A Disaster in Lübeck Bay: an Analysis of the Tragic Sinking of the Cap Arcona, 3 May 1945
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
A Disaster in Lübeck Bay: An Analysis of the Tragic Sinking of the Cap Arcona, 3 May 1945 Daniel Long A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy October 2017 1 Copyright Statement This work is the intellectual property of the author. You may copy up to 5% of this work for private study, or personal, non-commercial research. Any re-use of the information contained within this document should be fully referenced, quoting the author, title, university, degree level and pagination. Queries or requests for any other use, or if a more substantial copy is required, should be directed to the owner of the Intellectual Property Rights. 2 Abstract This dissertation aims to contextualise the history of the Cap Arcona, providing not only the first detailed reconstruction of the events which led to the incarceration of concentration camp prisoners on the ship, but also exploring British motives for its bombing. It argues, firstly, that the imprisonment of the former camp inmates on the Cap Arcona was not undertaken with a particular plan in mind, but in desperate reaction to a chain of circumstances: the rapid advance of the Allies, the hurried evacuation of Neuengamme as well as conflicts between Party, civilian and military offices created a problematic situation to which the ships at harbour in Lübeck Bay appeared to offer an interim solution. Secondly, it argues that the bombing of the ship by the British also resulted from a chain of circumstances, albeit a very different one. Concerned lest the Russians advance too far, the British pushed their forces north rapidly in the early part of 1945, hoping to get to the North Sea as fast as possible. In their rush, the British became increasingly careless and, in the case of the Cap Arcona, over-hastiness, poor communications and neglect of proper reconnaissance led to a disastrous error of judgement. By interweaving and chronologically juxtaposing the German and British sides of the story, the dissertation seeks to show how the war’s approaching end impacted on policies, thinking and practices which, while of course very different in the German and British cases, made possible the catastrophe in Lübeck Bay. 3 Contents Page Abstract 3 Contents 4 Abbreviations 5 Maps 8 Chapter One: The Cap Arcona: Historical Myth and Theory 9 Chapter Two: April 1945: Camp Evacuation Structure and 41 Processes Chapter Three: Evacuation to Lübeck Bay, April 1945 79 Chapter Four: British Military Policy in 1945 120 Chapter Five: What the British knew? 159 Chapter Six: The Bombing of the Cap Arcona, 3 May 1945 194 Conclusion 236 Previously Published Work 244 Appendices 257 Bibliography 261 4 Abbreviations AIR Air Record Files ANCXF Allied Naval Commander of Expeditionary Force BAB Bundesarchiv Berlin BAOR British Army of the Rhine CAB Cabinet Papers CAMN Cap Arcona Museum, Neustadt in Holstein CIU Central Interpretation Unit CROWCASS Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects C-in-C Commander in Chief DPs Displaced Persons FO Foreign Office Files GAULEITER Regional Political Official GeNA Gedenkstätte KZ Neuengamme HMSO His Majesty’s Stationary Office HSSPF Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer, Senior SS and Police Chief ICRC International Committee Red Cross 5 IMT International Military Tribunal ITS International Tracing Service IWM Imperial War Museum JAG Judge Advocate General KZ Konzentrationslager, Concentration Camp LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London MAF Militärarchiv Freiburg MT Motor Transport NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei OAN Open Access Archives, Neuengamme POW Prisoner of War PR Photographic Reconnaissance PREM Records of the Prime Minister’s Office RAF Royal Air Force REIKOSEE Reich Commissioner for Sea Shipping RP Rocket Projectile RVKK’s Reich Defence Commissioner SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force SS Schutzstaffel, Protection Squadron 6 SRC Swedish Red Cross STAHH State Archives, Hamburg TAF Tactical Air Force TNA The National Archives USAAF United States American Air Force VfZ Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte WO War Office Files WCT War Crimes Team WVHA SS Main Economic and Administrative Office YVA Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem 7 Google Earth Baltic Region, North Germany Google Earth District of Schleswig-Holstein 8 Chapter One The Cap Arcona: Historical Myth and Theory On the afternoon of 3 May 1945, a squadron of RAF Typhoons began a descent to attack Axis shipping in Neustadt Bay. Anchored in the Bay was the Cap Arcona, laden with over five thousand concentration camp prisoners who had been evacuated to the coast as no suitable alternative could be found. At around 3pm, Typhoons from Second Tactical Air Force attacked the Cap Arcona. The result left the Cap Arcona’s crew and prisoners struggling for survival in the icy Baltic waters. Yet some seventy years after the tragic sinking