sign in sign up
<<
Home , Arap, Awdal, Erigavo, Habr Awal, Harshin, Haud

Editorial Adom Brodbury Ray Akang Design/Maps: Rich Cawley/Adom Brodbury Cover photo: Homish Wilsan Print: Habbs the Printer Ltd, Tattan, Hompshil-e 5040 3WX Mark Bradbury

CIIR 1997 Third printing 2001 ISBN 1 85287 187 3 ------~------~-----~---

SOMALILAND

Contents

Maps iv

About ICD and the author vi

Introduction 1 Part I: The rise and fall of the Somali State The Somali people 2 Culture and conflict 4 The colonial legacy 5 Independence 5 Military rule 6 The War and its aftermath 7 Economic transformation and underdevelopment 7 The 1980s - economic decline and war 9 Disintegration of the Somali State 10 The Somali 1988-91 10 War with the 10 War with the Issaq 11 War with the Ogaden 11 War with the 12 The Digil and Rahanweyne 12 The opposition proliferates 12 The Manifesto Group 12 The fall of 13 War and famine 13 International intervention 14 International reaction to the war 14 Military intervention 14 The conference on national reconciliation 15 UNOSOM 11 15 The at war 16

Part 11: 1991-96

The of Somaliland 18

The Tuur administration 1991-93 19 The conference 21 The Charter 22

CIIR REPORT SOMALILAND

The National Charter 22 The Peace Conference 22 The Egal administration 1993-95 22

The state of government 22 Return to war 25 Political factors 25 The Burco factor 26 The SNM factor 26 Economic dimensions of the war 27 Decentralisation and governance 28 The role of the National Guurti 29 International relations 29 Somaliland 1996: Make or break 31

Somaliland consolidates independence 31 The conference and first moves towards reconciliation 31 A progressive peace process 31 Shir beeleedka 33 Fission and fusion 34 Reconsidering the role of elders and the National Guurti 34 Future prospects 35 International assistance in Somaliland 36

War and humanitarian intervention 40

The impact of the 40 The UN's lost agenda 40

Epilogue: Understanding the Somali conflict 43

Notes and References 45

Abbreviations and glossary 48

Boxes 1. Somali (and modern 9. Demobilisation 23 politico-military movements) 3 10. Mines'- a lasting legacy 24 2. Security, law and order 4 11. The new Somaliland 27 3. and fishing 8 12. The limits of government 28 4. Crop production 9 13. The Peace Committee for Somaliland 32 5. Geography of Somaliland 19 14. Local non-governmental organisations 37 6. The people of Somaliland 20 15. Capacity building in Somaliland 38 7. Primary Issaq lineages 20 16. Women in Somaliland 39 8. The 21 17. Political fragmentation 41

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT -- SOMALILAND

GULF OF

i t •I• : <' BARI Berberat , , ...... ,' •••••"" SANAAG I Bora~ • /WOQOYI ..J \. , \ GALBEED I "'~ I \r!argeisa :• Burco~•••••- -_..., • Gardo \, • , SOOL I ..... I \. , ,"' ...... •, ', Las ' ...... , , Anod. ," NUGAL .... '" I ," ...... ~ ~arowe ,- -~-.,.... .I I .Galkaiyo I~ ..; l to., , t J GALGADUD I 0 , • Bolo , , B' I ...._..../ ·-1 urtl, ~." I·I Beletweyne: ,I ..JI I .. I .--'\.. .J°-i BAKOOL ~ HIRAN : ~. I I /",\ • I I, / )- ...... _....-: . . b ,_._•••.1 I GEDO I Baldo a \ MIDDLE S ° .J. I\ , r I \.J • BAY II I ~-- Bardera· J ) <.' I r- \ " ~~\:\.,v OGADISHU t : \ ",~~ >:: I I \,' ~v.-s ib ~··_·i ~ ':'~O-..tl ~ I\ ~ , Brava \ '«, \ 'I \\ ~"(S) ° \-Y t· Doble ~.- I LOWER Regional boundary I I International boundary ° ~

SOMALIA

iv CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALlLAND

I~ • JOJIBOUTI

( /;~SA GAOAB .i .!.r': , Erigavo:. : ,'.!\ ~orama "'RSENGELI \ ../ .}~'\ s 0 ~S~QL I LA;~ D .f \. '-.. 0 ./ • Gardo $ ~ ! .... '--...... Burco '/~OLBAHUNTE ;r :...... § '. 'e-.k ·' ~~ '" .. ,,~ LasAnod ...... ' ...... _-.., • Garowe /" ,. • Galkaiyo • ETHIOPIA OGAOEN ,I /~ /~~ .4-? ...... I 'i(" ,...... !'-. . " '" I C:>6.. •...••••• -. \.~ V·...· I ,I ./ ( • \ I • ocloEN, ; • \ ,• • ._-. national boundary H1yiIYE boundary '. (approxirflate) /SOMALI LAN D

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT v SOMALI LAND

International Cooperation for Development International Cooperation for Development (ICD), the overseas programme of the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), first worked in Somalia in 1978/79 during the that followed Somalia's war with Ethiopia, in the . Between 1985 and 1990 ICD supported a country-wide assistance programme. In 1990 insecurity forced ICD to withdraw. Since 1991 ICD has supported a number of initiatives in Somaliland (north-west Somalia), and with Somali refugees in Kenya and in the UK. In 1995 ICD opened a technical assistance programme in Somaliland, placing a development worker in Hargeisa as a resource person for Somali non-governmental and community-based organisations. This Country Report is based on a consultancy undertaken for ICD in Somaliland in September 1995, and was updated following a visit to Somaliland in December 1996.

The author Mark Bradbury has worked extensively in Somaliland for non-governmen­ tal and development relief programmes. Country director for ActionAid in Somalia between 1988 and 1990 and in Somaliland in 1992, he has also car­ ried out assignments in the region for Oxfam UKI, International Cooperation for Development and VetAid. His publications include: The Somali Conflict: Prospects for peace (1994), published by Oxfam UKI; and Building Partnerships for Participatory Development (1996) and Building Partnerships for Peace and Development (1997), both published by CIIR.

Somalia/Somaliland Unless stated otherwise, 'Somalia' refers to the of the of Somalia, including the secessionist Somaliland, and 'Somaliland' refers to the region otherwise known as north-west Somalia.

vi CIIR COUNTRY REPORT .pt------~-----

SOMALlLAND

Introduction

n 1991 the Somali state collapsed as civil war it is essential to recognise that Somaliland is a legacy Iengulfed the capital and the military of European colonialism: before the colonial partition regime of Mohamed Siad Barre was forced from of the Horn of region, Somalia did not exist. power. After more than a century in the making and 30 The present-day borders of Somaliland follow the years of independence, Somalia has ceased to function borders of the former . as a . In May 1991 the north-west regions seceded from Somalia to form the independent o understand political trends in Somaliland and 'Republic of Somaliland'. Here clan-based institutions TSomalia, it is also vital to appreciate that the of elders, combined with fledgling governmental and political constitution of Somali society lies not in the non-governmental organisations, have emerged to take centralised institution of a European state model, but in responsibility for governance, security and a system where notions of a 'social contract' have reconstruction. Elsewhere, in the vacuum of state more to do with regulating relationships between collapse, various bodies have emerged: politico­ pastoral kinship groups than between a central polity military organisations and fragile civil structures, and the individual citizen. Colonialism grafted a including councils of elders, the remnants of UN system of centralised governance onto a decentralised sponsored administrative councils and, in places, and egalitarian political system of a pastoral people. religious authorities which have instituted Islamic law The centralisation of governance reached its peak (shari'a). during the repressive military regime of Mohamed In 1992 a US diplomat described the situation in Siad Barre. The civil war that was unleashed in May Somalia as 'the worst humanitarian crisis faced by 1988, when the Somali National Movement (SNM) any people in the world'. At the end of 1992 it attacked the northern cities of Burco and Hargeisa, was was estimated that more than 500,000 people had in part a struggle to overthrow a corrupt military died in the war and famine in Somalia (Prendergast, dictatorship, and to assert greater self-determination. 1997: 115). This included 300,000 children. Some The most dramatic example of this assertion of self­ 1.5 million had fled the country. Many more determination was Somaliland's secession. In the have since died. Even before the civil war Somalia context of general economic decline in the 1980s, and was considered one of the poorest in Africa. Somalia's marginalisation in the world economy, the The war destroyed housing, urban industry, Somali war has involved a violent struggle between communications, social services and agricultural factions for control of Somalia's internal resources, infrastructure. Government and public buildings were and externally provided aid. ransacked. Basic needs are greater now than ever. This report seeks to promote a better understanding of the Somali civil war, and the context of future o single factor can explain the causes of the social, economic and political rehabilitation and Nwar. The legacies of European colonialism, the development. The report falls into two parts: as a Somali kinship system, contradictions between a background to Somaliland's secession, the first traces centralised state and a pastoral culture, Cold War the history of the Somali state, the descent into civil politics, militarisation, marginalisation and uneven war and the impacts of international policies and development, ecological decline, lack of power­ interventiorts and the second part chronicles the brief sharing, corruption, oppression and the cumulative between 1991 and 1996. After impact of decades of armed conflict have all six years Somaliland's claims for independence contributed. The common use of '', 'chaos' remain unrecognised internationally. Also largely and 'madness' to describe the war and state of unrecognised are the efforts made by people there to disintegration in Somalia, demonstrate an ignorance of reconstruct their livelihoods and institutions after years Somali society and the nature of the civil war. This of war. The report analyses the impact of the conflict, ignorance was evident in the massively expensive and and the local and international efforts in reconstructing controversial UN military intervention in Somalia. civil and governmental structures and institutions in To understand Somaliland's claim to independence Somaliland.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 1 SOMALlLAND

PART 1 The rise and fall of the Somali state

n 18 May 1991 the Somali National Somalia was subjected to Italian fascist rule; O Movement (SNM) and the people of and during the Second World War and north-west Somalia seceded from Somalia and Britain fought over the country. Since reclaimed their independent as the independence the colonial boundaries of the 'Republic of Somaliland'. By revoking the 1960 Somali state have been a source of conflict Act of Union, which had united the colonial between Somalia and its neighbours. The territories of the British Somaliland Protectorate nationalist effort to reunite the 'lost' Somali and Italian Somalia, 'Somalilanders' signalled territories was a driving force in regional the demise of the Republic of Somalia. conflicts, with Kenya and Ethiopia in the 1960s, The Somali state was the direct product of the and with Ethiopia over the Ogaden in 1977 (see division of the and the lands of page 11). Between 1988 and 1991 Somalia, the Somali peoples by the 19th-century colonial which had taken more than a century to form powers of Britain, Italy and , and the and which had enjoyed 30 years of Abyssinian empire. Through colonisation the independence, was dismantled in four years of Somali people were territorially, politically and internecine warfare. The country no longer economically integrated into an international functioned as a unitary state. system constructed on a nation-state model. The history of state formation in Somalia falls roughly into three periods. The first, and The Somali people longest, 1827 to 1960, covers the colonisation At independence Somalia was considered a of the Horn of Africa and the division of the unique state in Africa, being founded on a single Somali people into five states: the British ethnic group - the Somali - whose ethnicity was Somaliland Protectorate, Italian Somalia, defined by a common language (af-somali), a French Somaliland (now ), the pastoral economy, an adherence to Ethiopian Ogaden, and northern Kenya. The (sunni), and a clan-based political system. It is second period (1960-69) covers the first nine puzzling, therefore, why 30 years later an years of independence under civilian apparently homogeneous society should be government as the . In the wrecked by such internal strife. Explanations third period (1969-91) democratic government have been sought in the nature of the Somali was replaced by a military dictatorship under kinship system, and in a previously neglected General Mohamed Siad Barre. In 1991 the cultural diversity. Somali state collapsed, as civil war engulfed Somalia, in the north-eastern tip of the Horn the capital Mogadishu and the military of Africa, is in the main a semi-desert region, regime of Mohamed Siad Barre was forced with 'an ecology best suited to a pastoral from power. nomadic existence. The exception is in the State formation in Somalia has not been a southern Shabelle and Juba river valleys, where peaceful process: in 20 years of warfare the environment can sustain and (1900-20) between British and Italian agro-pastoral production. Likewise the ecology colonialists and the Dervish armies of the of Somaliland is best suited to nomadic religious nationalist leader Sayid Mohamed , although there is some sedentary Abdulla Hassan a third of the of the agriculture to the west of the capital Hargeisa Somaliland Protectorate died (Ahmed I and on the northern escarpment of the Gollis Samatar, 1988: 33); in the 1920s and 1930s .

2 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALILAND

The colonialists who entered the Somali belong to one of six kin-based 'clan families', a region in the 19th century encountered two confederation of genealogically related clans dominant cultures - an interior populated by (Lewis, 1961). These are , Issaq, , dispersed pastoral groups, and a coastal city Hawiye, Digil and Rahanweyne. These again culture. In addition they found sedentary divide along the male line into smaller kin­ agriculturalists along the southern rivers. groups or sub-clans (see Box 1). Although the colonial and post-colonial states The Dir, Issaq, Darod, and Hawiye are incorporated a range of cultures, it is Somali predominantly nomadic pastoralists. The Digil pastoral culture that has been the dominant and Rahanweyne (also known as Digil-Mirifle) political culture and the basis of Somali are mainly agro-pastoralists. Occupying the nationalism. Before the 1990s war more than relatively fertile zone between the Juba and 60 per cent of Somalia's population engaged in Shabelle rivers, they have a political culture and some form of . language (af-maymay) distinct from nomadic The Somali-speaking people form one of the Somalis. All the Somali clans straddle the largest ethnic groups in Africa, living dispersed borders with neighbouring Ethiopia, Kenya and throughout the Horn, from the Awash , Djibouti. through the Ethiopian Ogaden and into northern Other ethnic groups in Somalia include Bantu Kenya as far as the Tana river. agriculturalists settled along the banks of the Although Somalis are united through southern rivers, and of Yemeni descent common descent, the Somali 'nation' did not found in the coastal towns of Mogadishu, constitute a unitary polity or state before , Brava and . Specialised 'castes' colonialism. Political affiliation and identity of blacksmiths, leather workers and hunters are was based on kinship. The Somali people also closely integrated with the Somali.

SOMALI CLANS (AND MODERN POLITICO-MILITARY MOVEMENTS)

I Aqiil Abuu Ta'alib 1 I I I Sab I I I I Irir I I I Darod I

I I I Digil Rahanweyne ~ Hawiye Issaq (SNF) (SDM) (SDM) (USC) (SNM) l I I Ogaden (SPM) . I I I I Samaroon I Biyamale Majeerteen Warsengeli Dolbahunte (USF) (SSNM) (SSDF) (USP) (USP) I Gadabursi

(SDA) Adapted from Lewis, 1961. See page 48 for acronyms

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 3 SOMALILAND

Culture and conflict new Somali state. It is no coincidence that the Rahanweyne, Digil, Bantu and Arabs - the non­ The war has led some Somalis and specialists nomadic and the non-Somali groups who have on Somalia to deconstruct , always been politically marginalised - died in and to recognise the plurality of cultures within the greatest numbers in the war and famine of Somalia's territories (Ali J Ahmed, 1995). This 1991-93 (Mohamed H Mukhtar, 1996). Any reinterpretation of the dominant political, political solution in Somalia needs to recognise cultural and academic discourse in Somalia this. However, this interpretation risks reducing raises questions about the composition of any the Somali war to a simple clash of cultures. A more conventional analysis of the Somali war has focused on the seemingly schismatic and SECURITY, LAW AND ORDER conflict-ridden nature of the Somali kinship lan-families represent the highest level of political system which is entrenched in the Somali Csolidarity in Somalia but are too large to act as people's culture. political units. The most stable political unit among In Somali pastoral society there is an northern pastoralists is the -paying group, whose essential link between the semi-subsistence members are united through kinship and are collectively economy and culture, political identity, rights, obliged to pay and receive diya ('blood compensation') and economic security. Somali nomadic for murder and other injuries (Lewis, 1961). The pastoralism entails transhumance between rainy diya-paying group is the focal unit for cooperation, season grasslands and dry season pastures and political action and collective security. points. The , nutrition and In Somali pastoral society rights and obligations are productivity of and, therefore, the laid down in 'contracts'. The xeer, which were livelihood and health of pastoralists is linked to traditionally transmitted orally, enshrine the basic values the quality of pasture and water and access to and norms of Somali society. They provide a system of them. Production is tied to the social sanctions and are the closest equivalent to the western organisation of pastoral groups. Social structure notion of a 'social contract'. Traditionally, xeer are determines entitlement to resources, the negotiated by elders meeting in councils (shir). Among division of labour and the exercise of authority. the most important xeer are those which govern Social institutions and organisational strength entitlements to water and pasture. determine a group's ability to cope with change Somali pastoral society has no hierarchy of political and to secure a livelihood. Collective action units or political and administrative offices, but through kinship provides physical, political and emphasises consensus decision-making. All adult males economic security. Well-being and have an equal right to speak in council as elders. Elders vulnerability are thus not just a measure of are delegates of and for their clans, rather than leaders. relative economic wealth, but of socio-political Only at the level of the clan is there a post approximating organisation. to a leader or chief, know as the suldaan () among The Somali kinship system is a dynamic one the Issaq and by other names among different clans. in which kin group alliances form and divide in The suldaan enjoys respect but not reverence. response to internal and external changes, such However, he functions as an arbiter and peacemaker with as a specific threat to security. The shifting other clans and within his own. The suldaan are said to be alliances between military factions in the war able to see 'beyond the fight' (Bradbury, 1994a: 92). In a are examples of this. peace meeting the elders undertake the negotiations, However, although the war in Somalia has while the suldaan approves the results as head of the been fought along the fault lines ofclan identity, clan. it has not been a traditional clan war, contrary Through these collective institutions and rule-bound to popular media depiction. Rather it has been behaviour social order is maintained and conflict a War where where 'clanism' has been managed. Warfare was traditionally bounded by rules manipulated by powerful elites and backed by which conditioned the scale of conflict and, although parties interested in more than grazing violent, disputes over grazing resources were resources, and with modern weaponry. The war characterised as much by negotiation and the formation of has undermined traditional institutions' alliances as by warfare. The Somali civil war, sponsored effectiveness in providing security and by parties with interests in more than grazing resources, managing conflict (see Box 2). Social and with modern weaponry, has strained the traditional institutions have adapted to these new political institutions' ability to provide security, law and order. realities. The interaction of the specific nature of Somali society with the impact of the

4 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

• SOMALlLAND

political and economic intrusions of colonialism forces, thus setting a trend for the future. and state policies this century provide some Finally, colonial state formation established explanation of the Somali crisis. an urban bias in development that marginalised the rural pastoral and agro-pastoral . As cities became centres of the political The colonial legacy bureaucracy, the commercial sector and Foreign strategic interest in Somalia has always , the cadres of the nationalist been commercial, due to its location. In 1839 movements, such as the the British established a garrison in Aden to and northern Somaliland National League, that protect its with . In the 1880s Britain, led Somalia to independence, were largely France and Italy signed numerous protection drawn from the new urban elite. treaties with Somali clans in a scramble for influence in the region (Lewis, 1988). By 1900 the division of Somali had been Independence consolidated in treaties between the European On 26 June 1960 Britain granted independence colonial powers and Abyssinia. to the Somaliland Protectorate. Four days later These colonial intrusions left a legacy of a the Italian-administered UN Trusteeship system of centralised government grafted onto Territory of Somalia achieved independence. an uncentralised political system of a pastoral On 1 July 1960 the two territories united to form people. This involved bringing pastoralists and the Somali Republic. their resources under state control. The task of integrating the territories' legal The political treaties which divided the land and administrative infrastructure took three of the Somalis created borders which did not years to complete and did not go smoothly. In respect clan territories. Of particular importance December 1961 northern dissatisfaction with were the Haud grazing lands 1 ceded to Ethiopia__ the process and the perceived bias towards the by Britain in 1954 (Lewis, 1988: 150). The south led to an abortive coup by disaffected demarcation of pastoral lands curbed the northt>tn army officers. mobility of pastoralists, leaving them more D'Gring the first nine years of the new vulnerable to the vagaries of climate. The republic bureaucratic state structures were allocation of pasture and water rights to certain expanded and government further centralised lineages reinforced a notion of clan and through centrally orchestrated development territorial identity, and upset the political programmes. Failure to invest in and develop a equilibrium between clans. State development productive domestic economy led the state to thus altered the way people participated in the become increasingly dependent on foreign aid. local management of resources. The country officially adopted a non-aligned In the absence of formal political institutions position at independence, but Cold War or offices, British rule in Somaliland was geopolitics began to intrude as Somalia sought administered indirectly through the heads of foreign aid and support for its claims to the diya-paying groups, known as akil, who 'lost' Somali territories in Kenya and Ethiopia. received government stipends. In practice, In 1963, for example, it turned down military administration remained in the hands ofcolonial aid from the West in return for aid from the district commissioners. In Italian Somalia a Soviet Union (Lewis, 1988: 201). A legacy of similar system of selected clan chiefs was colonialism was the development of the social introduced. These administrative structures and classes that controlled the state (Abdi I Samatar, other developments, such as the introduction of 1989: 82). a Western judicial system to replace diya, Increasingly, the state and its resources, inevitably altered pastoral socio-political including foreign aid, became a focus for institutions. competition between those elite classes. As a As new forms of wealth accumulated in the result, parliamentary democracy became state, the mandate of political leadership altered increasingly opaque and, in the absence of from regulating kin relations and entitlements to ideological differences between political pastoral resources, to regulating access to the parties, ever more 'clanist' in orientation. The political and economic benefits of the state, thus increasingly venal struggle for state control by sowing seeds of disunity and conflict. One these elite, eventually led to the collapse of response of the colonial government to such parliamentary democracy and a military coup. conflicts was to invest more in state security

