The Later Roman Naval Forces of the Northern Frontier (3 Rd

Home , 270s, Anderitum, Barbatio, Bonosus (usurper), Branodunum, Caister Roman Site

The Later Roman Naval Forces of the

Northern Frontier (3rd – 5th Centuries CE)

This thesis is presented by Alex Elliott (754083)

to the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies

in total fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in the field of Classics

in the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies

Faculty of Arts

University of Melbourne

Principal Supervisor: Associate Professor Frederik J. Vervaet

Secondary Supervisor: Professor Tim Parkin

Submission Date: 27/02/2019

Word Count: 34,659

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………….i

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 1: Literature Review………………………………………………………………….3 1.1 State of the Question………………………………………………………………3 1.2 The Early Roman Imperial ‘Navy’………………………………………………...4 1.3 The Diocletianic Reorganisation: The Army and Frontier……………………….13 1.4 The Notitia Dignitatum…………………………………………………………..21 Chapter 2: Britain…………………………………………………………………………….27 2.1 State of the Question……………………………………………………………..27 2.2 Literary History…………………………………………………………………..28 2.3 The Notitia Dignitatum…………………………………………………………..37 2.4 Archaeological Overview………………………………………………………..41 2.5 Summary of Findings……………………………………………………………57 Chapter 3: The Rhine………………………………………………………………………...59 3.1 State of the Question……………………………………………………………..59 3.2 Literary History…………………………………………………………………..60 3.3 The Notitia Dignitatum…………………………………………………………..73 3.4 Archaeological Overview………………………………………………………..77

3.5 Summary of Findings…………………………………………………………….90 Chapter 4: The Danube……………………………………………………………………….92

4.1 State of the Question……………………………………………………………..92 4.2 Literary History…………………………………………………………………..93 4.3 The Notitia Dignitatum…………………………………………………………103 4.4 Archaeological Overview……………………………………………………….112 4.5 Summary of Findings…………………………………………………………...127

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………..129

Acknowledgements

I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to Dr Frederik Vervaet. It was from his suggestion that I first undertook the study of Roman naval history, and it was his guidance and support which made the completion of this thesis possible. I would also like to thank Dr Tim Parkin for proofreading my work and providing me numerous times with advice and recommendations. In addition, I am also grateful to Dr Gijs Tol, Dr Hyun Jin Kim, and Dr Sean

Raymond Scalmer for setting aside the time to chair my research committee. Finally, I would like to thank my family, friends, and all the members of the University of Melbourne Classics and Archaeology Postgraduate Committee for supporting me through my candidature.

Introduction

“After many centuries of naval warfare, the battle of Actium established the economic unity of the Mediterranean basin and thereafter, for over three centuries, the peace of Rome prevailed over those waters, during which period the Roman navy shrank to a mere coast guard for the protection of the public against pirates.”1 Although written over 80 years ago, Rodgers’ simplified and dismissive view of Roman Imperial naval forces remains representative of scholarship. Despite the substantial corpus of Roman military studies, the role of fleets and naval units has remained an afterthought, typically glossed over or even wholly ignored.

Nowhere is this oversight more apparent than in the scarce research available on the naval forces of the later Roman Empire (3rd – 5th centuries). Remarkably few scholars have studied

Roman naval history, and the few who have focus largely on the early imperial period, before all but dismissing the topic from the 3rd century onwards. As a result, there is a widely held view that Roman naval power collapsed during the ‘crisis’ of the 3rd century and remained largely non-existent during the later 4th and 5th centuries.

This thesis aims to reassess the view of a 3rd century naval ‘collapse’ by focusing on the evidence for naval forces along the Northern Frontier from the 3rd – 5th centuries. The existence, distribution, and purpose of these forces will be discussed as well as their relationship with the fleets of the Principate. The analysis has been divided into four interrelated chapters. Chapter 1 will take the form of a literature review by providing an overview of current scholarly research and its limitations. Additionally, the military reforms of the late 3rd/early 4th century will be carefully examined in conjunction with the Notitia

Dignitatum, the key source which details these reforms. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will each be a case study of the fleets of the Northern Frontier based on geographic area: Chapter 2 will focus

1 Rodgers 1937, 538. All dates CE unless otherwise stated.

1 on Britain; Chapter 3, the Rhine; and Chapter 4, the Danube. Within each of these chapters, analysis will be divided into three sections based on sources of evidence. This evidence comprises literary source material, the Notitia Dignitatum, and modern archaeological excavations. After reviewing the evidence individually, the findings will be combined and summarised to conclude each chapter. The thesis will then conclude with a summary of findings and their implications regarding our understanding of the continued existence and distribution of Roman fleets along the Roman frontier during the 3rd – 5th centuries.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

1.1 State of the Question

“All naval historians of the ancient world agree that Roman sea power had been run down to almost nothing by the late 4th century, and most pass over the next couple of centuries in a few sentences.”2 MacGeorge’s comments on later Roman naval strength perfectly summarise the current dismissive attitude within scholarship. In fact, MacGeorge’s 4th century date is rather generous, as most scholars end their analysis during the middle of the 3rd century before negatively summarising later developments in a few sentences. An analysis of the scholarly tradition reveals that this current view has been heavily influenced by earlier 20th century works which have viewed the entirety of late antiquity as a period of decline little worthy of study. Furthermore, the majority of scholarship has followed an anachronistic model which treats the Roman classes as equivalent to a ‘Roman Navy’ acting as an independent force detached from the Roman army. As a result, the disappearance of most of these classes during the 3rd century has been used to argue for a Roman naval collapse.3 As will be shown, the

Romans did not hold the same distinctions between infantry and naval units as those of modern militaries. Instead, it can be said that many ‘infantry’ units also maintained warships as a part of their organisational structure. Roman naval power was never simply restrained by the term classis. These findings heavily undermine the traditional view that the ‘Roman Navy’ was massively diminished or even non-existent by the later 3rd century.

2 MacGeorge 2002, 306. 3 Pitassi 2011, 134-135; Pitassi 2009, 276-277; Rankov 1995, 85; Starr 1993, 191-198; Casson 1991, 213; Starr 1989, 78-80; Rougé 1981, 131-135.

1.2 The Early Roman Imperial ‘Navy’

The standard work on Roman imperial naval history remains Starr’s The Roman

Imperial Navy 31 BC – 324 AD, originally published in 1941.4 In this treatise, Starr presents a rise and fall narrative beginning with Augustus and ending with Constantine I. According to

Starr, Rome’s “navy” owes its establishment to the aftermath of Actium in 31 BCE. Following his naval victory, Augustus founded two flagship Italian bases at Misenum and Ravenna to serve as the foundation for Rome’s naval forces.5 Throughout the 1st century, these standing forces were supplemented by provincial squadrons throughout the Mediterranean.6

Additionally, the great rivers of the Northern Frontier and the English Channel were also given fleets. The Classis Britannica guarded the Channel, while the Classis Germanica oversaw the

Rhine. Due to its great length, the Danube was divided between two fleets. The Classis

Pannonica for the Upper/Middle Danube and the Classis Moesica for the Lower.7 Based largely upon inscriptions and stamped tiles, Starr portrays these fleets as regionally dominant entities which controlled naval forces at numerous bases within their territory. For example,

Starr argues that the Classis Germanica operated bases from its headquarters at Colonia

Agrippina to the shores of the Northern Ocean.8

While initially comprising a great force, the Roman navy became increasingly run down during the Pax Romana. As all shores were at peace, the fleets were no longer needed and gradually became neglected by authorities.9 This would prove to be a major weakness in

Rome’s defensive scheme. When trouble did occur in the mid-3rd century, this skeleton of a

4 Starr 1993. The work has been republished twice since its initial print in 1941. For the purposes of this work, the most recent 1993 edition will be used. 5 Starr 1993, 11-24. 6 Starr 1993, 106-123. 7 Starr 1993, 124-166. 8 Starr 1993, 148. 9 Starr 1993, 167-198.

4 naval apparatus “everywhere was inadequate to its mission and was swept away” by the invading barbarians.10 From this point onwards, Rome effectively lacked any significant naval forces. This can be seen most clearly at the Battle of the Hellespont during the civil war between

Constantine and Licinius in 324. Despite being a substantial naval battle, these ships do not appear to have been made up of the earlier Augustan fleet system. Instead, Starr concludes that they were “hastily levied squadrons” from the cities of the Eastern Mediterranean, indicating that Roman naval power was no more.11 Ultimately, Starr conveniently concludes that Roman naval history both began and ended with great naval battles. While acknowledging later naval events, these are no longer part of the “Augustan Navy” and therefore not worthy of further study.12

Since its publication in 1941, every major history concerned with Roman naval affairs has either followed or at least been heavily influenced by Starr’s conclusions. In a 1959 history of the Mediterranean, Casson devotes two chapters to the early imperial navy in which he relies heavily upon Starr.13 Unsurprisingly, Casson abruptly ends his narrative by claiming that the navy had “gone soft” by the 3rd century, before disappearing entirely by the events of 324.14 In a similarly themed work from 1981, Rougé also focuses largely on the early Empire before concluding that “most of the squadrons had probably disappeared” by the 3rd century.15

Significantly, Rougé does express some doubt in the prevalent view by noting that there are numerous examples of river fleets operating in the 4th and 5th centuries.16 The same considerations are not observed in Rankov’s 1995 article, Fleets of the Early Roman Empire

10 Starr 1993, 168. 11 Starr 1993, 197-198. 12 Starr 1993, 198. 13 Casson 1991, 213. The 2nd edition of 1991 has been cited in this work. Casson (1991, 143-213) devotes a substantial amount of attention to Roman naval forces from the 3rd century BCE. Once he reaches the 3rd century CE, however, he quickly dismisses the topic in a few sentences. 14 Casson 1991, 213. 15 Rougé 1981, 131. 16 Rougé 1981, 132-136.

31 BC – 324 AD, which virtually acts as a condensed version of Starr’s work. While also noting later river fleets, these are only interpreted as “remnants” of their earlier counterparts.17 Finally, as late as 2011, Pitassi still directly follows Starr’s example by claiming that the Roman navy collapsed in the 3rd century due to “neglect” and the “run-down” state of its squadrons.18

Apart from this overreliance on earlier scholarly material, it can be said that the common framework used to study Roman naval forces inherently neglects the later Empire.

This is because nearly all works which refer to later Roman naval units only do so in the context of greater studies covering the entire history of Roman naval affairs or ancient warfare in general.19 As the later Roman Empire is often viewed as the end of antiquity, later naval units are typically only presented as a decline or the collapse of the classical tradition. For example, in a 2013 work, De Souza covers the history of naval warfare from the Bronze Age until the end of the Roman Empire. Although devoting significant attention to Roman naval units, events from the 3rd century onwards are briefly summarised in a few sentences and used to conclude the work.20 A similar but reversed trend can be observed in later Byzantine and medieval naval works. In a 1985 naval study covering the years 300 – 1500, Lewis and Runyan briefly present the later Empire as only a period of decline before claiming that Justinian (527 – 565), “restored

Roman naval power to the Mediterranean or, to be more exact, established a new Eastern

17 Rankov 1995, 85. 18 Pitassi 2011, 135. Pitassi (2009, 276-286) expresses similar sentiments in a slightly earlier work. Both works are seemingly aimed at a general audience and quite regularly feature definitive statements and exact figures without references. Both works also contain a number of obvious errors such as referring to the panegyrist Claudian as a “historian” and treating the work of Zosimus as two separate accounts, see: Pitassi 2011, 152; Pitassi 2009, 304. 19 For Roman focused naval studies, see: Pitassi 2011; Pitassi 2009; Rankov 1995; Starr 1993. For studies focused on greater Mediterranean history, De Souza 2013; Casson 1991; Rougé 1981; Starr 1989; Rodgers 1937. For Byzantine/medieval focused naval studies, see: Hocker 1995; Lewis and Runyan 1985. 20 De Souza 2013, 390-391.

Roman or Byzantine navy.”21 Essentially, later Roman naval forces have fallen into the temporal divide between early Roman and later Byzantine scholars. As such it is typically only treated as a period of decline, referenced largely in passing, and almost never studied in its own right.

As a consequence of this tradition, few scholars have gone into any significant detail regarding later Roman naval units. The first is that of Courtois, whose 1939 French article on the later Roman navy predates the work of Starr. In this work, Courtois controversially argues that the Roman naval units of the Mediterranean had disappeared entirely by the later 3rd century.22 At the same time, however, he claims that the naval units along the rivers were greatly strengthened and became a crucial instrument in Rome’s defence against foreign invasion.23 Whereas the early Empire’s naval strength was centred around Italy and the

Mediterranean, the later Empire was focused on the frontier. This would suggest a complete reversal in Rome’s naval policy beginning from the late 3rd/early 4th century. The second work,

Reddé’s substantial 1986 Mare Nostrum, is also written in French. Like Starr, Reddé attempts an overview of the entire Roman naval organisation and its role in history using numerous literary, epigraphic, and archaeological sources. In a considerable development, however,

Reddé avoids Starr’s arbitrary 324 end date and extends his account well into the 5th century.24

Significantly, this leads to very different conclusions to those of his predecessor. For example,

21 Lewis and Runyan 1985, 16. Similarly, Hocker (1995, 90) briefly summarises later Roman naval units before claiming that Justinian re-established Roman naval power. Both works, however, neglect that Justinian’s campaign was the fourth such expedition launched from Constantinople aimed at retaking North Africa. In fact, the naval campaign of 468 is described as much larger than that of Justinian’s. It would seem that Justinian has earned his title simply because his campaign was successful whereas the others had failed. For the campaign of the 430s, see: Procop., Vand. 3.35-36; Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5931. For the campaign of 441, see: Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5941, 5942; Prosper, Epitoma Chronicon s.a. 441; Cassiod., Chronica 1236; Priscus, fr. 9.4. For the campaign of 468, see: Priscus, fr. 53.1, 53.3; Procop., Vand. 3.6.1; Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5961; John Lydus, De Magistratibus 3.43. 22 Coutois 1939, 225-226. Reddé (1986, 579-605) devotes most of his rebuttal against Courtois to disproving this argument. 23 Courtois 1939, 225-226, 238-239. 24 Reddé 1986, 572-652.

Reddé argues against the idea of a 3rd century naval disappearance and instead suggests that it was merely reorganised following the Roman recovery in the later 3rd/early 4th century.25 On the Northern Frontier, this new naval system was created by dividing the once centralised regional fleets into many smaller and localised units.26 Disagreeing with Courtois, he argues that these developments were not an enhancement, but instead resulted in the fragmenting and weakening of the formerly “great” units.27 Whereas the early Empire maintained a few centrally organised and mobile fleets which controlled large sections of shoreline, the later fleets were small and fixed at individual fortresses.

There are many problems with the prevalent view advocated by the majority of scholarship. The first and most significant issue comes from the very understanding of the early imperial ‘navy’ itself. In Starr’s work, the Augustan naval system is treated similarly to that of a modern navy, in that it is a centrally organised force which acts as a distinct military entity separate from the army. In this system, the provincial squads are also part of this ‘navy’ and are therefore responsible for all naval units operating in their geographic region.28 The extent of this geographic area of operations is determined by Starr largely through the use of inscriptions and stamped tiles. In this methodology, the presence of bricks stamped by the

Classis Germanica at various locations north of Cologne indicates that numerous fleet bases operated along this stretch of the river.29 Since Starr, subsequent scholarship has extrapolated upon his method substantially. Essentially, there has been a widespread tendency to attribute all literary and inscription based-evidence referring to the activities of fleets or ships as falling under the jurisdiction of these provincial ‘navies.’ This has led to a widely held view that these provincial fleets were significant forces which controlled naval affairs across multiple

25 Reddé 1986, 597. 26 Reddé 1986, 597, 640. 27 Reddé 1986, 597. 28 For Starr’s analysis of these provincial fleets on the Northern Frontier, see: Starr 1993, 124-166. 29 Starr 1993, 147-148.

8 provinces. For example, Bounegru and Zahariade argue that the Classis Moesica frequently operated along the Lower Danube as far west as Viminacium, as well as a third of the Black

Sea coast.30 This would suggest that the fleet’s prefecture was a significant command with jurisdiction across both Moesia Superior and Inferior.31 Similarly, British scholars have frequently treated the Classis Britannica as a substantial unit which controlled numerous naval bases throughout the Channel or even the entirety of Britain’s shores.32

There are, however, an increasing number of scholars who have begun to challenge this traditional view. As early as 1988, Saddington noted that there appeared to be a clear discrepancy between the “standing” provincial fleets and the massive “invasion” fleets used during campaigns of conquest. Rather than simply using the provincial fleets as the naval support for these campaigns, it seems that the Romans instead relied mostly on a combination of new campaign specific ships and requisitioned vessels.33 While these provincial fleets took part in campaigns, they do not appear to have overseen naval operations or to have made up the bulk of fleet strength. This would heavily suggest that these provincial fleets were not the powerful and far-reaching entities which they are usually presented.34 In 2008, Rummel

30 Bounegru and Zahariade 1996, 19. 31 Bounegru and Zahariade (1996, 16-19) make this claim directly, while also stating that the unit must have had considerable manpower. Similarly, Matei-Popescu (2010, 247-248) argues that the fleet operated vexillations in Moesia Secunda throughout the imperial period. Going further, Petculescu (2006, 32) claims that all fortresses in North-Eastern Moesia Inferior were manned exclusively by the Classis Moesica. 32 The proposed size and duties of the Classis Britannica have varied substantially depending on author. Mattingly (2006, 129) argues that the fleet operated numerous ports throughout the Channel and was mainly responsible for custom duties. Allen and Fulford (1999, 164-181) and Cleere (1977, 16-19) instead treat the fleet as a primarily logistical unit which handled shipping throughout the island. Phillip (1981, 115) estimates a substantial fighting unit of 7,000 men which operated fleets both in the Channel and in the North. More reserved, Salway (1981, 528-530) notes that the only evidence for fleet bases comes from the Southeast, yet still argues that it played a shipping role in the North. All these theories go well beyond Starr’s original interpretation of the fleet acting as a connection between the island and the continent, see: Starr 1993, 153- 155. 33 Saddington 1988, 301, 304. This theory is also expanded upon in subsequent works, see: Saddington 1991, 399; Saddington 1990, 229. 34 Much of Saddington’s (1991, 397-399; 1990, 223-229) work focuses on the Late Republic and establishment of these provincial fleets in the early Empire. Both Wheeler (2012, 122) and Rummel (2008, 298-299) note, however, that these same distinctions between “invasion” and “standing fleets” still apply throughout the 2nd and 3rd centuries.

9 expanded upon this theory by systematically re-examining the stamped tile and inscription evidence from every fortress typically argued to have acted as a northern provincial fleet base.

Rummel’s findings were both surprising and significant. Rather than widespread archaeological material, stamped tiles tend to cluster heavily around the perceived headquarters of each fleet.35 For example, nearly all archaeological material related to the Classis Pannonica clusters around its ‘headquarters’ at Taurunum in Pannonia Inferior.36 Furthermore, these tiles are typically only found in a single province.37 Instead of regionally dominant entities operating across multiple provinces, the available data suggests that these were much more local units which also played a role in shipping tiles and building materials across their respective provinces. This is further supported by discoveries of military diplomata which expressly assign each fleet to the exercitus of a single province.38

In a 2016 article, Wintjes reinforces these findings by noting the major discrepancy between the status of a provincial fleet prefect and those commanding the Italian fleets at

Misenum and Ravenna.39 Unlike their provincial counterparts, the Italian fleets frequently feature in historical sources and appear to have played a major role during both foreign and civil conflicts. One such event is when a desperate Nero summoned the marines from Misenum to Rome and converted them into a makeshift legion in 68.40 From this example and several others like it, these fleets are typically estimated to have been substantial units made up of between 5,000 – 10,000 soldiers each.41 Supporting this notion is the evidently high status achieved by the commanders of these fleets within the equestrian career structure. As Wintjes

35 Rummel 2008, 292-293. 36 Rummel 2008, 79-84. 37 Rummel 2008, 292-293. 38 Rummel 2008, 31, 88, 140-143. Starr (1993, 107) acknowledges this, yet allows considerable flexibility. 39 Wintjes 2016, 15-16. 40 Tac., Hist. 1.6. Vitellius would further draw upon Misenum a few months later, while Vespasian’s generals would do the same with Ravenna, see: Tac., Hist. 3.55, 4.68; Cass. Dio., 55.24.3. In 193, a desperate Didius Julianus would attempt the same, see: Cass. Dio., 74.16.4. 41 Malmberg 2016, 327; Wintjes 2016, 16. From these events, Saddington (2007, 209) gives an estimate of 15,000 – 18,000 for their combined strength.

10 notes, the command of such a fleet usually represented the last step in a successful equestrian career.42 The same, however, cannot be said of their provincial counterparts. As Starr himself relates, the prefects of the Classis Moesica and Classis Pannonica were sexagenarii meaning they received only the base salary of 60,000 sesterces per year.43 For comparison, the commander of a 1,000 strong cavalry unit received the same pay.44 The German and British fleets were slightly more prestigious, earning 100,000 sesterces per year, yet were still the second lowest positions available.45 As a result, these posts were clearly among the lowest ranking equestrian positions, usually held by men at the start of their career in the imperial administration.46 This combination of limited archaeological evidence and low ranking command positions heavily suggest that these provincial fleets were not the substantial military units which they have typically been portrayed.

This does not imply, however, that the Roman military lacked substantial standing naval forces. As both Rummel and Wintjes describe, there is considerable evidence that both legions and even auxiliary units maintained warships as a part of their organisational structure.47 This can be observed along the shores of Britain as well as both major rivers of the

Northern Frontier. In Britain, an altar erected by a soldier of the Legio VI Victrix at York records that his position was that of a gubernator (helmsman).48 Another from Chester, the headquarters of the Legio XX Valeria Victrix, refers to an optio who died in a shipwreck.49

Similarly, at Mainz along the Rhine, home of the Legio XXII Primigenia, there are several explicit examples of the legion operating warships. One inscription refers to a veteran of the

42 Wintjes 2016, 15. 43 Starr 1993, 107. 44 Wintjes 2016, 16. 45 Wintjes 2016, 15; Starr 1993, 107. 46 Wintjes 2016, 15-16. 47 Wintjes 2016, 17-18; Rummel 2008, 299-301. 48 RIB I, 653. 49 RIB I, 544.

11 legion who worked as a naupegus (shipwright), while two others refer to optiones navaliorum

(officers in charge of shipbuilding).50 Furthermore, many tiles with stamps in the shape of a warship containing the legion’s abbreviation have been found.51 Finally, the Danube has multiple legionary sites which have produced similar evidence. At Viminacium, there is an inscription referring to a soldier from the Legio VII Claudia training to become a marine

(Discens Epibata).52 Like Mainz, the legionary base at Novae has produced a large number of warship shaped stamped tiles.53 Arguably, the most significant evidence comes from a dedicatory inscription set up by a trierarchus of the Classis Moesica stationed at Chersonesus

Taurica in modern Crimea. Although clearly a member of the Classis Moesica, the inscription is notable as the soldier describes that he is serving under an officer from the Legio I Italica.54

Rather than signifying that this fleet frequently patrolled along the entire Black Sea coast, it is much more likely that a detachment of the fleet was stationed, either permanently or temporarily, at Chersonesus Taurica. Furthermore, this unit was only a part of a greater army detachment which ultimately answered to the legion.55

Overall, it can be said that the prevalent narrative has been founded upon an anachronistic model which has viewed the provincial fleets in the same way as a modern navy.

This has led to the commonly asserted view that these fleets were large autonomous units which sailed down long stretches of coastline. In reality, the Romans did not view the army and the navy as separate entities, with one controlling the land and the other the sea. As Wintjes remarks on the provincial fleets, “one might interpret them as army units equipped with boats

50 For the naupegus inscription, see: Pferdehirt 1995, 57. For the two referring to optiones navaliorum, see: CIL XIII, 6712, 6714. 51 Rummel 2008, 202; Höckmann 1993, 131. 52 CIL III, 14567. For the term itself, see: Doyle 1968, 180. 53 Sarnowski and Trynkowski 1986, 536-540. This is further supported by more recent finds of port facilities along the riverbank, see: Sarnowski 2012, 84-86. 54 CIL III, 14214. 55 Rummel 2008, 128-129.

12 to gain sufficient mobility for patrolling.”56 Due to this limited range and the relatively low rank of their prefects, these were likely much smaller and less significant units than is commonly asserted. However, the size and rank of these fleets did not constitute the full extent of Roman naval power. Instead, there are numerous inscriptions and tiles which suggest that legions and even auxiliary units also maintained warships. As the inscription from Chersonesus

Taurica suggests, when these forces worked together, the provincial fleets were subservient to the legions. This means that Roman naval power was not dependent upon a centrally organised naval structure. Rather, these naval units were incorporated into the general army apparatus.57

In times of conquest, these naval forces could be united and supplemented with newly constructed ships.58 The Roman military maintained substantial naval forces, yet there was never a such thing as the Roman ‘navy’ in the modern sense of the term.

1.3 The Diocletianic Reorganisation: The Army and Frontier

These more recent findings seriously undermine the traditional narrative that Roman naval forces of the later 3rd century were neglected or even non-existent. Essentially, if these fleets were never the ‘great’ units which dominated all naval affairs, how could they have become rundown and subsequently divided into many smaller remnant squadrons? As both

Wintjes and Rummel assert, these provincial fleets cannot have had more than a few thousand men each.59 Considering the massive manpower requirements of ancient warships, this would heavily limit the number of ships which these units could maintain. For example, based upon the size of its base at Colonia Agrippina, Rummel estimates the Classis Germanica as having

56 Wintjes 2016, 21. 57 Wintjes 2016, 18; Rummel 2008, 292; Saddington 2007, 202. 58 Wintjes 2016, 16-17; Rummel 2008, 298-299; Saddington 1991, 399; Saddington 1990, 229; Saddington 1988, 304. 59 Wintjes 2016, 16-21; Rummel 2008, 295-297.

13 a maximum of 2,500 men. Assuming the standard crew of an early Roman warship was between 55 – 80 men per ship, this would limit the entire fleet to only 30 – 45 ships.60 This is much too small of a unit to have become depleted and then divided into many smaller units along the course of the Rhine. This is even more apparent along the Danube. Due to the lower pay of their prefects and more limited archaeological evidence, it may be deduced that both

Danube fleets must have been smaller than their contemporaries along the Rhine and the

Channel.61 These units simply were not large or important enough to have undergone a 3rd century decay which led to a collapse of Roman naval power.

Furthermore, even the 3rd century demise of these provincial fleets is less certain than has often been presented in scholarship. This stems mostly from the method used to study the development and subsequent decline of these fleets. In Starr’s tile and inscription-based methodology, the lack of 3rd century material is used to signify that these units had begun to decay before disappearing entirely during the ensuing ‘crisis’.62 However, a 3rd century analysis based almost solely on tiles and inscriptions is heavily misleading. This is because examples of inscriptions relating to any military context and examples of military units stamping tiles from the 3rd century onwards are relatively scarce.63 This is not unique to the provincial fleets but can be observed in all military and even civilian contexts. Therefore, an analysis of even

Roman legionary units would display skewed results using Starr’s methodology.64

Additionally, the only substantial histories available for the 3rd century throughout the entirety

60 Rummel 2008, 295. 61 Rummel 2008, 297. 62 For each provincial fleet along the Northern Frontier, Starr simply records the last known epigraphic evidence before claiming that each fleet was largely swept away during the 3rd century crisis, see: Starr 1993, 137, 140-141, 151-152. The exception being the Classis Britannica which Starr agues existed well into the 4th century, see: Starr 1993, 155-156. 63 Mitchell 2002, 54; Casey 1994, 31. 64 For a discussion on the “epigraphic habit” of the Romans and its clear decline from the 3rd century, see: MacMullen 1982, 233-246. Although military units continued the practice of stamping tiles in the later period, the practice becomes more irregular, making it difficult to accurately trace troop movements, see: Scharf 2005, 221-282.

14 of the Empire are those of Herodian and an epitome of Cassius Dio, both of which end in the

230s.65 Instead, the historical developments of the 3rd century must be cobbled together from a variety of smaller sources.66 The lack of references to these fleets following the early 3rd century is merely reflective of later Empire-wide developments and not indicative of a specific naval decline.

The 3rd century military situation is more complex than the simple narrative of decadence and decline which continues to influence scholarship. Although heavily disturbed by both internal and external forces, the Roman military did not collapse entirely during the 3rd century. In fact, by the later 270s, the Romans had largely driven out the invading barbarians and regained much of their military vigour.67 Still, due to the large-scale upheavals over the previous 50 years, the Empire could not simply return to pre-crisis normalcy. As a result, later

3rd and early 4th century emperors initiated large-scale reforms to both the civil and military administrations which had a profound effect on the later Empire. Some of the most prominent changes being a large-scale reorganisation of the provinces, separation of the civil and military administrations, and a greatly expanded bureaucracy.68 Although a gradual process, the majority of these changes appear to have their origin during the reigns of Diocletian and the

Tetrarchy (284 – 305). For this reason, Diocletian’s reign is often cited as the beginning of late

65 Although fragmentary, the history or Cassius Dio ends roughly halfway through the reign of Alexander Severus (222 – 235), see: Cass. Dio., 80. The history of Herodian ends with the coronation of Gordian III in 238, see: Herodian, Hist. 8. 66 The only substantial narrative to cover the entirety of the 3rd century is that of Zosimus. His account, however, is quite confused, see: Zos., 1.8-71. 67 This was in large part due to the successful campaigns of Aurelian and Probus. For summaries of Aurelian’s campaigns, see: Zos., 1.48-62; Zonar., 12.27; Aur. Vict., Caes. 35. For Probus’ campaigns, see: Zos., 1.65-71; Zonar., 12.29; Aur. Vict., Caes. 37. 68 For general overviews of the changes in the army, see: Potter 2014, 437-449; Elton 2006, 325-346; Rees 2004, 16-18; For bureaucracy and administration, see: Potter 2014, 363-364; Kelly 2006, 183-204; Rees 2004, 25-28; Treadgold 1997, 16-27. For economy and society, see: Depeyrot 2006, 226-252; Mitchell 2002, 55-59.

15 antiquity with the ensuing administrative changes being known as the ‘Diolcetianic

Reorganisation’.69

The Roman military was also subject to widespread reforms. Most notably, it is generally agreed within scholarship that the Roman army underwent a process of expansion from the reign of Diocletian until the mid-4th century.70 The extent of this growth, however, has been heavily debated, largely from the inconsistency and vagueness of the source material.

For example, Lactantius criticises Diocletian and the tetrarchs for allegedly quadrupling the size of the army, and subsequently putting a great strain on the Roman economy.71 Assuming an army of roughly 300,000 men during the reign of Septimius Severus in the early 3rd century, this would place Diocletian’s army at well over 1,000,000 soldiers.72 Lactantius, however, is hardly a reliable source as the context for this statement is a work explicitly celebrating the triumph of Christianity over the crimes of previous pagan emperors. As a result, his statements are at best heavily exaggerated.73 A more reasonable figure comes from the 6th century historian

Agathias who, lamenting the state of the army in his period, notes that it used to be made up of

645,000 men.74 Agathias, however, does not specify the time in which the army contained so many soldiers. Finally, a fellow 6th century writer, John Lydus, mentions in passing that the army during the reign of Diocletian amounted to 389,704 men.75 Due to its exactness, this figure is generally treated as if it came from an official document.76 Significantly, there is no

69 The exact dates of these changes are obscure and debated within scholarship. Although often attributed to Diocletian, many of the changes appear to have their origins during the reigns of Aurelian and Probus, while others do not seem to have been enacted until the reign of Constantine. For arguments of the dates of these reforms, see: Potter 2014, 363-364, 441-446; Barnes 2011, 153-154; Kelly 2006, 184-187; Elton 2006, 329-330; Mitchell 2002, 59-62. The period of late antiquity is roughly regarded as comprising the 4th – 6th centuries, although scholars frequently set their own end and start dates which can range widely, see: Lenski 2006a, 1. 70 Corcoran 2006, 46; Depeyrot 2006, 244; Heather 2005, 63; Rees 2004, 17; Mitchell 2002, 59; Treadgold 1997, 19; Cameron 1993, 33-35; Jones 1964, 679. 71 Lactant., De mort. pers. 7.2. 72 Assuming a Severan army of roughly 300,000, see: Heather 2005, 63. 73 Rees 2004, 17; Treadgold 1995, 46; Jones 1964, 59-60. 74 Agathias, Histories 5.13.7-8. 75 John Lydus, De Mensibus 1.27. 76 Elton 2006, 332; Treadgold 1995, 45; Reddé 1986, 553; Jones 1964, 679-683.

