Hans Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International

Hans Morgenthau, Realism,and the ScientificStudy of International/

X OLiTiCALscience is a verytrendy discipline. Few books or articlesare citeda decade,let alone a generation,after they are written.When scholarsdie, theirideas oftendie withthem, althoughthey may be reinventedlater and trumpetedas new. Hans Morgenthauis a rare, if partial, exception to this generalization.Students still read his work,especially but not exclusivelyPolitics Among Nations which to a largedegree made thefield; scholars still cite his work,even if theyhave notread it recentlyor carefullyand even if theirmain objectiveis to attackit; and, perhapsmore importantly,there is muchto be gainedby re-reading his books and thinkingabout what he has to say. Morgenthauwrote too muchfor me to even attempta summary,and, like any subtleand supple thinker,he voiced too manycontradictions to permitready distillations. As botha detachedscholar and a passionateobserver of worldpolitics, Morgenthausought to have his generalphilosophy guide his viewson specificissues and yetto remainopen enoughto allow his observationsof the wisdom and folly-usually the latter-around him alter some of his mostdeeply-held beliefs. In a world in which scholarshipand public policy are increasinglyseparate, in whichhighest academic prestige goes to those who constructthe most abstractand apparently

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Winter1994)

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 854 SOCIAL RESEARCH rigorousmodels, and in which a fascinationwith everyday politics,let alone the hope to improvethe welfareof human- kind,is seen as antitheticalto the attemptto discoverthe laws of politicsand in whichan abilityto see severalsides of a hotly contestedissue is seen as an insufficientcommitment to the correctcause, Morgenthau'sapproach is not a popular one. And yetbecause he had so muchto sayabout so manytimeless questions,scholars find it impossibleto avoid him. Like so manyscholars who formedthe foundinggeneration of the Americanstudy of internationalpolitics, Hans Mor- genthau was a refugeefrom the Nazis, and his European educationand experienceprovided a breadthof outlookand an historicalorientation which gave him insights,which came more slowly to more parochial American students,and simultaneouslyblinded him to importantaspects of American policy,especially its domesticroots. He reservedsome of his deepestscorn for ideas which,if not uniquelyAmerican, are particularlyprominent in Americansocial science and political thought.More specifically,he sought to tame Americans' optimismabout human nature,science, and reform.Epito- mized by WoodrowWilson, much Americanpublic opinion, many politicalleaders, and a distressinglylarge numberof scholarsequated good intentionswith a successfulforeign policy,assumed that democracy could controlif not extinguish base human instincts,believed that democracies could avoid warsand thata peacefulworld could encouragedemocracies.1 I suspectthat in the 1940s and 1950s, when Morgenthau's ideas firstreceived widespread attention, both some of his appeal and some of the objectionto his argumentsstemmed fromhis darker,more European view of worldpolitics.2 Of course,most of what Morgenthauwrote for American audienceswas writtenduring the Cold War,and it was in this context that his writingsproved so influential.It is an exaggerationwith some truthto see Americanwritings on internationalpolitics before World War II as preoccupiedby legalismand Americanforeign policy in that era to have

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions HANS MORGENTHAU 855 neglectednational power. To scholars,statesmen, and an informedpublic whichbelieved that the USSR was a grave menace to Americansecurity and Westernvalues, that an assertiveAmerican policy was necessaryto cope with this threat,and thatmany American traditions were a hindrancein thisnew world,many of Morgenthau'sarguments were both enlighteningand useful.Of course,his influence should not be overestimated:the experienceof Hitlerwas a greatersponsor of Realismthan any writtentext could be. But people who wereresponding in whatwas forthem an unprecedentedway by activelyparticipating in the balance of powerwere greatly comfortedby the idea that their behavior was not only appropriatefor the momentbut was grounded in world historyand the necessaryconduct of nations. Morgenthau'sstress on thecentrality of the nationalinterest was particularlyimportant. Although many scholars- myself included- have feltit to be maddeninglyvague, the concept was particularlyimportant in theAmerican context for what it denied: that states should follow either sub-nationalor supra-nationalinterests. Both werehighly tempting to Ameri- cans. Lackinga strongstate and beinga nationof immigrants, the United States often had troublemaintaining a foreign policy that was guided more by externalthan by internal factors.In the nineteenthcentury, Irish immigrantsstrongly opposed policiesthat could be seen as pro-British;isolationism was particularlystrong in the middlewest in part because of the large German population;after World War II Eastern European voterswere adamantthat their countries of origin not be sacrificedto the USSR. To the post-warforeign policy establishment,which saw itselfas cosmopolitanand having risenabove suchparochialism, it was veryuseful to realizethat concernsof segmentsof the populationcould legitimatelybe put aside in favorof thewider good. But not too wide a good; whilethe United Nations might develop into a real instrument of worldorder, the United States could notafford to relyon it or to seek the commonbenefit of mankindunless this also