there still remain key and crucial questions that have yet to be explored. Overview The sinking of the Cap Arcona is often portrayed in terms of culpability.1 Any discussion focusing on the attack has largely been concerned with the need to assign responsibility to either German Commanders or British military HQ. As a consequence, historians have thus far under- appreciated the topic of the sinking in terms of its wider context. Some fundamental questions, therefore, remain unanswered. What was the purpose of using the Cap Arcona? Did British forces have information regarding the 1 For an overview, see Wilhelm Lange, Dokumentation: Cap Arcona, Das Tragische Ende der KZ-Häftlings-Flotte am 3. Mai 1945 (Struve's Buchdruckerei und Verlag: Eutin Germany, 2005); Roy C. Nesbit, Failed to Return: Mysteries of the Air 1939-1945 (Patrick Stephens Limited: Wellingborough, 1988). 9 placement of prisoners on board the Cap Arcona prior to an aerial attack? Why did British forces press hard to Lübeck in April 1945? What were the driving factors behind such a move? Why did the British attack shipping in May 1945? Why did the British push hard to the Baltic coast in April 1945? This thesis will open out the perspective beyond merely the sinking of the Cap Arcona and examine more closely this broader contextualisation, moving away from the moralising discussions, and focus instead on longer-term factors which help to explain the Cap Arcona tragedy within a wider framework. For the British side the Cap Arcona tragedy will be used to expand our knowledge and understanding of British military strategy in the final months of the war, including aerial strategies. In terms of the German narrative, by analysing the Cap Arcona in the wider context, our understanding of the evacuation processes from German camps yields new results. One useful aspect to consider is the method used to evacuate the camp. At a time when almost every aspect of German society was impacted by chaos, the transportation method of evacuating Neuengamme is largely unique when compared to other camps in this final period. The use of rail trucks, at a time when most camps either evacuated by foot, or were liberated, allows for further exploration as to the motives of the SS, as well as other local state functionaries and civilian administrators. By 3 May German forces were staging a last-ditched attempt at resisting the Allied advance. Sensing the end, British forces became more hastened in their approach to warfare. There were elements within Second Tactical Air Force that felt that Nazi forces 10 were staging a last-ditched attempt to flee to Norway. In direct response to this perceived threat, the number and focus of air assaults against shipping rose in the final days of the war. Throughout April and into May 1945, aerial attacks by British forces increased ten-fold as resistance in the air was often absent. The German Luftwaffe was unable to stage any substantial resistance particularly due to a lack of fuel supplies. With the war nearing an end, both British and German forces were impeded by the overriding military situation. For Britain, there developed an overwhelming feeling amongst military personnel that Nazi Germany would be forced in full capitulation. However the belief within Germany was that a partial surrender could still be negotiated on the Western Front. This led to an overall situation that was often marked by chaos. By chaos, this thesis refers to a situation that embodied confusion and disorder in all realms of society. The term ‘chaos’ often relates to a series of conditions that form together to create total imbalance and disintegration.2 Whereby the social stability of normal society breaks down, this often leads to a situation that created a rift within everyday society. As Blatman notes, the lack of a guarantee of social continuity by the political rulers developed a situation where the wider populace has a total loss of confidence in the existing regime.3 But as German and British forces entered the final weeks of the war, much of their judgment was further influenced by the term “fog of 2 See Daniel Blatman, The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide (Harvard University Press: London, 2011), p. 408. 3 Blatman, The Death Marches, pp. 408 – 411. 11 war”.4 During the final months of conflict armed forces were confronted with difficulties in determining situational awareness. Therefore the term “fog of war” is used to define a lack of uncertainty in both British and German military operations. This uncertainty was a culmination of communication breakdown, twined with a series of operational orders that were often out-dated, and led to further military confusion. This led to a potential situation of ‘operational blindness’ whereby military actions, by either British of German forces, were conducted in a scenario that they were ill-prepared and uncertain for. Intelligence is often used to prevent a so-called fog of war incident occurring during combat; however judgement can become impaired if there is a breakdown in communication.