Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemma

brief 28 Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma Reforming the Security Sector brief 28

Contents The editor Mark Sedra is a research associate at Zusammenfassung BICC, working on a project that German summary 4 monitors developments in the Afghan security sector reform process. Acknowledgments 6 He organized and served as the moderator for the BICC E- Background on the Bonn International Center for Conference titled, “Afghanistan: Conversion (BICC) and its Work on Afghanistan 7 Assessing the Progress of Security Sector Reform, One Year After the Introduction Geneva Conference”, of which this Mark Sedra 8 publication is a result.

Old Questions Needing New Answers: A Fresh Look at Security Needs in Afghanistan Paul O’Brien and Paul Barker 17

Military Reform in Afghanistan Antonio Giustozzi 23

Police Reform in Afghanistan: An Overview Mark Sedra 32

Identifying Options and Entry Points for Disarmament, Demobilization,and Reintegration in Afghanistan Barnett R. Rubin 40

Karzai’s Fiscal Foes and How to Beat Them S. Frederick Starr 45

Afghans Struggle to Restore Justice in their Country: How can Afghans Redress Past Abuses Without Creating New Injustices? Ahmad Nader Nadery 49 Cover photo: Caro/Trappe Gender and Security Issues: Women in Afghanistan Kabul, Afghanistan, 2003 Sadiqa Basiri 54 This conference report was made Recommendations possible by the generous support of Mark Sedra 62 the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada. Contributors 69

E-Conference Participation List 71

Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 72

2 B I C C brief 28 Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma Reforming the Security Sector

Mark Sedra (ed.)

september 2003

B I C C 3 brief 28

Zusammenfassung German Summary

ie Sicherheitssituation in Afghani- Die Agenda zur Sicherheitssektorreform aus verschiedenen internationalen Dstan hat sich im Jahre 2003 in in Afghanistan, die formell im April Organisationen, Nicht-Regierungs- alarmierender Weise verschlechtert. 2002 auf der Geberkonferenz in Genf organisationen, Forschungs- Selbst hochrangige afghanische beschlossen wurde, basiert auf fünf einrichtungen, Vertretungen der Regierungsmitglieder warnen bei Säulen: Geberländer sowie der Übergangsregie- Besuchen im Ausland vor der derzeiti- rung Afghanistans beteiligten. Drei gen Situation. Der afghanische Außen- Militärreform Aspekte der Sicherheitssektorreform minister Abdullah betonte während standen im Mittelpunkt der Konferenz: einer Reise nach Washington im Juli Polizeireform die Reform des Militärs, die Reform der 2003, dass das Land wieder zu einem Polizei und die Entwaffnung, Demobi- „failed state“ werde und von „Drogen- Rechtsreform lisierung und Reintegration von Ex- bossen, Kriegsherren und Kräften der Kombattanten. Die Ergebnisse dieses Dunkelheit regiert und durch Terroris- Entwaffnung, Demobilisierung und Dialogs bilden den Ausgangspunkt für mus destabilisiert wird“, wenn nicht Reintegration (DDR) von Ex- diesen brief. dringlich Maßnahmen ergriffen würden, Kombattanten um das Problem der inneren Sicherheit Die Reform des Sicherheitssektors in in Afghanistan anzugehen. Kampf gegen Drogen einem Land mit einer so langen Geschichte interner Konflikte und Die Gründe für den Mangel an Sicher- Trotz der großen Dringlichkeit ist ihr Kämpfe ist nicht einfach. Es ist ein heit sind mannigfaltig, und reichen Erfolg bis dato begrenzt. Pläne zur Prozess, der nicht nur Zeit kostet vom Wirken mächtiger Kriegsherren Reform des Militärs und der Polizei sondern auch der unerschütterlichen (Warlords), dem Wiederaufleben von sind deutlich hinter der Zeitplanung Entschlossenheit aller daran beteiligten Gruppen, die - wie die Taliban - den zurück; ein Plan zur Entwaffnung, Parteien bedarf. An der zuletzt genann- gegenwärtigen Konsolidierungskurs Demobilisierung und Reintegration von ten Bedingung scheiterte die Reform sabotieren wollen, über den Drogen- Ex-Kombattanten muss erst noch bisher. Fehler in der allgemeinen handel und die allgemeine Kriminalität implementiert werden und die Rechts- Strategie zur Implementierung der bis hin zur Einmischung von Nachbar- reform sowie ernsthafte Maßnahmen Sicherheitssektorreform, die durch staaten. Die afghanische Übergangsre- gegen den Drogenhandel sind durch kontraproduktive Entscheidungen von gierung (ATA) verfügt, obwohl sie seit organisatorische Schwierigkeiten, Geberländern wie auch Entscheidungen ihrer Einsetzung im Juni 2002 eine schlechte Planung und einen Mangel an der ATA noch verstärkt wurden, haben Reihe von bemerkenswerten Erfolgen Initiative verzögert worden. den Prozess behindert, ihn sogar zu verzeichnen hat, außerhalb Kabuls manchmal völlig zum Stillstand über kaum nennenswerte Autorität. Der nur stockende Fortschritt ist auf gebracht. Jenseits der Hauptstadt haben noch zwei Hauptfaktoren zurückzuführen: immer Kriegsherren, Milizen und Die internationalen Geber beachten und 1) Ausweitung der ISAF kriminelle Banden das Sagen. unterstützen die Reform nicht ausrei- Unabhängig davon, wie viel Geld chend und die institutionelle Reform und Unterstützung zur Reform des Da die internationale Staatengemein- der Ministerien des Inneren und der Militärs und der Polizei aufgewendet schaft bisher nicht bereit ist, das Mandat Verteidigung ist bisher nur schleppend wird, wird es so lange Sicherheits- der Friedensmission der International erfolgt. mängel geben, bis die afghanischen Security Assistance Force (ISAF) auf Der vorliegende brief versucht Möglich- Sicherheitskräfte ihre volle Kapazität Gebiete außerhalb der Hauptstadt keiten aufzuzeigen, wie der Prozess der erreicht haben. Angesichts des auszuweiten, konzentrieren sich die Sicherheitssektorreform auf den derzeitigen - eher langsamen - Hoffnungen auf eine Verbesserung der richtigen Weg gebracht werden kann Fortschritts in dem Situation auf die Reform des und die anvisierten Ziele erreicht werden Ausbildungsprozess für Polizei und Sicherheitssektors. Die Erwartungen an können. Armee wird dieses Defizit wohl noch eine solche Reform, deren Ziel es ist, drei bis fünf Jahre lang bestehen effiziente, effektive und rechenschafts- Dies war auch das Thema einer bleiben. Ohne die Stationierung pflichtige staatliche Sicherheitseinrich- ‚E-Konferenz‘ mit dem Titel: Bewertung internationaler Sicherheitskräfte tungen zu schaffen, sind jedoch des Fortschritts der Sicherheitssektorreform: während dieser Zeit zur Gewährlei- übertrieben hoch und unverhältnis- Ein Jahr nach der Geberkonferenz von Genf. stung eines Minimums an Sicherheit mäßig. Vom 4. bis11. Juni 2003 leitete das im Land droht der Bonn-Prozess zu BICC diesen im Internet geführten scheitern. Dialog, an dem sich über 100 Personen

4 B I C C German summary

2) Das afghanische Militär (AMF) dass derartige Themengebiete in die Die Reform des Sicherheitssektors ist Angesichts der derzeitigen Zahl von Diskussion um den Wiederaufbau das wichtigste Instrument zur Behe- Absolventen der Militärausbildung und die Reform des Sicherheits- bung des Sicherheitsproblems in für die afghanische Armee (ANA), sektors aufgenommen werden. Afghanistan. Um die ins Stocken wird es bis zu fünf Jahre dauern, bis geratene Reform wieder in Gang zu sie ihre maximale Truppenstärke von 5) Ausweitung und effektivere bringen, müssen sowohl die Geber- 70.000 erreicht hat. Dies bedeutet, Verteilung der wirtschaftlichen länder wie auch die ATA schwierige dass das afghanische Militär - derzeit Hilfe Entscheidungen treffen. Diese Entschei- eine Mischung verschiedenster Der derzeitige Umfang wirtschaftli- dungen werden unausweichlich verstärk- militärischer Gruppierungen der cher Hilfe und Unterstützung für die te finanzielle Verpflichtungen der einzelnen Stämme unter dem Reform des Sicherheitssektors - und Geberländer erfordern, wie auch eine Kommando des Verteidigungsmini- somit auch für den Prozess des stärkere Entschlossenheit zur Durch- steriums - länger als zuvor angenom- Wiederaufbaus - entspricht nicht führung von Reformen durch die men in seiner derzeitigen Zusam- dem Ausmaß der Anforderungen. afghanische Regierung. Sollte dieses mensetzung bestehen bleibt. Es ist Es ist dringend erforderlich, dass Vorhaben misslingen und die Unsicher- daher wichtig, dass das Militär, das mehr Unterstützung geleistet und heit in Afghanistan weiter zunehmen, im Kampf gegen die Taliban an diese effektiv eingesetzt wird. Mehr wird der Bonn-Prozess in seiner vorderster Stelle steht, einerseits Hilfe sollte in Trustfonds umgeleitet Umsetzung weiter erheblich gefährdet. genügend Unterstützung erhält, werden, die die laufenden Ausgaben andererseits aber auch einer genauen von Ministerien und Sicherheits- Kontrolle unterzogen wird. institutionen decken. Afghanistan steht derzeit vor einer akuten 3) Warlord-Ökonomien Haushaltslücke, die behoben werden In vielen Fällen beruht die Macht von muss. Einer der ersten Schritte bei Warlords in Afghanistan eher auf der Einleitung von Reformen in wirtschaftlichem als auf militäri- einer Post-Conflict-Gesellschaft ist es schem Erfolg. Anstelle von einseiti- sicherzustellen, dass Regierungsange- gen Bemühungen eine nationale stellte und Sicherheitskräfte ein Armee aufzubauen um Sicherheit angemessenes und regelmäßiges wiederherzustellen, sollte wesentlich Einkommen erhalten. mehr Aufmerksamkeit darauf gerichtet werden, wie die wirtschaftli- 6) Beschleunigung und Harmonisie- chen Fundamente der Macht der rung des Prozesses der Warlords ausgemerzt und die der Sicherheitssektorreform Karzai-Regierung gestützt werden Da es unwahrscheinlich ist, dass die können. Dazu muss die florierende Mission der Friedenstruppen Schattenwirtschaft, in der der ausgeweitet wird, ist es dringend Drogenhandel einen zentralen Punkt nötig, dass die Reform des darstellt, beseitigt und der Übergang Sicherheitssektors signifikant zu einer legitimen Zivilwirtschaft beschleunigt wird. Dazu bedarf es gefördert werden. jedoch einer erheblichen Verstärkung der externen Unterstützung. Darüber 4) Gender und Menschenrechte hinaus ist eine Harmonisierung der Von dem Status der schwächsten fünf Säulen der Sicherheitssektor- Gruppen in einem Staat kann man reform von großer Wichtigkeit. Der generell ableiten, wie es um die Erfolg der derzeitigen Strategie steht Sicherheit in einer Gesellschaft und fällt mit dem gleichzeitigen bestellt ist. In Afghanistan gehören Fortschritt in allen beteiligten fraglos Frauen, Kinder und Behin- Bereichen. Zögerlicher und ungleich- derte der schwächsten Gruppe an. mäßiger Fortschritt aufgrund von Daher sind die Themen um Gleich- unausgewogener Unterstützung berechtigung und Menschenrechte durch Geber hat dazu geführt, dass auch für die Sicherheit relevant. Aus die Reform des Sicherheitssektors diesem Grund ist es überaus wichtig, aufgehalten wurde. So hat z.B. fehlender Fortschritt im Bereich von Entwaffnung, Demobilisierung und Reintegration sowie der Justiz die Reform des Militärs und der Polizei erheblich behindert.

B I C C 5 brief 28

Acknowledgments

would like to thank all of the chapter Research Centre of Canada (IDRC). arrived at the organization in August Iauthors for contributing such Pamela Scholey and Gerd Schönwälder 2001; to Andreas Heinemann-Grüder excellent work to this publication. I at IDRC deserve thanks for the who played an important role in helping would also like to thank Katharina encouragement and support they have to establish the Afghanistan project; to Moraht of BICC’s Public Relations given to the project. Kees Kingma who, as a supervisor for Department for doing such a superb my work, provided me with invaluable job to prepare the brief for publication. Special thanks go to Corinna guidance and support; and finally to the Hauswedell, who has been extremely senior staff at BICC who have displayed Of course, neither the brief nor the e- supportive of my work at BICC since I firm resolve in supporting both the conference would have been possible Afghanistan project and my own work. without the generous financial support of the International Development Mark Sedra September 2003

Map: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

6 B I C C background

Background on the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) and its Work on Afghanistan

he Bonn International Center for consulting services to public and private The e-conference aimed to further one TConversion (BICC) is an indepen- organizations at the national and of the wider objectives of the project, to dent non-profit organization dedicated international level; and collects and promote dialogue among various to promoting the transfer of former disseminates data and information to Afghan and international stakeholders military resources and assets to alterna- practitioners in a wide range of fields and observers on Afghan security tive civilian purposes. The transfer of and institutions. BICC strives to reach issues. resources from the military to the researchers and practitioners as well as civilian sector represents both a social policy-makers, the media, and the and an economic challenge, as well as general public by means of a variety of offering an opportunity for the states tools, including: its publications and concerned. Established in 1994 with annual yearbook, its library, its extensive support from the German State of on-line documentation services, and its North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), internet service (www.bicc.de). BICC’s expertise has broadened from its traditional base in conversion to BICC Afghan Security encompass the following areas: Sector Reform Military technology, production and Monitoring Project expenditures In May 2002, BICC established a project to monitor the internationally- Economics, resources and conflict supported security sector reform process in Afghanistan, which was formally set Disarmament, arms control and in motion at the Geneva security donors surplus weapons meeting of April 2002. The aim of the project is to analyze and assess Small arms control developments in regard to the five pillars of the security sector reform Security sector reform agenda: military reform; police reform; judicial reform; counter-narcotics; and Demobilization and development the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR). Base closure and redevelopment The project offers research and advisory services to international organizations, Current conflicts and preventive governments and non-governmental conversion organizations. It has produced a number of articles and publications, As an international think tank and including BICC Paper 25, titled, clearinghouse, BICC conducts research Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security and makes policy recommendations; Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan offers project management and and the Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF) Special Report titled, Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction: Where do we go from here?

B I C C 7 brief 28

Introduction

by Mark Sedra “Security Sector Reform, in short, is the basic pre-requisite to recreating the nation that today’s parents hope to leave to future generations.” President Hamid Karzai 30 July 2003, Kabul, Afghanistan

ith the two-year anniversary of the wider reconstruction effort will be and Interior, have yet to materialize. Wthe fall of the Taliban nearly upon imperiled. The achievements of the Such reforms must be implemented us, it is an opportune moment for process have been limited thus far due without delay, as security institutions retrospection, a time to take stock of to a number of factors, five of which will not be deemed acceptable by the efforts to restore security and stability to are discussed in this brief. First, the population until they are seen as Afghanistan. According to US military multi-sector support scheme devised by ethnically representative and free of officials, the security situation in donor states, in which individual states corruption. Finally, an insufficient Afghanistan is the best it has been in have been tasked with the responsibility amount of attention has been dedicated decades. In May 2003, US Secretary of of supervising each pillar of the to issues of gender and human rights, Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on a state process, has proven to be flawed. The which have tremendous implications for visit to Kabul, declared an end to major rationale behind the scheme was that by security. These issues, long a blight on combat operations and a shift of giving donors a direct stake in the the country’s international image, will attention to “stabilization and process, their long-term engagement take time to resolve. However, it is reconstruction activities”. Such bold would be assured. In actuality, it has critical that steps to address them are pronouncements are justified with served to disjoint the process, fostering taken now and integrated into the larger references to the early successes of the uneven progress in a strategy contingent reconstruction and security sector reform state-building process, whether it is the on simultaneous movement among its processes. If mechanisms to protect the voluntary return of over 2.5 million constituent elements. This scheme has rights of women and prevent human refugees from neighboring countries— begun to disintegrate due to its inherent rights abuses are not erected in the the largest voluntary influx of refugees deficiencies, with the US gradually security sector, the reform process will in history—the establishment of a assuming de facto control over the only serve to perpetuate the gender- stable central government that grows entire process. The second obstacle based discrimination and egregious more assertive with each passing day, or relates to the security vacuum in the human rights violations that have the smooth introduction of a new country and the international characterized the recent history of currency, the afghani. Yet the situation community’s unwillingness to commit Afghanistan. on the ground appears to contradict peacekeeping forces to fill it. Regardless these confident assurances. The most of how rapid state security structures, The causes of Afghan insecurity, while qualified judges of the situation, the which were completely decimated by the highly interconnected, can be broken Afghan people, continue to cite security civil war, are reconstructed, there will down into five categories: warlordism; as the paramount problem facing their inevitably be a security gap until state total spoiler groups; the narcotics trade; country. The steady rise of insecurity in security structures reach their full the interference of regional states; and 2003 has impeded development and capacity. During this period, an external crime. Afghanistan’s warlords pose the reconstruction activities, hindered the security presence is needed to insulate most potent threat to the nascent process to establish a constitution, and the nascent central government and political order. They are products of shed doubt on the viability of national facilitate the reconstruction and peace- Afghanistan’s long civil war and its elections scheduled for June 2004. building process, a requirement clearly decentralized political tradition and outlined in the Bonn Agreement. Third, consist primarily of former mujahidin A security sector reform process was growing donor fatigue coupled with the commanders who control well-armed launched in 2002 to confront slow pace of aid delivery has deprived militia groups. In the power vacuum Afghanistan’s security dilemma in a the process of vital funds. This brief that emerged following the collapse of sustainable fashion. This brief will show argues that a substantial increase in the Taliban regime, they aggressively that without tangible progress in this donor support, specifically targeted at carved out mini-fiefdoms across the enterprise, which involves the meeting the recurrent budgetary country. Warlords utilize ethnicity as a establishment of efficient, effective, and requirements of state security tool to assure the loyalty of their accountable state security institutions, institutions, is a precondition for the followers and mobilize support; success of the process. Fourth, planned however, it is power and wealth not reforms for the Afghan government, particularly the Ministry’s of Defense

8 B I C C introduction

ethnic identity or religious zeal that force would be an option to confront dominated areas in the south and east, drives them. They generate resources some, with others it is simply unfeasible human rights abuses perpetrated by through the drug trade, aid from without sparking broader unrest. rival ethnic groups against Pashtuns in foreign states, taxation, and through Different packages of incentives and the north, and a perceived lack of various forms of criminal activity. Under disincentives will have to be devised to representation in the central current conditions, the central confront each warlord on a piecemeal government, have driven many government lacks the wherewithal to basis, a task that will require intensive Pashtuns into the arms of extremist forcibly eliminate the influence of the research on the structure of militia groups. The Taliban have launched a warlords. Accordingly, the Afghan groups and the economic, military, and propaganda campaign in the Pashtun central government and the internatio- social foundations of warlordism in belt to exploit growing Pashtun nal community have employed a Afghanistan, subjects that have yet to be discontent. Pamphlets have surfaced strategy of accommodation, which aims adequately explored. calling on the army and police to join to integrate them into the current the hard-line Islamic movement in its political framework. Contrary to the assertions of some campaign against President Hamid American officials, total spoiler groups Karzai and US-led forces. The Afghanistan’s warlords are an such as the Taliban and former Prime pamphlets also warned that those who amorphous group whose members vary Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i failed to follow the orders of the widely in power, wealth and prestige. Islami party are far from defeated. The Taliban would be killed. There are perhaps five to eight warlords Taliban, as a social and political of significant power in Afghanistan, movement, has been dealt a serious A number of attacks carried out against capable of directly challenging the central blow; however, integrated into a international interests in Afghanistan, government on a military and economic consortium of spoiler groups that most notably the suicide attack on ISAF basis. Paradoxically, however, it is the includes Hizb-i Islami and al-Qaeda peacekeeping forces on 7 June 2003 that myriad of second tier warlords, they have regrouped militarily. Their killed four German soldiers, have clearly incapable of overthrowing the central attacks on coalition forces and the illustrated the increased danger posed by government but powerful enough to Afghan government have gradually spoiler groups. Unlike the warlords, undermine its authority at the local level, increased in intensity and sophistication force is the principal tool that has been who pose the more dangerous threat. over the past year, denoting a new level used to confront these groups. First tier warlords, such as Rashid of motivation and organization in their However, it is not the only tool that can Dostum or Ismail Khan, have benefited guerilla resistance. be employed. To undermine the total greatly from their tacit support of, and spoiler groups as well as the warlords, participation in, the central government. The Taliban have learned from previous steps must be taken to choke off their Preserving the current political setbacks and modified their military sources of revenue, which often dispensation is clearly in their interest, as strategy to confront coalition forces, emanates from the narcotics trade and it provides them with the veneer of establishing mobile training camps and other criminal enterprises. legitimacy without curbing their employing suicide tactics, an approach activities. Second tier warlords do not formerly shunned by the Taliban Decades of war have created a vibrant benefit from the status quo on a leadership. It is estimated that there are war economy in Afghanistan that has commensurate level. more then 1,000 Taliban fighters continued to flourish in the aftermath operating in small groups throughout of the Taliban’s defeat. This shadow While the interests of first tier warlords southern Afghanistan and a economy encompasses a wide spectrum are easily determined, those of the comparable, if not larger, number of of illegitimate economic activity, second tier are much harder to isolate. Hizb-i Islami fighters in the east. The including the exploitation of natural This makes the task of devising a set of recruits are predominantly drawn from resources, such as gemstones, timber, incentives and disincentives to integrate the Pashtun community and range in and minerals; the drug trade; smuggling them into the new political system age from 18 to 30. Pashtuns are of antiquities and other contraband; extremely difficult. They are unsuitable particularly susceptible to recruitment by and extortion. The main beneficiaries of candidates for positions in the spoiler groups because of their growing these activities are the warlords, spoiler government due to their unpopularity sense of disillusionment with the groups and an emerging narco-mafia. among the general population—most current political order. Continued US are war criminals, guilty of grave human military operations in Pashtun The drug trade represents a dangerous rights violations—and developing obstacle to Afghan security. In 2002, viable economic inducements is difficult Afghanistan returned to its position as due to the involvement of many of the world’s foremost producer of them in the lucrative drug trade. While heroin. According to the UN Office on

B I C C 9 brief 28

Drugs and Crime (UNODC), profits economic, political and military ties with Confronting insecurity from drug trafficking accounted for 20 Ismail Khan; and elements of the percent of Afghanistan’s GDP in 2002 Pakistani military and intelligence Processes to reconstruct post-conflict (Reuters, 22 May 2003). Approximately apparatus have allegedly provided refuge states invariably includes initiatives to 3-4 million people in the country and support to their former client, the reform its security sector. The concept depend on the drug economy for their Taliban, turning a blind eye to their of security sector reform is relatively new survival. Poppy cultivation for use in cross-border guerilla attacks on and broadly defined; it can encompass opium and heroin production has been Coalition and ATA targets from various elements depending on the common in Afghanistan for several Pakistani territory. Other states including context in which it is implemented. The decades; however, a disturbing Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Organization for Economic Co- phenomenon of the past 1-2 years is and India are also guilty of interfering in operation and Development (OECD) the emergence of drug laboratories in Afghan domestic affairs, but on a lesser describes the security sector as the country. Whereas, poppies were scale. incorporating: previously taken outside the country to be refined into heroin, now, a large Violence and criminality are rife ...the security forces and the relevant civilian proportion of the narcotics apparatus, throughout Afghanistan, whether it is bodies and processes needed to manage them and the criminal networks that operate along its highways and borders or and encompassing state institutions which it, has shifted into Afghanistan. Afghan within its towns and urban centers. have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani has aptly Lakhdar Brahimi, in a speech at a the state and its citizens against acts of warned that the narcotics trade is “a conference on security sector reform in violence and coercion (e.g. armed forces, the threat to democracy” that if left July 2003, stated that “skirmishes police, the intelligence service and all other unchecked would transform Afghani- between local commanders...continue to institutions entrusted with police powers and stan into a narco-mafia state. cause civilian causalities in many parts of executive authority); and the elected and duly the country where terrorism is no longer appointed civil authorities responsible for The influence and interference of an issue” and there are “daily reports of control and oversight of these institutions neighboring states in Afghanistan is abuses committed by gunmen against (e.g. municipal, regional, and national also a source of conflict and division in the population—armed gangs who parliaments and the executive branch of the country. Afghanistan’s geopolitical establish illegal checkpoints, tax farmers, government) (OECD/DAC, 2001, pp. importance has impelled regional states intimidate, rob, rape and do so—all to 22-24). to surreptitiously compete for influence often—while wielding the formal title and pursue their interests via proxies, a of military commander, police or The fundamental objective of security tactic that has served to augment the security chief ” (Brahimi, 2003). While sector reform “is to strengthen the country’s fragmentation along ethnic, few Afghans would mourn the loss of ability of the sector as a whole and each religious and political lines. Virtually all the Taliban and the vast majority are of its individual parts to provide an observers agree that regional states must enthusiastically supportive of the new accountable, equitable, effective, and cease all support for sub-state actors— central government and its international rights respecting service” (UNDP, 2003, individual parties, tribes, and warlords. patrons, frustration over worsening p. 5). If left unreformed the security A significant step towards this goal was security conditions is palpable and sector could serve to perpetuate, rather achieved with the signing of the Kabul growing. It is not difficult to find then subdue insecurity. It is often the Declaration on Good-Neighborly Afghans who will explain that, although case in post-conflict societies that elite Relations, a pledge of non-interference the Taliban were ruthless and groups intent on utilizing state security by Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors, oppressive, one could travel from Kabul structures to further their narrow Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, to Kandahar without fear of bandits or interests dominate the security sector. China, and Iran, on 22 December 2002. a local warlord. Such perceptions, while Such a scenario fuels existing cycles of However, in spite of this declaration understandable, must be vigorously violence and will inevitably undermine and previous assurances from regional confronted, and the only way to do so is peace-building and reconstruction states that they would respect to improve the security environment processes. Another endemic problem Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial throughout the country. facing the security sectors of post- integrity, external interference has conflict states is a scarcity of resources. continued unabated. The most blatant Under-funded security and judicial offenders in this regard are Russia, Iran, institutions “are vulnerable and and Pakistan. Russia has provided susceptible to corruptive influence” economic and military aid to Jamiat-i which will only decrease public faith in Islami and particularly the dominant these structures and augment the Panjsheri faction; Iran has strong

10 B I C C introduction

likelihood of a return to hostilities (UF or Northern Alliance), the military Fourteen prominent experts and (UNDP, 2003, p. 6). The success of a force that ousted the Taliban with the practitioners working on Afghanistan state-building enterprise depends on the assistance of the US. This faction, presented papers at the event. A establishment of a well-functioning and comprised predominantly of ethnic selection of six of these conference structured security sector. The Tajiks emanating from the Panjsher papers and one wholly new piece are institutions that fall under its umbrella Valley situated north of Kabul, have included in this brief. are needed to provide a basic level of since consolidated their authority over safety and security for the public and these institutions, including the The first paper presented in the brief, by facilitate a return to normalcy in the Ministry’s of Defense and Interior, the Paul O’Brien and Paul Barker, the political, economic and social spheres. National Security Directorate (NSD), Advocacy Coordinator and Country and the Army. Representative respectively for one of To achieve the objective of creating a the largest and most respected aid efficient and effective security sector, The Afghan security sector reform organization’s operating in Afghanistan, reform efforts must address four agenda, formally established at a security CARE International, provides an specific areas: to establish democratic donors meeting in Geneva in April overview of the security situation from oversight over all security forces; to 2002, is, at its core, a donor driven the standpoint of an international ensure that resources are rationally and process. It forged an agenda with five NGO. efficiently distributed within the security pillars and allocated responsibility for sector; to prepare security forces to overseeing each pillar to an individual The breakdown of security across much provide the civilian population with an donor state. The pillars are as follows: of the Afghanistan has compelled the adequate level of security; and to clearly military reform (United States); police UN and many NGOs to scale down delineate the tasks and responsibilities reform (Germany); judicial reform their reconstruction and relief activities of the various security forces and (Italy); counter-narcotics (Great Britain); in various parts of the country. institutions to avoid overlap and and the disarmament, demobilization According to UN officials, one third of redundancies. Each individual case will and reintegration of ex-combatants Afghanistan is currently off-limits to demand specific reform measures and (Japan). Progress in each of these areas UN staff. An illustration of the dangers structures; however, all should observe has been slower than anticipated. A that face the UN and NGOs came on 28 these underlying principles (BICC, 2003, number of factors have hindered the March 2003 when Taliban loyalists pp. 54-55). process, including the intransigence of executed a Red Cross (ICRC) worker in the Ministry of Defense, adverse security southern Afghanistan. Ricardo In Afghanistan, it is somewhat conditions across the country, the Munguia, an El Salvadorian water misleading to speak of reforming the interference of regional states, the slow engineer working for the ICRC was security sector, as the process involves pace of reconstruction and aid delivery, gunned down after being singled out of the reconstruction of virtually all state and growing Pashtun disaffection. a two-car ICRC convoy that had been security and justice institutions. After 23 halted by 25 Taliban militants. The act, years of civil war and foreign invasion, In an effort to overcome the current clearly intended to send a message to elements of the former security and impasse and reenergize the security internationals working in Afghanistan, justice apparatuses have been either sector reform process, the Bonn sent shock waves through the aid destroyed or are perceived to be too International Center for Conversion community. It is clear that spoiler tainted by previous regimes to retain. (BICC) organized an e-conference on groups are deliberately targeting aid “Afghanistan: Assessing the Progress of workers in an attempt to destabilize the The Bonn Agreement, signed in Security Sector Reform, One Year After Karzai regime. December 2001 by Afghanistan’s the Geneva Conference.” The principal factions—except for the conference, which took place on 4-11 O’Brien and Barker’s paper offers the defeated Taliban—created an interim June 2003, assembled over one hundred perspective of an NGO, with hundreds government and laid the foundations participants representing various inter- of employees working on development for a nascent security sector. The governmental organizations, NGOs, and relief projects across the country, agreement, while inaugurating the state- academic institutions, donor that must grapple with risk assessments building process, was flawed in that it governments and the Afghan each day to carry out their work. They transferred authority over the bulk of Transitional Administration (ATA). address a number of issues including Afghanistan’s security institutions to a The conference focussed on three the impact of coalition military activities particular faction of the Islamic United aspects of the security sector reform under the auspices of Operation Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan process: military reform; police reform; Enduring Freedom, the Provisional and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