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 5 SOMALILAND

Military ru le consensus from below. Far from being brought into the political process, the population was The centralisation of political and economic alienated from it. Press censorship partially power in the Somali state reached its zenith negated the benefits of a standardised Somali under the military dictatorship of General spelling system, introduced in 1972, and mass Mohamed Siad Barre, who seized power in literacy campaigns in 1973 and 1975. Non­ October 1969. Within a year the military coup governmental, civil forms of association were was turned into a 'bloodless revolution'. undermined by the banning of unions and 'Scientific ' was adopted as the the Party's manipulation of civil organisations ideological framework for the country's future such as the Somali women and youth development. Weary of the debilitating effects associations. of 'clanism', and grappling with the shift from a pastoral society to a modern nation state, the Militarisation urban intelligentsia and technocrats initially backed this programme. Mohamed Siad Barre seized and maintained The first charter of the Somali revolution power through the armed forces. For the regime proclaimed the central role of the state in nation-building largely consisted of creating society, guaranteeing the right to work, social labyrinthine security structures to maintain justice, 'popular participation' in national political control, rather than investments in development and an end to 'tribalism'. Under social or economic development. The army the guidance first of the Supreme Revolutionary became the most powerful institution in the Council, and after 1976 the Somali country. By the early 1980s security accounted Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), the for nearly three-quarters of government populace was mobilised for national spending, and consumed more than half as programmes, such as a 1973-74 literacy much again as was earned from exports. campaign. In the campaign against tribalism, (Ahmed I Samatar, 1985: 37) effigies were ceremonially burnt, jaalle Somalia's militarisation began in the 1960s ('comrade') replaced 'uncle' and 'cousin' as during border disputes with Kenya and terms of address, the death sentence was Ethiopia, and increased throughout the 1970s introduced to replace diya, marriages were and into the late 1980s as a result of superpower celebrated at orientation centres and stripped of interests in the Horn of Africa. Siad Barre was clan significance, akils were replaced and particularly adept at using Cold War tensions to renamed 'peace-seekers' and integrated into the solicit a vast array of armaments for his state party, the country was reconstituted into government, initially courting support from the new regions renamed to exclude reference to Soviet Union and later the United States. With clans, and place of settlement replaced lineage Soviet finance Somalia built one of the most as the means of personal identification. powerful armies in sub-Saharan Africa. With The intention was to turn this 'nation of this force, Barre took Somalia into a war with ' into a modern socialist state, to which Ethiopia over the Ogaden. Defeated in the people could look for leadership, security and Ogaden when the Soviets switched their welfare instead of to the clan. Embodying the alliance to Ethiopia, Barre turned to the United nation was the president and 'father of the States. He was able to secure US$lOO million a nation', Siad Barre. year in development and military aid, in return Scientific Socialism's assault on the fabric of for US access to Soviet built facilities at Somali society was coupled with state control of Berbera port for use by its rapid deployment the economy. Although the government's force, created to police the . US declared policy was to decentralise state policy towards Somalia, as summed up by authority to enable grassroots participation in President George Bush's administration, was development, the structures through which based on wider geopolitical and economic development was instituted were subject to state concerns: control (Abdi I Samatar, 1985). Administration By virtue of Somalia's strategic location at was decentralised, but power remained the tip of the Horn of Africa, the United centralised. District and provincial officials States has several security interests in the were military or party functionaries appointed country. The US military has enjoyed access by the state. Mass participation was ordered to Somali air and port facilities. Access is from above rather than arising through important to support our security policies in

6 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALI LAND

the and the and could As the political and economic CrISIS prove vital as a support area for US forces developed in the 1980s, and as Somalia became responding to contingencies in the Persian more indebted to military and financial Gulf. (Cited in Prendergast, 1991) assistance from the West, the regime's socialist The United States and the Soviet Union were rhetoric began to wear thin and the reality of not the only suppliers of military equipment to political autocracy surfaced (Ahmed I Samatar, Somalia. Italy, Romania, East Germany, , 1988). Initially drawn from the Darod 'clan Iran, , , and family' and dubbed the 'MOD alliance' all contributed at different times. The (Marehan, Ogaden, Dolbahunte), in the face of largesse of the superpowers during the Cold mounting insecurity it increasingly became War is demonstrated in the arsenals of weapons dominated by Barre's Marehan clan. bequeathed to Somali 'warlords' to fight the The Barre government had an appalling war. human rights record (Amnesty International, 1988). In the regime's first seven years its targets were individual opponents of the regime. The Ogaden War and its aftermath After 1978, however, whole clans and economic groups associated with the insurgencies were Since colonial treaties had allotted the Somali­ targeted. Those who suffered most were the populated Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1948, the Majeerteen from Mudug region, the Issaq in the Ogaden had figured as one of Somalia's 'lost' north-west, and the riverine communities in the territories, and a constant source of tension in south. The armed opposition movements that Ethiopia-Somali relations. In 1974/75 Somalia emerged in the wake of the Ogaden war were a endured one of the worst in its history, direct response to the lack of power sharing, known in Somali as dabadheer (meaning corruption, human rights abuses, and what has 'endless'). In Ethiopia the inadequate response been described as a serious disjuncture between of the Haile Selassie government to the the moral and coercive authority in the state led to its overthrow in September 1974. In 1977, (Said S Samatar, 1991). As the civil war became taking advantage of a weakened Ethiopian state, protracted, any ideological concerns of the Barre launched a war to reclaim the Somali political movements evaporated. Ogaden for Somalia. The war was a high point of Somali nationalism and Siad Barre's Economic transformation and popularity. A year later the Somali army was defeated by the Soviet- and Cuban-backed underdevelopmenf2 Ethiopian army. Even before the war Somalia was considered Defeat was a turning point for the Barre one of the poorest countries in Africa. It was regime, and the beginning of the demise that led estimated that 70 per cent of the rural to the Somali civil war. Defeat ended any sense population lived below the absolute poverty of national unity. Ethiopian Somalis who fled level. The gross national product (GNP) per the fighting sought refuge in Somalia, making capita was only US$280 a year, some 70 per the country host to the largest refugee cent of which was income remitted by Somalis population in Africa. Estimated at 1.5 million, working abroad. In 1990 Somalia's refugees amounted to some 40 per cent of international debt stood at US$2 billion and Somalia's population. A deluge of international inflation was estimated to be running at 600 per aid, aid workers and aid organisations followed. cent a year. Internal dissent and the formation of military To comprehend Somalia's descent into civil insurgent groups began to threaten the regime. war and the battle for control of the Somali A failed coup attempt by Majeerteen officers in state, it is necessary to trace the broad economic 1978 led to the creation of the Somali Salvation transformations in Somalia since colonial times. Democratic Front (SSDF), which launched a guerrilla campaign against Barre in the central Transformations in the regions of Somalia. In 1981 disaffected Issaq of pastoral economy the northern regions formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) and took up arms Colonisation laid the basis for a mixed against the regime. Both the SSDF and the SNM economy. At independence this entailed a sought sanctuary in Ethiopia, illustrating the 'traditional' agricultural sector consisting of disintegration within the Somali state. pastoralism and peasant cultivation, and a

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 7 SOMALI LAND

'modern' agricultural sector based on plantation The commercialisation of the pastoral agriculture of bananas and sugar cane.3 Other economy has had a profound impact on productive economic activities included fishing Somalia. It has affected the entire social, and frankincense (see Boxes 3 and 4). In economic and political culture of pastoralists, addition there was an expanding entrepreneurial their livelihood, security of food supplies and sector of shop owners and trading companies, their relationship with the environment. For and a public sector of salaried government example, since the 1950s market demands have officials and civil servants. Broadly, rural led to more being herded (Mohamoud and development policies since colonial times have Hashi, 1988). The sale of surplus stock to meet sought to modernise the 'traditional' sector. market demands and provide a livelihood Since 1839, when Britain occupied Aden, and affects pastoralists' ability to insure against Somali became the main source of meat crises and reduces the numbers of for the garrison there, livestock production has available for traditional loans and marriage underpinned Somalia's economy. Before the transactions. This in turn leads to a loosening of war more than 60 per cent of the population traditional social and economic networks. were said to be involved in some form of (Swift, 1979) nomadic pastoralism. Stock-rearing was also an The volatility of market demand and prices integral part of the economy for the 20 per cent helps explain the vulnerability of pastoralists to of the population engaged in sedentary the 1974/75 drought which caused a famine and cultivation. Before the war the export of sheep, the deaths of 20,000 pastoralists in northern , cattle and accounted for up to Somalia (Simons, 1995:54). After 1984, when 80 per cent of national exports. Saudi Arabia banned imports from Somalia on The livestock trade expanded considerably the grounds of alleged rinderpest, livestock between 1950 and 1980, stimulated by the oil exports declined substantially and forced boom in Saudi Arabia, to which Somalia pastoralists into illicit trade with and supplied 90 per cent of meat imports. Between Kenya. the late 1960s and 1980 the trade grew from 50 Commercialisation imposed a new trading to 76 per cent of export earnings. (Laitin and structure and created new economic Samatar, 1987) relationships between pastoralists, merchants and the state. With livestock trade the major source of revenue for the state, the socio­ economic functions of pastoralism have had to FRANKINCENSE shift from supporting producers to supporting The coast is thought by some scholars to the state and merchants. Commercialisation be the mythical '', from where ancient encouraged the growth of a wealthy urban Egyptians obtained frankincense. Before the war Somalia mercantile class. Somali pastoral society, claimed to be the world's main exporter of frankincense politically egalitarian, became economically and . The trade was disrupted by the war, although divided. Governments' failure to re-invest in some export has resumed on a lower scale than pastoral development led, in the 1980s, to previously. pastoralism's declining capacity to support the needs of producers, merchants and the state; poverty among pastoralists increased. FISHING Despite its contribution to the national With the longest coastline in eastern Africa, Somalia has economy, since colonial times pastoralism has rich fishing grounds. In the mid 1970s Somfish, a Somali­ been seen as an outmoded and unproductive Soviet enterprise, embarked on production of industrial economic activity. Under Scientific Socialism, fisheries, but after the Soviet withdrawal in 1978 production cooperative production was the cornerstone of was never sustained. After the 1974/75 drought many the government's modernisation programme for pastoralists were airlifted from their grazing lands to the rural sector. The Land Registration Act of cooperative fishing settlements along the coast. However, 1975 brought Somalia's rangelands under the Somalia's fishing industry never achieved its potential. In control of the state, and settling pastoralists and the 1970s and 1980s the Somali government sold fishing state ranching was emphasised. A sedentary quotas to foreign companies and governments, and with population is easier to control and tax. the political turmoil in the country, Somalia's fishing Although policies to settle pastoralists, grounds are now subject to piracy by foreign companies. promote agricultural production or state ranching were never fully realised - partly

8 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

• »

SOMALILAND

because of the vitality of livestock exports and CROP PRODUCTION the strength of northern livestock traders - they had profound impacts on pastoralists. For Somalia has rarely been self-sufficient in crop production. example, the 1975 nationalisation of common At independence, crop cultivation was a small but lands officially nullified customary treaties expanding sector largely concentrated among peasant between pastoralists over the use and farmers in the riverine regions of the south and western management of rangelands. It removed Somaliland. Introduced as recently as the 19th century into customary property rights and led to the Somaliland, agricultural production was limited to the alienation of the people from their land. relatively high rainfall highland areas in Awdal, Woqoyi Rangeland enclosures spread rapidly in the Galbeed and Sanaag regions. However, until the war only 1980s, restricting pastoralists' movement and 2 per cent of land in Awdal and Woqoyi Galbeed was access to resources, and degrading the farmed. environment. Attempts by successive governments to modernise and The commercialisation of pastoral production expand peasant crop production largely failed. Only 20 per has not led to full-scale privatisation of cent of the population of Somalia before the 1990-94 war Somalia's rangelands. However, the integration were said to be involved in crop production. Average yields of pastoralism into a market economy created for the rain-fed sector were among the lowest in Africa. The new inequalities of wealth within and between principal crops of sorghum and were grown almost pastoral communities, merchants and the state. entirely for home consumption and the urban markets. Revenues from the livestock trade were Until banned in the mid 1980s, the narcotic plant qaat appropriated by a small number of trading (Catha edulis) , which is chewed widely in Somalia and families and the state. Range management lies other countries in the Horn, was the most profitable cash at the centre of the pastoral political economy, crop. and therefore clan politics. Competition between those pastoralists linked to the merchants and those linked to the government regional politics also obscured a growing generated conflicts over rangelands. During the economic and political crisis in Somalia during 1980s the government rewarded its supporters the 1980s. with investments in water supplies in their clan In the 1970s Somalia was allied to the Soviet areas, thus disturbing the political balance Union. Defeat in the Ogaden War brought between pastoralists (African Rights, 1994). Somalia into the fold of the United States in the Not surprisingly, water supplies were 1980s. In coping with a massive influx of deliberately targeted during the civil war. refugees from the Ogaden, Somalia reaped a (Bradbury and Davies, 1991) windfall of humanitarian assistance from the The experiments of Barre's government in West, estimated at some US$120 million a year. state cooperatives proved disastrous. State This injection of aid helped to maintain the control over producer prices favoured urban Barre regime in power. As the government and consumers and meant that farmers received less many thousands of Somalis became dependent than the global market price. Coupled with an on refugees for income, humanitarian aid overvalued which subsidised imports, became a major public source of corruption there was no incentive for the farmers to (Simons, 1995: 52). As armed insurgencies produce. In the early years of military rule, brought hostility to the regime into the open, the while the service and industrial sectors grew to distribution of aid only exacerbated those some extent, agricultural productivity declined, tensions. increasing poverty among smallholders, import After the Soviets' departure the United States dependency, inflation, and the country's became Somalia's largest donor. By 1982 external debt. Somalia was the ij),ird largest recipient of United States aid in Africa (Simons, 1996: 76). By late 1985 it was reported by the that, The 1980s - economic per capita, Somalia was one of the highest decline and war recipients of official development assistance in Africa. US influence steered Somalia towards a The Somali civil war marked the end of the liberalisation of economic policies - although Cold War in the Horn of Africa. Changing little change in political practice - and in 1981 superpower interests had a significant impact on Somalia agreed to an International Monetary the timing of the war. However, changing Fund (IMF) structural reform programme.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 9 SOMALlLAND

Deregulation of the economy, and the ending of background to the war in Somalia. However, the mandatory deliveries to state marketing boards links between poverty and conflict are complex. boosted agricultural production (Abdi I Samatar, Somalia's infamous 'warlords' did not come 1994). This had a cost for the peasant producers. from Somalia's poor. Underlying the Somali Land prices rocketed and a land rush ensued. civil war has been competition between elites Much of the irrigable land along the Shabelle over a parallel economy and the diminishing valley was expropriated by wealthy urbanites resources of the state. This struggle became for rice production. more violent, and was increasingly projected Deregulation of the economy also stimulated along the faultlines of 'clanism'. This, in part, is the growth of an illicit parallel economy what emerges from the chronology of Somalia's (Miller, 1981). In the mid 1980s low wages civil war. It goes some way to explaining why forced civil servants and others to seek incomes the war has been so protracted, and the way in outside their official duties. For some the gap which humanitarian aid became an integral part between wages and needs was filled by private of the conflict. of Somalis working abroad (estimated to number 250,000 people in 1980), others resorted to illicit trade and corruption. Following the drop in oil prices in the 1980s and subsequent decrease in employment opportunities in the Persian Gulf, remittances The Somali began to decline. As the formal economy and banking system atrophied, an informal and illicit economy emerged. Civil War Access to, and control over, the formal economy was through the state. As state power consolidated among Barre's immediate kin, 1988-91 clan identity, proscribed in the 1970s, re­ emerged as the passport to political and economic security. ince the Ogaden war Somalia and those Clans allied with the regime received Sareas of the Horn inhabited by the Somali preferential disbursements in development aid people have been in a virtually continuous state or political positions. Those not allied came to of armed conflict. The 1988 peace accord depend, in part, on the informal or illegal between Somalia and Ethiopia that sought to economy. At the end of the 1980s, in the context end 10 years of hostility between those of general economic decline, there was a countries only precipitated another war. The struggle between the (largely urban) political peace accord, which signalled the end of pan­ and economic elite for control over economic Somali unity by recognising Ethiopian control resources in the formal and informal economy. over the Haud, triggered an assault by the SNM on the northern cities of Burco and Hargeisa in May 1988. These proved to be the opening shots Disintegration of the Somali State to the Somali civil war. State formation in Somalia, from the colonial era to the Barre era, involved the transition from an uncentralised and egalitarian pastoral society War with the Majeerteen to a centralised, oppressive and predatory state. The first organised armed opposition to Barre Backed by a coercive military force, the Barre was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front regime was able to manipulate the delicately (SSDF) formed by Majeerteen officers who balanced clan system. escaped arrest following an abortive coup of State formation in Somalia also involved April 1978. Led by Colonel Abdillahi Yusuf, the development of a 'national' economy, and backed by the Ethiopian army, the SSDF in which drew Somalia into an expanding global the early 1980s managed to capture and control economic system. Somalia's external some border territory in Mudug region in marginalisation in this world economy Somalia's central rangelands, home of was matched by new internal inequalities of Abdillahi Yusuf's sub-clan. The response of the wealth. Poverty, inequity and chronic regime was savage. In May and June 1979 more underdevelopment therefore form part of the than 2,000 Majeerteen were said to have died in

10 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

a SOMALlLAND

Mudug region as the result of the regime's threat to their own lands. Government arming of policy (Said S Samatar, 1991: refugees fuelled this fear. The 1988 peace 18). The SSDF, however, retained possession of accord between Somalia and Ethiopia finally their border territory, and launched intermittent recognised Ethiopian control over the Ogaden cross-border raids until 1986, including joint and Haud. operations with the SNM in 1983. Issaq merchants were prominent in the The SSDF insurgency collapsed in 1986 after livestock trade, with the northern port of Abdillahi Yusuf was arrested by the Ethiopian Berbera a major outlet to the Persian Gulf. The government, which was seeking a rapprochement Issaq perceived government economic controls with Somalia. Although reconstituted in 1989, as and attempts to regulate a parallel market as an the civil war spread southwards and the north-east attack on their businesses and judged the became cut off, the SSDF took no part in Barre's government's ban in 1983 on qaat cultivation, final overthrow. In 1990, however, the Manifesto which flourished in the north-west, as further Group that sought Barre's peaceful removal from evidence of this. The Somali army's subsequent power contained several prominent Majeerteen monopoly of the qaat trade was early evidence (see page 12). of an emerging economy controlled through violence. Throughout the 1980s government policy War with the Issaq towards the Issaq became increasingly In 1980 a second opposition front emerged to repressive. A 'leaked' letter, allegedly from the challenge the regime in the form of the Somali military governor in the north to the head of National Movement (SNM). Founded in state, raised fear among the Issaq that the by intellectuals, businessmen and government had embarked on a genocidal religious leaders, the SNM was primarily an programme against them. In May 1988 the Issaq-based organisation. Issaq disaffection SNM, fearful of losing its bases in Ethiopia as a with the regime arose from a number ofsources: result of the peace accord, attacked and briefly inadequate (and undemocratic) political captured the northern cities of Burco and representation, unequal distribution of Hargeisa. In response Somali government development resources, and government forces launched a savage assault on the Issaq regulation of business, particularly the livestock population, forcing thousands to flee to and qaat trade. Ethiopia. Between May 1988 and March 1989 In British Somaliland the Issaq made up the some 50,000 people were estimated to have majority of the population. Although that been killed (Africa Watch, 1990). Up to this position changed when Somaliland united with point the SNM had not been widely supported Italian Somalia, the Issaq continued to have an by civilians. These brutal attacks finally united influence in government. Somalia's last two the Issaq behind the SNM for an all-out war civilian governments of 1967 and 1969 were against the regime. headed by an Issaq premier, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal. Under Barre several Issaqs held cabinet posts. Nevertheless, after Somalia's War with the Ogaden independence there was a feeling that political The Ogaden, a sub-lineage of the Darod, is the representation in Somalia's affairs favoured largest Somali clan confederacy. Its location in southerners. the Ogaden (Ethiopia) and in Kenya, coupled Somalilanders' decision to unite with the with the force of Somali irredentism, has given south in 1960 had been controversial. At the the clan a significant role in Somalia's politics. time, however, Somali nationalism was Under Barre the Ogadenis were prominent in vigorous. It was surmised that unity was the first the army and h@ld key military posts. Ogaden step towards the realisation of 'Greater refugees who entered Somalia after the war with Somalia', combining all Somali territories, and Ethiopia by and large supported Barre. Many re-establishing control over the Haud grazing were armed to fight the SNM. lands in Ethiopia, a primary resource for Barre's rapprochement with the Ethiopian Somaliland's pastoralists. The Issaq, along with regime, and the growing power of the Marehan other northerners, supported the war against within the military, caused disaffection among Ethiopia to reclaim the Ogaden. Somalia's Ogadeni soldiers. In April 1989 Barre sacked defeat, however, resulted in a mass influx of his defence minister, an Ogadeni, sparking a Ogadeni refugees into the north that posed a mutiny among Ogadeni soldiers in the southern

