyber supply chain risks arise from threats to and through ICT. When an organization acquires an ICT product or relies upon an ICT service, they inherit these ICT cyber supply chain risks and their potential exposure to harm. With few exceptions, organizations rely upon ICT to perform their functions, and to process, store, and share data and information. As the criticality of these functions, or the value or sensitivity of their associated information increases, so does the level of trust an organization needs to have in the person or product performing a critical function, or that has access to important information. Establishing and utilizing vetted, qualified sources of supplies can limit an organization’s exposure to risk. Incorporating cyber-SCRM-focused qualification criteria into existing or new qualification list processes can provide a targeted and effective means for providing assurance that an ICT supplier or product is sufficiently trustworthy. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) ICT Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Task Force established the Qualified Bidders List (QBL)/Qualified Manufacturers List (QML) Working Group (WG3) with the goal of providing realistic, actionable, economically feasible, and risk-based recommendations surrounding the use of “Qualified Lists” as one tool among many that can help organizations better manage ICT supply chain risk. This report is the result of the efforts by the QBL/QML WG3. It explains the purpose and benefits of qualified lists, provides a description of factors that inform a decision to build/rely on a QBL/QML for ICT products and services, and proposes actionable recommendations for incorporating SCRM considerations into new and existing ICT-related qualified list criteria and program processes. ii CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................ IIii QUALIFIED BIDDERS LIST (QBL)/QUALIFIED MANUFACTURERS LIST (QML) WORKING GROUP MEMBERS .......... 1 BACKGROUND AND APPROACH .................................................................................................................................. 3 CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE OF QUALIFIED LISTS TO ENHANCE C-SCRM ................................................................ 5 Qualified List Benefits ............................................................................................................................................. 5 Qualified List Costs and Risks ................................................................................................................................ 5 Establishing Qualified Lists: Considerations and Best Practices ......................................................................... 7 Purpose and Value of Addressing SCRM in a QL .................................................................................................. 8 Supply Chain Risk Categories ................................................................................................................................ 9 CATEGORICAL SCRM CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................... 10 Supply Chain Security ........................................................................................................................................... 10 PHYSICAL SECURITY ........................................................................................................................................ 10 CYBERSECURITY ............................................................................................................................................... 12 PERSONNEL SECURITY .................................................................................................................................... 15 SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRITY ............................................................................................................................... 16 SUPPLY CHAIN QUALITY ................................................................................................................................... 26 SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................................................. 27 APPENDICES .............................................................................................................................................................. 28 Appendix A: Background on Qualified Lists ......................................................................................................... 29 WHAT IS A QUALIFIED LIST AND ITS PURPOSE? ............................................................................................. 29 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR A QUALIFIED LIST? ............................................................................................. 29 FEDERAL ACQUISITION POLICY REGARDING QUALIFIED LIST REQUIREMENTS ........................................... 31 WHAT VARIATIONS IN QUALIFIED LISTS EXIST? ............................................................................................. 32 BEST PRACTICES FOR QUALIFIED LIST BUILDING .......................................................................................... 32 QUALIFIED LISTS SUPPORT GOVERNANCE, COMPLIANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES ............ 33 Appendix B: Additional Recommendations for Incorporating SCRM into ICT QLs ............................................ 39 KEY PRACTICES ................................................................................................................................................ 39 VALIDATION....................................................................................................................................................... 39 LIFECYCLE CONSIDERATIONS ......................................................................................................................... 39 ADVERSE QUALIFICATION DECISIONS............................................................................................................. 40 Appendix C: Summary of Use Case Reviews ...................................................................................................... 41 CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS MITIGATION (CDM) ............................................................................................ 41 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA) CATEGORY MANAGEMENT ................................................... 42 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS (FIPS) 201 EVALUATION PROGRAM AND APL ........ 42 DOD CYBERSECURITY MATURITY MODEL CERTIFICATION (CMMC) .............................................................. 43 THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA) SOLUTIONS FOR ENTERPRISE-WIDE PROCUREMENT (SEWP) ................................................................................................................................... 43 Appendix D: Examples of QLs and Program Activities ....................................................................................... 45 Appendix E: Hardware Integrity Resources ......................................................................................................... 49 EXAMPLE OF USE OF STANDARDS TO ADDRESS HARDWARE SECURITY ..................................................... 56 Appendix F: References ........................................................................................................................................ 57 iii CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY Tables Table 1: Summary of Benefits, Costs, and Risks Associated with Qualified Lists .................................................. 6 Table 2: Worksheet: Evaluating the Utility and Feasibility of Qualified Lists ........................................................
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