B I C C 11 brief 28

Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept, Much of the current debate on military been the reestablishment of the Kabul and the impact of the ongoing security reform focuses on the ANA training Police Academy. The Academy, which sector reform process. As the title of program. This has distracted attention began training an initial class of 1,500 their paper, Old Questions Needing New from the state of the Afghan Military recruits in the first week of August Answers: A Fresh Look at Security Needs in Force (AMF), otherwise known as the 2002, can be considered one of the Afghanistan, suggests, O’Brien and “existing forces”. Principally comprised success stories of the security sector Barker offer a number of succinct of the militia forces that formed the UF, reform enterprise. However, as Mark recommendations to address insecurity. the AMF numbers more than 100,000 Sedra points out in his paper, titled, These recommendations cover a broad and is at the frontline of the fight Police Reform in Afghanistan: An Overview, range of issues but dedicate particular against the Taliban. It is presumed that far from a solution, this initiative attention to security sector reform. the majority of these forces will be represents only a first step towards demobilized as a part of a addressing Afghanistan’s policing Military reform disarmament, demobilization and dilemma. reintegration program and that the The military reform process has been a ANA will assume their security Sedra provides an overview of the state focal point of attention within the responsibilities. However, with the of the police across the country. Lacking broader security sector reform ANA training program behind schedule training, underpaid if paid at all, and framework since its inception. The US’s and the DDR process stalled, the AMF devoid of basic equipment, the police assumption of the role of lead donor will undoubtedly remain a factor in are unable to provide a basic level of nation for the process illustrates its Afghanistan for years to come. security to the Afghan people. The perceived importance. The central feature Giustozzi stresses the need to dedicate majority of police in Afghanistan are of Afghan military reform is the more attention and scrutiny to the former soldiers and mujahidin fighters creation of a representative and profes- AMF. who bring “a militiamen’s mentality” to sional Afghan National Army (ANA). their jobs that is not conducive for The ANA training process is viewed by The ANA training program has been effective policing. Sedra points out that many as a litmus test for the entire state- beset by problems which limited its this mentality fosters corruption and building endeavor. With international output to 5,000-6,000 troops by August human rights abuses and has donors reluctant to consider the 2003. Giustozzi gives an overview of contributed to the public’s profound extension of the geographical mandate the current training regiment and lack of trust in the police. of the current peace-keeping mission, identifies areas that have been the International Security Assistance problematic. The various criticisms that The various reform initiatives Force (ISAF), beyond the capital, the have been leveled at it, such as its short undertaken with international support expectations for the nascent national duration and the lack of basic are detailed in Sedra’s paper. However, army have been raised to unrealistic equipment, are also deconstructed and particular attention is paid to the levels. Dr. Antonio Giustozzi’s paper assessed. Giustozzi identifies the initiatives undertaken by the Interior on military reform addresses the principal stumbling blocks in the ANA Ministry headed by Minister Ali Ahmad dilemma of expectations versus reality training process as the innate resistance Jalali. Sedra lauds Jalali’s three-pronged regarding the ANA. of the private militias to reform and the approach to address the current security factionalization of the current crisis. The approach involves the The paper begins with an examination government and political climate. establishment and deployment of a of the Afghan army in historical Without increased international quick response unit, highway patrol, and context. Giustozzi shows that many of involvement, Giustozzi sees the border police. This ambitious initiative the problems that hamper the training prospects for the formation of a stable coupled with efforts to shake-up the process today are consistent with national army as quite bleak. Ministry of Interior demonstrates previous attempts to create a broadly Jalali’s resolve to advance the reform representative national army, whether it Police reform process. is ethnic divisions or a lack of equipment and motivation. These The police reform process did not begin In spite of the progress made in police inherent problems compelled previous to receive the same level of scrutiny as reform, a number of imposing regimes to rely heavily on regional and that of military reform and DDR until obstacles remain. The most serious of tribal militias to maintain internal early 2003. One of the principal reasons these obstacles is the lack of internatio- security and control the borders. for the lack of attention is the modest nal support for the process. The Interior level of success that has been achieved in Ministry faces serious funding shortfalls this area. Assigned the task of that prevent it from meeting its supporting Afghan police reform, Germany’s main accomplishment has

12 B I C C introduction

recurrent budgetary priorities, most Afghanistan’s DDR program is perhaps property. Disincentives refer to options importantly the payment of salaries for the most talked about DDR initiative in such as the use of force; recourse to legal the police. The United Nations the world, despite the fact that it has yet measures such as prosecution for Development Programme (UNDP) to begin. The current program, called human rights abuses; and banishment. established a trust fund, called the Law The Afghan New Beginnings Program- and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan me (ANBP), like previous plans, is well Warlord economy (LOFTA), to meet this shortfall, but designed and fully funded. The main donors have failed to provide it with the problem, as Dr Barnett Rubin points Confronting warlordism in Afghanistan necessary funds. out in his paper titled, Identifying Options must involve efforts to undermine the and Entry Points for Disarmament, economic foundations of the warlord’s DDR Demobilization, and Reintegration in power and facilitate a transition to a Afghanistan, is not technical but political. civilian economy. This is the subject of Over the past decade, DDR has come to Rubin identifies several factors that have Dr. Frederick Starr’s paper titled, Karzai’s be viewed as a vital and indispensable stalled the implementation of DDR in Fiscal Foes and How to Beat Them. Starr component of post-war rehabilitation Afghanistan. Perhaps the most asserts that a campaign to combat the and reconstruction projects. A February important factor is Panjsheri economic underpinnings of warlordism 2000 report of the United Nations domination of the Ministry of Defense. should be prioritized ahead of efforts Secretary General titled, The Role of Rubin affirms that the vast majority of to build a national army. Starr uses United Nations Peacekeeping in Afghans perceive the Ministry of Defense Minister Fahim, perhaps the Disarmament, Demobilization and Defense under Marshall Abdul Qasim country’s most powerful warlord, as his Reintegration, recognized that DDR “has Fahim, as merely another factional army. principal case study. Apart from repeatedly proved to be vital to Afghan militia groups are unwilling to maintaining a private army of tens of stabilizing a post-conflict situation; to submit their guns to what they view as a thousands of troops independent of reducing the likelihood of renewed rival faction. Accordingly, the reform of his own Ministry, Fahim serves as the violence, either because of relapse into the MoD is a precondition for the head of a “mafia-like” network “that war or outbreaks of banditry; and to implementation of DDR. Another extends throughout the government facilitating a society’s transition from factor that has obstructed the process is and economy.” Fahim’s power, like that conflict to normalcy and development” the security vacuum that exists across of many other warlords, is predicated (United Nations, 2000, p.1). the country. Persistent insecurity and the mainly on a financial rather then a failure of the international community military basis. Accordingly, an effective The primary purpose of DDR in the to deploy forces to contain it, has means to confront warlordism is to Afghan context is to demilitarize the fostered the perception that people equip the Afghan central government country by disbanding all armed groups must acquire guns or solicit the services with the economic tools to disrupt and and military structures outside state of local warlords and militias to eventually dissolve their economic control and reintegrating former safeguard their families and property. networks. combatants into civilian society. Fundamentally speaking, it aims to According to Rubin, it is the mid-level With Afghanistan at the core of a vast ensure that the state possesses a commanders, or second tier warlords, continental network of transit trade, monopoly over the use of force. that pose the most formidable challenge one of the principal sources of Severing the relationship of dependence to a prospective DDR program. Little resources for the warlords is customs between militiamen and the warlords, research has been conducted on this revenue from the country’s seven main something that can only be group to establish strategies to deal with border points. The Afghan Finance accomplished through the provision of them. It is important that they are listed Ministry asserts that customs revenues reintegration support and employment and profiled to determine what collected nationwide last year exceeded opportunities, is the key to the success incentives and disincentives can be US$500 million, but only US$80 million of DDR in Afghanistan. The removal utilized to demobilize them. Incentives was handed over to Kabul. In an of weapons from Afghan society—it is could include appointments in the attempt to address the problem, Karzai, estimated that there are between eight government, military or police; the in a speech on 18 May 2003, demanded and ten million firearms circulating in provision of advice and support for the that regional leaders fall in line and Afghanistan today—is also a goal of a establishment of a private-sector deliver customs revenue to the central prospective DDR program, but a enterprises; or economic inducements, government. Following this speech, secondary one. The expectation that all, such as cash payoffs or the transfer of twelve of Afghanistan’s key governors or even a majority, of Afghanistan’s and military commanders signed an guns could be collected in the near agreement to hand over customs future is simply unrealistic. revenues to the central government and to stop all military interference in the

B I C C 13 brief 28

political and civil affairs of the country. preventable if concerted action is taken Ahmad Nader Nadery, a member of the This breakthrough has already begun to by the ATA and international AIHRC, offers an insider’s appraisal of pay dividends as several regional community to address them, but such the approach, work and difficulties faced governors have disclosed their financial action has not been forthcoming by the commission in his paper titled, records to the central government and (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Afghans Struggle to Restore Justice in their begun to hand over customs revenue. Country. Nadery’s paper, the only piece Perhaps most importantly, Ismail Few Afghans have been left untouched in the brief that was not presented at the Khan, who controls the lucrative by the egregious human rights e-conference, offers an historical customs post in Herat—it is alleged that violations perpetrated over the last overview of the issue of human rights this post generates up to US$1 million quarter of a century. Many of those in Afghanistan and provides personal per day—handed over US$20 million to responsible for these acts are now part insight on contemporary Afghan the Finance Ministry. This is surely a of the central government or allied with perceptions of the issue. laudable achievement, however, it coalition forces in the war against the remains to be seen whether it signals a remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The AIHRC began its work in earnest at permanent break with previous An independent commission, the the beginning of 2003 and has already behavior or merely a one-time gesture. Afghan Independent Human Rights received over fifty specific complaints Commission (AIHRC), was established concerning past abuses. Nadery stresses With donor fatigue increasingly to investigate these crimes and design that the Afghan population is discernible, it is imperative that the mechanisms to redress them. However, determined to see justice done and are central government assert control over its hands have been tied by a lack of growing increasingly impatient with the this source of revenue. However, to do political will among both the internatio- lack of progress made towards this goal. so the ATA requires the concerted nal community and the Afghan Included in Nadery’s paper are a number support of the international government to address the problem. of emotionally stirring personal community, particularly the US. Starr accounts, drawn from the hundreds of outlines a number of concrete steps that Transitional justice has become interviews conducted by the AIHRC, of the central government, in conjunction somewhat of a taboo subject in victims of human rights violations. with the US and other major donors, Afghanistan, due to concerns that can take to achieve this goal. powerful militia commanders and Nadery identifies several factors that regional warlords will withdraw from have served to “obstruct the path to Transitional justice the political process if the issue is restoring justice”. These include pursued. The UN Secretary General’s growing insecurity, insufficient progress The issues of human rights and Special Representative, Lakhdar Brahimi to reform the judicial system, the lack of transitional justice are central to the has argued emphatically that action on domestic and international political will, debate on Afghanistan’s security transitional justice should be delayed and the existence of deep family dilemma. Countless atrocities have been until the government is stronger, the linkages between victims and abusers. committed by all of Afghanistan’s judiciary reformed, and the security factions during the long civil war, situation stabilized. Brahimi’s approach, Human rights experts insist that several including mass rape, systemic shared by many in the donor steps can be taken in the short-term, executions, torture and indiscriminate community and the transitional within the political limitations imposed shelling. A Human Rights Watch report, administration, is rooted in the belief by the larger political process and the released in late July 2003, shows that that under present conditions adverse security situation, to begin to these abuses continue to occur across eliminating the power and influence of address the issue of transitional justice. much of the country. The report, titled, the warlords is impossible, thus steps Specifically, a countrywide consultation “Killing You Is a Very Easy Thing for that could conceivably alienate them process to gauge public sentiments Us,” catalogues crimes committed must be avoided. It is accurate that in regarding the issue could be established against Afghan civilians, many by state the absence of a countrywide and an international panel of inquiry, security services, over the past year in 12 peacekeeping force it is necessary to charged with assembling, analyzing and provinces of eastern and southeastern integrate the warlords into the political collecting new evidence regarding past Afghanistan. The crimes include armed process; however, ignoring past crimes abuses, formed. As Nadery points out, robbery, extortion, abduction, rape, completely will only serve to exacerbate this process should be integrated into assaults on civilians, and threats against insecurity and undermine the legitimacy the security sector reform process and journalists, feminists and political of the central government. The interna- initiated as soon as possible. activists. These abuses are largely tional community’s silence on accountability for human rights has, in actuality, emboldened warlords to consolidate their power in the central government and extend their influence over elements of the Bonn process.

14 B I C C introduction

Gender and security institutionalize gender equality in out the process over that same span. Afghan society is an incremental one Further illustrating this resource The status of a society’s most that must involve Afghan women, dilemma, the US currently spends vulnerable groups, which in Afghani- Afghan men, and the international US$11 billion per year on its military stan includes women, children and the community. mission in Afghanistan and only US$1 disabled, serves as an accurate barometer billion on reconstruction aid. of the security situation. Accordingly, it Basiri makes a number of concrete is essential that a security sector reform recommendations on how to address A number of general lessons can be process target these groups. The Taliban gender inequality in the short- and long- derived from the ongoing Afghan regime’s legacy of repression towards term. These recommendations include security sector reform process that can be women makes the issue of women’s the establishment of targeted applied to similar cases. First, a multi- rights particularly important in Afghani- employment programs for women, the sectoral donor approach can be stan. Just as the Taliban’s treatment of inclusion of more women in the problematic. The various elements of women was used as a rallying cry to constitutional process, the expansion of security sector reform are so generate support for the war to unseat educational opportunities for women, interconnected that uneven progress, the fundamentalist regime, the situation the introduction of a legal provision generated by an imbalance in levels of of women and girls is now used widely guaranteeing women a set number of donor support, could seriously obstruct in mainstream discourse as the principal seats in the government, the expansion the process. For instance, in Afghani- gauge of the progress of the state- of ISAF outside Kabul, and the stan, the lack of progress on judicial building enterprise. fulfillment of international aid pledges. reform and DDR has seriously impeded, and even stalled, the Sadiqa Basiri of the Afghan Women’s Addressing the implementation of military and police Network (AWN), a grass roots Afghan problem reform. Providing a single entity, such as NGO dedicated to the empowerment the UN, with authority to oversee the entire process, although still funded on of Afghan women, affirms in her paper With the security situation across a multilateral basis, may be more that women in Afghanistan face Afghanistan deteriorating and numerous threats; however, these effective. Second, it is important that aid conventional security solutions such as to the process is delivered on schedule problems are not so different from the deployment of international and channeled to trust funds those faced by women in many other peacekeeping forces unlikely, it is clear developing countries. Providing a responsible for providing budgetary that innovative new approaches to the assistance to relevant ministries and the historical overview of the status of security situation are needed. The final security services. As in many societies women since the late nineteenth century, section of this report contains a list of Basiri places the current state of with dysfunctional security sectors, the 36 recommendations developed during problem often stems from an acute lack women’s rights into its historical, the e-conference, which are intended to of resources that prevent it from cultural, and religious context. She provide a fresh stimulus to the debate meeting such fundamental requirements argues that while it is imperative that on security sector reform. gender approaches are immersed into as the payment of salaries for bureaucrats and security personnel. One the state-building and security sector A theme that runs like a red thread reform processes, the application of of the first steps in reforming a security through the recommendation list and sector is to ensure that adequate salaries overt external pressure could prove to all the papers in the brief is that an are paid on a consistent basis. Third, it be counterproductive. The imposition expansion of donor support for of western conceptions of women’s is virtually impossible to implement Afghanistan is urgently needed. Current security sector reform in a security rights in a country resistant to foreign levels of international support to vacuum, especially in a society with a interference would undoubtedly Afghanistan are simply not precipitate a violent backlash. legacy of violence and turmoil such as commensurate to the scale of the Afghanistan. Whether it is DDR or reconstruction and security challenges counter-narcotics, an organized and Gender roles in Afghanistan are the that exist. Accordingly, it is critical that byproduct of hundreds of years of politically neutral security force, either donors, most notably the United States internal or external, is required to history, punctuated by foreign invasion, and the European Union, significantly facilitate the process. In a country like internecine conflict, drought, and other augment their political, military and forms of hardship. Basiri cautions, that Afghanistan, where the war produced economic support to Afghanistan. At no clear winners or losers, only a myriad there is “no quick fix for the status of the January 2002 Tokyo donors of small- to large-sized factions, and women”. The process to empower conference, US$5.2 billion was pledged Afghanistan’s women and where no classical peace agreement has for the reconstruction of Afghanistan been achieved among the country’s over a five-year period; however, the World Bank has since estimated that US$15–20 billion will be needed to carry

B I C C 15 brief 28

warring parties, this is especially impera- References tive. The failure of the international community to commit peace-keeping Bonn International Center for troops to Afghanistan will undoubtedly Conversion. 2003. Conversion Survey be viewed in the future as a turning 2003. Baden-Baden: Nomos point in the post-Taliban era, whether it Verlagsgesellschaft. is because it precipitated the collapse of the Karzai regime or forced it to become Brahimi, Lakhdar. 2003. “Address to the more self-reliant and thereby more National Symposium on Security effective, is not yet clear. Sector Reform.” Kabul, Afghanistan. 30 July. One thing that is abundantly clear, however, is that if the current security Human Rights Watch. 2003. “Killing You situation is not addressed immediately, is a Very Easy Thing for Us”: Human the substantial gains made by the Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghani- Afghan government and the internatio- stan. Human Rights Watch. Vol. 15, nal community during the initial phase No. 5. July. of the reconstruction process could be squandered. Afghan Foreign Minister Organization for Economic Co- Dr. Abdallah delivered a stark warning Operation and Development. 2001. about the situation in Afghanistan on a The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent visit to Washington in late July 2003. He Violent Conflict. OECD. affirmed that if more aid and support was not made available, Afghanistan United Nations. 2000. “The Role of could once again degenerate into a failed United Nations Peacekeeping in state “ruled by drug lords, warlords, by Disarmament, Demobilization and forces of darkness, unstabalized by Reintegration.” Report of the Secretary terrorism once again.” As the papers in General to the Security Council. S/ this brief convey, security is the key to 2000/101. 11 February. reconstruction and security sector reform is the key to achieving security. The United Nations Development Program- consequences of the failure to exploit me. 2003. Security Sector Reform and the current window of opportunity to Transitional Justice: A Crisis Post- rebuild and stabilize Afghanistan would Conflict Programmatic Approach. be disastrous, for as Dr. Abdullah UNDP, March. candidly stated “I’m not optimistic to say if we lose this opportunity there will be another one” (UN Wire, 16 July 2003).

16 B I C C the security environment

Old Questions Needing New Answers: A Fresh Look at Security Needs in Afghanistan

by Paul O’Brien and Paul Barker

This piece reflects the individual perspectives of its authors and does not necessarily represent the institutional position of CARE International.

Introduction argue, nonetheless, that someone must which have very small populations.1 do precisely that. Very few would argue Many of the failed attempts occurred s Afghanistan in a security crisis? that the fragile peace currently holding in more than 50 years ago, but things have ISome say no. While there are sporadic Afghanistan has any real chance of not improved with time. Of 52 post- incidents of violence and crime, lasting without a cohesive security plan conflict countries since 1960, the World occasional attacks by “extremists” to get the country through the next five Bank estimates the risk of relapse into against Coalition forces, and skirmishes years. violence at 50 percent. Where a valuable between regional militias, US Secretary and exploitable resource such as heroin of State Donald Rumsfeld argues that Downhill momentum exists, it found the chances of relapse to most of the country is enjoying a be higher (Washington Post, 26 relative peace, measured against the past Is Secretary Rumsfeld right to describe November 2002). 23 years of war. Afghanistan as a success on the security front? We think not. Or at least, we Violence has its own momentum, its Why, then, do so many Afghans and think his declaration of victory was own laws, and its own culture. international observers believe that premature. The legacy of 23 years of war Declarations of victory against violence security remains the country’s first in Afghanistan is simply too powerful. in Afghanistan are optimistic at best. At priority? We believe there are three Most of the military forces that worst, they are profoundly dangerous reasons. First, the habits of violence devastated Afghanistan are still here, still for they may further distract the have a momentum of their own that armed, still in power. The habits of international community from a job cannot be arrested in one year or two. A violence do not die easily, not when so half done. culture of peace will need time to take many reasons to revert to violence hold in Afghanistan. Second, Afghan- remain and peaceful alternatives are so istan’s security is being threatened from few. four different directions, each of which 1 has the potential to unravel the current Measuring Afghanistan against The contexts in which regime change did not lead to stable democracies within ten tenuous accommodation between comparable contexts, one cannot help years include Haiti (1994-1996), Cambodia power brokers. Third, and perhaps but be pessimistic. Successful and (1973), South Vietnam (1973), Dominican most troubling of all, there is not peaceful regime change has been the Republic (1966), Dominican Republic enough international will to stifle these exception rather than the rule. Of the (1916–1924), Cuba (1917–1922), Haiti (1915– destructive forces. sixteen contexts in which the United 1934), Nicaragua (1909–1933) (1906–1909), States has led a regime change in the last Panama (1903–1936), and Cuba (1898–1902). In this paper, we take a brief look at century, only four had stable See Pei and Kasper, May 2003. these forces, and consider domestic and democracies ten years later: West international responses. Our hope is to Germany and Japan (1945–49)—both provoke discussion and to challenge of which were developed economies current assumptions around proposed prior to the conflict—and Grenada About the authors security strategies for Afghanistan. In (1983) and Panama (1989)—both of Paul Barker is the Afghanistan Country juggling the various dimensions of Director for CARE International and Afghanistan’s security conundrum, we Paul O’Brien is CARE International’s may end up throwing more balls in the Advocacy Coordinator in Afghanistan. air than we can hope to catch. But we

B I C C 17 brief 28

Disaggregating the worry about the lack of any police, army A cohesive security or court system to protect them. They security threat have waited in frustration for internatio- response—the domestic nal peacekeepers to arrive. They have dimension The total spoilers: Different observers watched localized criminality increase view Afghanistan’s security problem in dramatically since the fall of the Taliban. No one debates that Afghanistan’s different ways. For the international security must rest in Afghan hands—in community, the key threat remains Outside interference: Last but not the long term. A domestically led terrorism and “total spoilers” dedicated least, Afghanistan’s old nemesis— security solution is the only sustainable to regime overthrow. And that threat “outside interference”—is touted by way of ensuring long-term stability. Yet has exacerbated in recent months. many Afghans as a powerful progress appears to have been stifled on “Taliban” sightings, and attacks on destabilizing force. Their fears appear every front. Reform of the Ministries of Coalition forces have increased in 2003. justified: There will be no border police Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI) National and international staff of in the next five years capable of remains largely rhetorical; the process of relief organizations have been targeted controlling cross border military disarmament, demobilization and and killed. Schools have been burned by incursions. Pakistan’s Northwest reintegration (DDR) will not go ahead anti-government extremists. These Frontier Province will remain a haven until the MoD and MoI are reformed; incidents reflect a new and frightening for Pashtun militants and extremist and regional commanders are growing pattern of violence against civilians. groups. Iran seems determined to in power, while the training of the Although most Afghans and expatriates stretch its influence eastwards and has national army and police force has fallen are glad to have left behind the supported “Emir” Ismail Khan as a dangerously behind schedule. A oppression of the Taliban, it is worth security buffer. The “Stans”2 to the national security solution still appears a noting that under their rule, no schools north are apparently obsessed by the decade away. were burned—not even “illegal” girls growth of Islamic fundamentalism and schools—and no international aid are determined to support proxy The greatest challenge to domestic workers were killed. groups, often their ethnic counterparts, security sector reform may be the multi- across the border. For them, a strong dimensional nature of the problem. The warlord problem: President Afghanistan remains a threat (Rashid, Success depends on progress on several Karzai, however, may be more worried 2002). fronts in inter-related ways. The about the growing strength of the following section discusses progress warlords. While they may not want to Together, these four destabilizing forces that must be made on all these fronts. overthrow the regime in which they bring diverse security threats to Afghani- have gained so much power so quickly, stan. To date, no proposed strategy has MoD/MoI reform: In policy-making they are likely to further erode the ability begun to address the disaggregated circles in Afghanistan, most people agree of President Karzai to function as a nature of this problem. The Coalition that MoI/MoD reform is the necessary national political leader. Despite his focuses solely on the “total spoilers”, precondition for progress on all other courageous rhetoric, and steps taken in even funding the warlords to achieve fronts. Of the first 100 generals May 2003 to replace some of the weaker their aims. They will not engage in appointed by the new government, 90 governors, it is far from certain that “green on green” fighting and are all but were Panjsheri (Manuel and Singer, Karzai alone has the power to rein in ignoring human rights violations. The 2002). In Kabul, 80 percent of the the stronger warlords, both within and army and police training program police stations are run by Panjsheris beyond his government, whose massive appears to ignore the time bound (Eurasia Insight, June 2002). As long as revenue sources allow them to support nature of the current security crisis: By the senior ranks of the MoD and the large standing armies. Inter-warlord the time Afghanistan has a viable MoI are populated by people from one tension is likely to grow. Control of national security force, it may be unable valley in one district, these ministries poppy-growing villages means to challenge entrenched military powers. will have little claim to national entitlement to considerable levies. And no one appears to be challenging legitimacy. Control of trade routes brings access to Afghanistan’s neighbors to stop customs revenues. supporting the fragmentation of the To address this problem, however, it is country. important to understand the perspective The security vacuum: For ordinary of this factional enclave. They see Afghans trying to go about the work of themselves not just as Afghanistan’s rebuilding their lives, neither “total- liberators, but ironically enough, as the spoilers” nor “greedy-spoilers” are the 2 This is a term commonly used to describe guardians of Afghan pluralism. They greatest security concern. Rather, they the Central Asian states neighboring Afghanistan, namely, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

18 B I C C the security environment

held firm against the Pashtun arm and maintain. In the absence of police system is currently dominated by dominated Taliban when most others clear and significant foreign enemies we officers from one valley of one ethnic caved in. The Americans may have question whether Afghanistan needs group (Eurasia Insight, June 2002). supported them in 2001, but they were such a large army. the soldiers in the firing line who took Filling the vacuum: the Kabul and ended the Taliban era. They A reasonable target size for an ANA will be damned if they are going to give might be 20,000, a figure which could be international security away the keys to Afghanistan’s security reached in two to three years at the dimension in the name of political correctness and current pace of recruitment and training. “representativeness”. Such a force could combat organized Just as everyone accepts the need for a anti-state elements like resurgent Taliban domestic solution to Afghanistan’s No wonder, though, that they are and al-Qaeda, and work alongside long-term security, no one disagrees that widely perceived in Afghanistan as a international military forces to deal with it will take years before domestic hegemonic threat to the interests and any regional militias that refuse to fully structures are capable of providing that well-being of other Afghans. No armed engage in the DDR process. security. In the meantime, what group, however loyal to the idea of a happens? For the past eighteen months, new Afghanistan under Karzai rule, will The development of a national the international community has stuck of its own accord participate in a police: A national police force is quicker its head in the sand on this issue. disarmament process which leaves yet to train and cheaper to outfit and more military power in the hands of a support than an army. Minister of the Despite the growing strength of the small but powerful minority. Interior Ali Ahmad Jalali plans a 50,000 destructive forces mentioned above, person, multi-ethnic, national force of despite a shared consciousness of the DDR: Similarly, DDR needs to be in provincial officers, highway patrols for inevitability of a return to violence full harmony with all other aspects of a main transport arteries, and border without international intervention, the security sector reform program. Pushing police to regulate smuggling and the response by the international DDR without MoI/MoD reform and drug trade along the nation’s porous community has been naively optimistic the creation of a credible, multi-ethnic, borders. These ideas appear consistent in the extreme. As of today, there is still and non-factional professional security with the nation’s requirements. no international force—and therefore force will exacerbate rather than solve no force at all—mandated to provide Afghanistan’s security problems. The But three hurdles stand in the way of security to Afghans throughout most militias targeted for demobilization are developing an effective Afghan police of the country. those with nominal allegiance to the force: It must be thoroughly professio- central government. If they are not at nal and disciplined; its leadership must Three different international solutions once replaced with a credible national reflect the diversity of Afghanistan; and have been mooted at various times since and international security presence, the it must be open, honest and the fall of the Taliban: The expansion balance of power will shift in the accountable to civilian authority. There of the International Security Assistance direction of elements most violently are too many reports of men posing as Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul; the opposed to the government. If there security forces being responsible for expansion of the mandate of the are not sufficient resources and thefts of offices, businesses, vehicles, Coalition forces beyond the hunt for the programs to absorb the dissolved and homes. Many Kabul residents fear remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban; militia members, they could easily fall the police as much as the non- and the use of reconstruction/security back on their skills with weapons to uniformed criminal elements and are teams (currently known as Provincial become part of the destabilizing forces. accordingly afraid to report crimes to Reconstruction Teams) to promote their local police offices. Official crime security in key strategic areas. Each of The training of a national army: statistics may paint a picture of calm and these three options is capable of making For the past year, the creation of a security in Kabul, however, low- a real and important difference to 70,000-man multi-ethnic, non-factional reporting of crime arguably reflects security. Yet each has failed to do so. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has been more the culture of impunity for reasons why are worth looking at in seen as a necessary precondition for the uniformed misdeeds than a true more detail. promotion of improved security in reflection of the incidence of crime. Afghanistan. But armies are structured That impunity exists largely because the ISAF expansion: Almost a year ago, to protect a country from foreign the UN said that the expansion of the enemies and are blunt instruments for internationally mandated peacekeepers internal security. They are time was “the issue that would not go away”. consuming to train and expensive to Even today, it is still debated. With the transfer of ISAF control to NATO, it is

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back on the burner once again, with UN to engage in security sector support. The Provincial Reconstruction Ambassador Brahimi urging the UN They do not disarm local militias. They Teams: US forces in Afghanistan have Security Council to reconsider its do not destroy arms. They do not piloted a new scheme under the support for ISAF expansion. It remains engage in green-on-green fighting unfortunate name of “Provincial hard to fathom that while Kosovo, between local militias. They do not Reconstruction Teams”, or PRTs. The Bosnia, East Timor and Croatia had patrol areas in order to promote security. mandate of the PRTs is ever shifting more than one peacekeeper for every 100 They do not even support government and variable with location and people, Afghanistan has more than troops in reining in regional warlords personality. Distant planners originally 5,000 people for every peacekeeper in the who refuse to accede to central control. envisioned PRTs as having a vital role in country. ISAF expansion has some key In short, there are more than 8,000 US improving reconstruction coordination advantages over other solutions: First, troops in Afghanistan with very little to in Afghanistan, thereby duplicating the ISAF is a UN mandated force that has do these days. It is no wonder that role played by UNAMA’s Provincial multilateral legitimacy, having already rumors abound of their imminent Coordination Bodies and the been run by the British, Turks and withdrawal, which would make a Government’s Consultative Group Germans/Dutch before NATO. mockery of President Bush’s promise in structures. More recently, the PRTs have Moreover, as a peacekeeping force that January 2002 that “we will help the new been careful to avoid the “coordination” has not aggressively prosecuted a war in Afghan Government provide the word. Instead they claim to be Afghanistan, they are generally well security that is the foundation for expanding the writ of the central perceived and received by most locals. peace.” government outside of Kabul and to They have a record of success in Kabul be promoting a secure environment in on which they can build. And the Bonn One way to come through on that which reconstruction can move ahead. Agreement provides for the expansion promise would be for these forces to beyond Kabul, explicitly contemplating engage in security sector reform more Much of the debate about the PRTs that “such a force could, as appropriate, directly. The advantages are obvious. remains theoretical, and is little more be progressively expanded to other The Coalition forces are already here on than a distraction from more serious urban centers and other areas.” the ground, thus it would be politically discussions about countrywide security. Despite this mandate, there has been no and economically more feasible than They have been operating for only six international financial and military seeking a broad international months, and as of July 2003, are support for such a force. The US has commitment to import peacekeepers. It operational only in four areas of danced back and forth between active would also put some meat on the Afghanistan—Kunduz, Gardez, opposition to a force that might cause bones of America’s promise not just to Bamiyan and Mazar-i Sharif. Perhaps confusion with Coalition forces, and finish off al-Qaeda, but to provide more important is the fact that they passive acquiescence (as long as others security to the Afghan people, who after have neither the resources nor the come up with the money and the all, were not going to pay the price for mandate to engage seriously in either soldiers). The Europeans have refused the sins of the Taliban. Finally, it would reconstruction or security. The to take up the gauntlet claiming a lack of significantly strengthen the stated aim reconstruction budget for the three US- resources. As a result there has been of the PRTs, who are critically hampered led PRTs (Kunduz, Gardez and precious little discussion of what a by their lack of muscle. Bamiyan) is US$18 million dollars, less viable peacekeeping force might look like than 1/1,000th of the country’s in terms of numbers and cost. The It must be noted that such a strategy is reconstruction needs.3 Regarding Stimson Center has argued that a force not without risks. Afghanistan has a security, the PRTs are limited in similar of 18,000 could secure major urban long and rich tradition of not ways to the regular Coalition forces. centers and the commercial routes welcoming foreign military troops. They They cannot engage directly in security between them at a cost of less than may be tolerated under prevailing incidents—theirs is an observing and US$3 billion a year, less than a third of circumstances by a war weary population negotiating role. Thus, when Secretary the cost of the war against the Taliban aware of the security vacuum, but their Rumsfeld declares, “we decided to put (Durch, 2002). welcome wears thin when excessive force our efforts behind these provincial has been misdirected against Afghan reconstruction teams...We believe that Expansion of the mandate of US-led civilians and when foreign soldiers have that’s probably the best thing that can Coalition forces: When Donald acted in culturally inappropriate ways. be done to ultimately provide security”, Rumsfeld announced that the US had While such incidents continue, tolerance one has to wonder if the US is seriously completed phase three of the war in turns to resentment, which sows the committed to addressing insecurity on Afghanistan and was now moving to a seeds of militant anger. the ground. stabilization phase, he did not mention who would actually ensure that 3 Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, President stabilization. As of today, the Coalition Karzai, and US Senator Joseph Biden have forces in Afghanistan have no mandate estimated Afghanistan’s reconstruction needs at around US$20 billion.

