Vital Democracy This page intentionally left blank Vital Democracy A Theory of Democracy in Action Frank Hendriks Translated by R. Stuve 1 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX26DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York # Frank Hendriks 2010 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Library of Congress Control Number : 2009942566 Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King’s Lynn ISBN 978 0 19 957278 6 13579108642 Contents List of Figures vii List of Boxes ix Preface xi Acknowledgements xv Opening Debate 1 Part I. Concepts 15 1. Plural Democracy 17 2. Layered Democracy 31 Part II. Practices 47 3. Pendulum Democracy 49 4. Consensus Democracy 66 5. Voter Democracy 86 6. Participatory Democracy 107 Part III. Lessons 133 7. Mixing Democracy 135 8. Reforming Democracy 157 Closing Debate 178 Notes 189 Bibliography 219 Index 235 This page intentionally left blank List of Figures 1.1. Models of democracy 27 2.1. Pure versus impure democracy 32 2.2. Models of democracy, expressions, and foundations 33 2.3. Political culture and democratic ethos 37 2.4. Societal cultures 38 2.5. Citizenship styles 42 2.6. Leadership styles 44 2.7. Expressions of democratic models dealt with in Part II 45 3.1. Pendulum democracy: qualities and drawbacks 64 3.2. Pendulum democracy: strengths and weaknesses 65 4.1. Consensus democracy: qualities and drawbacks 84 4.2. Consensus democracy: strengths and weaknesses 85 5.1. Voter democracy: qualities and drawbacks 105 5.2. Voter democracy: strengths and weaknesses 106 6.1. Participatory democracy opposed to voter democracy 108 6.2. Participatory democracy: qualities and drawbacks 129 6.3. Participatory democracy: strengths and weaknesses 131 7.1. Variations on a theme 138 7.2. Positive and negative feedback mechanisms 139 7.3. Pure versus impure democracy 140 7.4. Six hybrids 142 7.5. Democracy and good governance 148 7.6. Strengths and weaknesses of models of democracy revisited 152 7.7. Models of democracy and cultural perspectives 154 7.8. System, setting, and culture 156 8.1. Policy issues arranged 168 8.2. Recapitulation: consensus democracy in the Netherlands 173 vii This page intentionally left blank List of Boxes 1.1. A general definition of democracy 22 1.2. Some other definitions of democracy 22 1.3. Categories of democracy 25 ix This page intentionally left blank Preface – Why is it that when people talk about democracy they usually talk past one another? One important reason for this is that they often proceed from the idea that there is only a single, superior ‘true democracy’, while in reality democracy is a plural phenomenon. A simple principle – the con- traction of demos and kratia, the people who rule – gives rise to various forms of thinking and operating. – How are these various forms built and to what effect? Democracy takes myriad forms, but four elementary forms repeatedly appear in several variants and mixtures whenever and wherever democracy is tried and tested. These four have different strengths and weaknesses which reveal themselves when the models are compared. – What lessons can be learned from doing this? One important lesson is that productive blending of democratic models, and that sensitivity to the situational and cultural context of democracy are crucial for its develop- ment and vitality. Given that democratic idealists are usually keen on pure models and as a rule do not evidence the required contextual sensitivity, this is an important task for democratic realists. In a nutshell, these are the issues that I elaborate in the book, which I have divided into three parts: concepts (I), practices (II), and lessons (III). This preface outlines the structure of the book and the debate from which I proceed. The underlying debate Democracy is a core concept in the public domain. It is a concept that is often played as a trump card in public debates. Any proposed solution can be declared bad and set aside if labelled ‘undemocratic’. Any problem becomes more serious if it can be represented as a ‘problem of democracy’. An important problem today appears to be the ‘chasm’ that has grown xi Vital Democracy between citizens and their government; some maintain that the two have drifted too far apart. This threatens not only the legitimacy of and support for democracy but also its effectiveness and capacity to solve problems. The proposed solution in many cases is ‘more democracy’ or ‘democratic renewal’. That the solution lies in democracy is usually beyond dispute. Almost nobody makes the case for ‘less democracy’ or the ‘dismantling of democracy’. That is a sign of the times. It was once possible to be against democracy – Plato is the classic example – and yet still be respectable. These days such a position would hardly be tenable. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, author of Democracy: The God That Failed (2001), is one of the few exceptions. Yet, in principle, even he places democracy on high (‘The God That Failed’).1 Another exception is Fareed Zakaria who questions excessive democratization in The Future of Freedom. He does not, however, reject democracy itself.2 Just like Zakaria, today’s critic of democracy is generally an advocate of democracy-in-a-particular-form. The desired form is not sufficiently insti- tutionalized; there is either too much or too little of it. This kind of critique is often heard. There has yet to be a society which has unanimously declared its satisfaction with democracy. In opposition to those who advo- cate democracy-in-a-particular-form are adherents of democracy-in-another- form. There is nothing wrong with this on the face of it. Quite the contrary: a vital democracy demands serious discussion between adversaries in order to keep themselves and the system sharp.3 The problem is that this does not happen often enough. There is sufficient debate on democracy, but all too often it ends up being a dialogue of the deaf, a debate in which participants talk past each other; a series of monologues masquerading as dialogue. Everyone knows what democracy is, don’t they? ‘True democracy is ...’ People who find the rest of this sentence self-evident usually fail to recognize divergent if equally legitimate answers – answers others take for granted. The consequence is Babel-like confusion. In addition to suffering from poor hearing, participants in the debate on democracy also often evidence poor sight. In particular, myopia – short- sightedness – is all too common. Democratic reformers are often preoccu- pied with their own favourite model of democracy, and with its advantages. They usually have less interest in the disadvantages and in alternative models of democracy. When examined, the latter tend to be seen in a biased and sombre light. The literature on the subject does not always help. There are quite a few publications on democracy which present a single model as desirable or ideal, and sometimes even do so beatifically. Alternatively, two models are xii Vital Democracy juxtaposed in such a way that one of the two is clearly to be set aside: ‘weak versus strong democracy’, ‘thin versus deep democracy’, ‘old versus new democracy’.4 The present volume In this book I contrast four fundamental forms of democracy without any preconceived notions as to which are good or bad: pendulum democracy, consensus democracy, voter democracy, and participatory democracy. These four models are derived from the contrast between aggregative (majoritarian) and integrative (non-majoritarian) democracy on the one hand and direct (self-governing) and indirect (representative) democracy on the other. These are two well-known dimensions of democracy theory that are usually dealt with separately in the existing literature, but are here approached together. The combination of two dimensions in a single conceptual framework is illuminating, as this book aims to prove. The framework helps to untwine, compare, and understand democratic practices and reform debates. The combined dimensions broaden our view of fundamental democratic forms and their ramifications. The conceptual framework is refined, but not too refined. Particular expressions of democracy are endlessly variable, but its fundamental forms are not. The various ways in which democracy is practised are central to this book. The central part of this work, Part II (Chapters 3 to 6), examines how the four basic models of democracy are given form in the realities of states and places, in which capacities and varieties, and to what effects, positive and negative.