16 clarification as to whether this number comes from the beginning or end of Diocletian’s reign.77

As a result of these vastly different figures, modern scholars have also ranged wildly in their estimates, from between 400,000 – 600,000 men. Nevertheless, despite the disagreement on exact figures, it can be said that both ancient and modern source material almost unanimously agree that the later army expanded during the later 3rd and early 4th century.78

According to Starr’s model, this would indicate that Roman naval forces diminished at a time when the rest of the military was actively expanding. As Starr claims, “Diocletian succeeded to a period in which a navy had been destroyed, accordingly no great navy rose to match the reinvigorated army of Diocletian and Constantine.”79 This claim, however, is explicitly contradicted by the ancient source material. Apart from his army figure, Lydus makes a special mention of Rome’s naval forces. According to Lydus, the naval forces, “stationed both on rivers and on the sea” amounted to 45,562 men during the reign of Diocletian.80 This statement, so blatantly at odds with the theory of non-existent naval forces, heavily undermines

Starr’s argument.

Coinciding with these army changes, the frontiers of the Empire also underwent a process of large-scale reorganisation. Following the upheavals in the second half of the 3rd century, the trans-Danubian province of Dacia, as well as the Upper Germanic-Rhaetian Limes,

77 Treadgold (1995, 45) argues that the figure should date to 285 immediately after Diocletian’s ascension. The reason being that this would have been the opportune time to survey his army. Although plausible, this observation is only speculative. 78 Jones (1964, 683) provides a high estimate of 600,000 men, noting its correlation with Agathias’ figure. Cameron (1993, 33-35) gives a more conservative figure of roughly 400,000 men. Heather (2005, 63) attempts a middle ground by broadly estimating somewhere between 400,000 – 600,000 soldiers. A major outlier to the consensus is that of Potter (2014, 448) who argues that the army was only 240,000 – 360,000 men, possibly even smaller than the Severan army. The major problem with Potter’s analysis, however, is that he simply treats the army size as consistent throughout the 4th century without recognizing the vast differences between the early and later 4th century. Perhaps the most plausible analysis is that provided by Depeyrot (2006, 244) who argues for 400,000 men during Diocletian’s reign, 500,000 for Constantine’s, and 200,000 during the 5th century. 79 Starr 1993, 197. 80 John Lydus, De Mensibus 1.27.

17 were permanently abandoned by Roman authorities.81 Consequently, this Limesfall led to noticeable changes along the Roman frontier. From an archaeological standpoint, this is most clearly visible in the large-scale fortification ‘programmes’ which occurred along the Rhine and Danube. As the Empire recovered, the fortresses along these frontiers were gradually rebuilt and supplemented by new fortifications along the length of both rivers.82 Additionally, many cities in the interior were also given walls for the first time. The exact dates, extent, and reasoning behind these fortification ‘programmes’ and their implications for a Roman ‘border policy’ have been much debated in scholarship.83 The most discussed and arguably most controversial is that of Edward Luttwak’s Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, originally published in 1976.84 In this work, Luttwak treats these fortification efforts as part of a “grand strategy” implemented by imperial authorities. For the late period, in particular, this amounted to what Luttwak describes as a shift to a “Defense-in-Depth” strategy. This constituted a wide- scale system centred around multiple lines of “hard point” fortifications working in conjunction with mobile field units. In the case of a barbarian invasion, soldiers could hold out in these fortifications while waiting for or working in conjunction with the mobile field armies to deal with the invaders.85

Since its publication, Luttwak’s work has provoked a large amount of scholarly debate.

Most notably, his theory of an extensive border policy has garnered harsh criticism with

81 For Aurelian’s evacuation of Dacia, see: Eutr., 9.15; SHA, Divus Aurelianus 39.7. For the withdrawal from the Upper Germanic-Rhaetian limes and consolidation along the new Danube-Iller-Rhine Limes, see: Mackensen 1999, 199-244; Johnson 1983, 169-172. 82 Like the general changes in the Roman army and administration, many of these programmes are liberally attributed to Diocletian. As the source material does credit Diocletian with a reputation for building, there is some justification for this, see: John Malalas, Chronographia 12.38-40; Pan. Lat., 9.18.4; Lactant., De mort. pers. 7.2-10. However, dating the building or repair of any fortress is usually somewhat vague and many locations can only be dated generally to the 3rd or 4th centuries. For general overviews and hypotheses concerning the dates and functions of these building programmes, see: Lander 1984; Johnson 1983. 83 For some of the most noted and in-depth arguments, see: Luttwak 2016; Whittaker 2004; Mattern 1999; Elton 1996; Isaac 1990. 84 For the purposes of this work, the most recent edition has been consulted, see: Luttwak 2016. 85 For Luttwak’s “Defense-in-Depth” strategy, see: Luttwak 2016, 146-218.

18 scholars noting that this idea is heavily based upon contemporary military strategy and utilising the hindsight of modern maps, rather than Roman source material.86 Unfortunately, while

Luttwak’s work is heavily influenced by modern military planning, subsequent scholarship has incorporated equally anachronistic thinking by often completely denying that Roman authorities had any capacity for large-scale strategic planning. As Mattern notes, there has been a noticeable trend of portraying the Romans as almost “completely irrational” in their organisational policies.87 For instance, Whittaker claims that the Romans only engaged in

“low-level” and “ad hoc” strategic thinking.88 Furthermore, some scholars have gone even further by denying outright the defensive nature of the Roman frontier, especially along the

Rhine and Danube. Most notably, Isaac goes as far as to deny the limes as having any defensive connotations, arguing that “the political boundary of the Empire was irrelevant as a concept” and that the great rivers had little defensive value whatsoever and should instead be interpreted as “links rather than barriers.”89

Like Luttwaks’ grand strategy concept, many of these counter arguments directly ignore or are highly selective in their choice of Roman source material.90 Instead, it can be seen that Roman authorities, even during the Principate, viewed the Rhine and Danube as delineators between the Roman world and that of the barbarians. For example, Tacitus claims that the

Empire was “fenced in” by its great rivers.91 Similarly, Herodian states directly that the rivers acted as a “barrier” against barbarian incursions, and that the soldiers stationed along them

“defended” the Empire.92 With the withdrawal of Roman authority behind these rivers in the

86 For a summary of scholarship both supporting and disagreeing with Luttwak, see: Whittaker 2004, 28-31. 87 Mattern 1999, 22-23. 88 Whittaker 2004, 37-38. Isaac (1990, 402-406) expresses similar dismissive views. 89 Isaac 1990, 3, 103. 90 As Nicasie (1997, 459) notes, Issac only mentions evidence supporting his argument while conveniently ignoring evidence to the contrary. 91 Tac., Ann. 1.9. 92 Herodian, Hist. 2.11.5.

19 later 3rd century, these sentiments only become more prevalent. Both Themistius and Procopius explicitly state that the purpose of the fortresses and the soldiers garrisoning them along the

Danube were to prevent barbarian incursions.93 Likewise, Ambrose describes the Rhine and its garrisons as a “wall” protecting the provinces.94 Furthermore, multiple late authors discuss the provincials fearing that during winter when the rivers froze, barbarian invaders would more easily be able to plunder the provinces.95

Despite their deficiencies, it is clear from the source material that the Romans viewed both the Rhine and Danube as barriers which delimited Roman from foreign soil.96 Although not their only function, there was a definite sense that the soldiers stationed along these rivers were meant to defend against invasion.97 Due to these large-scale building programmes, it is undeniable that there was some form of centralised decision making involved.98 Even the somewhat dismissive Whittaker concedes that, during the later Empire, there is “something quite like a unified frontier policy over a wide area.”99 Contrary to Luttwak, however, this does not suggest that Rome developed grand defensive strategies in the event of barbarian incursions. It would not require a grand strategic concept to rebuild damaged fortifications or to build new ones in areas subject to frequent crossings. Instead, it can be said that the fortification programmes along the rivers were a direct response to the growing pressures faced by the Empire in the later period. Some of these policies, like Aurelian’s conscious decision to

93 Them., Or. 10.136d-138b; Although writing in the 6th century, Procopius is referring directly to the situation along the Danube prior to the Hunnic invasions, see: Procop., Aed. 4.5.2. 94 Ambrose expresses a similar sentiment towards the Danube, see: Ambrose, Exameron 2.3.12. 95 Jord., Get. 280-281; Lib., Orationes 59.90; Pan. Lat., 6.6.4. A Gallic panegyrist describes that these fears were not only limited to the winter, but also during extremely dry summers when the Rhine’s water level was low enough to cross without boats, see: Pan. Lat., 10.7.4. 96 Rankov 2006, 179; Galestin 2006, 221; Mattern 1999, 110; Elton 1996, 35-36. 97 Of course, the ease of transport and communication were also important reasons for stationing of garrisons along the rivers. To deny the inherent defensive characteristics of such garrisons, however, is simply incorrect or misleading, see: Rankov 2006, 178; Mattern 1999, 112; Hodgson 1997, 65; Nicasie 1997, 456. 98 As Mattern (1999, 67-69) notes, despite the technologic and communicatory limitations, Roman emperors seem to have maintained a general understanding of the political situations in neighbouring lands. This was likely accomplished through correspondence with provincial governors, officers, and pro-Roman barbarians. 99 Whittaker 2004, 38.

20 evacuate Dacia, were the result of top-level imperial decision-making. The construction and repair of many individual fortresses and fortified cities were instead likely more localised and reactionary responses to barbarian attacks.100 Both developments, however, stemmed from a general understanding that these rivers acted as natural barriers which could be defended by

Roman soldiers.

1.4 The Notitia Dignitatum

Arguably, the most substantial limitation with the current understanding of later Roman naval forces is that scholarship has tended to rely upon a single source. This document is that of the Notitia Dignitatum (Notitia), which presents itself as an official government text listing the entirety of the late Roman civil and military administration. Due to its seemingly unique importance, scholars have traditionally taken the information provided as a face value representation of the distribution and hierarchy of later Roman military units101. Interpretations based solely on the Notitia, however, are seriously misleading. This is because the document is full of inconsistencies, errors, and significant gaps in some geographic regions which profoundly undermine the reliability of the document. For example, the Notitia itself is divided into Western, (in partibus Occidentis), and Eastern, (in partibus Orientis), halves. While on the surface appearing as a singular document, a closer analysis reveals that each half displays the Empire’s administration from separate periods.102 As a result, the composition date of each

100 It is difficult to ascertain how much emperors were directly involved in building projects. In the later period, there are certain widespread programmes, such as Diocletian’s building on the Lower Danube or Valentinian’s construction of numerous burgi, which appear to have been conducted under the authority of the emperor’s themselves. For many smaller scale projects, however, it would seem more reasonable to assume that these were handled by local military commanders, see: Whittaker 2004, 31-32; Johnson 1983, 60-61. For Diocletian’s building on the Lower Danube, see: Poulter 2007a, 30. For the proliferation of burgi in the reign of Valentinian, see: Visy 2003, 164-168. 101 The most well-known and significant is that of Jones (1964, 1417-1450) who treats the work as an official administrative document throughout. Jones, however, does recognise its limitations. 102 Kulikowski 2000b, 360-361; Brennan 1996, 164-166; Jones 1964, 360.

21 half, as well as the process in which they came to be a single document, has been debated in scholarship. Kulikowski argues that the Notitia comes from a single origin text dating between

386 – 395. At some point after this period, the document made its way west where it was continuously updated until the 420s or even later.103 Brennan, however, argues that the current text is made up of two separate Notitiae which were merely combined into one document at some point between 425 – 455.104 Regardless of its origin, both scholars agree that the Notitia does not give a fair representation of the late Roman military administration at any single moment.

The contentions surrounding the document significantly limit its usefulness as a guide to the later Roman army. For example, Brennan goes as far as to argue that the Notitia is largely an ideological text with little real basis in the late Roman administration. Instead, it serves to sustain the image of the Roman Empire’s “greatness” at a time when the Empire itself was failing.105 Kulikowski disagrees with Brennan’s analysis and suggests that although problematic, the Notitia does have its origin in an official document. The text, however, was simply revised quite haphazardly during the 5th century. This would suggest that while having a basis in historical realities, it is “essentially worthless as a mine of precise information on the history of the late Roman army.”106 While noting these disagreements over context, Whately argues that it would be unwise to disregard the Notitia entirely. Instead, he advocates a “middle ground” citing that it is still relevant for analysis as long as its inherent problems are recognised and taken into account. This is because, despite its inadequacies, the Notitia Dignitatum remains the most important source regarding the distribution of late Roman military units.107

103 Kulikowski 2000b, 360. 104 Brennan 1996, 164-166. 105 Brennan 1996, 152. 106 Kulikowski 2000b, 375. 107 Whately 2015, 8.

A simple overview of the Notitia reveals a military situation quite different from that of the Principate. Most notably, there are a large number of seemingly new legionary and auxiliary units strewn across the frontier. Furthermore, while older legions are still listed, they appear to have undergone a ‘fragmentation.’ Instead of one legion stationed at a local headquarters with various detachments, there now appear to be a few legions stationed across a province each with the same name.108 Unlike the Principate, however, each detachment has its own prefect, indicating that they are acting as autonomous units. For example, in the early

Empire, the Legio I Italica spent much of its existence headquartered at Novae in Moesia

Inferior.109 According to the Notitia, the legion was still stationed at Novae in the late 4th century.110 Interestingly, there is also a unit called the Legio I Italica, with its own prefect stationed at nearby Sexaginta Prista.111 Essentially, there appears to have been a shift toward more military units during the later period. These new units, however, were smaller than those of the Principate.112 Furthermore, the larger units of the Principate, the legions, appear to have undergone a reorganisation corresponding to these changes.

Regarding naval forces, in particular, the Notitia reveals that the fleets of the early

Empire had also been subject to some form of reorganisation. Significantly, none of the ‘great’ provincial fleets of the Principate are listed. Instead, the provinces are listed as having a great number of smaller fleets stationed along both the frontier and on interior rivers. For example, whereas there were two fleets stationed along the Danube during the Principate, the Notitia

108 Whately 2015, 11; Casey 1994, 93. 109 Sarnowski 2012, 18. 110 Not. Dign. Or., XL.30, 31. 111 Not. Dign. Or., XL.32. 112 Corcoran 2006, 46; Rees 2004, 17. It is unclear as to when these changes took place or how many men were assigned to individual units. Elton (2006, 46) argues that the legions were still large during the reign of Diocletian, but gradually fragmented over the course of the 4th century. Regarding unit size, there has been a tendency to simply assume 1,000 men per unit, although this is speculation, see: Luttwak 2016, 201; Potter 2014, 446.

23 lists 16 separate fleets operating along its length in the later period.113 As has been discussed above, naval scholars have traditionally taken this information to suggest that the provincial fleets either disappeared entirely or that their remnants became the units in the Notitia. This would suggest that the provincial fleets underwent a process of ‘fragmentation’ like that of the legions. However, as more recent research has outlined, there is no evidence that these early fleets were ever even remotely comparable in size to that of a legion.114 This would heavily challenge the notion that these fleets were ever large enough to ‘fragment’ in the first place.

Considering that the division of a unit would have necessitated substantial increases in administrative and bureaucratic personnel, this is quite unlikely.115 Furthermore, these fleets all have names inconsistent with those of the early Empire, and many are stationed in areas in which there is no evidence of earlier fleet activity. The summation of evidence simply does not suggest that the fleets listed in the Notitia were fragmented versions of once substantial unified fleets. Instead, a more reasonable interpretation would be to suggest that these were entirely new fleets established at some point during the later period.

Scholars have tended to treat the classes listed in the Notitia, as they treat the classes of the early Empire, as being synonymous for ‘Roman navy’. This has led to reinforcing the same perceived limitations in later Roman naval ability as these fleets are typically assumed to have been the extent of late Roman naval strength. For example, in his monumental 1964 work,

The Later Roman Empire, Jones attempts a survey of the later Roman army solely from the contents of the Notitia Dignitatum.116 Despite Jones clarifying that his estimates are “a very unsatisfactory basis for statistical calculations”, his evaluations have been used to make

113 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.50, 51, 52, 55, 56, XXXIII.58, XXXIV.28, 42, 43; Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.35, XLI.38, 39, XLII. 42, 43. 114 Wintjes 2016, 20; Rummel 2008, 294-297. 115 Wintjes 2016, 20. 116 Jones 1964, 1417-1450.

24 substantial claims about later Roman naval units.117 According to his estimate, each classis listed in the Notitia should have a unit strength of roughly 500 men.118 Since the Notitia lists

27 classes, Treadgold interprets this information as Jones stating that the “Romany navy” was made up of 13,500 men.119 However, as Treadgold notes, this number appears much smaller than the figures given by John Lydus and the major naval based campaigns to retake North

Africa in the 5th and 6th centuries.120 This disjunction heavily suggests, that like in the

Principate, Roman naval forces were not merely constricted to the term classis.

In 2015, McAndrew proposed a potentially significant solution to the discrepancies between the seemingly deficient later naval units displayed in the Notitia, and the large-scale operations mentioned in the historical source material. This is because, apart from the obvious classes and barcarii units, McAndrew argues that all command titles listed in the Notitia under the heading milites should be regarded as naval units.121 Since miles translates directly to

‘soldier’, the customary interpretation has been to regard these as simple infantry units.122 As early as Starr, however, scholars have noted that even sailors in the fleets typically refer to themselves as milites rather than nautae.123 Instead, terms like classicus or nauta are generally only used when there is a clear need to distinguish between infantry and naval soldiers.124 Even

Ulpian makes a note that this was not just convention, but rather that naval forces were legally defined as milites.125 Supporting McAndrew’s hypothesis, all 60 of these units are located directly on navigable bodies of water, mostly concentrated along the Rhine and Danube.126

117 Jones 1964, 682. 118 Jones 1964, 679-683. 119 Treadgold 1995, 47. 120 Despite its focus on a modern dichotomy between army and navy, the naval estimates of Treadgold (1995, 49-53) are significant. By focusing on the sources themselves, rather than a preconceived notion of decline, Treadgold argues that the 4th century “navy” was made up of 64,000 men. 121 McAndrew 2015a, 18. 122 McAndrew 2015a, 18; Jones 1964, 1417-1428. 123 Starr 1993, 58; Starr 1989, 68. 124 Saddington 2007, 212. 125 Ulp., Digest 37.13.1. 126 McAndrew 2015a, 19. For a map plotting the distribution of these units, see: McAndrew 2015a, 39.

This new interpretation of the Notitia suggests that naval units in the later period were drastically more prevalent than scholarship has traditionally acknowledged.

While a promising theory, McAndrew’s work suffers from many of the anachronistic assumptions of his predecessors. For example, the “milites hypothesis” treats the Roman army and navy as two separate institutions which have no inherent overlap. According to

McAndrew’s hypothesis, as the milites commands are not purely infantry units, then they must be purely naval units.127 Additionally, there is a tendency to view the Roman military in the same way as a modern military. McAndrew frequently uses modern terms such as “force package” and “task forces,” and attributes large-scale military “defence systems” to the

Romans, including the claim that the Rhine was defended by a “tripwire defence strategy.”128

Despite these glaring problems, the hypothesis may contain some merit. Perhaps a better solution to the problems identified by McAndrew would be to recognise the possibility of milites units utilising a combination of infantry and naval elements. Like Wintjes statements regarding early Roman classes as “army units with boats”, there is also a distinct possibility that many seemingly infantry-based units in the late period also utilised warships as a part of their organisational structure.129 Due to these many unsolved problems and the anachronistic approaches which have perpetuated them, it is clear that the later naval forces of the Northern

Frontier are in dire need of reassessment. This new interpretation, however, cannot rely solely on the Notitia Dignitatum. Instead, a complete study also incorporating literary source and archaeological material must be undertaken. Although the Notitia is a crucial source for later military organisation, it cannot be relied upon as the sole source of information.

127 McAndrew 2015a, 18; McAndrew 2015b, 47. 128 McAndrew 2015b, 51-63. 129 Wintjes 2016, 21.

Chapter 2: Britain

2.1 State of the Question

Like the other provincial fleets, the Classis Britannica is often assumed to have disappeared at some point in the 3rd century.130 Due to the paucity of late source material relating to historical events and a lack of contemporary analysis, there is no reasonable consensus for when or why this occurred. For example, Cotterill argues that the Classis

Britannica disappeared in the mid-3rd century due to the cessation of iron production in

Southeastern Britain rendering it obsolete.131 Rankov claims that the fleet remained in existence at least until 296, with its later history being “obscure”.132 Both Fields and Starr, however, argue that the fleet existed into the 4th century.133 Starr, in particular, considers the British squadron the only provincial fleet to have survived into late antiquity stating, “the Classis

Britannica alone endured through the barbarian invasions.”134 The major problem with these interpretations is that they are based solely on the assumption that the Classis Britannica was the sole naval force operating along British shores. As a result, all maritime activity in the

Channel is just assumed to be evidence of the fleets survival, while maritime actions outside the Channel have been largely ignored or assumed to be non-existent. This overview will attempt to discern the fate of the Classis Britannica, the organisation and history of the system which replaced it, as well as naval organisation elsewhere along the British coasts.

130 Casey 1994, 103; Cotterill 1993, 237; Mann 1989, 5; Cleere 1989, 22; Cleere 1977, 19. 131 Cotterill 1993, 237. 132 Rankov 1995, 85. 133 Fields 2006, 4; Starr 1993, 155-156, 197. 134 Starr 1993, 197.

2.2 Literary History

The available evidence confirms that Classis Britannica continued its role as a link between Britain and the continent at least until the mid-3rd century, after which, the sources fall silent. The first significant piece of evidence comes in the form of an inscription from Rome dating between 214 – 220.135 The inscription itself is the testament of a soldier’s career in which he was not only the prefect of the Classis Britannica but also of the German and Danube fleets.

Due to the unusual career path and period, Birley argues that this soldier’s string of fleet related titles refers to a joint command of the British, Rhine, and German fleets established for the specific purpose of Septimius Severus’ invasion of Caledonia.136 Supporting this theory,

Herodian does make it clear that naval efforts were a priority of the campaign due to the region’s marshy terrain.137 As the Classis Britannica alone could have never accommodated all of Severus’ army, it is certain that Severus would have had to build or requisition available ships, the most obvious source being from the other provincial fleets. While a plausible theory, it must be noted that the inscription itself is ambiguous and does not specify whether the soldier held all of these titles at the same time, or whether they were merely held at different points during his career. Regardless, this inscription does prove that the fleet continued to exist until the early 3rd century. The last known evidence of the fleet comes from a tombstone discovered at modern Arles (Arelate). In the inscription, a soldier mentions that he served in the Classis

Britannica during the reign of Philip (244 – 249).138 After this brief reference, the fleet is never again explicitly mentioned in either an inscription or any other written testimony. Therefore, the Classis Britannica can be confirmed to have existed until at least the 240s but no later.

135 CIL VI, 1643. 136 Birley 1999, 175. 137 Herodian, Hist. 3.14.5. 138 CIL XII, 686.

Rarely discussed in historical accounts, it is generally assumed that Britain weathered the crisis of the 3rd century better than most of the Empire. As most of the turmoil in the West was occurring in Gaul, ancient historians presumably felt no need to mention events in

Britain.139 The few scraps of evidence remaining, however, do suggest that Britain was also experiencing its share of calamities during the mid-late 3rd century. For example, although few details are known, Britain seemingly became an informal part of the runaway ‘Gallic Empire’ of 260 – 274.140 After its reintegration into the Empire, there are illusions to further troubles.

Both Zosimus and John Zonaras refer to an attempted revolt which was thwarted during the reign of Probus (276 – 282).141 Furthermore, an inscription from Rome reveals that the short- lived emperor Carinus (283 – 285) assumed the title of Britannicus Maximus, heavily implying some form of military victory on the island.142 Following Carinus’ overthrow, Diocletian would also take the title for a short time in 285 before subsequently abandoning it.143 According to

Casey, the newly empowered Diocletian likely finished off the remnants of the Carinus conflict and then assumed the title himself.144 Although seemingly important events, the lack of information does not allow for an analysis of the events themselves, much less any potential naval involvement.

Following this silence from the source material, Britain gains a brief spotlight during an attempted usurpation known as the Carausian revolt.145 Presumably, from the previous years of turmoil and confusion, Saxon and Frankish raiders were continually marauding and

139 Bédoyère 2013, 72; Casey 1994, 20, 33; Johnson 1980, 71. 140 Bédoyère 2013, 68; Nixon and Rodgers 1994, 107; Drinkwater 1987, 27. As Casey (1994, 23-38) points out, Britain seems to have acted largely as a manpower reserve for the usurper’s military campaigns against invading barbarians in Gaul. 141 Zos., 1.66.2; Zonar., 12.29. 142 CIL XIV, 126. 143 CIL XVI, 128. 144 Casey 1994, 102-103. Johnson (1979, 26) instead attempts to link this title with a Carausian military victory. Due to the only vague timeline given in the source material, either option is plausible given current evidence. 145 The Carausian revolt is covered by multiple sources but most of them are quite brief, see: Zonar., 12.31; Oros., 7.25.3,6; Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5788; Eutr., 9.21-22; Aur. Vict., Caes. 39; Pan. Lat., 8, 10, 11. By far, Casey provides the most in-depth modern work concerning Carausius, see: Casey 1994.

29 attacking the coasts of Belgica and Amorica.146 In response, the Caesar Maximian commissioned a favoured soldier named Carausius to prepare a fleet in the Channel to destroy the invaders. Using this fleet, Carausius quickly overwhelmed and defeated the barbarians, but rumours soon arose that Carausius was corrupt. Essentially, he was accused of allowing the barbarians to raid and plunder the coast before defeating them and subsequently keeping all of the booty for himself.147 Due to a fear of reprisal from Maximian, Carausius fled with his fleet to Britain where he quickly established himself as its ruler. Interestingly, while Britain was his main base of power, he also seems to have had continental holdings centred around Bononia, the old headquarters of the Classis Britannica.148 After seven years of pseudo-recognition and a successful defence against a Maximian invasion fleet, Carausius lost his hold on the continent when the newly appointed Caesar Constantius I recaptured Bononia.149 Likely resulting from this failure, Carausius was assassinated by his treasurer Allectus in 293, who assumed command of the rebel empire.150 With the loss of Bononia, however, it was only a matter of time before Rome would retake Britain. In 296 Constantius invaded with two separate fleets and destroyed Allectus and his army after a short and decisive battle.151

146 Oros., 7.25.3; Eutr., 9.21. 147 Oros., 7.25.3; Eutr., 9.21; Aur. Vict., Caes. 39.21. 148 Eutropius states directly that Carausius received his position at Bononia (Boulogne) before the revolt, see: Eutr. 9.21. It is never stated in the source material how Carausius managed to obtain these continental holdings. As Carausius managed to coerce numerous units to defect, it is plausible that this also applied to parts of the army on the continent, see: Morrison 2006, 232; Casey 1994, 53. 149 Panegyric 10, given in 289 to Maximian, spends a great deal of time discussing how the emperor has constructed a fleet and will soon destroy the usurper, see: Pan. Lat., 10.11-13. Two years later, however, Panegyric 11 is still focused on future naval campaigns and avoids discussing the events of the previous two years. As Casey (1994, 52) notes, it would appear that the panegyrist is trying to cover up a military disaster. Constantius’ victory panegyric would seem to support this theory as he briefly mentions the loss of a previous fleet due to the “elements”, which was celebrated as a military victory by Carausius, see: Pan. Lat., 8.12.2. 150 Eutr. 9.22; Aur. Vict., Caes. 39.40. 151 Most sources cite that the fleet led by Constantius’ praetorian prefect Asclepiodotus was entirely responsible for the victory, see: Zonar., 12.31; Oros., 7.25.6; Eutr., 9.22; Aur. Vict., Caes. 39.42; Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5788. Naturally, Constantius’ victory panegyric neglects Asclepiodotus entirely and instead attributes the victory solely to Constantius, see: Pan. Lat., 8.14-17.

The Carausian episode is notable in Roman history in that it is the only occasion in which a usurper based his strength on naval power.152 The sources are explicit that both

Carausius and Allectus maintained their empire and protected themselves against invasion due to the power of their fleet.153 Furthermore, both usurpers issued a variety of coins showcasing their warships on the reverse.154 The main question then becomes, where did this naval force come from? Did Carausius build a fleet from scratch or did he use already available naval resources? Modern scholarship has yet to answer this question and is somewhat confused on the issue. For example, some scholars such as Starr and Rankov treat Carausius’ actions as being a part of the still operating Classis Britannica.155 Casey, who has written the fullest analysis of the revolt, disagrees and argues that the squadron must have ceased operations by the mid-3rd century. Instead, he argues that Carausius was given an independent position and had to build his fleet from scratch.156

These arguments each have the same flaw in that both are based on the assumption that the Classis Britannica was the sole option of naval defence in the English Channel. For Starr and Rankov, the fact that naval activities occurred is proof alone that the fleet continued to operate. There is, however, no evidence from the available source material that Carausius was a prefect or even a sailor in the Classis Britannica. Aurelius Victor mentions that Carausius earned his position through his previous efforts in Maximian’s land-based war against the

Bagaudae in Gaul.157 The only reference to any naval experience before the revolt is when

Aurelius Victor describes him as gubernandi gnarus in his youth, vaguely translated as

152 Starr 1993, 156. 153 Both panegyrics 8 and 10 do not refer to Carausius by name but instead refer to him simply as “pirate”, see: Pan. Lat., 8.12.1, 10.12.1. 154 For the coinage of Carausius and Allectus, see: Webb 1968, 426-570. For specific examples of coins with warships, see: Webb 1968, 511, 563, 569. 155 Rankov 1995, 85; Starr 1993, 155-156, 197. 156 Casey 1994, 103. 157 Aur. Vict., Caes. 39.19-20.

‘helmsman’.158 Rather than proving a Classis Britannica connection, it seems that Maximian simply chose a high-ranking soldier with experience at sea to lead the expedition.

Contrary to Casey’s view, however, the scant evidence available does not imply that the fleet simply ceased to exist. For example, Casey takes Aurelius Victor’s statement of

Carausius parandae classi as proof that he had to “gather a fleet”.159 The statement itself is also vague and could just as easily be referring to him ‘preparing a fleet’ already in existence for a campaign. Apart from this reference, there are other hints that some form of fleet remained in the Channel before Carausius’ appointment. This is first illustrated in the panegyric celebrating

Constantius’ final victory over the revolt in which Carausius is disparaged for taking “the fleet which once guarded the Gauls” with him to Britain.160 Furthermore, Eutropius states that

Carausius himself received his initial command at Bononia, the home base of the Classis

Britannica.161

The source material does not present Carausius’ campaign as part of the operations of the Classis Britannica. At the same time, his actions do not prove that it no longer existed.

Rather, it seems that the Romans did the same thing which they had always done when preparing a campaign by sea. As a proven officer with experience at sea, Carausius was sent to

Bononia to take command of the expedition. While there he likely requisitioned whatever remained of Classis Britannica. Due to the turmoils of the earlier 3rd century, the fleet was likely depleted. Some ships must have remained in operation, however, as the campaigns during the reigns of Probus, Carinus, and possibly Diocletian would have been impossible without some form of enduring naval presence. It is also highly unlikely that Carausius would have been able to so quickly create a fleet if he did not already have models to base them on.

158 Aur. Vict., Caes. 39.20. 159 Aur. Vict., Caes. 39.20; Casey 1994, 103. 160 Pan. Lat., 8.12.1. 161 Eutr., 9.21.

From this core of ships, he would have then built more ships for the express concerns of the campaign. Even if the fleet remained anywhere near its largest 2nd century estimates of 4,000-

7,000 men, this would not have been enough men to cover a campaign likely stretching across both sides of the Channel.162 Altogether, despite source evidence being somewhat misconstrued by scholars on both sides of the argument, the Carausian revolt does provide evidence of the continued existence of the Classis Britannica into the later 3rd century.

