EERI Special Earthquake Report — April 2004

Learning from Earthquakes

Preliminary Observations on the Bam, Iran, Earthquake of December 26, 2003

Following the earthquake, EERI Introduction sent a reconnaissance team to the Prior to the earthquake, Bam was A magnitude 6.6 (Ms) earthquake affected area in cooperation with the one of the richest cities in Iran. Sur- struck the city of Bam in southeast International Institute of Earthquake rounded by deserts, Bam had a tra- Iran at 5:26:52 AM (local time) on Engineering and Seismology dition of very successful agriculture, Friday, December 26, 2003. The (IIEES) of Iran. The EERI team was thanks to man-made irrigation sys- city’s population was about 90,000, composed of structural engineers tems (qanats) built and maintained with 200,000 total residents in the Farzad Naeim (team leader), Mike by locals over many centuries. It greater Bam area. The U.N. Office Mehrain, and Mohsen Rahnama; produced more than 100,000 metric for the Coordination of Humanitarian strong-motion specialist Yousef tons of the finest quality dates per Affairs (OCHA) indicates that the Bozorgnia; environmental engineer year and a large amount of premium Bam earthquake caused the deaths Elahe Enssani; geotechnical engi- citrus fruits. East of the city, a mod- of approximately 43,200 residents neers Ali Bastani and Farhang ern industrial complex was built that, and injured approximately 20,000. Ostadan; medical doctor Haasan among other things, assembled Some 75,600 people (14,730 house- Movahedi; and remote-sensing about 15% of automobiles produced holds) were displaced, and 25,000 specialist Babak Mansouri. in Iran each year. dwellings were razed. An additional 24,000 dwellings were destroyed in Ron Eguchi, Beverley Adams, and Seismicity and Strong the rural areas. The vast majority of Charles Huyck, remote sensing Ground Motions buildings in the city collapsed, and specialists with ImageCat, Inc., most of the remaining buildings According to the USGS (2003), the made significant contributions to the were severely damaged. In terms earthquake epicenter was located at reconnaissance effort by preparing of human cost, the Bam earthquake 29.004 N, 58.337 E, on a predomi- detailed satellite-based damage ranks as the worst disaster in Iran- nantly right-lateral strike-slip fault. maps and a GPS-based software ian history. In addition, Bam’s an- The focal depth was estimated at system that was used by the team cient citadel (Arge-Bam), probably 7 km (BHRC 2004). Currently, sci- at the earthquake site. Satellite the oldest and largest adobe com- entists from Iran, the United States, imagery was purchased by EERI plex in the world, with 2,000 years of and the United Kingdom are carry- and the University of California at history, was substantially lost. ing out comprehensive investiga- Irvine.

The IIEES team was composed of Mohsen Ghafory Ashtiany (team leader), Sassan Eshghi, Mehdi Zare, Kambod Amini, Mahmood Hussaini, Kazem Jafari, Behrokh Hashemi, A. S. Moghadam, Farhang Pas, Farokh Parsizadeh, Khaked Hessami-Azar, Kiarash Asadi, Mehran Razaghi, Massoud Ahaari, Mehrtaash Mota- medi, Mohammad Reza Mahdavifar, Mohammad Bakhshaiesh, and Massoume Rakhshandeh.

All photos in this report were taken by team members except where noted. The publication of this report Figure 1 Satellite image of Bam area. The locations of few strong-motion recording is supported by EERI’s Learning stations are marked. For each station, the larger horizontal acceleration as well as from Earthquakes Program under peak vertical acceleration are given. For the Bam station, three peak accelerations 2 National Science Foundation grant are provided. All values are in cm/sec (imagery courtesy of DigitalGlobe, www. # CMS-0131895. digitalglobe.com).

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2003 Bam (Iran) Earthquake, Recorded at Bam

Figure 3 Response spectra of the recorded ground motions at Bam for 5% damping.