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 11 SOMALI LAND

port of Kismayo and leading to the fonnation of December 1990, having agreed a joint the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). The campaign with the SNM and SPM, the USC mutiny in Kismayo was also rooted in a took the war to Mogadishu. protracted dispute between Marehan and Ogadeni pastoralists over the pastoral resources of the Juba region (Bradbury, 1994a: 54; The Digil and Rahanweyne African Rights, 1994). The emergence of an The Digil and Rahanweyne, situated between Ogadeni opposition movement signalled the the Juba and Shabelle rivers, belong to the Saab break up of the 'MOD (Darod) alliance' that branch of the Somali people. As agriculturalists had dominated the ruling group in Somalia they are looked down on by pastoral Somalis. under Barre. A second Ogadeni front was Their inferior status and smaller numbers have fonned in June 1989, when Colonel Omar Jess given them a marginal role in Somali national defected with soldiers from the Somali army politics. In 1989 a Rahanweyne opposition in Hargeisa. For most of the war against BatTe movement was fonned, the Somali Democratic the SPM constituted a 'southern front', Movement (SDM), calling for the removal of destabilising the regions south of the capital. Siad Barre. They played only a limited role in his overthrow. However, after he was deposed, the Rahanweyne and Digil were unable to War with the Hawiye withstand the rampaging armies of Barre and Barre's downfall was finally precipitated by the the USC. When their agriculture was emergence in 1989 of a Hawiye-based military devastated, the Rahanweyne and Digil became force, the United Somali Congress (USC), in the main victims of the famine in the south. Somalia's central rangelands. As the largest clan in southern Somalia, stretching from the central rangelands to Kenya and Ethiopia, its The opposition proliferates size, geographical spread, and economic Anti-government groups proliferated as the war strength within the capital, Mogadishu, have escalated. During 1989 a Dolbahunte-based made the Hawiye significant players in the Somali United Liberation Front and the country's politics. The first president of Gadabursi-based Somali Democratic Alliance Somalia was Hawiye and throughout the 1960s were fonned. Neither took part in the military Hawiye members held 20 per cent of cabinet overthrow of Barre. Their proliferation posts in government. presaged the fissures that would emerge after During Barre's regime, although their Barre was overthrown. They reflected the political power was curtailed, they benefited concern with self-preservation in the post-Barre from the concentration of development era of mainly clan-based groups programmes in the south, and were not marginalised like the Issaq. An exception were the Hawiye pastoralists, such as the Habr Gedir, The Manifesto Group who came into dispute with the Marehan As the war escalated, several attempts at pastoralists favoured by Barre over resources in peaceful change were made internally by Somalia's central rangelands. (African Rights, different groups. In May 1989, for example, 1994) some prominent Marehan gave Barre an In October 1989 Hawiye soldiers mutinied in ultimatum to change and reinstate democracy. the town of Galkaiyo. Fighting quickly spread However, it was the Manifesto Group which through the regions of Mudug, Galgadud and made the most impact. Hiran. Government typically retaliated by Disaffection with the economic situation, a bombing villages and massacring civilians. The rising tide of the displaced in the capital and the USC was founded largely by individuals from government's handling of the conflict, the Habr Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye, several eventually led to anti-government riots in of whom had been members of the SNM central Mogadishu in July 1989. The riots were sparked committee. The USC's first leader, Mohamed by the assassination of the Catholic bishop of Wardhigly, who died in June 1990, sought a Mogadishu, and the subsequent arrest of several negotiated settlement to Somalia's war. General prominent religious leaders. Some 450 people Mohamed Farah Aideed, who succeeded him, were killed during a day of rioting, followed by favoured a military solution. The USC was mass atTests and executions of civilians, many supported in its campaign by the SNM. In of them Issaq.

12 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT f SOMALILAND

The ruthless suppression of the riots shattered Barre fled Mogadishu on 26 January 1991 to any remaining loyalty to the regime. In May his home area in south-west Somalia. There he 1990 more than 100 prominent Somali citizens reconstituted his army under the banner of the signed an open letter (,Manifesto No 1') Somali National Front (SNF), twice attempting condemning the regime's policies and calling to recapture Mogadishu. In April 1992 Barre on it to accept a process of discussion with fled Somalia to Kenya and eventually moved to opposition groups to bring about a solution to where he died in January 1995. the political turmoil. Forty-five of the signatories were arrested and charged with treason. They were later released after mass War and famine demonstrations in Mogadishu and international Once Barre was deposed the loose coalition of diplomatic pressure. forces that had defeated him collapsed. The Manifesto Group hurriedly appointed a businessman, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, as 'interim The fall of Siad Barre president' and a politician, Omar Arteh Ghalib, Under attack on several fronts, the regime as prime minister, thus precipitating an lamely tried to introduce some political reforms. irrecoverable split within the USC. Attempts by In September 1989 the central committee of the the Italian and regional governments to Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRSP) reconcile the factions at two conferences in approved a change in the constitution to allow Djibouti in May and June failed, and III for a return to a multi-party system. Qaat was November 1991 fighting again erupted in legalised and the laws giving equal inheritance Mogadishu between General Aideed and Ali rights to women revoked. In September 1990 a Mahdi. new constitution was ratified, the national The battle for Mogadishu lasted four months security laws were lifted and free elections were and cost the lives of as many as 25,000 scheduled for February 1991. These moves civilians. Two power blocs emerged, based towards liberalisation, coinciding with economic around General Aideed and Ali Mahdi, both reforms, had the effect of dismantling many of from sub-clans of the Hawiye. The most the structures of state set up by the revolution, powerful alliance, headed by Aideed, became thus leaving the regime more exposed. known as the Somali National Alliance (SNA). All offers of dialogue were rejected by the Ali Mahdi had gathered around him the opposition groups, who saw the moves towards Manifesto Group of businessmen and liberalisation as the last-ditch efforts of a dying politicians. administration to hold on to power. The For some 16 months, from December 1991 to constitutional changes, they insisted, were only March 1992, when the United Nations cosmetic while power remained in the hands of eventually brokered a ceasefire, there was the ruling family; to the end, eight of the almost continuous warfare in the south. The president's sons and daughters held powerful coastal towns of Merca, Brava and Kismayo positions within the administration. and the inland towns of Baidoba and Bardheere On 6 August 1990, meeting in Ethiopia, the suffered waves of invasions by fighters of the SNM, USC and SPM agreed to fmm a united USC, SPM, SNF and others. Rape of women, front against the Barre regime. Belated offers by particularly among the coastal Hamr and Italy and to mediate were rejected by the Bravani populations, mass executions, opposition. On 3 December the USC, under destruction of agricultural land, looting of grain General Mohamed Farah Aideed, took the war stores and livestock, and destruction of water to Mogadishu. The battle for Mogadishu lasted supplies and homes led to the massive almost two months, during which time further displacement of. people into Kenya, Ethiopia mediation efforts by the Italians, Egyptians and and Yemen, and mass starvation. the Manifesto Group failed.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 13 SOMALlLAND

A tripartite agreement on 'Durable Solutions International for the Ethiopian Refugees in Somalia' was signed between the governments of Ethiopia, Somalia and the United Nations High intervention Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in August 1989. However, the programme had difficulties raising the US$60 million needed for the operation. The phasing out of the UNHCR International reaction to the war programme increased armed banditry as local inhabitants saw a major source of income begin he outbreak of the war in Somalia in 1988 to dry up. As the conflict spread through the Tcoincided with the Cold War thaw and country NGOs withdrew to Mogadishu. By declining foreign interest in Somalia's strategic December 1990 many international NGOs had location, and so was allowed to develop drastically cut back their programmes. unchecked. The United States continued to The reduction in Western aid forced the provide military assistance to the Siad BalTe Somali government to turn elsewhere for regime even after war broke out in the north. economic and military aid. Military shipments However, by late 1989 it had began to distance were obtained from Libya, China, the United itself from the regime. This followed a critical Arab Emirates and Iraq. Libya sent military Amnesty International report in 1988 and a advisers and soldiers to Somalia in June 1990 report by a consultant, Robert Gersony, to the after the two governments signed an accord on US State Department on the status of Somali commercial cooperation; these three countries' refugees (Gersony, 1989). After the riots in embassies became targets of bombings. Mogadishu in July 1989 the US envoy for While Western governments closed their aid Africa declared that 'the people of Somalia programmes and embassies, little effort was were tired with military rule' and urged the made to prevent the impending catastrophe. regime to restore democratic government. This could be partly explained by the mounting Before the war official development crisis in the Persian Gulf. However, the lack of assistance to Somalia amounted to about international will in Somalia contrasted one-third of its GNP. As a result of the markedly with the US mediation efforts in international refugee support programme, up to Ethiopia six months later. On 4 and 5 January half the population was said to have had some 1992, while intense fighting in Mogadishu access to food aid. When war broke out in continued, a US aircraft carrier was diverted Hargeisa and Burco all foreign personnel were from its duties in the Persian Gulf to evacuate evacuated and relief and development work remaining foreign nationals, NGOs, diplomatic effectively stopped in the north. Some attempt missions and UN agencies from the country. In was made to resume food distribution to the words of the US ambassador to Somalia, the refugees there during 1990, notably through a US then 'turned out the light, closed the door UN Extraordinary Interim Emergency and forgot about Somalia' . Programme, but foreign assistance to the north was severely limited. Only the International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC), through M i lita ry interv e nt ion 4 its hospital in Berbera and a handful of As Somalia disintegrated into factional fighting international non-governmental organisations and famine, international NGOs and the ICRC (NGOs) running medical programmes on the formed the first international response to the SNM side of the lines worked in the north crisis, establishing emergency medical and during this period. feedinl} programmes as early as January and In January 1990 the US Congress halted non­ February 1991. It took 18 months for the United humanitarian aid to Somalia; bilateral aid was Nations to respond in any meaningful way. By cut to US$740,000 for 1990, compared with this time an estimated 300,000 people had died US$30 million in 1988. The Germans, Dutch of starvation and hunger-related diseases. Some and Finns suspended their bilateral aid 500,000 people had fled to Ethiopia, Kenya and programmes. Italy too, following the arrest of Djibouti, and as many as 3,000 people - mainly 45 signatories of Manifesto 1, reduced its aid. women, children and the old - were dying daily. Oil companies began to scale down their (Mohamed Sahnoun, 1994) research operations. In April 1992, having secured a ceasefire

14 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

a •

SOMALlLAND

agreement from Aideed and Ali Mahdi, the UN legacy of unresolved problems. The operation, Security Council, under Resolution 751 (24 initially welcomed by many Somalis, was to April 1992) authorised the establishment of the leave many feeling betrayed. United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). An Algerian diplomat, The Addis Ababa conference ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, was appointed as the UN secretary-general's special envoy to on national reconciliation Somalia. Conceived as an observer mission, Military intervention was followed by two UNOSOM initially comprised 50 unarmed hastily arranged national reconciliation military observers, later increased to 500. A six­ conferences, as precursors to handing over to a month Plan of Action was concurrently UN-led operation. In January 1993 leaders of mobilised by the United Nations to provide the southern factions meeting in Addis Ababa US$23 million in humanitarian aid. By agreed on a ceasefire and the procedures September the promised peacekeepers had not for disarmament. This was followed on arrived. When the UN secretary-general 27 March 1993 by a 'Conference on National Boutros Boutros-Ghali accused the West of Reconciliation'. Again this was held in Addis being more concerned with the 'rich man's war' Ababa, and again involved the 15 factional in former Yugoslavia than with Somalia, the leaders. UN headquarters announced plans to deploy The important agreements reached at Addis 3,500 armed troops. In October 1992 Sahnoun, Ababa concerned the formation of a frustrated with the UN's response and at odds Transitional National Council (TNC) and other with the secretary-general, publicly criticised transitional political and administrative the United Nations and resigned. structures that would guide the country to By this time inter-clan warfare had been elections in two years. However, the declaration replaced by the armed looting of food aid. The that the TNC would be the 'sole repository' of price agencies paid militia to protect relief Somali sovereignty angered the people of supplies was equivalent to the cost of the food Somaliland, involved at that time in their own delivered. With the UN troops unable to control national reconciliation conference at Borama the ports and secure the aid deliveries, many (see page 21 below). The Addis Ababa NGOs advocated international military agreement proved to be so full of other protection for the humanitarian operation. ambiguities that there was nothing to prevent Others were more cautious. In December the the signatories from repudiating it. UN Security Council endorsed Resolution 794 The UN's approach to reconciliation through (1992), which authorised an offer by the the Addis Ababa conferences enhanced the outgoing US president George Bush to deploy prestige of the warlords, strengthened their 30,000 US troops in Somalia. Codenamed political role, and left little room for other Operation Restore Hope, the limited objective potential leaders to emerge. The United Nations of the US-led UN International Task Force made little attempt to broaden the representation (UNITAF) was to 'create a secure environment in the reconciliation process, and efforts by for the delivery of humanitarian relief' other peace advocates to do so had little impact. throughout the country. On 9 December 1992 The warlords, who derived their power from US marines landed on Mogadishu's beaches. being military leaders, in fact had most to lose At the time UNITAF intervened, Aideed and in resolving the war. As long as the United Ali Mahdi had fought each other to a standstill Nations was willing to continue to sponsor trips during the four-month battle for Mogadishu. to conferences, there was little incentive for the Critics of Operation Restore Hope have argued factions to reconcile. that by the time the military intervened the famine had already peaked (African Rights, 1993). While delivery of food was improved, UNOSOM 11 the underlying political conflict was just held in The March 1993 Addis Ababa conference was abeyance. No attempt was made to disarm the critical to the international intervention in factions, and UNITAF, concerned for the Somalia. The conference was to provide a security of its own forces, sought the framework for tackling Somalia's political cooperation of the warlords, thus conferring on problems, and for the UN-led administration them a measure of legitimacy. The 'quick fix' that would take over from UNITAF. solution of military intervention thus left a On 26 March the UN Security Council, by

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 15 SOMALILAND

Resolution 814 (1993), authorised the included , who often had little or no establishment of UNOSOM II. Under this experience in Somalia or their particular resolution UNOSOM was reformulated as a job, being recruited as 'Zonal Directors', and broader civilian and military operation, with paid large salaries and given powers to match responsibilities for the political, economic and those of regional governors. Not surprisingly, civil reconstruction of Somalia. With a two-year Somalis began to accuse the United Nations mandate to expire in February 1995, the of imperialism, and foreigners of enriching objectives of UNOSOM II were to assist with themselves from Somalia's misery. Further, providing relief and economic rehabilitation, although UNOSOM II was supposed to be a and to promote political reconciliation, peace civilian operation, it continued to be managed by and stability through the re-establishment of the military. This meant that military matters took national and regional political and civil precedence over other UN and NGO relief and administrations, no small task. The US development interventions. (Ameen Jan, 1996) permanent representative to the UN, Madeline The contradictions between these two Albright, remarked at the time: approaches at nation building, together with the means of implementation, led the United With this resolution, we will embark on an Nations into a war with General Aideed, the unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing most powerful of the faction leaders. In the less than the restoration of an entire process the UN lost its role as neutral arbiter in country as a proud, functioning and viable Somalia. Consequently the United States and member of the community of nations. the UN were forced into an ignominious (Cited in Ameen Jan, 1996) withdrawal from Somalia. In line with the Addis Ababa agreement to re­ establish national and regional governmental institutions, this was to involve the formation of The United Nations at war district councils. The district council programme To support UNOSOM II in its task, the UN represented a second track, 'grassroots' process Security Council approved the expansion of the at nation building that was to complement the multilateral peacekeeping force to 28,000 first track, 'top-down' approach pursued through troops, plus 8,000 logistics personnel. the Addis Ababa conference and with the In addition Resolution 814 invoked Chapter VII warlords. of the UN Charter, giving UNOSOM II The programme, however, was problematic. powers of 'peace-enforcement'. These powers, The councils' representativeness was a matter vastly superior to those assumed for UNITAF, of concern, given the large population permitted the UN to use force when displacements, the lack of clarity and dialogue on 'international peace and security' were the councils' functions and authority, the speed threatened, rather than normal rules of with which they were created, their relationship engagement which limited UN military action with indigenous councils of elders, their to self-defence. relationship with the warlords, the emphasis on With a six-month military budget of developing constitutional mechanisms in the US$1.5 billion and with military forces from absence of revenue collection, and the lack of 27 different countries, UNOSOM II was at the real financial backing from the United Nations. time the most expensive and largest multilateral Finally, while placing some emphasis on force ever constituted for a peacekeeping decentralised political structures, the state-centric operation. It was the first time that the United leanings of the United Nations meant that the States had placed its troops under the UN flag ultimate aim of the programme was to rebuild a and command, and the first time German national body politic. This contradicted other soldieis operated outside NATO. At the end of tendencies in Somalia that thrived on the Cold War, and in the wake of the Gulf War, statelessness. Somalia became a testing ground for the The means by which UNOSOM sought to international community's response to conflict implement this programme were further at fault. and humanitarian crisis in the 'new world Although Somalia was not made a UN order'. UNOSOM II's policies were thus driven trusteeship, UNOSOM II, and individuals and more by international political concerns than by interested parties under the UN umbrella, were the situation in Somalia. given de facto authority to make decisions for On 4 May 1993 UNITAF handed over to and on behalf of the Somali people. This UNOSOM II. A month later, after 24 Pakistani

16 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

2 •

SOMALI LAND

UN peacekeepers and 35 Somalis were killed Mogadishu to protect the withdrawal of the during a weapons search of Radio Mogadishu, remaining 1,500 Pakistani troops. By 2 March the United Nations found itself at war with the evacuation was completed. In UNOSOM's General Aideed. Invoking Chapter VII, three-year operation, an estimated 6,000 UNOSOM took an aggressive stance and Somalis and 83 peacekeepers were killed in ordered his arrest. By mid-September 1993 at clashes between Somali military and the United least 56 UN soldiers and several hundred Nations. Somalis had died in clashes between the United At the end of 1993, with the demise of Nations and Aideed's forces. UNOSOM imminent, donor governments The UN's approach was widely condemned, established a new forum for coordinating and it was accused of human rights violations. rehabilitation assistance to Somalia. Known as In October two US helicopters were shot down the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB), in Mogadishu causing heavy US army this took over much of the policy coordination casualties, which led the United States to function that UNOSOM was intended to announce its intention to withdraw from provide in Somalia. Somalia and the United Nations to call off its UNOSOM was one of a number of hunt for Aideed. international humanitarian interventions in The US presence in Somalia came to an end internal wars that occurred at the beginning of in March 1994 and UNOSOM was handed over the 1990s. As such it was critical in the to a Pakistani force. In November 1994 the development of international political and Security Council ordered the United Nations to humanitarian policy. UNOSOM proved a costly withdraw from Somalia by 31 March 1995. US and flawed experiment. Some of the reasons for marines and Italians briefly returned to its failure are discussed in Part 11.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 17 SOMALI LAND

PART 11 Somaliland 1991-96

GULF OF ADEN

•1 Erigavo' ; &. : I ••••••••• .!'tVARSENGELI .,".' ~orama • • f. : \.../ ;\~,i"O S 'OB~ A L/~ AND f \ , __• ..,~ DOLBAHUNTE . .·t...... ",.--.. ; ", .~~ · '..."...... , . ",, ...... - .".

consequently Somaliland remains unrecognised The by the international community. Secession had never been a stated aim of the SNM. The decision by the leaders of the SNM secession of to reassert Somaliland's sovereignty was made under popular pressure during the 'Grand Somaliland Conference of the Northern Peoples' in May 1991, held in the city of Burco (Drysdale, 1992). The formation in February 1991 of an interim government in Mogadishu by the USC hen Mohamed Siad Barre was forced went against a previous accord between the W from power in 1991 the Somali state SNM, USC and the SPM. The people of the collapsed. In January that year, as the USC took northwest, particularly the Issaq who formed control of Mogadishu, the SNM captured the the backbone of the SNM, feared that any northern cities of Berbera, Hargeisa and Burco. further relationship with Mogadishu would lead On 18 May 1991 the people of the north-west to a repeat of the persecution they had suffered regions of Somalia revoked the 1960 Act of under military rule. Secession was also a Union that joined the colonial territories of pragmatic stance to distance the north from the British Somaliland and Italian Somalia, and factional fighting in the south, and a recognition announced the secession of the 'Republic of that northerners, the Issaq in particular, had no Somaliland'. The declaration of independence territorial claims over the south. It was also was made without consulting Somalia's believed that security and stability in the north numerous other political factions and would attract much-needed international aid.