Following the Carausian revolt, the source material once again goes almost entirely silent on events in Britain for over 50 years. Like the later 3rd century, this relative silence has been interpreted as a peaceful time in Britain’s history. Mason goes as far as to state that Britain enjoyed “something of a golden age” in the first half of the 4th century.163 The few sources in existence do corroborate the notion of a period of general peace. The only conflict recognised from 300 – 350 is that of Constantius’ brief war with the Picts in Northern Britain in 305. While details are unknown, the Origo Constantini Imperatoris and a panegyric dedicated to his son

Constantine both mention that Constantius set off from Bononia with a fleet.164 Occurring only

12 years after the end of the Carausian revolt, this fleet was almost certainly made up of

Constantius’ invasion fleet as well as Allectus’ appropriated warships. The source material alone, however, does not allow for an accurate reconstruction of how these ships would have been organised following the usurpers’ defeat. In 343, the emperor Constans is also reported

162 Mason (2003, 30) argues that the fleet probably had somewhere in the region of 7000 men. Cleere (1989, 20) is vague on the issue, but still claims that the fleet must have had over 5000 men. Based upon the fort sizes at Boulogne and Dover, however, Rummel (2008, 295) argues that only 4000 – 4500 men maximum could be stationed at these fortresses. Wintjes (2016, 15-16) is even more reserved and estimates that each provincial fleet had 2000 – 3000 men at most. 163 Mason 2003, 177. 164 Origo Constantini Imperatoris, 4; Pan. Lat., 6.7.5.

33 to have sailed to Britain due to some form of military emergency, but this too was quickly resolved.165

While the first half of the 4th century seems to have been a period of general peace, the second half is marked by crisis. Beginning in the 360s, the provinces in Britain would begin a period of prolonged decline which would result in the complete abandonment by Roman authorities in the early 5th century.166 As the island slowly dissolved into chaos, naval forces once again become a crucial aspect of the island’s defence. The first major conflict began in response to the barbarian ‘conspiracy’ of 367.167 According to Ammianus Marcellinus, this collusion occurred when large droves of Picts, Scots, Attacotti, Franks, and Saxons simultaneously attacked Britain from all sides.168 In response, Comes Theodosius (father of the later emperor) was sent to restore order which he did after a series of campaigns and battles.169

While Ammianus himself neglects to elaborate on the details of the campaigns, there are references which heavily suggest that naval warfare was a priority. For example, he mentions that a man named Nectaridus, the Comes Maritimi Tractus, was killed in the initial fighting.170

The most obvious location for this ‘Count of the Maritime Region’ is that of the Channel. This supposition is reinforced by the Ammianus’ mention of Saxons and Franks who, due to their geographic location, would have had to attack the Channel area by sea.171 Therefore

Ammianus’ remarks almost certainly suggest a seaborne attack on the Channel, which was met

165 Libanius simply stresses that Britain is now calm after Constans’ voyage, see: Lib., Orationes 59.141. Haywood (1991, 41) assumes that it must have been in response to piracy, whereas Morrison (2006, 234-235) argues that it was to combat a usurper. Despite the major civil and foreign wars seemingly fought during this period, the sources for the heirs of Constantine are unfortunately meager, see: Bleckman 2006, 26-29; Frakes 2006, 98-105. 166 For a summary of the collapse of Roman Britain, see: Bédoyère 2013, 74-78. 167 Ammianus is the main source for these events with some supplementary material provided by the panegyrists Pacatus and Claudian, see: Amm. Marc., 27.8, 28.3; Pan. Lat., 2.5.2; Claud., Panegyricus de Tertio Consulatu Honorii Augusti 51-56; Claud., Panegyricus de Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti 24-40. 168 Amm. Marc., 27.8.1-5. 169 Amm. Marc., 27.8.6-10, 28.3.1-8. 170 Amm. Marc., 27.8.1. 171 Haywood 1991, 43-46.

34 by a form of naval defence. The position of Comes is itself consistent with the reforms of

Diocletian and Constantine and indicates that the Classis Britannica was impacted by these changes.172

Due to the nature of the attacks, Theodosius’ campaigns seem to have taken him all over the island.173 That some of these engagements were based in naval warfare is explicit from the writings of the panegyrist’s Pacatus and Claudian. For example, Pacatus directly states that

Theodosius destroyed the Saxons in “naval warfare”.174 Later in the same work, he remarks that the younger Theodosius spent much of his early years campaigning with his father on “land and sea”, almost certainly referring to Britain.175 Similarly, Claudian states that Theodosius’

“roaming sword pursued the flying Scot; his adventurous oars broke the surface of the Northern

Seas.”176 Although it is dangerous to rely too much on the words of a panegyrist, Pacatus and

Claudian merely supplement Ammianus’ writings and do not contradict him.177 From these accounts, Britain clearly had access to marine resources, even if there is no evidence of the continued survival of the Classis Britannica.

While Theodosius’ war is portrayed as a resounding success, his victories would only provide a short-term cessation of hostilities. Instead, a series of usurpations and troop withdrawals, combined with ever worsening attacks and raids, would lead to the gradual demise of Roman Britain.178 The first disturbance occurred in 383 when, in response to an attack from the Scots and Picts in the North, Magnus Maximus usurped power. After meeting with some

172 For summaries of these reforms, see: Potter 2014, 437-446; Elton 2006, 326-334. 173 Nixon and Rodgers 1994, 518. 174 Pan. Lat., 2.5.2. 175 Pan. Lat., 2.8.1-4. 176 Claud., Panegyricus de Tertio Consulatu Honorii Augusti 51-56. 177 Nixon and Rodgers 1994, 517-519. For the benefits and challenges of using panegyrics as historical sources, see: Mitchell 2015, 19-21. 178 Bédoyère 2013, 74-78.

35 success, the usurper quickly abandoned Britain with an army and sailed to the continent.179

Unlike Carausius 100 years earlier, Magnus Maximus must have seen little value in the deteriorating island. Later in 402, Stilicho would exacerbate the decline by removing the legion on Hadrian’s Wall for his war against the Goths in Italy.180 Finally, in 406 the usurper

Constantine III would revolt, gather most of the remaining troops in Britain, and cross with a fleet into Gaul.181 What is so remarkable about these troop withdrawals is that they show that the Romans still maintained the logistical competence needed to transfer large numbers of troops by sea as late as the early 5th century.182 Even if the number of warships being maintained at this point was practically nil, these withdrawals prove that the Romans maintained some form of naval ability until the very collapse of the province.

Due to the final withdrawal of most troops from Britain, the Roman provinces would officially collapse a short time later. Zosimus states that the situation became so bad that the

Britons revolted from the Romans and felt safer protecting themselves.183 Procopius parallels with Zosimus’ timeline and states that this final revolt occurred around the sack of Rome in

410.184 Although no longer a part of the Empire, there is evidence that Britain was never totally cut off from the affairs of the Continent. For example, as late as the 470s Jordanes relates that a group of 12,000 men sailed from Britain to assist the emperor Anthemius. Their leader,

179 For the usurpation of Magnus Maximus and his sailing to the continent, see: Zos., 4.36.4-5; Oros., 7.34.9-10; Prosper, Epitoma Chronicon s.a. 384; Socrates, Hist. eccl. 5.11; Sozom., 7.13; Chronica Gallica 452, 6, 7, 9. 180Claud., De Bello Gothico 400-423. Miller (1975, 141-145) argues that Stilicho personally went to Britain and engaged in a war with the Picts from 398-400. After the failure of this war, Stilicho then removed the legions in 402. Mason (2003, 190) supports Miller’s argument, whereas Halsall (2005, 207) maintains that there is no point in Stilicho’s career which would have allowed for a Pictish War. 181 Significantly, the Gallic Chronicle of 452 records that this usurpation was in response to an invasion of the Saxons, see: Chronica Gallica 452, 62, 63. For the other sources regarding the usurpation of Constantine III and his flight to the continent, see: Zos., 5.27.1-3, 6.2.1-2; Oros., 7.40.4; Prosper, Epitoma Chronicon s.a. 407; Sozom., 9.11; Olympiodorus, fr. 13.1. 182 Wintjes 2009, 1168. 183 Zos., 6.5.2-3. 184 Procop., Vand. 3.2.38. An anonymous late biography of Honorius also supports Zosimus by claiming that Britain was lost forever during his reign (395-423), see: Narratio de imperatoribus domus Valentinianae et Theodosianae, 6.

Riothamus, is referenced only as King of the Britons and is not under the Empire’s authority.185

Overall, this survey of literary history has revealed that every known military campaign from the 3rd century to the end of Roman rule in 410 provides evidence that the Romans utilised naval forces in some way. Although the record is patchy, the Classis Britannica seems to have remained in existence until the Carausian revolt of the 3rd century. By the year 367, however, the old fleet appears to have been superseded by a new system. But when did this change precisely occur and how was this system organised?

2.3 The Notitia Dignitatum

The representation of the Roman army in Britain provided by the Notitia Dignitatum presents with its own set of problems. The first of these concerns the date of the British chapters. It has already described how the East section dates to around 395, whereas the

Western sections appear to have been continually updated until around 420.186 However, the chapters detailing the provinces of Britain appear to be an exception and outlier when it comes to these updates, as these chapters are much more complete than the rest of the Western

Empire.187 At first glance, this poses a problem as the Empire is known to have lost complete control of Britain well before most of its other Western territories.188 Therefore, if the list dates to around 420, the British chapters should not even exist, much less show a more complete picture than the rest of the West. As a result, scholars have suggested that the British sections of the Notitia date to around 395, the date when the East and West sections were officially split in half. As Britain was progressively lost, its sections were merely kept as they were rather than

185 Jord., Get. 237-238. 186 Kulikowski 2000b, 360; Brennan 1996, 165; Jones 1964, 1419-1423. 187 Hodgson 1991, 85; Johnson 1980, 26; Johnson 1979, 64-72. 188 Imperial coinage had almost completely stopped arriving in Britain by 402, see: Bédoyère 2013, 78.

37 being deleted from the document itself. This may make the British sections unique as they likely display the distribution of the Roman army as it was around 395.189 Supporting this view

Hodgson states that the British chapters “should be taken at face value as a record of the distribution of units in Britain at some time about the close of the 4th century.”190 This does not mean, however, that these chapters are without problems. For example, the chronologies of

British archaeological sites do not always align with the information in the Notitia. Some sites mentioned in the document do not appear to have been garrisoned until the end of the 4th century, whereas others not mentioned appear to show continued activity.191 Another problem is that, if the document does date to 395, the layout of earlier 3rd/4th century forces will have to be constructed from backwards projecting assumptions. Nevertheless, due to the absolute paucity of other sources, the Notitia remains a valuable source detailing the changes which occurred in the Roman army from the early to late Empire.

Beginning with the Channel, the most obvious observation is that there is no unit listed as the Classis Britannica. In fact, the term classis is not recorded as being used for any squadron operating on the British side of the Channel.192 However, contrary to previous scholarly opinion, this does not automatically imply that naval forces simply disappeared throughout the

3rd and 4th centuries. Instead, the Notitia lists the entire British side of the Channel as being under the control of a Comes Litoris Saxonici per Britanniam, literally the ‘Count of the Saxon

Shore for Britain.’193 This Comes is listed as being in command of nine fortresses all located along the southeast coast of Britain. Each fort is listed as containing one military unit, although they are not uniform. For example, there are four numeri, two cavalry detachments, one cohort,

189 Hodgson 1991, 85; Johnson 1980, 26; Johnson 1979, 64-72. 190 Hodgson 1991, 85. 191 Mason 2003, 188; Johnson 1980, 26-27, 85-86. 192 However, there are two fleets stationed on the Gallic side of the Channel which will be discussed below, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXVIII.8. 193 Not. Dign. Occ., XXVIII.

38 one milites unit, and one legionary detachment.194 Potentially aligning with Mcandrew’s hypothesis, it is notable that the milites unit is stationed at Dover, the former headquarters of the British side of the Classis Britannica.195

Apart from the forces listed in Britain, there are also units stationed along the Channel’s continental shores. These forces are listed as being split between two Duces, the Dux Tractus

Amoricani and the Dux Belgica Secundae.196 The Dux Tractus Amoricani commands 10 separate forts along the coasts of modern-day Normandy and Brittany. Differing from the

British side, these forces are more uniform and are made up of nine milites units and one cohort.197 Notably, one fort called Grannona is also listed as “in litore Saxonico” despite clearly listed as being on the continent.198 The command of the Dux Belgica Secundae is much smaller and only consists of three units based in four forts. These units are listed as one cavalry detachment, one milites unit, and one classis operating from both the forts of Quartensi and

Hornensi.199 Like the fort of Grannona, a fort in Belgica Secunda called Marcis is also listed as being “in litore Saxonico” despite its location.200 Taking all of this information together, the

Notitia clearly presents an arrangement of at least 23 forts located along the coasts on both sides of the Channel. These forts contained a wide array of military units, one of which is explicitly described as a fleet. That at least some of these fortresses also maintained ships not explicitly revealed in their unit title is suggested by their very location and the events described in the literary sources above.

Due to the unique name, location, and sheer size of the remaining archaeological structures these forts have been studied and heavily debated in modern scholarship. From an

194 Not. Dign. Occ., XXVIII.13-21. 195 Not. Dign. Occ., XXVIII.14. 196 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXVII, XXXVIII. 197 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXVII.14-23. 198 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXVII.14. 199 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXVIII.7-9. 200 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXVIII.7.

39 archaeological standpoint, it can be said that the vast majority of evidence comes from the

British side of the Channel. This is due to many of the continental sites sitting underneath modern cities, and a lack of evidence to link physical structures with the names in the Notitia.201

As a result, much of the scholarship has been based on the Saxon Shore of Britain, with continental sites acting as a supplement when evidence is available.202 The fullest and arguably the ‘standard’ interpretation comes from Johnson, who wrote a series of works on the Saxon

Shore during the 1970s and 1980s.203 Due to their coastal environment, Johnson argues that the forts on both sides of the Channel were designed as a system with the express purpose of ridding the Channel of piracy through naval superiority.204 Using these forts as bases, the

Roman naval forces could patrol the Channel and blockade or “give chase” to invading Saxon pirates.205 Based largely on fort typologies, Johnson argues that this system was first designed by Probus and was then inherited by Carausius who used the arrangement for his campaign against the pirates.206 The system was then handed over to a Comes who was in charge of both sides of the Channel. Following the attacks of 367, the command was reduced to only the

British side of the Channel.207 This is reflected in the Notitia by the two continental sites which still bear the title “in litore Saxonico” despite no longer being a part of the system.208

Johnson’s arguments, however, have been severely criticised by Cotterill. For example,

Cotterill disagrees completely with Johnson and argues against the forts acting as naval bases.

According to Cotteril, “It would have been physically impossible for Germanic seafarers to

201 Casey 1994, 98; Johnson 1983, 208. 202 For overviews of the Continental sites, see: Brulet 1991, 155-169; Johnson 1979, 73-89. For Boulogne in particular, see: Reddé 2014, 29-40. 203 For the largest and most influential work, see: Johnson 1979. For related works, see: Johnson 1991, Johnson 1983, Johnson 1980, Johnson 1977. 204 Johnson 1983, 209-210; Johnson 1979, 102, 121-124; Johnson 1977, 15-18. 205 Johnson 1977, 18. 206 Johnson 1991, 95; Johnson 1983, 211; Johnson 1979, 114-115. 207 Johnson 1980, 76-77; Johnson 1979, 90-95; Johnson 1977, 13. 208 Johnson 1980, 76-77; Johnson 1979, 90-95.; Johnson 1977, 13.

40 have raided the coasts of Britain in the late Roman period.”209 Accordingly, the forts would have had nothing to do with piracy, and should instead be seen as fortified transhipment centres for supplies to and from the continent.210 These arguments are indirectly supported by Rankov who argues that patrolling was impractical in the North Sea and likely never occurred.211 From these debates, subsequent scholars such as Casey, Mason, and Fields have taken a middle ground arguing that the fortifications were likely multifunctional structures constructed gradually throughout the 3rd century.212 As a result, there is still no agreement on a reasonable timeline for the construction of these forts or agreement on their purpose over the 3rd and 4th centuries.

2.4 Archaeological Overview

Saxon Shore: Date of Construction

Archaeologically, all forts in the British chapters of the Notitia have been linked with the remains of structures along the Southeast coast of Britain. These nine sites and their names in the Notitia are as follows; Brancaster (Branodunum), Reculver (Regulbium), Burgh Castle

(Garrianum), Dover (Dubris), Lympne (Lemanis), Bradwell (Othona), Richborough

(Rutupiae), Portchester (Portus Adurni), Pevensey (Anderitum).213 There are also at least three structures at Walton Castle (fallen into the ocean), Caister-on-Sea, and Bitterne which are not stated in the Notitia but are of similar construction and show similar time frames of

209 Cotterill 1993, 228. 210 Cotterill 1993, 236-239. 211 Rankov 2002, 922. 212 Fields 2006, 38-45; Mason 2003, 167; Casey 1994, 115-126. In a later work, Johnson (1991, 96) also acknowledges that these fortresses could have played a role in supply. 213 For overviews of each fortress and their identification, see: Fields 2006, 24-37; Johnson 1979, 34-63. Fuentes (1991, 58-61) argues for a few changes in the traditional identifications, although these ignore some of the etymological links between the ancient and modern place names.

41 occupation.214 Therefore, the system listed may have once been more extensive or was at least organised in a different manner than which is shown in the Notitia. Scholars have noticed that although the majority of forts are clearly of a late design, three of the forts (Brancaster,

Reculver, Caister-on-Sea) are designed in the typically early Empire fashion with rounded towers.215 Furthermore, the fort of Burgh Castle appears to have elements of both early and late imperial architecture.216 As a result, in Johnson’s system of one comprehensive policy, these early forts should date to the 250s or 260s, with Burgh Castle being transitional, and all other forts being built immediately following.217

More recent scholarship on the individual sites, however, has suggested that the early forts actually date to around the late 2nd or early 3rd century, with Allen and Fulford suggesting a Severan date for Brancaster, Reculver, and Caister-on-Sea.218 If these forts were built at some point between 190 – 220, then what was their purpose? A clue may be found in the location of the forts themselves. Interestingly, all three sites are not situated in the Channel but instead are located further north heading up East Anglia. In order to reach these sites, a Germanic sea- raider would have needed to make a dangerous open ocean sea crossing. The easier option would have always been to hop along the coasts and then cross at some point within the

Channel.219 Therefore, the fact that forts were constructed along East Anglia and not in the

Channel during this period heavily suggests that they were not built to combat pirate raids.

214 The identification with Portchester as Portus Adurni is the most contested of all fortresses. Walton Castle has also been identified with Portus Adurni, but as it collapsed into the sea in the 18th century, this poses a significant problem, see: Fields 2006, 37; Fuentes 1991, 60. For the proposed Saxon Shore fortress at Bitterne, see: King 1991, 108-109. For the fortification at Caister-on Sea, see: Fields 2006, 25. 215 Fields 2006, 24; Allen and Fulford 1999, 163. 216 Fields 2006, 24; Johnson 1979, 100. 217 Johnson 1979, 100-102; Johnson 1977, 14-15. 218 Allen and Fulford 1999, 163. 219 Fields 2006, 45; Erdkamp 2005, 187-188.

Instead, they were most likely built in order to facilitate shipping northwards to the garrisons along the Wall.220

Notably, this evidence parallels with the former British headquarters of the Classis

Britannica at Dover. Excavations have revealed that the fortress appears to have been abandoned around 210, precisely within the construction window of these forts as well as the

Severan campaign in the North.221 A plausible deduction from this evidence is that the soldiers of the fleet at Dover were conscripted into the Severan campaign.222 After the campaign, or perhaps during it, these soldiers were re-garrisoned in the newly constructed forts in East

Anglia where they assisted in the shipping of materials northwards.223 The fort at Dover was then deemed unnecessary and remained ungarrisoned.224 From this point on, the fleet operated exclusively out of its continental headquarters in Bononia. Although the connection between

Britain and the continent was vital, it was no longer seen as necessary to garrison both forts.

This evidence suggests that piracy was not a significant problem in the Channel in the early 3rd century and that the original forts which would later form part of the Saxon Shore were primarily concerned with shipping.

It is not until the second half of the 3rd century in which the threat of piracy can be seen in the archaeological record. Excavations at Boulogne-sur-Mer (Bononia) have suggested that

220 The major problem with Allen and Fulford’s theory is that it just assumes that all shipping operations were handled exclusively by the Classis Britannica. As there is little evidence of the fleet being involved outside of the Channel on a regular basis, it is more likely that a variety of units would have more been involved, see: Allen and Fulford 1999, 164-181. Perhaps a more reasonable solution is that the Dover detachment was broken up and incorporated into new or existing units which were then stationed at these fortresses. As the Dover fortress could only hold between 500 – 700 men, it is unlikely that this unit could have been spread out among three fortresses while still acting as the Classis Britannica. For the garrison at Dover, see: Reddé 2014, 35; Phillip 1981, 1. 221 Wilkinson 1994, 71; Phillip 1981, 94. For a brief overview of the archaeological periods identified at Dover, see: Wilkinson 1994, 55. 222 Phillip 1981, 99. 223 Allen and Fulford 1999, 177-181; Wilkinson 1994, 97-99. 224 As Wilkinson (1994, 55) notes, soil accumulated over the fortress’ remains from 210 until being rebuilt as a Saxon Shore fort around 275. This would heavily suggest that the fortress was virtually abandoned during this time.

43 the barracks remained in operation until at least 268 – 269 when they were destroyed by fire.225

It is in this context in which the majority of the Saxon Shore forts were built. Although a few of the sites are only imprecisely datable, the available archaeological evidence indicates that the construction of all nine remaining forts began within the period of 270 – 293.226 Aside from the fort at Pevensey, with a likely start date of construction in 293, all other forts can be further narrowed down to having a construction date in the 270s and 280s.227 Notably, these later constructed fortifications cluster in the Channel, concentrated around the strait of Dover. At

Dover itself, the long-abandoned Classis Britannica fort was demolished and rebuilt as a Saxon

Shore fort sometime around 275.228 The continental sites are less precise, but also fit a similar time frame. For example, the fort at Oudenburg, possibly Portus Aepaticus in the Notitia, was rebuilt in stone at some point after 260.229 Even the recently burned down fort at Bononia appears to have been rebuilt with larger walls at some point before the 290s.230 Taking all this evidence into consideration, the Saxon Shore forts can be divided into two groups. One smaller group consists of forts built in the early 3rd century and used to facilitate shipping. The larger group of at least nine British forts appears to have been built in a relatively short time frame and in response to the tumultuous conditions of the later 3rd century which was likely hallmarked by piracy. Although the evidence is less specific, the continental sites also appear to date from the same general period.

225 Reddé 2014, 35. 226 For basic overviews of the dates of the structures, see: Fields 2006, 24; Johnson 1979, 34-63. Most earlier scholars attempted to identify these structures as part of a building programme overseen by an individual emperor or usurper, see: Williams 1991, 138-139; Johnson 1983, 211; Johnson 1979, 114-115. Due to the vagueness of the evidence, subsequent scholarship has tended to avoid these identifications, see: Reddé 2014, 36; Fields 2006, 4. 227 At Pevensey, a number of coins found in the foundation piles confirm a construction date of 293, see: Pearson 1993, 98. The other forts which have been subject to systematic excavation all suggest 270s or 280s construction. For Portchester, see: Cuncliffe 1975, 60. For Richborough, see: Wilmott 2006, 71; Johnson 1970, 245-246. For Dover, see: Wilkinson 1994, 55. 228 Wilkinson 1994, 55; Phillip 1981, 1. 229 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXVIII.9; Vanhoutte 2015, 66; Vanhoutte 2009, 1386-1387. The identification as Portus Aepaticus is debated within scholarship, see: Vanhoutte 2015, 62. 230 Reddé 2014, 36.

Purpose of the Saxon Shore Forts

Due to the very location of the fortresses, it is clear that operations by sea were central to their existence. All 12 fortresses are located in coastal environments either directly on the coast or slightly inland on a navigable estuary.231 Furthermore, the Notitia makes it explicit that the forts were garrisoned with a variety of military units by the later 4th century. Cotterill’s theory of fortified transhipment centres may have been the original reasoning behind the construction of the three earlier forts.232 Even with these fortresses, however, the Notitia indicates that this was not their only purpose. Built as a group in the 270s – 280s, the remaining nine fortresses should be viewed in their historical context. It is at precisely this time when the sources for the Carausian revolt mention the coasts of the Channel as being infested with Saxon and Frankish pirates.233 Rather than a shipment centre, it is much more likely that this group of forts was created for the express purpose of combating the pirates raiding the area.

The events of Carausius’ campaign support this theory. While exact details are lacking,

Eutropius describes that Carausius allowed the barbarian pirates to pass by his forces. After ravaging the coasts of Belgica and Armorica, he then captured the pirates on their return journey when they were weighed down by all their booty.234 To reach these far-off coasts, both

Franks and Saxons would have had to cross through the narrows of the Channel on both their departing and return journeys. The simplest explanation of Eutropius’ account is that Carausius used these newly constructed fortresses as bases for his fleet. When the barbarians reached theses fortresses along the straits, Carausius then sprang his trap into action and captured the exhausted and weighed down pirates. Cotterill’s supposition that Germanic seafarers could not

231 Fields 2006, 38; Haywood 1991, 36; Johnson 1977, 15. 232 As Cotterill (1993, 237) notes “all trans-shipment centres in the Roman period were worthy of protection.” 233 Carausius appears to have been given his command to exterminate the pirates in 285. Due to the problems of the last few decades, it can be confidently assumed that these raids had been going on well before Carausius was given his position. It is very likely that Carausius inherited this ‘system’ which had already been developing in response to these raids, see: Casey 1994, 124; Johnson 1991, 95; Johnson 1979, 109-111. 234 Eutr., 9.21.

45 reach Britain at this time is completely refuted by the source material. If the barbarians could reach the coasts of Belgica and Armorica from remote Northern Germania, they certainly had the ability to simply hop across both sides of the Channel.235 Europius’ account fully supports the notion that the fortresses of the Saxon Shore were designed and successfully used to capture seaborne raiders at the narrowest point of the Channel.

This cumulation of evidence suggests that the Classis Britannica did not meet a violent end but was merely incorporated into this newly developing system. Rather than one main fleet in the Channel, the Saxon Shore system was a decentralised system focusing on multiple forts around the narrower part of the Channel. These forts were constructed in response to barbarian raids and were likely not designed initially as part of a comprehensive system.236 With the success of the Carausian campaign and its aftermath, new forts were added, and they came to be seen as interconnected. At some point shortly after Constantius’ victory in 296, the forts were integrated into the newly organised army structure initiated by Diocletian/Constantine and now under the umbrella of a Comes.237 As proposed by Johnson, the Comes Maritimi

Tractus mentioned by Ammianus is likely a predecessor to the Comes Litoris Saxonici per

Britanniam referred to in the Notitia.238 Under a Comes, the forts could operate autonomously or be commanded directly in the case of a large-scale invasion like that of the late 3rd century.

If the crisis became too severe, an independent supplementary force could be commissioned as in the case of Comes Theodosius and the ‘conspiracy’ of 367.

235 Fields 2006, 45. Ammianus comments specifically on the extraordinary ability of the Saxons to travel great distances for their raids, see: Amm. Marc., 28.2.12. 236 Johnson (1979, 90-102) refers to the Saxon Shore as a “comprehensive policy” and stresses the interconnectedness of the fortresses from the start. As the fortifications appear to have been built over a 20 – 30 year period, it would seem more likely to view the fortresses as a general response to a long-term problem of seaborne raids. 237 For overviews of these changes as well as proposed timelines for their enactment, see: Potter 2014, 437- 449; Elton 2006, 325-346. 238 Johnson 1979, 70-72.

It is likely that each fort maintained some form of naval forces. It has already been shown that the Notitia lists no fleets operating from the British side of the Channel in the late

4th century. It does, however, list an officer in Paris with the title Praefectus Classis

Anderetianorum.239 Almost certainly, this fleet received its name from the Saxon Shore fort of

Anderitum. This strongly suggests that the fleet was originally stationed at Anderitum, but for unknown reasons, it was transferred to Paris at some point in the 4th century.240 From this evidence, Johnson has argued that each Shore fort would have had its own classis which was no longer in operation when the Notitia was written.241 Johnson’s claims likely go too far, as it is not necessary that all naval forces were exclusively referred to as classes. For example, the fort of Portus Adurni is listed as the base of a numerus exploratorum, likely denoting a naval unit.242 This evidence does, however, reveal that naval forces were once more prominent then they appear to have been at the very end of the 4th century.

This decentralised system has traditionally been seen through the lens of a weakening late antique Roman navy and has resultantly been misconstrued. For example, despite

Carausius’ success, Casey sees the Saxon Shore as a “reactive strategy” rather than the

“aggressively campaigning” approach of the early Empire.243 This idea comes from the misconception of a once powerful Classis Britannica campaigning and protecting the Channel from piracy. There is, however, not any known evidence of the Classis Britannica campaigning against pirates in the 1st or 2nd centuries.244 Furthermore, if the Classis Britannica played a role

239 Not. Dign. Occ., XLII.23. 240 Pearson 1999, 102; Cotterill 1993, 232-233; Johnson 1979, 125. Reddé (1986, 626) disagrees and argues that this fleet could have simply come from somewhere in Gaul which had the same name. Although technically possible, there is no evidence of any place in Gaul having the name Anderitum from which the Paris fleet could derive. As a result, current evidence would suggest the view of the majority. 241 Johnson 1979, 125. 242 Not. Dign. Occ., XXVIII.21. 243 Casey 1994, 9-10. 244 As Rummel (2008, 298-299) notes, little is known of the actual duties of the Classis Britannica other than their activities in iron production in the Weald. Since Starr (1993, 153), it has been argued that the main duty of the fleet was to act as a connection between Britain and the continent. While authors such as Mason (2003, 142) and Casey (1994, 103) often assume anti-piracy operations, actual evidence is absent.

47 in Septimus Severus’ campaign, it would have only done so as one part of his invasion fleet.

There is no example in all Roman history of a military campaign relying on the naval forces of a provincial squadron alone.245 Instead, it is much more likely that the provincial squadrons would have only formed a supplement to newly built ships for the campaign, just as in the case of Carausius. Contrary to Casey, the rebuilding of a long-deserted Classis Britannica fort at

Dover, along with a series of new coastal fortifications, showcases increased attention to naval defence in the later period.246 Due to the increased pressure from barbarian seaborne raids, the

Channel needed more direct protection which the former Classis Britannica could have never afforded.

How this system actually worked has also been debated and widely misunderstood. For example, the late period author Vegetius describes 40 oared British scouting ships patrolling the seas in their attempts to capture raiders.247 Johnson has interpreted these patrols as proof that the Saxon Shore naval units patrolled the entirety of the Channel. Once an enemy was spotted, the fleets would then “give chase” and overcome the pirates.248 Rankov has rightly criticised this theory as anachronistic and inherently implausible due to the limitations of ancient oared warships.249 However, he then goes too far by dismissing Vegetius outright and claims that the whole chapter is “essentially worthless”.250 In order to back his assertion,

Rankov only cites Vegetius’ perceived inexperience in military affairs and his belief in a non- existent navy after 324.251 Vegetius’ statement itself is brief and simply describes operations similar to those implied in the Carausian campaign 100 years earlier.

245 Instead, there is epigraphic evidence which seems to refer to campaign specific joint commands between multiple fleets. For examples, see: CIL VI, 1643; CIL III, 726. As Wintjes (2016, 17) notes, however, even these were subordinate to the legions during campaigns. 246 The Saxon Shore fort was also considerably larger than its predecessor, see: Wilkinson 1994, 55. 247 Veg., Mil 4.37. 248 Johnson 1977, 18. 249 Rankov 2002, 922. 250 Rankov 2002, 924. 251 Rankov 2002, 922-923.