Figure 2 Ground accelerations recorded at the Bam station. station are plotted in Figure 3. An tions to identify the location and ex- important severe near-fault ground Evolution of Arias Intensity (AI) for tent of the causative fault of the motions. The instrument was on the the N278E component of the Bam Bam earthquake. ground floor of the two-story County station is plotted in Figure 4. With a Building. The building suffered se- 5-95% evolution of AI, the ground Southeast Iran has had previous vere damage and partial collapse at motion at Bam had a strong-motion major earthquakes. In 1981, two two locations, but the instrument duration of approximately eight earthquakes struck the area: in the room had only minor cracks in its seconds. Golbaf earthquake (Mw 6.6) 3,000 wall. Following the earthquake, the people lost their lives; in the Sirch staff of BHRC inspected the instru- In Figure 5, distributions of peak earthquake (Mw 7.1), 1,500 people ment room and the SSA-2 instru- horizontal and vertical ground ac- were killed. The other significant ment and documented their obser- celerations are plotted against the earthquake in the area was the vations (BHRC 2004). They con- seismogenic distance to the Bam 1998 Fandoqa earthquake, with a cluded that the instrument was not fault. The results of Campbell and magnitude of 6.6 (Berberian et al. damaged and did not malfunction Bozorgnia (2003) attenuation rela- 2001; Walker and Jackson 2002). during the earthquake. tions for the stiff soil sites are also plotted for comparison. It is evident Iran has 983 digital strong-motion The recorded ground accelerations that the recorded peak accelerations instruments and 71 SMA-1 analog at the Bam station are plotted in Fig- at Bam exceed the median value of strong-motion instruments. They are ure 2, which shows that the Bam attenuation models for both hori- maintained by the Building and station recorded very severe ground zontal and vertical components. Housing Research Center (BHRC). motions. The N278E component, In the Bam earthquake, 24 Kinemet- which is roughly in the fault-normal Geotechnical Aspects rics SSA-2 digital strong-motion in- direction, recorded a severe long- Geology and local soil condi- struments recorded the strong period pulse. The pulse corresponds tions: Surface deposits in the gen- ground motions in the area (BHRC to a high peak ground velocity of eral area of Bam consist of alluvial 2004). Figure 1 shows the Bam about 123 cm/sec (BHRC 2004). deposits from major seasonal flood- area, with a few locations of the The instrument also recorded very ing over time. The thickness of the strong-motion stations. strong vertical acceleration with a alluvium ranges from less than a peak value of about 1g. The re- few meters to about 50 m (IIEES A tri-axial strong-motion instrument sponse spectra of the uncorrected 2003), depending on the location. In located in downtown Bam recorded ground accelerations at the Bam the northeastern part of the city and

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2003 Bam, Iran, Bam Station (N278E) soil effects on the high-intensity ground motion recorded in the city.

Landslides: The area is generally flat, and there are no major man- made earth structures, but there were landslides along riverbanks and man-made channels. A typical riverbank landslide is shown in Fig- ure 6. Large blocks of soils moved and tumbled. Most soil blocks al- ready had tension cracks due to the dry environment. There was no di- Figure 4 Evolution of Arias Intensity (normalized) for the N278E component of the rect damage caused by the land- strong motion recorded at Bam. slides, but the soil blocks need to be removed to clear the riverbed for the next seasonal flooding.

Distribu- Figure 5 There was no surface tion of the recorded Liquefaction: peak ground accel- evidence of liquefaction due to the erations versus seis- depth of the ground water table. mogenic distance to There were no reports of any dam- the Bam fault, for the age or failure caused by liquefac- geometric mean of tion. the horizontal com- ponents (top) and Qanats: A qanat is a horizontal aque- vertical acceleration duct system that conveys water from (bottom). The actual an aquifer in mountainous alluvial site-to-source distances may be fans to lower-elevation irrigated fields, less than those as shown in Figure 7. It consists of shown here, if the a series of vertical shafts in sloping causative fault is ground spaced between 30-50 m, somewhat west of interconnected with an underground the Bam fault. tunnel. The soil removed is placed around the shafts forming a circular

Arge-Bam, a rock outcrop is visible. The underlying layers consist of re- cent quaternary alluvium, late quat- ernary sandstone and siltstone, sed- imentary and volcanic rocks. The seasonal riverbed (Posht-Rood), mostly dry, is in the northern part of the city. Due to heavy use of deep water wells, the groundwater table is low — at depths in excess of 30 m.