18 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT - •

SOMALILAND

The 1960 union with the south had been The Tuur driven by nationalistic aspirations to unite the five Somali territories in a ''. In this the northerners stood to re-establish access administration to the Haud grazing areas ceded by the British to Ethiopia in 1954. Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden war of 1977 destroyed any pretence of 1991-93 achieving that goal through a united Somalia. Years of conducting a guerrilla campaign from within Ethiopia, and the mass movement of he 'Tuur' administration had the task of Issaqs into refugee camps in the Haud in 1988, Tbuilding a government from scratch, bereft healed relations with Ethiopia. It may also have of any resources. In two years it failed to persuaded northernel'S that pastoralists' needs develop a revenue base to support an effective for unhindered access to the Haud could be administration. Nor did it attract effective better achieved through cooperation with external support. Banditry and looting by armed Ethiopia rather than unity with the south. It is militia mobilised during the war disrupted perhaps relevant that, before Burco 1991, the government and inter-clan attempts at previous 'Grand Shir' of the northern clans was reconciliation, and international relief in 1954, in response to the British decision to programmes. cede the Haud to Ethiopia. The initial euphoria of independence was In contrast to what happened in southern shattered by an outbreak of fighting in Burco in Somalia, the declaration of independence January 1992 and in Berbera in March 1992. ushered in a period of relative stability in The conflict was brought to an end in October Somaliland. The SNM assumed a two-year 1992, through a political settlement and peace mandate as the single party in Somaliland and conference in the town of Sheik, brokered by Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali 'Tuur', then chairman the Somaliland elders. The Sheik 'Tawfiq' of the SNM, was appointed interim president. conference paved the way for a national The SNM resolved not to extend its military reconciliation conference, held in the town of victory beyond Issaq territories, and the clans Borama, in which all Somaliland's clans within the north established a high degree of participated, and which adopted a 'Peace cooperation. The first government had a Charter' and 'National Charter' as a framework relatively equitable balance of northern clans for governance. represented in cabinet posts.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF SOMALI LAND The territory of the 'Republic of Somaliland', which covers approximately 117,500 square kilometres, corresponds to that of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. It incorporates the five former regions of north-west Somalia, Awdal, Woqoyi Galbeed, Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool, with its capital in Hargeisa. Its neighbours are Djibouti in the west, Ethiopia in the south and the North-East Region of Somalia to the east. Inland from Somaliland's narrow coastal plain, known as the Guban (meaning 'scorched'), the land rises above 2,000 metres in the Gollis mountains before descending southward across the Ogo plateau to the west, the Saraar plain to east, and onto the wet season pastures of the Haud in Ethiopia. The north-east and south-west monsoons bring two rainy seasons (May to July and November to January), and two lengthy dry seasons (January to April and August t~ October). Annual rainfall ranges between 200 and 800 mm, with temperatures ranging between 25 and 35°C. The area is subject to periodic drought. Somaliland's economy is dependent on trade in livestock. Cultivation is limited to rainfed areas to the west of Hargeisa, and in the Gollis mountains. The economy is linked to those of neighbouring countries. Livestock, agricultural produce and qaat are exported from Eastern Harerghe in Ethiopia and Somaliland through Berbera and Djibouti in exchange for the import of food and manufactured goods. Somali refugee camps in Ethiopia, with their food aid, form an important part of the regional economy. Insecurity in anyone of the countries can affect the neighbouring economies.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 19 SOMALlLAND

THE PEOPLE OF SOMALILAND The size and composition of Somaliland's population has altered considerably since 1988, when it was estimated at between 1.78 and 2.05 million, excluding Ethiopian refugees. Up to 600,000 people fled to Ethiopia when the war started in 1988. Others sought refuge in Djibouti or moved south. When the war ended in Somaliland, many refugees and displaced people returned. This included people who had never lived in Somaliland, but were forced out of the south to seek security within their own clan territory. In January 1992 Somaliland's population was estimated to be 1.35 million (Holt and Lawrence, 1992). When war broke out again in 1994 up to 150,000 people fled Hargeisa, many crossing to Ethiopia (Bryden, 1994). At the end of 1995 there were said to be 300,000 people from Somaliland still in Ethiopia (Bryden, 1995). The people of the region divide into five main clan groups. The Issaq are by far the most populous clan-family. Their traditional lands fall within Woqoyi Galbeed, Togdheer and western Sanaag regions. The main sub-clans of the lssaq are the Habr Yunis and lidagale (together the Garxajis), Habr Jeclo, (lsa Musa and Saad Musa), and Ayub (Box 7).

PRIMARY ISSAQ LINEAGES

Sheik Issaq

Musa Ahmed Ibrahim Mohamed (Habr (Toljecle) (Sambuur) (Ibraan) Jeclo)

Saad Habr I Musa Yunis llidalale

------H-a-b-r-M-a-g-aa-d-o-t------.:L ----.---H-a-b-r-H-a-b-u-u-s-h-I-----

Adapted from Lewis, 1969.

The Gadabursi and lssa, sub-clans of the Dir, are found in Awdal region in the west. The Dolbahunte of Sool and the Warsengeli of eastern Sanaag are sub-clans of the Harti Darod, related to the Majeerteen of north-east Somalia. Habr Magaado and Habr Habuush were wives of Issaq.

20 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT

• SOMALI LAND

THE SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT The SNM was founded in London in government' (ibid). The SNM installed, with 'Silaniyo' as chairman. 1981. It drew its early support from constitution called for a The military wing was split the in western two-chamber legislature, with an between two factions - a more and the Persian Gulf states. of elders. A council of radical element nicknamed the It was primarily an Issaq movement, elders (guurtl) was integral to the a/an as ('red flag'), comprising with its leaders coming from the SNM's political and military strategy. colonels who had been trained in urban elite. Several of them, such as Indeed, as early as February 1989 the eastern bloc, and another Ahmed Mohamed 'Silaniyo' and Issaq elders met to discuss the known as the shish ('snipers'). Abdulrahman Ahmed Ali 'Tuur', both formation of a provisional These factions were roughly split chairmen of the SNM, had held government in the north (Simons, along clan lines. Prominent posts in Barre's government. 1995: 75). personalities in the a/an as mainly The SNM was the most Like all political factions, the SNM come from the Habr Awal (Issa organised of the armed movements. relied on a coalition of allied clans ­ Musa and Saad Musa) and Habr Compared with the recently created in this case within the Issaq - to Jeclo; the shish from the Habr Yunis southern movements, the SNM had provide fighters for the war. SNM and lidagale. A dispute is said to a clearer political manifesto guerrillas fought in small units drawn have arisen between these wings (Compagnon, 1991). It also from the same clan, and generally over the 1988 attacks on Burco and published its policies. The SNM fought within their own clan territory Hargeisa. During the war, tensions argued that the clan system lay at (Drysdale, 1992). While many also arose over perceptions that the root of political stability, social fighters laid down their arms once some clans were not contributing cohesion and economic activity. the war was over, disarming and sufficiently, or that others were Thus they proposed: integrating these disparate units dominating the leadership. These became a problem immediately latent tensions re-emerged in a new political system built after the war. post-independence Somaliland. upon Somali cultural values of Although the SNM produced a In the first two years of co-operation rather than political manifesto for government, independence the SNM was the coercion; a system which like the other movements its sole official political party of elevated the Somali concept of struggle generally lacked a unifying . Somaliland. However, internal xeer or inter-family social contract ideology. Capitalism, c1anism, weaknesses and the difficulty of in which no man exercised democratic socialism, Islam, and integrating non-Issaq clans into the political power over another regional separation had their various movement, meant that it did not except according to established adherents within the SNM. Disputes play a significant role as a political law and custom, to the national arising from these internal party in post-independence level. (Ahmed I Samatar, 1988: differences weakened the Somaliland. After the 1993 Borama 142) movement. Primary among these Conference the SNM became Within the Somali traditions of social was a clash between the civilian and largely defunct, although an attempt organisation, the SNM emphasised military wings and the 'right' and was made to resuscitate it in 1994. the role of the elders. Their proposal 'left' leaning tendencies in the SNM. SNM veterans, however, continue to for government in post-Barre In 1983 the military wing ousted the celebrate 'SNM day' (marking the Somalia was to integrate 'traditional civilian component of the leadership founding of the SNM, its victories Somali egalitarianism and the (Ahmed I Samatar, 1988: 155). A and heroes), and continue to seek requirements of good central year later a new civilian group was recognition for their role in the war.

The Borama Conference could be achieved. A national committee of 150 The Borama 'Grand Conference on National Somaliland elders (the Somaliland National Reconciliation' was described as a 'make or Guurti) comprised the official voting delegates break event' in the creation of the Somaliland at the conference. However, during the four state. The conference agenda had two items: months, an estimated 2,000 people attended and reconciliation and security; and state formation. participated in some way in the meeting.S The The conference opened on 24 January 1993 conference was mostly financed by Somalis, a and lasted nearly four months. This gave time major factor in its success. Although some for issues to be exhaustively debated and for foreign donors did provide funds, UNOSOM flashpoints to be dealt with so that consensus did not provide any support.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 21 SOMALILAND

The Peace Charter first prime minister in 1960 and Somalia's last civilian prime minister in 1969 - as the new The outcome of deliberations on reconciliation . Abdulrahman Aw Ali and security was the 'Somaliland Communities was appointed vice-president. Security and Peace Charter' . This sought to rectify mistakes that had led to insecurity and ineffectual government (Somaliland Peace Charter, 1993). It The Sanaag Peace aimed to promote 'the strengthening of security Conference and stability [and] peaceful co-existence among all the communities of Somaliland' that had been The Borama conference was one of several agreed at independence (ibid). The charter peace processes under way in Somaliland at that established a national security framework, time. Of the others, the most significant and detailing mechanisms for demobilisation, the successful was in Sanaag region, where elders formation of local police forces and judicial of the region's four main clans - Habr Yunis, institutions and the securing of roads. The elders Habr Jeclo, Dolbahunte and Warsengeli ­ were given responsibility for ensuring that these embarked on a lengthy process of reconciliation security arrangements were put in place. The (Bradbury, 1994a; Ahmed Yusuf Farah, 1993). charter also defined the responsibilities of elders in This culminated in the 'Sanaag Grand Peace mediating and settling outstanding disputes and and Reconciliation Conference', which future conflicts. It set out a code of conduct for the concluded in October 1993 with the adoption of people of Somaliland, in accordance with their a regional Peace Charter. The charter allowed traditions and with the principles ofIslam. In effect, for the free movement of trade, the return of the Peace Charter represented a national xeer. fixed assets, in particular land, and the restoration of reciprocal access to grazing lands. In August 1995 the elders in Sanaag oversaw The National Charter the resettlement and return of land to those who Discussions on state formation produced a had been displaced during the war. This National Charter, which was to act as the involved some 500 families. (Haroon Ahmed constitution for Somaliland for two years. The Yusuf, 1996) incoming government was to be charged with drafting a national constitution to be ratified by within two years. The National Charter established a government structure with a bicameral legislature. This comprises an Assembly of Elders (guurti) as a non-elected The Egal upper house, and an Assembly of Representatives as an elected . Together these make up the parliament. The equivalent of a 'cabinet' is administration known as the Executive Council. In addition the charter separated the judiciary, 1993-95 auditor-general, and as agencies independent of the government. The charter institutionalised the elders as peacemakers, defining their role as 'to encourage and safeguard peace [and] creating new or enforcing existing The state of government Codes of Conduct [xeer] among the clans' gal took office on a wave of euphoria (Bradbury, 1994a: 74). Their authority was Efollowing the su~cessful conclusion of the confirmed by their right to appoint a president, Borama conference. During his first two years vice-president and members of the Assembly of in office, Egal's achievements in creating a Representatives. Within both the National functioning administration were considerable. Charter and the Peace Charter formulated at Ministries were revitalised. Government offices Borama, there is a clear link to the SNM's were refurbished. Regular morning and original vision to reform radically systems of afternoon work hours were instituted. A civil governance in the post-Barre era (see Box 8). service commission was formed. Regular In June 1993 the National Guurti appointed coordination meetings were established Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal - Somaliland's between the planning ministry and international

22 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALlLAND

NGOs and UN agencies. The central bank was army. The government even introduced a opened and a new Somaliland currency minimum wage. In November 1994 ministries introduced. In Hargeisa, Borama and Berbera received their own budgets. Some 50 per cent police forces were equipped and organised. was allocated to the defence ministry and Customs officers were appointed and offices police, with education and health combined established. A justice system of regional and making up 17 per cent (Gilkes, 1995). All this district courts was re-established in places, was achieved with minimal external assistance. utilising the 1960 penal code. In Hargeisa the In the absence of such support, however, these mayor embarked on a programme of town achievements have not been sustained. planning and civil engineering, including Although the government's writ was largely repairs to government hotels. Ministerial and confined to Hargeisa, Berbera and Borama, it civil service staff (estimated at around 2,500 in had a functional relationship with the regions, 1995) were paid regular salaries, as were where none had existed under Tuur. For national assembly members, the police, and example, regional health plans in Sanaag were

DEMOBILISATION

The militarisation of society is a clans anxious not to forgo the made in the east. Despite this, up to constant threat to security and benefits of retraining and 5,000 militia were estimated to have stability in Somaliland. Before May employment in the new security been disarmed (Niyathi, 1995: 27). 1988 the SNM was said to comprise forces envisaged, this had risen to Their reintegration was more some 3,000 fighters. When the war 6,000 by October. problematic. The reintegration escalated in 1988 there was a rapid Substantial assistance was programmes that existed were small militarisation of society as the Issaq anticipated from UNOSOM, which and run by SOOYAAL. Several population was mobilised for the had a mandate and a US$18 million hundred of those encamped in war. At the end of the war many budget for demobilisation (Bradbury 1993 were recruited into the police SNM fighters laid down their arms 1994a: 82). Despite several and customs forces. The remainder and returned to civilian life. Some assessment missions and the were sent home unemployed. remained together as military units. United Nations Development An informed estimate in early Some turned to banditry and were Programme (UNDP) posting two 1995 suggested that some joined by others who had not fought consultants in Hargeisa to draw up 10,000 militia remained to be dealt in the war. In 1993 the Somaliland demobilisation plans, the assistance with. (Gilkes, 1995) government estimated that there was never forthcoming. The failure The outbreak of war in 1994 were 50,000 armed militia in to support demobilisation in politicised and set back Somaliland (Niyathi, 1995: 27). This Somaliland is an indictment of demobilisation. While the was probably an over-estimation, UNOSOM. The German government government stated its intention to but indicated the scale of the through GTZ, with CARE, Oxfam continue with the programme, the problem. and the Swiss Group, have since NDC was unacceptable in The first Somaliland government supported demobilisation, but for opposition areas. In 1993 the had proposed to unify the militia in a the most part international support government had pronounced that it national army (Drysdale, 1992: 30). has been meagre. did not intend to form an army. That It failed to do this and the hational Somaliland has therefore largely policy changed when the National Peace Charter sought to establish a been left to itself to orchestrate the Army recruited militia into its ranks, framework in which the communities demobilisation and reintegration of giving rise to accusations that the would take responsibility for ex-combatants. Formally two government had gone against the security. Within four months of organisations exist to support this spirit of the Peace Charter. \. taking office Egal reached an process: a parastatal National • The 1st brigade of the new National agreement with some militia Demobilisation Commission (NDG) Army was operative by March 1994. commanders and elders to collect and SOOYAAL, a veterans By September 1995 estimates put militia in cantonment sites. association and NGO concerned the National Army as high as 15,000 Businessmen agreed to contribute with SNM veterans and their soldiers uniformed and armed. food in the interests of keeping the widows. In February 1994 the NDC Although the government has said roads safe. But events moved faster claimed it had acquired three­ it intends to demobilise them once than anticipated. In September quarters of the weapons from five the war is over, the positive 1993, 3,000 militia were encamped brigades, primarily in the Hargeisa environment that existed in 1993 in , south of Berbera. With area and the west. No progress was has dissipated.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 23 SOMALlLAND

authorised by the central ministry, while regional port has suffered technical problems, while health workers and some education officials Berbera has developed a simple but well-run received incentives through the government, facility, although still in need of improvement. although funded by international agencies. Berbera has also benefited from the closure of The progress in establishing an administration the southern ports of Kismayo and Mogadishu was achieved by increasing the government's due to the conflict there. Livestock from as far resource base. In September 1995 government south as Beletweyne are exported through revenue was estimated to be roughly Berbera. Expansion of the livestock trade has US$lO million, rising towards US$15 million. 6 also been stimulated by the reopening of the Government revenue collection improved after Saudi Arabian market, which had been closed to effective customs and excise facilities were Somali livestock since the 1980s. At least one established in Berbera and on the Djibouti border Saudi port is open, unofficially, to receive at , and from taxing the qaat trade. In 1995 and goats. In addition to trade, it was estimated that the annual value of qaat there has also been a gradual recovery of the imported into Hargeisa was equivalent to rural economy in Somaliland; in September US$137 million a year; for Somaliland as a 1995, the main cause of food insecurity in whole it was put at US$250 million (Gilkes, Hargeisa was inflation. In June 1995 private 1995). Government finances were also helped by companies re-established a functioning a windfall received when the Somaliland system in Hargeisa, with currency was introduced and exchanged at a international lines. This has since been extended preferential rate for the . to Berbera and Borama. Underlying the government's economic Underlying economic recovery was a greatly fortunes was Somaliland's buoyant economic improved security situation. Banditry was growth from mid 1993. The foundation of this widespread during the Tuur administration but was growth in the livestock export trade and the after the Borama conference it diminished opening of new external trading links. Since significantly. With the support of the clans the 1993 the volume of Somaliland's trade has government was able to remove checkpoints increased substantially. In particular, political from the main roads between Berbera, Hargeisa changes in Ethiopia and the opening of the and Borama, thus facilitating the flow of trade Somali-Ethiopian border has created a vast new and food. In the towns the establishment of market for Somali traders. Some 65 per cent of police forces and a judicial system helped to the trade through Berbera is said to be destined restore some law and order. A short-lived for Ethiopia. Along with Assab in , demobilisation campaign contributed to the Berbera is challenging Djibouti as the main port improved security situation (see Box 9). In for eastern Ethiopia in terms of volume of trade. Hargeisa the security situation improved to the Berbera offers the benefits of lower customs extent that the United Nations began to import dues than Djibouti. Some traders import their its own vehicles and international NGOs scaled goods through Berbera and ship them overland down their investment in security. to Djibouti to avoid taxes. In addition, Djibouti Although considerable progress was achieved in establishing the institutions of government, the new state remained politically MINES -A LASTING LEGACY fragile, and vulnerable to a shift in power Unexploded ordnance remains a major hazard throughout between the clans and politicians influencing Somaliland, and Somalia. During the war with Siad Barre the situation. The boundaries of the Somaliland 1.5 million mines were thought to have been laid in state were unclear, as non-Issaq clans Somaliland alone by the and the particularly in the east remained ambiguous SNM. Most were laid against civilian or economic targets, towards Somaliland. Egal's administration such as on farmland and records were not kept of their benefited from the port revenues from Berbera positions. The economic and social effects are long lasting. in a way that Tuur was never able to, because it A two-year (1992-93) de-mining project by a British firm lay within Egal's clan territory. Another head of with a team of trained Somalis cleared an estimated state may not have found people willing to pass 80,000 mines. Despite there being foreign troops in that revenue to the government. At the same Somalia who could have done this, UNOSOM failed to time Egal's government was unable to secure institute a de-mining programme. When war broke out in and control , a strategic site on 1994 new mines were laid, particularly around Burco. its doorstep which was held by Iidagale militia.