Rather than vast patrol operations or nothing at all, it is very likely that individual forts engaged in some form of local scouting and patrolling. Due to the limitations of ancient warships, seafarers would tend to avoid open ocean as much as possible. Instead, they tended to skirt the coasts and regularly make stops along coasts to rest and restock, or in the case of the Saxons, to raid.252 This reliance on a nearby coastline meant that it was possible to trap or ambush warships if their route was known.253 In the case of the Channel, warships would have had to cross through the narrow Straits of Dover. Once they passed, it was all but guaranteed that they would soon have to return the way they came.254 This means that the garrisons of the fortresses would have had some idea when Saxon and Frankish raiders would once again attempt to sail through. These naval units would not be required to regularly patrol, but only when they were aware of raiders coming through the Straits. Land-based forces, especially cavalry, could also have been used to try and keep some form of account of the barbarian’s location once inside the Channel. This could also explain why the Notitia lists a variety of infantry, cavalry, and naval forces garrisoned at the fortresses. Outside the Straits, there are other examples of sites focused on narrow channels. At Portchester, the base of the numerus exploratorum, the fort is strategically located in the Solent, the strait between the Isle of Wight and the mainland.255 Similarly, a late Roman fortification on Alderney is situated in an ideal spot to observe the narrow stretch of water between the island and the continent.256

The final fate of the Saxon Shore forts has yet to be archaeologically settled. As many of the sites have not been extensively excavated, nearly all the evidence of final occupation

252 Dunsch 2012, 271-272; Fields 2006, 45; Erdkamp 2005, 187-188. 253 Vegetius directly mentions naval ambushes, see: Veg., Mil. 4.45. 254 As De Souza (1999, 228) notes, this would allow the pirates to be intercepted as they entered the Channel or on their return journey. 255 Not. Dign. Occ., XVIII.21; Cuncliffe 1975, 428-429. 256 Monaghan 2011, 28-33.

49 comes from coin series.257 Perhaps due to the limited excavations, these coin series themselves can only provide limited information. For example, the little-excavated fort at Lympne provides little evidence of occupation after 350, whereas the fort at Richborough shows an increase of coinage in the early 5th century.258 Unfortunately, the current evidence does not yet allow a definite timeline for each forts’ abandonment. The most likely scenario is that the majority of the forts were gradually depleted of their garrisons in the second half of the 4th century due to the conflicts mentioned in the literary sources. This idea is supported by the more thorough excavations at Portchester which suggest military intensity on the site until the

370s, followed by a period of decline before 5th century abandonment.259 Not all sites would need to follow this pattern as the garrisons of individual forts could have been abandoned or sent elsewhere well before the final collapse. Whatever remained of the Saxon Shore in the early 5th century, its deathblow would have come with the final military withdrawals in 406.260

Eastern Britain

Although literary histories only refer to events in the Channel, there is evidence that naval forces were also maintained along both the eastern and western shores. For example, the

Notitia lists a praefectus numeri barcariorum Tigrisiensium being in command at a fort called

Arbeia.261 This fort has been positively identified as modern South Shields along the eastern coast of Hadrian’s Wall.262 Fortunately, the site has been well excavated revealing a continually garrisoned fortress from the late 1st until the early 5th century.263 In the 1st and 2nd centuries, there is little evidence which differentiates South Shields from its contemporaries along the

257 Johnson (1979, 34-63) relies heavily on coin evidence throughout. Fulford (1975, 270) notes that the later 4th century pottery in Southeast Britain is difficult to date accurately. 258 For Lympne, see: Johnson 1979, 53-56. For Richborough, see: Johnson 1979, 48-51. 259 According to Reece (1975, 188-197), there is no apparent decline at Portchester until after 378. 260 Chadwick Hawkes 1989, 81. Although remainders of the Roman military (especially in the North) would have lingered on into the 5th century, their later history is obscure, see: Wilmott 2006b, 135. 261 Not. Dign. Occ., XL.22. 262 Bidwell and Speak 1994, 42. 263 Bidwell and Speak 1994, 9.

Wall.264 From the 3rd century onwards, however, the site displays undeniable naval characteristics. In the early 3rd century, likely as part of the Severan campaign, the fort was reconstructed into a large supply base.265 This is evidenced by the construction of 24 large granaries which became the defining feature of the site.266 For Severus’ campaign, in particular, the fortress would have been situated in an ideal location to supply the campaign north of the

Wall by sea. Situated at the mouth of the River Tyne, the base would have also been strategically situated to supply the fortresses along the Wall by river.267 Presumably because of this secondary function, the fortress appears to have remained a supply base throughout the 3rd century, well after Severus’ departure.268

Like the forts of the Saxon Shore, South Shields would undergo major changes in the late 3rd/early 4th century following a destructive fire.269 While maintaining its role as a supply base, a number of the granaries were demolished and replaced by 10 military barracks.

According to Hodgson, this redesign was clearly to accommodate a new military unit.270 As there were no further major alterations to the fort until its abandonment, this implies that a new military unit was stationed in the late 3rd/early 4th century and remained in garrison until the end of the fort in the early 5th century.271 Although not conclusive, the available information strongly suggests that this unit was the numerus barcariorum listed in the Notitia.272

Based upon the number of barracks and their size, Hodgson estimates that the late garrison numbered between 300 – 400 men.273 From this information, he also hypothesises that

264 Bidwell and Speak 1994, 12. 265 Bidwell 2001, 3; Bidwell and Speak 1994, 26-32; Hodgson (2001, 34) goes as far as to claim that the connection has been “proven”. 266 Bidwell 2001, 3; Bidwell and Speak 1994, 26-32. 267 Bidwell and Speak 1994, 13. 268 Hodgson 2001, 34; Bidwell and Speak 1994, 26-27. 269 Hodgson 1999, 547; Bidwell and Speak 1994, 26-27. 270 Hodgson 1999, 547. 271 Bidwell and Speak 1994, 42. 272 Bidwell and Speak 1994, 42. 273 Hodgson 1999, 547.

51 each barrack of 30 – 40 men may represent individual vessels of the numerus barcariorum for a total of 10 warships.274 Although mere speculation, it should be noted that Hodgson’s estimates do align remarkably well with Vegetius’ statements claiming that 40 oared scouting vessels operated in Britain.275 As Constantius’ Pictish war in 305 proves, the situation in the

North was precarious in the early 4th century.276 A naval unit at South Shields would have been ideally positioned to monitor and possibly prevent Pictish ships from entering the River Tyne or sailing south down the Roman coast.277 Like the coastal Saxon Shore forts, the Roman fort at South Shields shows an increasing reliance on direct naval defence from the later 3rd century onwards.

Apart from the naval base at South Shields and the eastern forts of the Saxon Shore, there are an enigmatic series of late structures located along the Yorkshire shore. The structures are not listed in the Notitia and are only known from modern archaeological excavations.

Archaeologists have identified at least five of these fortlets running along the coast.278 From pottery and coin finds, all sites appear to have been constructed at some point during the reign of Valentinian (364 – 375) or even later in the 380s or 390s.279 Due to their concurrent construction, design, and location, the forts were clearly constructed as part of a “cohesive chain”.280

Clearly involved with the sea, the nature of these structures has been debated within scholarship. They are most commonly attributed as fortified late signal stations or

274 Hodgson 1999, 547-548. 275 Veg., Mil 4.37. 276 Origo Constantini Imperatoris, 4. 277 Bidwell and Speak (1994, 13) suggest that the main purpose of the fortress would have always been to protect the mouth of the River Tyne and its associated port. 278 Bell 1998, 303; Ottaway 1997, 135; Wilson 1991, 142. 279 Ottoway (1997, 138) proposes that the most likely dates for construction are during the reign of Magnus Maximus (383-388) or a few years later. 280 Bell 1998, 304.

52 lighthouses.281 As most sites are intervisible with their neighbours, these structures could have been used to communicate with one another or potentially with ships along the coast.282

Notably, Bell has suggested that the system was more expansive than is currently observable through archaeological excavation. Using antiquarian reports and supposed gaps in the system, he argues that there may have once been at least nine sites, with four having been lost to coastal erosion.283 These nine sites would have then been involved in observing and signalling between one another on potential seaborne attacks.284 Wilson and Ottaway add that the forts were likely used to alert inland forces of incoming sea raids, while also acting as potential refuges for local populations.285 The Notitia does present evidence in support of this theory. For example, at nearby Derventione (Malton), there is a listing for a numerus supervenientium.286 This unit of

“anticipators” could presumably be stationed at Malton with detachments at the coastal forts.

Once seaborne enemies were sighted, they could signal the other stations as well as head inland to alert more substantial forces.287 Although their exact function is disputed, these signal stations do suggest that the Romans were still building new coastal installations in the last decades before collapse.

Western Britain

There is scarcely any remaining documentation from the late period of Western Britain.

It is wholly ignored in late literary histories from the 3rd century.288 Adding to this problem, the forts and garrisons of modern Wales are inexplicably absent from the Notitia Dignitatum. To rectify these gaps, scholars usually assume that the garrisons in Wales were steadily reduced

281 Ottaway et al. 2000, 188; Bell 1998, 320; Wilson 1991, 143. 282 Ottaway et al. 2000, 188-189; Bell 1998, 320. 283 Bell 1998, 303-307. 284 Bell 1998, 320. 285 Ottaway et al. 2000, 188-189; Wilson 1991, 146. 286 Not. Dign. Occ., XL.31. 287 Ottaway et al. 2000, 189. 288 For a history of Western Britain using the available evidence, see: Mason 2001, 193-215.

53 from as early as the 2nd century onwards.289 This withdrawal concluded when Magnus

Maximus removed whatever soldiers were left in the fortresses in 383. When the Notitia was compiled roughly 12 years later, they were merely omitted as the soldiers never returned to their old garrisons.290 As a result, almost all deductions regarding the late Roman army and naval forces in Wales must be made from archaeological excavation. Generally, it can be said that the excavated sites in Wales are consistent with a gradual decline in military presence.

However, there are a number of sites, all coastal or riverine, which do not fit this pattern archaeologically.

The most notable of these sites is the fort of Segontium at modern Caernarfon. Like other Welsh sites, Segontium shows a gradual period of decline from the time of Hadrian.291

However, unlike its contemporaries, the fortress displays evidence of a great renewal in military activity from the early to mid-4th century.292 Following these 50 years of growth, the garrison appears to have steadily diminished, with the coin series ending in 393/394.293

Coinciding with this period of renewal, a 4th century walled structure at nearby Hen Waliau has also been excavated. Lying along the right bank of the River Seoint, the structure has been variously interpreted as a storage depot, fortified harbour, or fortlet.294 Whatever its exact purpose, the continued garrison and fortified enclosure at Hen Waliau proves that Segontium was still concerned with the protection of the mouth of the River Seiont and the sea. This argument is further enhanced by the excavations demonstrating that most of the 4th century pottery and animal bones were not locally sourced.295

289 Davies 1997, 267. 290 Casey 1994, 115; Davies 1991, 56. 291 Casey et al. 1993, 12. 292 Caset et al. 1993, 15, 165; Davies 1991, 56. 293 Casey et al. 1993, 128-132. 294 Both Boyle (1991, 211) and Moore (1977, 38) consider the structure a fortified storage depot which was supplied by sea through the River Seiont. 295 Davies 1997, 271; Casey et al. 1993, 15, 251.

Across the Menai Strait on the island of Anglesey, there is further evidence of coastal activity. At Caer Gybi, the remains of a very late fortified structure have been identified.

Mysteriously, the surviving structure only has three walls, with its eastern section apparently being left open to the sea.296 It is uncertain whether the structure was designed this way or whether the lost wall eroded into the sea, but regardless, the structure is clearly acting as some form of defensible fortress sitting on a natural harbour.297 Similar to the Yorkshire signal stations, there is also a late tower-like structure sited upon nearby Holyhead mountain. Built using similar mortar to that of Caer Gybi, it appears that both structures are contemporary and seemingly acted in conjunction with one another.298 The most obvious explanation for a coastal fortress and associated signal tower is that they were built as a way of increasing maritime security in the area.299 Incorporating these sites as a single unit, Davies suggests that they formed a coastal network of defensive sites which may have stretched as far as Chester.300

Roman Chester’s later history is somewhat obscure, although it does appear that it retained some form of military garrison until the end of the 4th century.301

Rather than a concentrated system of fortified sites like that of the Saxon Shore, it seems that the structures on the Welsh coast were focused on a few key straits and river estuaries.302

With a small overall garrison, it appears that the soldier’s in Wales did not have the manpower to defend more than what was absolutely necessary. Also complicating matters is that, unlike the narrow straits of the Channel, the Welsh coast offers no strategical advantages. Rather than station huge numbers of soldiers to protect a rather insignificant coastal area, it seems the

296 Both Symonds (2015, 52) and Johnson (1979, 137) note that the site makes more sense if the structure is assumed to have originally had four walls. 297 Symonds 2015, 52. 298 Symonds (2015, 52) notes that the discovery of a 390s coin hoard supports the theory that these structures were very late in construction. 299 Symonds 2015, 52; Davies 1991, 56. 300 Davies 1991, 56. Symonds (2015, 59) expresses a similar sentiment. 301 Although omitted from the Notitia, Mason (2001, 195, 199, 210-211) argues that the Legio XX Valeria Victrix likely remained at Chester until the end of Roman rule. 302 For a map of these late coastal sites, see: Mason 2001, 209.

Roman authorities were content to only garrison areas which were deemed most valuable.303

Notably, nearly all sites which remained garrisoned were located on the coast. For example, other references to naval activities can be found scattered across the coast. At the late 4th century temple at Lydney, there is an inscription commissioned by an official abbreviated PR.

REL.304 Scholars have interpreted this abbreviation as a shortened version of praepositus reliquationis classis, presumably an officer in charge of supplies by sea.305 The Roman fort at

Cardiff was also rebuilt in the late 3rd century in a style similar to those of the Saxon Shore further east.306 All of these sites heavily suggest some form of loosely connected military network, concentrated on key sites, which continued to receive coinage and imperial supplies by sea until nearly the end of Roman rule. Although the evidence is largely indirect, it is likely that these coastal sites maintained some form of local naval defence. The very nature and location of the sites suggest defence from the sea, and it is almost inconceivable that these forts would have lacked ships.307

Similar evidence exists further north near Hadrian’s Wall. The Notitia lists a Cohors

Prima Aelia Classica stationed at the unknown location of Tunnocelum.308 According to the

Notitia, this unit should be stationed somewhere along the Cumbrian coast. Matching the description, excavations at Ravenglass have uncovered a lead sealing bearing the unit’s stamp dated broadly between 190-370.309 Owing to the unit’s name and probable coastal garrison,

Shotter argues that the cohort was likely a converted unit from naval veterans who retained

303 Johnson 1980, 88-90; Johnson 1979, 138. 304 CIL VII, 137. 305 Cuncliffe 2013, 433; Reddé 1986, 286; Johnson 1980, 90; Johnson 1979, 138; Moore 1977, 36. 306 Mason 2001, 194. 307 As Symonds (2015, 59) argues, “if the fortlet garrisons were to intervene before any raiders landed, and also protect supply ships from piracy, they must have had a naval capability.” 308 Not. Dign. Occ., XL.51. 309 Potter 1979, 41-42. Due to the discovery of the lead sealing, Shotter notes that Ravenglass may be identified with Tunnocelum in the Notitia. However, the Notitia also lists a fort with the name Glannibanta which appears etymologically related to Ravenglass. As both forts appear to have been stationed along the Cumbrian coast, either could act as the base of a naval unit, see: Shotter 1979b, 316-318.

56 some maritime capacity.310 Further south, a 3rd or 4th century inscription from Lancaster refers to a numerus barcariorum similar to that of the unit at South Shields.311 As the term itself is general, it is unlikely that this inscription refers to the same unit.312 This heavily implies that

Lancaster also had its own late naval unit which had been disbanded or was simply omitted when the Notitia was being compiled. Like every other shore, a clear shift to coastal defence can be observed in Northwestern British archaeology. From the late 3rd century, inland military sites can be shown to generally fade away. At the same time, however, the coastal sites begin to show evidence of renewed activity.313 According to Potter, this takes the form of a “strong chain of shore forts, probably with Lancaster as the command centre of the system in the

Northwest.”314 Contrary to the view of most naval historians, archaeology suggests that coastal shipping and defence became a greater priority from the late 3rd century onwards.

2.5 Summary of Findings

By utilising all of the available source material, a history of the naval forces of later

Britain can be constructed. The garrison of the Classis Britannica at Dover was removed around 210 and never again returned. These troops were almost certainly incorporated into the

Severan campaign north of Hadrian’s Wall. Although their fate is uncertain, the soldiers were most likely re-garrisoned in the newly constructed fortresses along East Anglia to facilitate northbound shipping. The Classis Britannica endured, however, as its main base at Bononia remained continually garrisoned until 268 – 269 when destroyed by fire. The turmoil of the period makes the 270s and 280s notably obscure, but the necessity of a continental military

310 Shotter 1979a, 75. 311 RIB I, 601. 312 Shotter 1973, 609. 313 Potter 1979, 365. 314 Potter 1979, 365.

57 connection suggests that the Classis Britannica did not disappear completely. It is also during these years in which the majority of the forts which would later become known as the Saxon

Shore were constructed. Carausius inherited this developing network of fortresses in 285, and combining it with whatever remained of the Classis Britannica; he quickly overwhelmed the pirates infesting the Channel. Following Constantius’ victory in 293, the Classis Britannicus ceased to be a unit of the Roman Empire.

Instead of a single Channel fleet, the newly built fortresses were incorporated into a decentralised system ultimately under a Comes. Focused around the Channel straits, each fort would have maintained some form of naval capability to combat local piracy in conjunction with land units. In case of an emergency, such as that faced by Carausius, the forces could be united under that of the Comes. These changes are merely in line with the military reforms of the late 3rd and early 4th century seen throughout the Empire. They are not indicative of a decline or disinterest in naval defence. The Comes Maritimi Tractus mentioned by Ammianus in 367 and the Comes Litoris Saxonici of the Notitia Dignitatum are an evolution of the same system.

Experiencing a substantial decline from the 370s onwards, the system would completely collapse in the early 5th century. Outside of the Channel, the east and west coasts were also subject to the same reforms. Strategically placed existing sites received increases in their garrisons, and new smaller sites were continually being built until at least the 380s. Due to geographic limitations and army withdrawals, these locations did not receive the same concentration of forces as those in the Channel. Nevertheless, a distinct shift towards the garrisoning of key coastal sites can be observed.

Chapter 3: The Rhine

3.1 State of the Question

Due to a higher volume of remaining inscriptions and stamped tiles, the Classis

Germanica is the best recorded of all provincial fleets.315 Like its counterparts, however, this evidence disappears during the 3rd century. As a result, the same narrative of decline and subsequent disappearance has also dominated discussion along the Rhine. For example, Starr claims that the Rhenish campaigns of Alexander Severus and Maximinus Thrax in 235 mark its “last effort as an organised unit”.316 Similarly, Rankov states that the Classis Germanica must have been driven “to impotence” by 280 at the latest.317 Both authors come to the conclusion that units from the 4th century had little significance, and then move to quickly end their analyses.318 Conversely, both Rougé and Reddé treat the campaigns of Julian along the

Rhine in the 360s as part of the operations of a still functioning, yet diminished, Classis

Germanica.319 While coming to different conclusions, these authors all treat the fleet as a significant force responsible for the naval protection of the Rhenish provinces.320 For Starr and

Rankov, the perceived collapse of this force in the 3rd century means that subsequent naval actions are little worthy of study. However, for Rougé and Reddé, the fact that naval operations occurred in the 4th century is evidence of the fleet’s survival. Like the Classis Britannica, scholarly analysis has only considered naval actions along the Rhine as part of the operations of a single regionally dominant fleet. This has led to numerous presumptions, not supported by the source material, which have influenced the perception of later naval units along the Rhine.

315 As Reddé (1986, 290-291) notes, however, interpreting this evidence is just as troublesome. For a summary of the Classis Germanica inscriptions, see: Pferdehirt 1995, 45-72. 316 Starr 1993, 151. 317 Rankov 1995, 85. 318 Rankov 1995, 85; Starr 1993, 151-152. 319 Reddé 1986, 641-644; Rougé 1981, 136. 320 Rankov 1995, 81-82; Starr 1993, 144-151; Reddé 1986, 297; Rougé 1981, 122-123,130-131.

3.2 Literary History

The evidence for the Classis Germanica follows a pattern similar to that of the other provincial fleets. While numerous 2nd century inscriptions reference the fleet, these largely cease at the onset of the 3rd. The last inscription to mention the fleet by name is that of the presumed joint command for the Severan campaign dated to 214 – 220.321 Literary histories relating to the period are characteristically imprecise, yet they do confirm that naval operations remained a priority on the Rhine. For example, in a rare direct mention, the Historia Augusta claims that Pertinax acted as prefect of the fleet in the late 2nd century before becoming emperor322. In the early 3rd century, Caracalla embarked upon successful campaigns across the

Rhine against the Alamanni.323 Finally, Herodian records that both Severus Alexander and

Maximinus Thrax campaigned across the Rhine in the 230s.324 Despite Starr’s labelling of these campaign’s as the “last effort” of the Classis Germanica, there is no hint of decline or neglect mentioned in the narrative.325 In fact, Herodian relates that the Germans only raided across the

Rhine after Alexander had depleted the garrisons for his Persian campaign.326 Furthermore,

Herodian explicitly emphasises the role in which pontoon bridges played in transporting the armies across the river.327 Despite the relative brevity of the accounts, it appears that these were quite regular campaigns in which naval units played a role in the transport of troops and supplies. It seems that Starr conveniently ended his analysis of the Classis Germanica with the history of Herodian and avoided the confused accounts of the later 3rd century.328

321 CIL VI, 1643 322 SHA, Pert. 2.3. 323 Aur. Vict., Caes. 21.2; Herodian, Hist. 4.4.2-7. 324 Herodian, Hist. 6.5.6, 7.2.1. 325 Starr 1993, 151. 326 Herodian, Hist. 6.7.2-3. 327 Herodian, Hist. 6.5.6, 7.2.1. 328 Starr (1993, 150-151) summarises all events after the 230s in a single paragraph, briefly mentioning the usurpation of Bonosus and reign of Maximian. He then concludes by stating that lusoriae are “mentioned several times” during the 4th century.

It is not until the 250s that significant problems along the Rhine can be observed.

Almost certainly influenced by the success of Gothic invasions across the Danube, multiple confederations of Germanic barbarians began a series of mass invasions across the Rhine.329

Due to the confused and condensed nature of the existing accounts, the circumstances of these invasions and imperial response are notoriously difficult to interpret.330 What is certain, however, is that the Western provinces were thrown into a long-term period of chaos which resulted in the Roman territory east of the Rhine being permanently abandoned.331 The reign of Gallienus (253 – 268) would witness the height of the crisis in which numerous invasions, defeats in battle, and frequent usurpation attempts nearly led to the complete collapse of the

Empire.332 Orosius relates that Germanic tribesman ravaged as far south as Italy and Spain, whereas Aurelius Victor goes further by claiming that some barbarians even acquired ships and reached North Africa.333 It is quite clear that not only naval forces but the entire military institution would have been severely shaken by the near collapse of Roman authority.

Even with this almost total breakdown of imperial control, there is still evidence that the Romans were able to maintain warships along the Rhine. In 260, a Roman general named

Postumus took advantage of the situation and usurped control of the Gallic provinces.

Conventionally known as the ‘Gallic Empire’, Postumus and his successors would effectively control much of the western half of the Empire without imperial recognition for the next 14 years (260 – 274).334 Surprisingly, despite his status as a usurper, Postumus’ reign (260 – 269) is almost universally lauded by ancient writers. All sources report that Postumus was able to

329 Drinkwater 1987, 19-21. 330 For an analysis of these sources and their historical merit, see: Drinkwater 1987, 45-91. 331 For discussions on these new Danube-Iller-Rhine Limes, see: Mackensen 1999, 199-244; Johnson 1983, 169- 172. 332 For Gallienus and the widespread problems during his reign, see: Zos., 1.30.2-3; Zonar., 12.25; Oros., 7.22.6- 9; Eutr., 9.8; Aur. Vict., Caes. 33; SHA, Gallieni Duo. 333 Oros., 7.22.6-9.; Aur. Vict., Caes. 33.3. 334 For a modern history of the Gallic emperors, see: Drinkwater 1987, 19-44.

61 successfully defeat the invading barbarians, push them back beyond the Rhine, and then prevent further incursions while in power.335 With the central authority in near shambles, it seems that a regional strongman benefited the beleaguered provinces. The main question now becomes, how was Postumus able to so effectively prevent barbarian incursions? The sources themselves are brief and provide no details of naval or even infantry movements. The coinage of Postumus himself, however, suggests that naval strength along the Rhine was a priority. For example, multiple coins issued by Postumus feature images of galleys carrying armed soldiers with the legend LAETITIA.336 Others depict an image of Neptune standing on the prow of a galley with legends of either NEPTUNO COMITI or NEPTUNO REDUCI.337 These coins strongly suggest the importance of naval units in Postumus’ defence strategy and may even commemorate a naval victory along the Rhine or Northern Sea.338 The scarce sources which reflect the height of the 3rd century crisis along the Rhine provide no evidence of naval collapse.

Instead, the little evidence available emphasises the continued importance of warships operating on the Rhine.

Although Postumus and his successors seem to have performed well given their circumstances, the ‘Gallic Empire’ was not a long-term proposition. In 274, the last Gallic emperor Tetricus voluntarily abdicated in favour of Aurelian, formally reuniting the Empire.339

However, Aurelian’s assassination a year later would prompt further barbarian incursions.340

Fortunately for the Empire, the competent Probus would assume power in 276, crush the invaders and bring further stability to the provinces along the Rhine. For example, the later

335 For Postumus and his success, see: Zonar., 12.24; Oros., 7.22.10; Eutr., 9.9; Aur. Vict., Caes. 33.8; SHA, Gallieni Duo 4.3-4.6; SHA, Tyr. Trig. 3.1-7. 336 Webb 1968, 349. For the complete coinage of Postumus and the Gallic emperors, see: Webb 1968, 310-425. 337 Webb 1968, 339, 343. 338 Dhaeze 2009, 1239; Drinkwater 1987, 168-170. 339 Zos., 1.61.2; Oros., 7.23.5; Eutr., 9.13; Aur. Vict., Caes. 35.1-5; SHA, Divus Aurelianus 32.3-4. 340 For the assassination of Aurelian, see: Zos., 1.62.1-3; Eutr., 9.15; Aur. Vict., Caes. 35.7-8. The emperor Tacitus would rule briefly from 275 – 276. His reign was marked by campaigns beyond the Danube before dying on the way to confront the problems along the Rhine, see: Zos., 1.63.1-2.

62 emperor Julian writes that Probus gained a reputation for restoring over 70 beleaguered cities to their former glory.341 Besides these efforts against barbarians, the emperor also successfully crushed several attempts at usurpation.342 One such usurpation attempt occurred in 280 when a Roman soldier named Bonosus proclaimed himself emperor at Colonia Agrippina. Bonosus’ position before the usurpation is unclear, although the Historia Augusta relates that his motivation was due to a fear of reprisal after the Germans had burnt down the Roman lusoriae

(galleys) guarding the Rhine.343 Due to the source’s reputation for liberally mixing fact and fantasy this story cannot be taken merely at face value. However, coin finds and mentions in

Orosius, Eutropius, and Aurelius Victor do confirm that a man named Bonosus attempted a takeover from Colonia Agrippina.344 This is significant as Colonia Agrippina was the headquarters of the Classis Germanica.345 Combining the evidence with that of the burnt warships in the Historia Augusta, it is very likely that this account confirms the survival of the

Classis Germanica until 280 with Bonosus acting as its prefect.

Starr and Reddé refer to Bonosus’ usurpation, yet both dismiss it as insignificant. The major issue being the choice of the term lusoriae used in the account.346 Seemingly a pleasure craft in the early Empire, by the 4th century, the term lusoria is used exclusively when referring to military vessels operating along the Rhine and Danube.347 This poses a problem, however, as the Romans of the early imperial period usually use the term liburna when referring to

341 Julian., Caesares 314b. 342 For these attempted usurpations, see: Zos., 1.66.1-2; Oros., 7.24.3; Eutr., 9.17; Aur. Vict., Caes. 37.3. The various usurpations are also covered extensively in the Historia Augusta, but they are extremely unreliable and mixed liberally with obvious fabrications, see: SHA, Tyr. Trig.; SHA, Firmus Saturninus Proculus et Bonosus. 343 SHA, Firmus Saturninus Proculus et Bonosus 15.1; SHA, Prob. 18.5-7. 344 Oros., 7.24.3; Eutr., 9.17; Aur. Vict., Caes. 37.3. The Roman Imperial Coinage collection identifies three issues from this usurper, see: Webb 1968, 592. 345 Hanel 2002, 913-915; Rankov 1995, 82; Starr 1993, 147; Reddé 1986, 291-293. As Rummel (2008, 220) notes, however, this may have been its only base. 346 Starr 1993, 150-151. Reddé (1986, 620) is reluctant to discuss the event due to its association with the Historia Augusta. 347 Höckmann1993, 131-133; Haywood 1991, 46-48; Casson 1971, 333.

‘typical’ provincial warships.348 Presumably from this discrepancy in ship type, Starr does not see Bonosus’ lusoriae as a continuation of the Classis Germanica. Instead, he claims that these ships must have been a separate light unit created after the restoration of the frontier during the reigns of Aurelian or Probus.349 Starr’s argument contains a substantial flaw. This flaw is the presupposition that an early Roman liburna and a late lusoria signify ships types which are inherently different from one another.

For example, during the Hellenistic period, a liburna did refer to a specific ship type used by the Liburnian people on the Adriatic coast.350 However, as Starr himself notes, the term seems to have evolved into a generic synonym for ‘warship’ as early as the writings of

Tacitus.351 The same can be said for the 4th century term lusoria. As Haywood notes, the name lusoria appears to be used “indiscriminately” for any military vessel engaged in patrol or scouting operations along rivers.352 Although still referred to occasionally in the later period, the term liburna gradually becomes less common until essentially disappearing in the 5th century.353 Rather than a sharp 3rd century break between a liburna warship and a lusoria warship, it is more likely that the generic term for a warship had merely begun to change.354

Writing in the 4th century, the most probable explanation is that the author of the Historia

348 Starr 1993, 54. For liburnians and their use during the Principate, see: Morrison and Coates 1996, 170-171, 316-317. 349 Starr 1993, 150-151. 350 Morrison and Coates 1996, 317. 351 Starr 1993, 54. Morrison and Coates (1996, 170-171) argue that the smaller liburnian style ships would have been the principal warships operating along the rivers as early as the 1st century. Presumably, this would have directly led to their general use as a synonym for warship. 352 Haywood 1991, 47. 353 On the Mediterranean, the liburnian appears to have gradually evolved into the early Byzantine dromon by the 6th century. The exact time frame and process of this evolution, however, are difficult to trace, see: Pryor and Jeffreys 2006, 123-128; Pryor 1995, 101-106. Zosimus still refers to liburnians operating in the Mediterranean as late as 400 but notes that they no longer exist in his time (late 5th/early 6th century), see: Zos., 5.20.1-4. 354 Although Rankov (2002, 923; 1995, 85) claims that there was a sharp break in ship design following the Battle of the Hellespont in 324, this is not supported by the source material. Instead, as Pryor and Jeffreys (2006, 123-128) and Hocker (1995, 87) relate, there appears to have a gradual evolution from Roman to later Byzantine warships.

Augusta simply used his term for ‘warship’, rather than referring to an entirely separate naval unit coincidentally stationed at Colonia Agrippina.

Rather than a 3rd century decline and disappearance of naval units along the Rhine, a more probable interpretation can be put forward. The campaigns of the Severan dynasty and

Maximinus Thrax appear completely standard within the context of Roman imperial history and display no signs of naval neglect.355 With the mass invasions of the 250s, however, naval units along the Rhine may have been severely affected. This also would have affected the legions and general infantry units stationed along the Rhenish provinces. There is no evidence that naval units were particularly impacted. Even during this time, the coinage of the Gallic emperor Postumus suggests that naval units remained a strategic priority in preventing further crossings. These units would have been composed of a combination of legionary, auxiliary, and newly constructed vessels for the express purpose of the crisis. The Classis Germanica also likely survived this period and would have been utilised. The fleet then survived at least until the restoration under Probus when it was either greatly damaged or destroyed during a barbarian incursion in 280. Due to the specificity of the source material, the German unit may be the only provincial fleet in which a reasonably precise date for its disbandment can be suggested.