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 856 SOCIAL RESEARCH servedAmerican interests. There was nothingcynical in this; countrieswould not thrive-and mightnot survive-if they were excessivelyidealistic or altruistic.This is not to say that the statesmenof the earlyCold War yearswere more prone to see conflictsbetween what was good fortheir state and what was good for others than were those in other eras. Nevertheless,Realism's enjunctionthat states not seek to reshapethe worldwas usefulin bothrestraining some of the statesmen'swilder schemes and, more importantly,in giving thema languagewith which they could justify their policies to theAmerican public. Of coursethere is an ironyhere: it can be arguedthat, in theend, thepolicy of containmentdid re-order worldpolitics. As centralto Morgenthau'sanalysis as the nationalinterest was power.Indeed, forhim the twowere very closely related. Perhapshis mostfamous sentence is that"the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of internationalpolitics is the conceptof interest definedin termsof power"(Morgenthau, 1978, p. 5). Despite the importanceof the concept of power to him, he never analyzed it with the care and sophisticationit deserved, however.The discussionin PoliticsAmong Nations is not much differentthan that whichcould be found in less important textbooks.While he noted some of the obvious sources of nationalpower, he neverdiscussed many of the less obvious aspectsof powerto whichmodern political science has devoted much- but perhapsnot enough- attention.3Even by the time Morgenthaustarted writing, Carl Friedrichhad made the importantpoint that power was oftenreflected in anticipated reactions-that is, an actorwho apparently got his way may not have been powerfulbut mayhave been tailoringhis demands to whathe thoughtothers were willing to give(Friedrich, 1937, pp. 589-91). The crucialneed to separatethe resourcesthat mightcontribute to powerfrom the notionof poweritself was also establishedrelatively early. It was crucial to an understandingof power to see that it was highlyrelational and

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions HANS MORGENTHAU 857 context-boundand so was notreadily fungible. An actorcould have power over anotherin a particulararea withoutbeing able to swayothers on that questionor influencethe same actoron differentissues. Indeed, thiscrucial fact helps explain whythe concept of powercould notserve the same functionas theconcept of moneyin the economy,thereby preventing the disciplineof politicalscience from following its sister discipline in fruitfullydeveloping very abstract models. Althoughthis was a conclusionwith which Morgenthau strongly agreed, his failureto deeplyexplore the concept of powerrobbed some of his argumentsof muchof theirforce. To saythat the national interest must be definedin termsof powerdoes notsay exactly what it is. Morgenthau'sconception of Realismin factdoes notlead to specificpolicy prescriptions or detailedpropositions for empirical research.4 While it may be possible to condemn a particularlyegregious policy as diminishinga nation's power, a widerange of coursesof action remain. This may disturb a statesmanlooking for more detailed guidance, but it did not upset Morgenthau,who realizedthat statesmanship could not be reducedto formulas. He soughta realismthat would tell statesmen how to thinkand whatfactors to thinkabout, not what specificconclusions to reach.Thus, it was quite possiblefor people who wereequally true to the preceptsof Realism to advocate diametrically opposingpolicies. An obviousexample is Americanpolicy in Vietnam.Although Morgenthau not onlydisagreed with the Americanintervention but had troubleunderstanding how any sensibleperson could advocate it, in fact many of the argumentsfor the war could have been bolsteredby footnotes to PoliticsAmong Nations and amongthe policy's architects were people who had been figurativeand literal students of Morgenthau. If the factthat Realist reasoning could reach contradictory conclusionswas upsettingfor statesmen who werelooking for ambiguousguidance, the factthat Realismdoes not readily yieldtestable propositions has been a sourceof frustrationfor

