Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemma

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Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemma brief 28 Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma Reforming the Security Sector brief 28 Contents The editor Mark Sedra is a research associate at Zusammenfassung BICC, working on a project that German summary 4 monitors developments in the Afghan security sector reform process. Acknowledgments 6 He organized and served as the moderator for the BICC E- Background on the Bonn International Center for Conference titled, “Afghanistan: Conversion (BICC) and its Work on Afghanistan 7 Assessing the Progress of Security Sector Reform, One Year After the Introduction Geneva Conference”, of which this Mark Sedra 8 publication is a result. Old Questions Needing New Answers: A Fresh Look at Security Needs in Afghanistan Paul O’Brien and Paul Barker 17 Military Reform in Afghanistan Antonio Giustozzi 23 Police Reform in Afghanistan: An Overview Mark Sedra 32 Identifying Options and Entry Points for Disarmament, Demobilization,and Reintegration in Afghanistan Barnett R. Rubin 40 Karzai’s Fiscal Foes and How to Beat Them S. Frederick Starr 45 Afghans Struggle to Restore Justice in their Country: How can Afghans Redress Past Abuses Without Creating New Injustices? Ahmad Nader Nadery 49 Cover photo: Caro/Trappe Gender and Security Issues: Women in Afghanistan Kabul, Afghanistan, 2003 Sadiqa Basiri 54 This conference report was made Recommendations possible by the generous support of Mark Sedra 62 the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada. Contributors 69 E-Conference Participation List 71 Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 72 2 B I C C brief 28 Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma Reforming the Security Sector Mark Sedra (ed.) september 2003 B I C C 3 brief 28 Zusammenfassung German Summary ie Sicherheitssituation in Afghani- Die Agenda zur Sicherheitssektorreform aus verschiedenen internationalen Dstan hat sich im Jahre 2003 in in Afghanistan, die formell im April Organisationen, Nicht-Regierungs- alarmierender Weise verschlechtert. 2002 auf der Geberkonferenz in Genf organisationen, Forschungs- Selbst hochrangige afghanische beschlossen wurde, basiert auf fünf einrichtungen, Vertretungen der Regierungsmitglieder warnen bei Säulen: Geberländer sowie der Übergangsregie- Besuchen im Ausland vor der derzeiti- rung Afghanistans beteiligten. Drei gen Situation. Der afghanische Außen- Militärreform Aspekte der Sicherheitssektorreform minister Abdullah betonte während standen im Mittelpunkt der Konferenz: einer Reise nach Washington im Juli Polizeireform die Reform des Militärs, die Reform der 2003, dass das Land wieder zu einem Polizei und die Entwaffnung, Demobi- „failed state“ werde und von „Drogen- Rechtsreform lisierung und Reintegration von Ex- bossen, Kriegsherren und Kräften der Kombattanten. Die Ergebnisse dieses Dunkelheit regiert und durch Terroris- Entwaffnung, Demobilisierung und Dialogs bilden den Ausgangspunkt für mus destabilisiert wird“, wenn nicht Reintegration (DDR) von Ex- diesen brief. dringlich Maßnahmen ergriffen würden, Kombattanten um das Problem der inneren Sicherheit Die Reform des Sicherheitssektors in in Afghanistan anzugehen. Kampf gegen Drogen einem Land mit einer so langen Geschichte interner Konflikte und Die Gründe für den Mangel an Sicher- Trotz der großen Dringlichkeit ist ihr Kämpfe ist nicht einfach. Es ist ein heit sind mannigfaltig, und reichen Erfolg bis dato begrenzt. Pläne zur Prozess, der nicht nur Zeit kostet vom Wirken mächtiger Kriegsherren Reform des Militärs und der Polizei sondern auch der unerschütterlichen (Warlords), dem Wiederaufleben von sind deutlich hinter der Zeitplanung Entschlossenheit aller daran beteiligten Gruppen, die - wie die Taliban - den zurück; ein Plan zur Entwaffnung, Parteien bedarf. An der zuletzt genann- gegenwärtigen Konsolidierungskurs Demobilisierung und Reintegration von ten Bedingung scheiterte die Reform sabotieren wollen, über den Drogen- Ex-Kombattanten muss erst noch bisher. Fehler in der allgemeinen handel und die allgemeine Kriminalität implementiert werden und die Rechts- Strategie zur Implementierung der bis hin zur Einmischung von Nachbar- reform sowie ernsthafte Maßnahmen Sicherheitssektorreform, die durch staaten. Die afghanische Übergangsre- gegen den Drogenhandel sind durch kontraproduktive Entscheidungen von gierung (ATA) verfügt, obwohl sie seit organisatorische Schwierigkeiten, Geberländern wie auch Entscheidungen ihrer Einsetzung im Juni 2002 eine schlechte Planung und einen Mangel an der ATA noch verstärkt wurden, haben Reihe von bemerkenswerten Erfolgen Initiative verzögert worden. den Prozess behindert, ihn sogar zu verzeichnen hat, außerhalb Kabuls manchmal völlig zum Stillstand über kaum nennenswerte Autorität. Der nur stockende