At the time of the reconnaissance effort (January 2003), drilling was underway near the building where the only strong-motion instrument in the city of Bam was located. The soil layering and properties will be available in near future, and will be very useful for evaluating the local Figure 6 A typical landslide along a riverbank.

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Bam. Satellite photos of a neighbor- hood in Bam with 80%-100% dam- age are illustrative. Figure 9 was ta- ken on 9/30/2003 before the earth- quake, and Figure 10 was taken on 1/3/2004 after the earthquake.

An isoseismal map developed by IIEES is overlaid on a population map in Figure 11.

Historic buildings: The historic Arge-Bam Citadel is a complex of one- and two-story buildings sur- rounded by several tall free-standing walls. Figure 12 shows how it looked before the earthquake. The build- ing’s adobe is approximately three feet thick with a layer of straw-rein- forced mud cover for rain protection. Figure 7 A typical qanat system: (1) infiltration part of the tunnel, (2) water convey- ance part of the tunnel, (3) open channel, (4) vertical shafts, (5) small storage pond, The free-standing walls are thicker, (6) irrigation area, (7) sand and gravel, (8) layers of soil (source: http://www. but have the same construction as waterhistory.org/histories/qanats/#figure1). the building walls. The roofs consist of domes and cylindrical arches embankment protecting the shafts Building Performance constructed of adobe. These struc- from surface runoff. Water flows tures have little resistance to earth- Damage was concentrated in a rela- under gravity; no pumping is needed. quake motion so the quake caused tively small area of roughly 16 km² widespread and significant collapse around Bam. The United Nations Every few years dredging is required of the citadel (Figure 13). to remove the debris in the tunnel damage assessment team esti- mated that 90% of the building stock area. There are 22,000 qanats in Approximately 80% of the buildings in Bam suffered 60-100% damage, Iran with a total length of 170,000 experienced total collapse. The col- while the remaining 10% had 40- miles delivering 20,000 gallons per lapse pattern in various buildings 60% damage. Detailed 60-cm reso- second. It has been documented indicates that the failure initiated in lution optical satellite images ob- that qanats in Iran were used 3,000 load-bearing walls was followed by tained by EERI to assist the recon- years ago. roof collapse (Figure 14). There ap- naissance effort confirmed the wide- peared to be no difference in per- It is estimated that 50% of the water spread damage and destruction in for irrigation around Bam was deliv- ered by 120 qanat systems. About 40% of the qanats were damaged in the earthquake. Visible in the form of sinkholes, the failures were caused by the collapse of the shafts Figure 8 near the ground surface or the tun- Qanat sink- nel. There are also numerous old hole that qanats in the general area with damaged a locations that were unknown at the nearby time of city development. Some of structure (IIEES 2003). the old qanats failed and caused foundation damage in buildings lo- cated close by (see Figure 8). The shafts and qanats need to be re- paired and reinforced to prevent ex- tinction of the palm farms, the very livelihood of the city.

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seismic resistance in future events.

Traditional buildings: Many Bam residential buildings, from modest houses to large luxury residences, are similar to the historic citadel in their adobe construction. This con- struction consists of cylindrical or dome-shaped adobe arched roofs spanning approximately ten to 12 feet supported by thick (30”+/-) adobe bearing walls. A two-inch lay- er of straw-reinforced mud provides protection against rain on roof tops and exterior walls.