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 858 SOCIAL RESEARCH politicalscientists who soughtto maketheir discipline more of a science.Of course,this did notbother Morgenthau. For him, it made no senseto tryto rigorouslydeduce propositionsfrom fundamentalaxioms. This would have so oversimplified politicsas to producea caricature.Furthermore, it impliedthe existenceof one dominantvalue and vastlyunderestimated the role of contingencyin politics.For Morgenthau,it was a philosophicalerror of the most fundamentalkind to equate the practiceand studyof politicswith science (Morgenthau, 1946).Of course,Morgenthau felt that his views were based on and borne out by internationalhistory, but he nevertried to develop tightlinks between his argumentsand eitherspecific incidentsor an array of internationalevents, as political scientistsnow do. He never seriouslyconsidered alternative explanationsor triedto showhow the courseof international politicswas incompatiblewith them and consistentwith his views. It was thisrejection of the essenceof the scientificmethod that caused many later scholars to feel that however well-foundedhis premisesand howeverwise his insights, there were grave limitationsto the utilityof his approach. To go further,it was argued, much more rigor was called for; scholarshad to develop theoriesof internationalpolitics from whichthey could deduce testablepropositions. The founda- tionsfor the studyof internationalpolitics had to be driven deeper into bedrock by firstfinding principles of human behavior;upon thisone could builda structurethat was more consistentand more ambitious than was possible using Morgenthau'smore intuitiveframework (Waltz, 1990). Thus, themost influential current theory (Waltz's Neorealism) shares many of Morgenthau'sbasic premises but proceeds with greaterrigor (Waltz, 1979). Like Morgenthau,Waltz and those whohave followedhim stress the importance of powerand the nationalinterest and put to one side variationsin domestic politicsand societiesand decision-makers'beliefs and values. Explicitlyfor these theoristsand implicitlyfor Morgenthau,

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions HANS MORGENTHAU 859 the reason for this focus is the assumption that the internationalenvironment exerts sufficient compulsion on its membersso thattheir behavior usually will be onlymarginally affectedby theirinternal characteristics. The power of these theorieshas permittedscholars to draw from them many importantpropositions and to pointto new areas thatcan be fruitfullyexplored. The priceof thisparsimonious theorizing, however,is to omit a range of factorsthat Morgenthaufelt werevital- forexample, the multiplicity of goalsthat states can seek,the role of morality,and statesmanshipitself. Thus, many of those who criticizeWaltz and Neorealismhave come to moredeeply appreciate Morgenthau's approach. But bothMorgenthau's approach and Neorealismshare one importantand troublesomeattribute: they are descriptiveand prescriptive.That is, implicitlyor explicitlythey simulta- neouslyseek to explainhow statesdo behave and to pointout how states shouldbehave. While this dual mission is not illegitimate,it raisestwo related analytical problems. First, it is a bit anomalousto be tellingstatesmen that they must follow the inevitablelaws of internationalpolitics. Since the laws describe how statesmenmust behave, at least in general outline,it makesas littlesense to instructthem as it does to tell leavesto appear in thespring and fade in theautumn. In fact, Morgenthauseemed particularlyimpatient with American statesmen,who he thoughtwere especiallyprone to fail to conformto thelaws he had discerned.Second, failings are not onlythose of individualsstates and statesmenbut of thetheory as well.When statesmen disregard the laws or, to use language in currentuse, behavesub-optimally, the theory would seem to be disconfirmed.Thus, Americanbehavior in Vietnamposed real problemsfor Morgenthauand Waltz.They believedthe policyto be inconsistentwith the way their theories led themto thinkstates should and did behave.5 Morgenthaudid not explicitlytry to explain the contradictionbetween misguided Americanpolicy and his argumentsbut impliedthat the gap was furtherevidence of humanirrationality. Waltz confronted

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 860 SOCIAL RESEARCH the question more directlyand incorporatedthe aberrant behaviorinto his theoryin theform of an argumentabout the tendencyof statesto "overreact"to conflictsin the peripheries of a bipolar world. This claim does not fit well with the structureof the rest of his argument,however.6 So what Morgenthauand Waltz make inadvertentlyclear is thatit is difficultto develop an argumentthat both explains and prescribes.

UnusualElements in Morgenthau's Realism

AlthoughMorgenthau inspired many scholars to develophis ideas of power, the nationalinterest, and the international systeminto a morerigorous and parsimonioustheory, it would be a great mistaketo neglectthe elementsin Morgenthau's analysisthat do not fitthis tidy analysis. Indeed, it is the very presence of complicatingand unruly factorsthat defined politicsfor Morgenthau. It was largelybecause of themthat he felt that science- in his conceptionof it- could only be misleadingwhen applied to the understandingor practiceof thisrealm (and it is partlythe willingnessto put these areas aside thatenables others to pursuea morescientific approach). Particularlyimportant are Morgenthau'semphasis on ideas, morality,and diplomacy.

