Anti Shi'ism in Indonesia

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Anti Shi'ism in Indonesia PENELITIAN 24 DEDE SYARIF, ISKANDAR ZULKARNAIN, DICKY SOFJAN Anti Shi’ism in Indonesia: Genealogy, Development, and Methods Dede Syarif Ph.d candidate at Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies, UGM [email protected] Iskandar Zulkarnain State Islamic University of Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta [email protected] Dicky Sofjan Indonesia Consortium for Religious Studies, UGM [email protected] Artikel diterima 18 Mei, diseleksi 18 Mei, dan disetujui 8 Juni 2017 Abstract Abstrak The notion of anti Shi’sm is founded in many Gagasan tentang Anti-Shia ditemukan countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, diberbagai negara seperti Arab Saudi, Iraq, Syria, and some others countries in Pakistan, Iraq, Suriah, dan sejumlah negara South East Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia and di kawasan Asia Tenggara seperti Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam. This paper discusses Malaysia, dan Brunei Darussalam. Makalah the origin, development, and methods of ini mengkaji asal usul, perkembangan dan anti Shi’ism in Indonesian context. In order metode yang digunakan sebagai bentuk to understand the anti Shi’ism this also will sentiment anti-Shia di Indonesia. Makalah cover the responses expressed by majority ini juga membahas berbagai respons dari Sunni in general and in particular some kelompok mayoritas Sunni secara umum, religious group that continually show their dan secara khusus respon dari sejumlah anti Shia sentiment in vary of methods, kelompok organisasi kemasyarakatan yang including the anti Shi’ism in social media secara berkelanjutan memperlihatkan sikap and the establishment of National of Anti anti-Shia dalam berbagai cara, termasuk Shia Alliance, known as ANAS (Aliansi kampanye anti-Shia di sosial media serta Nasional Anti Shia). berdirinya Aliansi Nasional Anti Shia (ANAS). Keywords: anti-Shi’ism, heresy, minority, majority, prejudice. Kata kunci: Anti Syiah, bid’ah, Minoritas, Mayoritas, Prasangka. Introduction identities has been more noticeable in public. The Indonesian political shift from The recent decades of the twentieth the New Order regime towards democratic century have witnessed a global raise in rule brought with it the rise of religious the public presence of religion in political attribute in political life with Islamic life, both in the national and trans-national political parties participating in elections. spheres (Casanova 1994). This is especially Instead of formal political institution clear among Muslim societies where like Islamic political party, Indonesian the turn towards politicized religious democratic era, known as Orde Reformasi, HARMONI Januari - Juni 2017 Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius Vol. 16 No. 1 ANTI SHI’ISM INDONESIA: GENEALOGY, DEVELOPMENT, AND METHODS 25 also has been marked by an increase in propaganda and hate speech. Images, hard-line Islamist groups and communal photos, and articles on the infidelity and violence between religious groups in cruelty of Shia appear daily on various society. Using government regulation jihadi websites. In those images, photos, such as Blasphemy Law, some religious articles and other publications, the anti- groups play role as police of moral and Shia narratives, both in local and global religion. Though, Indonesian constitution nuance, are shared and liked by the anti- guarantees religious freedom as reflected Shia supporters. The anti-Shia narratives in the country’s national motto “Bhinneka which circulate in online media have two Tunggal Ika” which means “Unity in main goals, firstly, it gives theological Diversity”, but since democracy was justification for the war by portraying Shia introduced in 1998, numerous religious as a deviant belief, which not only taints conflicts have come to the front (Human the purity of Islam but also is hostile to Right Watch 2013). Whereas these conflicts it. Secondly, it frames the Syrian conflict were repressed by Suharto (1967-1998), within a broader sectarian war between the new space to maneuver means that in Sunni and Shia. The narrative goes that predominantly Sunni-Indonesia conflicts right through the history of Islam, the are now erupting with greater intensity. Shia have always tried to destabilize the Sunni caliphate (Nuraniyah, 2014:1). In the post New Order, there has been remarkable increase in violence In recent time, at least there are three against and discrimination of minority streams that contribute to violent attacks group. According to the Jakarta-based on Indonesia’s Shia minority (IPAC 2016). Setara Institute, which monitors religious First, Pro-ISIS extremists have begun to freedom in Indonesia, there have been target Shia as they increasingly take cues more than 200 violent attacks a year on from ISIS propaganda and exhortations religious