Collapse of these structures was widespread (Figures 16 and 17). Most of the 43,000 lives lost were due to their collapse. The mode of collapse appeared to be out-of- plane failure of walls, resulting in Figure 9 Satellite image taken from a neighborhood prior to earthquake (imagery loss of support for the roof. courtesy of DigitalGlobe, www.digitalglobe.com). In addition to residential buildings, this structural system was used for some schools and other public build- ings. However, due to the time of the earthquake (early morning), loss of life associated with these buildings was relatively low.

Contemporary construction: The majority of contemporary construc- tion uses steel framing with unrein- forced masonry brick infill and/or bearing walls. The floors and roofs in these buildings use a “Jack Arch” system consisting of brick arches spanning between webs of steel I-beams spaced at approximately three feet. The floor beams are sup- ported on steel girders. In many buildings, URM bearing walls at the perimeter provide gravity support. The girder system is typically double “I” or double channel sections pass- ing on both sides of columns and After-earthquake satellite image of the same neighborhood shown in Figure 10 supported by top and bottom angles Figure 9 (imagery courtesy of DigitalGlobe, ). www.digitalglobe.com (Figure 18). This system is also formance of domes as compared to Because of the historical signifi- used as moment frame for resisting cylindrical roofs. Some collapsed cance of the citadel, the repair of lateral loads in one direction of the walls revealed repairs that may have the structures is under study. The building. In the other direction, URM been made after previous earth- extensive damage suggests that brick walls (in low-rise buildings) or quakes (Figure 15). repair decisions should consider braced frames (in mid-rise buildings) provide lateral resistance.

4 5 EERI Special Earthquake Report — April 2004 EERI Special Earthquake Report — April 2004 ). View of the Arge-Bam Citadel before the December 2003 earthquake of the View Out-of-plane collapse of adobe walls in Arge-Bam. Out-of-plane collapse of adobe walls in www.raphaelk.co.uk/web%20pics/ Iran/Iran.htm www.raphaelk.co.uk/web%20pics/ Figure 14 Figure 12 ( Isoseismal map and population affected by the earthquake. View of damage to the Arge-Bam historical citadel. of damage to the View Figure 11 Figure 11 Figure 13

6 7 EERI Special Earthquake Report — April 2004 EERI Special Earthquake Report — April 2004 Failure of large adobe house. Typical steel construction with jack arches. Typical Figure 16 Figure 18 Addition of exterior layers to the core adobe walls suggests earlier Collapse of smaller adobe house. Figure 15 repair of earthquake damage. Figure 17

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fill behavior, but did not collapse. There may have been collapses in concrete buildings that will be identi- fied during more detailed investiga- tions. Domes such as those in mosques appear to have performed well, though there was damage to other parts of the same facility.

Essential buildings: The two ma- jor hospitals in the city experienced significant structural damage and/or partial collapse (Figure 21). The construction of these facilities is sim- ilar to the contemporary buildings discussed above, although some quality control may have been ob- served. Again, out-of-plane failure of unreinforced brick walls was a predominant behavior.

The city fire station had a weak-story collapse that rendered the fire en- gines useless (Figure 22). Collapse of the one-story bus depot structure crushed city buses (Figure 23).

Industrial facilities: Industrial facili- ties performed relatively well. Dam- age was primarily limited to partition and exterior wall failure. Several large horizontal tanks on braced steel support framing were found to be undamaged. Vertical steel tanks in one industrial facility did not ex- perience elephant foot instability or

Figure 19 Collapse of steel-framed dual-system building at least partially due to deficient welding practice.

The collapses of low-rise contempo- Weak-story collapse mechanism rary buildings were primarily due to was also observed repeatedly (Fig- out-of-plane wall failure leading to ure 20). Infill walls reinforced with floor collapse. In mid-rise construc- steel angles framing around win- tion with braced frames, collapses dows seemed to perform well. resulted from bad construction prac- tices or lack of quality control, in- Bam also had a few nonductile con- cluding improper welding (Figure 19) crete frame buildings with URM in- or nonengineered bracing schemes. fill. They were damaged due to in- Figure 20 Typical weak-story collapse.