Ideas

The question of the relative importanceof ideas and materialinterests, or, more usefully,the interrelationships betweenthe two,have been centralto social sciencefrom the beginning.In the post-warera, Americanscholars of security studieshave been particularlyconcerned with this question, examiningthe roles of militarydoctrine, statesmen's theories of conflict(especially deterrence versus the spiral model of

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions HANS MORGENTHAU 861 conflict),beliefs about whetheroffense or defense has the advantage,and images of other states.7Using a cognitive approach to the study of foreign policy, scholars have examinedhow beliefs and perceptionsform, change, and both affectand are affectedby behavior.8 More recently, students of internationalpolitical economy have come to realize that a purely materialistapproach is inadequate (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993).9 Many studies begin with a ritual assertionthat Realism, beingdeeply rooted in unchangingmaterial interests, ignores the role of ideas. Perhaps such a Realist model could be developed,and in placesWaltz's approach comes close to this, but it is foreignto Morgenthau'sanalysis. For all his stresson theimportance of thenational interest, which he oftenimplied was objective,he clearlysaw that statesmencan conceiveof theirinterests in quite differentways, are moved by deep psychologicalforces, need to developintellectual constructs to make sense of their world, and often are prisoners of inaccurateor inappropriatebeliefs. Indeed, an understandingof the power of ideas is closely relatedto thedescription/prescription tension in Morgenthau's thought.The prescriptiveelement in hisscholarly writings, not to speak of his frequentessays on currentpolicies, would be pointlessif he did not think both that people might be persuaded by them and that changingpeople's ideas would lead to changesin foreignpolicy. His wholediscussion of the importanceof powerand thenational interest was designedto establishin the Americanmind the viewthat he believedwas properand whichI inferhe thoughtwas literallyforeign to the traditionalAmerican approach to foreignpolicy. Let me just take two other examples of his concernwith statesmen'sbeliefs, one quitespecific and theother general. To startwith the former,Morgenthau believed that American securitypolicy in the Cold War was badly flawed by the tendencyto examinenuclear weapons withinthe conceptual frameworkthat was appropriatefor conventionalweapons

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(Morgenthau,1964, 1976). Because theyrender meaningful militaryvictory impossible, nuclear weapons fundamentally alter the traditionalrelationship between force and foreign policy.When victory was possible,arms races and thequest for militarysuperiority made sense.But as longas bothsides have secondstrike capability (that is, can destroythe other side even ifthe other launches a surpriseattack), the only way to prevent a nuclearwar from devastating both sides would be to agreeon rules thatwould limitthe conflict.The destructivepower of the weapons,the difficultiesof wartimecommunication, and the hold of human emotions would make such limits impossible,however. Thus, mutualvulnerability has created dilemmaswhich traditional military strategy, far frombeing able to solve,only serves to compound. Trapped as theywere in pre-nuclearways of thinking,many analystsand decision-makerspursued traditionalsolutions such as nuclearsuperiority and the developmentof complex war plans. At bottom,this approach constituteda failureto accept the realities of mutual vulnerabilityand mutual deterrence.Although I would faultMorgenthau for not fully appreciatingthe argumentswith which he disagreed or probingthe intellectual,institutional, and politicalreasons for theAmerican stance- whichwas generallyparalleled by Soviet policy-I thinkthat his insightwas acute and indeed relied heavilyupon it in my two books on nuclearstrategy (Jervis, 1984, 1989). Withoutarguing that Americandefense policy was foundedsimply on an intellectualerror, that the dispute was entirelyamenable to empirical evidence and careful reasoning,or thatwe can everforget to ask who is advantaged and whois disadvantagedin domesticand bureaucraticpolitics by the successof alternativeviews, I thinkthat Morgenthau was correctto argue thatone cannotunderstand the policy alternativesor internationaloutcomes without grasping the content,origins, and implicationsof alternativeviews about how nuclearweapons affect world politics. Even more at odds with the stereotypeof Realism is

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Morgenthau'stwo-fold argument that people's beliefsabout the worldare deeplyaffected by theirpast politicalstruggles and thatthey are prone to failto understandthis. Central to his attackon Liberalism'sexaggerated faith in the power of reasonand the associatedattempt to reduce politicsto science is his view that knowledgeis contingent,depending on the conditionsand interestswhich lead people to hold it. Those who believe that all realists conceive of knowledge as independentfrom experience and self-interest,who thinkthat theyhave made a fundamentaldiscovery when they argue that people's sense of theirsocial world is in significantmeasure sociallyconstructed, and who thinkthat they are the firstto grasp the close interconnectionsbetween power and knowledge have neverread ScientificMan VersusPower Politics. In a penetratingand lucid analysis,Morgenthau shows that much of modern Liberalismfails to understandthe contingent nature of its own knowledge.The person who argues that scientificreasoning allows him to fullyunderstand politics is in facta "truedogmatist who universalizescognitive principles of limitedvalidity and applies them to realmsnot accessibleto them"(Morgenthau, 1946, p. 220). The scientificideas of modern Liberalismas applied to politicsgrew out of the struggleof the emergingmiddle class against feudalism,aristocracy, and arbitraryrule. This was both understandableand in many senses admirable. The problem,however, lies in theinevitable tendency of thehuman mindto endowwith inherent legitimacy and value theways of thinkingand substantiveideas that served people well in reachingspecified ends. Thus, "Liberalismdeduced fromthe limitedexperience of a certainage universallaws whichwere found wantingwhen applied to conditionsdifferent from those under which they were originallydeveloped" (Mor- genthau,1946, p. 85). People bothuniversalize their ideas and abstractthem from the interestswhich played a large part in shapingthem: the "claimto universality,however, is actually detrimentalto [the] scientificclaim, since it obliteratesthe

