Book Review Carlos Gershenson* Universidad Nacional Autónoma De México Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Book Review Carlos Gershenson* Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason, and Religion. Stuart A. Kauffman, (2008, Basic Books.) $27. One of the main goals of this book is to demonstrate the inadequacy of reductionism in contem- porary science. It does not negate its explanatory and predictive powers. It notes its limits, exploring several phenomena that are not predictable due to their complex nature. Thus, Kauffman argues, a shift in science is required if we want to understand these complex phenomena. Reductionism assumes that the “real” nature of the universe is described by physics. Thus, in order to reveal the “true” reality and explain it, we must reduce every phenomenon down to physics. As Stephen Weinberg is quoted: “All explanatory arrows point downwards” (p. ix). This approach has dominated science since the times of Galileo, Newton, Descartes, and Laplace. Its assumptions are exemplified most clearly with Laplaceʼs demon: If a hypothetical entity had access to all the positions and momenta of all particles of the universe, it could calculate—following Newtonʼslaws—all past and future events in the universe. There are several problems with Laplaceʼsdemon:(1)Thereare irreversible phenomena in the universe (e.g., thermodynamics), so we cannot know past events with certainty. (2) There are chaotic phenomena, so we cannot predict their future with enough precision. (3) A model of the universe is a part of the universe, so it should also contain itself. This leads to a version of Russellʼs paradox. However, the most problematic aspect, still present in reductionist science—and the one Kauffman deals mainly with—is the following: (4) Interactions generate new information that is relevant for the future evolution of systems. This information cannot be known beforehand. There is no shortcut. Just as with type III or IV elementary cellular automata [7, 8], we have to “run the tape and watch.” People might disagree with the answers that Kauffman puts forward. However, in my opinion the greatest contribution of this book, as with Platoʼs works, lies in the questions asked. It points out clearly which problems are currently relevant for science and society, even those that people are not aware of. Different tentative or partial solutions can be debated. However, the most difficult part is to start the discussion, and that is precisely what this book achieves. There are several phenomena that are not reducible to physics. Kauffman discusses agency, value, and especially meaning, present in living systems and absent in current physical laws (Chapter 6). Thus, if we want to study biological evolution, we cannot express this in terms of current physics. A similar example I can give is the following: The positions of the electrons of a car are determined not only by their interactions, but also by the carʼs movement. The electrons can move around the car, but the car will be moving along a road. Both types of movement can be described with physics. However, the absolute movement of electrons in space cannot be described only with quantum mechanics, that is, it is not reducible. We can say that it is a problem of the scale of observation. Kauffman uses Murray Gell-Mannʼs definition of “natural law”: “a compact description beforehand of the regularities of a process” (p. 5). He argues that there are real phenomena beyond natural law, such as Darwinian preadaptations. Does this mean that we should shift the way we do science and/or change our understanding of a “natural law”? In either case, the reductionism prevalent in science is not sufficient to explore these phenomena. Chapters 1–3 discuss problems with reductionism and physics. Chapter 4 argues convincingly that biology cannot be reduced to physics.

* IIMAS and C3, Universidad Autónoma de México, México. E-mail: [email protected].

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Chapters 5–9 summarize and expand previous work of Kauffman, mainly from his Investigations [4]. In Chapter 10, the intellectual center of the book, Kauffman tries to “break the Galilean spell.” This lies in the scientific belief that the universe is governed by natural laws (as defined above). How- ever, Kauffman argues convincingly that “physical laws alone do not describe the causal unfolding of the universe” (p. 131). He focuses on Darwinian preadaptations, noting that these cannot be known before they appear. At the end of the chapter, reasons explaining the inadequacy of “intelligent design” are exposed. Chapter 11 discusses the evolving economy. This is not entirely new work, but is quite relevant to the recent economic crisis. Just like Darwinian preadaptations, technological innovations cannot be predicted. They are “partially beyond natural law.” The creativity of biological and technological evolutions is related to human creativity in Chapter 12, which deals with the human mind. A common argument related to these phenomena is that they seem to be not (always) algorithmic. Thus, just as with the halting problem [6], we have to “run” evolution or the mind before we can see what might come out of it. Chapter 13 is the most speculative (and perhaps most debatable) of the book, dealing with con- sciousness. However, the questions are worth speculating on, and in any case Kauffmanʼs specula- tions are scientifically based. We have to start with something, even if it is quantum mechanics. The final chapters of the book are more philosophical, extending the previous discussions into other domains. In Chapter 14, Kauffman discusses how can we live without being able to predict. Well, we have seen that we have to rely on adaptation as much as—or even more than—we rely on prediction [1]. Chapter 15 tries to bridge the gap between the “hard” sciences and the humanities. Chapter 16 ponders our future as a globalized civilization. Ethics are discussed in Chapters 17 and 18, trying to update them with the consequences of the scientific ideas presented in the first chapters. In the final chapter, Kauffman proposes to use Gordon Kaufmanʼs definition of God that would reconcile science and religions all around the world. This view suggests redefining God as the creativity present in the universe [5]. This is consistent with religious and scientific interpretations. We can be amazed by it, we cannot predict it, we can study it, and it can help us lead our lives. There is repetition of the main ideas throughout the book. This is valuable in making the arguments clearer, and also useful for people reading the book only in part. Many of the topics have been discussed in Kauffmanʼs previous books: The Origins of Order [3: Chapters 5, 8] and Investigations [4: Chapters 5–9, 11]. However, the ideas have been refined, more results have been obtained, and the discussion goes further. The book is recommendable to everybody: the educated general public, students, and researchers. However, the publishing could have been better. There are a few typos, and the endnotes are quite cumbersome, since they are not cited in the text. One has to check at the end of the book whether there are notes for the chapter one is reading, and this becomes tedious. Also, citations are missing where one might wish for them. This book is so stimulating that a simple review is not sufficient for me. I cannot avoid adding some of my personal thoughts below.