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30% to 50% of them were dam- aged.

The water is pumped to distribu- tion reservoirs from the wells via 47.5 total miles (76 km) of trans- mission pipes made of asbestos- cement. About 10% of these pipes were damaged by the earthquake and were repaired within the first two weeks of the event. There were three underground rein- forced concrete distribution reser- voirs for the storage of water that do not seem to have been dam- aged. However, two chlorine gas disinfection systems for the distri- bution reservoirs were damaged, but fortunately there were no reported chlorine gas releases. After the quake, four new liquid chlorine systems were installed. Figure 21 Substantial damage to a hospital building. Gravity flow carries water from the damage to the piping system. How- reservoirs into the distribution net- ever, many industrial facilities re- mained out of operation due to loss of staff.

Lifeline Performance Drinking water system: The water supply for all of the affected area is groundwater. The Dasht-e-Bam watershed covers an area of 3,900 square miles (10,000 Km²), where the annual rainfall is 2.00 inches (50 mm). This is typical of an arid zone, but for the past two years the Bam area has been experiencing drought conditions, with only 0.4 (10 mm) inches of annual rainfall. The groundwater table in this area is deep: levels range from 260 ft. to 56 ft. (200 m-80 m).

Before the earthquake, the City and Figure 22 Fire engines were crushed under the collapsed fire station. County of Bam obtained water from 15 production wells located in the southern section of the city. The depth of these wells ranged from 328 to 656 ft (100-200 m). Eleven of the wells were in production when the temblor occurred, and five had some damage. In 60 nearby villages with 23 deep wells in production, Figure 23 Collapse of the bus terminal roof trapped city buses.

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Electric utilities: There was minor damage to the only electric substa- tion in the city. The transformers were slightly derailed and ceramic insulator fallouts were observed. The substation was out of operation for about 16 hours.

Telecommunications Systems: There was very little damage to the telecommunications system. Mobile phones were out of operation for only two or three hours.

Transportation system: There are no long-span bridges in the affected area. Several concrete bridges over waterways appeared to perform well, although one bridge had minor damage to the bearing support at the wing wall.

Search and Rescue The earthquake nearly destroyed the emergency response infrastruc- Figure 24 Small tent-side water tanks provided by local authorities. ture. As has been the case in previ- ous earthquakes around the world, trapped people were generally res- work. Immediately after the quake, width of the pipe, upper and lower cued by family members who had the outflow from the reservoirs was section; and at the joints. The impor- escaped without injuries. The work stopped by closing the exit valves, tant question in reconstructing this was done mostly by hand, as sim- which prevented flooding of the city. collapsed distribution system is ple tools such as shovels were Local engineers had learned about whether to repair the current system scarce. Rescue workers from Ker- the flooding risk from the 1981 Gol- or to replace it with a more earth- man and other parts of the province baf earthquake and had incorpor- quake-reinforced material. ated valve closing into their emer- were slow to arrive, and help didn’t arrive from Tehran until after the gency response procedures. Be- Wastewater collection and treat- national government met 12 hours cause of the failure of the piping net- ment: There is no wastewater col- post-disaster. In addition to the lack work, the city pumped water out of lection and treatment system in of experienced search and rescue four operational wells into mobile the City and County of Bam. Waste- teams, loss of electricity and, hence, tankers that filled small portable water is collected in 24-33 ft. (8 to light brought all rescue work to a tanks in the displaced-person camps 10 m) wells that are common halt on Friday night. This factor, after the quake (Figure 24). throughout Iran. No damage to these along with the cold weather, proba- wells was observed or assessed. Between 70% and 80% of the 306 bly accounted for the unusually high number of casualties in this disaster. miles (490 km) of the distribution Solid waste collection and dispo- lines were damaged, the ages of sal: Before the earthquake, the city With the arrival of the national and which vary from two months to 40 collected solid waste on a daily ba- international rescue teams the fol- years. The lines of the main grid are sis and disposed of it 20 miles (30 lowing day, an estimated 2,000 vic- asbestos-cement with diameters km) southeast of the city at Rahim tims were rescued in the following ranging from 7.87 inches to 27.6 Abad. Because this is where the de- 48 hours. At the end of this time inches (200mm-700 mm). The break- bris removed from the destroyed period (the third day after the disas- age observed in these pipes was as sites is currently taken, solid waste ter), official search and rescue ef- follows: across the length of the pipe, collection by the city was stopped forts were called off because of the upper and lower section; across the after the earthquake. low probability that anyone else had