20 B I C C the security environment

The British have indicated that they will 2. DDR: At present, what security exists fighting between local militias where focus more on security and less on on the ground results from fragile civilian security is put at risk; (3) reconstruction in regard to their PRT in political agreements between local patrolling civilian areas and trade Mazar-i Sharif. Currently, they plan to warlords and local militias charged by routes; and (4) assisting national spend more on reconstruction than any their commanders with protecting security forces to rein in regional individual US-led PRT, but their local populations. A DDR process warlords who refuse to accede to commitment to focus on security which moves ahead without an central control. remains informal and nuanced rather international security presence, and than clearly mandated. which disarms some factions but not 6. PRT reconfiguration and others by relying (over optimistically) expansion: The PRTs have neither It would be constructive if the PRTs on militia leaders to disarm their the resources nor the mandate to could be renamed PSTs for Provincial troops for the “greater good of provide either significant security Security (or Stabilization) Teams. If the Afghanistan” risks undermining protection or reconstruction, and as a PRTs were seen as primarily platforms what little security does exist. We result achieve little more than the for promoting security sector reform in recommend, therefore, that the DDR veneer of engagement on both Afghanistan, they would be welcomed process is put on hold until there is a fronts. We recommend that (1) they rather than questioned by international serious international commitment to are reconfigured to focus exclusively aid workers. If they were a true platform provide security in areas where DDR on security sector reform, and change for promoting SSR, they would be is moving ahead. their names to Provincial Security/ structured to support the deployment Stabilization teams in order to clarify of newly trained national police and 3. Army vs. police provided security: their role; and (2) they are given ANA units; they would work with The development of a large national adequate resources to provide a solid other actors to support DDR initiatives; army has been the first choice of platform for security sector reform and they would work closely with their Afghan and international policy- (DDR, police/army training, new Afghan security counterparts to makers. Considering the limited patrolling, peace-making and deal with incidents of human rights and progress to date and current security peacekeeping) in the areas where they security abuse that arise in their needs in Afghanistan, we question operate. respective provinces. whether this strategy needs a rethink and recommend that the One way to raise Old problems in need development of a professional multi-ethnic national police force be the stakes—tie the of new solutions emphasized over army training. upcoming elections to progress on security In the spirit of provoking debate and In terms of international support for looking for new solutions, we security: How can we have a serious discussion recommend that the following issues be with policy-makers about security and given serious consideration by those 4. ISAF expansion: To date, the engaged in formulating security-related not simply talk to ourselves? A mere international community has eighteen months after the war, it is policies in Afghanistan: dismissed ISAF expansion as too almost impossible to garner serious expensive, in part because most On the domestic front: policy making attention for Afghani- policy discussions have been held in stan. The media have moved on. “all or nothing” terms. In line with Afghanistan is already “the war before”. 1. MoD/MoI reform: Diplomatic the Bonn Agreement, we urge efforts to reform the MoD and MoI American policy-makers in particular are rethinking on the possibility for keen to declare victory in Afghanistan. have thus far failed. If this iterative expansion of ISAF to key They need to demonstrate that regime government is to gain nationwide urban centers and the commercial legitimacy, President Karzai must change works. routes between them. have and exercise the power to run Perhaps the only major Afghan event his government. We recommend 5. Expansion of the mandate of the that he demonstrate a clear will and that will capture serious attention before Coalition forces: Consistent with the next US presidential elections in capacity to lead his cabinet. This can the US Pentagon’s statement that the November 2004, are the national be done through cabinet reshuffles Coalition has moved from fighting or serious retrenchment of senior elections to be held in Afghanistan by the Taliban/al-Qaeda to stabilization June 2004. Peaceful democratic elections positions in the security related efforts, we recommend an expansion would be a huge dividend for Afghani- ministries. in the explicit mandate of coalition stan and a ringing endorsement of the forces to engage in (1) disarming and international community’s efforts here. demobilizing local militias; (2) engaging in green-on-green

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Yet, without genuine security, elections References will be a farce. Local warlords will use them to become stronger, not weaker. Durch, William. 2002. Security and Peace Drug lords will buy votes. Voices Support in Afghanistan: Analysis and offering peaceful political alternatives Short- to Medium-Term Options. and raising hard questions will be Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson stifled. People will vote, if they vote at Center, June. all, out of fear, not hope. And so Afghanistan will lose a huge Manuel, Anja, and Peter W. Singer. 2002. opportunity to join the community of “A New Model Afghan Army.” free and fair democracies. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4. pp. 44–59. Precisely because free and fair elections are so important both to Afghans and Pei, Minxin, and Sara Kasper. 2003. the international community, we urge Lessons from the Past: The American that genuine security and the election Record on Nation-Building. Policy Brief process be tied together and one should 24. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie not proceed without the other. Endowment for International Peace, May. Closing thoughts Rashid, Ahmed. 2002. Jihad: The Rise of Bringing security to Afghanistan will Militant Islam in Central Asia. New require a serious rethink of domestic Haven: Yale University Press. and international strategies to date. While forward progress has been made on soft issues, there has been a general unwillingness to face up to some of the more serious security threats: the local victors in the war against the Taliban will not easily give up their hold on power; the drug trade will continue to enrich and entrench the more dangerous threats to regional security; and the international community is still refusing to put enough of its soldiers in harm’s way. Of course the price for taking up these challenges will be high. As was argued so often to justify the war against the Taliban, the price of allowing Afghanistan to survive as a rogue state will almost certainly be higher, both domestically and in the world at large.

Eighteen months after the end of the Taliban, discussions on Afghan security risk becoming stale. We hope this paper helps to provoke fresh discussion to support answers to a very real problem.

22 B I C C military reform

Military Reform in Afghanistan by Antonio Giustozzi

The Afghan army in soldiers would speak at least two and as their home territory, whereas regular many as four or five different languages army service meant to be taken historical perspective and have different cultural backgrounds. elsewhere in the country. In a localized Because the loyalty of the troops rested and fragmented country such as he modern Afghan army emerged with their village, if not with their ethnic Afghanistan, regular military service is as a viable force only in the 1930s T group or tribe, all the governments that particularly unpopular and maintaining and 1940s and acquired an undisputed succeeded in Afghanistan adopted the the morale of the troops has always ability to successfully confront tribal practice of posting troops far from their proven difficult. revolts only between the second half of region of origin. While this made the 1950s and the beginning of the desertions more difficult and ensured a From 1978, the army started receiving 1960s. Rapidly, however, the army greater willingness of the troops to carry large quantities of military hardware, became badly factionalized, a out the orders they were given, even but lacked the human resources to man consequence of the lack of avenues of when that implied harming the local them. Recruiting pilots and technicians social promotion in Afghanistan and population, it also made the relations proved particularly problematic and the tendency of sections of the with the local inhabitants more difficult. resulted in the waste of a great deal of intelligentsia to adopt the army as their If the army became a more compliant equipment. privileged tool for seizing power. The tool in the repression of local coups of 1973 and 1978 were only the disturbances, the likelihood that more The disintegration of beginning of a process which not only serious confrontations would emerge caused the disintegration of Afghan that might prove difficult to contain the army in 1992 society, but also of the army itself. increased. After the PDPA came to power in 1978, Certain characteristics of the Afghan several purges of the officer corps took On the other hand, the Afghan army army remained the same throughout its place, which should have resulted by often lacked the equipment, training and history, limiting its effectiveness and motivation to secure the national 1992 in an officers corps that was, at increasing its fragility. First and least in theory, very homogenous territory in times of serious internal foremost, the relationship between the politically. In reality, several different conflict. This was largely due to the officers and the troops was always difficult geography of the country and tendencies persist within the Afghan difficult, as exemplified by the army. On the one hand, a large number to the lack of roads. As a result, the widespread recourse to corporal of officers were inclined to see army always made use of militias, punishment. More generally, the officers mainly tribal ones, to control the themselves first and foremost as corps considered itself to be part of the military professionals and had taken the borders, the territory, and to bolster its intelligentsia of the country and like the party card only for reasons of numerical strength when facing an intelligentsia had the tendency to shun external enemy. The militias received a opportunism. On the other, even the uneducated masses and to treat within the PDPA (by then renamed huge boost after 1986, as the them with contempt. Watan), factionalism was ripe. The rift government tried to buy consensus in the rural areas by using the same means between Khalqis and Parchamis Moreover, efforts to build a viable and continued and was still capable of of the mujahidin parties, offering effective modern army have been reaching considerable extremes, as autonomy and weapons to whoever hampered by the low level of was willing to side with it. It proved shown by Defense Minister Tanai’s coup integration among the different regions attempt in 1990. Also, the much easier to recruit militiamen than of the country. Despite the claims of precariousness of the situation had regular troops for a variety of reasons, part of the Afghan intelligentsia, there is among which the main one was the pushed many officers, including some little sense of Afghan unity among the possibility for the militiamen to serve in majority of the population, and even much of the intelligentsia itself does About the author not stand up to its own standards. In Dr. Antonio Giustozzi is a research an ethnically mixed unit of the army, fellow in the Crisis States Programme at the Development Research Centre in the London School of Economics (LSE).

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of high rank, to seek out agreements maintain the regular units with which it fact they remained mostly loyal to the with the various opposition parties in had seized control. Its battalions and local warlords, commanders and order to guarantee their safe-conduct in regiments were in fact the old guerrilla political parties. However, the Ministry the event of the fall of the Najibullah units with a new name. Professional of Defense, and specifically Minister of regime. This practice had long existed, soldiers remained in the ranks, but Defense Fahim, did and does have the but gained a renewed popularity mainly in the role of technicians and means to exercise pressure over the beginning in 1991, as the impending specialists, only rarely as officers. Those units of the transitional army. For demise of the Soviet Union, by far the few commanders with a background in example, he had the power to appoint most important source of support, the regular army were more often commanders and officers. Even if his appeared to promise few advantages for former NCOs rather than former decision could in practice be disregarded, the regime. officers. Jamiat-i Islami in particular it would become a political issue and requested the help of professional could create a frontal confrontation with The growing scarcity of resources within officers in running the central staff and the Karzai administration. For example, the regime also accentuated the conflict logistics of its militia army while it was the appointment of Hazrat Ali (an ally among army factions, this time with an in control of Kabul and tried half- of Fahim) as the military commander ethnic twist. The resentment against heartedly to build a national army, an of the 1st Army Corps (Nangrahar) Pashtun officers grew among officers attempt that had already bogged down towards the end of 2002 was very belonging to ethnic minorities, while by the time the Taliban took Kabul in controversial and was clearly politically factions that appeared to have been 1996. motivated, but Fahim won the neutralized resurfaced with renewed confrontation and forced the other main strength, as in the case of the followers Immediately after the fall of the Taliban contender, Zaman Gul (a monarchist), of former President Babrak Karmal, at the end of 2001, a proliferation of to abandon the fray and take refuge in and started exploiting these divisions to armed groups took place around the Pakistan. Moreover, the Ministry of mobilize support. country, a phenomenon strengthened Defense pays for the food of the troops by the prospects of claiming a share of and some maintenance expenses. These trends greatly contributed to the power in the new interim government. Although these are small sums, it must fragmentation of the army in 1992, after There was resentment among the ranks be considered that virtually all units of the fall of Najibullah, even if the most of Jamiat in particular that late comers the AMF are well understrength and important factor was the disunity in the fight against the Taliban, therefore significant resources can either among the mujahidin parties including virtually all Pashtun be pocketed by the commanders or themselves. The largest chunk of the commanders of some importance, redistributed among the troops. regular army was taken over by the should be given even a modest share of newly established Jumbesh-i Milli, led power, but soon Jamiat itself eclipsed Being part of the transitional national by General Dostum, formed on the all other factions in its recruiting drive army brings a number of other basis of the militias created by the among former Taliban militias and advantages, apart from some funding, Najibullah government. Another large other groups of “dubious” political such as an officially recognized status chunk ended up in the hands of Jamiat- allegiance, especially in areas where it was and the possibility of exercising power i Islami, the largest jihad party, with the trying to expand, like northern and locally. Several units of the transitional remaining parties finding it much more central Afghanistan. army have remained in active service and difficult to maintain the few military have, in some cases, been issued with units that they inherited. The private militias in existence in early uniforms. They have also been charged 2002 numbered on paper as much as with the task of trying to collect Private militias and the one million men, although the actual weapons from the population and number of full-time militiamen in the patrolling the surrounding areas. The national army ranks is likely to have been between one remaining part of the armed men tenth and one fifth of that number. In belonging to the AMF/transitional By September 2001, the political part, these private militias were army were gathered in improvised vicissitudes of Afghanistan had been absorbed in early 2002 into a “national” garrisons and asked to hand over their such that little was left of the regular army, referred to as the Afghan Military weapons in order to have them army at all. Jumbesh had disintegrated Force (AMF) by UN officers, and what registered before being re-issued after the Taliban launched their we will call “transitional”, while their firearms. successful offensive in 1998, while in the ultimate fate was still to be decided. long term Jamiat had proved unable to While the private militias were incorporated into this very tenuous structure, in theory subjected to the control of the Ministry of Defense, in

24 B I C C military reform

According to an official document of according to which the ranks of the pocketed by the commanders. The the Afghan Ministry of Defense commanding officers of the transitional Ministry of Defense does not pay any (Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, army are to be brought in line with the salaries to the troops and guarantees 2002), the organizational chart is going type of units that they are commanding. only a (not always regular) supply of to be modified and adapted during the In other terms, generals would no food. As a result, the military capabilities registration and collection of weapons, longer command battalions and would of the Afghan transitional army are which was scheduled to start in autumn be replaced by colonels. Therefore, many abysmally poor. Even the best units, 2002. The existence of military units of Afghanistan’s thousands face such as some of those deployed in the would be linked to the quantity of demotion. The Ministry of Defense north and northeast, suffer from weapons retrieved. For example, the says that nobody will be forced to accept chronic under-supplying due to collection of 400 to 600 weapons would lower ranks, but those who do not embezzlement and other factors. result in the creation of a battalion, and should be transferred to other duties Discipline varies between low and very so on. The idea is clearly to provide an (i.e. no field command). A result of this low and only a few units perform incentive to armed formations for policy would be undermining the power regular training and patrols and exercise allowing the weapons to be collected. structure of the old private militias, effective control over territory. Lack of Units refusing to allow the collection incorporated within the transitional equipment, low discipline and and registration of their weapons are army. Another plan is to transfer inefficiency mean that the operational threatened with disbandment. A further commanders away from their and tactical mobility of the transitional incentive is the linking of the number strongholds for training and other army is very poor. Experience has of officer posts allowed to the number purposes, again with a similar effect of shown that chasing small guerrilla units of collected weapons, in the measure of weakening their hold over their units. is beyond the capabilities of these 8 officers per 100 weapons. However, Yet another example of this policy is the troops, even when the population is the slow progress in implementing the stated desire of the Ministry of Defense thoroughly hostile to such guerrillas, as collection of weapons has so far made it to appoint professional deputies to the in northern Afghanistan. impossible to put this plan into practice commanders of the old private nation-wide. There is clearly little interest militias.1 However, as in many other Given these considerations, the on the part of the Ministry of Defense instances, by May 2003 none of these question arises of what is the raison in pushing this process, because it plans had entered an implementation d’être of the transitional army, apart would limit its potential for patronage. phase. from being a parking area for military forces that cannot immediately be The most critical issue in terms of What is the purpose of demobilized. Clearly, neither the UN, establishing political control over the the US nor other donors are keen on the transitional army was the fate of the the transitional army? transitional army and have so far commanders of the private militias steadfastly refused to fund it. In fact, The degree of military efficiency of the under the new system. The inflation in there appears to be a deliberate attempt units of the transitional army, while military ranks of the last 15 years means to starve the transitional army out of that the transitional army has one of the remaining generally quite low, varies resources and force its soldiers to leave widely. The different units receive some highest officer to soldier ratios in the its ranks and demobilize spontaneously. funding from the Ministry of Defense world, estimated at 1 to 2 (Lt. Col. C. This is actually happening in most of Bournac, interview, May 2003). For for improvement works in the barracks the Pashtun belt, where the army had and for maintaining their equipment. comparative purposes, it is worth been gathered very hastily and is less Often, the leaders of the private militias mentioning that most armies are in the motivated. 1 to 12 or 13 range. Moreover, the continue to invest in their former military units even after they have joined qualifications of such officers are mostly The presence of strong factional leaders the transitional army in order to weak or non-existent. There are in the rest of the country, however, thousands of generals in Afghanistan maintain their loyalty, an approach that slowed this process. Fahim and Jamiat-i has been quite successful. However, little who have never been to the military Islami appear particularly keen on the of the money spent, at least by the academy and cannot read or write. transitional army, ostensibly to face the Ministry of Defense, reaches down to “Pakistani threat”, but more realistically the troops in terms of direct or indirect Although it seems that a final plan on as a tool of patronage. Ismail Khan, benefits; more often than not it is how to sort this problem out has not Rashid Dostum and Fahim all have been approved yet, there have been resources to maintain the troops attempts to address it. At the beginning affiliated to their movements, although 1 of March 2003, a plan became public, General Pezhanwai, quoted in RFE/RL in some cases they appear to be Newsline, 5 March 2003; General Atiqullah Baryalai, quoted in New York Times, 25 January 2003; General Gulad quoted in Christian Science Monitor, 27 March 2002.

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experiencing difficulties, especially where immediate proliferation of military Ludin has not been able to effectively looting and imposing arbitrary taxes on units, with no less than 14 divisions take up his position in Gardez due to the population is not an option, as in and several other smaller units in the hostility of supposedly subordinate Kabul. Fahim and Jamiat-i Islami, in existence by the end of 2002. In the officers close to Marshal Fahim, and particular, might have overstretched north of the country too, a region remains based in his home province of themselves in trying to maintain forces characterized by a bitter rivalry between Logar, well outside the military region much larger than those of their rivals in Jamiat-i Islami and Jumbesh-i Milli, of his competence. active service. In April, for example, 200 military units proliferated; at the end of soldiers (belonging to units loyal to 2002 there were at least 10 divisions The influence of political considerations Fahim) demonstrated in favor of better there. By contrast, the Ministry of on the selection process meant that pay and living conditions in front of the Defense was not as generous in many of the units left out of the Ministry of Defense in Kabul. establishing military units in the rest of “transitional” army were distributed the country. The west, for example, was unevenly across the country. Mainly Military patronage given just four divisions, while the small and medium commanders with south was given another four, the little political leverage were left out. The The problem of how to expand and southeast five and the east another five. presence of militias outside the army maintain government control over the Two more divisions were established in structure is, according to reports, countryside was faced by others before Bamiyan province in central Afghani- particularly prevalent in Hazarajat, but it the post-Taliban regime. The stan. is by no means exclusive to this area. communist regime, for example, after The future status of these militias some early, unsuccessful attempts to The establishment of patronage remains uncertain, as there are no clear “mobilize the revolutionary masses” networks in the form of army units plans for their demobilization and they and give a new lease on life to the appears to be a key policy of the Afghan should presumably have handed over regular army, began to shift towards a government and in particular the their weapons in the context of the more pragmatic approach. In those Ministry of Defense, a reality that general disarmament of the population. days, as in 2002, it appeared that clear becomes clear when the appointments priority had to be given to rebuilding are closely scrutinized. With the However, incorporation in the effective armed forces. However, it also exception of the 8th Army Corps, transitional army does not guarantee, by emerged that such a task could not be dominated by Jumbesh-i Milli, the 4th any means, the favor of the Ministry of separated from the more political issue Army Corps, dominated by Ismail Defense, since some units have patrons of establishing a foothold among the Khan, and the 2nd Army Corps, others than Fahim. Many units, for people who were actually running most dominated by Gul Agha Shirzai and his example, never received a request from of the countryside, i.e. warlords and allies, the large majority of military units Kabul for recruits to be sent to the guerrilla commanders. in the country are commanded by central training unit of the new national people politically allied to Minister of army, where troops are trained by US With well over 40 divisions in existence Defense Fahim. When appointing instructors. Units “exempted” from this at the end of 2002, to which a large commanders affiliated with his own recruitment include some of the best number of independent brigades, faction (Shura-i Nezar) or party (Jamiat-i units of the transitional army, such as regiments and battalions is to be added, Islami) would cause too much of an 25 Division in Khost or 19 Division in there is indeed much room for uproar, such as in the provinces Samangan, which are considered patronage in the transitional army. demographically dominated by politically unreliable by Marshal Fahim. Significantly, the type of armed unit is Pashtuns, Fahim would normally opt not directly related to its actual size, for Pashtun commanders belonging to A brand new army rather it is a measure of how good the factions close to Jamiat, mostly Prof. political connections of its commander Sayyaf ’s Ittehad-i Islami. The few The ultimate fate of the transitional are. For this reason, some brigades additional exceptions are some units of army was not immediately clear from its could well be bigger than certain the 7th Army Corps, which are also inception. A debate about the shape of divisions. under the control of Jumbesh, and the future Afghan National Army some commanders who were appointed (ANA) dragged on for several months, During 2002, the establishment of a due to external pressure, such as with Marshal Fahim leading the group division or any lesser military unit was Atiqullah Ludin, commander of 3rd which advocated a large, 200–250,000- subject to a decision of the Ministry of Army Corps, allegedly imposed by the man army, while the UK and the US Defense, which promptly made good US. Interestingly, at the time of writing were the chief proponents of a much political use of this opportunity. The smaller and more professional army of northeast and the area of Kabul, where 60–70,000. It is clear that if the first private militias were largely affiliated option had been chosen, the transitional with Jamiat-i Islami, saw an almost

26 B I C C military reform

army would have served as a base for to start the demobilization from the transport planes and a few transport the new entity. However, despite southern and northern regions, where and attack helicopters. Expenditures resistance by Fahim and his men, the most armed forces are controlled by planned for the ANA in the first year is donor countries carried the day and by opponents of Marshal Fahim and US$235 million, while a number of December 2002 the presumed final Jamiat-i Islami, or, alternatively, in all countries supplied hardware directly, decision had been taken to create an regions simultaneously (Military such as light weapons, mortars, army of 60,000, to which a police force, Attaché, interview, May 2003; UNAMA uniforms and communication sets. a border force and an air force would be Political Officer, interview, May 2003). Russia played a leading role in the added. The new Afghan National Army provision of supplies, delivering trucks (ANA) would be created almost from The smaller sized ANA that has been and helicopters, in addition to spare scratch. Initially, no input was to be opted for is clearly meant to act as a parts for existing equipment. By no allowed from the private militias, counter-insurgency force with little means, however, has all of this however, given the difficulties in capacity for fighting against another equipment been delivered to the new recruiting enough men, it was later regular army. This is illustrated by the national army. In fact, the most decided that a certain percentage of the current plan to organize the new army, important supplies went to units of the personnel, provisionally put at 15 which envisions the creation of a mix transitional army loyal to Defense percent, could be composed of former of light infantry and motorized units, Minister Fahim, including some trucks militiamen. As a matter of fact, recruits possibly with one motorized and seven and the helicopters. with previous military experience infantry divisions or their equivalent. represent at least half of the total. All However, at the time of writing only The biggest problem of the ANA, troops would be trained from the start the composition of the Central Corps especially in the beginning, has been by foreign (chiefly American and French) had been agreed upon. The Central recruiting and keeping people in the instructors and the new army was Corps will consist of two light infantry ranks. On the surface the pay troops intended to be completely in place by brigades of three infantry battalions receive does not appear too bad by 2009. each (plus artillery), one quick reaction Afghan standards, especially once the brigade with one tank, one mechanized proposed increase to US$70 comes into According to this plan, the transitional and one quick reaction battalion and effect. However, considering that this is army should be demobilized by that two supply/logistics brigades (Military supposed to become a professional date. The demobilization process was Attaché, interview, May 2003). The army and that militiamen, while on a supposed to start shortly after the counter-insurgency, or “internal”, nature lower salary, might be able to accumulate training program, but as of May 2003 (a of the new army’s mission is also more jobs, earn supplemental income year after the start of training) no step demonstrated by the type of training from criminal activities, and at the same had been taken and the capacity to begin provided, which, for example, does not time live close to their families, such pay the demobilization process was only include any anti-aircraft training. Even levels are not attractive enough. expected to be in place by July 2003. anti-tank training plays a relatively Militiamen serving in the units recruited Differences were reported between the modest role (Major John Harrell, by the US for fighting against al-Qaeda Ministry of Defense and the UN in interview, May 2003). On the other earn a rather more substantial US$200, regard to which region would be hand, training has a considerable focus but the attraction of such “jobs” for the subjected to demobilization first. Logic on how to handle a civilian population. average army recruit is limited because dictates that the Central Corps, which The technological level of the new army only a few thousands such men are was receiving the newly trained troops, is deliberately kept low, mainly in order needed by the US and the number is should start the demobilization of the to make it sustainable in the long-term not expanding. old units, but the predominant opinion by the Afghan state, but presumably within the UN appears to be that also to minimize the perceived threat it With the prospects of relatively well starting it in the “quieter” areas of could pose to neighboring countries. paid jobs in the reconstruction business Afghanistan, such as the northeast, is low and the transitional army being the best approach. The main reason Equipment is not the starved of funds, the pay offered by the given for not starting from the Central new national army has begun to look Corps is that it would represent a main problem more attractive. Among its virtues is the legitimization of the presence of those fact that it is paid regularly and reliably, Although it cannot be said that Afgha- troops in Kabul, which goes against the which contrasts sharply with the Bonn Agreement. In fact, the nistan is short of military equipment situation of the transitional army. as such, much of it is old and of transitional army should not have a Efforts have been made during the last dubious serviceability. Transport and Central Corps at all. Deputy Minister few months of 2002 and the initial Baryalai, on the other hand, suggested communication equipment are serious months of 2003 to improve the living concerns, as is the state of the air force, which at the time of writing could count only on a few fixed wing

B I C C 27 brief 28

conditions of the troops, an effort that As the French took over the training of the low average quality of the recruits, has achieved tangible results. US sources officers, they abandoned the training of but there are also allegations of subsequently reported that the attrition troops at the beginning of 2003, leaving mistreatment of recruits by Afghan rate decreased to just over 30 percent. the US Army completely in control of officers, possibly on ethnic grounds as it This rate may look high but it is not the process. Starting from the 7th has predominantly affected Pashtuns. uncommon in volunteer armies. For the Battalion, actual training was taken over Such allegations are common in first few classes to graduate in 2002 the by Afghan instructors, who had been Pashtun areas. However, US officers attrition rate was close to 50 percent, a trained in turn by the French and supervising the training process deny remarkably negative figure for an army Americans. There is a sense of urgency the existence of any ethnic which actually saw virtually no fighting because there is a desire to be able to discrimination within the army (Major and was headquartered in the capital city. field at least 9,000 trained soldiers by the John Harrell, interview, May 2003). Several reasons have been forwarded to planned 2004 general elections. An Some figures support the idea of explain the high dropout rate among improvement in the speed of the fostering ethnic co-operation within the recruits. The officers in charge of the training process was indeed noticeable new national army. For example, of the course mention a lack of understanding by early 2003, as battalions were first batch of candidates for the NCOs of the new national army among the commissioned at the rate of one every training course, the large majority of recruits and the unwillingness of some five weeks as opposed to one every 6–7 those selected by Afghan officers were provincial authorities to send fit weeks during 2002. Pashtuns (Major Stuart Carver, soldiers, problems that had, at least in interview, May 2003). Allegations have part, been sorted out by early 2003. It Doubts have been expressed about the emerged that some militia commanders, remains, of course, to be seen how the insufficient length of the basic training faced with a new national army almost new army will stand the test on the period (10 weeks) for a professional completely under the control of their battlefield, which is the ultimate army, even if further training courses in enemies, ordered their men to leave measure of any army. special topics are planned. In Western their army units and come back (Ahmed Europe and North America, professio- Rashid, Eurasianet, 29 July 2003). A hurried training nal armies consider that it takes up to a year before a soldier is battle-ready. In Ethnic bias? program? particular, the new troops are reported not to have been well drilled and still The training of the ANA started in There is little doubt that the have problems marching together. The appointments within the Ministry of spring 2002 with the units to be impression is that the training program assigned to the National Guard and the Defense during 2002 have been biased was shortened because of a lack of time Central Army Corps. These units, to be towards a single ethnic group, the Tajiks. and to avoid imposing too heavy a Of the 38 generals chosen by Marshal based in Kabul, will become the hard burden on the recruits, which could core and central reserve of the new Fahim in February to constitute the have led to an even higher rate of national army and could be used to keep general staff of the army, 37 were Tajiks attrition. the warlords in line. They should also (like Fahim) and one was Uzbek. It is become a “model” for the rest of the not so much a matter of ethnic It is certainly the case that the quality of army and presumably contribute to its discrimination as it is political the recruits in the new battalions leaves favoritism. Of the 37 Tajik generals training. This central force should be something to be desired. The recruits composed of recruits sent by the 33 appointed, 35 were affiliated to Shura-i are supposed to be between 22 and 28 provinces (200 each), in order to achieve Nezar (The Friday Times, 22–28 March years of age, but in practice it is 2002). Of a total of 100 generals a balanced mix of all regions and ethnic acknowledged that they are between 16 groups. By the spring of 2003, the appointed by Fahim in early 2002, 90 and 40. Often, at the beginning of the ANA training process was lagging belonged to Shura-i Nezar (Manuel and training schedule troops were found to Singer, 2002, p. 57). Even more criticism behind schedule by over a third, with be so unfit that whole batches had to be just over 3,000 trained men. Training of was aroused by the fact that most of sent back, as admitted by Deputy NCOs was lagging further behind, these new generals do not have a Minister Baryalai himself. However, the professional army background, having started in March 2003, and by high attrition rate likely leads to a much May 2003 most units were still relying although they all served during the civil higher qualitative level among soldiers on NCOs without specific training. war. While the effort to staff the army completing the training course. with high-ranking officers close to Similarly, the training of officers started Moreover, the quality of the recruits and in early 2003 and by mid-2003 most Shura-i Nezar is obvious, it remains to candidate officers is reported to be units were still staffed with officers steadily increasing (Lt. Col. C. Bournac, lacking specific training. interview, May 2003). The high attrition rate is probably due to a large extent to

28 B I C C military reform

be seen how strong their loyalty will As far as the troops of the new national army were predominantly Tajiks, at least prove to be in the future, especially in army are concerned, the problem is not among those who were selected for the case of officers with a background in as monolithic as in the case of the specific training courses. The 3rd batch the regular army. Some sources allege general staff. However, since the of candidate officers, which started tensions between “mujahidin” generals inception of the ANA process, the training in spring 2003, was the first to and generals trained by the Russians Tajiks have been over-represented, even include a majority of Pashtuns (51 (Former regular army general, interview, amongst the rank-and-file troops. An percent), indicating how the original May 2003). estimate dating to early 2003 attributed imbalance is being addressed. 40 percent of the new national army to The Afghan army has been plagued by be Tajiks, 37 percent Pashtuns and the Much of the original recruitment drive accusations of ethnic bias even during rest to other minorities (AP, 26 January for the new national army has taken the times of the monarchy. The 2003).2 Some sources have reported that place in and around Kabul, which itself majority of the officers, especially before the ethnic imbalance that characterized favors an overrepresentation of Tajiks the Soviet occupation, belonged to the the first few battalions has begun to be among the officers. The Ministry of Pashtun majority, with a smaller redressed, but there are indications that Defense itself might have tried to favor number being Tajiks and very few the problem was still persisting by the loyal candidates (most likely Tajiks), but belonging to other minorities. Reforms end of 2002. In part, this could be due as the international instructors were implemented in 1963 instituted a quota to the selective recruitment mentioned calling for better candidate officers, it system by which the ranks of officers above, with some Pashtun, Hazara and might have been forced to look for any and NCOs were to be filled with the Uzbek divisions not being asked by the fit candidate. After a public relations aim of ensuring that each ethnic group Ministry of Defense to send their campaign, which involved deployments was represented in accordance to their quotas of recruits. of ANA units in the provinces and proportionate share of the population. organized visits by provincial governors During the 1970s, the effect of this It has not been possible to definitively and local commanders to the training reform was to reduce the preponderance verify claims that Pashtun recruits have base just outside Kabul, the willingness of Pashtun officers in the army, been dropping out at a rate faster than of regional power brokers to supply although they remained the majority. those belonging to other ethnic groups, good candidate officers increased During the communist era, the number or at least in comparison to the Tajiks, noticeably, mainly to the advantage of of non-Pashtun officers rose steadily, but there is some evidence of this (UN Pashtuns. even if the Pashtuns remained Political Officer, interview, January 2003; numerous, and by the early 1990s Tajiks USA Today, 27 November 2002).3 The The population of the Pashtun belt were over-represented in the army causes of this phenomenon are not looks extremely sensitive to allegations compared to their share of the total easily established, although it seems that of Tajik domination of the new army population. However, Tajiks tended to in some cases the main reason is that and does not pay much attention to be concentrated in logistical and other training is provided in Dari only (no signs that the ethnic imbalance might non-combat units, with the infantry Pashto). As reported above, just be a temporary phenomenon. A being led predominantly by Pashtun mistreatment of Pashtun recruits by debate on how to address this officers. The same was true of the Tajik officers is alleged. Other sources imbalance has progressed, during which Sarandoy (constabulary), while the refer to complaints of Turkmen recruits it has been suggested that at least one armed branch of the intelligence service about being mistreated by other soldiers other training center could be was characterized by a more balanced because of their lack of proficiency in established in Pashtun territory. UN ethnic mix. The communist either Dari or Pashto (Minister Nur officials, however, are determined to governments of 1980–1992 were Mohammed Qarqin, interview, May maintain a single training center in the particularly keen to make more room for 2003). It is worth pointing out that whole of Afghanistan, something they officers belonging to ethnic minorities, ethnic groups other than Pashtuns and view as a precondition for the formation especially Uzbeks and Hazaras, a policy Tajiks, such as Uzbeks, Turkmens and of a truly national army. In any case, that resulted in the creation of several Hazaras, actually have a far less than what really matters is the political Hazara- and Uzbek-only divisions proportional share of recruits than allegiance of the superior officers rather between the late 1980s and early 1990s. Pashtuns. There is no doubt that than the make up of the rank-and-file. This policy had the advantage of initially the officers of the new national avoiding the problem of imposing The virtual monopoly of Shura-i Nezar Hazara and Uzbek officers on Pashtun on the top positions within the army, 2 troops, which might have caused Estimates of the share of ethnic groups out police, and intelligence service has trouble. of the whole population are roughly: attracted criticism not only from political Pashtuns 42%, Tajiks 25%, others 33%. rivals and foreign observers, but also 3 Evidence of a higher attrition rate among Pashtuns remains anecdotal.