24 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALILAND

The fragility of the administration and became divided towns. New arms flowed into security was exposed 18 months after Egal was the region as the opposition received support made president, when war returned to from Aideed and the government acquired Somaliland. weapons from eastern Europe. The war harmed a rapidly expanding economy, causing currency devaluation, inflation in the west and a retraction Retu rn to WO r in international assistance programmes. In the After a year of heady progress which included a east trade was curtailed, hurting small businesses. concerted attempt at demobilisation, and the Government budgets were also severely affected: strengthening of government institutions and the government allegedly spent US$4.5 million revenue collection, fighting again broke out in re-equipping the army. November 1994 in Hargeisa, spreading to Perhaps the most immediate damage was the Burco in March 1995. The immediate reasons loss of confidence among Somalilanders who were twofold: a struggle for control of Hargeisa had believed that fighting was over. The war airport and its revenue between the government caused new social and political cleavages. and a militia of the Iidagale (Issaq) clan within There was a further rejection of central whose territory the airport lies, and an attempt government and 'politicians', and the war threw by the government to impose its authority Somaliland's viability into doubt. The different outside Hargeisa (Bryden, 1994). The roots of layers of the conflict are examined below. the conflict, however, are more complex. The prime catalyst was the manipulation of the airport confrontation and historical clan Political factors animosities by a political clique opposed to the Despite the achievements in creating an Egal administration. Also important were administration, politically things did not begin unresolved issues of power sharing, historical well for the Egal administration. Egal's first divisions within the SNM, competition over government met with strong opposition from Somaliland's resources (particularly trade and the Habr Yunis and Iidagale (collectively currency), and interventions by General Aideed known as Garxajis). The Habr Yunis and from Mogadishu and the international Warsengeli refused offers of two ministerial community through the United Nations. Most of posts. In July 1993 the Habr Yunis meeting in these have been threads throughout the previous Burco (the 'Liiban Congress') declared that bouts of fighting in Somaliland.7 they would not take up their seats in the Upper At the time this report was written, hostilities and Lower Houses, nor be bound by laws were continuing. As in 1991 and 1992, the war passed by parliament. has been largely confined within the Issaq clans, The Habr Yunis' s grievances were threefold. (although insecurity affected Awdal in 1995 First, they argued that the election which when the Issaq, Gadabursi and Issa clashed on selected Egal over Abdulrahman Tuur, a Habr the Djibouti-Somaliland border over control of Yunis, was unfair. Second, they asserted that trade between Hargeisa and Djibouti, and over seats in the upper and lower houses of the port of Zeila). For non-Issaq the conflict is parliament should be allotted according to seen primarily as an Issaq problem. As with region rather than clan, which would have given previous wars, fighting has concentrated around them a greater number. This dispute was the major urban and commercial centres of supposed to be settled by a constitutional Hargeisa and Burco in the north-west and committee, but discussion on a new constitution Togdheer regions, giving credence to claims did not start until 1995. Egal rejected calls for that this is largely a war among an urban another national conference to resolve the issue. political elite. Third, the Habr Yunis and Iidagale accused The war has involved the heaviest and most Egal of anti-Garxajis sentiments and of forming protracted fighting since the end of the conflict his government from a 'single political wing' with Siad Barre in 1991. Tens of thousands of (Bradbury, 1994a). This referred to Egal's first civilians fled Hargeisa and Burco, many going choice of cabinet ministers who included some to Ethiopia from where they had returned in of the most aggressive opponents of Tuur's 1991. Some estimates put the number of people administration and members of the alan as killed in Burco alone as high as 4,000. There faction within the SNM who had opposed Tuur has been widespread destruction of property during the conflict in Berbera in 1992. The rehabilitated since 1991. Hargeisa and Burco impression given was that those who fought

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 25 SOMALILAND

against the Tuur administration won the war and Rejection of and Tuur, however, did so undermined the spirit of reconciliation not translate into support for Egal. In achieved at Sheik. Somaliland the Garxajis were concerned with In November 1994, after protracted their under-representation in government, the negotiations with the Iidagale militia broke predominance of Habr Awal political and down, the government took the Iidagale-held commercial interests in government, the Hargeisa airport by force. The army then went on inclusion in the government of alan as officers, to attack the Iidagale town of Toon. This and alleged violations of the National Charter. government act ofaggression forced the Garxajis (The last refers to the formation of a national to unite against the Egal administration. army and government attempts to control The dispute over the airport was largely Hargeisa airport.) On these grounds the manipulated by prominent politicians, including Garxajis elders and leadership portrayed the former President Tuur (Habr Yunis) and conflict as being clan-based. General Jama Mohamed Qalib 'Yare' (lidagale). In April 1994 Tuur revived an acquaintance with General Aideed, formed when The Burco factor the SNM and USC agreed to coordinate In January 1995, with a newly equipped army, operations against Barre, and announced his the government re-asserted control over conversion to a united federal Somalia. In 1995 Hargeisa airport. Once the capital was secured, he joined Aideed's self-proclaimed government the government's policy was to establish its in Mogadishu as a vice-president. Jama Yare has authority in the east. In March 1995 the war consistently opposed Somaliland's indepen­ spread to Burco after the national army tried to dence. However, it was not until 1995 that he take over checkpoints in the city. joined Aideed's government as foreign minister. The conflict in Burco is different from that of Tuur's change of heart occurred in part under Hargeisa. The core of the conflict here is a inducements from UNOSOM, which was historical struggle between elements of the Habr desperate to conclude a peace deal before leaving Yunis and the Habr Jeclo for control of the Somalia in March 1994 and invited him to town, a major commercial centre. After the participate in a UN reconciliation conference. fighting in January 1992 between the Habr (Bryden, 1994) Yunis and Habr Jeclo militia, the town was Once fighting broke out, the government and divided and only a fragile peace existed. With 'opposition' disagreed about whether the the renewal of conflict the population of Burco conflict was about political or clan issues. The evacuated the town, the Habr Yunis moving to government sought to portray the war as being and Ethiopia or east to Sanaag between proponents and opponents of region. However, elders in neighbouring Sanaag independence, and thus claimed the moral high region managed to prevent the fighting ground. These claims were reinforced by spreading to that area. General Aideed's material support for the Garxajis and public claims that his forces were fighting the Egal administration. The The SNM factor government initially rejected overtures for inter­ In renouncing Somaliland's independence, Tuur clan negotiations from elders, on the grounds made an unsuccessful attempt to resurrect the that this was a 'political' rather than clan SNM as a political force in order to broaden his struggle. There was some legitimacy in this, as legitimacy within Somaliland. the government could claim to represent a broad coalition of clans. At the same time, Egal's aggressive stance was not conducive to EcoDomic dimensions of the war negotiations. The 1991-92 war over Berbera was dubbed the For the opposition, the 'federalist' position 'sheep war'. While directly referring to a was limited to the clique of political figures specific clash over a convoy of livestock such and Tuur and Yare. The Habr Yunis destined for export through Berbera, the name 'Liiban Congress' in July 1993 and again in highlighted the economic dimensions of that December 1994 reaffirmed their commitment to conflict. Economic growth since 1993 has been Somaliland. It was not until July 1994, at a critical factor in Somaliland's survival and 'Liiban Congress 11', that Tuur received any Egal's success in re-establishing government support for his position from Habr Yunis elders. institutions. The clash over Hargeisa airport was

26 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALI LAND

one element in a complex economic environment where the Garxajis own many buildings. As part which involves shifting monopolies on the of the Hargeisa municipality's rehabilitation livestock and qaat trade, and control of the programme the central market was divided into Somaliland currency. smaller markets around the city, supposedly to There were claims by both sides that the other spread the benefits of trade. The effect, in fact, was profiting from continued instability. In was to undermine the economy of the Garxajis 1995 Egal asked the vice-president to in Hargeisa. The city's livestock market, investigate allegations that individuals had used traditionally located in a Garxajis area, was also money meant for the war effort to enrich moved by the municipality, signalling to the themselves. Garxajis a change in the monopoly in livestock Economic tensions have a clan dimension. trade. In the east the livestock trade has become The Habr Awal have traditionally controlled the dominated by a single Habr Jeclo trader, while wealth in the urban centres of Hargeisa and the Habr Awal have become dominant in the Berbera, with a strong foothold in Djibouti. qaat trade to western Somaliland. They were important financiers of the SNM. These changes in trade monopolies since Their wealth is based on commodity trade. The 1994 tend to support Garxajis grievances that Habr Yunis have been prominent in the civil the Egal administration has strengthened the service since colonial times, while the Garxajis and Habr Jeclo have been prominent in the livestock trade. THE NEW On taking office Egal's priorities were to Control of currency has become integral to the war in restore law and order and create a strong Somaliland.8 A new currency was introduced in October revenue. The latter involved affirming 1994 at the rate of 54 Somaliland to the US dollar, government authority over the ports and a rate greatly preferential to the Somali shilling. When the airports, including Hargeisa. Egal, from the Isa government bought old Somali shillings with Somaliland Musa sub-clan of the Habr Awal from Berbera, shillings at a this rate it was accused of 'the greatest has been able to raise taxes on the port's robbery in Africa'.9 The government certainly made big revenue. As it lies within their territory the profits from changing the currency. Two years later, in Iidagale claim Hargeisa airport as their asset, as October 1996, the market rate was 4,500 Somaliland Berbera is for the Isa MusalHabr Awal. shillings to one US dollar. The immediate cause of the Opposition leaders further justified this position devaluation was a shortage of US dollars in Somaliland. with the National Charter, which provides for Behind this lay the central bank's failure to control the local security arrangements. By taxing and market, the strength of the Somaliland traders compared to harassing passengers of commercial and aid the bank, and the cost of the war. Failure to establish a flights, the Iidagale militia affected Hargeisa's banking system throughout Somaliland meant the new economy. Habr Awal businessmen in Hargeisa currency was only introduced in Hargeisa and the west. were particularly aggrieved. The airport was The war prevented its circulation to eastern regions. Indeed, thus a focus for a range of competing economic money sent from Hargeisa to the army in Burco had to be interests. sent in US dollars or converted into old Somali shillings. The government's relationship with Throughout 1995 and 1996, the government introduced prominent merchants was crucial to the progress increasingly draconian policies to prevent the circulation of Egal made in re-establishing government old Somali shillings in the west and to control the exchange institutions. Egal's main financial backers were rate. These failed to stem the devaluation. By the end of a group of Habr Awal importers and 1996, in Borama, the Ethiopian bir became the favoured wholesalers based in Djibouti who held a currency. monopoly on the trade between Berbera, Frequent devaluations coupled with spiralling inflation Hargeisa, Ethiopia and Djibouti. When created insecurity about being able to afford food, government revenue was insufficient to feed the particularly among Hargeisa's poor. The devaluation also National Army, the merchants assisted with eroded government salaries. In September 1995, for food for the army and police. They also example, the price of 50 kg of sugar rose from 6,600 to financed the printing of Somaliland's new 9,000 Somaliland shillings in one day. Despite this, it currency, introduced on the eve of war in became politically impossible for the government to October 1994 (see Box 11). re-introduce the old Somali shilling as legal tender or to Before the war Hargeisa market was withdraw the Somaliland shilling. At the end of 1996 the booming. Much of the early fighting in government was continuing to print new Somaliland notes. Hargeisa was around the central market, an area

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 27 SOMALILAND

role of the Habr Awal business community. government, they do not appear to be interested Hargeisa, which traditionally lies in Habr Awal in investing in infrastructure or social services. territory, has prospered during Egal's tenure. One exception is the telecommunications The Habr Awal consequently fear the impact companies that have established themselves that a non-Habr Awal presidency would have. since 1995. The only private investment in At the same time opposition areas have suffered social welfare services is being made by greater economic hardship as a result of the war. international agencies. Where the state is unable The informal economy in Somaliland is to regulate the market, redistribution of wealth extremely strong, stimulated by lack of depends entirely on the clan system. Exclusion government regulation. However, there is little from the market, or other means of evidence of economic growth reaching the poor. accumulation such as through government or While the merchants have been prepared to even aid agencies, is a source of ongoing make political investments in support of the tension. Any settlement of the conflict will have to address wealth distribution and the economic imbalances created by the war in which not only THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT have the 'opposition' areas lost out to the The case of Sanaag region raises interesting questions administration's, but also rural to urban areas, about the reconstruction of the state in post-war and the poor to the wealthy. Somaliland. Since the war against Siad Barre ended in 1991 Sanaag has had no functioning government administration. A regional guurti consisting of 36 elders, an Decentralisation and NGO committee delegated by the guurti to liaise with governance international and local NGOs, and an education committee and regional health team, represent the only form of local The future political constitution of Soma1i1and ­ administration. No tax revenue is collected. Based in the and in particular decentralisation - has been regional centre, Erigavo, the remit of these committees at a central to the war. Article 21 of the Somaliland local district or village level is highly limited. Badhan district National Charter promotes the principle of in western Sanaag, for example, does not recognise the decentralisation through the creation of regional authority of the regional guurti. and district councils. However, their precise The region has consistently rejected central government authority was not defined, nor implementation appointment of regional governmental officials, or the covered. For example, no guidelines were establishment of a national police force. Some sections of established on the fiscal power of local the community feel that there is an opportunity to develop councils, an issue at the heart of the conflict new, more appropriate forms of governance that will mix over Hargeisa airport. the traditional with the 'modern'; the modern is seen to Decentralisation was one issue on which the have failed. However, had Somaliland achieved opposition could count for broad support. It is international recognition, allowing bilateral funds to be about more than clanism or territoriality: it is a channelled to government, it might have provided sufficient political issue about governance. It was incentive for Sanaag to form a local administration. It might expected that councils would be created within also have created new conflicts and supported the the government's two-year mandate, yet it was formation of unfair structures. only in the later part of 1994 that the Allegations of 'corruption' within government have been government began to tackle the issue seriously, made by both the opposition and Egal himself, and are spurred on partly by the opposition's activities. further constraints to creating government structures in UNOSOM's support for the formation of Somaliland. Corruption and abuse of government district and regional councils in Somalia was resources were major grievances against the regime of based on establishing the constitutional Siad Barre. As new government structures emerge there is techniQalities of decentralisation. The rationale a danger that, without checks and balances, the mutual was to support grassroots representation in a dependence of politicians and their clan constituencies will regional and central government. In Somaliland become institutionalised and corruption and nepotism will the Egal administration placed more emphasis flourish. This requires a change in attitude towards on developing functioning local government government as a means of wealth distribution rather than a structures, with responsibilities for revenue source of enrichment. Without this there is a risk that the collection and municipal administration; same flawed state that people fought to overthrow will be political representation was a secondary issue. recreated in Somaliland. Hargeisa municipality was an example of this.

28 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALI LAND

In early 1995 the government attempted to origins in the war against Siad Barre, and the redraft Article 21 of the National Charter, to SNM's policy to integrate traditional and establish the legal basis for a relationship modern systems of governance (see Box 8). The between the centre and the regions. However, National Guurti was written into the first negotiations with parliament broke down. lO The constitution of Somaliland - the National government agreed to provide some finance for Charter - with a specific role to safeguard peace local councils, but local representatives did not and uphold the xeer among people. The division agree to generate their own sources of revenue. of the elders and politicians into two houses For example, because the regions were unable sought to separate domestic clan politics from or unwilling to raise revenue to support local national (and international) politics. It identified police, it was agreed that a national police force 'clanism' as a potential source of conflict, and would continue under government authority. the need for a mechanism to manage it. The This, however, was seen as an infringement of chairman of the National Guurti, Sheik Ibrahim, local autonomy. Further, while the parliament remarked in 1993: 'Our task is to ensure accepted centrally-appointed executive chairmen security and reconciliation. The government's of regional and district councils, it stipulated responsibility is management, administration that they had to be agreed by the National and development.'(Rakiya Omaar, 1993). Guurti, the Lower house, akils and elders. In the The war brought to light the difficulties in end, Egal chose the same route as Tuur by creating a council of elders as a permanent making appointments centrally. institution, and of integrating so-called Egal was required by the National Charter to traditional and modern forms of government. draft a constitution for Somaliland, for approval An immediate result of the war was that the by referendum. This turned out to be a National Guurti split. Members who remained controversial process. A constitution may help in Hargeisa were seen to be allied to the clarify some of the issues of decentralisation, government. Members of the Guurti receive but it cannot resolve them without resources and salaries and accommodation costs, which has structures in place, and political consensus. indebted them to the administration and is seen to have compromised their neutrality. The role of the National Guurti The view of the Guurti as a neutral body, and no more than a mechanism for conflict The issue of governance is related to the role of resolution, misjudges the role of elders. Elders elders, in particular the National Guurti are not above day-to-day happenings and (Assembly of Elders). The 1993 Borama intrigues. Indeed, their knowledge is drawn conference was an impressive example of an from their daily involvement in matters of the indigenous Somali reconciliation process, in clan. It is also misleading to view the institution which the role of lineage elders as mediators in of elders as static. Since colonial times, when the internal affairs of the communities were akils were incorporated into the colonial clearly displayed. It provided an alternative administration, the role of elders has been model to the reconciliation process promoted by changing. During the Barre era their role was the United Nations in Somalia after the politicised. The failure of the National Guurti resignation of Ambassador Sahnoun. to intervene in the war raised doubts about The authority of the Somaliland elders arose whether to integrate the institution of elders into from the failure of the first SNM government modern government, as it left little alternative and a country paralysed by the conflict in space for inter-clan dialogue. Berbera. The capacity of grassroots political structures to provide a mechanism for conflict resolution was demonstrated when elders International, relations interceded to end the war and restore stability A further element in Somaliland's internal crisis through the Borama Conference. In the absence has been the international policy environment. The of credible government, committees of elders United Nations and the international community became active in all regions of the country in have refused to recognise Somaliland's response to particular crises. The origins of independence. In this, regional governments and these committees are thus rooted in conflict the Organisation for African Unity would have to management. The question arises as to whether take the lead, and none to date have done so. they can have any other role in government. Somaliland today is of little strategic interest to The Somaliland National Guurti has its Northern or regional powers. Some Somalis

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 29 SOMALILAND

believe there are commercial quantities of oil in Yet lack of recogmtIOn has forced the Somaliland, but no company has been prepared government to develop its own capacity. to invest in exploration while political instability Although this has not brought recognition, it continues. Ethiopia has an interest in Somaliland achieved a certain 'acceptance' (Gilkes, 1995). remaining stable, as events in its eastern The British and German governments have sent neighbour can affect Five in high-level delegations to Somaliland and are Ethiopia. The continuation of trade through supporting aid programmes, although the Berbera, and prevention of any Islamic German aid programme withdrew in 1996 fundamentalist threat, are of particular interest to following the kidnapping of its field director. Ethiopia. Relationships with regional states have been Independence did not bring the anticipated more problematic. Since 1991, Somaliland's international assistance to Somaliland. The relationship with Djibouti has been fragile. concentration of humanitarian efforts in Since the war against Barre, Djibouti has hosted southern Somalia, and the UN's refusal to a significant number of refugees from acknowledge and underpin the achievements of Somaliland. Commercial links between the two the Borama peace process and demobilisation countries are intricate, with Somaliland's efforts, have left a legacy of mistrust towards wealthiest businessmen operating out of the United Nations. UNOSOM was asked to Djibouti. The Somaliland-Djibouti border leave Somaliland soon after Egal assumed dissects the land of the Isa clan of the ruling office, when assistance for the police and family in Djibouti. The Djibouti government demobilisation failed to materialise. While has been nervous about the possible impact of encouraging the formation of stable an independent Somaliland on Djibouti' s administrations elsewhere in Somalia, the UN internal politics. Since 1991 there have been has consistently failed to accept the validity of intermittent clashes along the border area over the authorities in Somaliland. The view in commerce and territory. Somaliland that the United Nations has sought The current Ethiopian government came to to destabilise Somaliland has some validity. At power as the Somali state collapsed. In contrast times UNOSOM openly supported other to Somalia, the transfer of power in Ethiopia political parties in Somaliland and encouraged was smooth, brokered and supported by the certain regions to look to Somalia rather than international community, in particular the Somaliland for political alliances. Perhaps most United States. The presence of refugee damaging was UNOSOM's support for the populations in Ethiopia from Somaliland, and federalist positions of Tuur and Jama Yare, the political regionalisation process in Ethiopia which raised doubts in the international that has created Somali Region Five, has left the community over Somaliland's future status. Somaliland-Ethiopian border almost redundant. Since the demise of UNOSOM, policy Somaliland and Region Five form part of a makers such as the Somali Aid Coordination single cultural and economic zone. People move Body (SACB) have continued to refuse to daily between Hargeisa and Hartisheik in engage constructively with Somaliland and to Ethiopia, and many Somalis hold Ethiopian reinforce principles of good governance and passports. Ethiopian traded goods pass through disarmament. Egal's relations with the Berbera, and Hargeisa and Borama are and the SACB have been important commercial centres for eastern fraught. One donor representative summarised Ethiopia. the international community's attitude towards The Ethiopian government has become Somaliland as follows: increasingly concerned about the activities of The image of Somalia as a place in a Islamic movements in the Horn of Africa, and perpetual state of anarchy does not apply to the growth of fundamentalism in Somalia. This North West Somalia. This is the thinking that was demonstrated by Ethiopian attacks on donor interventions from are based Islamic communities in southern Somalia in on. Since UNOSOM was thrown out of the 1996, and threats to Somaliland. Ethiopia has an area, no-one is looking to see North West interest in maintaining good relations with the Somalia succeed. In a sense, people are just Somaliland government in order to curtail any waiting for the collapse of the North West potential threats from Islamic groups. However, Somalia state. (Cited in Boyden and recognition has not been forthcoming. Goodhand, 1995: 15)

30 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT =

SOMALI LAND

In September 1995 there were some signs of Somaliland compromise on both sides. Ministerial reshuffles in that month were seen as an attempt by Egal to reduce the influence of the alan as 1996: Make within the government. Within the Garxajis there were also changes in the military or break leadership.

A progressive peace process By December 1995 the war appeared to have Somaliland consolidates reached a stalemate, but in the absence of independence dialogue or a ceasefire the situation was fragile. It was this situation that concerned It was generally assumed that the emergence of 'Somalilanders' from the Somali emigrant a 'federalist' opposition from within Somaliland diaspora and from within Somaliland sought to signalled the end of Somaliland's ambitions for rectify through the intervention of the 'Peace independence. Ironically, the effect was, if Committee for Somaliland' (see Box 13). anything, to strengthen people's resolve for From May 1996 a peace process began to independence. After 18 months of war the unfold in Somaliland through a number of intra­ federalists had not succeeded in convincing and inter-clan peace meetings. The process their clansmen to reunite with the south. Nor evolved along two fronts: one in the west had they won the support of non-Issaq clans between the Iidagale and the Hargeisa clans to who have less allegiance to Somaliland. The resolve the Hargeisa conflict, the other in the major cost of the war to Somaliland was in east involving Habr Jeclo and Habr Yunis to human lives and in setting back recovery. Those resolve the Burco conflict. who suffered most were the opposition, and In July 1996 representatives of the Iidagale their people who were scattered throughout and Hargeisa clans met in Camp Abokor in Somaliland and across the Ethiopian border. Ethiopia and reached an agreement on 'peaceful coexistence' (Ahmed Farah Yusuf, 1996b). The Camp Abokor conference - Geedi-Socadka The Harshin conference and Nabadda ee Beelaha Hargeisa ('Progressive fi rst moves towa rd s Peace Process Initiated by the Clans in Hargeisa') - was considered by many as a reconciliation breakthrough, being the first substantive talks The fact that a sizeable number of Garxajis between the Iidagale and representatives of the remained in Hargeisa and opposed the opposition Hargeisa clans, in particular the Saad illustrated that this was not just a clan war, but a Musa/Habr Awal. The Peace Committee for struggle between politicians. This impeded early Somaliland played a significant role in the prospects of reconciliation through inter-clan organisation and facilitation of this conference. dialogue. The government rejected another It also garnered the support of the Ethiopian Borama- national conference of clans. authorities of Somali Region Five (Ahmed Mechanisms for inter-clan dialogue were limited Yusuf Farah, 1996a). The Camp Abokor because members of the Guurti were divided. meeting resolved (ibid): In June 1995 a reconciliation conference took • that local groups in Hargeisa area should live place in the village of Harshin on the border together 'harmoniously' and collaborate in with Ethiopia. Initiated by concerned restoring stability and peaceful coexistence individuals within Hargeisa, it involved Iidagale • to conduct a follow-up meeting to continue the elders and members of the National Guurti. peace dialogue, and to hold a second conference Iidagalle elders were under pressure to in Somaliland on 15 August. negotiate, as 80,000 of their people were The Camp Abokor conference was to be displaced to Ethiopia, and UNHCR had refused followed by a meeting in Baali Gubadle in to register them. Although the meeting Somaliland between elders of the Hargeisa concluded optimistically with future talks clans and the Iidagale. However, the scheduled to take place in Hargeisa, these were government opposed the meeting and it was pre-empted in August when the Garxajis militia cancelled. Consequently, the Peace Committee attacked Hargeisa airport. did not manage to turn the Abokor meeting into

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 31 SOMALlLAND

a wider peace process between the Garxajis and helped the check the war, and provided an the government. Egal's attitude towards the impetus for the Camp Abokor meeting. Peace Committee had been ambivalent from the The first meeting between the Habr Jeclo and beginning. Rumour and speculation suggested Habr Yunis came under pressure from the that he was suspicious ofits motives, and that he Ethiopian authorities after fighting between the viewed the Camp Abokor meeting's success as clans over a water tank on the Ethiopian side of a threat to his own authority and influence over the border threatened to spread. The two clans forthcoming presidential elections (see below). met three times from May 1996. This, coupled The peace process in the east proved more with a withdrawal of Somaliland government successful. Since 1991 Burco has suffered two soldiers from around Burco, appears to have major wars. A peace settlement here would be created the opening for reconciliation. A peace of great significance for Somaliland. The agreement was finalised in the town of Beer in reconciliation process in Burco primarily October 1996. While the Peace Committee was involved the Habr Yunis and Habr Jeclo who able to provide some financial support to this are predominant in Burco, with the Arap and Isa peace process, it was the clans in the area who Musa/Habr Awal who live in the area also made the largest investments. participating. The peace process here in fact Tensions between the Habr Yunis and Habr evolved faster than that in the west. Its success Jeclo in Burco stretch back to colonial times.