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by their families. This was followed by a larger second wave of injured a few hours later, as more people found means to get to Kerman City.

The Kerman hospitals were well pre- pared to deal with the disaster be- cause of experience gained during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. Many people involved in emergency re- sponse in Kerman hospitals had dealt with large numbers of injured soldiers in the past. The doctors and staff performed heroically after the quake, but they already knew what to do and did it almost automatically. Considering the magnitude of the disaster and the limitations that existed on the ground, the perfor- mance of the hospitals was exceptional.

Figure 25 Street-side tents using portable water for washing clothes and dishes. Shelters survived the cold weather. was close to 3,500, with about 2,000 The sheltering arrangement is seen during the first 72 hours. The something of a patchwork. Accord- Care of the Injured staff of Afzalipour woke up at 5:30 ing to public officials of various a.m. Friday morning due to the agencies who talked with the recon- Because Bam’s two main hospitals ground shaking. Not knowing exact- naissance team, more than 110,000 were virtually destroyed, the injured ly where the quake was, the hospi- tents were dispersed in Bam by lo- had to be transported elsewhere for tals nonetheless activated the initial cal and international aid organiza- care. The City of Kerman — about phase of the hospital emergency tions (Figures 25 and 26). Some 100 miles northwest of Bam — was system. By 7:00 a.m., the dean of tent camps were established, but the main place for the initial phase the university, the medical chief of tents were also given away. With of receiving and stabilizing the in- staff, the head of nursing, and a few an option of going to a camp or ob- jured. Of the approximately 20,000 staff physicians were present at Af- taining a tent and placing it on or injured, 11,000 were transported by zalipour and formed the crisis cen- next to their property, many people car, ambulance, and helicopters to ter. The staff of the hospital learned chose the latter. Thus, many of the Kerman for treatment, and 5,000 about the location and the extent of tent camps were half occupied while were transported by airplanes to the disaster by 9:00 a.m., when the thousands of people camped by other cities. first wave of injured were driven in their properties. This made providing

Kerman has seven main hospitals: three at universities, one semi-pri- vate, two private, and one belonging to the Revolutionary Guard. The in- formation in this report is mainly from the three university hospitals that cared for over 7,500 of the 11,000 taken to Kerman City. Afzali- pour Hospital, which is the largest and most modern of the three, had a census of about 250 patients in the days before the earthquake. Howev- er, the number of injured they cared for in the ten days after the disaster Figure 26 Children playing near an established tent camp.