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social and moral determinationby whichall social scienceis qualified"(Morgenthau, 1946, p. 167). "In the socialsciences, the social conditionsdetermine not onlythe ulteriorpurpose but also the objectof inquiry,the investigator'srelation to it, his assumptions,methods, and immediateaims. ... In all societiescertain resultsare beyond the reach of scientific inquiry..." (Morgenthau,1946, p. 162). I do not know whether it is more strikingthat Morgenthau failed to acknowledgethat others, especially Karl Manheimand E.H. Carr, had made parallel argumentsand neglectedto fully develop thisimportant line of reasoningin his laterwork, or thatboth scholarswho soughtto develop Realismand those who soughtto attackit have neglectedhis analysis. WhileMorgenthau's discussion is groundedin his attackon theover-reliance on scienceand reasonin politics,the thrust of his positiongoes further.Consistent with modern psychology, he sees that beliefs cannot be explained purely by "cold cognition"and insteadare influencedby emotion, interest, and self-image.In a way strikinglyparallel to the classicstudy of Opinionsand Personality, which asks "of what use to a man is his opinions?"(Smith, Bruner, and White, 1956), Morgenthau sees that

reason is like a lightwhich by its own inner forcecan move nowhere.It mustbe carriedin orderto move.It is carriedby the irrationalforces of interestand emotionto wherethese forces wantit to move.. . . [Because]even though man is dominatedby interestsand drivenby emotional impulses, as wellas motivated by reason,he likesto see himselfprimarily in the lightof this latter,eminently human quality. Hence, he giveshis irrational qualitiesthe earmarksof reason.What we call 'ideology'is the resultof thisprocess of rationalization(Morgenthau, 1946, p. 155).

More recentstudies of foreignpolicy have also exploredthe extent to which emotional and political needs determine perceptionsof otheractors and expectationsof thechances of successof alternativecourses of action.10This line of research

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions HANS MORGENTHAU 865 raises the question of the conditionsunder which and the extentto whichideas and beliefsare a functionof theperson's interests-that is, are superstructure,to use the Marxist terminology.Morgenthau does not venturean answer,which is understandablegiven the difficultyof the question; his successorshave not done muchbetter. But one shouldat least note the tensionbetween his insightthat beliefs about world politicsare contingentand his centraltenet:

politicalrealism believes that politics, like society in general,is governedby objectivelaws. ... It believesalso ... in the possibilityof distinguishingin politicsbetween a truthand opinion-between what is true objectivelyand rationally, supportedby evidence and illuminatedby reason, and whatis onlya subjectivejudgment, divorced from the facts as theyare and informedby prejudice and wishfulthinking (Morgenthau, 1978,p. 4).

In his view that ideas are deeply colored by parochial experienceand self-interest,Morgenthau sees that powerful states,even- if notespecially- when they are liberaldemocra- cies satisfiedwith the statusquo, will oftennot only say but actuallybelieve that their policies are in thebest interests of the entirecommunity of nations.Although a bit less explicitand bitingin this regard than E.H. Carr (1939), Morgenthau realizesthat human beings do notwant to recognizethe limits of their own perspectivesor the powerfuldrives of their selfishness.Thus, statesare oftenhighly moralistic and, by comingto believethat they are doinggood forothers as wellas themselves,do moreevil than was necessary.Liberal democracies sufferthe furtherdisability of universalizingthe waysin whichthey overcame tyranny and aristocracyat home.Liberals

equatethe distinction between war and peace to the one between aristocraticviolence and liberalrationality. Thus Liberalism detachedthe specific techniques ithad developed as instruments of its domesticdomination, such as legal pledges,judicial machinery,economic transformations, from their political substratumand transferredthem as self-sufficiententities,

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devoidof theiroriginal political functions, to theinternational sphere(Morgenthau, 1946, pp. 50-1).