minorities after 2008. In 2008 from Indonesian fighters in Syria and Iraq. there were more than 260 such cases. Shia Second, Saudi-oriented Salafis, following are the second-most frequently attacked an ultra-puritan strand of Islam, see Shia groups, next to Ahmadiyyah, in Sunni as a heretical sect (aliran sesat) that must be majority Indonesia. In particular, Shia banned. They have stepped up advocacy Muslims are increasingly being targeted. efforts against it, using the scenery of While there has been passive Sunni-Shia international events to warn that Shia tension in Indonesia, the geopolitical are intent on wreaking destruction in conflict, such as Syrian conflict has made Indonesia as they have in Syria, Yemen it worse. and Bahrain. Third, the growing concern of some conservative people in Nahdlatul Despite rising Sunni-Shia tension, Ulama (NU) about Shi’a recruitment of anti-Shia propaganda is growing in their members, especially in East Java. social media. To persuade the majority Sunni Muslims of the legitimacy of jihad Those streams strengthen each other, against Shia, the jihadi groups propagate particularly in a climate where Islamist the anti-Shia narrative that frames the civil society has been using democratic conflict in global level as sectarian one. space to push the government to assume a Framing the war in Syria as a religious greater role in defining Islamic orthodoxy. conflict, Muslims versus non Muslims, This pressure over the last decade has that justify jihad and mobilize people led to violence and legal restrictions in to participate in Shia exclusion. Indeed, Indonesia against the minority religious in the last few years, various jihadi group such as Ahmadiyyah, but until media have been flooded with anti-Shia recently there was less focus on Shia. HARMONI Januari - Juni 2017 Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius Vol. 16 No. 1 26 DEDE SYARIF, ISKANDAR ZULKARNAIN, DICKY SOFJAN The suspicious toward Shia as threat doctrinal grounds for a declaration of to unity of Indonesia is a bit excessive, Shia as deviant.1 since there is no logical reason and also the number of Shia in Indonesia is very Like the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Syrian conflict drives tension in the small. The Indonesian Shia community Shia-Sunni relation in Indonesia. The is around 2.5 million out of a population propaganda of anti-Shia since the Syrian of close to 250 million. They are divided conflict erupted, however, is qualitatively into three groups: Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul different because it has the potential Bait Indonesia (IJABI); Ahlul Bait Indonesia for targeted violence both physical and (ABI); and Organization of Ahlul Bait for symbolical. The case of Sampang is Social Support and Education (OASE). physical one, whether the growing of anti IJABI, the largest, was established in 2000. Shia rhetoric in social media is an example ABI, founded in 2010 and much smaller of symbolic violent. than IJABI, is dominated by Sayyids (descendants of the Prophet) and religious Differ from the past of anti-Shia scholars concerned with jurisprudence; it campaign which based on intellectual is more Iranian-oriented in terms of its arena throughout seminar, polemic in doctrine and political stance. OASE is the mass media, and book publication which smallest, with a more puritan outlook. Its circulated among religious elite and in growing militancy in the wake of anti- formal sphere (Zulkifli, 2009: 244-250), the Shia advocacy has strained its relationship recent anti Shia campaign is more massive with the other two groups that have been and sporadic involved both elite and laity careful in the past not to antagonize the actor (orang awam). The development of Sunni majority (IPAC 2016). information technology facilitated this kind of anti Shia sentiment from just The intensity of the anti-Shia intellectual discourse as expressed in campaign in Indonesia is relatively new, fatwa, religious preaching, and seminar, to although anti-Shia sentiment is not. become a daily expression. People could Some scholars identified that the Iranian easily participate in spreading anti-Shia Revolution as the inspiring momentum massages, meme, photos and uploading to the rising of political Shi’ism. The image framing Shia as deviant, bad, and 1979 Iranian Revolution inspired hopes dangerous. for revolutionary change, particularly among Indonesian students and led to Instead of personal attacks on Shia many conversions to Shia, but it also keen congregation, various efforts to deprive government suspicions and spawned the right of Shia as citizen have been a wave of anti-Shia propaganda from occurred in systematic and organized Saudi-linked foundations (Zainuddin way. In East Java, some Sunni clerics and Basyar, 2000). In the mid-1990s, have asked the local administration to NU conservatives
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