B I C C 29 brief 28

from US officials. It was reported at the came from the communist army (The The process set in motion by the beginning of 2003 that Fahim was Friday Times, 22–28 March 2002). training of the new national army being asked to replace at least 33 senior Recently, voices have arisen, most might, in the long run, undermine the officers within his ministry with people notably that of General Nurulhaq political control exerted by the Minister coming from other ethnic groups and Olumi, calling for a more widespread of Defense. The multinational officers parties, as well as to withdraw his recourse to former army officers in order who supervise the training process are troops from the capital and deliver the to build a viable transitional army along keen to maintain certain standards. supplies he was allegedly hoarding in the lines of the 25th Division in Khost, Some of the candidates sent for training Panjsher (Ahmed Rashid, Eurasianet, 3 but it is far from clear whether the as officers have been turned down, to January 2003; AP, 26 January 2003). Karzai administration will heed such the displeasure of the Ministry. The Fahim eventually felt that he had to calls. need to meet the qualitative demands show some compliance. In early 2003, of the multinational instructors led to a he appointed eleven new department Individuals with experience in the rapidly increasing percentage of heads and four other officials within the communist army abound among lower candidates who had spent at least three Defense Ministry, all non-Tajiks rank officers. There are estimated to be years at a military academy; in the case of replacing members of Shura-i Nezar, close to 20,000 former officers from the the 3rd batch of candidates, this who were transferred to “other jobs”. monarchist, republican and communist percentage reached an impressive 86 (Lt. He also created a fourth deputy ministe- periods who live in foreign countries, to Col. C. Bournac, interview, May 2003). rial position, to which he appointed a which those living in Afghanistan Clearly, professional potential is Pashtun general, predictably affiliated to should be added. A few returned to becoming more important than political his ally, Sayyaf ’s Ittehad-i Islami. Of the Afghanistan during the first months of cronyism. other three deputy ministers who 2002, volunteering for service in the new retained their positions, two are Tajiks national army, but, for the most part, NCOs are normally pre-selected from and members of Shura-i Nezar and one appeared to have received a hostile among the recruits by the officers is Uzbek (General Dostum). reception, being forced to wait for themselves and then by British months. They often complained of instructors. Quite a few NCOs have A professional army? having been granted ranks well below previous experience as officers in the those they held in the past, but this is regular army, normally during the Another issue which has been widely the fate shared by a large majority of communist period, a fact that might debated is the place that former officers former officers that have joined the new lead to some resentment among them of the regular army, both royal, national army. Those who continued to (Major Stuart Carver, interview, May republican and most of all communist, reside in Afghanistan during the years 2003). Even some units of the should play in the rebuilding of the of the civil war received a better welcome transitional army enlist significant national army. The attempts of some and were more likely to receive field numbers of former regular army monarchists, including some former officer positions in the new national officers. This is the case of some units high-ranking officers of the royal army, army. It is estimated that they represent of the 7th, 8th, and Central Army to bring back to Afghanistan ex-officers roughly a third of those staffing the Corps, which absorbed them in 1992, from exile to help rebuild the army, do new battalions trained up to early 2003, and of the 25th and 30th Divisions, not appear likely to succeed as far as the with another third going to mujahidin which recruited them either due to the senior ranks are concerned, and even if field commanders, accepted mainly initiative of the local divisional they did this would only add to the because of their past services, and a final commander or governor. The 25th mass of aspiring generals. Those third being made up of cronies and Division, for example, was established generals who have been appointed to relatives of generals and politicians on a professional basis in Khost with the central staff of the army, first and (AFP, 9 November 2002). However, local funding thanks to the efforts of foremost General Delaware, the chief of most of the officers who served under the governor, Hakim Taniwal, and was staff, had all been involved with the the communists (and all those of the quite effective in establishing some mujahidin government from 1992. At general staff) are there because they degree of government control over the the level of the general staff, 16 of the transferred their loyalty in 1992 to restive province. 38 generals appointed in February 2002 Shura-i Nezar, rather than just because of their professional skills. Since officers are selected by the Ministry of Defense this is hardly surprising.

30 B I C C military reform

A vicious circle constraints, the only constructive short- References and medium-term approach appears to The prospects for military reform in be the reform of at least some divisions Bournac, Lt. Col. C. (French Army). Afghanistan face two major stumbling of the 2nd and 3rd Army Corps of the 2003. Interview by author. Kabul, blocks. On the one side are the interests transitional army based in Kandahar Afghanistan. May. coagulated into the private militias, and Gardez, chiefly through the which are inevitably opposed to genuine introduction of more former regular Carver, Major Stuart (British Army). reform. It is not only the militias that army officers. This could be done in a 2003. Interview by author. Kabul, represent a source of power for aspiring matter of a few months and would Afghanistan. May. politicians, but also the multitudes of improve their discipline, enhance their militiamen that make a good living out military effectiveness in containing the Harrell, Major John. (US Army). 2003. of their criminal activities; resurgence of Taliban activity along the Interview by author. Kabul, Afgha- demobilization or greater discipline border with Pakistan, and would, most nistan. May. represent nothing more than a threat to likely, make them more acceptable in the them. On the other hand, the precarious eyes of the population. Manuel, Anja, and Peter W. Singer. 2002. political balance within the country is “A New Model Afghan Army.” also an obstacle to military reform. A Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4. pp. genuinely professional army might 44–59. eventually become acceptable to most factions, but the problem is how to Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan. establish it and how to guarantee its 2002. Main principles and guidelines for professionalism and political non- the creation of the new Afghan National alignment. If the factional leaders Army and for the collection of arms. assume that one of them will control Kabul: MoD of Afghanistan. the new national army, they will do their August. best to delay the dismantling of their militias. Qarqin, Minister Nur Mohammed. 2003. Interview by author. Kabul, Short of a much greater commitment Afghanistan. May. of international troops, which seems unlikely to materialize, the vicious circle Further interviews were carried out in of a regime which benefits from the 2003 with a former regular army general, status quo but simultaneously a military attaché, a UN political officer undermines it will be difficult to break. and a UNAMA political officer. The pressure exerted on the Ministry of Defense by US officials and others has achieved only very modest results. The replacement of Defense Minister Fahim, with somebody more compliant would be a major political development, but is difficult to foresee. In the short term, the main role of the ANA will be political, advertising the new “multi- ethnic” regime in the provinces through its local deployments. By 2004, the new national army should be able to play a deterrent role against limited challenges by regional “warlords”, but it will be a long time before it will be able to secure the whole of the country. Given these

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Police Reform in Afghanistan: An Overview by Mark Sedra

olice reform is a vital component of process have been incommensurate to attacks, prompting UN relief agencies Ppeace-building and reconstruction the task at hand. The insufficiency of and NGOs to scale down their activities. activities in any postwar country. A donor support is one of several factors In the past five months, seven Afghan professional and disciplined police force outlined in this paper that has hindered mine-clearers have been shot and one is required to maintain internal security police reform and should be addressed killed in four separate ambushes in the and facilitate the transition from military in the coming months to put the south of the country; a Red Cross water to civilian life at the community level. In process back on track. engineer from El Salvador was executed most post-conflict situations—and when his convoy was stopped on a road Afghanistan is no exception—it is Climate of insecurity in southern Kandahar province; and necessary to recreate a police force, as grenades were thrown at a UNICEF former internal security structures were Insecurity in Afghanistan has reached compound in the east of the country. either destroyed by the conflict or alarming levels in 2003, raising the De-mining work was subsequently viewed as too tainted by the previous specter of the collapse of the peace- halted in the south and the UN political order to retain. In Afghanistan, building and reconstruction process. restricted vehicle movement to daylight where 23 years of civil war has destroyed Possessing little authority outside hours and suspended travel altogether virtually all state security institutions and Kabul, the Afghan Transitional Admi- on some roads. fractured the country along ethnic and nistration (ATA) lacks the wherewithal political lines, the task of recreating a to quell growing unrest and establish Policing in Afghanistan: police force that is professional, the rule of law. Warlords hold sway past & present accountable, effective and representative across much of the country. Maintaining of the country’s ethnic diversity is private armies and generating resources Afghanistan last possessed a legitimate daunting. The deterioration of security through illegitimate taxation, extortion, conditions across Afghanistan in late national police force during the 1960s the narcotics trade, and other illegal and 1970s, during the reign of Moham- 2002 and early 2003, coupled with the activities, these figures have established med Zahir Shah. The force was created reluctance of the international mini-fiefdoms and defy the central community to establish a peacekeeping with the help of the Federal Republic of government at will. Clashes between Germany and the German Democratic presence outside the capital, has rival warlords and factions have been Republic, who contributed resources highlighted the urgent need for a commonplace since the fall of the professional national police force. The and provided training. Police structures Taliban, killing scores of combatants broke down after the Soviet invasion of importance of such a force transcends and civilians. Among the most volatile Afghanistan in 1979. It was not until considerations of security; it serves as a factional rivalries in the country can be powerful symbol of national unity and 1989, under the regime of President found in northern Afghanistan around Najibullah, that efforts to establish a political stability, a symbol urgently the city of Mazar-i Sharif, where two professional police force were resumed needed in a country where confidence powerful UF commanders, General and faith in the government is so fragile. in earnest. In that year, the Kabul Police Rashid Dostum and General Atta Academy was founded. This initiative Mohammed, have been embroiled in a was short lived, however, as the Police reform was identified as a vital bitter turf war that has killed hundreds pillar of the security sector reform mujahidin’s conquest of Kabul in 1992 of people in the past twenty months. led to the closure of the facility. agenda set at the security donors conference held in Geneva in April 2002. Perhaps the most debilitating effect of Appointed as the lead nation for police According to the ATA Interior Ministry, the rise of insecurity is the curtailment there are approximately 73,000 police reform, Germany has worked of reconstruction and relief operations and 12,000 border guards in Afghani- assiduously to build Afghan capacity to in some of the most impoverished stan today. One must be circumspect train a modern police. However, in light parts of the country. Aid workers have of the severity of Afghanistan’s security been the target of a number of recent situation, the resources and expertise About the author committed by the international Mark Sedra is a research associate at the community to the police training Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC).

32 B I C C police reform

with such figures as regional governors per month with police generals making Afghan police. After presenting a study and police chiefs tend to inflate the double that amount (Christian Science from a fact-finding mission it had stated number of police under their Monitor, 7 January 2003). The low level dispatched to Kabul in January of that control to secure more revenue from the of police salaries has created a fertile year, Germany pledged 10 million euros central government. The police consist ground for corruption. Extortion, for police reform in 2002. At a subse- primarily of conscripts and former bribery, and thievery have become a quent meeting in Berlin on 14–15 March mujahidin fighters who lack any police common practice for police due to the 2002, the German government training or even rudimentary education. insufficiency of their wages. introduced a comprehensive plan to Most of these figures are products of create a national police service. Dubbed the civil war and accordingly have There is no established command the “German Project for Support of the become accustomed to acting with structure or hierarchy for the police in Police in Afghanistan”, the plan impunity. A recent report by Amnesty Afghanistan. Police are often loyal to delineated five areas for German action: International titled, Afghanistan: Police local powerbrokers as opposed to advice on the structure and organization reconstruction essential for the protection of centrally appointed governors and police of the force; the rehabilitation of the human rights, catalogues human rights chiefs, as they are able to remunerate Kabul Police Academy; the violations perpetrated by police across them for their services. Under such reconstruction of police buildings and the country since the fall of the Taliban. conditions the police are more inclined institutions; the provision of Although Interior Ministry officials have to promote the agendas of local equipment such as police vehicles; and refuted the claim that human rights commanders than act in the interest of the coordination of all other donor abuses are systemic and widespread public security and safety. activities that relate to policing. within the ranks of the country’s police, it is clear the force’s lack of discipline and Cumulatively these factors have The rehabilitation of the Kabul Police professionalism poses a major challenge engendered distrust between Academy is the centerpiece of the to the police reform process. communities and the police. Growing German program. The first team of frustration over policing came to the German police officers arrived in Kabul According to the Amnesty International fore on 1 March 2003 when hundreds on 16 March 2002 to implement a train- report, only 120 out of 3,000 officers in of protestors took to the streets in west the-trainers course for the academy’s Kandahar province have received formal Kabul to demonstrate against the local police instructors (UN Secretary General, police training, and the bulk of that police, who were accused of attempting 2002a). A total of 82 officers have since occurred over a decade ago (Amnesty to abduct a local woman. Although the completed this program. These trainers International, 2003, p. 9). Such figures Dasht-i Barchi district where the began teaching the Academy’s first class are emblematic of the state of policing demonstration took place is of 1,500 police recruits in the first week across Afghanistan. Former mujahidin predominantly inhabited by ethnic of August 2002 (UN Secretary General, have, for the most part, been Hazaras, the local police are composed 2002b). The pool of trainees is diverse, unsuccessful in making the transition almost entirely of ethnic Tajiks, an comprising 100 from each province, from guerilla fighter to civilian imbalance that has fostered intense including in total 40 women. The Police policeman. Mohammed Farid Hamidi, a tension and animosity. The lack of Academy offers a one-year course for member of the Afghan Independent ethnic diversity in the police is a non-commissioned officers and a three- Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), problem throughout the country. year course for commissioned officers. affirms that mujahidin incorporated Illustrating this fact, 12 of the 15 police into the police “often confuse police stations in Kabul are headed by UNDP Law & Order duties with military ones.” They bring a Panjsheri Tajiks (Eurasia Insight, 26 “militiamen’s mentality” to the police June 2002). Until such blatant inequities Trust Fund (LOTFA) that has alienated communities and are rectified and sweeping reforms In December 2002, the United Nations exacerbated tension and insecurity (RFE, undertaken, public suspicion and 22 April 2003). distrust of the police will persist. Development Programme (UNDP) established a Law & Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), whose principal purpose was Police across the country lack basic German support resources to pursue their jobs, including to cover the recurrent budgetary expenses, most importantly salaries, of pens, paper, boots, cars and Having been allotted the status of lead the country’s police. The fund is also communications equipment. Police nation for police reform, the German salaries are often below subsistence level intended to procure non-lethal government convened a conference in equipment, to rehabilitate police or not paid at all. The average trained Berlin on 13 February 2002 that facilities, and to strengthen law policemen in Afghanistan makes US$24 assembled representatives of 18 nations enforcement capacity across the country. and 11 international organizations to discuss international support for the

B I C C 33 brief 28

The establishment of the trust fund The Jalali plan cross-border insurgency activities from marked a watershed in the police reform Pakistan. The Interior Ministry intends process; however, it has been hindered On 28 January 2003, Ali Ahmad Jalali to establish a presence at 75 border by fund-raising difficulties. As of May (Pashtun), a professional military officer points in eight border regions. This 2003, only US$11 million of the US$75 and former military historian, was presence will bolster the central million funding target had been raised. appointed as the Minister of the government’s efforts to collect customs Interior, replacing Taj Mohammad and tax revenues, which have been National police training Wardak. After being appointed by channeled to the pockets of regional center (NPTC) President Karzai following the Loya governors and warlords rather than the Jirga in June 2002, Wardak had coffers of the Ministry of Finance. The Norwegian government has indicated In May 2003, the ATA with support promised to control security within six months of his term or resign. Wardak, that it will support the program to train from the US established a new training and re-equip the Border Police. facility intended to accelerate the police an 80-year old naturalized American training process. The National Police who returned to Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban, was never able to Jalali has also begun to reform the Training Center (NPTC) provides Interior Ministry and the Afghan constable-level training courses to assert his authority over the security intelligence service known as the current police and new recruits. The first services, let alone enact tough reforms. Jalali, a much stronger political figure, National Security Directorate (NSD). trainees at the center are 40 police officers The NSD is currently headed by undergoing a course in police-instructor has displayed the necessary resolve and Mohammad Arif, a Panjsheri Tajik. development. After completing the vision to bring change. He has pledged to implement comprehensive reforms Although Arif is officially answerable to intensive three-week course they will be Karzai it is widely believed that he takes accredited as qualified instructors and in his ministry and create a police force orders from Defense Minister Fahim. will begin training the first classes of of 50,000 and a border police of 12,000 in a 4–5 year period. The NSD contains 23 directorates, all of recruits. The length of a standard which are led by Panjsheri Tajiks. training course will be eight weeks and Employing more than 30,000 the only prerequisite for enrollment is In the short-term, Jalali has introduced a plan to fill the present security vacuum employees, it is the most powerful basic literacy. In the future, all officers security institution in the country, and wishing to join the Afghan national and accelerate the police reform process. must be reformed to make it police will have to pass through the This plan places emphasis on three representative and accountable. NPTC. branches of the police: a Quick Response Unit, a Highway Patrol, and The programs offered at the NPTC will the Border Police. The Quick Response Obstacles to reform include instruction on human rights, Unit consists of 3,000–4,000 officers basic democratic principles, and interna- based in Kabul, but capable of being Resources tional standards of policing. The rapidly deployed to any area of the international police training team, while country. This force has already been A persistent shortfall in resources has led by the US who have contributed successfully utilized to quell crises in been the principal obstacle to police three officers, will include two officers Khost and Zabul provinces. It is a reform in Afghanistan. Interior Minister from the UK, one from Sweden, and temporary structure intended to Jalali has stated that US$380 million will one from Slovenia. The NPTC will stabilize volatile areas and act as a be needed over the next 4–5 years to significantly expedite the police-training deterrent to violence until traditional build a national police force. This schedule; the center expects to produce state security structures reach their full money has been slow to materialize. Of 7,000 graduates by next year. Its capacity. The Highway Patrol will the US$75 million requested for the establishment has introduced an endeavor to secure Afghanistan’s major LOTFA, only US$11 million has been important division of labor into the roads and highways, which have been delivered by the international donor training scheme. The Kabul Police the target of repeated attacks from community. The LOTFA, whose Academy, which offers BA and higher spoiler groups and bandits. primary goal is to cover the salaries of level programs of study, will train senior Safeguarding the roads will facilitate police officers, has not proven to be officers and commanders, while the road reconstruction and trade, greatly attractive to donors, who tend to fund NPTC, offering basic-level training, will advancing the country’s economic projects with tangible outputs that can be responsible for instilling the recovery. The Border Police are currently be easily exhibited to their governments country’s rank-and-file officers with a in the process of being retrained, and constituencies. The problem is, as professional ethic. restructured, and re-equipped to confront insecurity in border areas, principally caused by the drug trade and

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Simon Chesterman notes, “that Reform of the Ministry of Interior demonstrators in November 2002, countries often want their names up in (MoI) killing and wounding several students. lights next to their pet programmes, Jurat has hardly been neutralized as a sometimes administered by their own In spite of the strenuous efforts of political force as he will continue to NGOs. Everyone wants to send Jalali to reform the Ministry of the control two police battalions, but now children back to school; no one wants to Interior, the bulk of the senior they are charged with the less pay military [or police] salaries” positions in the Ministry, the police, and controversial task of helping out in (Chesterman, 2002, p. 42). the National Security Directorate (NSD), natural disasters and emergencies. The remain in the hands of a narrow cadre other two battalions formerly under his The lack of resources is acute across of elites affiliated to the Panjsheri command will serve as reserve police. Afghanistan. In many areas of the faction of the UF, headed by Defense This is a modest but important step country, such as Bamiyan, local Minister Fahim. As in most toward achieving the vital goal of full governors have resorted to borrowing government ministries, patronage and MoI reform. money from local tradesmen and clientalism are the main determinants of merchants to pay rank and file personnel decisions in the Ministry of Gender issues policeman (Amnesty International, p. Interior, a situation that has invariably 23). This situation is unsustainable and created gross ethnic and factional There are currently 40 female recruits in has already engendered a sharp rise in imbalances in the government. To the Kabul Police Academy, 28 in the corruption. Even in Kabul, where last successfully implement police reform on one-year program and 12 in the year 7,000 officers received a salary from a countrywide level, the MoI must be advanced three-year program. German the LOTFA, most illegal checkpoints subjected to comprehensive reforms initiatives to increase female recruitment used to extort money are erected and that will make it non-partisan, have achieved some success. According operated by the police. A vivid accountable, and representative of the to a police academy spokesperson, they illustration of the extent of the country’s ethnic make-up. have received more applications from problem of corruption and criminality women then they have places. in the police came in November 2002 Immediately after his appointment, Nevertheless, conservative religious and when the curfew over Kabul, in effect Jalali committed himself to social attitudes remain firmly rooted in since the Soviet invasion in 1978, was reorganizing his Ministry and the Afghan society. Even relatively minor lifted. The crime rate in the city actually security services under his control. After issues such as the uniforms donned by decreased following the lifting of the a number of abortive attempts to fulfill female officers arouse controversy— curfew. It appears that the police had this commitment, he finally made some there is a great deal of resistance from exploited the curfew, ostensibly in place headway in early June 2003 when he conservative quarters to policewomen to protect the citizenry, to engage in ordered a shake-up of his Ministry. The wearing standard police uniforms that criminal activity without public scrutiny reshuffle dissolved two departments include caps rather then veils. Many men and interference. and demoted three senior officials; in Afghanistan have begun to accept however, the main casualty was Din that female police are needed, but only Police facilities across the country are in a Mohammed Jurat, who headed the to carry out minor duties that male desperate state due to the long civil war. Department for National Public Security. police cannot due to religious or tribal Most are dilapidated and need to be This Department was formerly customs, such as body searches and completely rebuilt. The paucity of responsible for security in major cities arrests of women. Public awareness adequate facilities to detain prisoners has and highways across Afghanistan, and activities aiming to shift these ingrained led to the use of restraints, such as leg controlled four special battalions of cultural attitudes must be intensified. If irons and straight jackets, in a manner police, totaling 5,000 men. The move the Afghan police force is to meet that contravenes international human effectively reduced the influence of one international standards and address the rights norms. Also, basic equipment of the most powerful and controversial unique security concerns of women, such as cars, radios, pencils and paper are figures in Kabul. Last year, President whether it be domestic abuse or rape, it in short supply. Donor support to the Karzai publicly named Jurat as one of must possess an adequate number of police reform process must be three possible suspects implicated in the female officers with a status equal to substantially increased. This is necessary murder of Aviation Minister Abdul their male counterparts. both to expand the police training Rahman—although he was never program and to pay and properly equip charged—and it was members of Jurat’s Human rights that force. If police are not paid an police battalion that shot at student adequate salary and provided with the Human rights violations have become basic equipment needed to prosecute common in police stations across their duties it will be difficult to ensure Afghanistan, fostering what Amnesty that they meet international standards International calls “a widespread lack of of policing.

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public faith in the police” (Amnesty reform agenda: military reform; the Afghanistan as it is estimated that there International, 2003, p. 1). As Interior disarmament, demobilization and are 8–10 million guns in the country Minister Jalali has aptly stated, “The reintegration of former combatants and anywhere between 100,000 and police cannot do their job without the (DDR); counter-narcotics; and judicial 250,000 combatants from all phases of cooperation of the people” (IRIN, 20 reform. The five elements of the the conflict. In spite of the vital March 2003). To restore the peoples’ security sector reform agenda are importance of this enterprise, a DDR trust in the police, the culture of intricately entwined and must be program has yet to be implemented. impunity that pervades the force must pursued on a parallel basis. Japan has assumed the responsibility of be contravened. To achieve this goal, the lead nation for DDR. The Japanese police of Afghanistan must be retrained Military reform government has proposed several plans to meet international standards of for DDR in Afghanistan but none have policing. Central to these standards is By August 2003, the Afghan National materialized. Although the Japanese professionalism and respect for the Army (ANA) numbered 5,000–6,000 remain as the principal funder for DDR, inalienable human rights of each man, troops. Low pay, poor food and living they have largely deferred the woman, and child. conditions, and confusion regarding the responsibility for DDR planning and length and terms of service have support to the UN Assistance Mission Steps have been taken by both the impelled many graduates to return in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UN international community and the home following basic training. The Development Programme (UNDP), Afghan Interior Ministry to address the ATA and US estimate that under and the United States. issue of human rights. A human rights favorable conditions, it will take at least department has been established at the five years to establish a capable and UNAMA has introduced a DDR Interior Ministry and human rights functional army. It is advisable that this program titled, “The Afghan New offices have been opened in every police period be shortened considerably. Beginnings Programme”, which is department of the provinces and Accordingly, the US-coordinated training slated to begin in August 2003. The districts. The goal of these offices is to program to build the ANA should be program, which will run for three years raise awareness in regard to human revised and expanded. at a cost of US$127 million, is being rights issues among the police. The supported by Japan, the US, UK, Norwegian government has sent a A professional and effective national Canada, and Sweden. The program is special team to develop a human rights army is an essential element of efforts well designed and has sufficient funding training module at the Kabul Police to legitimize the central government and for its initial year of operation. Academy and the new NPTC has made counter the internal and external security However, until reform of the Ministry human rights a central component of threats that face Afghanistan. Although of Defense is implemented and a their curriculum. These are positive the police is traditionally responsible for genuine political consensus concerning steps but even more must be done. The maintaining internal security, a police DDR among Afghanistan’s main power establishment of a police oversight force in Afghanistan, even one that is brokers achieved, the program will likely body or ombudsman could be a tool to well trained and equipped, would be remain grounded. build public confidence. Also, the incapable of overcoming the challenge punishment of blatant human rights posed by some of Afghanistan’s Without DDR, the job of the police in offenders of the past and present, warlords and spoiler groups. The army Afghanistan will be exceedingly difficult. within a broader strategy for transitional will be needed to bring the most The police are not equipped to control justice and national reconciliation, powerful warlords to heel through the well-armed and organized paramilitary would also serve to enhance the image threat and application of force, and to forces. These groups must be of security institutions in the public eradicate the last vestiges of the Taliban demobilized and reintegrated into sphere. and al-Qaeda. Only after these threats civilian society for civilian policing to be have been removed can the army return viable. Security sector reform to its barracks and the police assume its conventional task of keeping the peace. Counter-narcotics Delays, inefficiency, and a lack of resources and initiative have marred the Disarmament, demobilization and In 2002, Afghanistan returned to its entire security sector reform process. The reintegration (DDR) position as the world’s foremost impact of police reform initiatives is producer of heroin. The 2002 crop contingent on progress made in the The disarmament, demobilization and reached an estimated 3,400 mt., a 540 other pillars of the security sector reintegration of former combatants percent increase on the yield for 2001 (DDR) is an important component of and significantly higher than the 1,900– peace-building activities in any post- 2,700 mt. earlier predicted for 2002 conflict society. It is imperative in

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(IRIN, 21 January 2003). According to In terms of drug enforcement, the UK Judicial reform the UN Office on Drugs and Crime government has pledged £70 million (UNODC), profits from drug trafficking over three years to create an anti- Establishing the rule of law in Afghani- accounted for 20 percent of narcotics task force. With this money stan is a prerequisite for effective Afghanistan’s GDP in 2002 (Reuters, 22 Britain has implemented a program to policing. The UNDP Deputy Country May 2003). This lucrative trade is a train a drug enforcement unit of the Director in Afghanistan, Knut Ostby, major source of income for warlords Afghan police. Fifty British customs aptly recognizes that “Afghanistan’s and spoiler groups and fuels corruption, experts have begun training Afghan economic growth, political and social money-laundering, crime, and poses a recruits on advanced drug enforcement security depends on a functioning legal major health threat by spreading the use techniques. The trainees will form the system” (UNDP, 2002). With of intravenous drug consumption, a core of a new drug law enforcement Afghanistan’s judicial system in disarray major cause of AIDS. department of the Afghan national and progress in police reform having police called the Kabul Counter exceeded that of the justice sector, the On 17 January 2002, in an attempt to Narcotics Directorate. The British have courts currently lack the capacity to arrest control of drug production, the also pledged to provide the Afghan handle the volume of cases brought Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) border police with modern equipment before them. Accordingly, criminals banned poppy cultivation and the to reach remote border areas quickly in apprehended by police are released consumption of heroin and introduced, order to close drug trafficking corridors without punishment and innocent with British support, an aggressive along the Afghan-Pakistan, Afghan- Afghans, with no recourse to legal poppy eradication program. From the Iran, and Afghan-Tajikistan borders. protection, have been subjected to outset, the program was plagued by However, according to Mirwais Yasimi, unlawful imprisonment. The reality is inefficiency and mismanagement. It the Head of the Kabul Counter that the police cannot adequately offered US$350 for each jirib (one fifth Narcotics Directorate, little of the funds maintain law and order until the of a hectare) of poppies destroyed; and support promised by the UK have country’s justice system is reestablished. however, poppy growers can make been delivered. “I was expecting Mr. double that from growing their produce Blair to do more”, Mirwais has stated. On 28 November 2002 a judicial reform and selling it on the open market He went on to say, “We need funds and commission, supported by the Italian (Davis, 2003, pp. 28–29). assistance...my men are dedicated…but government and UNDP, was Compounding the problem, many they have received only tens of inaugurated to initiate the farmers claimed that they were not duly thousands of dollars from the UK, not reconstruction of the country’s legal compensated for the destruction of even hundreds of thousands” (UK framework. The founding of the their crops. The abject failure of this Mirror, 02 August 2003). Not commission was followed by the US$34 million program, which surprisingly in light of this shortfall in convening of an international prompted UK and ATA officials to resources, no major drug arrests have conference titled, Reform of the Afghan shelve it, was evinced by the fact that been made. Justice System, held in Rome in poppy cultivation actually increased in December 2002. Conference participants areas that were targeted by the program. While the initiatives introduced by the pledged US$30 million for the judicial It will be difficult for the ATA to lower ATA and the British are beneficial, they reform process (International Crisis production if they cannot provide are severely under-funded and fail to Group, 2003, pp. i–iii). alternative livelihoods for farmers. In address the underlying cause of drug drought-ridden areas of the country this production in Afghanistan, a lack of The commission has a difficult is one of the only crops that farmers can viable alternative livelihoods for farmers. mandate: to develop a legal framework afford to produce – it is attractive Resources and energy must be invested that respects Islamic legal principles yet because it is drought resistant, easy to in the design and implementation of recognizes the equality of women. store, and extremely profitable. A farmer alternative-crop and rural infrastructure Nonetheless the commission took a can make between 60 and 65 times more development programs, to run parallel major step towards achieving these money growing poppies than wheat to eradication programs. The goals on 26 January 2003 when it and (IRIN, 21 January 2003). Therefore, the government does not have the capacity, UNDP initiated a two-year project called key to counter-narcotics efforts will be particularly in remote drug-producing “Rebuilding the Justice System in the provision of subsidies to farmers to areas, to forcefully uphold the poppy Afghanistan.” The first phase of the grow alternative crops. ban. It requires incentives to build project will involve the reconstruction public trust. Of course this will be a long-term process, one that British officials admit could take more than a decade.