THE PEACE COMMITTEE FOR SOMALILAND The Peace Committee for of the committee were (ibid): and 'opposition'. This strategy Somaliland has its origins in a • to achieve an immediate involved promoting parallel dialogue series of consultations within the ceasefire wherever armed conflict between the Habr Yunis and Habr Somaliland diaspora during early prevails Jeclo to resolve the war in the east, 1995. In the absence of any • to prepare a framework and and between the lidagale and genuine moves towards venue for dialogue and negotiation Hargeisa over fighting in the west. \ reconciliation between the • to prepare a report on lessons Depending on the outcome, the government and opposition, and learned that could be useful in next step was to facilitate dialogue the apparent failure of the preventing similar conflicts in the between the government and Somaliland elders to intervene, region. Garxajis opposition in Hargeisa, these consultations concluded that In addition, the committee stated followed by a constitutional there was a need to convene an that it would disband once a conference (Peace Committee for independent mission to try to broker ceasefire had been achieved, and Somaliland, 1996). dialogue between the warring an agreement reached by the The Committee had to contend parties. parties to resolve their differences with suspicion about its 'agenda' The Peace Committee defined through dialogue. and the ambitions of its members. itself as a committee of Those objectives later widened to However, given that the traditional 'intellectuals', and received its promote substantive discussions mechanisms appeared not to be mandate from a conference of that would address some of the working, the intransigence of the Somaliland intellectuals held in causes of the conflict. These government and opposition, and London in April 1995 (Peace included discussions on what would the failure of those within the Committee for Somaliland, 1995). constitute a 'viable government' in country to break the deadlock, the The committee relied heavily on Somaliland and the relevance of need for a 'third party' was funding from the diaspora and its 'traditional systems of accepted by many people. The members' individual efforts and governance'.11 Peace Committee managed to put commitment, although some The strategy of the Peace the issue of peace back on the external resources were raised. Committee was twofold. First, to agenda in Somaliland (Ahmed The membership has changed treat the Burco and Hargeisa Yusuf Farah, 1996a). In the words of since 1995. This has enabled the conflicts separately and encourage one Somali: committee to remain adaptable and dialogue between clans with vested The Peace Committee for maintain its independence. interests in those areas. Second, to Somaliland introduced the word The Peace Committee was first encourage dialogue at the level of 'peace' at a time when non-one convened in Addis Ababa in the grassroots political structures of was talking about peace. That September 1995. The initial goals the clan, rather than 'government' helped.12

32 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALlLAND

The current rapprochement between these 1996, raised political tensions in Somaliland. protagonists and other eastern clans at Beer was Concerns were raised about the timing, location, interpreted by some Somalis as an alliance of legitimacy and organisation of the Congress. convenience to challenge Egal's government. 13 First, it was argued that the Congress could It was particularly significant that the Habr not proceed without a cessation of hostilities Yunis agreed to negotiate at Beer within the and a peace agreement; reconciliation was a framework of Somaliland, thus repudiating the prerequisite for a meaningful Congress. The federalist position they once held. However, fact that the Congress in Hargeisa opened while united in Beer, both the Habr Yunis and before the conference in Beer was concluded the Habr Jeclo were themselves divided along raised the possibility of there being two sub-clan lines, with some allied to the conferences, leading to the selection of two government. A concerted effort will be needed presidents. Given the precedent of southern from all sides to ensure the long-term security Somalia, this was seen as extremely dangerous. and peace of Togdheer. Egal's supporters were more positive, arguing It had been envisaged by the Peace that there would be room within the conference Committee that a successful process in the east for reconciliation. Participants at Beer decided and west would pave the way to a constitutional to send a delegation to the Hargeisa Congress conference, similar to the Borama conference of rather than holding a separate conference. 1993 (Peace Committee for Somaliland, 1996; However, when the Congress opened there was Ahmed YusufFarah, 1996b). Plans to widen the little indication that those Iidagale outside discourse, however, were interrupted by the Hargeisa would participate. cancellation of the Baali Gubadle conference Second, the appropriateness of making and the National Guurti's announcement of its Hargeisa the venue for the congress was intention to call a national congress. questioned. The eastern clans wanted the conference to take place in Sheik. This was rejected by the Guurti. Shir Bee/eedka Third, the legitimacy of the Congress was When President Egal's term of office was questioned. Many Somalis argued that extended by 18 months he was required to bring procedures set out in National Charter were the war to an end, introduce a constitution and being ignored. People objected to the the Guurti prepare elections. By mid 1996 the government, giving only 10 days' notice for the start of the parliament and National Guurti were perceived Congress. The government and Guurti were by many Somalis to have failed on all these accused of influencing the selection of counts. delegates, rather than them being chosen by Two draft constitutions were produced, one their clans. Furthermore, the legality of the by a Sudanese lawyer contracted by the existing members of the Guurti and parliament president, and a second by a parliamentary having voting rights in the Congress was committee. In May 1996 heated discussions questioned. The Congress was to comprise 300 over these constitutions led to a vote of no voting delegates, to include 150 from the Guurti confidence in the chair of the parliament, and and parliament and 150 new delegates. There the boycott of parliament by some thirty would also be 100 invited observers. Those parliamentarians and Guurti members claiming opposed to the Congress argued that the current interference from the president. 14 Guurti should not automatically have voting The 18-month extension of Egal's term of rights unless chosen by their clans. The office was due to end on 4 November 1996. In opposition in particular viewed the Guurti as the absence of an agreed constitution multi­ impartial. party elections could not be held. In this Finally, it was argued that it was unclear situation, it was understood that four months whether the Congress's main purpose was to before the expiry of the government's mandate bring about reconciliation, to appoint a new the Guurti would announce the date for a president or decide on a constitution. In the national conference to select a new president opinion of some Somalis, time was required to and vice-president. In September the Guurti discuss the failures and successes of the past announced the date for a national congress (the two administrations before a new administration Shir Beeleedka or Congress of Clans). was selected or constitution introduced. The announcement, and subsequent opening The government, however, gave little space of the Shir Beeleedka in Hargeisa on 15 October for debate on these issues. Before the opening a

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 33 SOMALlLAND

petition signed by 79 Somaliland 'intellectuals' competItion caused one Somali observer to called on the Guurti to rethink its approach and comment: 'The clans do not work collectively to establish 'an independent neutral Guurti and together any more.' 16 preparatory committee in order to have a By December, 12 people had announced their national conference based on free, equitable candidature for president. The criteria set by the representation of the whole population' .15 Guurti for the president immediately ruled out However, all informal approaches and formal several of them. The Congress also agreed on a petitions to the government and Guurti constitution and adopted a new flag. Given that regarding the Congress were rejected, the all these decisions went in Egal's favour ­ activities of the Peace Committee were though not without some opposition - there was proscribed and ministers suspected of every indication at the end of 1996 that he questioning the government's actions were would be re-selected (see note 19). dismissed. The Guurti and government's refusal to countenance any debate on the Congress alarmed many people. Reconsidering the role of elders and the National Fission and fusion Guurti Despite announcing earlier that he would not A knowledgeable observer on Somaliland stand for re-election in November 1996, Egal suggested that the series of inter-clan peace announced his candidacy. Several factors conferences in Somaliland in 1996 was proof favoured his re-election. One was a fear among that 'the traditional method of resolving conflict people in western Somaliland of losing the and political uncertainty in Somaliland now benefits accrued during his administration if a offer the best solution' for the country's new president was selected. A second reason problems (Ahmed YusufFarah, 1996b). In 1993 had to do with the influence Egal was able to the elders of Somaliland won plaudits from assert over the Congress. A major difference many quarters for the way in which they between the 1996 Congress and the 1993 intervened to restore some semblance of peace. Borama Conference was that in 1993 there was The 1993 Borama conference was described by no functioning government with any resources one commentator as 'a triumph of discourse to guide the process. over armed conflict' (Rakiya Omaar, 1993). As the opening of the Congress of Clans The National Charter adopted at Borama approached, Somaliland appeared to be more defined the role of the elders as safeguarding divided and fragmented than at any time since peace. However, in the euphoria of Borama the secession. Clan unity was no longer a given, role of the National Guurti was only with many divided in their attitude towards the superficially specified. The mechanism for Egal administration. For example, in October, selecting the Guurti was poorly defined. Those the paramount suldaan of the Habr Yunis who became the National Guurti in 1993 were decided to join the Congress, which was a major active individuals, but were largely self-selected coup for the government. A second Habr Yunis rather than selected by their clans. suldaan, however, remained in Beer. Similarly, In the light of the war, the subsequent peace among the Iidagale, the suldaan remained processes, and the organisation of the shir critical of the government, while a leading beeleedka, some Somalis were concerned that Iidagale akil joined the Congress. Divisions the Guurti had failed to follow the National existed within the Gadabursi who put forward Charter which they were responsible for five candidates for vice-president. Even Egal's introducing. Elders were 'traditionally' own sub-clan was divided. This fragmentation expect~d to intervene in a conflict. According to was in part precipitated by the government's one Somali the National Guurti had not appointment of new akils and suldaans. performed that role: Fragmentation among the clans, while They will not go to an area of conflict possibly precipitating a move away from clan­ because they fear for their lives. They first based politics, was happening for the wrong ask permission from the government. They reasons. The financial benefits of being in ask for a per diem to go anywhere. I? government or allied to government was The perceived failure of the elders led to the creating competition within clans to fill the 150 intervention of the Peace Committee for seats for delegates at the Congress. This Somaliland.

34 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALILAND

Councils or committees of elders are Future prospects traditionally ad hoc institutions concerned with managing pastoral resources or local clan In mid 1996 the Peace Committee and other disputes. They form in response to a crisis and commentators concluded that the opportunities dissolve once it is resolved. Given the perceived for restoring peace in Somaliland had 'never failings of the Guurti, there is some doubt as to been better' (Ahmed YusufFarah, 1996a; Peace whether the it should be a permanent institution Committee for Somaliland, 1996). This was rather than functioning as an independent ad based on a view that the Egal administration's hoc, task-focused committee that responds to term of office was ending. There was an particular crisis. opportunity for the transfer of power to a new While much of the discussion around the Shir administration, in such a way as to avoid Beeleedka focused on the presidential election, demolishing of Egal's achievements. In there was only limited discussion about what addition, the opposition appeared to have would happen to the current members of the softened their position on negotiations with the Guurti and parliament. The assumption of government and had clarified their position on voting rights by the Guurti was seen by some Somaliland. The influence of the federalist Somalis as an attempt by its members to sustain politicians had for the moment been their positions. People pointed to Egal's marginalised. The possibility of negotiations statement that 'those who extended my period within a single political framework therefore of office also extended their own'. existed. However, by the end of 1996 this Somali social institutions are far from static. optimistic view was fading. Egal's ambivalence The traditional role of the suldaan is perceived towards the peace process, a public feeling that to have changed. The office once held only he was intent on retaining power, and concerns symbolic power (Lewis, 1961): the suldaan over the Congress did not augur well for the were said to stand above the fight to maintain a future. impartial role that enabled them to intervene in The Congress, however, offered the a conflict, but now they appear to be assuming a opportunity for compromise, and time to political role. The Iidagale suldaan who led his address some of the issues that could people to war in Hargeisa brandishing a consolidate peace and stability in Somaliland. Kalashnikov goes against the traditional image. Having opened on 15 October 1996, formal The suldaan in Somaliland are also increasing business was immediately suspended while in number: there were twice as many in 1993 as negotiations were held with a delegation from there had been at independence (Ahmed Yusuf the Beer conference. The concerted effort to Farah, 1993). In 1995 the Dolbahunte were said avoid having two congresses resulting in two to have six garaad (ie suldaan) compared with presidential elections was a sign that two before the war. Somalilanders were tired of war. At the end of The role of religious leaders is also perceived 1996 Somaliland stood at a critical juncture. to have changed. One Somali commented: 'If The outcome of the Shir Beeleedka will shape you see a Sheik entering the office of the the future of Somaliland and peace in the government, suspect his religion.' 18 There is a region. 19 sense that the activities of some of the elders, and religious leaders have contributed to a perceived decline in values.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 35 ~------

SOMALILAND

The progress in rehabilitating basic social International services is all the more impressive .given the small amount spent by the international • • community in Somaliland. The largest assistance In proportion of external assistance has been in health, education, water and sanitation. Some Somaliland limited investment has been made in the agricultural and veterinary sectors. With the exception of water supplies there has been little ven before the civil -war Somalia was investment in essential infrastructure, although Econsidered one of the poorest countrIes III the European Union plans to invest in road Africa. Somaliland's development needs are maintenance and the rehabilitation of port greater now than before. In 1991, immediately facilities at Berbera, and the United Nations after the war, there were no functioning town plans to upgrade the airfields. Overall, there is a water supplies, no sanitation infrastructure, only bias in international assistance programmes basic emergency health services and no towards the major urban centres such as functioning schools throughout Somali1and. Hargeisa. Evidence of increased poverty in rural Basic infrastructure banking, roads, areas (Ahmed Mohamed Hashi, 1996) suggests communications, transport - required extensive that this bias needs to be rectified. rehabilitation. Urban unemployment was high. The war in Somalia and Somaliland has not In 1996, despite strides in rehabilitating only devastated the physical and economic base education and health systems, basic welfare of the country, but also the human and services remained minimal, particularly for institutional - government and civic ­ rural populations. Urban problems of sanitation, structures. Little international assistance has been employment, home construction, and civic channelled through government institutions or has amenities are likely to rise as the urban been directed at strengthening them. In contrast, populations grow. Environmental issues of several agencies, have supported 'capacity range management and changes in land building' for local Somali non-governmental ownership are also likely to increase in organisations (see Boxes 14 and 15). importance. The welfare of refugees and the After UNOSOM withdrew from Somalia, the displaced remains a critical issue, as does UN Coordination Team for Somalia (UNCT) demobilisation and the clearing of land mines. headed by the UNDP resident representative, Access to information, both historical and and senior UN staff, established bases in contemporary, for government and NOOs in all Nairobi along with the donors' forum, SACB, these areas is lacking. Indeed, needs exist in chaired by the European Union. Based in every sector. Nairobi, their perspectives are influenced more One informed observer described the closely by events in Somalia, to the detriment of international response to humanitarian needs in informed decision-making on Somaliland. Somaliland as 'too little, too late, too slow, too Both the Tuur and Egal administrations have bureaucratic' (Oilkes, 1993). Certainly compared sought to regulate and exert some control over with southern Somalia, Somaliland has received international assistance programmes, arguing minimal assistance. The lack of international that international agencies often confuse the recognition of Somaliland means that it does not role of 'guidance' and 'assistance'. At different qualify for bilateral aid and has been eligible times and through various means they have only for humanitarian assistance. Although some sought to tax the aid programmes, often when of this help includes medium-term funding (of the government is in financial straits. In March one to two years) it is disbursed solely through 1995 me government drafted new agreements UN agencies and international non-governmental for international agencies and issued a paper organisations. The numbers of international with eight 'ground rules' for cooperation.20 The NOOs and UN agencies have fluctuated greatly significant rules were: depending on the policy environment and • acceptance of the 'reality of the existence of funding. Fragile security and the lack of the Republic of Somaliland, and the authority substantial funding for long-term assistance of its government' have meant that emergency preparedness and • the integration of assistance programmes response have remained a significant part of into a national development plan international assistance programmes. • a requirement that agencies bring all their

36 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT •

SOMALlLAND

hard currency into the country and open accounts with the National Bank LOCAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL • a requirement that agencies inform the ORGANISATIONS (LNGOs) Ministry of the Interior of all movements, in The indigenous NGO sector in Somalia goes back to the return for which the government guarantees early 1980s and the Ethiopian refugee crisis (Mohamed security Abdillahi, 1996: 39). World Bank structural • the acceptance by agencies of 'accountability adjustment programmes in the late 1980s further stimulated and transparency for funds allocated to the sector's growth. However, as a consequence of war, the Somaliland' collapse of government, and the international intervention in • the recruitment of Somaliland nationals, Somalia, there has been a proliferation of local NGOs unless required qualifications are locally throughout Somalia and Somaliland. unavailable. In Somaliland most were founded by Somali These ground rules would be minimal professionals displaced by the war and living in requirements for international agencies working communities of their kin. Limited job opportunities and a in most countries. In Somaliland most genuine concern to meet urgent rehabilitation needs has international agencies, bar the United Nations led to the creation of local NGOs as a means of gaining owing to political constraints, had little access to resources for their communities. The lack of an objection to the demands. However, agencies internationally recognised government has meant that objected to using the National Bank, given the international assistance agencies have also sought out local fragility of governmental institutions. In 1992 NGOs as indigenous partners to work through. In 1996, in one agency lost all the funds raised from food Hargeisa alone, the government had registered 80 local monetisation that were deposited in the bank NGOs (Bradbury, 1997). In Somaliland the rapid when war broke out in Berbera. There were no proliferation of local NGOs has led to fragmentation, guarantees, and indeed much suspicion, that competition and conflict, and done little to support funds deposited in the bank would be used to reconciliation, consensus building or the reconstruction of support the government's war effort. accountable community based structures or government. Furthermore, agencies were concerned that The local NGO sector, however, is extremely fluid, agreeing to these ground rules in a politically reflecting the opportunistic nature of many of the divided country could be interpreted as an organisations. As government structures have grown in overtly political act. Hargeisa, employment opportunities for professionals have Although the Tuur and Egal administrations' improved, and the numbers of local NGOs declined. A motives for wanting to regulate international number of local NGOs were also displaced and some assistance more closely may be suspect, they divided by the war. identified the need for coordination and The rich variety of LNGOs meets different local needs. coherence in assistance programmes. In Many represent particular sub-clans and the locality that different international they work in. However, it is possible to distinguish between agencies with varied philosophies and interests those with a genuine social concern and those which are implement very different kinds of development ineffectual or purely interested in getting access to programmes, and there is little attempt to resources. Since 1995 efforts among a number of local coordinate or learn from each other, let alone NGOs at self-definition and self-regulation have begun to involve local communities and authorities. The bear with the emergence of a more professional and result is fragmentation and competition rather coherent local NGO community (Mohamed Sheikh than consensus. (Bradbury, 1996) Abdillahi, 1997). Indeed, efforts at self-regulation and After UNOSOM withdrew, international coordination are in many ways in advance of international funding for Somalia and Somaliland declined. agencies. The six-month US$70 million, UN The growth of NGOs and donor support for NGOs over Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia the past decade 'Parallels the dismantling of the state in December 1994 raised only US$13 million in welfare institutions in favour of privatised welfare (Riddell, five months (UN Department of Humanitarian 1992; Duffield, 1994). International NGOs should reflect on Affairs, 1995). The reduction in emergency the implications of this in approaching capacity building or funding for Somalia and Somaliland resulted in institutional strengthening in Somaliland. Openness to these several agencies scaling down their operations. issues will mean that international NGOs are better able to Since 1996, possibly as a result of declining evaluate whether or not they are helping to strengthen local resources, there has been a shift in donors' institutions and contribute to a more stable, just and policy towards supporting areas of stability, equitable environment. rather than instability. Consequently, there has

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 37 SOMALlLAND

CAPACITY BUILDING IN SOMALILAND n politically stable environments indigenous forms of social cope with disaster and recovery. Idevelopment agencies have come organisation that offer alternatives to In Somaliland the government to see institutional development as predatory military structures expressed concern that assistance an important 'empowering' strategy. (Prendergast, 1995). Local programmes through local NGOs Humanitarian interventions in authorities - whether indigenous are not reaching the most war-related disasters, such as in community structures, civic or vulnerable or marginalised groups ­ Somalia, however, have tended to governmental structures - must be such as the Gabooya ('outcastes').22 neglect the institutional or structural encouraged away from predatory Building the capacity of public causes of the crisis in favour of relations with vulnerable voluntary organisations to provide delivering commodities and basic populations, to relationships built on welfare safety nets, or to undertake services. Civic and civil structures reciprocity. However, under the the roles previously carried out by are often neglected and allowed to rubric of strengthening civil society government, does not have a erode. (Bradbury, 1996) this frequently involves international particularly successful history in the A community's vulnerability agencies, often ignorant of other West or elsewhere in Africa. There is arises as much from organisational, structures to work with, encouraging no reason why it should be any institutional or political weakness, as the growth of indigenous NGOs. more effective in Somaliland. from lack of material or physical Capacity building here often To date, capacity building of well-being. Likewise, individual consists of little more than local NGOs in Somaliland, has vulnerability arises as much from strengthening organisations of involved little more than the breakdown of social structures professionals to implement projects strengthening sub-contracting and groups (the family, community, designed by international agencies. relations. If other rationales exist ­ village) as from lack of material In Somaliland, capacity building such as strengthening civic resources. During wars it is programmes supported by institutions as a balance to necessary to support and maintain international agencies to date have government, improving the civil and civic structures before they been primarily concerned with the effectiveness and sustainability of break down completely. 'Capacity 'organisational development' of development interventions, building' to maintain or strengthen local NGOs. Training has focused strengthening livelihood security such structures should be an on management skills, strategic systems, or enabling communities essential part of the humanitarian planning, administration, and to cope with disasters - then they response to war-related disasters. approaches to participatory are poorly articulated. In civil wars where the state has development. The impact of this While some forms of capacity collapsed, it can be difficult to may be seen in the strength and building may enable communities to identify 'legitimate' political and civic durability of some local groups that deal with the 'shocks' of a natural structures to support and work with, have received this kind of support. disaster, there is little understanding and by what criteria. Programmes However, it says little about their of how to build people's capacities to build or strengthen institutional impact. The net effect may be the to deal with the shocks of political capacity are often premised on development of local organisations instability and conflict. War may be external agencies' definitions of in the image of international NGOs, fought to increase the material and what is legitimate. UNOSOM's but dependent on external support. political capacity of one group at attempts to create civil In Somaliland many local the expense of another. Indeed, administrations in southern Somalia organisations have adopted the while the foundered when communities failed label of NGO when in fact some are has welcomed capacity building to accept their legitimacy. In many more like businesses and should be programmes for local NGOs, there places clan-based councils of elders recognised and supported as such. has been apprehension that the net proved more acceptable. In Support to local NGOs and civil • effect may be to build the capacity Somaliland the failure of international society is considered a non-political of those constituencies which the donors and UN agencies to activity, and therefore easy to justify NGOs are associated with. At the recognise the legitimacy of in a politically charged environment. same time, the government is indigenous councils or their right to However, international agencies interested in building the capacity of appoint their choice of government need to question the extent to its own institutions. In a politically has undermined recovery. which building the capacity of such charged environment, involvement In war-related emergencies organisations actually helps to in capacity building is thus fraught efforts should be made to support strengthen communities' ability to with dangers.