The collapse of the Classis Germanica would not have spelt the end of naval forces along the Rhine. In fact, literary sources actually suggest a resurgence of naval power in the late 3rd/early 4th centuries. Like the provinces of Britain, this can largely be attributed to a period of relative stability along the Rhine frontier. For example, the tetrarchs Diocletian and

Maximian each inflicted crushing defeats against the Germanic barbarians in their own

355 While there may have been a slight increase in brigandage and raiding along the Rhine in the early 3rd century, major problems did not occur until around 250, see: Drinkwater 1987, 19-21.

65 territory.356 The sources for these campaigns are meagre, but it can be assumed that these trans-

Rhenish campaigns required some form of naval support. More direct evidence comes from the Germanic campaigns of Constantine I in the early 4th century. During these campaigns,

Constantine appears to have gone on the offensive by crossing the Rhine numerous times and even building a permanent bridge at Colonia Agrippina for easy access into barbarian territory.357 Furthermore, the panegyrists who describe these events frequently refer to warships and fleets playing a pivotal role in the events.358 For example, one panegyrist goes as far as to claim that “the whole Rhine is furnished with armed ships” and that these ships are stationed

“as far as the Ocean”.359

While certainly embellished, naval forces undoubtedly played a crucial role. Like those of the early Empire, these do not appear to have been a subcomponent of a single regionally dominant fleet. For example, in an event just before Constantine’s ascension, a contingent of

Germans attempted to cross the frozen Rhine. Due to an unexpected thawing of the river, however, the tribesmen ended up stranded on an island in the middle of the Rhine. The Romans took advantage of the situation by immediately sailing to the island, forcing them to surrender.360 Due to this seemingly rapid succession of events, it can be concluded that these ships were already stationed in the area, allowing a quick response from the Romans. In another event, Constantine is described as deceiving a group of Franks by pretending to tend another part of the frontier. Then after the Franks advanced, Constantine crossed into their territory and devastated their homeland using a fleet of ships.361 Finally, in response to the alleged revolt of

356 Although it is certain that campaigns occurred, they are poorly documented. Most sources are more concerned with Maximian defeating a supposed uprising of peasants (Bagaudae). The fullest accounts come from two panegyrics given to Maximian in the late 280s or early 290s, see: Pan. Lat., 10, 11. 357 Potter 2014, 343. Lenski 2006b, 63-64; Carroll-Spillecke 1997, 143. 358 The panegyrics are largely the only source for these events, see: Pan. Lat., 4, 6, 7, 12. Theophanes and Eusebius both refer to the campaigns yet provide no details, see: Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5816; Euseb., Vit. Const. 4.5-6. 359 Pan. Lat., 6.13.1. 360 Pan. Lat., 6.6.4. 361 Pan. Lat., 12.22.1-6.

Maximian, Constantine is described as frantically commandeering civilian ships from the harbour at Cabillonum (Chalon-sur- Saône) in order to catch the usurper before he could flee from Arelate (Arles).362

These events suggest that the early 4th century military in Gaul utilised naval units in various ways. For small-scale or localised incidents, ships directly attached to fortresses could handle the situation on their own. For larger campaigns directly involving the emperor, new ships would have to be built or obtained from fortresses along the Rhine. This is suggested by

Constantine allowing the Franks to cross the river. It is likely that Constantine’s deception was a response to an unfavourable strategic position. As a result, Constantine allowed the Franks to cross until he was able to acquire an adequate naval force which he then used to devastate the Frankish homeland. In cases of emergency, civilian ships could also be requisitioned by the army. These are all remarkably similar to the methods employed during the Principate. With a return to stability, it appears that the Romans once again maintained some form of standing naval units while also retaining the ability to construct and commandeer ships for campaigns.

For the remainder of Constantine’s long reign (305 – 337), the Rhine appears to have been largely pacified.363 Notably, this trend also appears to have continued into the reign of his son Constans (337 – 350). The Consularia Constantinopolitana records that Constans successfully waged war against the Franks in 341.364 Similarly, both Ammianus and Libanius reinforce that Constans had gained a reputation for inspiring fear into the barbarians along the

Rhine.365 However, the situation appears to have rapidly deteriorated following the assassination of Constans by the usurper Magnentius in 350.366 Constantius II managed to

362 Pan. Lat., 6.18.1-7. 363 For a summary of Constantine’s reign, including his efforts along the Rhine, see: Lenski 2006b, 61-82. 364 Consularia Constantinopolitana, s.a. 341. 365 Amm. Marc., 30.7.5; Lib., Orationes 59.124-134. 366 For Magnentius’ revolt and killing of Constans, see: Zos., 1.42.1-5; Zonar., 13.6; Oros., 7.29.7-8; Eutr., 10.9; Aur. Vict., Caes. 41; Chron. Pasch., 349.

67 defeat the usurper in 353, but only at a high cost to the Empire. The few surviving sources describe the war as particularly bloody and damaging to the garrisons stationed along the frontier.367 As the bulk of Magnentius’ destroyed army was drawn from the Rhenish provinces, the barbarians appear to have taken advantage and crossed the Rhine en masse.368 In response,

Constantius embarked upon a few campaigns along the Rhine with mixed success, before departing to deal with problems in the East.369 As a result, Constantius appointed his inexperienced cousin Julian as Caesar to oversee the deteriorating situation in 355.370

Despite his lack of military experience, Julian was able to oust the invading barbarians, restore the frontier, and repair numerous cities and fortresses in only a few short years.

Fortunately, these campaigns are among the best understood in all the later Roman period as

Ammianus makes them a focal point in his history.371 Like Constantine's campaigns almost 50 years earlier, Ammianus reveals in Julian’s campaigns a flexible system that was composed of standing naval forces, but which also maintained the ability to construct new forces if required for a campaign. There is no hint of a centrally organised fleet responsible for the entirety of the

Rhine. Instead, existing naval forces are described as if they were attached directly to the fortresses along the length of the river. As a result, Julian is often presented as having had a fluctuating supply of boats and manpower depending on which area of the Rhine he was campaigning along. These ships were not only attached to fortresses along the Rhine but also operate from fortresses along the Rhine’s tributaries.372

367 The Battle of Mursa, although won by Constantius, appears to have been particularly damaging to both armies. For the war between Constantius and Magnentius, see: Zos., 2.42-54; Zonar., 13.8; Oros., 7.29.12; Eutr., 10.12. Aur. Vict., Caes. 42. 368 Amm. Marc., 15.5.2; Zos., 3.1.1. Zonar., 13.9. 369 For Constantius’ campaigns along the Rhine, see: Amm. Marc., 14-15. 370 Amm. Marc., 15.8.1-17; Zos., 3.2. 371 Ammianus is by far the best source regarding these campaigns, see: Amm. Marc., 16-21. 372 For some examples, see: Amm. Marc., 16.11.8-9, 17.1.1-2, 17.1.4-7, 17.2.1-3, 17.10.1-10, 18.2.11-14.

The flexibility and limitations of this system can be observed in various examples from

Julian’s campaigns. For instance, early in his reign as Caesar, Julian is described as wanting to cross the Rhine to attack the barbarians directly, but he lacked the necessary boats for a pontoon bridge. Opportunely, an officer stationed further south did have access to pontoon boats, leading Julian to request seven of them for a bridge.373 On another occasion, Julian is described as sending a contingent of soldiers across the river near the fortress of Mainz in 40 lusoriae.

Ammianus is explicit that Julian would have sent more, but that these were the only ones available at the time.374 As the attack had to be undertaken immediately and in stealth, Julian simply engaged the enemy with the ships he had available. Finally, Ammianus even describes lusoriae being deployed at fortresses along the Meuse, a left tributary of the Rhine.375

If given the required time for shipbuilding, the Romans also retained the ability to create large fleets for specific campaigns. Shortly after the decisive Roman victory at Strasbourg,

Julian created such a fleet in order to re-establish shipping links between Britain and the

Rhine.376 According to a letter from Julian himself, a fleet of 200 ships were gathered and supplemented with 400 newly built vessels.377 With this massive fleet of 600 ships, Julian then sailed down the Rhine restoring the depleted granary reserves of the garrisons along the river.378

Although primarily transport ships, this fleet must have also contained warships for protection.

Julian reinforces this suggestion by noting the difficulty of the operation due to the frequent

373 Julian would never receive these boats. Despite his promotion to Caesar, Ammianus claims that Constantius envied Julian and hoped that he would die on campaign. As a result, he sent his general Barbatio to frustrate Julian’s efforts. Ammianus claims that Barbatio simply burnt his ships rather than fulfilling the request, see: Amm. Marc., 16.11.8-9. 374 Amm. Marc., 18.2.11-14. 375 Amm. Marc., 17.2.1-3. 376 For the decisive Battle of Strasbourg, see: Amm. Marc., 16.12. 377 Julian., Letter to the Senate and People of Athens 280. Zosimus in a slightly exaggerated account claims that Julian built 800 ships, see: Zos., 3.5.1-2. 378 Amm. Marc., 18.2.3-6; Zos., 3.5.1-2; Lib., Orationes 18.83-87; Eunap., fr. 18.6.

69 skirmishes with barbarians as the fleet sailed up the river.379 Free from civil war and under the guidance of a competent ruler, Julian’s campaigns show that naval forces had hardly disappeared by the mid-4th century.

Following these campaigns of the 350s, the next significant events along the Rhine came during the reign of Valentinian I. Like his predecessor, Valentinian’s reign was marked by a series of successful campaigns against the Alemanni, who had invaded after Julian’s death.380 Valentinian seems to have placed a particular focus on strengthening the Rhine border.

For example, Ammianus claims that “Valentinian fortified the entire Rhine from the beginnings of Raetia as far as the strait of the Ocean.”381 Even the usually hostile Zosimus concedes that

Valentinian was a benefit to the Gallic provinces.382 Apart from fortifying the Roman border, the emperor even constructed fortifications on the opposite bank to facilitate campaigns.383

Once again, there are hints that naval units remained a priority in these efforts. For example, the 370s work known as the Pseudo-Hegessipus celebrates that the Rhine is no longer infested with Germanic boats, but instead filled with Roman liburnae.384 Similarly, Symmachus’ second panegyric to Valentinian speaks of a regia classis with an associated port located somewhere near modern Speyer.385 Reddé acknowledges Symmachus’ reference and treats this fleet as the last confirmed evidence of a still operational Classis Germanica.386 However, the

379 Julian., Letter to the Senate and People of Athens 280. A parallel can be drawn between this event and Julian’s later campaign in Persia. According to Ammianus, Julian’s invasion fleet was made up of 1,000 cargo ships, 50 warships, as well as 50 pontoon ships for building bridges, see: Amm. Marc., 23.3.9. 380 For Valentinians’ campaigns along the Rhine, see: Amm. Marc., 26-30; Zos., 4.3.4-5, 4.9.1-3, 4.12.1; Zonar., 13.15. 381 Amm. Marc., 28.2.1. 382 Zos., 4.3.4-5, 4.12.1. 383 Amm. Marc., 28.2.1, 30.7.6. Obviously, these actions led to hostile encounters with the Alemanni, see: Amm. Marc., 28.2.5-9. 384 Pseudo-Hegesippus, 2.9.1. The Pseudo-Hegesippus is a 4th century adaption of Josephus’ Jewish War, likely written during Valentinian’s reign around 370. Although in many respects a direct plagarisation, the author often adds his own set piece orations, refers to later historical developments, and uses specific terminology which reveal a later 4th century composition, see: Casey 1994, 158; Bell 1987, 347-371. 385 Symm., Laudatio in Valentinianum II 28. 386 Reddé 1986, 644.

70 very location of this fleet, in conjunction with the fact that there is absolutely no evidence of its survival since the 3rd century, strongly argues against this supposition. Instead, it is much more likely that Valentinian’s ‘royal fleet’ was a newly created invasion fleet associated with his campaigns. This flotilla would have most likely been a combination of ships appropriated from fortresses and supplemented with newly built units. While Valentinian’s campaigns do suggest the importance of naval units and fleets, they do not provide evidence of the survival of the Classis Germanica.

Following the death of Valentinian in 375, the source material concerned with the Rhine declines significantly.387 Nevertheless, the few remaining sources indicate that the reign of

Gratian (375 – 383) also saw the Romans maintain their advantages over the barbarians. In

378, a large contingent of 30,000 – 40,000 Alemanni managed to cross the Rhine but were quickly defeated by Gratian’s field army.388 Although indeed under increased pressure, the

Roman forces along the Rhine frontier appear to have been almost universally successful when headed by a competent emperor. It is not until the year 383 in which the army stationed along the Rhine entered an irreparable period of decline. Notably, this was not initiated by a barbarian invasion but instead by civil war. In this year, Magnus Maximus declared himself emperor in

Britain and crossed into Gaul.389 Once on the mainland, Sozomen recounts that Maximus managed to absorb many of the local Gauls and Celts into his invading army before killing

Gratian.390 This strongly implies that Maximus drew upon existing manpower along the Rhine to reinforce his army. For the next 20 years, this would prove a consistent theme as the garrisons along the Rhine were progressively drained for both civil and foreign wars. Maximus and his

387 The history of Ammianus ends in 378 following the Battle of Adrianople, see: Amm. Marc., 31. 388 For the events of this invasion, see: Amm. Marc., 31.10.1-19; Oros., 7.33.9-15; Epit. de Caes., 47.2; Cassiod., Chronica 1125. 389 For the usurpation of Magnus Maximus and his sailing to the continent, see: Zos., 4.36.4-5; Oros., 7.34.9-10; Prosper, Epitoma Chronicon s.a. 384; Socrates, Hist. eccl. 5.11; Sozom., 7.13; Chronica Gallica 452, 6, 7, 9. 390 Sozom., 7.13.

71 army were eventually defeated by Theodosius I in 388 but were soon followed by the usurpers

Eugenius and Arbogast in 392.391 As Halsall notes, it is difficult to suppose that there was any reorganisation or recovery along the Rhine, as a mere four years after Maximus’ death, the

Rhine was once again being depleted.392 These usurpers and their army were also defeated by

Theodosius in 394, but the damage was already done to the Rhine garrison.393 Two successive armies, drawn mainly from the Rhineland, had been decimated within six years. The situation would only deteriorate further, however, as Stilicho withdrew the remaining forces from the

Rhine in 402 to raise an army against the barbarian leader Alaric.394

Following this last significant withdrawal, it is likely that the Rhine garrison was almost completely deprived of any naval support. As even smaller warships were manpower-intensive, it is hard to imagine that many ships remained in operation to patrol. Furthermore, the interior field armies must have been severely impacted by the almost 20-year period of civil war when there would not have been any significant troop replacement. Already in the 18th century,

Gibbon poetically exclaimed that “the forces of the Rhine were abandoned, and the safety of

Gaul was protected only by the faith of the Germans and the ancient terror of the Roman name.”395 It would not be long before the barbarian tribes exploited the situation. On either

December 31st 405 or 406, large contingents of Alans, Sueves, and Vandals made a mass crossing of the Rhine without any Roman opposition.396 Although any existing units would have already been crippled by this time, the date marks a definitive endpoint for effective

391 For the defeat of Magnus Maximus, see: Zos., 4.45-47; Oros., 7.35.1-5; Pan. Lat., 2. 392 Halsall 2007, 199-200. 393 For the usurpation of Eugenius and Arbogast, see: Zos., 4.53-59; Socrates, Hist. eccl. 5.25; Sozom., 7.22, 24. 394 Claud., De Bello Gothico 400-423. 395 A later edition of Gibbon has been consulted for this work, see: Gibbon 1854, 132. 396 For the mass crossing, see: Zos., 6.3.1-2; Chron. Marcell., 408.1; Oros., 7.40.3; Prosper, Epitoma Chronicon s.a. 406. Although no Roman opposition is mentioned, Gregory of Tours (quoting Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus) relates that an army of allied Franks fought and lost a major battle against the Vandals before they crossed, see: Gregory of Tours, Hist. 11.9.

Roman naval units along the Rhine.397 As the barbarians managed to permanently establish themselves in Roman territory, the protection of the Rhine as a frontier lost much of its importance.398 Overall, the military stationed along the Rhine appears to have maintained naval units as long as it was able to defend the province effectively. These units appear to have been made up of a combination of standing and campaign specific ships which continued to be employed well after the dissolution of the Classis Germanica. As usual, the literary sources are characteristically vague throughout the period in question. As a result, it is necessary to substantiate this evidence with the information contained within the Notitia Dignitatum and from modern archaeological excavations.

3.3 The Notitia Dignitatum

The Rhine chapters are the most problematic sections within the Notitia. Whereas the

British chapters likely date to around 395, the Rhine sections are clearly the subject of numerous revisions until possibly as late as the 420s.399 This poses a significant problem as the literary sources suggest that the Rhenish provinces were in a destitute state by the late 4th/early

5th century. As a result, the Notitia in its current form displays a dilapidated and ad hoc system much removed from the organisational structure of the earlier 4th century. Most notably, the military forces for both Germania Prima and Secunda are absent.400 Instead, they are replaced

397 Although traditionally dated to 406, Kulikowski (2000a, 326-327) has convincingly argued that 405 makes better sense historically. Wijnendaele (2015, 19-20) and Halsall (2007, 211) have also supported this argument. 398 This does not mean that Roman military units simply ceased operations along or near the Rhine. For example, the Valentinian era fort at Alzey appears to have retained some form of garrison until the mid-5th century. However, questions remain regarding who was still inhabiting these fortresses and in what capacity, see: Oldenstein 2009, 283-290. 399 Scharf 2005, 306-309. 400 The Notitia does list a civil governor for the province of Germania Secunda, suggesting that a military command still existed. For unknown reasons, these military sections appear to have been deleted, see: Scharf 2005, 298-299.

73 with a few seemingly 5th century military creations.401 For example, the most substantial military command is that of the Dux Mogontiacensis who commands 11 fortresses clustered around Mogontiacum (Mainz).402 Each of these fortresses are located directly on the Rhine, yet there is no indication of naval support or even any diversity in unit type. Instead, the 11 fortresses are only listed as containing a milites unit each.403

The other two military commands listed along the Rhine are even more poorly understood. The first, the Dux Prouinciae Sequanici is listed as having only a single fortress under his control. Notably, this fortress at Olitione (Besançon) is also the headquarters for a single unit of milites.404 The second, the Comes Argentoratensis is listed as controlling the area around the Tractus Argentoratensis (roughly Alsace).405 This area, however, is not listed as containing any garrisoned fortresses or military units. Seemingly both commands are the remnants of once larger commands which have merely been left in the Notitia, despite their now defunct status.406 Furthermore, even these depleted commands may have only been created in the 5th century. For example, both Mann and Van Berchem argue that all three of these Rhine commands were newly created by Stilicho around the year 400.407 Oldenstein goes even further and instead attributes the creation of the Dux Mogontiacensis command title to the usurper

Constantine III following the mass crossing of 406.408 According to both theories, the Notitia likely displays the depleted military situation of the 420s, featuring ephemeral commands

401 The province of Germania Prima was originally commanded by a Dux Germaniae Primae for most of the 4th century. Last mentioned by Ammianus in 372, the date of its disbandment and replacement by the Dux Mogontiacensis is almost entirely speculative, see: Scharf 2005, 298-309. 402 Not. Dign. Occ., XLI. 403 Not. Dign. Occ., XLI.15-25. For speculations on the origins of these units as well as the circumstances for their stationing on the Rhine, see: Scharf 2005, 221-282. 404 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXVI.5. Although the province of Maxima Sequanorum was created during the Diocletianic reforms in the late 3rd/early 4th century, only assumptions can be made regarding its military situation, see: Scharf 2005, 11, 45, 300-304. 405 Not. Dign. Occ., XXVII.5. 406 Scharf 2005, 300-304. 407 Both arguments are based on Stilicho’s personal visit to the Rhine frontier in 396, see: Mann 1991, 216-218. Van Berchem 1955, 141. 408 Oldenstein 2009, 305-308.

74 which themselves were not created until the early 5th century. This would suggest that the current state of the Notitia is heavily removed from the military situation along the Rhine of the late 3rd or even 4th century.

Despite these glaring issues, there is one part of the Rhine which appears to reflect 4th century military organisation more accurately. The upper extremities of the Rhine and Lake

Constance did not fall under any of these commands but were instead under the control of the

Dux Raetiae.409 Fortunately, the chapters dedicated to this position, controlling both Raetia

Prima and Secunda, are seemingly less revised. Although this section of the limes was also subject to substantial invasion and subsequent organisational breakdown, there is no evidence of the 5th century ad hoc commands noticeable elsewhere in chapters concerning the Rhine.410

Instead, these provinces appear to have been organised in roughly the same manner as when they were first created during the Diocletianic reorganisation. Therefore, the units within these sections likely reflect units created in the late 3rd/early 4th century which were still operational, at least nominally, in the later 4th/5th centuries.411 This is significant as the Dux Raetiae is listed as having naval units under his command. Like the naval unit at Arbeia in Northeast Britain, the Notitia lists a Praefectus numeri barcariorum operating from two fleet bases on Lake

Constance.412 Essentially, the 5th century ad hoc Rhine chapters do not detail anything about naval units, whereas the preserved 4th century Raetian chapters explicitly reference such units.

Similar observations can be observed along other major rivers and lakes in Western

Europe. For example, the Rhône is listed as having two fleet bases stationed at Arelate (Arles)

409 For the Dux Raetiae, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXV. 410 As Dietz (2011, 64-73) points out, these frontiers were also subject to an organizational breakdown in the early 5th century. Were military forces able to recover or are the chapters simply outdated? As the Notitia is the only surviving source for military organization during this time, it is impossible to state with certainty. 411 This is not to say, however, that these sections are without fault. The Dux Raetiae chapters are still heavily flawed with the same questions regarding date of composition, troop movements, and archaeological inconsistency. For a discussion, somewhat pessimistic, on these issues, see: Dietz 2011, 64-68. 412 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXV.32.

75 and Vienna (Vienne) under a Praefectus classis fluminis Rhodani.413 The Saône, a lesser tributary of the Rhône, also has a fleet listed at Cabillonum (Chalon-sur-Saône).414 Likewise, the Seine has a Praefectus classis Anderetianorum stationed at Paris.415 Even Lake Como in

Northern Italy and Lake Neuchâtel in modern Switzerland are each listed as having fleets.416

These examples, display how face value analyses of the Notitia have led to gross misconceptions regarding late naval units. Is it really to be believed that the Romans maintained fleets on interior rivers and even large lakes, yet did not maintain a single unit on their most important riverine frontier?

As discussed above, the literary sources do not support such a supposition. Instead, a more nuanced interpretation can be given using both literary history and the intact chapters of the Notitia. In its current form, the Notitia does not reflect the military organisation along the

Rhine in the later 3rd and 4th centuries. Rather, it depicts the fragmented and impromptu remnants following the massive troop withdrawals which began in the 380s.417 As a result, an absence of listed naval commands is not an indication that the naval forces ceased to exist in the later period. In fact, the opposite is suggested as numerous sources discuss the continued importance of warships until the later 4th century. This is also supported from the information contained within other chapters of the Notitia itself. There are numerous fleets listed as operating within the Western interior. If much of the Western half of the document does indeed date to the 420s, then this all fits historical context. It can be assumed that the remaining military along the Rhine was heavily disturbed following the mass crossing in 405/406. Yet as late as the 420s, most of the Gallic interior was still effectively under Roman control.418 The

413 Not. Dign. Occ., XLII.14. 414 Not. Dign. Occ., XLII.21. 415 Not. Dign. Occ., XLII.23. 416 For Lake Como, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XLII.9. For Lake Neuchâtel, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XLII.15. 417 Oldenstein 2009, 305-308; Mann 1991, 216-218; Van Berchem 1955, 141. 418 For a general history of the prolonged collapse of the West, see: Heather 2005, 198-445.

Notitia is simply reflecting a transitional point in the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in which the frontier was largely lost, yet a tenuous hold on the interior remained. Taking this information into consideration, there are two key points which can be observed. Firstly, this unfortunately means that the Rhine chapters of the Notitia can provide almost no reliable information regarding the disposition or organisation of pre-5th century naval units. However, the inclusion of interior fleets in other Western provinces does suggest that the Rhine may have also contained similar units before the organisational breakdown in the late 4th century. The only way to better substantiate these suggestions is with archaeological evidence.

3.4 Archaeological Overview

Lake Constance

While historical sources often refer to the Rhenish provinces, they are typically focused only on the cities along the Middle Rhine which were subject to barbarian invasion. Other areas, such as lower Germany and the Rhine Delta, however, rarely feature in historical accounts. The current state of the surviving Notitia chapters add little to this incomplete picture and do not allow for an accurate reconstruction of the military distribution for the later period.

As a result, much of our information concerning individual sites relies almost exclusively upon modern excavation. Fortunately, there are multiple well-excavated locations along the Rhine which not only display evidence of late harbour works and military presence but also directly confirm the presence of warships. Due to the patchy and sometimes imprecise picture presented in the source material, this study will abstain from engaging in a general overview of late

Rhenish military sites. Instead, it will focus on a select number of historically notable or particularly well-excavated sites which provide direct evidence of later naval activity.

Beginning in Raetia, the two fleet bases at Lake Constance are the only locations along the entirety of the Rhine network listed explicitly as housing naval units.419 The first, at a site listed as Confluentes, has yet to be identified.420 Fortunately, the second location of Brigantium

(Bregenz) is known and has been investigated. Archaeological excavations have revealed a series of massive waterfront installations identified as wharves or port facilities.421

Significantly, these timber structures have been subject to dendrochronological analysis, which suggests a construction date of 372 ± 10 years.422 Apart from these harbour facilities, excavations have also revealed associated late Roman buildings and a horreum.423 Taking this information into consideration, it can be said that the archaeological evidence fully supports the identification of Brigantium as a late naval base. From the available information, this unit would most likely owe its existence to the campaign and fortification programmes attributed to Valentinian. The strategic importance of Lake Constance, however, extends back to the days of the tetrarchy and the establishment of the Danube–Iller–Rhine Limes.424 For example, the fortress at Arbor Felix (Arbon) appears to have been newly built along the Lake’s southern shores at the turn of the 4th century.425 As a result, the information in the Notitia and the dendrochronological analysis at Brigantium may only represent the latest iteration of a military framework originating in the late 3rd/early 4th century. Regardless, it can be said that the available evidence strongly suggests that naval units operated along the shores of Lake

Constance during the 4th century.

419 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXV.32. 420 McAndrew 2015, 30-31. 421 Christie 2007, 572; Mackensen 1999, 233. 422 Mackensen 2000, 217; Mackensen 1999, 233. 423 Christie 2007, 572; Mackensen 1999, 233-234. 424 For the development of the late Raetian limes, see: Mackensen 2000, 214-218. 425 Mackensen 1999, 228. This fortress is still listed in the Notitia as the base of cohort, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXV.34.

Mainz

The headquarters of the Legio XXII Primigenia, the city of Mainz (Mogontiacum) had acted as an important military centre along the Middle Rhine since at least the 1st century.426

With the frequent literary references to barbarian invasion and the eventual establishment of the Dux Mogontiacensis, the site clearly retained its strategic importance until the collapse of

Roman rule. Although lying directly under the modern city, large areas of the legionary fortress and associated structures in the area have been subject to archaeological examination.427

Significantly, Mainz is unique among riverine fortresses in that its port facilities have also been discovered and systematically investigated. Excavations have revealed at least three Roman harbours.428 Although the chronology and function of each harbour is uncertain, individual discoveries suggest that Mainz functioned as both a military and civilian maritime centre. For example, the remains of two Roman river barges have been uncovered during excavations of the “Kapelhof harbour”. Dendrochronological analysis from one vessel has provided a felling date of 81.429 Apart from these more civilian finds, it has already been noted that there are numerous inscriptions and tiles relating to the Legio XXII Primigenia which suggest that the legion operated warships during the Principate. Altogether, these findings leave little doubt that

Mainz acted as both a substantial civilian and military port during the 1st – 3rd centuries.

Significantly, excavations have also confirmed that naval operations remained crucial in the later Roman period. At the “Mainz-Brand” port, the remains of five late Roman vessels have been uncovered.430 Of these five ships, two separate types can be distinguished. The first, consisting of a single ship, has a rather stout construction and measures roughly 17.5 meters

426 Rummel 2008, 200. 427 For summaries of the excavations at Mainz, see: Rummel 2008, 199-204; Cüppers 1990, 458-470. 428 Rummel 2008, 200-202; Höckmann 1986, 370-377. 429 Rummel 2008, 201. 430 Höckmann has written multiple articles concerning these ships, see: Höckmann 1993, 1988, 1986, 1983.

79 long with a wide centre.431 Although it is difficult to gauge, the crew has been estimated at roughly 18 oarsmen (nine per side).432 Due to its unique shape, the purpose and identification of said ship have also been debated. For example, Höckmann views the craft as a navis cubiculata, a vessel equipped with a central cabin for the purpose of transporting state officials by river.433 Pferdehirt, however, argues that the ship was a patrol vessel and was likely equipped with mounted weaponry against barbarian attack.434 Despite these disagreements over function, the ship was undoubtedly some form of state vessel manned by Roman soldiers.

The remaining four vessels all belong to the same standardised ship type.435 Measuring roughly 21 meters long, these ships are all of a sleek construction designed for speed.436

Although primarily oar-propelled vessels, they were also equipped for sailing if necessary.437

Based upon length, Pferdehirt estimates a complement of 35 men per ship, of which 32 would have committed to rowing.438 Notably, apart from a thin compartment in the centre of the ship, there is little room for storage, which indicates that they were not intended as shipping vessels.439 Instead, the ships appear to be designed for carrying only the rowers who propelled them. Dendrochronological analysis of one ship suggests a very late construction date of

375/376 with subsequent repairs in 385 and 394.440 Taking this information into consideration, these vessels were all clearly warships, most probably lusoriae, designed to be used by a late

431 For discussions on this vessel as well as a proposed reconstruction, see: Pferdehirt 1995, 17; Höckmann 1993, 132-133. 432 Pferdehirt 1995, 17. 433 Höckmann 1993, 133. 434 Pferdehirt 1995, 17. 435 Höckmann 1993, 127; Cüppers 1990, 468; Höckmann 1983, 403. 436 Höckmann 1993, 127; Höckmann 1983, 406-407. 437 Pferdehirt 1995, 9-13; Höckmann 1993, 127. 438 The proposed additional crew members being two sail operators and one helmsman, see: Pferdehirt 1995, 7. Höckmann estimates a slightly lower oar crew ranging from 24 – 30 men, see: Höckmann 1993, 127; Höckmann 1988, 572. 439 Although lacking large storage holds, Höckmann (1993, 131) argues that the compartments would have been large enough to have some value as basic transport. This is supported by a passage in Ammianus in which soldiers in lusoriae are described as transporting palisade poles across the Rhine to facilitate their attack, see: Amm. Marc., 18.2.11-12. 440 Rummel 2008, 201; Hocker 1995, 89; Cüppers 1990, 468; Höckmann 1986, 414; Höckmann 1983, 406.