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and provision of equipment for facilitate expansion. In the long-term, References courthouses across the country; the the creation of a national police force is training of judges and other law offices; best suited to maintain security and Amnesty International. 2003. Afghani- increasing the capacity of the foster national unity in Afghanistan, stan: Police reconstruction essential for administration of the justice system; thus this endeavor should be allocated the protection of human rights. Amne- and organizing seminars and training more resources and attention by the sty International. March for the staff of the system. Special international donor community. attention will be paid to ensuring However, in the short-term more steps CARE International. 2003. A New Year’s gender equality in the system and must be taken to mitigate the Resolution to Keep: Secure a Lasting strengthening the teaching and research immediate and imposing security Peace in Afghanistan. CARE Interna- capacity of Kabul University’s Faculty of threats to the ATA. It will take a decade tional. January. Law and Sharia. The Italian government for the national police and army to and UNDP should take steps to ensure challenge the warlords and the drug Chesterman, Simon. 2002. “Walking that judicial reform features more barons in Afghanistan. How the Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of prominently in the wider reconstruction international community helps the ATA UN State-Building.” Survival. vol. 44, agenda, that donor aid is delivered in a to confront these threats in the no. 3. Autumn, 37–46. timely fashion, and that technical meantime will determine the fate of the assistance is provided when and where it state-building enterprise. Davis, Anthony. 2003. “Afghanistan’s is required. The police and judicial opium production rises post- reform processes are symbiotically Taliban.” Jane’s Intelligence Review. connected and must be harmonized. December, 28–29.

The Kabul student riots of November International Crisis Group (ICG). 2003. 2002, which resulted in the deaths of ICG Asia Report no. 45: Afghanistan: several students at the hands of Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice. overzealous police officers, clearly Afghanistan/Brussels: ICG, 28 illustrated the need to expand the January. police-training scheme currently being implemented. President Karzai partially Kingma, Kees. 2002. Improving External attributed this tragic incident to the Support for Reintegration of Combatants police’s lack of training and Into Civilian Life. Paper presented as professionalism. With the security part of the IPA-UNDP Workshop situation so dire in Afghanistan, it is titled, “A Framework for Lasting clear that the creation of an effective and Demobilization, Disarmament and professional national police and army is Reintegration of Former a priority of the peace-building and Combatants in Crisis Situations.” reconstruction processes. However, New York, 12–13 December. regardless of the amount of resources and attention allocated to these Kingma, Kees and Mark Sedra. 2003. programs, erecting security structures is a “Reorienting the Mujahidin: process that takes a great deal of time. Prospects for Demobilization in Accordingly, a security vacuum will Afghanistan.” In: BICC Conversion inevitably remain until these structures Survey 2003. Baden-Baden: Nomos achieve a degree of viability, which will Verlagesellschaft. pp. 93–111. be a matter of years rather than months. The most obvious solution to the Manuel, Anja, and P. W. Singer. 2002. “A problem is the expansion of the New Model Afghan Army.” Foreign International Security Assistance Force Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4. pp. 44–59. (ISAF) or the Coalition’s Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), but such proposals have received tepid support from donor states, which would have to provide the funding and troops to

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Rubin, Barnett. 2003. Identifying Options United Nations Secretary General. 2002a. and Entry Points for Disarmament, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Demobilization, and Reintegration in its Implications for International Afghanistan. Paper presented as part Peace and Security.” Report to the of the BICC E-conference titled, General Assembly and Security “Afghanistan: Assessing the Progress Council. 18 March 2002. A/56/875 of Security Sector Reform, One Year S/2002/278. After the Geneva Conference.” www.bicc.de/forum, 4–11 June. United Nations Secretary General. 2002b. “The Situation in Afghanistan Sedra, Mark. 2002. Challenging the and its Implications for International Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform Peace and Security.” Report to the in Post-Taliban Afghanistan. Paper 25. General Assembly and Security Bonn: BICC, October. Council. 11 July 2002. A/56/1000 S/ 2002/737. Sedra, Mark. 2003a. Afghanistan: Between War and Reconstruction. Where do we go from here? Silver City, NM & Wa- shington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus. March.

Sedra, Mark. 2003b. The Forgotten War Shows No Sign of Abating. Silver City, NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus. April.

UNICEF. 2002. “Programme for the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers/minors associated with the fighting forces in Afghani- stan and prevention of recruitment” (draft). May.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). 2002. “Partnership for Peace Programme for Afghanistan; Afghan Demobilization and Reintegration Programme” (draft). 28 August.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Judicial Reform Commission Starts Up With Support From UNDP. December 2002, www.undp.org.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2003. “The Opium Problem in Afghanistan: An International Problem.” New York: United Nations.

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Identifying Options and Entry Points for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Afghanistan by Barnett R. Rubin

Context more than another of these factional The Bonn Agreement of 5 December armies. The recognition of that army’s 2001, was not a peace agreement among ifteen months after the Interim commander as Minister of Defense warring parties. One side in the armed FAuthority of Afghanistan assumed does not confer any particular legitimacy conflict, the Taliban and al-Qaeda, was control of what remained of the on that group in the eyes of many, a in the process of being bombed out of apparatus of government, most point to bear in mind when discussing office by the US military, while four Afghans, as well as foreign the role of the Ministry of Defense in factions met in Bonn under UN organizations trying to work on disarming factional militias. auspices to decide how to create a reconstruction, identify the lack of successor government. Only one of security as the country’s most pressing Most of these commanders were already those groups, the Islamic United Front problem. While the International disarmed once, by the Taliban, and this for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UF or Security Assistance Force (ISAF) helps was the Taliban’s most popular policy. Northern Alliance) commanded troops the authorities provide security in Kabul The CIA revived these militias again in the field, and it was a loosely and the environs, throughout most of very quickly in the weeks after September organized coalition of very different the rest of the country undisciplined 11, 2001, through the relatively simple groups, brought together only by their and largely autonomous armed groups means of distributing cash in such large opposition to the Taliban. survive through control of vital quantities that the value of the dollar resources. These forces range from against the afghani was cut in half in The Bonn Agreement does not contain consistently predatory to the merely three months, according to the IMF. any agreement on DDR. The UN undisciplined, but they threaten both Many commanders continued to receive drafters initially included a paragraph of economic and political activity. Unless subsidies after the fall of the Taliban peace agreement boilerplate calling for they are either transformed into, or and the establishment of the AIA for DDR of unofficial forces, but the replaced by, legally constituted security assisting US and coalition forces in reaction was furious. UF delegates from services, neither reconstruction nor battles against remnants of the Taliban several armed factions claimed it was improvement of governance, to say and al-Qaeda. The US claims that it has dishonorable to take arms from nothing of the more distant goal of ceased providing such subsidies, but it mujahidin. Outside the meeting, and in democratization, can take place. may do so on a temporary basis for Afghanistan, they expressed suspicion particular battles. In any case, once that the West wanted to disarm the The leaders of these armed groups are armed and funded, commanders can mujahidin and bring ISAF in order to mostly former commanders of the anti- become economically self-sufficient by prevent an Islamic government from Soviet jihad, but some were gaining control of customs posts, being established. Hence the final text commanders of the “tribal” militias of bazaars, and opium trafficking routes. states only that, as of the installation of the Najibullah regime. Some are Raw opium is currently selling at the AIA, all armed groups come under regionally consolidated into large forces US$500–600/kg, a historic high, a figure its authority, and that these groups (as in western or northern Afghanistan) that it is difficult for a DDR program to should be integrated into the national and some are fragmented into small compete with. army, which will be reorganized bands (as in southeast Afghanistan). according to need. Most participants Most Afghans consider the current Ministry of Defense, under Marshall About the author Abdul Qasim Fahim, who inherited the Barnett R. Rubin is a Senior Fellow and mantle of military command from the Director of the Center on International late Ahmad Shah Massoud, as little Cooperation (CIC) at New York University.

40 B I C C DDR

understood that “according to need” international assistance to turn his Terms like “security sector reform” have meant eventual demobilization, but this ministry into another center of power, a rather technocratic tone, leading to was not explicit, and there was no creating greater balance—and greater questions such as whether the state has discussion of numbers. A new tension—in the cabinet, especially as he the capacity to provide economic paragraph was also inserted into the has refused to pay the salaries of all the alternatives and to monitor the process, preamble, praising the sacrifice of the armed men Fahim claims to have on his but the process is basically political. mujahidin, in order to try to calm their payroll. In early 2003 Fahim and his Building the ANA, reforming the suspicions. followers were campaigning against Ministry of Defense, and disarming and Ghani, charging him with corruption demobilizing the militias, all form part The political settlement that emerged and ethnic favoritism in discussions of the task of building a legitimate from Bonn does not consist of a stable with the UN and donor countries. national state in Afghanistan. Different or effective power sharing arrangement. models of these processes have UN SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi stated As long as the US and coalition forces implications for the issues of: who repeatedly that the UN Talks on are present, these tensions will not lead holds state power; how they exercise Afghanistan in Bonn were extremely to the breakup of the government or a power; what is the definition of the imperfect, and that the government that return to war, which everyone wants to Afghan nation; and what is the basis of emerged from Bonn would also be avoid. 2003 and 2004, however, will the state’s legitimacy. imperfect. The purpose of the Bonn likely see increasing tensions over the agreement was to reach agreement on a new constitution and elections. The The principal person responsible for process, extending through June 2004, westernizing and centralizing forces DDR in the Afghan government is which would enable the government to symbolized by Ghani will be the object Deputy Minister of Defense, General become more legitimate and effective. of attack by regional and Islamist Atiqullah Baryalai, who is also a The government and UN have met all leaders who will use Islamic symbolism member of the National Defense the formal timetables and benchmarks, and discourse against the government. Commission. Baryalai is a Panjsheri give or take a few days, but the The failure of the government and commander who, among other things, procedures have not been as effective as international community to deliver oversaw the battle of Kunduz in hoped in addressing imbalances in the significant visible reconstruction aid in November 2001. He has no formal government. most areas, as Afghans perceive it, will military training, except perhaps also undermine the westernizing group through Massoud’s own military The major grievance of most Afghans in the central government. This is also academy, but he has considerable about the composition of the the group that most strongly supports battlefield experience. Baryalai’s plan for government at the beginning was the DDR and the building of an Afghan disarmament, which he has modified domination of the most important National Army (ANA) that is professio- very little since the summer of 2002, positions by the followers of Massoud nal and not formed on the basis of adheres closely to the language of the from the Panjsher Valley. These existing warlord militias. Bonn Agreement. To simplify some positions included the Minister of very complex arguments, especially Defense, the Minister of Interior, the New beginnings? about stages and timing, Baryalai’s plan Director of the National Security has the following features: Directorate (combining internal and The Afghan government has named its external functions), and the Minister of DDR program “Afghanistan’s New The ANA is to be formed from Foreign Affairs. The Minister of the Beginnings Program” (ANBP). This demobilized, reorganized, retrained, Interior was replaced by a weak, elderly program forms part of a larger package and winnowed-down units of Pashtun at the Loya Jirga, which did not of security sector reform also including “mujahidin.” bring the Panjsheris in the ministry the building of the ANA, reforms of under control but did remove their the ministries of defense and interior, Commanders of “mujahidin” will accountability. The appointment of Ali and judicial reform. The task of DDR receive rank in the ANA according to Ahmad Jalali, a professional military cannot be understood apart from the the number of weapons that they officer and military historian (Pashtun) building of the ANA and the reforms turn in. as Minister of the Interior in February of the Ministry of Defense. Even 2003 may be a turning point, though reforms of the Ministry of the Interior The Ministry of Defense will lead Fahim blocked his first attempted and the judiciary are related, since and control the process. dismissal of a high official. The Minister policing will have to move into the of Finance, Ashraf Ghani, has used vacuum created by the disarming of The process will start simultaneously militias, if they are not to be simply throughout the country. replaced with new militias.

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According to this model, participation The UN and US have also offered Under this model, the “existing forces” in the jihad and the struggle against the alternatives and attempted to negotiate are seen as, at best, having outlived their Taliban provides legitimacy for rulership with Gen. Baryalai and modify his plan usefulness, and, at worst, as being a and command in the armed forces. The in accord with discussions in the NDC major part of the problem that the new “existing forces,” as the MoD calls and elsewhere. In addition, while government has to solve. Legitimacy them, which it accuses Ashraf Ghani of adequate donor funding seems likely to comes from an elected government trying to destroy by withholding be available for an acceptable DDR plan, employing Afghan citizens based on payment, will become the core of the it will not be available for a plan to merit, with international training. new forces. In some versions of this remake the UF forces into the army of Ethnically, this model could reinstate a plan, the reorganized existing forces Afghanistan under Panjsheri leadership. strong Pashtun presence in the security would at least be deployed away from When confronted with this fact, Gen. forces. Some suspect it would restore their native areas, to reduce their ability Baryalai states that he refuses to Pashtun dominance in the military, to act as warlords or make illicit contacts. compromise the sovereignty of based on an alliance of royalist and The current Ministry of Defense enjoys Afghanistan because of donor pressure. former communist military full legitimacy as a national institution, professionals, and that the talk of in this proposal, and all regional units While there is no detailed alternative “professionalism” is a cover for that should be integrated into a centralized plan, other members of the NDC, project. As in Baryalai’s model, however, force under its command. Ethnically, UNAMA, the US, and even some regional forces would be dissolved and this model will favor the non-Pashtun particularly thoughtful Panjsheris have replaced by a completely centralized elements of the former United Front suggested elements of the following: national military force. over Pashtuns, as they possess far more weapons and hence will dominate the DDR and building the ANA should In August 2002 Fahim offered to officer corps, and Panjsheris over the be separate projects. It is better to replace 30 of the top 38 positions in the rest of the United Front. The Panjsheris train new recruits untainted by the MoD with new appointees to be named would retain their power and have it past than to untrain mujahidin from by Karzai. Karzai deputed Wardak to further legitimized by the international their guerrilla bad habits and then try identify candidates, but it took until community’s support for the DDR to retrain them to be professional February 2003 to name fifteen of them, program and ANA, which they will soldiers. Demobilized fighters only three of whom came from control. Starting the process throughout meeting certain high standards can Wardak’s list. They included ten the country, while avoiding the political apply for training for the ANA, but Pashtuns, two Uzbeks, two Hazaras, problem of seeming favoritism, would with no guarantee of acceptance. and one Tajik. Many express skepticism, also definitively preclude any form of claiming the appointees are weak, and international monitoring, as no The officer corps of the ANA should will have little power. Some are aligned organization would have this capacity. be an amalgam of former with the Islamist wing of the UF and Hence the MoD would have a free hand. commanders (kept to a minimum), thus do not diversify the political former professional soldiers with as character of the MoD at all, whatever There is no single alternative proposal, little taint as possible, and new their ethnic origin. Deputy Minister of though Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak, trainees. Defense General Gul Zarak Zadran is a another member of the Defense Pashtun from Paktia who was a Commission, has emerged as a critic of The Ministry of Defense must be professional soldier trained in the US. Baryalai’s approach. Wardak, a Pashtun thoroughly reformed so that it is, During the jihad, however, he became a military officer trained in the US under and is seen to be, under national commander of ‘Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul the pre-1978 regime, served as military rather than factional control. The Sayyaf ’s Ittehad-i Islami party, an commander of the moderate National ultimate reform, of course, would be Islamist organization that became one Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA - to remove Fahim, which many of the few Pashtun-led components of Gailani) during the jihad. He briefly Afghans and foreigners would like to the UF. He is a strong advocate of served as chief of army staff under do, a fact of which Fahim is fully excluding all but jihadi forces from the Ahmad Shah Massoud in 1992 but aware. army, even more so than Baryalai. soon left. A supporter of the former king of Afghanistan, Wardak The NDC, the UN, and donors The nature of the MoD and ANA are participated in the Bonn Talks as a should oversee the process of DDR. vital for the success of DDR, because of member of the Rome group. He hoped their relationship to the central problem to be named Minister of Defense at DDR should begin at selected of DDR: To whom will the ex- Bonn and has poor relations with the locations in the country and spread combatants hand over their weapons? Panjsheri group. gradually as resources allow and as the team in charge learns lessons.

42 B I C C DDR

Who remains armed, and who special envoy on Afghanistan). Before Commander Zardad in October 2002. guarantees the security of those who are joining the cabinet as Minister of Town He was captured running down the no longer armed? The attraction that the Planning, Housing, and Urban street trying to kill one of his wives, and possession of arms and membership in Development, he was a spokesman for after he was jailed, witnesses to other an armed group had during the years of Gul Agha Shirzai, governor of crimes stepped forward. It is difficult to jihad has worn off, and many fighters Kandahar. Since the early 1980s he had make a common recommendation are looking for a way out. They would founded an NGO engaged in medical regarding these commanders. Each of seize opportunities at reintegration assistance in Quetta, Pakistan, and lived them might require a different approach. offered them, if they were sure their much of the time in the US. Thus far the MoD has not compiled a security could be guaranteed. list of the commanders who have to be Commanders and leaders similarly are At the local level, especially where there demobilized, any more than they have eager for new careers, some as military are rival militias, as in the north, compiled a list of soldiers who have to officers, but many as businessmen commanders and fighters are worried be paid. Such a list, with particulars (some legitimate, some not so about the relative pace of about each one, will probably be legitimate), civilian officials, or demobilization of various forces. They necessary to devise a set of strategies for politicians. would need to be protected during the demobilizing commanders in different process until it was completed. This is situations and regions. Commanders For many regional commanders and one role that an expanded ISAF could who own twelve houses in Kabul and their followers, the key issue is the have performed. Indeed the warring several businesses will not be bought domination of the Ministry of Defense factions in Mazar-i Sharif requested off with agricultural land, as some have and “army” in Kabul by Fahim and his ISAF monitoring of their agreement to suggested. followers. In some areas weapons withdraw heavy weapons from the city. collection that began soon after the The Provincial Reconstruction Teams The security crisis throughout the installation of the AIA stopped when it (PRTs) being established by the US, country undermines DDR in more ways became clear that these forces would now with the participation of several than by placing fighters in a classic control Kabul and the central army. other countries, could play a similar role, security dilemma, where each group can Since these regional commanders but thus far the Pentagon has excluded make itself more secure only by making perceive Fahim as simply a rival faction participation in DDR as part of their others, and hence eventually itself, less leader, enjoying the support of the US mission. secure. The failure to deploy internatio- as the principal ally in the war on nal forces to break the cycle of insecurity terrorism, they are unwilling to disarm As individuals, the fighters will need has not only reinforced fighters’ belief or demobilize to make way for an ANA economic alternatives, in the form of that they need to keep their weapons, controlled by him. employment, training, capital, or land. It but also impeded reconstruction and will be difficult to compete with the lure development assistance that would The chairs of the demobilization sub- of opium at such high prices. The top provide alternative employment for ex- commission of the NDC, Abdul Karim leaders—probably fewer than ten combatants. The idea of supplying Khalili and Yusuf Pashtun, are not people—will have to be accommodated security through the ANA and the new credible as overseers of the process. in the political or governmental system Afghan police is an excellent one, if one Neither has any military background or somehow, unless some of them are is prepared to wait five to ten years, since credentials. Khalili, leader of the mainly eventually confronted militarily by the that is the most reasonable estimate of Hazara Hizb-i Wahdat, is a cleric and coalition, a rather unlikely prospect. how long it will take for the ANA to politician, not a commander. He spent become a self-supporting force capable much of the period of the jihad in Iran. Probably the most difficult and of combat. That is under the best He has influence only in Bamiyan. He challenging problem of demobilization scenario, based on calculations of how suffered a severe heart attack in March will be the mid-level commanders. long it will take to train recruits. The 2003 and is incapacitated. Yusuf Many of them have grown wealthy main issue surrounding the ANA, Pashtun, a Barakzai Pashtun from through the use of their forces to however, is not training soldiers, but Kandahar, is an architect trained at the commandeer property and prey upon determining who will command it. Will American University of Beirut (as were trade, including the drug trade. Most are the ANA be a better army for Fahim, or Ashraf Ghani, Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, not promising material for the officer will it be a national army under the president of the Central Bank, and corps and are unlikely to make a career as command of a non-factional national Zalmay Khalilzad, the US presidential politicians, since the local people tend to government? Uncertainty about this hate them. Some might eventually be jailed for common crimes, as was

B I C C 43 brief 28

question, or, rather, presumption that Japan is the lead donor for DDR and, different situations. This would include the answer is the former, is a principal along with the UK and others, has an analysis of the economic basis of reason that the ANA has had such committed at least US$50 million. warlordism in various regions of the difficulty attracting and keeping recruits, Senior Panjsheri officials view this as a country, as well as of how leader- and that the recruits have been sign of US disengagement: as one said, follower relationships are cemented and overwhelmingly Tajik. “When we agreed to be the US’s partner maintained. No organization to my in the war against terrorism, we did not knowledge is carrying out intelligence Attempts to use aid to foster security expect to be told to go talk to some analysis of that degree of (“securitization of assistance” in the Japanese for funding.” So far that sophistication. It is possible that an jargon) have not worked any better here funding is only theoretical, as DDR has appropriate institution could lead a than elsewhere. The US announced that not actually started, and there is as yet group of researchers together with the it had ended all reconstruction assistance no agreed-upon plan. appropriate UN or Afghan counterparts in the north in response to the factional to compile such information. fighting around Mazar-i Sharif. The lure Currently the major political obstacles to of resumption of the rather small DDR are: disagreement about the In Afghanistan as in Iraq, people do not quantity of assistance has not proved to leadership, composition, and role of the want to be forced to choose between be an effective incentive, since the aid MoD itself; lack of full US participation tyranny and anarchy. They want an does not go in cash to the commanders, in the effort to provide the leverage accountable public order that provides unlike the loot from control of a needed for such a sensitive and difficult security. Such security is the condition fertilizer plant or opium trade route. operation; and the absence of any offer for progress on all other fronts, and of international military observers for without demobilizing the Foreign role in DDR the demobilization process. Nowhere unaccountable militias that formed the has post-conflict demobilization US’s emergency allies in the fall of 2001 Currently, the main foreign roles in the succeeded without international insecurity will continue to reign. If the DDR process, which remains at the level observers to monitor the process and US does not assume greater of policy, are played by UNAMA and assure the combatants of their security responsibility for this process, Afghans the US military command in Afghani- while they are going through the very and many others in the Muslim world stan. They have sometimes differed, in vulnerable state of giving up their and beyond will conclude that, once particular over the decree to which military equipment (if not all weapons). again, America used Afghans for its factional control of the MoD represents own interests and then abandoned an obstacle to the process. Recently, Europeans have been almost completely them to cope with the consequences. however, their views have converged. absent from the DDR debate and The US’s initial emphasis almost entirely process. The European leadership of on training recruits for the ANA was ISAF should form a common position somewhat misplaced, as political issues and attempt to engage on that basis. about the command of the ANA and Once agreement is reached, among the its relationship to the MoD and the many needed tasks would be of course “existing forces” had to be clarified, the provision of military observers. before the process could move forward. These could function as part of the Russia also refuses to distinguish Provincial Reconstruction Teams, who between the ANA and the MoD and will not be able to promote the “jump- claims to be providing direct material starting” of reconstruction, as assistance to the MoD, though senior advertised, unless the militias that Panjsheri officials claim they have not disrupt such activities stand down. They actually received any of the obsolete could also sponsor investigation to equipment promised by Moscow. compile information on all the mid- level commanders who need to be demobilized, with a view to designing an appropriate set of strategies for

44 B I C C the warlord economy

Karzai’s Fiscal Foes and How to Beat Them by S. Frederick Starr

year after the fall of the Taliban, it plans. Thus, when told they must Badakhshan in the northeast. Foreign Ais daily more evident that the disarm warlords, Fahim’s people Minister Abdullah, with no control over Karzai government in Kabul is being disarmed only a few of their resources, has also been neutralized. steadily undermined by powerful opponents, leaving their own political foes, and that these foes, far supporters intact. Worse, Secretary Fahim presides over a system run by his from being maneuvered deftly towards Rumsfeld recently found himself in the own clan, at the head of which is his the sidelines, are daily gaining in power. absurd position of appearing publicly brother, Haji Hasin Fahim. Hungry for Where the Bonn plan called for the with Fahim who, as Minister of power, shrewd, and a masterful hustler, extension of the Interim Government’s Defense, will command the new force he can neutralize or shape all decrees authority to every corner of the land, it supposedly being created for Karzai. issuing from Karzai’s government. is instead being cornered in Kabul, and When the Afghan Investment Council even there divided into two broad If things continue as they are, the issued rules on contracting that excluded factions: Karzai’s, representing the Fahim coalition may neutralize Karzai in sweetheart deals, Haji had them moderate, secularist, modernizing, and the June 2004 elections. And to the modified to enable him to channel deals technocratic camp; and Minister of extent there is already a backlash against to Tepe and other Turkish firms with Defense Fahim’s, representing an Fahim, especially among Pashtuns, it is which he was allied. Holding no office, unlikely Red-Green alliance of former also directed against America, which, Haji is more powerful than any Communists and Jihadists headed by however paradoxically, is seen as his governmental minister except his Panjsheris from the old Northern backer. Rather than acknowledge this, brother. Alliance but increasingly drawing in like- the US clings to the delusional view that minded people from elsewhere. the armed opposition is comprised of Fahim’s family business extends further. Taliban holdouts, rather than a diverse One brother-in-law serves as deputy The roots of this polarization trace to collection of people (some of whom, and another is his personal secretary. the months before the Bonn meetings, indeed, had worked with the Taliban) Beyond the family are such powerful when a group of officers and zeroing in on the new state of affairs allies as Jalil Almas, again with no public supporters of the Northern Alliance that appears to deny them a voice in office but with his fifty bodyguards, a and their aspiring president Rabbani government and seems to bear an force to be reckoned with in all affairs of arrogantly defied President Bush’s American imprimatur. state. Still others sit in key posts like the orders and moved their forces into financially important embassy in Dubai. Kabul, where they immediately began But is not Fahim merely the Minister of Many leading “new Afghans” are also packing the government with their own Defense, reporting to Karzai? True linked secretly with the Fahim network, people. The Americans accepted this fait enough, but he also commands his either as active backers or compliant accompli, naively assuming that they own armed forces. No less important, contributors to its coffers. could gradually concentrate power in he controls a huge and largely invisible Karzai’s hands, especially with the network that extends throughout the As Minister of Defense, Fahim formation of a national army, and thus government and economy. The fact that commands tens of thousands of trim the opposition’s wings. Fahim’s network is opaque and largely troops who are loyal to him and not to invisible to foreigners enhances its day- Karzai or his friends from Washington. They gravely underestimated the to-day effectiveness. So extensive is this But the essential heart of Fahim’s Northern Alliance’s resolve. While the Mafia-like collection of businesses, power is less military than financial. The Pentagon slowly trained the first small organizations, and power brokers that cadre of the new national army, the Red- Fahim is said to have recently bragged, Green coalition, now under Marshall not without reason, “Who is Karzai? About the author Fahim’s leadership, consolidated and This is my country.” Fahim himself is S. Frederick Starr is the Chairman of the extended its power so effectively that it firmly in charge of this network. Former Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at the can today stymie Washington’s best-laid Afghan president Rabbani’s power is Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced now mainly symbolic, his actual International Studies (SAIS) at Johns influence having been limited to Hopkins University, Baltimore.