There is much to Morgenthau'sanalysis, especially the fundamentaltruth that politicians,like people in their everydaylives, are slowto appreciatethe context in whichtheir moralvalues as wellas theirempirical beliefs are validand are quick to extendinto one sphere the truthsthat are derived fromanother. Interestingly enough, Louis Hartzsimilarly saw thefundamental importance of the struggleagainst feudalism in shaping politicalthought, but did so in the contextof explainingwhy Americans had sucha differentunderstanding of politicsfrom Europeans: the formerwere "born equal"- Americansociety was founded by a middle-classfragment, never underwenta bourgeoisrevolution against feudalism, and so never developed eitherstrong reactionary or strong n socialiststrains of thinking(Hartz, 1955). Indeed, Hartz explains the Americaninability to understandmany other societies,its pathologicalfear of revolutions,and its paranoid anti-communismby the ideologythat grew out of the very absenceof a struggleagainst feudalism that Morgenthau sees as responsiblefor the over-reasonedand overly scientific perspectiveof Westernnations that has caused foreignpolicy debacles. The irony,of course,is that Morgenthausees the UnitedStates as the primeexample of whathe is describing, yet Hartz shows that America is distinctfrom Europe in lackingthe experienceof feudalismand the middle class's overthrowof it. Although this summarycannot do full justice to Mor- genthau'sarguments, I hope I have said enoughto showthat in his understandingthat being powerfulcan lead people to believethat their views are trueand benefitothers as well as themselves,and in the tensionhe portrays(without resolving) betweeninterests and ideas, Morgenthauis a much more complex Realist than most current discussionseither of Morgenthauor of thesesubjects would lead us to believe.

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Morality

In his conceptionof the role of moralityin international politics,Morgenthau again divergesfrom what most people associatewith Realism; many scholars who argue thatmorality playsa significantrole in foreignpolicy contrast their views withwhat they take to be Morgenthau'swithout understanding the latter.12It is alwaysgood forauthors to findsomeone to disagree with-and there is much to disagree with in Morgenthau'sanalysis- but it simplywill not do to use selected quotationsto showthat Morgenthau thought that international politicsleaves no room for ethicalconsiderations. Indeed, at one pointMorgenthau quotes Cavour's famous remark: "If we had done forourselves what we did forItaly, what scoundrels we wouldhave been!" (Morgenthau,1946, p. 179). Those whotell the standard tale of Morgenthauand Realism would not be surprised;they would be surprised,however, at what Morgenthausays next: "No civilizationcan be satisfied withsuch a dual morality"(Morgenthau, 1946). Morgenthau's viewsof therelationship between expediency and moralityare notsimple, and I do notthink they are entirelyconsistent. But it is clear thathe believesthat morality does and mustplay a large role in the selectionof nationalmeans and goals. "In order to be worthyof our lastingsympathy, a nation must pursueits interests for the sake of a transcendentpurpose that gives meaning to the day-to-dayoperations of its foreign policy"(Morgenthau, 1960, p. 8). Moralitycan be destructive whenstatesmen use it to identifythe good of the worldwith the good of their state, if not of themselvespersonally. Properlyconceived, however, morality provides a checkon this tendency:

Politicalrealism refuses to identifythe moral aspirations of a particularnation with the moral laws that govern the universe. . . . The lightheartedequation between a particularnationalism and thecounsels of Providenceis morallyindefensible, for it is thatvery sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the

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Biblicalprophets have warned rulers and ruled. The equationis also politicallypernicious, for it is liable to engenderthe distortionin judgmentwhich, in the blindnessof crusading frenzy,destroys nations and civilizations(Morgenthau, 1978, p. 11).

More than is true for later scholars,Morgenthau traces muchof the sourceof the necessaryevil in politicsto human nature and "the animusdominarteli, the desire for power" (Morgenthau,1946, p. 192). Pure selfishnessand thedesire to gratifybasic humanneeds, such as shelter,food, and security, would onlyproduce some of the conflictwe see in our social worldbecause thoseimpulses can oftenbe gratifiedthrough cooperationon thebasis of mutualrespect and equality."The desirefor power, on the otherhand, concernsitself not with theindividual's survival but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured. Consequently,the selfishnessof man has limits:his will to power has none" 13 (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 193). Although the desire to dominateplays a role in all aspectsof humanlife, in politicsit is "thevery life-blood of theaction, the constitutive principle of politicsas a distinctsphere of human activity"(Morgenthau, 1946, p. 195). This does not mean thatthere is no room for morality,but that if it is to be meaningfuland effective,it must takeaccount of the demandingrealm in whichit operates. For Morgenthau,the rules of moralityare not simple,in partbecause the importanceof powerin internationalpolitics meansthat judgments must be renderedin particularcontexts, thus prohibitingthe abstractionsthat could otherwiseguide policy.Indeed, a danger second only to universalizingone's interestsand perspectivesis to applygeneral principles without paying attentionto the context in which they will work themselvesout. Thus, inter-warWestern statesmen who were seekingto buildinternational politics on enlightenedprinciples of justice "were intellectuallyand morallyunable to resist Germanexpansion as long as it appeared to be justified-as in the cases of Austria and the Sudetenland-by the holy