38 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT s l

SOMALI LAND

been new interest in Somaliland, and with it a move from relief to developmental WOMEN IN SOMALILAND programming.22 The shift, however, begs many During the war against Siad Barre women were questions. Not least of these are: What kind of an invisible front for the SNM, working as nurses development? And which institutions on and medics. They were also a lifeline for the the ground are appropriate to implement family, taking relatives out of the country. As development? One observer on Somalia noted: refugees in Europe they remitted money back to the country. Able to travel in Somalia more freely Many of today's 'reconstruction' and than men, women maintained channels of 'rehabilitation' programmes are designed to communication and were extremely important as do little more than to repair, piecemeal, the traders. In the Ethiopian refugee camps Issaq ruins of the former system; UN agencies and women established trading networks that ran NGOs rarely consider to what extent their between the Persian Gulf, Djibouti and programmes may replicate the profoundly Mogadishu. flawed and dysfunctional expansion of the During the Barre era women were politically old unsustainable, largely artificial, and aid­ active in the north demonstrating against the dependent Somali state. (Bryden, 1995) regime. Many of the most active Somaliland Given a largely unsatisfactory history of aid NGOs are headed by women, and many women programmes in Somalia, some observers have are active in the new Islamic movements. In 1992 argued for a reduction of external assistance as and 1993 women played a significant role in the best way forward (de Waal, 1995). The 'aid­ supporting peace and reconciliation. This dependent' state will no longer be something to included exerting pressure on the elders to fight over. Foreign aid will no longer destabilise mediate in the Berbera conflict, organising the political process and fuel fighting in the way demonstrations in Hargeisa in support of peace, that it has done in the south. It will also require petitioning Tuur's administration to sue for peace, people to rely on their own resources. and providing some logistics and financial It could be argued that the lack of support. This critical role was finally international intervention in Somaliland has acknowledged by the Guurti at the Borama indeed provided a space for people to re­ conference of 1993. Women were given greater establish 'social contracts' without the opportunity than usual to recite poems at the distractions of aid. However, it has also delayed conference. the process of recovery. A policy of In post-war Somaliland women are often the abandonment has left the region isolated and sole providers of family income as petty traders. marginalised, and its population vulnerable to Among pastoralist communities women have the machinations of political elites and regional taken on increased responsibilities for family and international forces. The alternative to livelihoods. While men acknowledge this, it has abandonment is to identify appropriate forms of not translated into increased decision-making assistance that strengthen internal efforts to powers for women (Ahmed Mohamed Hashi, rebuild a more stable social, political and 1996). The roles and rights of women have not economic order. been recognised in the distribution of employment Here one might take the lead from Somalis opportunities. Men have had first priority in all whose efforts through forums such as the jobs in government institutions and welfare Borama conference, if not totally successful, services. Although there was a woman in Egal's have focused on addressing the institutional first cabinet in 1993, the post proved temporary. dimensions of the crisis. The Borama After the outbreak of war in November 1994 conference was a missed opportunity for the the activities of NGOs headed by women international community in Somaliland. Timely declined. Like ttfe male organisations they were and appropriate international support to back up subject to the political divisions in society. Many the resolutions of that conference might have women leaders were displaced. By 1996 some helped to avert the crisis that erupted in 1994. women's NGOs had been revitalised, and At the end of 1996 most donors and aid women again began to be active in peace and agencies had adopted a 'wait and see' position reconciliation. For the first time women's on the National Congress. Given that this was a organisations were invited to attend critical juncture in Somaliland, this was National Conference as observers in 1996. potentially a very negative response. (Brad bury, 1997)

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 39 SOMALlLAND

developed during the war (see Box 17), War and Somalia, and to an extent Somaliland, has been left with a maze of localised polities. These include councils of elders, the remnants of humanitarian UNOSOM initiated district councils, and in places religious authorities which have intervention instituted Islamic law (shari'a). These varied polities represent new forms of adaptation to the collapse of the state. In the absence of state institutions they perform some of the essential functions of governance. In The impact of the Somali some areas councils of clan elders have Civil War established local security systems in cooperation with militia. These councils are In 1992, at the height of the conflict and famine, involved in negotiating external relations with the situation in Somalia was described by one aid agencies, and provide the main source of US diplomat as 'the worst humanitarian crisis local authority and nascent administrations. In faced by any people in the world'. By the end of north Mogadishu, Islamic courts fill a vacuum that year more than 500,000 people had died in social control and security, although the (twice the number that perished in Bosnia), and emergence of Islamic fundamentalists is a 1.5 million people, including the majority of the source of concern for many Somalis. These non-Somali population, had sought refuge varied polities have become the first point of outside the country. Many more Somalis have contact for international agencies. Their since died. legitimacy and authority should be measured on The war has affected all parts of Somalia and the basis of their local support, their Somaliland. Only the north-eastern regions of performance and their standards of good Somalia and Sool and Awdal regions of governance, rather than the bureaucratic needs Somaliland escaped the worst of the violence. of foreign donors and NGOs (Menkhaus and However, as the state collapsed, these areas, like Prendergast, 1995). others, were affected by the pressures of Many Somali intellectuals, politicians, and destitute and traumatised people displaced by the international community generally, have the war. Whole communities were uprooted. argued that regulation and security can be The majority of the non-Somali population left provided only by re-establishing a strong state the country. The war destroyed housing, urban authority. However, doing so would have to industry, communications, social services and contest with political, social and economic agricultural infrastructure. In Hargeisa alone forces that continue to promote statelessness. 60,000 houses were destroyed. From Hargeisa These include interests that profit from the and Galkaiyo to the Kenyan border, government economy of plunder, militia leaders whose and public buildings were ransacked. power base rests on mobilisation and fear, and Since 1990 there have been extensive entire clans that benefit from the occupation of movements of people within the country. In valuable real estate in Mogadishu and the 1992 an estimated 2 million Somalis were riverine valleys. It is acknowledged that there internally displaced. Most population can be no military victory for any Somali movements involved people fleeing from the faction. The reasons for the continuation of the violence, although agricultural and other conflict must therefore lie elsewhere. In economic opportunities in the south, including Somaliland the incentive for reconciliation and t1lQse provided by aid agencies, attracted peac~ul coexistence must contest with, in the aggressive clan expansion. In places this words of Egal, the 'project' of war. involved 'clan cleansing' (Lewis and Mayall, 1995: xvi). Traditionally in Somali pastoral society there are no fixed land rights. One The UN's lost agenda consequence of the war has been that clans have In 1993 UNOSOM 11, with a budget of tended to assert territorial rights more generally, US$1.5 billion, was at the time the most based on traditional or recently conquered expensive UN peacekeeping operation in the spheres of interest. world; the next was Bosnia at US$222 million. Within the broad political alliances that Somalia was host to the greatest number of UN

40 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT s

SOMALlLAND

troops ever deployed in a peacekeeping through peace conferences helped legitimise operation. It was the first time the United Nations them and restrict the emergence of alternative invoked powers of peace enforcement under leaders. In some areas the district councils did Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNOSOM in provide a vehicle for improved inter-clan Somalia was therefore an experiment for the UN in which the stakes were high (Bradbury, 1994a; Slim and Visman, 1994). POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION Coming at the end of the Cold War, the In the course of the war the Somali state has fractured into Somali civil war became a testing ground for semi-autonomous regions, controlled by clan-based military the international community's response to organisations and varied fragile forms of local administration. violent conflict and humanitarian crises in a In 1995 the main political factions and alliances consisted of 'new world order' . In particular it became a trial the following (Menkhaus and Prendergast, 1995): for the United Nations's envisaged role as the Somali Patriotic Movement/Somali National Alliance: An international arbiter of conflicts (Boutros Ghali, alliance of Ogaden clans occupying the west bank of the 1992). UNOSOM was one of a growing number river Juba and Middle Juba region, and allied to Aideed. of humanitarian operations in the early 1990s Somali Patriotic Movement: Primarily based on the that sought to assist war-affected civilians Majeerteen clan in Kismayo, headed by Siad Barre's during an on-going conflict (Karim et aI, 1996). son-in-law General Morgan. It thus had international significance for the Somali Salvation Democratic Front: Primarily based on the evolution of humanitarian policy and conflict Majeerteen in north-east Somalia, although they also have management. The United States, following its wider interests in the south, particularly Kismayo. Although success leading the allies in the Gulf War was the north-east became virtually autonomous, the political also exercising its authority as the world's elite still prefer a federal structure. remaining superpower. There was also United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance suspicion that US military intervention in (USC/SNA): Headed by General Aideed and based in south Somalia was a move to protect US oil Mogadishu, this is dominated by a fragile alliance of Habr investments (Parenti, 1996: 437).23 Gedir Hawiye clans. The alliance was weakened by UNOSOM's policies and actions in Somalia divisions between Aideed and his former financier Osman were thus dominated more by the political Ato. In March 1995 Aideed attempted to form a new interim agendas ofthe United Nations and United States government, which included former Somaliland president than those of the Somali people. The vested Abdulrahman Tuur as vice-president and Jama Yare as interests of parties within UNOSOM impeded foreign minister. Aideed's failure to win support for his its ability to respond adequately to the situation. government led most analysts to assume that his power Although humanitarian assistance undoubtedly was waning. In September 1995, however, he captured helped to save thousands of lives in the south Baidoba. Initially, this united most of the other factions and restored some public services, the political against him. General Aideed was killed in fighting in August and military sides of the operation were 1996. His son Hussein Aideed has since taken his place as ignominious failures, which have had far­ head of the SNA. reaching implications for UN missions in United Somali Congress (USC): Headed by Ali Mahdi Bosnia and . Despite six internationally Mohamed, based in north Mogadishu, and consisting of a sponsored peace conferences, the United fragile alliance of Ali Mahdi's Hawiye Abgal and other Nations failed to restore stability in the south. Hawiye clans. Two schools of thought have dominated Somali Democratic Movement: Based on a Oigil-Merifle approaches to reconciliation and peacebuilding in alliance in Baidoba and the inter-riverine region, with some Somalia. One advocates engaging with the Oir groups around Brava. Its aspiration for local autonomy warlords, as the de facto political leaders in the within Somalia was upset by Aideed's capture of Baidoba south. The other advocates engaging with a and splits within the SOM. 'grassroots' constituency through localised, Minority groups: Other alliances representing the interests indigenous and democratic peacemaking of minor groups in Somalia, and to some extent in processes in which the warlords are marginalised. Somaliland, have asserted their separate identities. In UNOSOM pursued both tracks, engaging with the Hargeisa, for example, a party representing the 'Gabooya' warlords and their factions through internationally (outcastes) has emerged to put its case of discrimination to brokered peace conferences, and a wider the government. Through the court they reclaimed some of constituency through the formation of district the property they lost during the war. Many who had sought councils. Both approaches were problematic. The refuge in Ojibouti have since returned to Hargeisa. warlords' participation in the political process

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 41 ------

SOMALI LAND

relations, and intersected with traditional administration were exposed when the authority structures (, Somaliland National Guurti failed to avert or April 1995). However, they failed to provide the intercede to end the conflict in 1994. building blocks for a restored Somali While massive humanitarian aid helped stem government. UNOSOM concurrently failed to the tide of famine in Somalia, the UN recognise and build on localised peace intervention failed to comprehend the economic processes that brought a measure of stability to dimensions of the war. Estimates of the cost of some areas. These included the Galkaiyo peace the UNOSOM mission since 1992 run between conference in May 1993 which restored some US$2 billion and US$3 billion; UNOSOM's stability to the central regions and opened trade headquarters alone cost US$160 million to routes between Mudug, Galgadud and build. By early 1994 UNOSOM was paying Mogadishu, the August 1993 Jubaland more than US$40 million in salaries and conference which brought six months of peace contracts, and was employing as many as to Kismayo, and the June 1993 Borama 17,000 Somalis, 11 ,000 in Mogadishu alone conference in Somaliland. (Bradbury, 1994a) (Prendergast, 1997: 113). The concentration of UN efforts at mediating the Somali conflict UN operations in Mogadishu meant that other contrast starkly with local peace initiatives in areas missed out on assistance. Humanitarian Somaliland in 1992 and 1993. The locally aid also also helped perpetuate Mogadishu as a sponsored peace conferences in Sheikh and focus of conflict. The financial payments made Borama were fundamentally different from the directly and indirectly to faction leaders helped UN sponsored conferences in Addis Ababa. The fund their political and military machines. peace process that has been unfolding in Aideed, who controlled southern Mogadishu, Somaliland since, while partially the result of where the largest part of the UN operation was the intercession of Somalilanders from the based, probably benefited most. International diaspora, has again sought to harness the NGOs, through the hiring of armed guards to lineage-based grassroots political structures. protect their staff and operations, also bear some And yet neither the so-called 'top-down' responsibility. At one time the International approach to conflict resolution characterised by Committee of the Red Cross was said to be the UN in Somalia, nor the 'bottom-up' spending US$100,000 weekly on protection in approach adopted by elders in Somaliland has Mogadishu (ibid: 113). But it was not just secured lasting peace and stability. Somalis who benefited. International staff of The reasons for the failure of the UN agencies had their salaries augmented with approach are clear. Among other things, the hardship post bonuses. It is said that two conferences were externally driven and Western contractors to UNOSOM in two years sponsored. There was little incentive for earned the equivalent of more than one-third of military leaders and their militias, who were annual US development assistance to Africa profiting from an economy of plunder and (ibid: 113). extortion, to implement any peace accord. With Following the withdrawal of UNOSOM, the peace conferences held outside Somalia most factions' power bases eroded and the there was little pressure on the factional leaders internal struggle moved to other resources. In to adhere to the agreements. UNOSOM was a March 1995, for example, fighting broke out bureaucratic state-centric body. Constituted by between clients of rival Italian and US fruit governments, its mandate was to re-establish a companies over the Somali banana trade centralised government, albeit with (Menkhaus and Prendergast, 1995). Economic decentralised regional and district structures. decline in Somalia in the 1980s, as noted, Here the United Nations failed to acknowledge hastened the end of the Barre regime, as a government as a source of conflict. The inept violertt struggle emerged between elites for attempts to cobble together a government set control over Somalia's formal and informal back opportunities for national reconciliation. economies, and southern Somalia's productive At the same time, local level reconciliation resources. This struggle was later transferred to and grassroots peace accords, to date, have not humanitarian aid brought by international provided the foundations for lasting resolution agencies. The UN humanitarian and military to conflict in Somaliland. The inherent intervention and efforts at peacebuilding in difficulties of melding customary institutions, Somalia did not begin to address the economic concerned with managing pastoral resources or crisis underlying the conflict. local clan disputes, with a modern

42 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALlLAND

Subsequent civilian and military governments EPILOGUE attempted to create a unitary Somali state, by turning corporate responsibility away from sectional kinship loyalties towards the state. The development of a centralised state reached Understanding its peak, and nadir, in the repressive regime of Siad Barre. From this perspective the civil war may be seen as a conflict about governance, a the Somali struggle to overthrow a corrupt and oppressive state in pursuit of greater self-determination and conflict democracy. The most dramatic example of this re-assertion of self-determination was the declaration of Somaliland's independence. The most conspicuous feature of the Somali he Somali state has collapsed. However, conflict has been a reaffirmation of lineage Tterms like 'anarchy', 'chaos' and 'madness' identity and territoriality over national to describe the disintegration and condition of concerns. The civil war in Somalia, while the statelessness in Somalia, indicate an inadequate direct legacy of the lack of power sharing, understanding of Somali society and the corruption, and human rights violations by the dynamics of the conflict. They also serve to Barre regime, has manifestly been fought along portray the conflict as intractable, beyond clan lines. The 'anarchy' today must, therefore, understanding and therefore resolution. partly be understood in relation to the The legacies of European colonialism, a segmentary nature of clans and their shifting schismatic kinship system, the contradictions alliances. For the majority of Somalis, however, between a centralised state and a pastoral the reaffirmation of lineage identity has been culture, Cold War geopolitics, militarisation, predicated on the pursuit of security; and for underdevelopment and inequitable development, others the pursuit of economic and political ecological degradation, the abuse of power, gain. A singular focus on the internal, functional corruption and human rights violations, all dynamics of 'clanism' overlooks the external provide some explanation for the crisis in economic, political and environmental factors Somalia. In addition one must look at the that lie behind the war. A simple recitation of cumulative effects of decades of protracted historic anthropological analysis disregards the conflict within Somalia and between it and its contemporary political and economic changes. neighbours on the development of the Somali The Somali civil war erupted as the Horn of state and the lives of the Somali people. Africa was undergoing social, political and At independence Somalia was considered economic transformations directly related to unique in Africa, being a state founded on a global political and economic changes at the single ethnic group (Somali Government, 1962). end of the Cold War. Globally, and in the Horn, Why a seemingly ethnically homogeneous traditional definitions of sovereignty are under society should be wrecked by such internal pressure to adapt (Boutros Ghali, 1992). conflict is difficult for outsiders to comprehend. Decades of civil war and natural catastrophe To understand current and future political trends have left the region economically bankrupt. The in Somalia and Somaliland it is important to arming of governments by foreign powers over revise Eurocentric notions of political decades has left the Horn awash with weapons. formations. The political constitution of Somali While superpower geopolitics no longer society lies not in the centralised political dominate the region, the Somali war is more institutions of a European model, but in a than an 'internal war'. This is not a traditional particular social system where the notion of a war between pastoral clans, but one where 'social contract' has more to do with regulating 'clanism' has been manipulated by powerful political and economic relationships between elites struggling to control diminishing pastoral kinship groups, than with delegating resources in a context of declining aid flows responsibility to a central polity. Until the and Somalia's (and Africa's) marginalisation colonial period the Somali nation did not form a in the world economy. It is, therefore, the unitary state. Colonialism grafted a system of specific nature of Somali society and its centralised governance onto a decentralised and interaction with global processes that account egalitarian political system of a pastoral people. for the Somali civil war.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 43 SOMALlLAND