B I C C 45 brief 28

keystone to Afghan political reality today can bodyguards while Fahim can gangsters but also to Fahim’s army. is that the Fahim mafia has built for swagger about Kabul surrounded only None of these revenues reach itself a formidable financial base, the by native Afghan loyalists. Less visible Afghanistan’s national treasury presided profits of which can be directed to the casual eye is the solid grounding over by the capable Minister of Finance, strategically and without regard for the of Fahim’s financial support in the World Bank veteran Ashraf Ghani. niceties of the law. Jalil Almas controls emerging local economy. By contrast, the the former Afghan-Soviet organization Karzai government has yet to forge a In effect, then, Afghanistan today has that still dominates trade with Russia solid financial base for itself. two separate tax regimes: the modest and otherwise figures in many of the and ineffective official system managed biggest recent deals. When there is Due to poverty and the absence of by Karzai’s government, and the valuable Kabul real estate is to be effective institutions, many of the usual unofficial one comprising, at one level, a redistributed, the Fahim network can sources of governmental revenues are motley assemblage of smugglers, drug direct it towards its loyalists. In the negligible or nonexistent in today’s traffickers, and bandits, and, at a higher name of urban renewal, Fahim allies Afghanistan, notably income taxes and level, the very effective Fahim network relocated and then took control of a taxes on real estate. However, its and key local warlords who control the large tire and rubber market that once location at the heart of a vast seven main ports of entry. It is true that stood near the palace. At times, Fahim’s continental network of transit trade has Fahim does not himself control the key crowd can act with stunning brazenness. always enabled Afghanistan to thrive on regional warlords or the revenues they When the government introduced the customs duties, transit fees, and derive from the main customs points. new currency, Fahim’s forces brought in imposts on trade. During the decades But the latter cannot exist without the sixteen containers full of the old of civil war and chaos these lush fruits overall protection provided by the afghanis. were picked by local warlords and former. This translates into further outright bandits. With the revival of a political power for Fahim. In the Much has been made of the role in central government all this was to have absence of decisive intervention, it is Afghan politics played by drug money. changed. Transit fees and taxes flowing only a matter of time before these two This trade is concentrated largely in the to Kabul were to legitimize the new elements of the unofficial system link poppy-growing areas of the south and government as the disburser of public more formally with each other and forge southeast, as is smuggling. The Fahim funds, and these revenues, applied to a common political front against Karzai. mafia is largely content to leave these public works and human services, were sub rosa sources of revenue in the to undercut the handouts to individual How can the broadening financial hands of others, mainly Pashtuns. Its fighters on which the warlords’ power disparity between Karzai and his leaders know full well that they was based. But this has not happened. enemies be redressed? Is it possible to command larger, more reliable, and less This, no less than his lack of a reliable cut back the sources of Fahim’s blatantly suspect income streams that army, is the core of Karzai’s weakness. economic and political power and at the can only expand in the future, and Until it is corrected, he will play second same time redress the weakness of which are connected with prominent fiddle to the Fahim clan and its Hamid Karzai’s government in both individuals and groups who are glad to network. areas? Two things are certain. First, support their work from outside the America’s current effort to build a government. Given Afghanistan’s general poverty, the national army addresses only part of the scale of revenues accruing from customs problem and, arguably, the less But surely Karzai, as President, can duties and transit fees is hard to important part. If Karzai had a 100,000- greatly influence the allocation and imagine. At the customs post on the man army today he would still have to distribution of international assistance Iranian border near the western city of depend on Washington to finance it. and investments? True enough, but he Herat, US$1,000 is collected from each Such an army alone would not is constrained in his financial dealings by used Japanese automobile imported neutralize Fahim because the Minister’s a laudable commitment to transparency, from Dubai. Total revenues from that financial network would remain intact. while Fahim is not. Moreover, where post alone reach US$1 million a day. All Besides, as Minister of Defense, Fahim Karzai’s resource base may be temporary of it flows to the regional warlord would still be able to exert powerful and significantly controlled by others, Ismail Khan, the self-proclaimed influence over the new army. Fahim’s is neither. Stated differently, if “Emir” of Herat. Unofficial posts along half the problem is the organizational the highway to Kabul yield millions Second, Karzai cannot on his own and financial strength of Fahim’s more, not only to local warlords and address the threat posed by Fahim. He network, the other half is Karzai’s rules what is in effect a coalition relative weakness in both areas. Suffice it government and Fahim and his group to say that Karzai must rely on Ameri- are part of that coalition. This

46 B I C C the warlord economy

condemns Karzai to a “balanced” other key warlords would use armed A more promising approach would be approach to enemies who are out to force to prevent changes that would to slowly trim and control Fahim’s destroy not only his rule but the cripple their regimes? True enough, activities in all areas except those that are moderate, secular, and modernizing which is why the transition would have proper to his post as Minister of values he represents. They have to be protected by ISAF and American Defense. The goal would be gradually to successfully thwarted past attempts by forces. No other force is capable of dry up his independent sources of Karzai’s otherwise able technocrats to accomplishing this. The US would have funds. A first step would be for Karzai address the problem and are likely to to be willing to speak bluntly to the to close down Fahim’s “branch offices,” amass yet more power to do so in the warlords, informing them that beginning with his crucial ally in the future. henceforth the central government Afghan embassy in Dubai. would control the borders and that the Simultaneously, Karzai would gradually This means that the United States must international community is prepared to impose strict financial controls within use its full authority to make the use all necessary force, including B-52s, the Ministry of Defense. A new Finance changes necessary to enable Karzai to against anyone threatening this normal and Accounting Department within the become the chief of state in deed as well exercise of governmental authority at Ministry, staffed by Afghan as word. This requires decisive action to the points of entry. It would have to professionals from among returning strengthen the financial underpinnings state with equal bluntness that once the members of the Diaspora, would track of Karzai’s government and equally national government assumed control the movement of money and impose resolute steps to disable financially both over the customs points, Mr. Khan tough controls on all disbursements. Fahim and the key warlords. Such an would no longer need the protection of Through such a process, a system of approach must proceed simultaneously his 35,000 troops. firewalls would be created. These would on two fronts. steadily impose limits on what Fahim The carrot offered alongside this stick could and could not do, and in due With respect to the Karzai government, would be firm assurances that an agreed course restrict him to duties appropriate the immediate goal must be to exert the percentage of all revenues thus collected to his role as Minister. central government’s control over the would be remitted by Kabul to the customs offices at the key borders. regional authorities. This key provision Both prongs of this campaign entail Karzai has recently tried to address this would compel those warlords certain risks and neither is without by jawboning the warlords but so far to controlling points of entry to choose obvious problems. However, an no avail. Yet the task may not be as between firm control over part of the approach that focuses rigorously on the difficult as it appears. New border posts revenue pie and no control over any of financial underpinnings of resistance to should be constructed at all the seven it. Clearly, the allocation of revenues the central government can succeed, and key points of entry, focusing especially between central and local authorities presents far better prospects than the on Herat. These should be situated at must be such as to provide real current one-sided emphasis on defensible points at some distance from incentives to the latter. developing the national army or than the existing posts and from major cities the unfocused array of measures on the like Herat. International donors with What, then, about Fahim? If the US civilian side that may be individually experience in such matters should equip were to move decisively with Karzai on worthy but are strategically ineffectual. the new posts with computerized the new customs posts at the main Under any circumstances, it is past time information systems linked directly with points of entry it would mark an to acknowledge that the timid and Kabul. With such a system in place, no important symbolic shift of power in unfocused approaches now being money would change hands at the favor of the national government pursued will prove ineffective against borders themselves. Instead, shippers headed by President Karzai. This in such determined survivalists as Fahim would be required to present invoices itself would wound Fahim but it and the key warlords. on their goods and certificates of would not disable him. Some promi- deposit indicating that the necessary nent Afghan officials have It is worth noting that nothing duties had been deposited in a recommended naming Fahim to some proposed here would deny to either governmental account abroad. These foreign embassy, in effect sending him Fahim or the warlords a significant role would be quickly checked against records into exile. But Fahim would likely use in Afghanistan’s future political life. On in Kabul and the shipment then his troops to resist so abrupt a move. the contrary, it offers them an honorable allowed to proceed across the country. In the unlikely chance that it would be way out and, as noted above, an assured successful, the removal of Fahim would means of preserving significant How, though, would the shift from the doubtless unleash fighting between his elements of the power they have built existing system to a new system be followers and the government and effected? Surely Ismail Khan and the among his followers. Chaos would ensue and the entire project would backfire.

B I C C 47 brief 28

up over the years. But to achieve this, revenues from the main points of entry, the US must be willing to say, and mean the lesser warlords capitalize on the it, “This is the way you can work economic isolation of the various successfully with the United States and valleys where they rule. Lacking the the price for not doing so will be means of feeding themselves and their serious.” families, men from these areas gladly sign up with local warlords in order to Gaining governmental control over get the modest stipends they offer. customs revenue and drying up the Access to markets will make village sources of Fahim’s independent funds agriculture and manufactures viable and are essential tactical steps but they do “drain the swamp” in which warlords not alone constitute the fresh strategy and other armed opposition groups that is now so urgently needed. These now thrive. moves in the short and mid-term must be accompanied by more focused The renewal and expansion of attention on the long-term need to Afghanistan’s road network must be the develop the sources of revenue that are work of the private sector, and mainly essential to the survival of Karzai’s of Afghans themselves. This requires government and to its ability to provide across-the-board bidding for contracts, those essential services to the transparency, and rigorous accounting population that will alone assure public controls over the work. At present, such support for it. work is overseen by the Afghanistan Aid and Coordination Association As we have seen, Afghanistan’s (AACA) which in turn works with the geographical position at the pivot of various ministries and local authorities. continental transit trade determines that While in itself worthy, the AACA is customs duties will for the foreseeable engaged simultaneously in a plethora of future remain the government’s prime projects, of which road building is only source of income, as they were always in one. Given the importance of transport the past. No measure taken by the US (and of the associated customs government in Afghanistan since the fall revenues) to the economic viability of of Taliban rule has had a more strategic both the Afghan government and character than the decision to rebuild the society, it is essential that a new entity be main roads linking Kabul, Herat, and created, one that is dedicated exclusively Kandahar and each of those cities with to the issue of roads and customs the main points of entry. To be sure, revenues. This must be an authoritative this project will be meaningless, and body that includes representatives of could even bring short-term harm, until the ministries of Transport, Commerce, the government gains control over and Finances at the highest level, as well customs points, as proposed above. as of international agencies and funders. But once such control is established, the further development of the road system The creation of such a body will enable must be the primary strategic focus of Afghanistan to reap the full benefits of the US and of supportive governments the decisive measures to control the elsewhere. dangerous powers of Marshall Fahim and the key warlords that are outlined Today, the main road network of above. But it is pointless and delusional Afghanistan forms a kind of doughnut, to think that one can expand transport, with most of the country inside and renew commerce, and foster a private outside the ring nearly inaccessible to sector in Afghanistan without first trade and commerce. If the main decisively addressing the dangerous and warlords thrive off of customs destabilizing economic power wielded today by Marshall Fahim and the principal warlords. The good news is that this is a Rubic’s Cube with a solution.

48 B I C C human rights & transitional justice

Afghans Struggle to Restore Justice in their Country: How can Afghans Redress Past Abuses Without Creating New Injustices? by Ahmad Nader Nadery

e was 48 years old, looking very basis. People drive days and nights and repeatedly emphasized the need to Hcalm and relaxed. Like a typical walk for hours to get to us. They come develop mechanisms to address the Afghan he looked straight into your to our office from some of the most issue of transitional justice. His eyes trying to show he had the energy remote areas of the country in search of Excellency, Hamid Karzai (Chairperson and the confidence to struggle for justice, places like Daykondy of of the Interim Administration at the justice. He wanted to see justice be Oruzgan, Nadali of Helmand, time), in his opening speech of the done, which meant that those who Balamurghab of Badghis, and Darwaz workshop, announced that “Another murdered his family members and of Badakhshan. important matter to consider is the tortured him in an underground cell question of human rights violations in had to be held accountable. Twenty-three years of civil war, Soviet the past.” He added, “I cannot say invasion and interference by whether the current Interim Admini- Haji Abdul Qudos is a victim who lost neighboring countries has left hundreds stration has the full authority to address his entire family after he and his family of thousands of men, women, and this issue, but it is my hope that the resisted marrying his 16 year-old children eagerly awaiting for justice to be Loya Jirga government will have the daughter to a warlord that controlled restored and perpetrators of past abuses authority to establish a truth their district in the eastern province of committed against them and their commission and ensure that the people Jalalabad. He was carrying a folder full families to be brought to justice. Now will have justice...Mass graves have been of papers, a writing pad, and some that Afghanistan is moving toward found where hundreds have been family photos. The pictures showed democracy, human rights abuses buried, houses were burnt and so many that he once had a happy family. Haji committed by groups and individuals other cruel acts.” Mrs. Mary Robinson, Qudos is the only survivor of his need to be properly documented and the UN High Commissioner for seven-member family. He knew the local investigated; ongoing abuses Human Rights, and Mr. Lakhdar commander who had killed his family monitored; and a special court Brahimi, the UN Secretary General’s members and had savagely tortured established to mete out justice. Special Representative, talked about him. He wanted the commander and serious violations of human rights in his men to be brought to justice. We Now the question is how should Afghanistan the past and the crucial need for the tried to explain to him our concern for cope with the legacy of repressive authorities, establishment of a national human his security, but he kept saying, “I am armed groups and individuals? rights institution in Afghanistan. not afraid of death, I have no one to live for”. With his eyes fixed on the wall This was one of the questions that In August 2002, in his statement during of my office he uttered, “Life has no participants in the first National the workshop on transitional justice, meaning for me, all I want from you is Workshop on Human Rights, convened Mr. Brahimi—with some fifty justice, justice.” He went on repeating to establish the Human Rights participants listening intently for his “Justice, justice that is what I want.” Commission in Afghanistan, addressed views on the issue—brought forward on 9 March 2002. At this historic event, Qudos’s brief testimony and request representatives of civil society, elders, About the author before the Afghan Independent Human and government asked for and Ahmad Nader Nadery currently works Rights Commission (AIHRC) is one of as a member of the Afghan Indepen- hundreds of testimonies that the dent Human Rights Commission commission registers on a monthly (AIHRC) in Kabul, Afghanistan.

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the example of Chile. He explained that imposing and pressing tasks that has Aslam Big, General Nasir ulah Baber, Chileans only began to think about faced the commission is the issue of General Hamid Gul, General Akhtar justice eight years following the change transitional justice. However, the Mohammad, Carnal Amam of Paki- in regime. He continued, “Don’t you commission is prepared to face this, and stan, Najafi, the Iranian ambassador think the talk of transitional justice will any other challenge in order to protect during 1991, and William Kasi of the undermine security and stability in your and promote human rights in United States. There are individuals such country?” People perceived Mr. Afghanistan. as Ayat ulha Joahery, the Special Brahimi’s statement to mean that from Representative of Amam from Iran, the standpoint of the UN, peace comes Other factors that obstruct the path to who worked as an advisor in north and first, then justice restoring justice, apart from security, are central Afghanistan from 1992 to 1995 the inefficient judicial system, the lack of and who was indirectly responsible for One can derive this message because political will, and the existence of deep the deaths of around 60,000 people in most of the local commanders and family linkages between victims and two years. These names were mentioned warlords accused of wartime crimes are abusers. Whether these factors are taken by several civil society groups and militarily powerful individuals who also into consideration or merely ignored individuals in Mazar, Jalalabad, Herat formed part of the Interim Administra- will play a major role in the outcome of and Kabul during the human rights tion. According to Brahimi, the talk of the transitional justice process in training workshop conducted by the transitional justice would undermine Afghanistan. Human Rights Commission in the peace process and ensure that the February, March, and June 2003. country remained a battlefield. In discussions with existing civil society Although there did not seem to be groups, the commission found that a Institutional reform much political support for the majority of people want to see the establishment of the Human Rights transitional justice process start by In the preliminary draft of the Bonn Commission, the Bonn Agreement prosecuting high-ranking warlords and Agreement, it was clearly mentioned obligated the Interim Administration to local commanders rather than starting that “anybody who is accused of war facilitate the establishment of an with junior level perpetrators within crimes and crimes against humanity and independent commission to promote different factions and groups. In an violations of human rights cannot serve human rights and document, assessment carried out by the as a minister in the Interim Administra- investigate and monitor human rights Transitional Justice Team of the tion”. This section was omitted after UF abuses. Human Rights Commission in May delegates opposed it strongly. The issue and June 2003, it was discovered that up was subsequently addressed in section The Afghan Independent Human to one million individuals have three, subsection five of the Agreement, Rights Commission (AIHRC), with the committed crimes during the conflict or but with very soft language. The assistance of UNAMA and UNHCR, have been involved in one way or provision was formulated as follows: was established on 7 June 2002, days another in human rights abuses. It will “The Interim Administration with the before the end of the Interim be very difficult to apply techniques and assistance of the UN should establish a Administration’s term and just prior to methods utilized to confront civil commission to monitor the the convening of the Emergency Loya widespread human rights abuses in qualification of the high rank officials of Jirga. Under the decree issued by the other parts of the world, whether it be the government including governors of Chairperson of the Interim Administra- East Timor, Sierra Leone or South provinces and make recommendations tion, the eleven-member commission Africa, given the large number of for appointment.” was mandated to advance human rights perpetrators and the fact that most education, promote human rights for people blame one regime or another for The hope for institutional reform, women, monitor and investigate the abuses rather than focusing on something that ordinary Afghans were human rights violations, and conduct a individuals. desperate for, faded when delegates saw national consultation process on the special treatment received by transitional justice. The other main issue to be considered warlords and war criminals during the in the transitional justice process is the Emergency Loya Jirga. The first rows of Today, the commission has five units: issue of external actors in human rights seats were reserved for warlords and Human Rights Education, Women’s violations. Ignoring external military commanders and they were Rights Protection, Child Rights perpetrators of grave human rights given more time to speak and express Protection, Monitoring and violations will be another crime their generally conservative views than Investigation, and Transitional Justice. committed against the people. One other delegates. Moreover, several of Since its inception, one of the most cannot forget the names of General those who were accused of violating the Gromove of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Yosfue, General

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basic rights of men, women, and graduated from Madrassas [religious community’s lack of interest in children were appointed to ministerial schools]. There was no longer transitional justice. The experiences of level posts. In interviews with some uniformity in the application and the International Criminal Tribunals for one hundred delegates, the human interpretation of the law across the the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and rights commission found that 83 country; different parts of the country Rwanda (ICTR) show that they are very percent of the interviewees questioned possessed different judicial systems. For expensive and ineffective in that they the government’s will to bring justice to example, in Kunar and Kandahar Sharia have successfully tried very few people. the country. law was strictly enforced and cases did The international community is not follow legal codes and procedures. convinced that the best option for A delegate representing Nimrooz at the dealing with transitional justice in Emergency Loya Jirga said, “When my During the Taliban era, from 1996 until Afghanistan is through domestic son and his two-year old daughter were 2001, a mixture of strict interpretation structures and mechanisms. burned alive in their house in 1991, a of Sharia and Afghan traditions was member of this new government was enforced. All statutory laws were One can gauge the level of interest of ruling the part of Kandahar who abolished. All trust in the courts and the international community to engage ordered the killing of my son, Mahdi. judicial personnel evaporated. With the in the issue of transitional justice in Instead of bringing him to justice the inauguration of the Interim Admini- Afghanistan from the 59th annual transitional government gave him a stration, courts started functioning again meeting of the UN Commission on promotion. Now you tell me, is this according to the country’s legal Human Rights at Geneva in April 2003, justice?” framework, although people are still where a heated debate took place over a reluctant to seek assistance from the proposal to establish an international Prosecution judicial system. commission of inquiry to look into past war crimes in Afghanistan. “Much Prosecution of perpetrators of grave Despite many uncertainties, Abdullah of the debate centered on whether the human rights violations is another issue Shah, a war criminal who had time was ripe in Afghanistan to begin brought up by ordinary Afghans who committed crimes against humanity, seriously discussing how to address the submit their complaints to the human was arrested in January 2003, while past, with some participants pushing rights commission. The judicial system attempting to kill his fourth wife. for a strong resolution, others opposing is very weak and easily influenced by the Abdullah Shah, also known as Zardad’s any action at this time”. The AIHRC political convulsions that have gripped dog, was a local commander of ‘Abd al- fully supported this idea and submitted the country since 1978. In most parts of Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf ’s Ittehad-i Islami. a letter of support along with its the country, the courts and judges have Abdullah Shah was accused of recommended amendments to the become tools of legitimization for grave massacres, the torture of civilians, the proposal, to the Chairperson of the UN human rights violations. In 1978, after murder of his own three children, and High Commissioner for Human the Saur coup, the judicial system was the looting of people’s properties Rights. However, “the proposal on a modified according to the communist between 1992 and 1996. He was first commission of inquiry was quite ideology. It nullified the independence tried in the primary and then high court. cautiously worded, and did not spell of the judiciary by fostering a mentality In both courts his case was dealt with as out any particular mechanism, judicial or of dependence on the executive, among an ordinary crime. Although sixteen non-judicial, for addressing past crimes. both judges and lawyers. In most cases, witnesses testified before the court Instead, it advocated an approach that judges took the side of the government including his own wife, the court never would involve international experts to if an individual lodged complaints mentioned or levied accusations of war begin mapping the major incidents of about its conduct. Also, no legal crimes against him. There are two the past. Whether this would involve assistance was provided to plaintiffs principal reasons for this: First, the putting together what is already who brought suits against the current penal code did not have the documented, or undertaking new government. Gradually people lost capacity to deal with war crimes and research in Afghanistan was not confidence in the legal and judicial crimes against humanity; and secondly, specified. There is a general consensus systems. strong political figures and warlords among those involved in the issue of were interfering in the judicial procedure, transitional justice in Afghanistan that In 1992, when the mujahidin took ensuring that it dragged on for a period some kind of stock-taking and analysis power in Kabul, the judicial system was of eight months. of sources and existing documentation further damaged. A number of highly would be an important part of creating qualified judges were dismissed and Although Afghan civil society groups a record that Afghans can use whenever replaced with unqualified and have expressed an interest in there is an opportunity to pursue the unprofessional persons who had establishing a special international tribunal, the idea has not moved forward due to the international

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truth and some measure of justice.” In family was murdered by the girl’s 2. A series of the most horrifying and spite of the tremendous optimism brother or father. Of four hundred grave violations of human rights in expressed by Afghan human rights petitions submitted to the commission Afghan history began in 1992, when activists and the Afghan Human Rights since August 2002, none of the victims the mujahidin toppled Najibullah’s Commission (AIHRC), the transitional interviewed expressed a willingness to Moscow-backed regime and took justice proposal was not fully supported forgive their victimizers. power in Kabul. Various armed by the international community mujahidin groups assumed control (Gossman, 2003). The timeline of the whole country, creating what was in effect a stateless country. The Amnesty When speaking of a historical timeline systematic mass killings and for human rights in Afghanistan, most violations of Afshar, Karta-i naw, Forgiveness and amnesty is a sign of begin with the Soviet invasion and and Macroryan in 1992 and 1993 are greatness in Afghan culture. This value occupation, 24 years ago. In a number the most serious incidents that is summarized in an old Afghan adage: of interviews, individuals emphatically occurred during this period. “Even a knife cannot cut a soft throat if asserted that Afghanistan’s miseries bowed before you.” Islam encourages began in 1978. On the basis of these 3. The Taliban era, from 1996 to victims to forgive, even in the case of interviews, the past twenty-four years December 2001, can be considered murder and other grave crimes. A tenet can be divided into the following the darkest period of Afghanistan’s of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) categories: history. The hard-line religious on forgiveness, which became part of fundamentalist regime committed Sharia law, is as follows: God doesn’t 1. The Saur revolution of 1978 is the the gravest violations of human like bloodshed and killing of human starting point of grave violations by rights witnessed in the modern beings, and will bless those who forgive the repressive regime of the Khalq history of Afghanistan. From a person who is sentenced to Qisas (an party. Torture, arbitrary detentions, massacres to the abolition of basic Islamic punishment that allows the extra-judicial killings, and rights and freedoms, the Taliban victim and his/her family to seek justice disappearances were commonly consistently violated international by committing the same act suffered by committed by government norms of human rights. The the victim on the perpetrator). authorities. This triggered the first regime’s discriminatory policies According to Afghan tradition, this large exodus of refugees, who began towards women, which effectively form of amnesty could take the form leaving in waves until the January dehumanized half the population, of an individual or group act. As in all 1979 Soviet Invasion, by which time was perhaps the most publicized post-conflict countries, the social and more then six million people had left example of Taliban cruelty and cultural destruction of Afghanistan the country, primarily for Pakistan oppression. I still remember the created an environment of distrust and and Iran. During the Soviet speeches of Mullah Abdul Manan sparked a shift in the country’s value occupation, systematic violations of Nayazi, one of the spokespersons of system. It will take some time to re- human rights occurred across the the Taliban, who said, “We are here vitalize those values. The culture of country. Massacres of civilians during to implement the law of Allah to his forgiveness and tolerance was replaced Soviet bombardments, arbitrary land, we will burn everything that by a culture of violence and intolerance killings, the detonation of homes, stands in our way, as we did in in Afghanistan. the destruction of agriculture fields, Mazar; we will kill everybody who and forced displacement of civilians doesn’t accept our authority, the Forgiveness or amnesty can only be were commonplace. authority of Sharia, as we killed granted collectively by Shuras those who resisted us in Kabul and (community-based councils), but such Mr. Dadfar an Afghan psychiatrist the north”. decisions invariably create new victims. who ran a Trauma Center in Those victims are most often young Peshawar Pakistan during the Torture of civilians, not only girls, forced to marry a family member occupation said that he had filed physically but psychologically, was an of the victim to make amends for the more then seven hundred cases. accepted practice under the Taliban. crime committed by a member of her “Most people reacted in a shocking They also committed cultural own family. Such a solution is usually way when hearing the name of Pul-i genocide, a new phenomenon in the enacted when a member of the victim’s Charkhi prison” he said. Pul-i country’s history, with the Charkhi was known as a center of mass execution for the communist regime.

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destruction of the cherished giant References Buddha statues of Bamiyan, irreplaceable cultural treasures. Gossman, Patricia. 2003. “The Past as During the six years of Taliban rule, Present: War Crimes, Immunity and Afghans were prevented from the Rule of Law”. Paper presented as exercising the most fundamental part of the Symposium on State rights and freedoms. Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan. Organized A description of the Taliban’s by the Centre for Development deplorable track record on human Research (ZEF), University of Bonn rights would shock the conscience of and the Crisis States Program, any human being. Every Afghan Development Research Centre, yearns for the day when the Taliban London School of Economics and leaders will be tried for the crimes Political Science (LSE). Bonn, they committed against the Afghan Germany. 30 May – 1 June. people. Many foreigners also bear varying degrees of responsibility for these crimes and should be held accountable. The names of Taliban officials such as Mullah Omar, Mullah Manan Nayzi, Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhond, Mullah Dadulah, Mullah Wakil Ahmad Motawkil, and Qazi Hussan Ahmad, Mulana Farel ullrahman, and Carnal Imam of Pakistan, men who have been party to Afghanistan’s travails since the 1980s, are notorious even among children as young as five years of age.

The use of transitional justice instruments and methodologies employed in other countries may not be useful or appropriate in Afghanistan. Developing a national strategy for transitional justice should be approached as a means to promote the rule of law and should be clearly linked to the reform and development of security, good governance and an effective judicial system.

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Gender and Security Issues: Women in Afghanistan

by Sadiqa Basiri

he Taliban’s discrimination against Gender issues in women. Purdah and the wearing of the Twomen and girls has made gender veil, though never officially prohibited issues in Afghanistan world news. In Afghanistan by law, were discouraged by the ruling most areas of the country, elite. A Women’s Protective Association Today, gender is one of the paramount opportunities for girls to go to school was formed under the direction of the or for women to do paid work outside issues facing Afghanistan. Women’s king’s sister. rights are often violated in developing their homes have not existed for years. countries; however in Afghanistan, the In general, the people were not well After 23 years of fighting, displacement situation is even more pronounced. informed about Amanullah’s reform The main cause of these violations is and destruction, the protracted conflict program. The majority of those who the poor economic status of women. in Afghanistan continues to have grave were aware of the steps being taken implications for the Afghan population, Women rely on the income of their deemed them to be unacceptable. In the husbands for subsistence. If they raise particularly women. waning days of Amanullah’s rule, their voice or agitate for their rights, they during a revolt against the government, Human rights is clearly a development are blackmailed by the threat of these reforms were cited as a justification “divorce”. A divorced woman carries a issue; the rights to live in peace and to for the removal of the king and his negative stigma and is considered to be develop one’s human potential are government. This eventually forced intrinsic and belong to both men and a burden on her family. The average Amanullah to leave the country. All Afghan family is composed of a women. Gender does not refer solely to reforms regarding emancipation were minimum of six and a maximum of the needs of women; it deals with men, subsequently abrogated and all girls’ women, boys, and girls. Gender twenty children from between one and schools were closed. three wives. The majority of Afghan describes the different roles and women are illiterate and do not have responsibilities of men and women and 1929–1959 the relationships between them. It also access to any income. They are completely dependent on their spouses refers to the power structures inherent Significant official support for female or male relatives. in these relationships. education and career development emerged between 1929 and 1959. This There will be no real and sustainable Historical account of trend was a turning point. When development in Afghanistan until the the gender situation in restrictions were removed, women realities of daily life for women as well Afghanistan immediately began training to assume as men are taken into account in policy- public service positions. This making and program development; and 1880–1901 development was extremely important until both women and men are given as it continues to have an impact. After the opportunity to participate in, and Some official efforts to improve the 1959, the government showed benefit from, the development process. status of women were made by Amir tremendous determination to move Abdur Rehaman, who was the King forward on this progressive path, and This paper will explore the issues of during this period. He took steps to continued to do so until it was gender and security in Afghanistan and give women an improved position with deposed. will propose recommendations to regard to their rights in Islam, improve the situation of Afghan specifically in respect to personal women, providing them with more property (Wingo, 1998, pp. 7–9). freedom and a stronger voice in society. About the author 1919–1929 Sadiqa Basiri is the Assistant Director and Director of External Affairs for the King Amanullah ruled the country Afghan Women’s Network (AWN). between 1919 and 1929 and attempted to bring about a package of modern reforms, including the emancipation of

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1959–1978 The political and social position of (except for work in hospitals) or attend Afghan women, especially in Kabul, school or university, all in spite of the The government of King Zahir Shah, rose to levels commensurate with that fact that Islam permits the education of who in 1959 supported the voluntary of women in the Soviet Union. In women. Women also were ordered by removal of the veil and the end of the sharp contrast to these developments, the Taliban to wear burqas and their seclusion of women, brought Afghani- the launch of the jihad against the movement outside the home was stan closer to gender equality. However, Soviet occupation by the socially prohibited unless accompanied by a ordinary people and even members of conservative mujahidin, principally close male relative. the government did not accept these based in rural areas, forced women in actions. these areas into seclusion (Dupree, By imposing strict restrictions on 1998). women, the regime declared its intent to During this period, excellent girls’ subordinate their autonomy, thereby schools opened in both cities and rural During the 1980s, the exiled political conveying the message that the Taliban areas, education in Kabul University parties ran women’s organizations both was capable of exercising control over all was mixed, and medical training was inside Afghanistan and in Peshawar, aspects of social behavior (Maley, 1998). offered to women at hospitals. Pakistan in order to mobilize women in accordance with Islamic principles. In Summary of gender development The 1964 Constitution gave women the contrast, the central government over the past 120 years right to vote and the right to seek established women’s organizations in education and work. These changes order to mobilize the Afghan women Over the years, Afghans have often mainly affected urban areas, especially politically. raised objections against governments Kabul. A growing number of women that have tried to impose constraints on functioned in the public arena. They did Women played an important role in the women. However, steps to implement so without a loss of honor to war against the Soviets, caring and reforms that would emancipate women, themselves or their families. Still, there providing for their families while the if too hastily advanced, have also created were family pressures; traditional men were absent. The war caused resistance, not only from religious attitudes and religious opposition millions of Afghans to go abroad as groups and ultraconservative elements continued to impose constraints on the refugees and others to become internally but also from broad segments of the actions of women. displaced. mainly rural population. 1978–1992: the Saur Coup and the 1992–1998: the Civil War Gender roles in sovietization of Afghan society During this period, the situation for contemporary When the 1978 Saur coup took place, women and girls worsened. In the Afghanistan the new government, in line with its 1990s, gender was increasingly focused ideology, took steps to further improve upon both in Afghanistan and the Afghan society is consistent in its women’s rights. This interference in wider world. Women’s rights, especially attitudes toward the underlying women’s affairs challenged traditional in Kabul, were attacked, first by groups principles of gender. However, the practices, which they perceived to be a describing themselves as mujahidin and application of these principles does vary product of patriarchal and feudal ties later by the Taliban. between urban and rural areas, between between men and women. It prohibited different ethnic groups, and across the actions like bride price and limited Conservative groups, religious Shia/Sunni divide. dowries, banned forced marriages and institutions and mujahidin leaders were set the minimum age of consent to all opposed to foreign influences and An analysis of gender roles in Afghan marry to 16 for girls and 18 for boys (Le initiated a military and ideological jihad society can be broken down into the Duc & Sabri, 1996). against any semblance of external following categories: encroachment. They believed that the Within a year, literacy programs were free movement of women in public Afghan families prioritized and expanded to provide areas would cause moral deviations and basic reading and writing skills to all destroy the fabric of Afghan society. Urban areas adults. Selected young women as well as These attitudes were intensified under young men were given the chance to the Taliban (Dupree, 1998). Rural areas receive an education in the Soviet Union. In regard to women, the Taliban implemented a particular interpretation of Sharia Law. Women no longer had the right to work outside the home

