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Toward Democratic Nationalism in Indonesia

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Toward Democratic Nationalism in Indonesia © COPYRIGHT by Nadia Bulkin 2013 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED For my courageous and loving parents, Farchan Bulkin and Jan Hostetler CONSTRUCTING THE NATIONAL PROJECT: TOWARD DEMOCRATIC NATIONALISM IN INDONESIA BY Nadia Bulkin ABSTRACT A new kind of nationalism is taking root in Indonesia: democratic nationalism, which is constructed from the bottom up instead of imposed by the state. Democratic nationalism’s objective is mass voluntary contribution to the national project with the intention of engendering loyalty to the state, though not necessarily the regime. This sets it apart from top-down nationalisms that previously defined the Indonesian nation: colonial administrative nationalism, anti-colonial nationalism, and regime-sustaining nationalism. The shift to democratic nationalism was brought about by state policies of democratization and decentralization, which have dramatically increased the number of actors both within and outside the state who believe they have a stake not only in their own daily lives but in the national project. The Indonesian people have yet to answer all questions about their national identity, but as of now, popular commitment to the idea of Indonesia as well as democracy appears to be strong. ii PREFACE Turning and turning in the widening gyre The falcon cannot hear the falconer; Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. - William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming” We all have to accept reality, yes, that’s true. But just to accept reality and do nothing else, that is the attitude of human beings who have lost the ability to develop and grow, because human beings also have the ability to create new realities. And if there are no longer people who want to create new realities, then perhaps the word “progress” should be removed altogether from humankind’s vocabulary. - Pramoedya Ananta Toer, House of Glass iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This thesis would not have been possible without the open-minded support and insightful guidance provided by my thesis advisers, Dr. Amitav Acharya and Dr. Pek Koon Heng. Their mentorship has been a constant throughout my entire M.A. program at the School of International Service at American University, for which I express my heartfelt gratitude. I would like to thank Dr. Anders Härdig for providing feedback on an initial research outline and my academic adviser, Mr. Michael Rosenberger, for his diligence in keeping me on track. I also thank two other faculty whose courses provided valuable understanding of the complexities of domestic politics in the developing world, Dr. Charles Call and Dr. Balbina Hwang. Finally, I owe an immeasurable debt to my friends and family, whose unwavering patience, support, and understanding throughout the entire thesis process kept me level-headed. This thesis was inspired by my father, Dr. Farchan Bulkin, who deeply loved his homeland and never stopped believing that Indonesia was not a nation of goats in need of a shepherd; that despite whatever “the General” might say, Indonesia was capable of democracy. He died in March 1998, mere months before he was proven right. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. ii PREFACE ................................................................................................................................. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................... iv LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW......................................................................................7 Three Schools of Nationalism ..........................................................................................7 The Nation, the State, and Nationalism .......................................................................... 14 Theories of Democracy .................................................................................................. 16 Four Types of Nationalism ............................................................................................ 22 CHAPTER 3 THE HISTORY OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM ........................................ 36 A Brief History of Indonesia .......................................................................................... 37 Colonial Administrative Nationalism ............................................................................. 42 Anti-Colonial Nationalism ............................................................................................. 44 Regime-Sustaining Nationalism ..................................................................................... 52 Democratic Nationalism ................................................................................................ 62 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 78 CHAPTER 4 EXPLANATIONS FOR CHANGES IN NATIONALISM .................................. 80 Personalistic Factors ...................................................................................................... 80 International Factors ...................................................................................................... 84 Democratization and Decentralization ........................................................................... 93 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 135 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 137 Theoretical Implications .............................................................................................. 140 Prospects for the Future ............................................................................................... 144 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................... 151 v LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Four Types of Nationalism ....................................................................................................35 vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION In studies of nationalism, Indonesia has attracted much scholarly attention because there appears to be nothing “natural” about its national unity: it is geographically scattered over an archipelago, and so juggles hundreds of languages and dialects, ethnic groups, and religions.1 In other words, there was no obvious adhesive – yet a strong nationalist movement devoted to a nation called “Indonesia,” speaking a language called “Indonesian,” had emerged by the 1920s, before the Dutch East Indies had declared independence from the Netherlands. In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson used the Indonesian case to formulate his influential theory of nationalism, which defines the nation as an imagined (limited and sovereign) political community: more socially-constructed than physical, modern instead of ancient, yet bound to its “deep, horizontal comradeship.”2 The state of Indonesia has undergone significant changes since Imagined Communities was first published in 1982. Most significantly, Indonesia began its democratic transition in 1998 after thirty-three years of dictatorship under the Suharto regime. The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis had crippled the Indonesian economy and provided an opening for democracy activists and Suharto’s political opponents to protest against Suharto’s legitimacy. The democratic transition was in and of itself surprising to observers; even more surprising was the fact that the upheaval of this transition neither destroyed the solidarity of the Indonesian nation, nor led to an upsurge in inclusionary nationalist policies intended to hold the nation together. State leaders did not turn to aggressive nationalism to cement their popular support or retain the 1 Cribb 1999, 169. 2 Anderson 1991, 6, 7. 1 hold of national unity – in fact, they scarcely imposed any form of nationalism at all. The Indonesian government wants to protect Indonesia’s democratic, moderate-Muslim identity, which has given Indonesia a great deal of international credibility, but is reluctant to engage in indoctrination or even censorship. This is not the outcome that would have been predicted by the dominant view of nationalism and conflict. Mansfield and Snyder, for example, predict that competing elites in democratizing states use “nationalist prestige strategies” to mobilize and maintain mass support, creating a militant and populist environment in which nationalist politicians must continuously up the ante on each other. Eventually, the unstable state, unconstrained by immature democratic institutions and inflamed by nationalist rhetoric, veers toward war.3 Samuel Huntington’s famous Political Order and Changing Societies predicts a different but related route to government collapse following mass mobilization into politics, especially in immature states: when efforts to mobilize a “unifying” nationalism fail and the state is instead torn apart by inter- ethnic civil wars.4 This argument has lent fodder to the conservative, “Burkian” view that democracy empowers demagogues and an immature populace to make dangerous decisions
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