80 military unit stationed at Mainz.441 Due to the presence of these warships and the unusual

“basin” shape of the port area, Höckmann argues that the entire area should be identified as a late Roman military harbour.442

Although these discoveries provide explicit evidence of naval forces operating at Mainz until the end of the 4th century, they also raise multiple questions. Most importantly, who was operating these ships? Based upon its long-confirmed history at the site, as well as the evidence of warship maintenance in the 1st – 3rd centuries, the most obvious candidate would be the soldiers of the Legio XXII Primigenia. However, this poses a significant problem as there is no evidence of the legion’s ongoing existence after the 350s. For example, excavations suggest that the legionary camp was largely abandoned and then demolished at some point during the mid-4th century.443 Likewise, the Notitia no longer lists the legion but instead records that a little-understood unit called the Milites Armigeri was stationed at Mainz.444 Consequently, it is generally assumed that the Legio XXII Primigenia was destroyed during the civil war between

Magnentius and Constantius II from 350 – 353.445 The legion would presumably have then been replaced with the Milites Armigeri.446 Due to the significant gaps in the evidence and uncertainty surrounding the Notitia, however, there remains the possibility that the legion is

441 Höckmann (1986, 390-397) identifies these ships as lusoriae and argues that their design emerged as an entirely novel type in response to the 3rd century invasions. Höckmann’s argument, however, is almost entirely dependent on highly stylised representations of warships on imperial coinage. Due to the general usage of both the terms lusoria and liburna as synonyms for warships, the distinction between ship types is likely more blurred than Höckmann suggests. As such, the Mainz ships may have been regarded as either lusoriae or liburnae. 442 Höckmann 1993, 125; Höckmann 1986, 373-377. 443 Scharf 2005, 258; Cüppers 1990, 458. 444 Not. Dign. Occ., XLI.21. For a summary of what is known about this unit, see: Scharf 2005, 257-258. 445 Oldenstein 2009, 333. 446 Although plausible, this interpretation does not totally fill in the gaps in the evidence. As Scharf (2005, 257) notes, Amminaus states that Mainz lacked a garrison during Valentinian’s campaigns in 368 – 369. This would suggest that the Milites Armigeri was only transferred to Mainz in 369 at the earliest. If the Legio XXII Primigenia disappeared in the early 350s, this explanation would then suggest that the city lacked a garrison for nearly 20 years. The passage in question, however, is vague and may only be suggesting that Mainz lacked a garrison “at that time”, see: Amm. Marc., 27.10.1.

81 simply unrecorded and remained at Mainz until the later 4th century.447 As a result, there is simply too little evidence to accurately identify the unit which operated the warships.

Regardless, there is no evidence of a classis or any other explicitly named naval squadron ever operating from Mainz. Instead, whether it be a legion or a milites unit, it appears clear that

Mainz was always garrisoned by units traditionally identified as ‘infantry’. These units seemingly maintained warships as a part of their organisational structure in both the early and late Roman period.

Despite these limitations regarding unit identification, the location and design of the ships themselves provide evidence of their purpose. As Höckmann notes, the port containing the ship remains is situated almost directly across from the confluence of the Rhine and its eastern tributary, the Main.448 As the early Roman limes had once extended well beyond the

Rhine, the Main posed little strategic risk. With the 3rd century withdrawal and re-establishment of the limes directly on the Rhine itself, however, barbarians could then have potentially sailed down the Main and entered the Rhine directly for raids. As a result, the Mainz ships would have been ideally positioned to quickly sail out and meet any invaders at the mouth of the

Main.449 Due to their sleek design and little storage capability, these ships were clearly designed for the rapid transport of troops and would have been ideal for combating unexpected attacks.450 During more typical operations, they would have almost certainly been used in regular scouting and surveillance missions like the lusoriae mentioned in Ammianus’ account.

Due to the considerable amount of unambiguous evidence, it is very likely that Mainz military units consistently maintained some form of naval force from the 1st – 2nd century until the collapse of the Rhine border in the early 5th century.

447 Oldenstein 2009, 314, 333. 448 Höckmann 1993, 125; Höckmann 1986, 379. 449 Hocker 1995, 89; Höckmann 1993, 125; Höckmann 1986, 379. 450 Pferdehirt 1995, 4.

Fortified Harbours

Besides Mainz, numerous fortifications along the Middle Rhine display evidence of 4th century repair and construction. With the retraction of the limes, former civilian centres such as Andernach and Koblenz appear to have been refortified and regained a military importance which had been absent since the 1st/2nd centuries.451 Other sites, like Alzey and Bad Kreuznach, were only newly constructed as late as the reign of Valentinian.452 Like most riverine fortifications, port facilities are typically assumed to have been present at all sites, yet have never been confirmed archaeologically. For example, the late Andernach appears to have been oriented towards an arm of the Rhine which forms a natural harbour.453 Similarly, the

Valentinian fortress of Altrip seems to have been designed to connect to the Rhine bank directly.454 Although suggestive, without conclusive evidence like that of Mainz, these ports are only speculative.

However, the refurbishment and construction of large fortifications are not the extent of late defensive efforts. Alongside these major building programmes, a proliferation of smaller outposts and burgi were constructed along the Rhine throughout the 4th century. Among these smaller fortifications, there is a specific design which was constructed with naval considerations in mind. Currently identified at nine locations along the Middle Rhine, this fortification type appears as a three-walled structure connected directly to a central tower.455

The fourth wall is non-existent, with two of the walls instead running directly into the water, leaving the structure open to the river.456 Interestingly, these structures are also unique in that

451 For Andernach, see: Rummel 2008, 194-195; Cüppers 1990, 304-306. For Koblenz, see: Rummel 2008, 196- 197; Cüppers 1990, 418-422. 452 For Alzey’s construction date, see: Oldenstein 2009, 282; Scharf 2005, 189-190; Cüppers 1990, 302-303. For that of Bad Kreuznach, see: Oldenstein 2009, 311; Cüppers 1990, 321. 453 Rummel 2008, 195; Cüppers 1990, 306; Johnson 1983, 150. 454 Cüppers 1990, 300. Altrip was constructed in 369 under Valentinian, see: Oldenstein 2009, 311; Scharf 2005, 189; Höckmann 1986, 404; Johnson 1983, 155. 455 For all nine locations, see: Lander 1984, 284-286. 456 For images of this construction type, see: Oldenstein 2009, 325; Höckmann 1986, 402.

83 they are often located on the right bank of the Rhine.457 While only select sites have been systematically excavated, the fortifications are typically dated as a group as belonging to the reign of Valentinian I. This date is derived from coin series, identifiable stamped tiles, and a uniformity in construction style.458 However, due to large numbers of tiles dating from the time of Constantius II discovered in foundational levels, it has also been argued that Valentinian merely repaired existing structures.459 Regardless, a relatively precise construction window between the 350s – 370s is generally agreed upon.460 Characterised variously as fortified landing places, bridgehead fortresses, or fortified harbours depending on the author, the purpose of these structures have been heavily debated.

For example, Lander argues that these fortresses formed part of an offensive frontier system created by Valentinian. With most structures lying on the opposite bank of the Rhine, they should be seen as part of an aggressive policy of striking quickly into barbarian lands.461

Reddé disagrees by noting that the structures lack the necessary outer doors to facilitate troops for offensive strikes.462 Instead, he argues that they would have acted as fortified patrol stations in which soldiers travelling by boat could find rest and safety at night. In this scenario, the lateral arms would have formed a protective harbour against both an unexpected attack as well as the river’s current.463 As Höckmann observes, however, each landing fort is always located within a few kilometres of a major fortress on the Middle Rhine.464 While not lying directly across to suggest the bridgeheads argued by Lander, they are close enough to be associated. As

457 Oldenstein 2009, 322-326; Reddé 1986, 386. 458 Oldenstein 2009, 322-326; Scharf 2005, 39-41; Lander 1984, 288. 459 Soproni 1980, 236-237. Oldenstein (2009, 323-324) attempts to distinguish the constructions of Constantius from those Valentinian based on slight differences in the designs of individual fortresses. However, his arguments are entirely speculative. 460 Oldenstein 2009, 322-326; Scharf 2005, 39-41; Lander 1984, 288; Heukemes 1981, 466; Soproni 1980, 236- 237. 461 Lander 1984, 284-290. 462 Reddé 1986, 368. 463 For his full argument, see: Reddé 1986, 364-369. 464 Höckmann 1986, 401.

84 a result, Höckmann argues that these burgi should be considered satellite fortlets linked with the principal fortresses of the Middle Rhine.465 In this arrangement, each burgi would have been maintained by a detachment from a nearby fortress which was supplied through lusoriae.

For example, the cargo holds in the Mainz ships were not large enough to suggest a major shipping function. However, they were large enough to supply these smaller burgi which were estimated to garrison roughly 45 men each.466 In addition, these ships would have regularly patrolled between locations for the purpose of scouting for barbarian activity.467 This strategy would have expanded the area of operations monitored by an individual fortress allowing

Roman soldiers to better track and defend against barbarian crossings. According to

Höckmann’s scenario, every major fortress along the Middle Rhine would have effectively functioned as both infantry and naval bases.468 Whether it be for bridgeheads, patrol stations, or satellite fortlets, these fortified harbours clearly owed their existence to a late military strategy reliant upon naval efforts.

Cologne

The city of Roman Cologne (Colonia Agrippina) provides a perfect example of the ambiguity and challenges in identifying an ancient military port. Lying roughly 3 kilometres from the city proper, the fortress at Cologne-Alteburg is generally identified as the headquarters of the Classis Germanica.469 This is due to a large number of stamped tiles and associated inscriptions created by the soldiers of the fleet themselves.470 However, as both areas lie directly under modern Cologne, the presumed port facilities of both the fortress and the ancient city are little understood. For example, the only harbour facilities currently identified are of a

465 Höckmann 1986, 399-406. 466 Höckmann 1993, 131; Höckmann 1986, 400. For garrison size, see: Heukemes 1981, 466. 467 Höckmann 1986, 399-406. 468 Höckmann (1986, 406) suggests 5 – 6 lusoriae per fortress. 469 Hanel 2002, 913; Rankov 1995, 82; Starr 1993, 147; Höckmann 1986, 379; Reddé 1986, 657. 470 For an overview of the evidence for Cologne-Alteburg as the headquarters of the Classis Germanica, see: Rummel 2008, 185-190.

85 secondary port which appears to have silted up by the early 2nd century.471 Despite these limitations, the fortress at Cologne-Alteburg has been relatively well researched since the early

20th century.472 Excavations have revealed a substantial military fortification large enough to hold a garrison of roughly 1,000 men.473 Notably, the site appears to have been continuously occupied by the military from the early 1st until the later 3rd century, with the coin series ending abruptly in the 270s.474 This end date aligns remarkably well with the account of Bonosus’ usurpation in the Historia Augusta and supports the disbandment of the Classis Germanica around 280.

However, the abandonment of Cologne-Alteburg, would not have meant the end of military activity in the immediate vicinity. In the early 4th century, a large bridgehead fortification and associated bridge were constructed directly across from Cologne. Remarkable for late antiquity, both structures are securely datable. A Constantinian panegyric dated to either 309 or 310 states that Constantine had recently built a bridge from Cologne to facilitate his campaigns into Frankish territory.475 This statement is further collaborated by a commemorative inscription celebrating the completion of the fortification in 315.476 Therefore, both the bridge and fort appear to have been constructed and completed between 308 – 315.477

Excavations at the site, named Divitia (Cologne-Deutz), have confirmed a large and regularly

471 This port took advantage of a secondary arm of the Rhine which existed until siltation attached it to the river bank. The main port of the city was presumably located directly on the Rhine, see: Schäfer and Herrmann 2014, 208-209; Schäfer and Trier 2013, 34-36. The port at Cologne-Alteburg has never been investigated, see: Schäfer and Wagner 2018, 56-57. 472 Unfortunately, much of the early work at the site was destroyed during World War II, see: Fischer 2002, 909. 473 Schäfer and Wagner 2018, 54; Rummel 2008, 186; Fischer 2002, 909. 474 Fischer 2002, 910; Hanel 2002, 915. 475 Pan. Lat., 6.13.1-5. For the date of the panegyric, see: Nixon and Rodgers 1994, 214. 476 Although securely attested, this inscription is now considered lost, see: Carroll-Spillecke 1997, 143. 477 Schäfer 2011, 353. Despite the uncertainty of the panegyric’s date, most scholars give a narrower date range of 310 – 315, see: Dodt et al. 2016, 8; Hanel and Verstegen 2009, 749; Carroll-Spillecke 1997, 143.

86 planned fortification which could have accommodated between 500 – 1,000 men.478 Like other military sites along the Rhine, the site then appears to have been regularly garrisoned until the early 5th century.479

The placement of Divitia on the Rhine’s right bank provided multiple strategic advantages. Apart from protecting the city itself, offensive campaigns could now easily penetrate directly into barbarian territory.480 As Dodt, Karas and Schäfer note, the Romans also gained the ability to effectively monitor shipping and river traffic.481 In order to do so, however, the military unit at Divitia must have had access to warships. Unfortunately, due to the absence of Germania Secunda in the extant Notitia, the identity of this unit is unknown.482 As there is no evidence for the survival of the Classis Germanica after 280, it is doubtful that the fleet garrisoned Divitia. Instead, a more probable solution is that an existing unit involved in

Constantine’s war against the Franks was transferred to the fortress following its construction.

Like Mainz, this unit was probably an auxiliary or legionary detachment which operated lusoriae as part of its regular operations. The accounts of Constantine’s wars along the Rhine confirm that warships still operated in the vicinity of Cologne despite the demise of the Classis

Germanica.483 However, from the 280s onwards, this appears to have been accomplished without the use of a unit labelled as a classis.

478 The uniform layout of Divitia is also unique for a late fortress, see: Schäfer 2018, 113. The estimate of a 1,000-man garrison assumes that all the barrack style buildings housed soldiers, see: Dodt et al. 2016, 8. Carroll-Spillecke (1997, 144-148), however, argues that some of these buildings may have been stables associated with a mounted unit and gives a smaller estimate of 500 – 600 men. 479 Both the coin series and characteristically Roman pottery cease in the early 5th century, see: Dodt et al. 2016, 11. According to Carroll-Spillecke (1997, 148), Frankish foederati likely occupied the fort in the 5th century. 480 Schäfer 2011, 353; Carroll-Spillecke 1997, 148. 481 Dodt et al. 2016, 11. 482 Carroll-Spillecke (1997, 144-148) speculates that this may have been an auxiliary unit with an element of cavalry, although this based on strategic considerations rather than explicit evidence. 483 For Constantine’s Frankish campaigns, see: Pan. Lat., 4, 6, 7, 12.

The Meuse and Rhine Delta

Later Roman military involvement in the area around the Rhine Delta is notoriously difficult to interpret. Due to constant changes in river course and coastal erosion, many sites are heavily damaged or even lost entirely.484 Literary sources add little to this incomplete picture, as the area is virtually ignored in all accounts.485 As a result of this lack of evidence, it has traditionally been accepted that most military sites in the region were merely abandoned following the Limesfall in the 260s – 270s.486 More recent archaeological findings, however, have revealed continuity at many locations and even a re-garrisoning of long-abandoned military sites.487 For example, at Cujik along the Meuse, the 1st century military fortification appears to have transformed into a civilian settlement during the 2nd and 3rd centuries.488 In the early 4th century, the site shows signs of renewed military activity with the construction of a wooden and subsequent stone fortification.489 Significantly, this fortification was also equipped with a quay as well as a substantial bridge spanning the river. Dendrochronological analysis taken from the timber of the quay suggests a 325/326 construction date with subsequent repairs in 372/373.490 Similarly, testing of the wooden piles which support the bridge suggests numerous repairs over the 4th century with the last occurring in the 390s.491

Although the best excavated and understood late Roman fortification along the Meuse,

Cujik is not an outlier. Multiple locations along the river, such as Maastricht and Kessel-Lith,

484 Van Der Meulen 2017, 28-29, 47; Dhaeze 2009, 1234-1235; Willems 1988, 241. 485 Although Ammianus mentions the area during Julian’s campaigns, he rarely discusses individual sites, see: Amm. Marc., 16-21. 486 Van Der Meulen 2017, 9; Dhaeze 2009, 1238; Willems 1988, 241. 487 For a site catalogue of the late sites in the Rhine Delta, including excavation summaries, see: Van Der Meulen 2017, 77-149. 488 Seinen 2014, 330-331; Goudswaard 1995, 233. Cujik is generally identified with ancient Ceuclum, listed on the Peutinger Table, see: Goudswaard et al. 2001, 440. 489 The wooden fortification is typically dated to the reign of Constantine with the stone reconstruction dated to that of Valentinian, see: Seinen 2014, 331; Goudswaard et al. 2001, 441; Goudswaard 1995, 233. 490 Seinen 2014, 339-340; Goudswaard et al. 2001, 483. 491 Van Der Meulen and Van Der Veen 2015, 34-35; Goudswaard et al. 2001, 483; Goudswaard 1995, 240.

88 also appear to have become newly militarised in the 4th century.492 As Van Der Meulen suggests, the Meuse appears to have gained a military importance which it lacked during the previous centuries.493 Likely due to instability along the Rhine, this line of fortifications was built in order to create a safer thoroughfare for military shipping. Ammianus supports this notion by describing how Julian delayed a campaign in order to restore three fortifications along the river which had been destroyed during barbarian invasions.494 This does not mean, however, that the Rhine was merely abandoned. Although indeed reduced, older sites such as

Nijmegen appear to have retained some form of military garrison throughout the 4th century.495

Rather than an all-out replacement, it seems more likely that the Meuse fortifications acted as a supplement to an area under increasing pressure.

Apart from more typical functions, these fortifications would have played a role during major campaigns along the Rhine. As Scharf notes, any sizable military effort along the river would have had to rely heavily on the importation of grain from Britain.496 Both Libanius and

Julian himself emphasise the significance of the emperor's re-establishment of these shipping lines in the 350s.497 Julian, however, was not the first emperor to focus on maintaining this link following the Limesfall. Although initially assumed to have been abandoned in the 270s, modern excavations at the coastal site of Valkenburg (Praetorium Agrippinae) have revealed three considerable horrea.498 Dendrochronological analysis of wood from one horreum revealed a date of 365 ± 40 years, whereas an associated wooden drain yielded an earlier date of 316 ± 10 years.499 Taking this into consideration, the evidence strongly suggests that these

492 For summaries of the late evidence at both sites, see: Van Der Meulen 2017, 131-141. 493 Van Der Meulen 2017, 53. 494 Amm. Marc., 17.9.1. 495 Van Der Meulen 2017, 105-112; Thyssen 2002, 453-454. If the identifications in the Peutinger Table are to be accepted, Cujik and Nijmegen were linked with a major road, see: Goudswaard et al. 2001, 531. 496 Scharf 2005, 39-40. 497 Julian., Letter to the Senate and People of Athens 280; Lib., Orationes 18.83. 498 Van Der Meulen 2017, 84; Rummel 2008, 153; Willems 1988, 250. 499 Van Der Meulen 2017, 84.

89 granaries were used to store British grain before being shipped along the Rhine. Despite the significant disturbances in the area, this link between the island and the continent was just too important to outright abandon. These grain ships must have required some form of protection from barbarian attacks. Based on the sites along the Middle Rhine, the most likely scenario is to suggest that each fortification maintained a few lusoriae. This is reinforced by Ammianus, who relates that Julian utilised lusoriae along the Meuse during his campaigns.500 The garrisons of these fortresses would have then been expected to engage in both basic infantry and naval activities. Despite these uncertainties, it is certain that modern archaeological excavations have revealed the continuance of military shipping in an area once assumed to have been largely abandoned by Roman authorities.

3.5 Summary of Findings

The Classis Germanica appears to have maintained regular operations until the mid-

3rd century. During this time, the entirety of the Roman military along the Rhine was shaken due to numerous barbarian invasions. However, the usurper Postumus was able to lead several campaigns to effectively oust the invaders as well as to defend against subsequent incursions.

Although the details of these campaigns are obscure, naval efforts appear to have been a priority, in which the Classis Germanica likely participated. Despite the Roman recovery beginning in the 270s, the fleet appears to have been permanently destroyed during a further invasion around the year 280. This is supported not only by the literary source material but also by excavations at Cologne-Alteburg which substantiates a sudden abandonment around the time of the usurpation of Bonosus. As a result, the Classis Germanica is the only major provincial fleet for which a definite end date can be reasonably assumed.

500 Amm. Marc., 17.2.1-3.

With the loss of the Rhenish chapters of the Notitia Dignitatum, the later distribution of the Roman military is difficult to ascertain. Following the demise of the Classis Germanica, there is no evidence of any unit labelled classis operating along the Rhine. This does not mean, however, that the Roman military lacked warships. Literary sources are clear that both standing and newly constructed naval forces were utilised during the campaigns of Constantine, Julian, and Valentinian. Rather than specialised classes, Rhenish naval units were now incorporated directly into the ‘infantry’ units stationed at the fortresses along the river. Through lusoriae, these units could patrol and monitor barbarian movements near their home base. To expand operations, smaller detachments were also housed in associated burgi with harbour facilities which could operate between multiple locations. Due to the unstable military situation in the

Rhine Delta, lusoriae also operated along the Meuse as means of safeguarding shipping. These units continued in regular operation until the civil wars and mass troop withdrawals which began in the 380s. Even still, the Mainz ships provide direct evidence that at least some of these ships operated until the collapse of the Rhine frontier in the early 5th century.

Chapter 4: The Danube

4.1 State of the Question

In the source material, there are more references to naval activity in the Danube area than in any other region of the Empire. The literary sources frequently mention fleet activities and even naval battles throughout the 3rd – 5th centuries. Furthermore, the Notitia Dignitatum lists many fleets stationed at strategic points along the Danube. However, even with this abundance of evidence, the same preconceived notion of late decline plagues scholarship. For example, Starr dismisses late Danube fleets outright and treats them as ad hoc remnants of the

“carefully organised squadrons of the early Empire.”501 Similarly, Reddé interprets the late fleets as isolated, irregularly concentrated, and frozen geographically in comparison with the mobile and widespread fleets of the Principate.502 Both arguments are dominated by the outdated view that the Classis Pannonica and Classis Moesica acted as independent forces, controlling fleet bases along the entirety of the Danube. As has been established, these claims are not supported by archaeological or literary evidence. The same approach can be seen in

Bounegru and Zahariade. In their work on the Lower Danube, late literary and archaeological evidence is even occasionally used to make backwards projecting assumptions about the

Classis Moesica, assumptions for which there is no supporting evidence.503 Despite these methods, the authors still conclude that naval forces had weakened by the 4th century.504 As a result of these preconceptions, the later naval forces on the Danube have only been viewed in the shadow of the ‘great’ fleets of the early Empire, and not in their own right.

501 Starr 1993, 197. 502 Reddé 1986, 631. 503 The most obvious being the liberal identification of Classis Moesica fleet stations, often based upon later evidence from the 3rd – 5thcenturies. For these supposed fleet bases, see: Bounegru and Zahariade 1996, 89. 504 Bounegru and Zahariade 1996, 61.

4.2 Literary History

Epigraphical evidence suggests that both the Classis Pannonica and Classis Moesica continued to into the 3rd century. As with other provincial fleets, the overall paucity of evidence from this period makes the development of both fleets in the 3rd century challenging to understand. For example, the last datable inscription of the Classis Pannonica is from between

201 – 207.505 The Classis Moesica, however, is given the title Kλάσσης Φλαουίας Μυσικῆς

Γορδιανῆς in a 3rd century inscription, indicating that it still existed through the reign of

Gordian III (238 – 244).506 Literary sources add little to this picture as the only surviving histories almost wholly neglect the Danube in the first half of the 3rd century. Herodian relates that Maximinus Thrax (235 – 238) embarked upon campaigns across the Danube, but these are skimmed over in a few sentences.507 Likewise, Zosimus briefly mentions that Phillip the Arab

(244 – 249) won victories over the Carpi across the Danube.508 The almost complete silence from the source material regarding these campaigns means that the role of any naval units involved is impossible to discern. As there is no evidence that any radical changes occurred to the army pre-250, the most likely scenario is that both Danube fleets continued in regular operation.

The situation on the Danube, however, would change drastically with the usurpation of

Decius in 249.509 Likely taking advantage of the ensuing governmental instability, the Goths would launch their first major invasion across the Danube. These events triggered a series of civil wars and subsequent barbarian invasions which marked the height of the 3rd century crisis.

505 Starr 1993, 140. For the inscription itself, see: CIL VIII, 7977. There are a few other inscriptions which have been broadly dated between the late 2nd/early 3rd centuries, see: CIL III, 4025, CIL VI, 41277, CIL XIV, 4468. 506 IScM II, 106. 507 Herodian, Hist. 7.2.9. 508 Zos., 1.20.1-2. 509 For Decius’ usurpation and reign, see: Zos., 1.21-23; Zonar., 12.20; Oros., 7.21.3; Eutr., 9.4; Aur. Vict., Caes. 29; Epit. de Caes., 29.3.

The Danube and the west coast of the Black Sea would be subject to almost continuous barbarian invasion throughout 250 – 270.510 The details of these campaigns are unfortunately poorly documented and muddled in the source material. As a result, it is difficult to construct any full account of individual invasions or the campaigns conducted to rebuff them. The fullest version of events comes from Zosimus whose confused account mentions huge numbers of barbarian tribes including Borani, Urgundi, Heruli, Carpi, Peuci, as well as more generic mentions of Goths and Scythians.511 Although a reliable chronology is lacking, the sources are unanimous that these invasions devastated most of the Danubian provinces as well as Asia

Minor, Greece, and even as far south as Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean.512

Traditionally, the success of these invasions has been used as proof that the Roman fleets had weakened throughout the 3rd century. For example, Starr states that the navy, in general, was “inadequate” and “swept away” by the incursions.513 Casson goes even further and bluntly states that the fleets “had gone soft.”514 Even the more sceptical Bounegru and

Zahariade argue that the Classis Moesica must have been wiped out by the year 267 as a Gothic invasion at that time was so successful that it ventured all the way into the Aegean.515

Essentially, these authors are all making the argument that if the Classis Moesica still existed or was maintained properly, it would have stopped the invaders. These arguments, however, stem from a massive overestimation of the size and role of both the Classis Pannonica and

Classis Moesica in the early Empire. There is no evidence of either fleet at any point in the

Empire’s history being tasked with preventing invading armies from crossing the Danube.

510 Although Zosimus provides the most complete account, numerous authors discuss the events in question. All these authors, however, suffer from many of the same problems see: Zos., 1.23-47; Zonar., 12.20-26; Jord., Get. 91-109; Oros., 7.21-23; Eutr., 9.4-9.11; Aur. Vict., Caes. 29-34; SHA, Valeriani Duo; SHA, Gallieni Duo; SHA, Tyr. Trig.; SHA, Divus Claudius. 511 Zos., 1.23-47. 512 For the Goths reaching Italy, see: Zos., 1.31, 37. For the Goths in the Mediterranean, see: Zos., 1.44, 46. 513 Starr 1993, 168. 514 Casson 1991, 213. 515 Bounegru and Zahariade 1996, 103.

According to Zosimus, the invasion of 269 – 270 alone was made up of 320,000 men in over

2,000 ships.516 Although these numbers are obviously grossly exaggerated, it clear from the source material that these were significant invasions involving massive numbers of men. Even if the actual numbers were less than one-tenth of the numbers cited, it is difficult to see how either Danube fleet could have been expected to ward off the invaders. It is more likely that both fleets were concerned with general patrolling, policing small-scale incursions, and logistics within their respective provinces.517 As a result, the seeming inability of the Danube fleets to stop a massive invasion does not reflect a weakening of Roman fleets on the Danube.

Rome did not lack the ability to orchestrate adequate naval defence in the 3rd century.

In fact, Roman sources relate numerous attempts at stopping the invasions by sea. For example, in a summary of the entire period, Ammianus mentions that the Romans lost many battles to the Goths fought on “land and sea.”518 More explicitly, the Historia Augusta relates that in both the invasions of 266 and 267 the Goths were defeated by the Romans in naval battles.519 Finally, the emperor Claudius Gothicus received his title after finally destroying the Goths in two battles fought at sea and one on land.520 Rather than a naval weakness or decline, a more balanced interpretation of the invasions can be put forward. When the first mass incursions of the Goths began in the 250s, the unstable government was completely unprepared to defend

516 Zos., 1.42.1-2. The Historia Augusta also gives the figure of 320,000 men but claims that they came in 2,000 ships. Similarly, Ammianus refers to 2,000 ships but does not give a manpower estimate, see: SHA, Divus Claudius 6.1-6; Amm. Marc., 31.5.15. 517 Due to nearly all information pertaining to these fleets coming from inscriptions, it is difficult to ascertain their main duties and tasks on a day-to-day basis. While defense was certainly a priority, this would have taken up only a small amount of any frontier units overall time, see: Elton 1996, 59. Perhaps it is not too surprising that most documentary evidence records the fleets engaged in non-combat activities such as military supply and building projects. For a catalogue of provincial fleet inscription and tile evidence, see: Rummel 2008, 28- 288. For speculations on the normal day-to-day operations of these fleets, see: Rankov 1995, 80-83; Starr 1993, 124-166; Rougé 1981, 130. 518 Amm. Marc., 31.5.17. 519 The naval battle of 266 was fought somewhere along the western coast of the Black Sea. The battle of 267 appears to have occurred somewhere near Byzantium. Due to the vague nature of the source material, the exact locations are unknown, see: SHA, Gallieni Duo 12.6, 13.6-10. 520 Zonar., 12.29; Pan. Lat., 6.2.2.; George Synkellos, Ekloge Chronographias AM 5763.

95 against them. As Kulikowski notes, these invasions set off a cyclical state of affairs in which the Empire was constantly beset by usurpation followed by opportune invasion and vice versa.521 In these early years, the naval forces of both Danubian fleets were almost certainly greatly affected and possibly wiped out. This disaster, however, must be seen in its proper context as most of the army stationed along the Danubian provinces also experienced the same disruption.522 However, as the Empire began to regain some semblance of stability, it once again managed to marshal both effective infantry and naval forces. The naval forces mentioned in the late 260s may have contained units from the Danube fleets, but like any invasion fleet, they would have been mostly new constructions. The Gothic invasions from 250 – 270 were indeed devastating events, but they were the product of political volatility and the subsequent weakening of the entire military structure. As the government and army gradually regained stability, the ability to maintain and create new combat fleets also returned.

Although the height of the catastrophe was over, the Danubian provinces could not just return to the status quo. Aurelian (270 – 275) would embark on further campaigns against the

Goths and decided to evacuate Dacia north of the Danube.523 It is likely that much of the military reorganisation which would affect the Danube was begun during Aurelian and his successor Probus’ (276 – 282) reign.524 Unfortunately, a dearth of source material relating to the Danube even during the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine means that little can be discerned from literary sources alone. Diocletian is credited with crushing both the Carpi and the Sarmatians across the Danube and is even stated to have built fortresses north of the

521 Kulikowski 2007, 28-30. 522 Reddé 1986, 616-617. 523 For Aurelians’ campaigns across the Danube, see: Zos., 1.48; Oros., 7.23.2; Eutr., 9.13; SHA, Divus Aurelianus 18.2-3, 22.2-3, 30.4. For his abandonment of Dacia, see: Eutr., 9.15; SHA, Divus Aurelianus 39.7. 524 The Historia Augusta records that Probus pacified many tribes along the Danube through a combination of campaigns and diplomacy, see: SHA, Prob. 16.1-3.

Danube.525 Likewise, Constantine is stated to have constructed a number fortresses, crossed the Danube multiple times for successful campaigns against Goths and Sarmatians, and even built a bridge spanning the river.526 Although naval units would have been necessary for any trans-Danubian campaign, the complete lack of details means little can be inferred other than a general resurgence of Roman military might.527

With the start of Ammianus’ history in 353, more can be said of specific naval operations. For example, during the reigns of Constantius, Julian, and Valentinian there are numerous examples of fleets being used for bridge building, transference of troops along the river, as well as general patrol and surveillance along the Danube.528 However, it is not until the catastrophic Gothic crossing of 376 that naval forces become the narrative’s focus. Due to the sudden growth in Hunnic power, a group of reportedly 200,000 Gothic refugees migrated to the north bank of the Danube and entreated the Romans for entry into the Empire.529

Although 200,000 is undoubtedly an exaggeration, Kulikowski argues that the number must have been in the tens of thousands at least.530 Presumably heavily outmanned and disadvantaged, the emperor Valens made an agreement in which the Gothic tribe of Theruingi would be permitted to settle in Thrace. Other Gothic tribes, most notably the Greuthingi, were ordered to remain north of the Danube.531 To enforce this agreement, the Romans agreed to

525 For Diocletians’ campaigns across the Danube, see: Amm. Marc., 28.1.15; Consularia Constantinopolitana, s.a. 295; Oros., 7.25.12. For the fortresses built across the Danube, see: Consularia Constantinopolitana, s.a. 295. 526 For Constantine’s numerous campaigns against the Goths, see: Zos., 2.21; Consularia Constantinopolitana, s.a. 332, 334; Zonar., 13.2; Oros., 7.28.29; Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5816; Origo Constantini Imperatoris, 21, 31-34; Euseb., Vit. Const. 4.5-6. For the substantial stone bridge, see: Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5820; Aur. Vict., Caes. 41.18; Epit. de Caes., 41.13; Chron. Pasch., 328. For a modern discussion on these campaigns, see: Kulikowski 2006, 347-376. 527 Liebeschuetz (2007, 102) goes as far as to claim that the Lower Danubian provinces experienced a “Golden Age” of peace and prosperity from the years 332-376. 528 Ammianus goes into far more depth than any other author during the period and provides numerous examples of naval operations along the Danube. For bridge building, see: Amm. Marc., 17.13.27, 27.5.2-4. For troop transfer, see: Amm. Marc., 21.9.2, 31.11.6. For patrolling and surveillance, see: 19.11.7-8, 31.5.3. 529 Eunap., fr. 42. 530 Kulikowski 2007, 130. 531 Amm. Marc., 31.4.1-13.