This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions HANS MORGENTHAU 869 principlesof nationalunification" (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 54). Properlyconceived, morality seeks to both furtherthe state's legitimateinterests and respectthose of others.It searchesfor common ground withoutyielding what the state needs to protectitself. This searchis not likelyto succeedif stateshave wildlydifferent conceptions of rightand justice. Thus, for Morgenthaua degree of moralconsensus among nationsis a prerequisitefor a well functioninginternational order. In contrastto more recent analystslike Waltz (and myself), Morgenthauargues thatthe balance of powerarose not only out of the clash of competingself-interests but out of a commonculture, respect for other's rights, and agreementon basic moralprinciples (Morgenthau, 1978, pp. 221-28; Waltz, 1979; Jervis,forthcoming, eh. 4).14 WhileMorgenthau is maddeninglyelusive about exactly what moralityrequires and therelationship between morality and pru- dence,he is clear thatdespite the crucialrole for moralityin politics,there will always be tensionbetween the imperatives of powerand thoseof morality,and, for thisreason, statesmen cannotseek to behave morallyin the sense of doing as much good foras manypeople as possible."There is no escape from theevil of power,regardless of what one does. . . . Politicalethics is indeedthe ethics of doingevil. While it condemnspolitics as thedomain of evilpar excellence,it mustreconcile itself to the enduringpresence of evil in all politicalaction. Its last resort, then,is theendeavor to choose,since evil there must be, among severalpossible actions the one thatis leastevil" (Morgenthau, 1946,pp. 201-2). I thinkas importantas thewillingness to face thenecessity to do evilis Morgenthau'sstress that indeed there is choice.Taken to itsextreme, Realism argues that because internationalpolitics lacks government, the international environ- mentis so hostilethat states have littleroom to maneuver:they are in therealm of compulsion, not choice. But Morgenthau,like hisfellow distinguished Realist Arnold Wolfers, realizes that while thisis in factsometimes the case, statesmen rarely are entirelythe prisonerof forcesbeyond their own control(Wolfers, 1962).

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Diplomacy

Since Morgenthausees a largerole forstatesmen and statesmanship,it is notsurprising that he also stressesthe importance of diplomacy.But thistoo contrastswith the standardview of Realismas describingand prescribingexpansion of control if not of territory,stiff-necked refusal to compromise,and constant threats.But Morgenthaudevotes the finalchapters of Politics AmongNations to diplomacy and includesas itsonly appendix the Charterof the United Nations. Realism, at leastfor Morgenthau, impliesnot onlythat states must guard theirpower stakes, but thatthey must also compromiseand trimtheir objectives to what is feasible.Force and warcan neverbe dismissedfrom internationalpolitics, but in a prudentpolicy, they usually remain in the background.Morgenthau's rules of diplomacymay seem com- monsense, but thosewho knowMorgenthau by standardsum- mariesof himmay be surprisedby them:"Diplomacy must be divestedof the crusadingspirit"; "Diplomacy must look at the politicalscene from the point of view of other nations"; "Nations mustbe willingto compromiseon all issuesthat are notvital to them";"Never put yourself in a positionfrom which you cannot retreatwithout losing face and fromwhich you cannotadvance withoutgrave risks"; "Never allow a weakally to makedecisions foryou"; "The armedforces are theinstruments of foreignpolicy,not its master" (Morgenthau, 1978, pp. 550-58). Partlybecause of theinfluence of theCold War,a greatdeal of the studyof internationalpolitics over the past twodecades has focusedon bargaining.Of course,this process inevitably involvescommon as well as conflictinginterests (Schelling, 1960),but, nevertheless, the emphasishas been on how states seekto getas muchas possible,primarily by the use of threats. As Morgenthaushows, this view is not incorrect,but it is incomplete.Much of internationalpolitics consists of a mutual adjustmentof interests,and this involvesnot only exerting one's willover others but understandingwhat others want and whythey want it. The protractedand patientinteraction with

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others,the explorationof alternativesolutions, the accommo- dation of what others need constitutesthe essence of day-to-daydiplomacy which, if successful,does not produce thosedramatic clashes which have so preoccupiedscholars and giventhem a distortedview of how internationalpolitics does and shouldfunction.