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Afghan families sons as possible. If a woman is not able Most women are not asked for their to give birth to a son, the Afghan man opinion on the choice of a spouse and In Afghanistan, the family is the core will not divorce her but is obliged to defer to their parents on this issue. unit of society. The principle of respect marry another woman in spite of his A woman who selects a spouse is based on age and hierarchical position is feelings for his first wife and how it may considered rude and impolite and puts central to inter-familial relations. For affect her. The mother and sisters of the the honor of the entire family at risk. example, youngsters stand when elders, husband will automatically plan for the In actuality, Islam gives women the such as the father or mother, enters a second marriage of their son or brother. right to choose spouses for themselves. room. He will never divorce his wife because in A woman has the right to propose to a society he will be called a coward or boy or man. However, if such an Divorce is considered shameful. Wives accused of being ‘un-Afghan’. Once interpretation of Islamic doctrine were would never want to be divorced again, the problem relates to the high preached in Afghanistan today, those because of the societal stigma that it rate of illiteracy. If properly educated, responsible would be severely punished. carries. If a disagreement occurs between men would come to understand that a wife and husband, both of them will the sex of a child is determined by a In the first year of childhood, parents prefer any option other than divorce. As man, not a woman. do not distinguish between boys and previously mentioned, women do not girls in terms of how they treat them. want a divorce because a divorced In Afghan families the grandfather is This difference becomes pronounced woman is considered a bad woman by the head of the household. In most over time. Men invite their sons to society. Society is not interested in situations, a grandfather’s approval for accompany them outside the home to understanding the reason behind the family decisions is mandatory. If the learn about the family’s land and divorce or the state of the marriage. The grandfather has died, the husband property. In contrast, girls are assigned reason why men prefer any option other becomes the decision-maker. If the to the kitchen and asked to assist their than divorce is that they do not want husband has died, the brother-in-law or mothers. When girls reach the age of their wife to be married to another man. brother has authority. Between five and seven, they have to seek the permission It is dishonorable for a man to see his ten percent of Afghan women have a of their fathers and brothers to leave the wife remarry, despite the fact that Islam decision-making role within their home. When leaving the home, girls are permits a woman to remarry according families. Most of these are educated customarily required to cover themselves to her will with any other Muslim man. women. or wear a burqa to prevent them from being seen by other men. Research that I have conducted at a When it comes to the status of girls Kabul prison revealed that 30 percent of versus boys and men versus women, as The elders of the family—grandfathers the female inmates had been noted earlier, sons are preferred over and grandmothers—are at the top of imprisoned for reasons of divorce. I daughters. From childhood, sons know the family hierarchy. The grandmother met with four women who were jailed they are prioritized over their sisters and can have a decision-making role in a because they had re-married. According act accordingly. Similarly, sisters know family, but usually only for her to Sharia Law they should not have they should care for their brothers and daughters-in-law. In some situations been jailed as long as their marriage was that they should work around the where the male head of the family has legal. The justification for their house, accepting the orders given by died, the grandmother becomes the imprisonment was that the women in their fathers and brothers. Most girls head of the household. If such a question did not possess proper seek permission even from their situation arises, other families in their documentation for their divorce. The younger brothers to go out of the village would help the family headed by main reason they encountered this home in the absence of their mother. a woman and, if it encountered a problem is a lack of education. The opinion of the mother is largely serious problem, the elders of the area Predominantly illiterate, the women ignored. Girls are never allowed to be would convene a Jirga to deal with it. chose to return to the homes of their alone in the same place as boys. parents following their divorces. After Urban areas several years they remarried. Dishonored Marriages are arranged and proposals are and aggrieved over their former wives’ made first by men. Wedding parties, In 1996, when the Taliban took power, newfound happiness, the former Eid festivals and visits to gardens in the it gave Afghan gender issues internatio- husbands accused the women of summer to dry fruit are the only nal notoriety. There were many changes bigamy. occasions when men can see women. that occurred in the country’s main When a man sees a woman he likes, he urban centers such as Kabul, Jalalabad, In almost all Afghan families, sons are asks his mother to go to the woman’s Kandahar, and Herat. Cities that were given preferential treatment. Most of home to propose to her on his behalf. not under the control of Taliban were in the men have second, third or fourth an even more difficult situation because marriages in order to produce as many most people were terrified of Taliban

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spies; even the prospect of detection Currently, Afghan women can be women’s work—including women was enough to condition their behavior. divided into two main groups: educated themselves. It demonstrates how deeply Schools for girls were closed. In urban and uneducated. The educated women ingrained such discriminatory attitudes areas, people ran some home schools have come out of their homes and have are in Afghan society. but the Taliban closed these as soon as joined the workforce. They have started they were discovered. working with the government, interna- The second type of women are those tional NGOs, local NGOs, universities who are uneducated. At the moment, Women who had previously worked and schools. Currently, approximately 98.8 percent of Afghan women are professionally became jobless. They 1,400 NGOs are registered with the illiterate. The rights of such women are were forced to leave the public and government of Afghanistan, providing consistently violated as they are private sectors. All female teachers were humanitarian assistance and capacity subjected to a form of blackmail. They rendered unemployed as universities, building, as well as work for educated have been taught that if they do not high schools, and primary schools were Afghan women. Women lead more abide by societal customs and the rules closed. Most families faced difficult than 300 of these registered NGOs. All of their family they will be violating economic situations, prompting many of these changes have occurred after the Islamic Law. The women accept Afghans to leave for Pakistan and Iran. fall of the Taliban regime. everything that men command of them due to their beliefs in Islamic Law and After the fall of the Taliban in 2002, An unforgettable event happened on 8 lack of understanding of the actual most refugee families started March 2003, International Women’s tenets of Islam. They are taught and repatriating. Now, in the big cities of Day. A celebration was held in the Loya told the wrong things but are unable to Afghanistan, the situation has become Jirga tent at the Polytechnic Institute in read and distinguish between right and much better. Women and girls are Kabul. More than 2,000 Afghan women wrong. liberated enough to go to work and from different parts of the country attend school or university. In Kabul, attended and celebrated this event. After Rural areas men and women work together. The 23 years of war it was the first time that Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) this event had been celebrated in Women in rural areas depend is working to strengthen the role of Afghanistan. Afghan refugees— completely upon their husbands. The women. It is difficult to imagine that including myself—returned to Afghani- men are predominantly engaged in Afghanistan has a ministry for women stan for the first time since leaving the agricultural work. Women care for the when only a few years ago, Afghan country. I had been away from Afghani- animals; they do the milking, for women were considered, and treated, as stan for 18 years. The event was an example. Without schools in rural areas, no better than animals. outstanding display of solidarity among women who live in these locales are Afghan women, which is difficult to often illiterate. The few educated At present, the behavior of men toward describe in words. The tears streaming women in rural areas relocated there due their wives, daughters and sisters in down the faces of young girls and to fighting in Kabul, Kandahar, urban centers has noticeably changed. women, especially the returnees, who Jalalabad, and Mazar-i Sharif during the Some educated men have allowed their heard our national song for the first civil war. wives, daughters and sisters to work time is unforgettable. It was like a and attend school. There are even a few dream for me. I thank God the When the Taliban took power, rural men who have let their daughters celebration happened. areas were not impacted much. Women choose their attire on the basis of had been accustomed to wearing the comfort. But such situations are still However, in some situations, well- burqa. The Taliban did not have much rare. Most of these men are fathers educated women are still prevented interest in these areas. The major change rather than brothers or husbands. The from leaving the home due to the in their lives was that each young boy reason for this change of approach is pressure of a male family leader, had to wear a hat and were prohibited twofold: either the fathers have reached whether it is a father, brother, husband, from shaving their beards, and women an age at which they no longer wish to or father in-law. They often justify this were not allowed to sing songs at be as strict with their daughters, or they action by citing security concerns; weddings. understand that there is nothing wrong however, in actuality, they are acting out with a woman wishing to realize the fear that their family’s honor and rights to which she is entitled under reputation would be besmirched if their Islam. women were allowed to leave the home unattended. They think that if a woman works it is shameful. As a result, there are people who still do not give value to

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Addressing gender features an eclectic mix of the worst Security issues in elements of patriarchy present in South discrimination Asian, Central Asian, and Islamic Afghanistan culture. Afghanistan has been, and still is, a Security is the key to change in Afghani- highly conservative rural society with stan and the wider region. Today, most Although some of the problems faced deeply rooted traditions related to tribal by Afghan women are unique to them, Afghans prioritize security above all or extended family survival. Women, as other issues. Restoring security in a many others are shared with women purveyors of culture, are pivotal in such country that has endured continuous across the world. Forging a new a system. They are perceived as a Afghanistan requires time and patience. warfare over a 23-year period is difficult, representation of the family’s honor especially when large swathes of the Afghan women do not live in a that must be controlled and protected country remain under the control of vacuum. The relationships, which define from outside influences that could their gender roles and relations, have armed local commanders. The signing pollute them and threaten the well- of the Bonn Agreement, the decision existed for hundreds of years in some being of the tribe or extended family. of the 2002 Loya Jirga to pursue cases, and the duration of the war in Women, in a society adhering to such a others. There is no quick fix for the disarmament, and the growing power worldview, are confined to a narrow set of the Transitional Government has status of Afghan women, thus external of behavioral possibilities and life made many Afghans hopeful for a pressure should be applied with a great choices. Change has been slow to deal of care in order to avoid gains peaceful future. develop as stringent control of made for women’s equality being women’s access to the outside world However, a new generation has come to rejected as ‘foreign’, ‘un-Afghan’, and remains. Only a relatively small ‘un-Islamic’. the fore that lacks a vision of how to percentage of the population currently create a peaceful society. They have not shows interest in extending educational heard messages of peace; they are We cannot avoid involving Afghan men and employment opportunities to in changing the situation of Afghan accustomed only to hearing the shok- women (Moghaddam, 2002). king sounds of rockets, bombs, women. Afghan women are not a explosions, and missiles. Deprived of homogenous mass with a single set of In the wake of 11 September 2001, the needs. As in any sizeable country educational opportunities, most of the world has witnessed the fall of the Afghan population—girls and boys— featuring unequal development, the Taliban and the establishment of a are illiterate. No one has taught them situation is highly complex and requires Transitional Administration for detailed analysis and planning. Finally, about solidarity and peace; instead, boys Afghanistan, which included the and men were being encouraged to be Afghan women have long been aforementioned Ministry of Women’s part of one political group or another. subjected to a vicious cycle in which their Affairs. Much has changed during the rights have been granted and once again No government took responsibility for two decades of war that engulfed the the security of women. Women whose deprived by Afghan men intent on country; the very chemistry of the fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers exploiting the status of women either Afghan people has been irrevocably as a symbol of modernization or an died in the war were forced to assume altered. Most external actors are the role of breadwinner for their example to demonstrate their Islamic analyzing, planning, and acting on a families, but most could not leave their moral credentials. Afghan women need Kabul-centric vision of the country. to assume ownership of the homes due to a lack of security. This is imprudent as Afghanistan is, at reconstruction process. Women’s its core, a rural society. The implications In Kabul, the story of a woman giving perspectives and leadership must be of this reality for the status of women exercised both within government poison to her children is often told. The in the country are significant. mother, who became the principal ministries and outside of government, provider for her family after her in civil society and community level It is true that Afghan women have structures. For change to be sustainable, husband’s death, could not leave the suffered tremendously as a result of war home to make money and feed her it must touch both rural and urban and the discriminatory policies that children. For a mother, it was difficult to areas. resulted from the convergence of see her children starving and begging Taliban and al-Qaeda ideological just for a piece of bread; thus she principles. Yet, many of the current poisoned them and herself to end the woes of Afghan women can be traced misery. to the inherent hardships of life in a mountainous, resource-poor country that is highly underdeveloped and

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Today, the new government is working A lack of security. Women were Family enmity or personal problems. for the welfare of Afghanistan but still intimidated and restrained by cannot provide security for women and provincial military commanders who Harassment of women and girls in men. The country needs to be rebuilt dominate all forms of political public places. and reconstructed, but the lack of activity outside the capital. security all over Afghanistan has No access to adequate education. hindered this effort. The major obstacle A lack of knowledge. The women is the armed commanders from the invited did not know how to present Shortages of water and electricity. various ethnic groups. The limited and express themselves; they do not number of ISAF soldiers present in the have courage to talk on behalf of In light of the above mentioned country cannot overcome the threat themselves. problems, Afghans can be categorized posed by these warlords. into five groups: A lack of equality. The women did Kabul is much safer due to the presence not have permission from their Returnees facing problems in of ISAF troops and Afghan police fathers/brothers/ father in-laws/ Afghanistan. teams. The districts around Kabul and husbands to attend. the other provinces, however, are not Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) safe at all. The NGOs that have assessed Poor economic conditions. in Afghanistan. the needs of different provinces are not able to implement their projects due to A lack of transportation in the Afghans that had lived in Pakistan insecurity. For example, a car filled with provinces. and Iran who are doubtful about NGO workers recently travelling to their repatriation. Wardak province was attacked, an all too Even women who had taken part in the familiar occurrence since the fall of the Loya Jirga of June 2002 were not ready Afghans who came back to Pakistan Taliban. The NGO was working on to give interviews to express their views after their repatriation. mine clearance. As a result, three and concerns about the current Afghans passed away and four others situation. Teams were sent to the Well-educated Afghans who left the were seriously injured. provinces to conduct interviews but due country due to previous regimes, to a lack of security and the presence of often settling in western countries, In the present situation, without armed commanders, women were who are unsure about the prospects security, Afghan women are particularly inhibited from expressing their points of return due to insecurity and a lack at risk. Approximately half the of view. Women who did speak on of development. population consists of women. Due to behalf of the women in their villages lack of security, women are having did so only on condition of anonymity. Efforts of ISAF difficulty participating in the re-drafting They did not want to put themselves at of the new Afghan Constitution or risk by exposing their identity. ISAF is doing a superb job in Kabul. even to consider casting a vote in the The presence of ISAF is one of the Constitutional Loya Jirga. That said, will Since November 2001, about two principal reasons for the massive women’s votes and recommendations million Afghans have repatriated from voluntary influx of refugees. Most truly be included in the constitution of Pakistan. Thousands of families have Afghans are in favor of ISAF’s presence the country? repatriated from Iran as well. and supportive of its expansion. Once Disturbingly, many families have chosen security is restored across the country To ensure women’s recommendations to return to their lives as refugees people will be willing to return to their are included in the new Afghan following their repatriation. According own provinces. Refugees have streamed Constitution and that women are able to UNHCR, families who came back to into Kabul due to the perception that to take part in voting at the Pakistan after their repatriation cited the the presence of ISAF has created a safe Constitutional Loya Jirga, the following reasons for their return: haven there—a phenomenon that has government needs to develop a strategy. created a severe problem of On 10 and 11 March 2003, the Ministry Lack of security in the country. overcrowding in the capital. of Women’s Affairs and UNIFEM held a workshop on constitutional awareness Lack of homes and high rents. UNAMA is currently planning to begin at the Polytechnic Institute in Kabul. the voter registration process for the Women were invited from all of the High cost of living and poor June 2004 elections. It will hire 4,500 provinces of Afghanistan; however, economic conditions. registrars to register 10 million Afghans most could not attend due to various for the election. However, UNAMA’s reasons, including: voter registration plan will not be

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feasible if there is no security. Therefore, In general, it looks as if there is security window of opportunity to explore new more ISAF troops are needed to in Kabul. In fact, there is not as much approaches and points of view. The facilitate this process in urban and rural security as there should be. People Afghan constitution has been rewritten areas. cannot walk or drive late at night. eight times in the past. To avoid the Women and girls are still afraid of being need for a tenth constitution, the Efforts of the Afghan army and kidnapped. They are afraid to walk following recommendations should be police alone, ride in a taxi alone, or walk home seriously considered. alone in the evening. While the national army is responsible To free Afghan society of gender for protecting Afghanistan’s borders, Foreigners and NGO’s require armed discrimination, Afghan women from the police is responsible for maintaining guards to stroll in the bazaars or around every corner of the country should internal security. In the present the city. The government says that there have the rights to vote and publicly situation, it is difficult to say how the is freedom of the press, but in reality express themselves. Women should protection offered by soldiers and police journalists face violence or be made aware of their constitutional is improving in any significant way. imprisonment if they criticize the rights. The governmental sector as Violence continues to occur among government or armed factions. well as non-governmental northern, southern, eastern and western organizations can assist in raising this ethnic groups. Awareness-raising and In the past four months, several NGOs, awareness. With such a high rate of reconciliation activities are urgently local as well as international, have been illiteracy among Afghan women, required in Afghanistan; it takes time to robbed, including UNICEF. Robbery in representatives should be appointed change the behavior of people. It is shops and homes is common. Many to speak on behalf of those who are important that the people are convinced houses in Kabul have become the uneducated and voiceless. to think of the welfare of the nation as refuges for thieves and robbers. opposed to a single ethnic or political Women should be given more seats group, to identify themselves above all Security in rural areas in the government. Currently, only as Afghans. four women have high Rural areas were not as adversely governmental posts. More women The Afghan police require training, as impacted by the war as urban centers. should be included in the decision- they were away from their work for The Taliban were not interested in these making process. Women understand several years. The Afghan army and areas from a political and religious the problems of their fellow women police also need more resources and standpoint. The people in rural areas and will work hardest to address better facilities. A typical salary for a depend upon each other as well as elders them. member of one of the security forces is and traditional tribal structures such as 1,700 afghanis per month, which is the Jirga to solve problems and resolve Women should have a prominent nothing in a city like Kabul. More often disputes. role in the drafting of the new than not their salaries are not paid to constitution. Their them on time. In order to develop a Now, rural areas are full of risk. Armed recommendations should be professional ethic and nurture the local commanders are based in rural seriously considered and integrated loyalty of the police and army, their areas. They intimidate the local into the final document. At the salaries should be increased and paid on population and bar outside access, Constitutional Loya Jirga, they schedule. marring reconstruction and should be able to vote and present rehabilitation work. Due to these armed their recommendations. In order to Security in urban areas groups, many NGOs have stopped include women from all the their services to rural areas altogether. provinces of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan was not expected to be so According to surveys done in rural areas, government should take special stable at this stage. The war made people are in desperate need of water measures to ensure their security. security a major issue because a whole for drinking, schools for boys and girls Women speaking on behalf of other generation of Afghans has become and the repair of roads, hospitals, and women should realize that they are accustomed to resorting to the gun clinics. taking responsibility for thousands instead of the pen to make a living and of women who have suffered due to resolve problems. They have thought Recommendations the current state of affairs. more of seeking revenge than restoring peace. They have seen traumatic Many of the following recommen- Primary education should be situations more than having fun. Time dations will not be easily implemented compulsory for all girls in Afghani- is needed to change these mindsets and in Afghanistan. However, with a new stan. Afghan women thirst for patterns of behavior. constitution in the process of being education; today, there are Afghan crafted, Afghanistan faces a unique

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women who are above the age of 60 problem by most Afghan women. References who still attend literacy courses. Furthermore, Islam allows women Schools for girls should be to choose a spouse for themselves; Dupree, Nancy Hatch. 1998. The Women established in all of the provinces of there is no provision for forced of Afghanistan. Swedish Committee Afghanistan to combat the marriage. Afghan fathers and for Afghanistan (with support from exceedingly high rate of illiteracy and mothers should understand what the office of the UN Co-ordinator ignorance. They should be educated Sharia law says in this regard. When a for Afghanistan.) about their constitutional rights, girl wants to get married, she should Sharia law, international human say two things to gain a legal Nikah Led Duc, Carol A. and Homa Sabri. rights law as it pertains to women, (marriage agreement). The girl 1996. Room to Maneuver: Study on and the country’s penal, judicial and should be allowed to declare that she Women’s Programming in Afghanistan. civil codes. They must be endowed accepts this agreement and is content United Nations Development with the courage to raise their voice with it. Programme (UNDP). and demand their intrinsic rights. It is also important that women and According to the decisions made in Maley, William ed. 1998. Fundamentalism children are given access to gender the Loya Jirga, the weapons of the Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. training activities. warlords should be collected. New York: New York University Disarmament should happen all Press. Strenuous efforts must be taken to over Afghanistan. The local shift the ingrained mindsets of commanders should be disarmed Moghaddam, Sippi Azarbaijani. 2002. Afghans, women and men, to show and no longer allowed to interfere in Gender Guidelines: Report of the RRM them that women are indeed official affairs. It is highly Assessment Mission to Afghanistan. human-beings and as such, are recommended that this take place Brussels: European Commission entitled to equal rights in society. If before the final version of the Conflict Prevention and Crisis discrimination is eliminated, gender- Constitution is released or the Management Unit. based violence would decrease and Constitutional Loya Jirga takes place. women would be free to make Wingo, Gunilla. 1998. Gender Perspective decisions for themselves. More ISAF troops are needed to on SCA. Peshawar, Pakistan: Swedish promote security in the rural areas of Committee for Afghanistan (SCA). One of the principal reasons for the Afghanistan. People who are suffering of Afghan women is their repatriating are eager for the complete dependence on their deployment of ISAF in rural areas. husbands and male relatives. They think that if any problems Women are prevented from seeking emerge, ISAF troops will be there to an education or to work to support control the situation. Also, the themselves due to this relationship training programs for the Afghan of dependence. Aid must be given National Army (ANA) and police to women to allow them to become should be accelerated and expanded financially self-sufficient. to enable them to assume security Employment programs that target responsibilities in the shortest women should be created to advance duration of time possible. this objective. The commitments made at the Bonn As human beings, Afghan women Conference should be implemented. should have the freedom of will and Afghans, especially women, are choice. They should be free to choose impatiently waiting for the a spouse and the way they dress. fulfillment of the promises made by External observers often conflate the international community to symptoms and causes: the burqa, for Afghanistan. Two years after the example, is not considered a major Bonn Conference, many of the pledges made have yet to be fulfilled, a situation that has engendered increasing frustration.

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Recommendations

by Mark Sedra

or eight days, from 4–11 June 2003, Military reform raise the profile of the army outside FBICC hosted an e-conference on the capital. Such an initiative could “Afghanistan: Assessing the Progress of 2. Reform of the Afghan Military give a major boost to the military Security Sector Reform, One Year After Force (AMF) reform process which has proceeded the Geneva Conference.” Over one Even if a DDR process is initiated in at an unexpectedly slow rate. hundred participants representing the coming weeks or months, various inter-governmental existing military forces and structures Police reform organizations, NGOs, academic will remain a factor in the country for institutions, donor governments and some time. In addition to the current 4. Increase Donor Support to LOFTA the Afghan Transitional Administration program to create an Afghan Donors should increase funding to (ATA) took part. The conference National Army (ANA), efforts the UNDP administered Law and focussed on three aspects of the security should be taken to reform the AMF. Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan sector reform process: military reform; Steps that could be taken in this (LOFTA), which is intended to cover police reform; and the disarmament, regard include: the recurrent budgetary expenses, demobilization, and reintegration of ex- most importantly salaries, of the combatants. However, all facets of the A. The appointment of new country’s police. In spite of the current security situation were discussed. commanders to some of the existing importance of this initiative, as of The dialogue was vibrant and resulted AMF divisions, especially in south- June 2003 only US$11 million of the in the following list of 36 policy and southeast Afghanistan. These US$75 million target for the fund recommendations on how to refocus commanders should include generals has been secured. This glaring and reenergize the security sector reform from the army of the Najibullah shortfall must be rectified. process and address rising insecurity. regime. They possess previous The recommendations were drawn military training and could impose 5. Create independent monitoring from the fourteen papers produced for much-needed discipline on the structures the conference—six of which are troops. Monitoring and accountability presented in this brief—and the structures for police performance conference discussion. Some of the B. The antiquated military equipment of should be developed, such as the recommendations are new while others some AMF units, particularly those establishment of a Police are reformulations of existing ideas, but directly involved in combat against Ombudsman. A recent report by cumulatively they reflect a broadening the remnants of the Taliban, should Amnesty International titled, consensus that a new and more dynamic be upgraded. This could be achieved Afghanistan: Police reconstruction approach is needed toward security by redistributing equipment from essential for the protection of human sector reform in Afghanistan. better-equipped units in other parts rights, affirms that there is “a of the country. For example, widespread lack of public faith in the Institutional reform transport equipment, which has been police” in Afghanistan. As Interior hoarded by Defense Minister Fahim’s Minister Ali Ahmad Jalali has stated: 1. Reform of the Afghan Ministries troops in Kabul and Panjsher, “The police cannot do their job of Defense (MoD) and Interior should be transferred to these units. without the co-operation of the (MoI) people.” Accordingly, it is acutely The success of the entire security 3. Establish Regional Military necessary to take measures to raise sector reform enterprise depends on Training Centers public confidence in the police. The reforms made in the MoD and MoI. Currently, virtually all ANA training creation of a police oversight body Efforts to reform these two activities are carried out at in the could greatly advance such ministries, to make them ethnically capital at the Kabul Military Training confidence-building efforts. representative and accountable, have Center (KMTC). The establishment been largely unsuccessful thus far. of regional training outposts could 6. More support to a Quick Reaction More concerted pressure must be accelerate the training process, Force applied by the international encourage regional recruitment, and International donors should assist community, most notably the the Ministry of Interior in forming United States, on the responsible and operating a Quick Reaction Force Ministers to implement the needed capable of being deployed in all of reforms. the country’s provinces to address

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urgent security threats. This force and substantial international support this could have a number of could also be utilized to facilitate the would send a message that the detrimental impacts on prisoners implementation of the international community will no and their families. Emphasis should constitutional consultation process longer accept the system of impunity instead be put on reconstructing and DDR. in Afghanistan. provincial detention facilities across the country. Prison staff throughout 7. Establish an adequate screening 10. Establish a National Police Code Afghanistan lack training in process of Conduct correctional work. As with many An effective screening mechanism A national police code of conduct government employees, even their should be established to ensure that based on international standards for extremely meager salaries are new recruits for the Kabul Police law enforcement officials needs to be infrequently disbursed. Academy and the National Police adopted and disseminated both to Training Center (NPTC) have not the police and the general In March 2003, a presidential decree previously been involved in human population. The various police transferred the administration of rights violations or are tainted by training projects underway need to prisons from the Ministry of previous involvement in militia incorporate this code of conduct into Interior to the Ministry of Justice. activity. their curriculums and it must be The practicalities and logistical details made clear in all training courses that of this transfer have yet to be 8. Establish Regional Police police will be held accountable when worked out, leaving the day-to-day Training Centers they breach this code. This linkage duties of administration, including Currently, all police training is limited should be reinforced through regular the payment of salaries and the to Kabul where the Kabul Police communication and co-ordination provision of food, still in the hands Academy and the NPTC are situated. with accountability initiatives, of the Ministry of Interior. More To abandon the Kabul-centric particularly the new human rights technical assistance and pressure approach to the process, police office in the Ministry of the Interior, from the international community training facilities should be to ensure that there is consistent needs to be given to ensure that this established in the provinces. This post-training monitoring of police. transfer of responsibility to the would provide a concrete means to To date, training initiatives have not Ministry of Justice is completed in a accelerate the police reform process, been linked with any sort of productive manner that advances to ensure that the composition of accountability mechanisms. efforts to build a modern the force reflects the country’s ethnic correctional system in line with make-up, and to extend the central 11. More attention must be paid to international human rights government’s authority to outlying Afghanistan’s prison system standards. areas. The criminal justice system will only be able to operate effectively when DDR 9. More international support to the each component part—police, courts Human Rights Unit of the and prisons—is functioning 12. DDR cannot be implemented in a Ministry of the Interior properly. While there has been security vacuum The Minister of the Interior has consistent international attention on At present, what security exists on established a human rights office the reconstruction of the police in the ground results from fragile within the Ministry in response to Afghanistan and increasing attention political agreements between local calls for an internal mechanism for on the functioning of the courts, warlords and local militias charged by monitoring the police. While it is too there has been extremely little their commanders with protecting early to judge whether or not this international attention paid to the local populations. A DDR process unit will be an effective mechanism reconstruction of the prison system. which moves ahead without an to address violations by the police, it The only donor project in this regard international security presence, and is unlikely to become so if it is not is focused on the reconstruction of which disarms some factions and given sufficient donor support, in Pul-i Charkhi prison, in the outskirts not others by relying on militia terms of technical, material and of Kabul. But a single large prison in leaders to disarm their own troops, financial assistance. International Kabul will not effectively address the risks undermining what little security support to such a unit could have a problems faced by prisoners across does exist. Accordingly, the DDR dual outcome: First, the unit itself the country, who are held in district process should be put on hold until could become an effective way of and provincial detention facilities that there is a serious international addressing problems within the are often overcrowded, dilapidated, commitment to provide security in police force and, second, sufficient and lacking basic sanitation. The urge areas where DDR is moving ahead. to centralize the prison system in Pul-i Charkhi should be resisted as