97 selectively ferry the Theruingi across the Danube, but their large numbers made the process difficult. As a result, Ammianus relates that the Goths were brought into Roman territory using boats, rafts, and even hollowed out tree trunks.532 At the same time, Roman soldiers would patrol the bank in ships to prevent the forbidden Goths from crossing.533

The whole situation ended in complete catastrophe. As the Theruingi were in a destitute state, they were severely mistreated by both Roman soldiers and merchants who had come to profit from the situation.534 Making matters worse, many of the Goths had managed to bribe

Roman officials into letting them keep their weapons for the crossing. The beleaguered yet armed Theruingi eventually revolted throwing the Roman soldiery into a panic.535 The

Greuthingi, noticing that the boats which usually patrolled were busy elsewhere, then illegally crossed en masse and joined their compatriots.536 In short, these events culminated in the disastrous Battle of Adrianople in which the emperor Valens himself was killed.537

These events were indeed a devastating blow to Roman power and have even been argued as the start of the fall of the Roman Empire.538 From a naval perspective, however, the events highlight the continued importance placed on Roman riverine flotillas. As Kulikowksi notes, the entire process from negotiations to crossing must have happened over several months.539 During this time, the Romans flotillas were able to successfully ferry one large group of barbarians across the river. At the same time, they were also able to effectively prevent the presumably destitute and desperate Greuthingi from also crossing. Eunapius even relates

532 Amm. Marc., 31.4.5. 533 Amm. Marc., 31.5.3. 534 Amm. Marc., 31.4.11, 31.5.1-2; Zos., 4.20.6. 535 Zos., 4.20.6; Oros., 7.33.9-15; Eunap, fr. 42. 536 Amm. Marc., 31.5.3. 537 For the Battle of Adrianople, see: Amm. Marc., 31.12-13; Zos., 4.23-24; Sozom., 6.40; Socrates, Hist. eccl. 4.38. 538 Both Potter (2014, 475) and Heather (2005, 145) argue that the disaster at Adrianople initiated the eventual collapse of the Roman government. 539 Kulikowski 2007, 129.

98 that a group of Goths (likely Greuthingi) did try an illegal crossing but were cut down in the process.540 Furthermore, Ammianus is explicit that the Greuthingi only attempted their mass crossing upon realising that the Roman boats had departed to deal with the Theruingi revolt.541

The mass Gothic crossing in 376 was the result of an unusually large amount of tribesmen combined with an undermanned Roman force who mishandled the situation. It was not the result of non-existent or ineffective naval forces.

The years following Adrianople are marked by disorder and confusion within the

Roman military. To replenish the soldiers lost at Adrianople, Valens’ successor Theodosius is said to have enrolled numerous barbarians from across the Danube into the army ranks.542

According to Zosimus, this only led to a further breakdown as the newly recruited barbarians simply let their kinsman come and go across the Danube as they pleased. It is difficult to say whether naval units even operated during this time as Zosimus presents a picture of almost complete lawlessness.543 Eventually, Theodosius gave up on crushing the Goths and agreed to an unfavourable compromise in which the Goths would remain in Thrace operating under their own laws.544 Although hardly a practical solution, Theodosius’ compromise did allow the

Romans to re-establish much needed control of the Danube.545 From the few surviving accounts, his primary instrument of enforcing this control was through naval strength.

In 386, a large contingent of Greuthingi under King Odotheus attempted another mass crossing of the Danube. In response, Promotus, the magister peditum of Thrace, confronted the

540 Eunap, fr. 42. 541 Amm. Marc., 31.5.3. 542 With the narrative of Ammianus ending in 378, the next few years are notably obscure. Despite its problems, the history of Zosimus must be relied upon, see: Zos., 4.30.1. 543 The pagan Zosimus is very hostile towards the Christian Theodosius. Despite the obvious bias, his account is by far the most in-depth and must be relied upon, see: Zos., 4.31.1-3. 544 For interpretations of Theodosius’ compromise, see: Mitchell 2015, 90-91; Kulikowski 2007, 150-153; Heather 2005, 186-190. 545 Both Kulikowski (2007, 152) and Heather (2005, 188) argue that Theodosius was left with little option other than compromise.

Goths with a considerable naval force.546 The sources present the battle as a confrontation between two substantial forces. For example, Claudian mentions that barbarians attempted their crossing in over 3,000 boats and canoes.547 Promotus, however, was supplied with an even larger flotilla and managed to line the Danube with galleys three deep for a distance of over 20 stades.548 The battle itself was an absolute massacre by the Romans, with Zosimus declaring that there was a “slaughter greater than in any previous naval battle.”549 Although Zosimus and

Claudian are both presenting exaggerated accounts, the Consularia Constantinopolitana and the chronicle of Marcellinus Comes both record that Theodosius entered Constantinople in triumph after the victory.550 After years of turmoil, it is probable that Theodosius would have been desperate to promote a sense of security for those living in fear of barbarian crossings.

This naval battle and its subsequent glorification indicate that this was done through riverine naval superiority.

This same focus on naval efforts can be observed in Vegetius’ De Re Militari.

According to Milner, the purpose of Vegetius’ work is to offer a “systematised remedy for alleged military failures.”551 Therefore, Vegetius spends much more time discussing what he sees as the failures of the army in the late 4th century. Notably, however, Vegetius does not devote the same amount of attention to naval matters. In fact, Vegetius ends his work by stating that there is no point in discussing the lusoriae which patrol the Danube daily, “as their increased use has discovered a more advanced science for them than ancient theory had to show.”552 Vegetius’ statements, so obviously at odds with a decline in riverine naval power,

546 Zosimus appears to reference this single battle on two separate occasions without realising that they are the same event, see: Zosimus 4.35.1, 4.38-39. Most sources simply attribute the victory to Theodosius and do not acknowledge Promotus, see: Consularia Constantinopolitana, s.a. 386.1-2; Chron. Marcell., s.a. 386.1. 547 Claud., Panegyricus de Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti 619-637. 548 Zos., 4.38-4.39. 549 Zos., 4.35.1, 4.38-39. 550 Consularia Constantinopolitana, s.a. 386.1-2; Chron. Marcell., s.a. 386.1. 551 Milner 1993, XVI. 552 Veg., Mil 4.46.

100 are often conveniently ignored in most modern analyses.553 Although, the date of De Re

Militari has been estimated anywhere between 383 – 450, its most likely date of composition is 388 – 391.554 If this date range is correct, it further supports the idea that there would have been a massive effort to restore the borders along the Danube through naval force following the chaos caused by the disaster at Adrianople.

The turbulent 5th century is arguably the most poorly documented period in all of

Roman history.555 Despite these limitations, the few sources in existence confirm that naval forces remained a priority for defending the Danube. In 412, the Codex Theodosianus records a mandate in which the Duces of Moesia Secunda and Scythia were ordered to distribute 100 and 125 lusoriae throughout their respective provinces.556 Due to these defensive measures, the early years of the 5th century seem to indicate a slight recovery from the chaos of the later

4th. This respite from hostilities, however, would end dramatically with the Hunnic invasions of the 440s, which would ultimately lead to the collapse of the Pannonian provinces. As Whitby relates, it appears that up until these attacks the Romans still managed to hold the Danube in force.557 For example, Attila’s first invasion in 441 only occurred after the East had deployed a massive naval contingent with the aim of reclaiming North Africa from the Vandals.558

According to Heather, the campaign would have not only drawn upon the soldiers of the interior but also from the limitanei stationed along the Danube frontier.559 The fact that Attila waited

553 Both MacGeorge (2002, 307) and Starr (1993, 198) argue that Vegetius uses the past tense when referring to the Roman “Navy” therefore proving it no longer existed. These statements have been taken out of context. In the passage in question, Vegetius is specifically lamenting that the large Italian fleets no longer exist, while later praising the success of the river fleets, see: Veg., Mil 4.31, 46. 554 Milner 1993, XLI. Tavares and Gonçalves (2015, 20) are more reserved and simply date it to the reign of Theodosius I (379 – 395). 555 Mitchell 2015, 109. 556 Cod. Theod., 7.17.1. 557 Whitby 2007, 138. 558 As a result of the Hunnic attacks, the fleet would never make it to Africa. Instead, it was recalled while in transit at Sicily, see: Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5941, 5942; Prosper, Epitoma Chronicon s.a. 441; Cassiod., Chronica 1236; Priscus, fr. 9.4. 559 Heather 2005, 304.

101 to invade until after the campaign had departed suggests that the Romans still managed to exert control over the river. This observation is supported by a Theodosian Novel from 443 which orders the Duces along the Danube to repair damaged fortifications while also signalling out the repair and construction of the lusoriae attached to them.560 As late as the 440s the Romans were clearly still attempting to defend the Danube from invasion through the use of warships.

Despite the Roman’s defence efforts, the Hunnic invasions had lasting effects upon the

Danubian provinces. In a second invasion in 447, the historian Priscus claims that the Huns effectively managed to gain control of the Pannonian provinces all the way to the river Sava.561

Even after the Huns were effectively ousted and moved west, it appears that these provinces were never integrated back into the Empire. For example, Eugippius refers vaguely to forces still operating at Faviana (Mautern) in the 450s, an area which the Notitia Dignitatum mentions as a former legionary base with a fleet detachment.562 Whether these forces managed to retain any naval capabilities or even if they can still be considered ‘Roman’ by the 450s is unknown.563 Regardless, in the 440s – 450s the provinces of the entire Upper Danube appear to have been lost and whatever remaining naval units along with them.564 However, with the westward departure of the Huns, the provinces of the Lower Danube were given a chance to consolidate and rebuild. As a result, the eastern half of the Empire would retain roughly the same Danubian borders until its collapse in the early 7th century. For example, as late as the

580s, Menander Protector records Byzantine naval units controlling the Danube as far west as

Singidunum (Belgrade).565

560 Nov. Theod., 24.1. 561 Priscus, fr. 11.1. 562 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV.41; Eugippius, Vita Sancti Severini 4.1-4. Groh and Sedlmayer (2015, 501-502) note that the site appears to show limited activity from the 450s with a total abandonment by the late 5th century. 563 Barkóczi (1980, 120) notes that the Upper Danubian provinces were still acknowledged by the Romans even after Attila’s death, yet this appears to have been largely symbolic. 564 For the lasting damage caused by the Huns along the Danube, see: Mosser 2015, 85; Poulter 2007a, 39; Poulter 2007b, 69-71; Whitby 2007, 138; Von Bulow 2007, 466; Christie 2007, 553. 565 Menander Protector, fr. 25.1.

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The literary sources relating to the Danube from the 3rd – 5th centuries do not reflect a weakening or neglect of naval forces. In the second half of the 3rd century, the Classis

Pannonica and Classis Moesica were put under excessive strain and may have been disbanded.

This strain, however, was the same as affected all of the army in the region and should not be seen as a sign of naval neglect. Furthermore, as soon as the Empire managed to gain some semblance of stability, fleets are once again recorded as being utilised as an agent of defence.

The literary sources do not relate in detail the trans-Danubian campaigns of the Tetrarchy or

Constantine, but the mere fact that they occurred indicates naval support. Following the disaster at Adrianople, there is direct evidence of Roman officials trying to restore control of the

Danube, primarily through naval flotillas. These fleets were continually maintained and rebuilt until the Hunnic invasions caused the collapse of the beleaguered provinces of the Upper

Danube. Meanwhile, the Lower Danube would remain an essential part of the frontier until well after the collapse of the West and continued to be serviced by fleets.

4.3 The Notitia Dignitatum

Although literary sources are explicit that riverine naval units existed, they do not give any information on how they were organised. As such, it is once again necessary to turn to the evidence presented within the Notitia Dignitatum. The Notitia lists 14 positions of Praefectus

Classis at 16 locations across the entirety of the Danube.566 The reason for the discrepancy between title and location is that two of the prefects appear to have more than one base of command. For example, in Pannonia Prima the Notitia lists the title of Praefectus classis

Histricae, Arrunto siue Uindomanae, indicating that the prefect was in command of the fleets

566 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.50, 51, 52, 55, 56, XXXIII.58, XXXIV.28, 42, 43; Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.35, XLI.38, 39, XLII. 42, 43.

103 at both Carnuntum and Vindobona.567 The classes are spread out over eight provinces and are divided between the command of six separate Duces. The discrepancy between provinces and

Duces is due to the Dux Pannoniae Primae and the Dux Pannoniae Secundae also controlling the military units of Noricum Ripense and Savia respectively.568 The fleets are heavily weighted in certain areas. For example, the Dux Pannoniae Primae and Dux Pannoniae

Secundae are listed as comprising 10 fleets between them, whereas the Dux Moesiae Secundae is notably left without a single fleet.569 Similarly, the Diocletianic provinces of Valeria and

Scythia are also seemingly undermanned with only a single fleet each.570 Finally, Moesia Prima and Dacia Ripensis, the province formed on the south bank of the Danube following Aurelian’s withdrawal from Dacia, are each listed as having two fleets.571 Most fleets are located directly on the river itself with a few units instead being located on the Sava and Drava tributaries.

Notably, the title Praefectus Classis Histricae is used at six locations along the river.572

In Starr’s proposed system of large regionally dominant fleets of the early Empire, it is easy to understand how the Classis Histrica may be seen as the probable remnants of the once ‘great’

Classis Pannonica and Classis Moesica.573 Upon close review, however, there is no apparent connection between the Classis Histrica and the fleets of the early Empire. This is because the

Classis Histrica titles are spread out throughout five provinces, from Pannonia Prima to Dacia

Ripensis. There is no single prefect for these fleets and no indication that they are part of an

567 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV.28. 568 For the Dux Pannoniae Primae, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV. For the Dux Pannoniae Secundae, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII. 569 For the fleets under the command of the Dux Pannoniae Primae, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV.28, 42, 43. For the fleets under the command of the Dux Pannoniae Secundae, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.50, 51, 52, 55, 56. 570 For the fleet stationed in Valeria, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIII.58. For the fleet stationed in Scythia, see: Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.35. 571 For the fleets of Moesia Prima, see: Not. Dign. Or., XLI.38, 39. For the fleets of Dacia Ripensis, see: Not. Dign. Or., XLII.42, 43. 572 For the units labelled Classis Histrica, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.52, XXXIII.58, XXXIV.28; Not. Dign. Or., XLI.38, XLII.42. 573 Bounegru and Zahariade (1996, 25) claim that the Classis Histrica was formed from the remnants of the Classis Moesica. None of the fleets with the name Classis Histrica, however, are stationed anywhere near the earlier fleet’s former province of Moesia Inferior.

104 overarching system. Instead, all of the prefects listed are independent of one another and answering to the associated Dux of their province. Finally, there are other fleets present in most of these provinces which have their own prefects entirely separate from those using the name

Classis Histrica.574 These Danube fleets clearly had little to do with one another other and should not be viewed as the successors to the Danube fleets of the early Empire. Rather than a dominant fleet prefect with control in many areas, it is much more probable that there were many locations which merely used the generic term ‘Danube fleet’.

The most striking feature of fleet distribution as per the Notitia is the lack of fleets for nearly the entirety of the Lower Danube. It is hard to believe that such a long stretch of riverine frontier could function without any naval support whatsoever. This is even more striking considering that most of the barbarian invasions of the 3rd and 4th centuries occurred around the provinces of Moesia Secunda and Scythia.575 The Notitia lists only a single fleet in either province at a location called Inplateypegiis.576 According to McAndrew, this uncertain location should be identified with Aegyssus near the mouth of the Danube.577 The name Inplateypegiis itself is troubling as it is not otherwise mentioned in any other source material. Zahariade speculates that the name likely comes from the Greek word πλατυπήγια, a type of flat-bottomed boat frequently used on the Nile.578 Flat bottomed boats are hardly thought of as effective combat ships and instead, imply a logistical role. Although impossible to substantiate with current available evidence, Zahariade’s theory suggests that the only fleet located on the Lower

Danube may have had no defensive abilities at all. Therefore, according to the traditional interpretation of the Notitia, there was not a single combat fleet stationed on the Lower Danube.

574 For example, Dacia Ripensis has a listing for a Praefectus classis Histrica stationed at Egeta, but also has a Praefectus classis Ratiarensis stationed at Ratiaria, see: Not. Dign. Or., XLII.42, 43. 575 The Gothic invasions of the 3rd century and the Gothic crossing of 376 both heavily impacted the Lower Danube, see: Kulikowski 2007, 18-23, 133-143. 576 Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.35. 577 McAndrew 2015a, 27, 31. 578 Zahariade 2009a, 353.

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The Notitia, however, is explicitly contradicted by the aforementioned Codex

Theodosianus decree of 412, which orders that 100 lusoriae be assigned to the Dux Moesia

Secundae and another 125 lusoriae to the Dux Sythiae.579 Either the Notitia is outright incorrect or Roman naval forces were simply not confined by the term classis. McAndrew’s “milites hypothesis” has some merit and offers a tantalising solution to this problem. For example, stationed at five forts of Pannonia Prima there are units referred to as milites liburnarii.580

Similar to the situation along the Rhine, it is impossible to state whether these ‘liburnian soldiers’ operated the same type of warships as those of the 1st – 3rd century. Was there a difference in ship type between those units manning liburnae and those operating lusoriae?

Due to the general usage of both terms, this is unclear with present evidence. It is certain, however, that these were all units of warships.581 Notably, these five naval units all fall under the jurisdiction of the Dux Pannoniae Primae who is separately listed as commanding five classes.582 As a result, this Dux alone commanded at least 10 naval units. Also of interest is that the fort of Carnuntum is listed as having both a classis as well as a separate unit of milites liburnarii.583 Does this suggest the classis acted in a logistical role while the milites liburnarii acted in a defensive one?584 Unfortunately, the Notitia can give no concrete answers, but the findings do suggest a much larger naval element in Pannonia Prima than is currently recognised.

579 Cod. Theod., 7.17.1. 580 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV.26, 27, 37, 40, 41. 581 As Charles (2005, 287) notes, the term liburna appears to have been very extremely confused in late antiquity. Despite these obvious naval affinities, most scholars have tended to ignore or downplay these units. For example, Heather (2005, 409) refers to them as “river police”. Höckmann (1986, 410-413) is among the few scholars to treat the listings as legitimate military units. 582 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV.28, 42, 43. 583 For the classis, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV.28. For the milites liburnarii command, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV.26. 584 McAndrew (2015b, 51-63) surmises that the classis, barcarii, and milites titles in the Notitia all represent specialized units which had certain task and duties. For McAdnrew, classis commands are primarily logistical, whereas milites commands handled the patrols mentioned in the source material. While a possible deduction, it must be noted that much of his theory is rooted in a modern military framework.

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According to the Notitia, there were 27 other milites units located along the Danube, many of which undoubtedly contained at least a naval element. In Moesia Prima and Dacia

Ripensis, there were reportedly four units of milites exploratores stationed along the river.585

The description of naval scouts parallels with Vegetius’ statements that military vessels frequently patrolled the waters of the Danube looking for potential barbarian crossings.586 Also, the seemingly undermanned provinces of Scythia and Moesia Secunda both had individual units of milites nauclarii, which undoubtedly refers to some form of naval soldier.587 Finally,

Moesia Secunda lists the position of a Praefectus navium amnicarum et militum ibidem deputatorum.588 No base for this position is given, but it is tempting to link the position to the

Codex Theodosianus law of 412. Could this position have been responsible for the distribution of the 100 lusoriae across Moesia Secunda? Due to the limitations of the Notitia, it cannot be confirmed what role these units played, if they interacted with one another, or why some provinces have specific unit attachments while others do not. The results are, however, suggestive. Combining these seven units with those of the five milites liburnarii, it can be confidently stated that at least 12 “milites commands” contained some form of naval element entirely separate from those of the classes.

However, McAndrew’s proposition of labelling every single milites command as a naval unit has little backing evidence and seems rather ambitious. Most references to milites commands in the Notitia do not imply that they included a naval element and seem to have been identified only because they are located near the river. For example, references to units such as the milites Scythici or the milites primi Constantiani hold no indication of being

585 For Moesia Prima, see: Not. Dign. Or., XLI.34, 35, 37. For Dacia Ripensis, see: Not. Dign. Or., XLII.29. 586 Veg., Mil 4.46. 587 For Scythia, see: Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.20. For Moesia Secunda, see: Not. Dign. Or., XL.28. Whately (2015, 12) identifies these nauclarii units as an abbreviated form of nauicularius, “belonging to the navy”. From this evidence he notes that they may be connected to the above legislation in the Codex Theodosianus. 588 Not. Dign. Or., XL.36.

107 inherently naval.589 Instead, it can be supposed that the traditional view of general infantry units should be preferred. Still, many of these units are the only troops listed in the Notitia as manning these river-based fortresses. As such it is likely that even these ‘infantry’ units also maintained a few lusoriae for general surveillance and reconnaissance. While many examples of milites commands do imply strictly naval units and these have been overlooked, this implication is not apparent in every single example of a unit labelled milites.

There is also further evidence within the Notitia which suggests the existence of naval units. Similar to that of the Principate, the possibility of late legions directly maintaining naval forces has been virtually ignored. In Moesia Secunda and Scythia, there are four units each listed as being under the control of a Praefectus ripae legionis.590 While the term ‘prefect of a river bank’ does not necessarily imply naval commands, the results are suggestive when comparing related titles. At Novae in Moesia Secunda, there is a listing of a prefect of the Legio

I Italica.591 As Novae was the headquarters of this legion in the Principate, this is hardly notable.592 Surprisingly, however, the Notitia also lists a separate prefect of the Legio I Italica for the river bank.593 Why bother to have a detached prefect of the same legion limited to the river bank? The most obvious conclusion is that there was a prefect primarily in charge of the infantry, whereas the other oversaw the naval element. This idea is further supported by the stamped tiles depicting warships made by the Legio I Italica at Novae during the Principate.594

Therefore, it is probable that the Legio I Italica maintained a fleet detachment in both the

Principate and the late Roman period at Novae. There are similar listings for Noviodunum in

Scythia, the former headquarters of the Classis Moesica. The Notitia lists no successor classis

589 Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.22, 25. 590 For Moesia Secunda, see: Not. Dign. Or., XL.31, 32, 34, 35. For Scythia, see: Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.30, 31, 33, 34. 591 Not. Dign. Or., XL.30. 592 Sarnowski 2012, 18. 593 Not. Dign. Or., XL.31. 594 Sarnowski and Trynkowski 1986, 536-540.

108 as operating from Noviodunum. It does, however, list both a prefect and a prefect of the river bank of the Legio I Iovia garrisoned at the fort.595 Furthermore, Ammianus mentions that

Valens chose Noviodunum as the crossing point for the army during his third campaign against the Goths in 369.596 Taking all of this information together, Noviodunum likely maintained a naval contingent in the 4th century. Rather than a classis akin to those of the early Empire, it appears that this naval unit was maintained by the Legio I Iovia which had its own prefect.597

From the above analysis, it can be confidently concluded that the Notitia provides ample evidence that naval units were posted along the length of the Danube. However, like elsewhere in the Empire, the date and origin of these Danubian units are not apparent from the surviving evidence. An examination of the unit names listed displays a framework which developed and changed over the years. For example, the Notitia still lists some legions from the early Empire, such as the Legio I Italica and the Legio XI Claudia, as operating along the

Danube.598 However, these forces are supplemented by multiple legions with the epithets of

Iovia and Herculia. Undoubtedly, these units were created and named after the epithets of emperors Diocletian and Maximian at some point after 285.599 Furthermore, many of the milites, cavalry, and auxiliary units bear titles with numerous forms of the name ‘Constantine’.

These units could theoretically derive their name from any point during the entirety of the

Constantinian dynasty.600 There is even evidence of units being changed as late as the 380s or

390s, as the Cuneus Equitum Arcadum stationed at Halmyris is likely named after the emperor

Arcadius (383 – 408).601 Due to these amendments and changes, it is difficult to ascertain the

595 Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.32, 33. 596 Amm. Marc., 27.5.6-9. For the use of pontoon bridges during military campaigns, see: Cass. Dio., 71.3.1. 597 Unfortunately, this theory cannot yet be tested archaeologically. Although Bounegru and Zahariade (1996, 10-15) claim that Noviodunum has probable port facilities, they do not support this claim with any evidence. The site was excavated from 2000-2010, but only two brief preliminary reports have been published thus far, see: Lockyear et al. 2005, 121-158; Lockyear et al. 2008, 45-48. 598 Both legions are stationed throughout Moesia Secunda, see: Not. Dign. Or., XL.30-35. 599 For legions in Scythia given these epithets, see: Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.29-35. 600 Whately 2015, 14. 601 Zahariade 2009a, 347-353.

109 date of establishment or when changes were made to individual units prior to the information being recorded in the Notitia.

Regarding naval units, many of the same conclusions must be made. Two of the fleets under the Dux Pannoniae Secundae bear the title Flavia, which undoubtedly refers to the

Constantinian dynasty.602 This would suggest that the fleet was either created during the dynasty or was at least renamed during it. Reddé argues that the Classis Prima Pannonica and the Classis Secunda Pannonica listed in the Notitia are likely the remnants of the Classis

Pannonica of the Principate.603 The names of these squadrons only indicate that they were created after the division of the Pannonias in the late 3rd century, and do not necessarily imply any relationship with the Classis Pannonica.604 Furthermore, the origins of these fleets are impossible to identify as the Notitia indicates that the units have been transferred from their original locations. According to the Notitia, the Classis Prima Pannonica was stationed at

Servitium. The city of Servitium, however, was not located within Pannonia Prima. It was instead situated within the province of Savia which was under the command of the Dux

Pannoniae Secundae.605 Accordingly, this implies that there was once a late fleet stationed somewhere in Pannonia Prima, but that at some unknown time in the 4th century, this fleet was transferred to its final location of Servititum. Similarly, the full listing for the prefect of the

Classis Secunda Pannonica is praefectus classis Aegetensium siue secundae

Pannonica,…...nunc Sisciae.606 Seemingly, this would imply that a fleet was initially located in Pannonia Secunda and was then transferred to Aegeta in Dacia Ripensis. The fleet in Aegeta was then presumably transferred to its final location of Siscia, also in Savia, the location

602 Reddé 1986, 633. 603 Reddé 1986, 633. 604 For the division of the provincial administration in the late 3rd/early 4th century, see: Kelly 2006, 184-187; Jones 1954, 21-29. Taurunum, the assumed base of the Classis Pannonica during the Principate, is not listed as a fleet base in the Notitia, see: Radman-Livaja 2012, 179-180. 605 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.55. 606 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.56.

110 recorded in the Notitia. Due to the convoluted nature of the Notitia, the configuration of earlier

3rd and 4th century naval units cannot adequately be deciphered. Although the Notitia certainly suggests that these units existed, they were seemingly subject to transfers and reorganisations throughout the 4th century.607 As a result, it is problematic to project the information in the

Notitia backwards as it necessitates making too many assumptions.

Overall, there is much more direct evidence for naval units in the Notitia Dignitatum on the Danube than has generally been recognised in scholarship. The current understanding has been limited by using the term classis as a synonym for ‘navy’ while lumping in all other command titles with that of the infantry. The “milites hypothesis” offers an intriguing solution for many of the gaps in knowledge as regards the frontier defence. Although 12 milites commands on the Danube can be confirmed as primarily naval units, all others are merely speculative. It is also likely that the prefects of the legions of the river bank listed in the Notitia were also involved in naval activities. Apart from the title itself, this proposition is strengthened by the evidence that legions maintained naval detachments even in the Principate. Like any study of the Notitia, many of the findings and arguments are largely based on incomplete evidence. This is especially true for any theory regarding the organisation of naval units in the earlier 4th century. The only way to uncover a more accurate picture of the late navies of the

Danube is to incorporate archaeological evidence.

607 Radman-Livaja 2012, 180.

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4.4 Archaeological Overview

Upper Danube and Danube Bend

This archaeological overview will divide the Danube into its Upper and Lower provinces. For the sake of convenience, the riverine provinces from Raetia Secunda until

Pannonia Secunda will be considered the ‘Upper’, whereas those from Moesia Prima until

Scythia will be grouped as the ‘Lower’. As the Notitia Dignitatum also lists a few fleets on western tributaries, these will be discussed separately. Like the Rhine, an archaeological overview of the Danube from a naval perspective presents with some challenges. While most of the sites mentioned in the Notitia have been positively identified, they have not all been subject to the same level of archaeological excavation.608 For example, while fortresses and parts of cities may be well studied, harbour works are often ignored. Furthermore, many of the sites discussed lie underneath modern cities, making excavation difficult.609 As a result, this analysis will focus on individual well-excavated sites and observable trends within the

Danubian provinces.

Beginning with the Upper Danube, it can be said that the limes of the Raetian Danube are very little understood. Both Ammianus and Zosimus state that Julian assembled his fleet for his war with Constantius II along the Raetian Danube.610 The Notitia, however, lists no fleets along these provinces other than the aforementioned numerus barcariorum stationed at

Lake Constance.611 Archaeology has yet to solve this discrepancy, although a few general observations can be made. At some point around 260, during the height of 3rd century turmoil,

608 The only fleet along the Danube with an unidentified location is that of the Classis Secunda Flavia stationed at a location called Graio, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.51. For a speculative placing of Graio, see: McAndrew 2015a, 27, 31. 609 For the opportunities as well as the challenges of underwater archaeology along the Danube, see: Karović 1996, 265-268. 610 Zos., 3.10.2; Amm. Marc., 21.9.2; Lib., Orationes 18.111. 611 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXV.32.

112 the trans-Danubian fortresses of Raetia appear to have been abandoned forever.612 With the stability during the tetrarchy, the limes were restored, albeit along a new frontier. This new line retreated to the Upper Danube and its tributary the river Iller. These new Iller-Danube limes were marked by a vast building project involving the reconstruction of destroyed fortresses as well as the construction of new sites, most of which date to the Tetrarchy.613 As the limes were now directly on the Danube, it can be expected that naval units would have played a significant role. For example, Mackensen assumes that boats patrolling and shipping supplies to the army would have been a crucial element of military operations.614 Unfortunately, as there have been no excavations focusing on late ports in the area, these arguments cannot be substantiated with current evidence.

While Noricum appears to have fared much better than its surrounding provinces during the 3rd century, it was still subject to a massive reorganisation during the tetrarchy. By 304 –

305 at the latest, Noricum had been split into two with the newly created Noricum Ripensis bordering the Danube.615 Whereas the early Empire concentrated military forces at strategic locations, the later period shows evidence of military activity along the length of the limes.616

The Notitia lists three fleet bases at Lauriacum, Arelape, and Comagena.617 Of these,

Lauriacum (Lorch) is the best excavated and understood. Sitting directly at the confluence of the rivers Enns and Danube, Lauriacum seems to have owed its very existence to operations along the river. According to Alföldy, although it has never been properly investigated, the site has a confirmed Roman harbour north of the fortress.618 The fortress appears to have been destroyed around the year 270 but was totally rebuilt shortly after in the reigns of Probus or

612 Mackensen 1999, 200-201; Johnson 1983, 188-189. 613 Mackensen 1999, 221. 614 Mackensen 1999, 222. 615 Flynt 2005, 26; Alföldy 1974, 199. 616 Alföldy 1974, 202-203. 617 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV.42, 43. 618 Alföldy 1974, 167.