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food and supplies very difficult for system, was seriously damaged. have been consulting with experts the authorities, because the tents Immediate and major repairs are re- from around the world, including are broadly dispersed. There was quired to the water system (or con- India, a country with significant re- also no way for authorities to distin- struction of a new, improved system) building experience. The United guish between who was actually a before serious reconstruction work Nations ISDR office and the U.N. resident of Bam and who had can begin in the city. Until the water Development Programme are also rushed to the city to take advantage situation is resolved, much of life is involved in providing rebuilding ad- of the situation, because the city in- on hold. Schools are only slowly re- vice. Over the next several months, frastructure (official buildings, files, opening their doors. In addition to the rebuilding policies should be- and records) had totally collapsed. the damaged drinking water system, come clearer. As of this writing, work has begun damage to the irrigation system and on erecting temporary housing qanats means that the date palms, References structures, but it is unknown when the economic base of this region, or whether there will be enough for may not get the water they need Berberian, M., et al., 2002. “The all the displaced people. during their growing season. This 1998 March 14 Fandoqa earthquake would have devastating economic (Mw 6.6) in Kerman province, repercussions for the region. southeast Iran: Re-rupture of the Public Policy Issues 1981 Sirch earthquake fault, trig- The widespread and almost total • Most residents are currently living gering of slip on adjacent thrust and devastation of the city of Bam has in tents and using water from tempo- the active tectonics of the Gowk enormous social and economic con- rary devices, many of which were fault zone,” Geophysical Journal sequences that will affect the recov- brought in by international aid agen- International 146, 371-398. ery process. At this writing the gov- cies. As spring and summer ap- Building and Housing Research ernment reconstruction policy is proach, the temperature in Bam will Center (BHRC), 2004. “Second still unclear, but there are a number rise to close to 50ºC (122°F), mak- quick preliminary report on the Bam of issues that will need to be ing such temporary living quarters earthquake,” Government of Iran, addressed: extremely unpleasant and possibly unhealthful. In addition, hot winds January. • As mentioned earlier, Bam is the called the 100-Day Winds of Sistan Campbell, K. W. and Bozorgnia, Y., wealthy center of this region, while will come in the late spring, blowing 2003. “Updated near-source ground surrounding villages are poorer. As dust around. There has already motion (attenuation) relations for the a consequence, many villagers have been one severe wind storm in mid- horizontal and vertical components come into Bam to avail themselves March, with 70-mph winds that dam- of peak ground acceleration and ac- of the aid that has been pouring into aged some of the tents. Typically, celeration response spectra.” Bulle- the city. Anecdotal reports indicate people during this time of year tin of the Seismological Society of that the population of Bam has now spend most of their days indoors, America 93, 314–331. swollen to over 120,000, a remarka- even in basements. ble figure considering that more International Institute of Engineering than 40,000 people were killed in • There is substantial pressure to Earthquake and Seismology the earthquake. More than 100,000 rebuild the Arge-Bam quickly, as a (IIEES), 2003. “Preliminary Report tents have been dispersed. There symbol of the rebirth of the region. on the Bam Earthquake,” web site: are reports of villagers coming into As a UNESCO World Heritage site, http://www.iiees.ac.ir/English/ the city by day and availing them- it is a major cultural treasure that Bam_report_english.html. selves of food and other assis- needs careful evaluation and con- Office for the Coordination of Hu- tance, and driving back out to their sideration to be rebuilt appropriately. manitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2004. villages at night. Sorting out who is Unfortunately, pressure to make “Situation Report, February 9th,” entitled to disaster aid and tempo- speedy decisions will not allow United Nations. rary housing will be a challenge for enough time to study the building the government. In fact, at the be- history of the site (exposed by the Walker, R. and Jackson, J., 2002. ginning of March there were riots in earthquake), and it may result in “Offset and evolution of the Gowk the streets in Bam, with aid recipi- inadequate attention to seismically fault, S.E. Iran: A major intraconti- ents protesting the lack of assis- resistant adobe building techniques. nental strike-slip system,” Journal of tance. How many of the rioters were • The central government in Tehran Structural Geology 24, 1677-1698. earthquake victims is not clear. is developing a reconstruction plan U.S. Geological Survey, 2003. Data • The basic infrastructure of the for the region. They have substantial on the Bam, Iran, earthquake, web city, particularly the drinking water experience from previous earth- site: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/ quakes and other disasters, and recenteqsww/Quakes/uscvad. htm.

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