1 Beyond the Review

A rejection of reductionism leads to dualism: If we cannot explain “mind” in terms of “matter” (or biological agency and meaning in terms of physics), then we are led to distinguish them as different categories, as Descartes did. However, dualism brings several philosophical problems, the main one being the relationship between mind and matter. An alternative is to describe the world in terms of information [2]. Matter and energy can be seen as information, and mind and meanings can as well. It might seem cumbersome to describe physical objects in terms of information, but this description enables us to relate them with more complex phenomena without requiring reductionism. Moreover, following the spirit of general systems theory and cybernetics, we can find “laws” of information that apply both to nonliving and to living systems [2].

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I would not say that natural laws “govern” the universe (p. 131). A better word would be “describe.” This is because laws are descriptions we make of observed phenomena. Depending on the context and scale at which the phenomena are observed, different laws (descriptions) might apply. We cannot say that one is better than another, because this depends on the context. For example, Newtonʼs law of universal gravitation does not apply at very small or very large scales. However, at mesoscales it is a more concise description of phenomena than other descriptions, such as general relativity. Thus, we cannot say whether Newtonʼs law is better or worse than another description, independent of a context. Because of this contextuality, we cannot find purely objective “laws,” as the context depends partially on the observer and his or her capacities and goals. Nor are “laws” purely subjective, since they are contrasted with observed phenomena shared by many observers. We can agree on laws (descriptions), but we need to be aware that these are limited to specific contexts, not “universal truths.” Another question that arises concerning natural laws is the following: Does a natural law need to give complete predictability? For example, the second law of thermodynamics describes certain phenomena, but it cannot predict, for example, where each particle will be in the future. Maybe we will find similar “laws” for biology, that are not completely predictive, but more descriptive. Will we be satisfied with these “loose” laws? If we agree with Kauffmanʼs arguments, there is not much more we can hope for. But maybe we need to change our concept of natural law in any case. If there is no short description of a computation that has never been made (e.g., imagine a type III or IV cellular automaton with a random initial state), can we say that it is beyond natural law? I think that we should better change our concept of natural law, because so many phenomena would fall outside Gell-Mannʼsdefinition. The fact that we do not have short a priori descriptions of phenomena does not imply that they are “lawless.” I do not see the phenomena Kauffman discusses (evolution, economy, mind) as being “beyond science” just because they are not predictable. In a chaotic system, a future state might also be a “mystery.” However, its consideration is entirely scientific. Indeed, a change in the prevailing scientific assumptions must be made to explore these phenomena, but they can—and must—be studied within science. What we need to give up is the belief that phenomena are completely predictable. References 1. Gershenson, C. (2007a). Design and control of self-organizing systems. CopIt Arxives, http://tinyurl.com/ DCSOS2007. 2. Gershenson, C. (2007b). The world as evolving information. In Y. Bar-Yam (Ed.), Proceedings of International Conference on Complex Systems (ICCS2007). 3. Kauffman, S. A. (1993). The origins of order. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 4. Kauffman, S. A. (2000). Investigations. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 5. Kaufman, G. D. (2000). In the beginning… Creativity. Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress Publishers. 6. Turing, A. M. (1936). On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Series 2, 42, 230–265. 7. Wolfram, S. (1986). Theory and application of cellular automata. San Diego, CA: World Scientific. 8. Wolfram, S. (2002). A new kind of science. Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media.

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