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Diocletian.619 From this point until the late 4th century, the fortress appears to have been well maintained with restoration works visible from the reign of Constantine until Valentinian.620

Ammianus reinforces these findings by relating that Gratian sailed with an armed force from

Lauriacum in attempt to aid Valens before the Battle of Adrianople.621 It is only in the late 4th century in which the site begins to show signs of military decline as the vicus population moved within the walls. Even still, the site shows continuous occupation until being destroyed in the mid-5th century.622

Moving downstream, the Pannonian provinces provide more direct evidence of the functioning and movements of naval units. In Pannonia Prima, the Notitia lists a Praefectus classis Histricae, Arrunto siue Uindomanae who appears to have overseen both the fleet at

Carnuntum and Vindobona.623 Modern excavations have been carried out at both sites and confirm that Carnuntum and Vindobona remained heavily populated until the mid-4th century.624 However, At some point around 350, both sites were devastated by a particularly powerful earthquake.625 Whereas Vindobona was able to largely recover and shows continuous habitation until roughly 440, much of Carnuntum appears to have never been rebuilt and remained partially ruined.626 This is supported by Ammianus who states that Carnuntum was already in ruins during the Quadian War of Valentinian (374 – 375).627 Taking this into consideration, it is likely that both Carnuntum and Vindobona had fleets at some point in the

4th century. After the mid-century earthquake and decline of Carnuntum, these commands were

619 Flynt 2005, 65; Alföldy 1974, 186. 620 Flynt 2005, 65. 621 Amm. Marc., 31.10.20, 31.11.6. 622 Flynt 2005, 65; Johnson 1983, 178; Alföldy 1974, 216. 623 Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIV.28. 624 For Carnuntum, see: Decker et al. 2006, 483. For Vindobona, see: Mosser 2015, 83-85; Kronberger and Mosser 2002, 574 625 Mosser 2015, 82; Găzdac et al. 2015, 75; Decker et al. 2006, 483. 626 The abandonment of Vindobona appears to coincide directly with the Hunnic invasions of the 5th century, see: Mosser 2015, 76, 87. Although there is later building during the reigns of Constantius II and Valentinian, it appears that large sections of Carnuntum remained in ruins, see: Decker et al. 2006, 483-486. 627 Amm. Marc., 30.5.2.

114 simply combined under the command of one prefect. Although excavations have revealed that

Carnuntum remained inhabited in the 5th century, its reduced importance meant that it no longer warranted having a prefect of its own. Early 20th century discoveries of Roman harbours at both sites would seem to support this argument.628

While only specified as having a single fleet base in the Notitia, the province of Valeria shows by far the most explicit evidence of late naval activity. This is because the military defences of Valeria are characterised by not only a large-scale fortification network on the

Roman bank but also an unusually high number of counter fortifications on the barbarian shores, the Ripa Sarmatica.629 Similar to those found on the Rhine, many of these forts were designed as three-sided structures, with two sides running parallel into the water and the fourth open to the river.630 Unlike the Rhine though, there has been a greater tendency to associate these structures with the military campaigns of a single emperor. This has led to a greater variation in the proposed construction dates and function for the counterfortifications in

Valeria. For example, Mócsy dates all structures, both the fortified harbours and more traditional four-sided fortresses, to the reign of Diocletian as part of an attempt to extend control across the Danube.631 Johnson supports Mócsy’s theory but also suggests a widespread reconstruction during the reign of Valentinian as part of a programme to monitor barbarian crossings.632 The majority of scholarship, however, treats these fortified harbours as

628 Mosser (2015, 82-83) supports this theory of a merged fleet following Carnuntum’s decay. For the 20th century identification of a Roman port at Vindobona, see: Mosser 2015, 83. For similar discoveries at Carnuntum, see: Reddé 1986, 301. 629 Bertók 1997, 165. 630 For overviews of these fortifications, see: Reddé 1986, 364-369; Lander 1984, 284-289; Mócsy 1974, 269- 270. For descriptions of individual structures, see: Nagy 2003, 169-170; Mráv 2003b, 171-173; Gaál 2003, 173- 176. 631 Mócsy 1974, 269. 632 Johnson (1983, 192-195) sees the rebuilding of these fortresses as a part of the widespread proliferation of burgi/watchtowers constructed in the Valentinian period.

115 contemporaneous with those along the Rhine, ascribing a foundation date between the 350s –

370s.633

The major issue with these accounts is the assumption that every structure was either made as part of a system by a single emperor or for a specific function. The archaeological evidence itself does not support this supposition. Instead, the evidence reveals that there are multiple construction and repair programmes which occurred over the 4th century. For example, the Consularia Constantinopolitana records that Diocletian built fortresses in Sarmatia contra

Acinco et Bononia.634 Largely from this reference alone, Mócsy dates all associated fortifications as part of a Diocletianic system.635 While some sites such as those at Begeč

(contra Bononiam) and Dunafalva (contra Florentiam) do show evidence of late 3rd century/early 4th century construction, this does not apply to the majority.636 Other sites like that of Március (contra Aquincum/contra Tautantum) are better dated to the reign of

Constantine or the mid-4th century.637 Most of the sites, almost identical to the fortified harbours along the Rhine, can instead be dated to the reigns of Constantius II and

Valentinian.638 Rather than a single widespread building programme, the archaeological evidence reveals that a number of counter fortresses were built and repaired consistently from the reigns of Diocletian to Valentinian.

633 Oldenstein 2009, 322-326; Scharf 2005, 39-41; Lander 1984, 284-289; Soproni 1980, 236-237. 634 Consularia Constantinopolitana, s.a. 294. 635 Mócsy 1974, 269. 636 A series of fortresses appear to have existed at the site of Florentia (originally called Lugio) from the 1st through the 5th centuries. It is only in the late 3rd/early 4th century, however, in which the bridgehead of Contra Florentiam was constructed, see: Gábor 2003a, 130-132; Gábor 2003b, 179-180; Fülep 1980, 42. Both sites are listed as having garrisons in the Notitia with Florentia being listed as the base of a legionary detachment and a classis, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXIII.22, 44, 53, 58. Currently, archeological evidence at Begeč can only suggest a general 4th century date of construction. If the identification with this fortress is correct, however, it can be identified with listing in the Consularia Constantinopolitana of 294, see: Vasić 2003, 143-144. This fortress is also listed in the Notitia as the base of a legionary detachment and of an auxiliary unit, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.41, 48. 637 A more traditional four-sided structure, the ancient name for this fortification is uncertain and has been identified with either contra Aquincum or contra Tautantum depending on the argument, see: Németh 2003, 201-203. 638 Oldenstein 2009, 322-326; Scharf 2005, 39-41; Lander 1984, 288.

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Due to these arguments that focus on individual building programmes, the purpose of these structures has been pigeonholed to correspond with the dates of particular campaigns or military actions. Instead, it is probable that these forts were multi-purpose structures which were used in various ways depending on time and location. For example, the earliest examples from the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine were very likely constructed as concerted attempts to extend Roman power across the Danube.639 This supposition is further supported by a widespread series of linear mounds and ditches which were built in Sarmatia at some point in the early 4th century.640 Although it is doubtful that the Romans ever maintained direct control over Sarmatia, these counter fortresses were likely sustained as a way of maintaining influence across the Danube. For example, as late as the reign of Valentinian I, the Romans were still making attempts to build fortresses deep in barbarian territory.641 The Notitia still lists several of these counterforts as having garrisons varying between auxiliaries, legionary detachments, and cavalry.642 There is no hint of any overriding function between the forts listed. Instead, they were likely part of an effort by Diocletian and his successors of striking directly into barbarian territory.643

639 Mócsy 1974, 267-269. 640 Colloquially known as the Devil’s Dykes, these earthworks have been variously interpreted as either direct Roman defences or as a means of protecting allied Gothic tribes. Regardless of exact function, they clearly reveal a direct Roman involvement across the Danube, see: Bertók 1997, 167; Soproni 1980, 222; Mócsy 1974, 271-272. 641 Ammianus relates that one of the triggers for the Quadian war of the 370s was Valentinian’s attempt to build a fortress deep within Quadian territory, see: Amm. Marc., 29.6.2. An unfinished Roman fortress dating to the 370s has been excavated and identified with Ammianus’ account, see: Mráv 2006, 773-776; Mráv 2003a, 198-201. 642 For these counter fortresses and their garrisons, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.41, 48, XXXIII, 44, 48, 55, 65. 643 From Diocletian until Valentinian I there were a series of offensive (largely successful) wars launched against the Goths, Sarmatians, and Quadi across the Danube. For Diocletians’ campaigns across the Danube, see: Amm. Marc., 28.1.15; Consularia Constantinopolitana, s.a. 295; Oros., 7.25.12. For those of Constantine, see: Zos., 2.21; Consularia Constantinopolitana, s.a. 332, 334; Zonar., 13.2; Oros., 7.28.29; Theophanes, Chronographia AM 5816; Origo Constantini Imperatoris, 21, 31-34; Euseb., Vit. Const. 4.5-6. For those of Constantius II, Valentinian I, and Valens, Amminaus provides by far the most complete narrative. For Constantius II, see: Amm. Marc., 17, 19. For Valens, see: Amm. Marc., 27. For Valentinian I, see: Amm. Marc., 29-30.

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This explanation, however, cannot apply to all fortresses lying in Barbaricum. Many of the smaller and later landing places (burgi), do not lie directly across from Roman fortresses.644

Furthermore, there are even examples of these fortified harbours lying on the Roman side of the bank. For example, one such site at Szob is located north of the Danube, whereas its counterpart at Hideglelős-kereszt is one kilometre upstream and on the south bank.645 Why bother to build a fortified harbour on one’s own territory? Similar to Höckmann’s theory for identical structures along the Rhine, these smaller burgi likely acted as satellite fortlets housing soldiers from nearby headquarters.646 In this system, Roman garrisons could have expanded surveillance operations well beyond their immediate surroundings. The fortifications along both sides could also have functioned as a statement of Roman control along the Danube. The mid-late 4th century date of these constructions coincides with the general proliferation of burgi along the river, usually attributed to Valentinian I.647 As a result, Valentinian’s efforts to build many small closely spaced fortresses along the rivers were likely also concerned with naval patrol and reconnaissance.648 These ships would not have been maintained by a classis, but were instead probably stationed at major fortresses nearby or even at the burgi themselves. The multiple fortified landing places and counterforts along the Ripa Valeria were likely built at different times for a variety of reasons, but all of them indicate the continued importance of naval support along the river.

644Reddé 1986, 368; Lander 1984, 287. 645 Lander 1984, 287. 646 Höckmann 1986, 399-405. Alternatively, Reddé’s (1986, 368) theory of fortified patrol stations is also plausible. 647 For the proliferation of burgi construction during the reign of Valentinian I, see: Gabler 2003, 41; Visy 2003, 164-168; Lander 1984, 270-276; Johnson 1983, 192-195; Barkóczi 1980, 115; Mócsy 1974, 291-292. 648 Reddé 1986, 368; Höckmann 1986, 399-403.

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Tributaries of the Danube

Apart from the Danube itself, the Notitia lists several fleets stationed at major cities along the Drava and Sava tributaries.649 Beginning with the most westerly, the city of Siscia

(Sisak) grew increasingly large and influential during the late Roman period. The city was established as an imperial mint in the later 3rd century and would become the capital of the province of Savia after the administrative splitting of the Pannonias.650 Sitting at the confluence of the Kupa and Sava rivers, Siscia owed much of its importance to being a centre for trade and shipping.651 This has been confirmed directly as excavations have discovered the city’s Roman port. Over 200 piles, many still attached to their iron shoes, were uncovered from the river

Kupa.652 Apart from these port foundations, large amounts of Roman bricks, tegulae, and worked stones were unearthed.653 The assemblage of pottery and coins uncovered ranged mostly from the 1st – 4th centuries, with some earlier and later outliers.654 A sizeable Roman river barge, estimated at over 25 meters in length, was also discovered with radiocarbon dating giving a date range of 241 – 264.655

Most notably, this port complex also appears to have been a centre for metals manufacture. In particular, large amounts of finished and unfinished items, as well as metal by- products were discovered in layers with large numbers of 4th century coins.656 According to

Koscevic, most of these metal finds, items such as fibulae, buckles, and cavalry harness

649 These fleets are all listed under the command of the Dux Pannoniae Secundae, see: Not. Dign. Occ., XXXII.50, 51, 52, 55, 56. 650 For the later administrative changes which occurred in the Pannonias, see: Kovács 2003, 31-36; Lolić 2003, 134-135.The larger cities of Southern Pannonia all appear to have undergone a revival in the late 3rd and early 4th centuries characterised by extensive building programmes, see: Lolić and Wiewegh 2012, 219; Póczy, 1980, 244-245. In the case of Siscia, the city walls seem to have been a focus, see: Migotti 2012, 15-16. 651 Lolić 2003, 131. The river port is also attested epigraphically, see: CIL III, 11382. 652 Lolić and Wiewegh 2012, 215; Gaspari et al. 2006, 285. 653 Gaspari et al. 2006, 285. The remains of a Roman bridge have been also been investigated in the Sava, see: Lolić and Wiewegh 2012, 214-15; Póczy 1980, 268 654 Gaspari et al. (2006, 286) remarks that coins from the 4th century are the most common. 655 Gaspari et al. 2006, 286-287. 656 Koščević 2013, 4, 9, 36; Gaspari et al. 2006, 286.

119 pendants, seem to be associated with a military context.657 This heavily suggests that this area was the site of military workshops or production centres along the bank of the Kupa during the later period. The pottery assemblage also supports this argument. As pottery forms decline significantly from the mid-3rd century onwards, this suggests a specialisation in port activity.658

Taking all of this into consideration, it can confidently be said that all archaeological indications support the listing of a late naval base at Siscia. From the available evidence, this fleet would have been concerned with the manufacture and shipping of military equipment.

Lying roughly 15 kilometres from the Danube along the river Drava, the city of Mursa also seems to have owed its importance to riverine traffic.659 Excavations reveal that the city remained significant in the later period with major renovations and construction programmes continually carried out from Diocletian until the middle of the 4th century.660 Like most

Pannonian cities the site contracts in the 5th century, with an eventual loss of Roman control following the Hunnic invasions of the 440s.661 Unfortunately, the later Roman levels are quite disturbed as they lie directly under the modern city of Osijek.662 A shipwreck discovered in the

19th century confirms that the Romans used the Drava for shipping.663 Based on the location of this find a harbour location has been proposed, although it is yet to be properly investigated.

Furthermore, four pillars of a substantial Roman bridge have been discovered in the river

Drava.664 This bridge appears to have been constructed in either the 2nd or 3rd century but shows

657 Koščević 2013, 36. 658 Lolić and Wiewegh 2012, 215. 659 Lolić and Wiewegh 2012, 215; Filipović 2004, 160; Filipović and Sanader 2003, 161. 660 Knezović (2012, 234-245) remarks that building and reconstruction appears to end earlier in Mursa then nearby Siscia. A plausible deduction would be that the city never recovered after the civil war between Constantius and Magnentius. The Battle of Mursa occurred near the city in 351 and may be at least partially responsible for this seemingly early decline. For the civil war and battle, see: Zos., 2.42-54; Zonar., 13.8; Oros., 7.29.12; Eutr., 10.12. 661 Filipović 2004, 157; Filipović and Sanader 2003, 161. 662 Migotti 2012, 16; Lolić and Wiewegh 2012, 194. 663 Lolić and Wiewegh 2012, 215. 664 Lolić and Wiewegh 2012, 214-215; Knezović 2012, 235.

120 signs of repairs and reinforcement in the 4th century.665 Due to its confirmed late importance as a riverine centre, there is no reason to dispute the record of Mursa as a fleet base.

The city of Sirmium became one of the most important military and administrative centres of the later Roman Empire.666 The city itself was on the Sava roughly 26 kilometres from the confluence of the Danube at a major road junction.667 As the capital of Pannonia

Inferior, the military hub of Illyricum, and the site of an imperial palace, it is undeniable that both overland and maritime supply and communication were critical to its importance.

Excavations confirm that Sirmium was given walls in the 3rd century and reached its “golden period” in the 4th.668 The River Sava has also been subject to investigations which have revealed the supports of a substantial late bridge.669 In conjunction with this bridge, there were also a number of wooden supports and discoloured soil which were identified as having been a quay.

Most notably these structures directly connect with the fortification walls of the 4th/5th century.670 Considering the city’s status as a military centre and the direct evidence of a fortified harbour, the identification of Sirmium as a fleet base appears to be justified.

Lower Danube

The Lower Danube shows more evidence of wide-scale fortification and construction than any other area of the Roman frontier. According to Poulter, these building efforts are unique in that they can often be dated with an unusual degree of accuracy for late antiquity.671

For example, there are at least five known building dedications with the same inscription, pro futurum in aeternum rei publicae praesidium constituerunt.672 Remarkably, these inscriptions

665 Filipović 2004, 160. 666 Mirković 2004, 145; Póczy 1980, 267; Velkov 1977, 63. 667 Mirković 2004, 145. 668 Póczy 1980, 267; Mócsy 1974, 312-313. 669 Milošević 1999, 201. 670 Rummel 2008, 74; Milošević 1999, 201-202. 671 Poulter 2007a, 29. 672 For the inscriptions see, Zahariade 2009b, 1549; Poulter 2007a, 30.

121 are all datable between 295 – 305 and are distributed across the three provinces of Dacia

Ripensis, Moesia Secunda, and Scythia.673 This gives direct evidence of a tetrarchic building programme which was concerned with the entirety of the Lower Danube and not just select sites. While lacking such an inscription, Moesia Prima also displays late 3rd/4th attention along the frontier. For example, the Notitia lists a praefectus classis Stradensis et Germensis, stationed at the fortified city of Margum.674 On the opposite side of the Danube, the Notitia also lists a Praefectus militum at a counterfort aptly named Contra Margum.675 This counterfort has been positively identified and appears to have been constructed at some point in the 4th century. As Bugarski and Ivanišević point out, it appears that Margum gained a strategic military importance which it did not have in the early Empire.676 Elsewhere, at the auxiliary fort at Novae (Cesava), there are extant walls which lead into the water to form a fortified harbour like those in Pannonia.677 In the Notitia, Novae is the base of a unit of milites exploratores supporting the suggestion that these units were primarily naval.678

In Dacia Ripensis, the Notitia lists two fleets stationed at Aegeta and Ratiaria.679 At

Aegeta, there are stone walls connected to the late fortifications which lead directly into the

Danube. As Bounegru and Zahariade note, these structures appear to be the remains of a late fortified harbour.680 Ratiaria’s port facilities are less certain but have been suggested based upon known changes in the river's course since antiquity.681 These are not the only sites within the province, however, which would have had access to naval units. This is because two of the main cities of the province, Drobeta and Sucidava, were located on the north bank of the

673 Poulter 2007a, 30. 674 Not. Dign. Or., XLI.39. 675 Not. Dign. Or., XLI.33. 676 Bugarski and Ivanišević 2013, 467. 677 Gudea 2001, 62-64. Not to be confused with the legionary fort with the same name. 678 Not. Dign. Or., XLI.34. 679 Not. Dign. Or., XLII.42, 43. 680 Bounegru and Zahariade 1996, 85. 681 Luka (2014, 50) treats Ratiaria as a military fleet base already in the 2nd and 3rd centuries but does not provide any evidence for this assertion.

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Danube.682 The settlement at Drobeta has its origins as the bridgehead to Trajan’s famous bridge during his Dacian war.683 An extension wall ending in a fan-shaped tower can be observed leading from the fortifications going into the Danube. Bounegru and Zahariade have identified these walls with port facilities associated with the Classis Moesica.684 However, as

Rummel notes, these walls actually appear to form a part of the Diocletianic/Constantinian fortification and therefore should not be associated with the earlier fleet.685 Essentially, late naval activity has been used to reinforce assumptions about the Classis Moesica for which there is no evidence. The Notitia does not list the fortress as housing a fleet but instead cavalry and auxiliary units.686 Furthermore, on the opposite bank, the fort of Transdrobeta is listed as the base of a legionary detachment.687 With such a concentration of military units, it would appear that Drobeta grew in strategic importance in the later period. This notion is supported by excavations which have revealed that the interior architecture appears to have been substantially modified in the early 4th century, likely for the introduction of unspecified military units.688 Combining this evidence, it is undeniable that naval backing would have been a necessity. These ships simply must have been maintained by the units themselves rather than that of a classis.

The site of Sucidava is also best known as the site of a famous bridge, being the location of Constantine’s bridge across the Danube.689 As Kulikowski notes, this bridge seems to have been dismantled within a few decades of its construction.690 The Notitia, however, states that

682 For both cities, see: Bondoc 2009, 731-740. 683 Bondoc (2009, 732) argues that Gallienus refortified the site in the mid-3rd century, signifying its increased importance in the later period. 684 Bounegru and Zahariade 1996, 82-83. 685 Rummel 2008, 94-96. 686 Not. Dign. Or., XLII.16, 24. 687 Not. Dign. Or., XLII.35. 688 Bondoc (2009, 734-736) suspects that these modifications may have related to the units listed in the Notitia Dignitatum. 689 Bondoc 2009, 737. 690 Kulikowski 2007, 116-117.

123 the city, along with Oescus on the opposite bank, remained garrisoned by detachments of the

Legio V Macedonica in the late 4th century.691 This listing is corroborated with the site’s coin series which are uninterrupted from the reign of Aurelian until the Hunnic invasions of the

440s.692 With legionary detachments on both sides of the river, naval operations would have been inherent to continued cooperation between both sites. Apart from these major centres, there is evidence that even small sites were concerned with naval affairs. For example, a small and somewhat isolated 4th – 6th century Roman fort has been identified at Hajdučka Vodenica.

Even here, there is evidence of walls with towers which run into the Danube forming a fortified harbour.693 Dacia Ripensis, like the other provinces along the banks of the Danube, thus provides direct evidence of late naval operations.

The provinces of Moesia Secunda and Scythia present a great conundrum. While literary testimonies describe more naval operations in these areas than on any other frontier, the Notitia seems to demonstrate provinces almost wholly devoid of naval units. This problem is further compounded by the archaeological evidence, which shows massive amounts of fortification efforts on both the frontier and the interior. Scorpan goes so far as to state that the

Scythian limes reveal a “grand strategic concept” beginning with Diocletian.694 In a similar vein, Zahariade argues that nearly every town and fortification display building efforts dating from the tetrarchy.695 Although more reserved than either scholar, even Whitby claims that the

Lower Danube is one of the few areas of the Empire which could be considered “defense-in-

691 Not. Dign. Or., XLII.33, 39. 692 Bondoc (2009, 736-737) claims that both cities appear to have been destroyed by the Hunnic invasions. 693 For Hajdučka Vodenica, see: Bounegru and Zahariade 1996, 83-84. Unfortunately, the site is now underwater due to the construction of a power plant. As such, the only way to study the site is by means of an underwater survey, see: Karović 1996, 267. 694 Scorpan 1980, 3. 695 Zahariade 2007, 10.

124 depth”.696 Due to this intense focus on a vulnerable frontier region, it is inconceivable that naval forces would be outright ignored.

The legionary base at Novae in Moesia Secunda provides evidence in support of this assertion. The headquarters of the Legio I Italica, the site was garrisoned continuously by the legion from the 1st until at least the end of the 4th century.697 Although disturbed during the middle of the 3rd century, the site, as well as its surrounding supply network, appear to have returned to a sense of normalcy by the late 3rd/early 4th century.698 Either during this crisis or as a result of military reforms, it appears that the Legio I Italica gradually ‘fragmented’ into several units spread out upon the Lower Danube Limes.699 At Novae itself, this led to a seemingly decreased garrison. However, despite this reduction in troops, excavations support that the sight remained primarily a military centre until at least the end of the 4th century, with the principia still seemingly in use until the Hunnic attacks of the 440s.700 With an archaeologically confirmed military port and large numbers of stamped warship tiles, it can be confidently stated that the legion maintained warships during the early Empire.701 Due to the legion’s permanent presence at the site and its continued military importance, there is no reason to suppose naval operations would cease during the later period. In fact, the record of a praefectus ripae legionis stationed at Novae would seem to support the continued importance of operations along the river.702 Furthermore, as one of the most important military centres of the Lower Danube, it is reasonable to suppose that Novae may have been one of the locations

696 Whitby 2007, 157. 697 Sarnowski 2012, 18. As Klenina (2006, 403) notes, the site’s military horreum appears to have remained in regular use until the later 4th century. 698 Dyczek 2002, 685. 699 Although the Notitia only lists detachments at Novae and Sexaginta Prista, Conrad and Stančev (2002, 677) argue that detachments would have also been stationed at all fortresses in between. 700 Sarnowski 2012, 52. Poulter (2007a, 39) also notes that the entire Lower Danube military supply system appears to have still operated effectively until these attacks. 701 Sarnowski (1996, 196) attempts to link the port with the campaigns of Trajan in the 2nd century but notes that this is only an “assumption.” The facilities have yet to be systematically studied. For the port facilities, see: Sarnowski 2012, 84-86; Sarnowski 1996, 195-199. 702 Not. Dign. Or., XL.31.

125 which received lusoriae as a part of the Theodosian law of 412.703 Although somewhat ambiguous, the archaeological evidence does not support a break in naval operations at Novae.

Instead, both archaeological and historical contexts support the continued importance of warships manned by the legion at Novae during the 3rd and 4th centuries.

The fort at Halmyris offers a perfect example of the current naval ambiguity displayed at many later fortresses along the Lower Danube. Situated near the confluence of the Danube and the Black Sea, the fort was located in the heart of the area affected by the Gothic invasions.704 This can be seen archaeologically in that the original stone fortress appears to have been heavily damaged in the mid-3rd century.705 Following a return to stability in the 270s and 280s, however, a massive reconstruction was initiated and eventually completed in the early 4th century.706 The new fortress was not only rebuilt but completely redesigned and now oriented directly towards the Danube.707 The site appears to have survived multiple further invasions and subsequent repair before finally being abandoned in the 7th century.708 Due to its location and frequent clashes with barbarians from across the Danube, it can naturally be assumed that some form of scouting force would have been necessary. The Notitia, however, only lists the fortress as the base of a cavalry unit.709 As with the Rhine, the best solution to this discrepancy between the historical source material and the Notitia would be to assume that

703 Cod. Theod., 7.17.1. Building and repair work in the late 4th/early 5th century would suggest a slight recovery after Adrianople until the destruction in the 430s/440s, see: Sarnowski 2012, 96; Klenina 2002, 697. 704 Philostorgius mentions the fortress directly as a location sacked by the Goths in the 380s, see: Philostorgius, Historia Ecclesiastica 10.6. 705 Zahariade and Phelps 2002, 236; Zahriade 1991, 314. 706 Zahariade 2007, 8; Zahariade and Phelps 2002, 237; Zahariade 1991, 314. Halmyris is one of the five locations along the Danube in which a tetrarchic building inscription has been found, see: Zahariade 2009b, 1549. 707 Zahariade and Phelps 2002, 239. 708 Zahariade 2009b, 1547. 709 Not. Dign. Or., XXXIX.18. Throughout his site reports, Zahariade frequently treats Halmyris as a fleet base of the Classis Moesica with a substantial port. Due to its location, it would be assumed that a port would have been necessary for the fort’s existence. There is no evidence from any of Zahariade’s reports, however, that the port actually exists or has been excavated archaeologically. Similar claims have been made at Salsovia, the fortress immediately west of Halmyris, with no archaeological confirmation, see: Haynes et al. 2007, 134.

126 each of these forts on the Lower Danube, regardless of unit type, maintained some lusoriae for general scouting and patrol. This would not have to be more than a few ships, and as a result, would not have been considered a formal naval unit. Instead, it is likely that the limitanei stationed in the fortresses along the Lower Danube were multipurpose soldiers engaged in both basic infantry and naval exercises.

Overall, the current archaeological evidence reveals that many of the fortresses along the Danube were severely affected by the invasions of the 3rd century. Immediately following these invasions, however, most damaged fortresses were restored and new fortifications were built. As a result, the Danube frontier of the 4th century was more fortified than during any other period in Roman history. Furthermore, in this period many of the old fortifications appear to have built fortified port structures for the first time. In addition, many new larger fortifications and smaller burgi seem to have been explicitly constructed as fortified harbours.

In fact, the later period arguably displays more evidence of naval structures and harbours than that of the early Empire.

4.5 Summary of Findings

Taking all this information into consideration, a more accurate depiction of the later naval forces along the Danube can be given. Both the Classis Pannonica and Classis Moesica seem to have functioned as usual until the Gothic invasions of the mid-3rd century. These attacks caused a mass disturbance along the river, and both fleets may have indeed been significantly depleted or even wiped out. This disaster, however, must be seen in the proper context as much of the army itself was also subject to the same disruption. By the later 260s, with the Empire regaining some level of control, the Romans were once again able to build fleets to repulse barbarian invasion. These fleets had varying success but alongside the army

127 they eventually played a role in defeating the Goths. With the Goths driven out and largely neutralised, the limes were once again established following the abandonment of most territory north of the Danube. This was done through a massive building programme, which although likely begun by Aurelian or Probus, was fully realised during the tetrarchy and subsequent reign of Constantine. Old fortresses were repaired while new ones were built in previously undefended areas.

Like all other areas of the Empire, the naval forces along the Danube were decentralised and spread out among the numerous fortifications. Whereas the Principate had two comparatively larger classes stationed along the river, the later Empire maintained many smaller ones. Supplementing these classes were many other naval units including ‘liburnian soldiers’ and legionary fleet detachments. It is also likely that most forts, regardless of unit type, maintained some lusoriae for scouting and surveillance. During the reigns of Constantius

II and Valentinian I numerous small fortified landing places were also constructed to facilitate naval patrols. There is little indication of naval decline in the later Empire along the Danube.

In fact, the historical sources suggest the exact opposite, with Vegetius even stating that the later fleets outperformed those of the Principate. It was only after the disaster of Adrianople in

378 that a substantial decline in both army and naval forces can be seen. As the Western Empire gradually faded away, it appears that the naval forces along the Upper Danube went with it.

Whatever system remained by the 440s, the invasions of the Huns was undoubtedly the deathblow. The units along the Lower Danube, however, would survive the turmoil of the 5th century and become part of Byzantine history.

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Conclusion

The provincial fleets of the Northern Frontier were put under considerable stress during the barbarian invasions of the 3rd century. Contrary to the majority of scholarly opinion, this was not an isolated phenomenon as the entirety of Rome’s military institution was also subject to the same pressures. There is no evidence of a specific naval neglect or decline which exacerbated attacks. The few surviving sources instead suggest that naval efforts played a crucial role in frontier defence even at the height of the ‘crisis’. While the provincial fleets would have surely played a role, they were never the extent or even bulk of Rome’s naval strength. Instead, Rome’s naval forces always came from a combination of standing classes as well as frontier auxiliary and legionary units which maintained warships as a part of their organisational structure. The full potential of Roman naval strength, however, was only realised during large-scale campaigns in which these units were brought together and supplemented with campaign specific warships. As the imperial government slowly recovered during the 260s

– 280s, there is once again evidence of these large-scale invasion fleets being commissioned to combat the barbarian armies.

With a return to relative stability in the late 3rd/early 4th century, the Roman military was subject to widespread reforms. Although the precise fate of the northern provincial fleets is obscure, it can be stated with reasonable certainty that none of these units survived the organisational changes. This does not mean, however, that naval forces ceased to exist during the later Empire. Each area surveyed provided ample evidence that both standing and campaign specific naval forces were employed for a variety of purposes. Each area was merely organised differently from that of the Principate while also displaying substantial regional variation.

Although subject to further organisational change, much of which is uncertain given current evidence, these forces operated throughout the 4th century. It is only in the 370s – 380s, due to

129 the combination of civil war and barbarian invasion, in which a noticeable and rapid decline can be observed. Even still, warships continued to operate along the shores of Britain, the

Rhine, and the Upper Danube until the very collapse of these provinces in the early 5th century.

As the provinces of the Lower Danube survived the period in question, there is no corresponding evidence of naval collapse. Ultimately, although lacking a ‘navy’ in the modern sense of the term, naval forces clearly remained an integral part of the Roman military framework for as long as the military itself continued to function.

130

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Title: The later Roman naval forces of the Northern Frontier (3rd – 5th centuries CE)

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