Realism,Peace, and DomesticPolitics

Toward the end of his career,Morgenthau modified if not renouncedsome of theimportant elements of his approachon the groundsthat changes in the world had renderedthem inappropriate.The existenceof huge stockpilesof nuclear weapons meantthat superpower war was no longera viable tool of statecraft(Morgenthau, 1964). Increasingeconomic interdependencehad drawn the developed states closer together,increasing the benefitsof peace and the costs of severedrelationships (Morgenthau, 1975). This analysiswas accurateand important;with the benefit of hindsight,I would argue thatMorgenthau did notgo farenough, did notsee the extentto whichinternational politics among the developed states15was being transformedradically not only because of changesin thecosts and benefitsof warand peace butbecause of changes in values and the propensityof democraciesto cooperatewith each other.Morgenthau denied the possibility of theformer change or theefficacy of thelatter. His stresson the role of malignhuman natureon the one hand and the powerfulrole of the internationalenvironment on the other leftlittle room for values and domesticregimes. But if human beings have not changed, significantelements of the value systemin developed democracies have. The triumphof bourgeois democracymay not be the end of history,but concernfor honor, preoccupationwith position for its own sake ratherthan for nationalwell-being, and the drive for nationaldominance are greatlyreduced.16

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Morgenthauwould have troublewith this conclusion. He reservedsome of his sharpestcomments for those who believed thatdemocracies were fundamentally different, that they could extendthe norms and valuesupon whichthey were constructed to the internationalarena. Indeed, WoodrowWilson and his followersrepresent for Morgenthaumuch that was wrong- headed about foreignpolicy in the twentiethcentury. Most re- alistsagreed; states were like "billiard balls" in thattheir internal differenceswere inconsequential and theirbehavior determined onlyby their reactions to one another.17But whileit is truethat democraciesare notless willing to fightthan are otherforms of government,they rarely if ever fight each other.18Although it is all too easyto imaginethe frail democracies in theformer USSR and EasternEurope goingto warwith each other,regimes that are not onlysubject to the willof theirpeoples but also have stableand well-establishedinstitutions are verylikely to remain at peace witheach otherand to cooperatemore readily than is truefor autocracies or revolutionaryregimes. The individual- ism,faith in reason,and willingnessto compromisethat Mor- genthauhad seen as underminingdemocracies' ability to con- ductworld politics in a worldof hostile states may in factproduce thedesired and expectedresults when they are sharedamong all themajor powers. The expectationthat just regimes would even- tuallytriumph and thatstates could not remainstrong if they oppressedtheir people seemed naive to mostrealists (myself included).But it mayhave sustainedpopular support for West- ernforeign policies during the Cold Warand helpedbring about whatMorgenthau and so manyothers thought was impossible: a worldin whichthe most powerful states in thesystem no longer menaceeach other.

Notes 1 There seemsto be morethan a bitof truthin thesepropositions, as I willdiscuss later.

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2 The classic contrastbetween Anglo-Americaninternational thoughton the one hand and thatof ContinentalEurope on the otheris Wolfers,1962, ch. 15. 3 The most complete treatment,with special reference to internationalpolitics, is Baldwin,1989. 4 He makes the formerpoint clear in Morgenthau,1958, pp. 75-81. 5 It is possible,of course, for a scholar'spolicy preferences to shape his theoriesand indeed thismay have been truefor some of Waltz'sarguments. 6 For furtherdiscussion, see Jervis,forthcoming, ch. 3. 7 See, for example,Snyder, 1984; Posen, 1984; Schelling,1960, ch. 9; 1985. 8 Spiegel, The literatureis voluminous:important works include Wohlstet- ter, 1962; Holsti, 1967, ch. 2; Jervis,1976; Larson, 1985; Jervis, Lebow,and Stein,1985. 9 For an earlier theselines, see Odell, 1982. 10 studyalong See, forexample, Janis and Mann, 1977; Cottam,1977; Lebow, 1981; Tervis,Lebow, and Stein,1985; Wark,1985. 11 This book is perhapsthe mostimportant and surelyone of the mostcontroversial in the studyof Americanpolitics and society. 12 See, forexample, Lumsdaine, 1993, ch. 1. 13 Much recentscholarship has concernedthe conditionsunder whichstates pursue relativerather than absolute gains: Baldwin, 1993. 14 More recently,Paul Schroeder(1994) has developed in rich detaila viewthat is similarto Morgenthau's. 15 This qualificationis important;international politics in the rest of theworld bears much greater resemblance to traditionalpatterns. 16 For furtherdiscussion, see, forexample, Mueller, 1989; Jervis, 1991/92;Tervis, 1993. 17 The analogy comes from Wolfers,Discord and Collaboration. Waltz'spowerful theory is built in large measure on denyingthe relevance of domestic differencesfor the basic patterns of internationalpolitics (Theory of International Politics), although he sees theirrole in settingthe detailsof policy(Waltz, 1967). The evidenceand literatureis wellsummarized in Russett, 1993.

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