For the future, an essential question is the those external changes. Telecommunications extent to which fundamental social values, such that make informal money transfers possible as expressed in the Somali xeer, have been lost between London and any part of Somaliland during years of military rule and war. Evidence within 24 hours is another. The proliferation of suggests that Barre's assault on the fabric of Somali non-governmental organisations, the Somali society ultimately did not manage to growth of international NGGs and the eliminate the traditional or historical Somali responsibilities delegated to them by donors to value systems. There is a strong sense in act in the Somali crisis is yet another. Somaliland of people looking to their culture, The political constitution of Somali society is their religion and their politics, both for intricately linked to the pastoral economy. That explanations as to why Somalia has reached the economy is changing in response to internal and state it is in, and to the future. There is a external factors. The commercialisation of the conviction among many Somalis that future livestock sector in the past three decades has peace and stability can grow only as people affected the social, economic and political rebuild trust, consensus and political and relations in Somali society. Since 1991 numbers economic cooperation from the grassroots. To of livestock exported from Somaliland have this end people in Somaliland and some areas in increased substantially. Growth in livestock Somalia have put their faith in traditional numbers puts pressure on rangeland resources. institutions and means of political conflict The amount of commercial feed being grown is management. The Borama Conference and the increasing. Cultivation is becoming more Sanaag and Togdheer peace processes all attest widespread. Changes in the composition of to the strength of these. However, as noted, livestock herds affect the division of labour and these 'grassroots' processes have yet to bear social relations. A monetary economy fruit in long-term stability. The war has had an encourages urban migration. The breakdown of impact on the lineage-based political structures traditional pastoralism affects authority of Somali society. The internal and external structures. Privatisation of land is increasing. environment with which they must cope is The expansion of enclosures on rangelands has, volatile. in places, led to armed clashes. The war has also The civil war's effect on the political caused a considerable movement in population. economy of Somali society has scarcely been Transformations in the Somali political analysed. The current political formations in economy in the 1980s, linked to global changes, Somaliland and Somalia are a response and helped to precipitate the Somali war. External adaptation to an 'internal' political crisis ­ interventions by aid organisations in Somalia historical political regimes and the civil war ­ and Somaliland need to be of both the and 'external' political changes taking place in nature of these internal changes, and the impact the region and globally. The appearance of of the external environment on the Somali satellite television in Somaliland, where none peoples. existed before the war, is a simple example of

44 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALlLAND

Notes 12. Interviewed in Hargeisa, October 1996. 13. Interviews in Hargeisa, October 1996. 1. The 'Haud and Reserved Area' are the 14. Interview with parliamentarian, October principal wet-season grazing grounds for 1996. Somaliland livestock. By the 1897 Anglo­ 15. Notice of the 'Forum for Peace and Egyptian Treaty, clans of the Somaliland National Reconciliation', August 1996. Protectorate had rights of access to the Haud. 16. Interviewed in Hargeisa, December 1996 A second Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty in 1954 saw 17. Interviewed in Hargeisa, October 1996. British military administration withdraw from 18. Interviewed in Hargeisa, October 1996. the Haud and Reserved Area. Somalilanders' 19. On 23 February 1997 Mohamed Haji rights were reaffirmed, but abrogated at Ibrahim Egal was elected by 223 votes in the Somaliland's independence in 1960. Shir Beeleedka as President of Somaliland for 2. This section draws on Bradbury, 1994b. a further five years. His closest rival received 3. Italian commercial interest in Somalia's 90 votes. Early indications were that the banana trade continues today. decision of the Congress has been widely 4. This section draws on Bradbury, 1994a. accepted and that Somaliland's war has come 5. Dr Aden Yousef Abokor, personal to an end. The Iidagale have returned to communication. Hargeisa. 6. John Drysdale, personal communication, 20 Council of Ministers Policy Statement, 15 September 1995. March 1995. 7. According to some observers, the 21. Interview with government minister, recruitment of Gadabursi militia into the September 1995. The name 'Gabooya' refers 'national army' created deep resentment to the 'outcastes', Tumaale, Midgan and Yibr. among the Garxajis, and a sense of grievance 22. See, for example, 'From Relief to which will colour future clan relationships in Development in Somalia: Situation Report for Somaliland. the Period 19 December 1995 - 15 January 8. Control of currency has also been a 1996'. Office of the United Nations significant factor in southern Somalia. Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator for 9. Interview by author, Hargeisa, October Somalia, Nairobi. 1996. 23. The US oil companies Conoco, Amoco, 10. John Drysdale, personal communication, Chevron, and Phillips owned concessions in October 1995. Somalia. Osman Atto, General Aideed's 11. Draft agenda for a 'Forum of Somaliland financier, was a Conoco representative in Intellectuals' (October 1996). Somalia.

African Rights (1993) Operation Restore References Hope: A preliminary assessment, London: African Rights. African Rights (1994) Grass and the Roots of Peace: Pastoral resources, conflict and Abdillahi, Mohamed S (1996) in M Bradbury conflict resolution in Somalia and Somaliland, Building Partnerships for Participatory London: unpublished. Development: Report ofa workshop held in Africa Watch (1990) Somalia: A government Hargeisa, Somaliland ID-14th December 1995, at war with its people, The Africa Watch London: ICD/CIIR. Committee: New York. Abdillahi, Mohamed S (1997) 'Report from Ahmed, Ali J (1995) (ed) The Invention of Awdal NGOs: the establishment of the Awdal Somalia, Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press. Association ofIndigenous NGOs' in M Amnesty International (1988 September) Bradbury Building Partnerships for Peace and Somalia: A long-term human rights crisis, Development: Report ofa workshop held in Washington, DC. Borama, Somaliland 9-12th December 1996, Boutros-Ghali, B (1992) An Agenda for London: ICD/CIIR. Peace, New York: United Nations.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 45 SOMALlLAND

Boyden, J and Goodhand, J (1995 October) beelaha Hargeysa: Progressive peacemaking NGO Capacity-Building in North West process among the clans in Hargeysa Area, Somalia, consultancy report, Oxford: UNDP Emergency Unit for Ethiopia. INTRAC. Gersony, R (1989) Why Somalis Flee: A Bradbury, M and Davies, R (1991) Report of synthesis ofaccounts ofconflict experience in the Assessment Mission to Bari, Nugal and Northern Somalia by Somali refugees, displaced Mudug Regions, Inter-NGO Committee for persons and others, Washington DC: Bureau for Somalia, London: ActionAid. Displaced Persons, US Department of State. Bradbury, M (1994a) The Somali Conflict: Gilkes, P (1993) Two Wasted Years: The Prospects for peace, Oxfam Research Paper Republic ofSomaliland 1991-1993, London: No 9, Oxfam UKII: Oxford. Save the Children Fund (UK). Bradbury, M (1994b) The Politics of Gilkes, P (1995) Acceptance not Recognition: Vulnerability, Development and Conflict: The Republic ofSomaliland 1993-1995, Exploring the issues with reference to Somalia London: Save the Children Fund (UK). and Somaliland, MSc dissertation, Hashi, Ahmed M (1996) Pastoral Livelihood Birmingham University, UK. Systems: Resource trends and institutional Bradbury, M (1996) Conflict and constraints in Sool and Sanaag Region, Humanitarian Aid: Civil society and our part VetAid: Somaliland. in its downfall? Paper presented to British Holt, J and Lawrence, M (1992) The Prize of Agencies Afghanistan Group at 'Good Practice Peace - A Survey ofRural Somaliland, in the Afghan Context: NGOs Planning and London: Save the Children Fund (UK). Collaborating to Strengthen Civil Society' Human Rights Watch/Africa (April 1995) seminar, 10 January 1996. Somalia Faces the Future: Human rights in a Bradbury, M (1997) Building Partnerships fragmented society, Vol 7, No. 2, New York, for Peace and Development: Report ofa Washington and London. workshop held in Borama, Somaliland 9-12th Jan, Ameen (1996 July) Peace Building in December 1996, London: ICD/CIIR. Somalia, IPA Policy Briefing Series, New Bryden, M (1994 December) Mission to York: International Peace Academy. Somalia, Special report prepared for UNDP Kapteijns, L (1994) 'Women and the Crisis of Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia. Communal Identity: The Cultural Construction Bryden, M (1995 November) Somaliland and of Gender in Somali History' in Ahmed I Peace in the Horn ofAfrica: A situation report Samatar (ed) The Somali Challenge: From and analysis, UNDP Emergencies Unit for catastrophe to renewal?, London: Lynne Ethiopia, mimeo. Rienner, Boulder, pp 211-33. Compagnon, D (1991) 'The Somali Opposition Karim, A, Duffield, M, Jaspers, S, Benini, Fronts: Some Comments and Questions' in A, Macrae, J, Bradbury, M, Johnson, D, Horn ofAfrica, vol XIII, No. 1 and 2. and Larbi, J (1996) Operation Lifeline de Waal, A (1995) 'Negative Capability' in (OLS): A review, Department of Humanitarian UN: Make or break, London: Index on Affairs, Geneva. Censorship, No. 511995, pp 58-66. Laitin, DD, and Samatar, Said S (1987) Drysdale, J (1992) Somaliland: The anatomy Somalia: A nation in search ofa state, ofsecession, Brighton: Global Stats Ltd. London: Gower. Duffield, M (1994) 'Complex Emergencies Lewis, IM (1961) A Pastoral Democracy: A and the Crisis of Developmentalism' in study ofpastoralism and politics among the Maxwell and Buchanan-Smith (ed) Linking Northern Somali ofthe Horn ofAfrica, Reliefand Development, IDS Bulletin, vol 25, London: Oxford University Press. No. 4, Sussex: IDS. Lewls, IM (1969) Peoples ofthe Horn of Farah, Ahmed Yusuf (1993) The Roots of Africa, Somali, Afar and Saho, Ethnographic Reconciliation: Peace-making endeavours of Survey of Africa, North , Part 1, comtemporary lineage leaders in North- West London: International Africa Institute. Somalia/Somaliland, London: ActionAid. Lewis, IM (1988) A Modern History of Farah, Ahmed Yusuf (1996a 27 June) Camp Somalia, Colorado: Westview Press. Abokor Meeting, UNDP Emergencies Unit for Lewis, IM and Mayall, J (1995 August) A Ethiopia, mimeo. Study ofDecentralised Political Structures for Farah, Ahmed Yusuf (1996b 11 July) Camp Somalia: A menu ofoptions, London School of Abokor Peace Conference, General Economics and Political Science. Observations: Geedi-Socodka nabadda ee

46 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT SOMALlLAND

Little, PD (1992) 'Traders, Brokers and Sahnoun, Mohamed (1994) Somalia: The Market "Crisis" in Southern Somalia' in missed opportunities, Washington: USIP Press. Africa, 62 (1) pp 94-124. Samatar, Abdi I (1994) 'Empty Bowl: Menkhaus, K and Prendergast, J (May Agrarian Political Economy in Transition and 1995) Governance and Economic Survival in the Crisis of Accumulation' in Ahmed 1. Post-intervention Somalia, CSIS Africa Notes, Samatar (ed) The Somali Challenge: From Centre for Strategic and International Studies, catastrophe to renewal? London: Lynne Washington, No 172. Rienner, Boulder, pp 65-94. Mohamoud, MS and Hashi, AM (1988) Samatar, Abdi I (1989) The State and Rural Somalia Livestock Sector Development: Transformation in Northern Somalia, 1984­ Interventions and responses, Mogadishu: 1986, WisconsinlLondon: University of BOCD (CUR). Wisconsin Press. Miller, NN (1981) 'The Other Somalia: Part 1 Samatar, Abdi I (1985) 'The Predatory State - Illicit Trade and the Hidden Economy' in and the Peasantry: Reflections on Rural American Universities Field StaffReports, Development Policy in Somalia' in Africa Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, (29), pp 1-17. Today, 32, No. 3, pp 41-56. Mukhtar, H Mohamed (1996) 'The Plight of Samatar, Ahmed I (1988) Socialist Somalia: the Agro-Pastora1 Society of Somalia' in Rhetoric and reality, London: Zed Books. Review ofAfrican Political Economy, Vo1 32, Samatar, Ahmed I (1985) No 7, pp543-553, Oxford: CARFAX. 'Underdevelopment in Somalia: Dictatorship Niyathi, P (1995) 'Somali1and, : without Hegemony' in Africa Today, 32, No. Demobilisation and development. The tasks of 3, pp 23-40. redesigning a future without conflict' in A Shepherd Samatar, Said S (1991) Somalia: A nation in and M Bradbury (eds) Rural Extension Bulletin: turmoil, Minority Rights Group: London. Development and conflict, No 8, December, Simons, A (1995) Networks ofDissolution: Reading University AERDD, pp 26-28. Somalia undone, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Omaar, Rakiya (1993) The Best Chance for Press. Peace: Africa Report. Simons, A (1996) 'Somalia: A Regional Parenti, M (1996 December) 'The Myth of Security Dilemma' in 1. Keller and D Rothchild Good Interventions' in Peace Review: (eds) Africa in the New International Order: Humanitarian intervention? Vo1 8/4, Oxford: Rethinking state sovereignty and regional CARFAX Publishing Company, pp 471-76. security, UK: Lynne Rienner, pp 71-84. Peace Committee for Somaliland (1995) The Slim, Hand Visman, E (1994) 'Evacuation, Search for a Peaceful Solution to Fighting in Intervention and Retaliation: United Nations Somaliland: An interim report, mimeo. Humanitarian Operations in Somalia 1991­ Peace Committee for Somaliland (1996) An 1993' in J Harris (ed) Sovereignty and Interim Report on the Search for a Peaceful Suffering, London: Pinter/Save the Children. Solution to the Fighting in Somaliland, report Somali Government (1962) The Somali on main events from 22 March 1996 and other Peninsula: A new light on imperial motives, major activities planned to follow, mimeo. Information Services of the Somali Prendergast, J (1991) Peace, Development government. and People ofthe Horn ofAfrica, occasional Somaliland Peace Charter (1993) Somaliland paper, Washington: Bread for the World Communities Security and Peace Charter Institute. (translation by Mohamoud Hamud Sheik). Prendergast, J (1995 October) Minimizing Swift, J (1979) 'The Development of Negative Externalities ofAid: The Ten Livestock Trading in a Nomadic Pastoral Commandments, draft paper for the US Economy' in PastrJral Production and Society, Institute for Peace, 'Humanitarian Aid and Proceedings ofthe International Meeting on Conflict in Africa' . Nomadic Pastoralism, Paris, 1-3 December Prendergast, J (1997) Crisis Response: 1976: Cambridge University Press, pp 447-65. Humanitarian band-aids in Sudan and UNDHA, DHA News, May/June 1995, Somalia, London: P1uto Press with Centre of No. 14, Geneva: UN Department of Concern. Humanitarian Affairs. Riddell, R (1992) Losing the 90s: Another Yusuf, Haroon A (1996) The role of declining decade for African development, traditional governance in Sanaag/Somaliland, CUR Briefing Paper, London: CUR. ActionAid: unpublished mimeo.

CIIR COUNTRY REPORT 47 SOMALILAND

Abbreviations and glossary

ABBREVIATIONS

EU European Union GNP gross national product ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IMF International Monetary Fund LNGO local non-governmental organisation NDC National Demobilisation Commission NGO non-governmental organisation ORH Operation Restore Hope SACS Somalia Aid Coordination Body SDA Somali Democratic Alliance SDM Somali Democratic Movement SNA Somali National Alliance SNF Somali National Front SNM Somali National Movement SPM Somali Patriotic Movement SRSP Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front SSNM Southern Somali National Movement TNC Transitional National Council UNCT United Nations Coordination Team for Somalia UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNITAF United Nations International Task Force UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees USC United Somali Congress USF United Somali Front USP United Somali Party

GLOSSARY

af-somali the qaat mild narcotic (catha edulis) akil headman of diya-paying shari'a Islamic law groups, a position formalised shir council of elders by the British shir beeleedka congress of clans alan as red flag (SNM faction) shish snipers (SNM faction) dabadheer drought (specifically of suldaan leader or chief in Issaq clan; 1974/75 - means 'endless') often but not always diya blood compensation , hereditary; also known in garaad leader or chief different parts of Somalia as guurti committee of elders boqar, garaad (among the jaalle comrade, as form of address Dolbahunte) and ugas. under Scientific Socialism; sunni sect of Islam no longer acceptable usage xeer contracts maymay language of Digil and Rahanweyne clans

48 CIIR COUNTRY REPORT s

Other CIIR publications on Somaliland

Human Rights in Somaliland - Awareness and action The report ofa workshop in Hargeisa, Somaliland, 17-19 October 1998 Amnesty International and International Cooperation for Development In 1998 in Hargeisa civil society activists met with journalists, government representatives and lawyers to define the key human rights issues in Somaliland. The workshop, organised jointly by Amnesty International and International Cooperation for Development, provided an unprecedented opportunity to explore children's rights, human rights awareness, the rights of women and minorities, justice and prison conditions. This report documents the workshop. It will be of value to anyone with an interest in human rights promotion, education and training, and current developments in Somaliland. 52 pages £4.95 1999 ISBN 1852872225

Somaliland NGOs - Challenges and opportunities by Mohamed Sheik Abdillahi The collapse ofgovernment and public services in Somalia as a result of the country's civil war left a vacuum that has seen a rapid growth in the number oflocal non-governmental organisations. In the north-west regions, which seceded from Somalia in 1991 to form the independent Republic of Somaliland, local NGOs have played a key role in rehabilitation, governance, security and reconciliation. In this paper, Mohamed Sheik Abdillahi, an acrive member of the movement since its beginnings, outlines the achievements of Somaliland's NGOs and the many challenges facing them, including strained relations with government and international bodies. He sets out recommendations for local NGOs to realise their full potential in the vast and urgent task of reconstructing their country virtually from scratch. 8 pages £1.50 1997 ISBN 1852871970

Building Partnerships for Participatory Development Report ofa workshop held in Hargeisa, Somaliland Sustained social and economic recovery in Somalia will depend on building a political consensus based on a common vision and shared values. In December 1995 Somali development workers organised a pioneering workshop in Hargeisa with representatives from local and international NGOs, community organisations and Somaliland's government to discuss the country's rehabilitation. This report describes the workshop, its objectives and methodology. It is an invaluable resource for development workers and NGOs interested in Somaliland and/or participatory development. 48 pages £9.95 1996 ISBN 1852871539

Building partnerships for Peace and Development Report ofa workshop held in Borama, Somaliland This report details a workshop held in late 1996 to equip local NGOs with skills in conflict analysis and strategy building for peace and development. The workshop aimed to promote collaborative efforts between local NGOs as a means of fostering rehabilitation and development in Somaliland. It also aimed to contribute to the building ofa viable local NGO movement. It provides a practical resource for local organisations planning similar initiatives. It traces the learning process of the workshop leaders, who took part in conflict resolution training in the UK, and describes how they shared their new skills with workshop participants. 58 pages £4.95 1997 ISBNI852871962

A catalogue of CUR publications is available from the address below.

For more information or to place an order please contact: Publications Section, CUR, Unit 3 Canonbury Yard 190a New North Road, London NI 7BJ, UK Phone +44 (0)20 7354 0883 Fax +44 (0)20 7359 0017 [email protected] www.ciir.org Other CIIR publications on peace processes and democratisation

Peacebuilding from Below - Alternative perspectives on Colombia's peace process Briefing by Geraldine McDonald Colombia is a country of increasing milirarisarion, violence and human rights abuse. Insread of trying to solve the conflier rhrough negotiation, rhe Colombian government is relying on a milirary response, thus fuelling rhe violence. One reason why artempts ar negotiated setrlements have failed is rhar rhe ralks were limited to political elires. This paper examines a number of peacebuilding and peacemaking iniriatives by Colombian civil organisations at the grassroots, assessing their impact and potential contribution to lasting peace in Colombia. 36 page £2.50 1997 English edition ISBN 1852871849 Spanish edition 1852871857

Peace in the Making - Gvil groups in Guatemala Briefing by Tania Palencia Prado The peace process in Guatemala, which began in the mid 1980s, reached a final agreement in December 1996. In this paper, Tania Palencia Prado, a writer and researcher who has worked for a range of Guatemalan NGOs and institutions, examines the roots of the conflict in Guatemala, traces rhe evolution ofrhe peace process, and describes rhe shifting positions ofthe main actors. She details the accords signed on human rights, the resetrlement ofpeople uprooted by the war, a truth commission, indigenous peoples' rights and socio-economic issues. The author argues that civil groups need to be strengthened and made an integral part of the peace process, and that international support must continue if the final agreements are to bring about lasting peace. 44 pages £3.50 1996 English edition ISBN 1852871709 Spanish edition ISBN 1852872446

The People's Conscience? Gvil groups in the Guatemalan and South Mrican transitions Briefing by Richard A Wilson The active participation of civil groups in both Guatemala and South Africa holds important lessons for future peace processes in other countries. Learning from the experiences of these groups is vital to discovering how best civil organisations can organise them­ selves and influence change. This paper compares the experience of civil groups in both countries and assesses the contribution they have made to the building ofconsensus, focusing in particular on their role in clarifying the truth about past human rights abuses. 40 pages £4.00 1997 ISBN1852871784

A catalogue of CUR publications is available from the address below.

For more information or to place an order please contact Publications Section, CUR, Unit 3 Canonbury Yard 190a New North Road, London NI 7BJ, UK Phone +44 (0)20 7354 0883 Fax +44 (0)20 7359 00 17 [email protected] www.ciir.org ------&

The Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) aims to contribute to the eradication of poverty through a programme that combines advocacy at national and international level with community-based development. International Cooperation for Development (ICD), CIIR's technical assistance programme, recruits experienced professionals to share their skills in development projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the . Founded in 1940 CIIR is an independent charity which works with people of all faiths and none.

CIIR, Unit 3 Canonbury Yard, 190a New North Road, London NI 78J, UK CIIR has consultative status at the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) Charity registration no. 294329 ••• C!I!·n:iJjiiJ!1d~7a