Fortschritt ist auf gebracht. Jenseits der Hauptstadt haben noch zwei Hauptfaktoren zurückzuführen: immer Kriegsherren, Milizen und Die internationalen Geber beachten und 1) Ausweitung der ISAF kriminelle Banden das Sagen. unterstützen die Reform nicht ausrei- Unabhängig davon, wie viel Geld chend und die institutionelle Reform und Unterstützung zur Reform des Da die internationale Staatengemein- der Ministerien des Inneren und der Militärs und der Polizei aufgewendet schaft bisher nicht bereit ist, das Mandat Verteidigung ist bisher nur schleppend wird, wird es so lange Sicherheits- der Friedensmission der International erfolgt. mängel geben, bis die afghanischen Security Assistance Force (ISAF) auf Der vorliegende brief versucht Möglich- Sicherheitskräfte ihre volle Kapazität Gebiete außerhalb der Hauptstadt keiten aufzuzeigen, wie der Prozess der erreicht haben. Angesichts des auszuweiten, konzentrieren sich die Sicherheitssektorreform auf den derzeitigen - eher langsamen - Hoffnungen auf eine Verbesserung der richtigen Weg gebracht werden kann Fortschritts in dem Situation auf die Reform des und die anvisierten Ziele erreicht werden Ausbildungsprozess für Polizei und Sicherheitssektors. Die Erwartungen an können. Armee wird dieses Defizit wohl noch eine solche Reform, deren Ziel es ist, drei bis fünf Jahre lang bestehen effiziente, effektive und rechenschafts- Dies war auch das Thema einer bleiben. Ohne die Stationierung pflichtige staatliche Sicherheitseinrich- ‚E-Konferenz‘ mit dem Titel: Bewertung internationaler Sicherheitskräfte tungen zu schaffen, sind jedoch des Fortschritts der Sicherheitssektorreform: während dieser Zeit zur Gewährlei- übertrieben hoch und unverhältnis- Ein Jahr nach der Geberkonferenz von Genf. stung eines Minimums an Sicherheit mäßig. Vom 4. bis11. Juni 2003 leitete das im Land droht der Bonn-Prozess zu BICC diesen im Internet geführten scheitern. Dialog, an dem sich über 100 Personen 4 B I C C German summary 2) Das afghanische Militär (AMF) dass derartige Themengebiete in die Die Reform des Sicherheitssektors ist Angesichts der derzeitigen Zahl von Diskussion um den Wiederaufbau das wichtigste Instrument zur Behe- Absolventen der Militärausbildung und die Reform des Sicherheits- bung des Sicherheitsproblems in für die afghanische Armee (ANA), sektors aufgenommen werden. Afghanistan. Um die ins Stocken wird es bis zu fünf Jahre dauern, bis geratene Reform wieder in Gang zu sie ihre maximale Truppenstärke von 5) Ausweitung und effektivere bringen, müssen sowohl die Geber- 70.000 erreicht hat. Dies bedeutet, Verteilung der wirtschaftlichen länder wie auch die ATA schwierige dass das afghanische Militär - derzeit Hilfe Entscheidungen treffen. Diese Entschei- eine Mischung verschiedenster Der derzeitige Umfang wirtschaftli- dungen werden unausweichlich verstärk- militärischer Gruppierungen der cher Hilfe und Unterstützung für die te finanzielle Verpflichtungen der einzelnen Stämme unter dem Reform des Sicherheitssektors - und Geberländer erfordern, wie auch eine Kommando des Verteidigungsmini- somit auch für den Prozess des stärkere Entschlossenheit zur Durch- steriums - länger als zuvor angenom- Wiederaufbaus - entspricht nicht führung von Reformen durch die men in seiner derzeitigen Zusam- dem Ausmaß der Anforderungen. afghanische Regierung. Sollte dieses mensetzung bestehen bleibt. Es ist Es ist dringend erforderlich, dass Vorhaben misslingen und die Unsicher- daher wichtig, dass das Militär, das mehr Unterstützung geleistet und heit in Afghanistan weiter zunehmen, im Kampf gegen die Taliban an diese effektiv eingesetzt wird. Mehr wird der Bonn-Prozess in seiner vorderster Stelle steht, einerseits Hilfe sollte in Trustfonds umgeleitet Umsetzung weiter erheblich gefährdet. genügend Unterstützung erhält, werden, die die laufenden Ausgaben andererseits aber auch einer genauen von Ministerien und Sicherheits- Kontrolle unterzogen wird. institutionen decken. Afghanistan steht derzeit vor einer akuten 3) Warlord-Ökonomien Haushaltslücke, die behoben werden In vielen Fällen beruht die Macht von muss. Einer der ersten Schritte bei Warlords in Afghanistan eher auf der Einleitung von Reformen in wirtschaftlichem als auf militäri- einer Post-Conflict-Gesellschaft ist es schem Erfolg. Anstelle von einseiti- sicherzustellen, dass Regierungsange- gen Bemühungen eine nationale stellte und Sicherheitskräfte ein Armee aufzubauen um Sicherheit angemessenes und regelmäßiges wiederherzustellen, sollte wesentlich Einkommen erhalten. mehr Aufmerksamkeit darauf gerichtet werden, wie die wirtschaftli- 6) Beschleunigung und Harmonisie- chen Fundamente der Macht der rung des Prozesses der Warlords ausgemerzt und die der Sicherheitssektorreform Karzai-Regierung gestützt werden Da es unwahrscheinlich ist, dass die können. Dazu muss die florierende Mission der Friedenstruppen Schattenwirtschaft,
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