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13. Concentrate on ‘R’ over ‘DD’ 14. Forge a political consensus program. An extensive countrywide The preconditions for the regarding key aspects of DDR survey, aimed to determine the implementation of a DDR program A political consensus must be forged socio-economic positions and needs in Afghanistan—a political immediately among key Afghan of ex-combatants must be consensus among key powerbrokers; powerbrokers regarding the goals, conducted. MoD reform; and a minimum level scope and duration of a DDR of security—have clearly not been process. Two developments in the There is also a dearth of detailed met. The longer it takes to initiate past three months show that information on the command the process, the more frustration will progress is being made towards structures of Afghanistan’s militia build among ex-combatants. It is achieving this goal. First, in late April groups. One of the most difficult critical that they begin to visualize 2003, the Afghan government obstacles facing the demobilization their civilian future, abandoning the convened a two-day conference, process will be the mid-level identity of a combatant, as soon as assembling Afghanistan’s senior commanders. A combination of possible. Concentrating on military commanders, to reach an incentives and force will be needed to reintegration ahead of disarmament agreement regarding the ongoing deal with them. While the number and demobilization will help to security sector reform process. This of top commanders or warlords is build the capacity of the market place was the first military meeting of its not difficult to determine, the to lure combatants away from their type since the fall of the Taliban. A country’s sub-commanders form a militia units and into a peace-based statement issued at the end of the much more amorphous group. It is economy, thereby creating an conference stated that the participants necessary to list and profile these environment conducive for a large- agreed to work with the central figures in order to devise strategies scale disarmament and government for the good of the on how to deal with them during demobilization program. country’s security and to build a the demobilization process. multi-ethnic national army. Second, Practically speaking, this process in late May 2003, 12 of Afghanistan’s 16. Focus on job creation could be initiated by providing a major powerbrokers signed an There is tendency during a DDR pilot group of voluntarily agreement to hand over customs process to place more emphasis on demobilized ex-combatants with revenues to the central government aspects of disarmament and high-quality reintegration assistance and to stop all military interference in demobilization than reintegration. that leads to alternative employment. the country’s political and civil affairs. This is a mistake, for if combatants This will, in turn, entice other ex- Taken together, these two cannot be offered alternative combatants to follow suit. In the developments represent a watershed livelihoods, a means to care for current political environment, DD is in the effort to bind Afghanistan’s themselves and their families, there likely not feasible, but reintegration powerbrokers to the new political will be no impetus to reenter civilian activities in the form of local order, but more must be done. life. The demilitarization of Afghan economic development, Afghan history shows that the society cannot be achieved unless employment in infrastructure signing of agreements marks only suitable reintegration opportunities projects, vocational training, and the first stage in a negotiating are available to former combatants. small business promotion schemes process. The US should exploit the To a certain degree, “it all comes should not be delayed. recent breakthroughs by utilizing its down to jobs”. Even if the interna- considerable economic and political tional community provides ex- In many respects, the situation in leverage with Afghanistan’s warlords combatants with vocational training, Afghanistan defies conventional to pressure them to fulfil their tool kits or micro-credit for small DDR logic. Accordingly, a non- commitments. business creation, if the economy conventional approach that does not remains stagnant and no necessarily adhere to the linear D-D- 15. Conduct a large-scale survey of employment is forthcoming, the R formula may be what is needed to Afghan combatants and profile process will collapse. Job creation is break the deadlock and jumpstart the militia commanders the key to demilitarizing Afghan process. Paradoxically, RDD may be Successful post-war demobilization society. An increase in donor- the answer to Afghanistan’s DDR and resettlement require good data supported investment projects dilemma. for planning purposes. The Afghan would have an enormous impact in DDR process lacks a foundation of creating employment for the good data and research. Accordingly, multitudes of unemployed Afghans, DDR planners have not been among them ex-combatants. operating with a precise picture of the problem facing a prospective

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17. Donor funding banning arms in the United States. police cannot adequately maintain It is important that donor states and The goal of DDR is to demilitarize order until the country’s justice agencies make long-term Afghanistan by demobilizing and system is reestablished. More donor commitments to the DDR process. disarming organized militia groups support should be provided to the Currently, financial support is not an and to ensure that the ATA has a process. issue of concern as US$50.7 million monopoly on the use of force. has been committed to the process, Special measures to collect and 22. Establish a system of free an amount sufficient to cover the control small arms and light Defense council costs of the current DDR program weapons could bolster the moment- Recent research by Amnesty Interna- (the Afghan New Beginnings um for demobilization but it is not a tional into the functioning of the Programme) for its first year of precondition for it. In spite of its court system revealed massive fair operation. With the cost of the attractive simplicity, the numbers of trial violations. One of the most entire process estimated to be arms collected is a not an adequate worrying failures is the absence of US$127 million, and this figure is measure of the success of DDR and any Defense council. A system of sure to increase as the process confuses the real purpose of the free Defense council is urgently develops, more money will have to program. required. To date, the judicial reform be raised in the coming months. The process has focussed entirely on task of mobilizing funds for a DDR 20. Engage NGOs in reintegration judges and prosecutors. Another process while it is underway has planning and implementation alarming pattern is the length of proven to be problematic in other It is critical that an integrative and time detainees are held in pre-trial contexts, thus donor states should inclusive approach to reintegration detention, sometimes for many commit to underwriting the process planning and implementation is months without ever coming before in its entirety. taken in Afghanistan. This involves a judge. This needs to be remedied extensive consultation and on a systemic basis. 18. Community-based approaches coordination with NGOs and Previous DDR experiences show that Afghan civil society, which are best Counter-narcotics the outcome of reintegration placed to provide reintegration depends, to a certain degree, on the support in many parts of the 23. Develop alternative sources of support ex-combatants receive from country. To date, the level of NGO economic livelihood the communities to which they are involvement in the reintegration It will be difficult for the ATA to returning. Accordingly, increasing the planning process has been lower production if they cannot absorptive capacity of communities insufficient. A successful provide alternative livelihoods for will greatly advance DDR. reintegration program exploits farmers. In drought-ridden areas of Community-based approaches synergies amongst a multitude of the country poppy is one of the only provide an effective means to actors, one of the most notable crops that farmers can afford to promote DDR and development in groups being international and local produce—it is attractive because it is a sustainable fashion. Local NGOs. The ATA and UNAMA drought resistant, easy to store, and government has always been the core must work more assiduously to extremely profitable. Therefore, the level of decision making in Afghani- integrate NGOs into the current key to counter-narcotics efforts will stan. International reconstruction DDR process. be the provision of resources and and peace-building processes must know-how for farmers to grow recognize this fundamental reality by Judicial reform alternative crops. coordinating their activities with local institutions and structures such as 21. Accelerate judicial reform 24. De-legitimize poppy production the village Shura. With the judicial system in Afghani- Poppy cultivation has increased and stan in disarray and progress in police come to be perceived as acceptable in 19. The ‘Numbers Game’ reform having exceeded that of the recent decades. An information All DDR processes face the danger of justice sector, the courts currently lack campaign, involving religious and becoming overly fixated on the capacity to handle the volume of community leaders, should seek to disarmament, particularly the cases brought before them. undermine this growing ‘numbers game’, regarding the Accordingly, criminals apprehended legitimization of the drug trade. number of arms collected. by police are released without Removing all small arms from punishment while innocent Afghans, Afghan society is as implausible as with no recourse to legal protection, have been subjected to unlawful imprisonment. The reality is that the

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Gender and security Discrimination Against Women, influence and pursue their interests Afghanistan has an obligation to via proxies, a tactic that has served to 25. Gender and policing revise its legal codes to ensure that fragment the country along ethnic, There are currently 40 female recruits both men and women have an equal religious and political lines. The most in the Kabul Police Academy, 28 in right to enter into and dissolve a blatant offenders in this regard have the one-year program and 12 in the marriage. While discriminatory laws been Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and to a advanced three-year program. are just one part of an interlocking lesser extent, India and the Central German initiatives to increase female set of barriers preventing women Asian states. recruitment have had some success. from accessing justice, the current According to a police academy period of constitutional drafting and To arrest the growth of insecurity in spokesperson, they have received legal reform provides an opportunity Afghanistan, it is critical that regional more applications from women then to erode and even eliminate this part states cease all support for sub-state they have places. Nevertheless, of the barrier. actors—individual parties, tribes, and conservative religious and social warlords. A significant step towards attitudes remain firmly rooted in 27. Expand access to education for achieving this goal was made with Afghan society. Many men in women and girls the signing of the Kabul Declaration Afghanistan have begun to accept Primary education should be on Good-Neighborly Relations, a that female police are needed, but compulsory for all girls in Afghani- pledge of non-interference by only to carry out duties that male stan. Schools for girls should be Afghanistan’s immediate police cannot, such as body searches established in all of the provinces in neighbors—Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and arrests of women. Public order to address the exceedingly high Turkmenistan, China and Iran— awareness aiming to shift these rate of illiteracy and ignorance among signed on 22 December 2002. The ingrained cultural attitudes must be women. Specialized training should international community, most intensified and recruitment efforts be provided to women to educate notably the United States, should expanded. them about their constitutional exert pressure on the signatories of rights, Sharia Law, international this declaration, along with other 26. Address the issue of domestic standards of human rights, and the states with a history of intervention violence against women country’s penal, judicial and civil in Afghanistan, to observe the Currently, when a woman or girl faces codes. agreement’s fundamental principle: violence in her home or community the inviolability of Afghanistan’s there are virtually no effective 28. Targeted employment programs sovereignty. mechanisms through which she can for women seek justice or protection. Codes of Employment generation programs Until external actors are compelled to honor and shame pressure women should target women in order to cease meddling in Afghan internal to remain silent about such abuse. undercut their dependence on affairs, efforts to overcome the Even the very small number of spouses and male relatives. Such centrifugal forces that have given rise women who try to access help initiatives could be incorporated into to insecurity and instability in through the formal system are not reintegration support programs for Afghanistan will be fruitless. A given basic assistance. For example, ex-combatants. concerted diplomatic campaign, led in cases where the husband opposes by the United States, must be a divorce, many judges have Regional issues launched to forge an international displayed an unwillingness to grant a agreement that bars external divorce even in the face of 29. Secure the adherence of interference in Afghanistan. This compelling testimony detailing neighboring states to a strict agreement should proscribe the severe domestic violence. While policy of non-interference provision of economic aid, arms and women struggle to obtain divorces The influence and interference of equipment to sub-state actors and under such circumstances, men are neighboring states in Afghanistan address the issues of customs duties able to declare divorce at any point has been one of the principal sources and borders. without stating a reason. With the of conflict and division in the ratification of the Convention on the country. Afghanistan’s geopolitical Elimination of all forms of importance has impelled regional states to surreptitiously compete for

66 B I C C recommendations

Warlord economies rebuild roads and bridges, to revamp The capital for each of these funds the irrigation system, and clean the would be invested by foreign banks, 30. Prioritize fiscal measures to karez network will give the warlords a out of the reach of warlords. The confront warlordism vested interest in local government annual interest from the capital Undermining the economic and economic management. It will invested would provide a regular and foundations of the warlords should spark a process to reform the established income for civil society be prioritized. In this regard the warlords into businessmen, organizations. Grants should be following steps should be taken: transforming warlordism into made for five-year periods by a local peacelordism. Although it is clear committee of three-five people from A. New border posts should be that investment could serve as a each province, and paid quarterly by a established at the seven key points dominant engine of political, social donor-run office subject to adequate of entry, with special emphasis on and economic change in Afghanistan, reporting and accounting standards. Herat. They should be situated at it has been extremely slow to This would give civil society defensible points at some distance materialize. Illustrating this situation organizations the chance to develop from the existing posts and from is the US-led project to repair the themselves and their capacities. major cities. International donors Kabul-Kandahar highway. The should equip these posts with the project, initiated seven months ago, Grants from this Regional Civil latest technological equipment to was supposed to generate thousands Society Trust Fund could be issued prosecute their duties. To assuage the of jobs. However, to date, only two to a wide range of recipients such as concerns of regional leaders, customs percent of the job has been finished mosque committees and Sufi groups revenue should be fairly distributed and it has given work to a mere 100 for charitable work, to local NGOs, to regional governments. Coalition people. A massive increase in donor women’s cooperatives, and to forces and ISAF would be required investment is needed to create the international NGOs committed to to facilitate the transition to this new spark necessary to rejuvenate working on a long-term basis in the system. The US, in particular, must Afghanistan’s economy. areas of regional education and use the threat of force to keep the health. Over time, the project could warlords in line. Afghan civil society help to create a new layer of non- governmental activity—independent B. The restoration of Afghanistan’s 32. Encourage the growth of Afghan of regional and national road network is a vital step towards civil society government—that would give the undermining the power bases of A key element of any strategy to average Afghan a voice in the affairs many of Afghanistan’s warlords. undermine the power of the of the state. Road reconstruction has proceeded at warlords is the creation of alternative an unacceptably slow rate and should voices and sources of influence The International be energized. A new institution outside current power structures. Security and Assistance should be created to deal exclusively This can be achieved by with the issue of roads and customs strengthening Afghan civil society. Force (ISAF) revenues. This must be an There are two obvious targets for 33. Expand ISAF authoritative body that includes this support: the mosques and representatives of the ministries of traditional tribal structures such as To date, the international community has dismissed ISAF expansion as Transport, Commerce, and Finance the village Shura. Western style too expensive, in part because most at the highest levels, as well as NGOs should also be encouraged, officials from international agencies although they have few traditional policy discussions have been approached in “all or nothing” and donors. roots in Afghan society. terms. A strategy involving the 31. Encourage the transition from a Afghan civil society organizations, as expansion of ISAF to key urban centers and the commercial routes war to peace economy through is the case in many other developing between them should be considered. increased economic investment countries, will be as fragile as their Until the appeal of the current funding sources. Durable and long- NATO’s assumption of the command for ISAF in August 2003 criminalized economy is blunted, all term funding is needed to develop provides a golden opportunity to efforts to establish security in civil society in a sustainable fashion. Afghanistan will be abortive. To A practical plan to achieve this goal expand the force, as it possesses the economic and military resources to circumvent this warlord economy it would be to create a civil society trust carry out such a complex mission. is necessary to give the warlords an fund for every region in Afghanistan. economy to buy into. Large-scale With security conditions having deteriorated to the point where relief investment in infrastructure, to

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and reconstruction activities have B. Given adequate resources to provide a been seriously curtailed across much solid platform for security sector of Afghanistan, the need for an reform (DDR, police/army training, expansion of the peacekeeping patrolling, peace making and operation has never been more peacekeeping) in the areas where they apparent. operate. Coalition military forces 36. Provide Central Government liaisons to PRTs 34. Expand the mandate of the The central government should be Coalition Forces encouraged to assign representatives Consistent with the US Pentagon’s to the PRTs to extend its influence statement that the Coalition has outside the capital and enhance moved from fighting the Taliban communication with the provinces. and al-Qaeda to reconstruction and This would also serve to strengthen stabilization efforts, the mandate of cooperation and coordination coalition forces should be expanded between the central government and to include: coalition forces.

A. Facilitating the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants.

B. Intervening in green-on-green fighting between local militias where civilian security is put at risk.

C. Patrolling civilian areas and trade routes.

D. Assisting national security forces to rein in regional warlords who refuse to accede to central control.

35. Expand and reconfigure the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) The PRTs have neither the resources nor the mandate to provide significant security protection or reconstruction, and as a result achieve little more than the veneer of engagement on both fronts. The PRTs should be:

A. Reconfigured to focus exclusively on security sector reform and given a new name, such as Provincial Security/Stabilization Teams, in order to clarify their role.

68 B I C C contributors

Contributors

Paul Barker Ms. Basiri holds a Diploma in Compu- Mr. Nadery has been working to ter Science and a BA in Dari literature. promote and protect human rights in Paul Barker has served as the Afghani- She began her tenure with AWN in Afghanistan since 1990. As a student, he stan Country Director for CARE September 2002. Before joining AWN co-founded a public awareness International since October 2001. He she worked with the Afghan Women’s magazine in Nimrooz province, which also held that position from 1995 to Educational Center (AWEC) as a Project he ran successfully until 1996 when the 1999, under Taliban rule. CARE Coordinator. Currently she is managing Taliban shut down his office after International, one of the world’s largest a school, opened in September 2002, in objecting to one of his editorials that private humanitarian organizations, is her home province of Wardak. In the highlighted that Islam encourages dedicated to combating global poverty coming months she plans to open an women to receive an education. He was through the implementation of relief orphanage for Afghan children from imprisoned by the Taliban police and and rehabilitation programs in across the country. then taken to Kandahar where he was communities across the world. CARE’s ordered to work on editing the weekly programs in Afghanistan address the Antonio Giustozzi newspaper published by the Taliban following areas: drought relief, rural government. After managing to escape food security, infrastructure Dr. Antonio Giustozzi is currently a from Kandahar, Mr. Nadery moved to development, widows’ feeding, research fellow in the Crisis States Kabul and started teaching International community-based education, urban Programme at the Development Relations at the University of Kabul. water and sanitation, and partnership Research Centre in the London School Shortly after taking this post, he was development. of Economics (LSE), where he is fired for telling his students that the working on the origins and Taliban’s policies were isolating Afghani- Mr. Barker has worked for CARE since development of the system of private stan from the international community. 1984. In that time he has served as a militias in Afghanistan. He is the author He was again imprisoned and had to Country Director in Afghanistan, of the book, War, politics and society in leave the country for Pakistan. He then Ethiopia and the Palestinian territories Afghanistan, 1978–1992, published by worked as a freelance writer and also and as an Assistant Country Director in Georgetown University Press in 2000. organized Afghan youth to advocate for Ethiopia and Egypt. He has a wealth of peace and democracy in Afghanistan. In experience in the field of development, He took his Ph.D. in International 1999 he, and several other Afghan having worked in the area for 27 years. Relations at the LSE in 1997, after human rights activists inside Taliban- having studied contemporary history in held areas, prepared a report on human He received a B.A. in History and a Italy. rights violations in Afghanistan and M.A.T in Education from Lewis and sent the report to the UN Special Clark University in Portland, Oregon Ahmad Nader Nadery Rapporteures on Afghanistan and other and an M.A. from UCLA in California. international human rights organizations, demanding a war crimes Mr. Nadery is an Afghan human rights tribunal for Afghanistan. Sadiqa Basiri activist and political analyst. He currently works as a member of the Afghan Mr. Nadery has studied Law and Sadiqa Basiri is the Assistant Director Independent Human Rights International Relations at the University and Director of External Affairs for the Commission (AIHRC) in Kabul, of Kabul. He has written extensively on Afghan Women’s Network (AWN). Afghanistan. Before accepting the politics, society, human rights, and AWN is a non-partisan network of appointment as a commissioner to the women’s rights in Afghanistan. women and women’s NGOs working AIHRC, he worked as the Program to empower Afghan women and ensure Coordinator for the International their equal participation in Afghan Human Rights Law Group in Kabul. Paul O’Brien society. The members of the network He also attended the Bonn Conference also recognize the value and role of in December 2002 as an observer, and Paul O’Brien is CARE International’s children as the future of Afghanistan worked as a spokesperson and public Advocacy Coordinator in Afghanistan. and, as such, regard the empowerment information officer for the Special Mr. O’Brien graduated from Harvard and protection of children as funda- Independent Commission for the Law School in 1993, and has spent the mental to their work. Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga.

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majority of his time since then in Africa States Institute of Peace and Assistant the London School of Economics and Asia, specializing in human rights Professor of Political Science at Yale (LSE). His studies centered on issues of law and education. Mr. O’Brien first University. He received a B.A. (1972) peace and conflict with an emphasis on visited Afghanistan in 1999, working from Yale University, and an M.A. the Middle East. with the United Nations and Afghan (1976) and a Ph.D. (1982) from the human rights groups to help them University of Chicago. S. Frederick Starr develop a training curriculum. He has published the Benefits-Harms Package Dr. Rubin is the author of numerous Dr. Starr is the Chairman of the Central (a manual and facilitation guide) which publications, including the acclaimed Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Paul H. offers a rights based approach for books, Blood on the Doorstep: the Politics Nitze School of Advanced International assistance workers aiming to take of Preventing Violent Conflict (2002) and Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins responsibility for the human rights The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State University, Baltimore. He is also a impact of their work, as well as a Formation and Collapse in the International research professor at the Foreign Policy number of other human rights training System (2002; first edition 1995). Institute of SAIS, and the pro-tem guides. Since November 2001, he has Rector of the University of Central Asia. been working with CARE Afghanistan Mark Sedra He is a leading specialist on the society to promote national and international and politics of Central Asia, including policies that promote the rights of the Mark Sedra is a research associate at the Afghanistan, as well as Russian politics Afghan poor and marginalized. Bonn International Center for and foreign policy, US policy in Eurasia, Conversion (BICC). Since his arrival at and the regional politics of oil. Barnett R. Rubin the center in August 2001, his research has focused on the area of security in Dr. Starr is a former president of Dr. Rubin is a Senior Fellow and post-conflict societies. During his tenure Oberlin College and founding director Director of the Center on International at the institute, he has conducted of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Cooperation (CIC) at New York research on a number of countries and Russian Studies at the Woodrow University. In November–December regions, including Afghanistan, Wilson Center for International Studies. 2001 he served as special advisor to the Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and He has written or edited 18 books and UN Special Representative of the the Balkans. In June 2002, he began more than 130 articles on Russian and Secretary General for Afghanistan, work on a BICC project to monitor the Eurasian affairs. His current activities Lakhdar Brahimi, during the progress of the internationally include planning work for a new negotiations that produced the Bonn supported security sector reform process institution of higher education to be Agreement, which Rubin helped to in Afghanistan. He has produced a established by the Aga Khan in draft. During 1994–2000 he was major report on the issue, titled, Tajikistan. Director of the Center for Preventive Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Action, and Director, Peace and Conflict Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan Dr. Starr received his Ph.D. in history Studies, at the Council on Foreign and has presented his work at from Princeton University. Relations in New York. He is considered numerous international conferences and one of the world’s foremost experts on forums. Mr. Sedra regularly contributes Afghanistan and the surrounding articles, reports, and policy papers to the region, as well as on conflict prevention US think tank Foreign Policy in Focus and peace-building. (FPIF) which publishes an e-magazine called the Progressive Response. His work Dr. Rubin was Associate Professor of has also been published in a number of Political Science and Director of the journals and newspapers in Germany Center for the Study of Central Asia at and the United States, including Blätter Columbia University from 1990 to für deutsche und internationale Politik and 1996. Previously, he was a Jennings the Miami Herald. Randolph Peace Fellow at the United Born in Canada, Mr. Sedra gained a Hon. B.A. in Political Science and History at the University of Toronto and a M.Sc. in International History at

70 B I C C participants

E-Conference Participation List

Samina Ahmed Luc van de Goor Micahel Pohly Kibandama Alexander Patricia Gossman Wolf E. Poulet Katarina Ammitzboell Lynne Griffiths-Fulton Robin-Edward Poulton Alice Andrews Imitaz Gul Indunil Ranaviraja Edward R. Aquino Andreas Heinemann-Grüder Lotahr Rast Arnie Arnesen Kate Hairsine Edward Rees Meryem Aslan Humayun Hamidzada Barnett Rubin Sally Austin Emily Harris Dirk Salomons Sultan Aziz Sven F.L. Helmet Abdul Razique Samadi Nicole Ball Kevin Henry Susie Sanders Paul Barker Terumi Hirai Conrad Schetter Sadiqa Basiri Matt Hobson Pamela Scholey Judy A. Benjamin Lutz Holländer Annette Schwitzke Marc von Boemcken Zahid Hussein Mark Sedra James K. Boyce Jeffrey Isima Rachel Shakides Michael Brzoska M. Ismail Deborah Sharp Paul Burkholder David Jackman John Sifton Berverly Carmichael Hamid Jalil Grant Smith Vera Chrobok Lucy Jones Irma Specht Stephen P. Cohen Andrzej Karkoszka Barbara J. Stapleton Joanna Crichton Nasrin Magda Katona S. Frederick Starr Erling Dessau Uli Kindermann Craig Steffensen Mark Duffield Kees Kingma Astri Suhrke Iris Eisbein Shukuko Koyama Geir Valle Yoshio Endo Margaret Ladner Seddiq Weera Faruq Faisel Eugene de Lange Elisabeth Winter Sami Faltas Tom Leckinger Daud Yaar Steven Feller Citha D. Maass Daoud Yaqub Chris Ferguson Aqab Khan Malik Omar Zakhilwal Reinhard Fichtl Riefqi Muna Sabine Fründt Ahmad Nader Nadery Antonio Giustozzi Yui Nakamura Bernt Glatzer Homira Nassery David Gold Paul O’Brien Larry P. Goodson Eileen Olexiuk Marina Ottaway Vikram Parekh Tobias Pietz

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Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief AIA Afghan Interim Administration AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission AIMS Afghanistan Information Management System AIP Afghan Islamic Press ANA Afghan National Army ANBP Afghan New Beginnings Programme ATA Afghanistan Transitional Administration AWN Afghan Women’s Network DDR Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization HRW Human Rights Watch ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Person IMF International Monetary Fund IOM International Organization for Migration IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks ISAF International Security Assistance Force ITAP Immediate and Transitional Assistance Program for the Afghan People IWPR Institute for War and Peace Reporting LOFTA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan MAPA Mine Action Program for Afghanistan MoD Ministry of Defense MoI Ministry of Interior MoWA Ministry of Women’s Affairs NGO Non-Governmental Organization NDC National Disarmament Commission NDF National Development Framework NPTC National Police Training Center NSD National Security Directorate (Amaniyat) PRT Provisional Reconstruction Team REAP Rapid Employment in Afghanistan Program UF Islamic United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Northern Alliance) UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime US United States UXO Unexploded Ordnance WFP World Food Program WHO World Health Organization

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Selected Publications

For a complete list of our publications, please refer to www.bicc.de/publications/. All briefs and papers can be downloaded from this site.

yearbooks No. 3: brief 20: Jürgen Altmann (Hrsg.). 2000. Dual-use in Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Wolf- Conversion Survey 1996: der Hochtechnologie: Erfahrungen, Strategien und Christian Paes, Wag the Dog: The Mobilization Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Perspektiven in Telekommunikation und and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Demobilization, Oxford University Press, Luftfahrt, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Ba- Army, October 2001 UK, 1996 den-Baden brief 21: Conversion Survey 1997: No 4: Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Small States— Global Disarmament and Disposal of Surplus Hartmut Küchle. 2001. Rüstungsindustrie im Big Worries. Choice and Purpose in the Security Weapons, Oxford University Press, UK, Umbruch: Strategien deutscher Unternehmen Policies of the Baltic States, February 2002 1997 und Ansätze einer europäischen Neuordnung (Arms Industry Restructuring—German Com- brief 22: Conversion Survey 1998: panies in a New European Setting), Nomos Corinna Hauswedell and Kris Brown, Global Disarmament, Defense Industry Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Burying the Hatchet—The Decommissioning of Consolidation and Conversion, Oxford Paramilitary Arms in Northern Ireland, University Press, UK, 1998 No. 5: March 2002 Sami Faltas/Joseph Di Chiaro III (eds.). Conversion Survey 1999: 2001. Managing the Remnants of War: brief 23: Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Microdisarmament as an Element of Peace- Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold and Isabelle Demobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, building, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden- Masson (eds.), Small Arms in the Horn of Baden-Baden, 1999 Baden Africa: Challenges, Issues and Perspectives, April 2002 Conversion Survey 2000: No. 6: Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Michael Brzoska. 2001. Smart Sanctions: The brief 24: Demobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Next Steps. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold and Vanessa A. Baden-Baden, 2000 Baden-Baden Farr (eds.), Gender Perspectives on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional and Inter- Conversion Survey 2001: briefs national Concerns, July 2002 Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, brief 15: brief 25: Baden-Baden, 2001 Herbert Wulf (ed.), Security Sector Reform, Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (ed.), June 2000 The Military in Transition: Restructuring and Conversion Survey 2002: Downsizing the Armed Forces of Eastern Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and brief 16: Europe, August 2002 Demobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Herbert Wulf (ed.), Practical Disarmament, Baden-Baden, 2002 August 2000 brief 26: Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Becoming an Conversion Survey 2003: brief 17: Ex-military Man: Demobilization and Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Ksenia Gonchar, Russia’s Defense Industry at Reintegration of Military Professionals Demobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, the Turn of the Century, November 2000 in Eastern Europe, October 2002 Baden-Baden, 2003 brief 18: brief 27: BICC disarmament and Peter Batchelor, Jacklyn Cook and Penny Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Tobias conversion studies McKenzie, Conversion in South Africa in the Pietz with Shay Duffy, 1990’s: Defense Downsizing and Human Turning Soldiers into a Work Force: No. 1: Development Changes, December 2000 Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-Dayton Jörn Brömmelhörster (ed.). 2000. Bosnia and Herzegovina, September 2003 Demystifying the Peace Dividend, Nomos brief 19: Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Ksenia Gonchar and Thilo Roettger, brief 28: Assisting Conversion and Company Restructu- Mark Sedra (ed.), Confronting Afghanistan's No. 2: ring in Moldova, September 2001 Security Dilemma: Reforming the Security Natalie Pauwels (ed.). 2000. War Force to Sector, September 2003 Work Force: Global Perspectives on Demobilization and Reintegration, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden

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reports paper 23: Jörn Brömmelhörster and John Franken- Amanuel Mehreteab, Veteran combatants do stein (eds.). 1997. Mixed Motives, Uncertain report 4: not fade away: a comparative study on two Outcomes—Defense Conversion in China, Keith Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, demobilization and reintegration exercises in Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO Restructuring the US Military Bases in Eritrea, September 2002 Germany: Scope, Impacts and Opportunities, John Hart and Cynthia D. Miller. 1998. June 1995 paper 24: Chemical Weapon Destruction in Russia: Isabelle Ioannides, The European Rapid Political, Legal and Technical Aspects, report 5: Reaction Force: Implications for democratic Oxford: Oxford University Press Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and accountability, September 2002 Herbert Wulf (eds.), Military Conversion for Michael Brzoska and Ann Markusen (eds.). Social Development, July 1995 paper 25: 2000. Military Industrial Conversion, Special Mark Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture: issue of the International Regional Science report 8: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Review (IRSR), Vol. 23, No. 1, Sage Publi- Ulrike Lindemann und JØrgen Klußmann, Afghanistan, cations Konversion militärischer Liegenschaften—Eine October 2002 weltweite Herausforderung, Konferenzreportage, Monterey Institute for International Stu- Oktober 1996 paper 26: dies (MIIS) and Bonn International Center Jocelyn Mawdsley, The Gap between Rhetoric for Conversion (BICC). 2000. Tackling report 10: and Reality. Weapons Acquisition and ESDP Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Practical Ksenia Gonchar, Research and Development December 2002 Guide for Collection and Destruction (R&D) Conversion in Russia, May 1997 paper 27: Kees Kingma (ed.). 2000. Demobilization in report 11: João Gomes Porto and Imogen Parsons, Sub-Saharan Africa; The Development and Keith Cunningham, Base Closure and Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview Security Impacts. Basingstoke: Macmillan Redevelopment in Central and Eastern Europe, of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Press July 1997 Reintegration, March 2003 Andreas Heinemann-Grüder. 2003. Im report 12: paper 28: Namen der NATO. Sicherheitspolitik und Kiflemariam Gebrewold (ed.), Converting Myeong-Chin Cho, Restructuring of Korea’s Streitkräftereform in Osteuropa. Münster: Defense Resources to Human Development, Defense Aerospace Industry: Challenges and Agenda Verlag (forthcoming) Conference Proceedings, October 1998 opportunities? June 2003 report 13: paper 29: David DeClerq, Destroying Small Arms and Lucien Mufor Atanga, Tackling Small Arms Light Weapons: Survey of Methods and Practi- in Central Africa, June 2003 cal Guide, April 1999 paper 30: report 14: Henri Myrttinen, Base Conversion in Central Herbert Wulf (ed.), Disarmament and Con- and Eastern Europe 1989–2003, June 2003 flict Prevention in Development Cooperation, Conference Proceedings, February 2000 paper 31: Jocelyn Mawdsley, The European Union and papers Defense Industrial Policy, July 2003 paper 20: paper 32: Vanessa Farr, Gendering Demilitarization as a Hartmut Küchle, Globalisierung in der Peacebuilding Tool, June 2002 Rüstungsindustrie: Formen und Auswirkungen auf den deutschen Standort und die paper 21: Arbeitsplätze, August 2003 Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska with Kees Kingma and Herbert Wulf, Voice and accoun- books tability in the security sector, July 2002 Michael Brzoska und Werner Voss (eds.). paper 22: 1996. Auswirkungen und Alternativen des Dimitar Dimitrov, The Restructuring and Eurofighter 2000, Nomos Verlagsgesell- Conversion of the Bulgarian Defense schaft, Baden-Baden Industry during the Transition Period, July 2002 Ulrike Lindemann und Ulrich Schirowski. 1996. Truppenabbau und Konversion in NRW, Handbuch für Kommunen

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