Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security in Southeast Asia:
ASEAN’s and the ARF’s Responses to Non-Traditional Security Issues in the post-Cold War era
Yih Chang
Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
The University of New South Wales @ Australian Defence Force Academy
December 2011
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First name: Yih Other name/s:
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Title: Comprehensive security and Cooperative security in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s and the ARF’s Responses to Non- Traditional Security Issues in the post-Cold War era
Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)
This study applies the concepts of comprehensive and cooperative security in order to explore how Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have dealt with non-traditional security (NTS) issues in Southeast Asia after the Cold War, and what individual countries’ strategic thinking affected when tackling these threats. In investigating the task, the dissertation considers a broad range of issues, including (but not limited to): the intrastate conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, and the southern Philippines; transnational crimes (with a focus here on narcotics) and terrorism; and the 2004 Indonesian tsunami and Cyclone Nargis. It is found that ASEAN and the ARF emphasized a common rhetorical position rather than initiated a collective strategy in dealing with these issues in the region; the national and the sub-regional efforts occurred mostly when seeking to tackle these threats. However, there has been an emergence of consensus in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami and Cyclone Nargis, which takes a somewhat more proactive and positive stance in better responding to future natural disasters.
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ABSTRACT
This study applies the concepts of comprehensive and cooperative security in order to explore how Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) have dealt with non-traditional security (NTS) issues in Southeast Asia after the Cold
War, and what individual countries’ strategic thinking affected when tackling these threats. In investigating the task, the dissertation considers a broad range of issues, including (but not limited to): the intrastate conflicts in East Timor, Aceh, and the southern Philippines; transnational crimes (with a focus here on narcotics) and terrorism; and the 2004 Indonesian tsunami and Cyclone Nargis. It is found that ASEAN and the ARF emphasized a common rhetorical position rather than initiated a collective strategy in dealing with these issues in the region; the national and the sub-regional efforts occurred mostly when seeking to tackle these threats. However, there has been an emergence of consensus in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami and Cyclone Nargis, which takes a somewhat more proactive and positive stance in better responding to future natural disasters.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude toward my supervisor, Emeritus Professor Carlyle A.
Thayer, for his never ending patience, guidance, and steering.
On a more personnel note, I would like to thank my colleagues and friends from
UNSW@ADFA, and Taiwanese Association of Canberra, Australia, in particular, Travis Wu and Chan-Feng Lin. Their constant support and an exceptional friendship helped me to keep going. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Alison Chiu and Alex Chang. The dissertation would be impossible without financial and emotional support from them. I am indebted to them for their faith in me, loving encouragement, and sensible advice. Without them, I could not have completed this dissertation.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………...…...ii
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………..……iii
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………..…...iv
List of Figures………………………………………………………………………….…...viii
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………..…..ix
Acronyms and Abbreviations……………………………………………………………..…x
Chapter I: Introduction…………………………………………………………………...….1
1. Literature Review: The Emergence of the Concepts and Their Definitions…………...2
1.1 ASEAN as a comprehensive and cooperative security regime………………………...2 1.2 The ARF as a cooperative security regime………………………………………….....8 1.3 Non-traditional security in Southeast Asia……………………………………...…….14
2. Research Approach...... 17
3. Chapters Structure…………………………………………………………………..…...17
Chapter II: Peacekeeping in Southeast Asia after the Cold War...... 20
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...…..20
2. The Processes and Mechanisms of Conflict Management in ASEAN……………...….21
3. An Overview of the ARF’s Approaches to Peacekeeping during 1994-1997………….26
4. ASEAN members’ Responses to PKOs in Southeast Asia...... 29
4.1 East Timor……………………………………………………………………...……29 4.2 Aceh………………………………………………………………………………....34 4.3 The southern Philippines…………………………………………...... 39 iv
5. Lessons to be Learned...... …………………………………………...………42
5.1The development of peacekeeping in the ARF: constraints and opportunities………………………………………………………………………..…..42 5.2 Evaluation of the advantages and the disadvantages in ASEAN’s contributions to PKOs in East Timor, Aceh, and the southern Philippines……………………………...45 6. Conclusion...... …………………………………………………...... 52
Chapter III: Regional and National Responses to Transnational Crimes and Terrorism in Southeast Asia………………………………………………………………………….…56
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….....56
2. Initial Responses to Transnational Crimes………………………………………...……58
2.1 ASEAN……………………………………………………………………...……...58 2.2 The ARF…..……………………………………………………………………..…63 3. After 9/11...... …64
3.1 ASEAN’s initial responses to terrorism from 9/11 to the 2002 Bali bombings……64 3.2 ASEAN’s responses to the US role in counter-terrorism and its aftermath………..67 4. National Counter-Terrorism Measures...... ……………………………..…76
4.1 Indonesia-US…………………………………………………………………….....76 4.2 Indonesia-Australia……………………………………………………………...….82 4.3 Philippines-US……..…………………………………………….……………...….85 5. The Implication for ASEAN in Counter-Terrorism...... ………………...... 92
6. Counter-Terrorism Agenda in the ARF...... …………………………….....95
7. Conclusion...... ………………………………...... 99
Chapter IV: The Effects of the 2004 Tsunami and Cyclone Nargis upon Disaster Management Mechanisms and Strategic Thinking at the Regional and the National Levels…………………………………………………………………………………..……102
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...…102
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2. The Development of Regional Disaster Management before the 2004 Tsunami…....105
2.1 ASEAN…………………………………………………………………………....105 2.2 The ARF…..………………………………………………………………..……..106 3. The Responses to the 2004 Tsunami...... 107
4. Indonesia’s Improved Disaster Management...... 112
5. Indonesia’s Strategic Thinking...... 115
6. A Balance between Humanitarian Assistance and National Strategic Thinking……118
7. The Development of Regional Mechanisms in the Aftermath of the Tsunami...... 118
7.1 ASEAN……………………………………………………………...…………….118 7.2 The ARF…………………………………………………………………..………121 8. The Responses to Cyclone Nargis in 2008…………………………………...…………123
9. Myanmar’s Fear of US Invasion since 1988...... 126
10. Myanmar’s Strategic Thinking...... 131
11. Regional Mechanism’s Responses to Nargis and Aftermath...... 133
11.1 ASEAN…………………………...... 133 11.2 The ARF……………………………………………………………...…………140 12. Conclusion...... ………………………………...... 142
Chapter V: Conclusion……………………………………………………………...……...144
1. The Pursuit of Resilience against NTS Threats…………………………………...…...144
2. Limitations of the Research and Further Considerations………………………….....146
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..…....149
Appendices………………………………………………………………………...... 191
A. Helsinki MoU………………………………………………………………………..…..191
B. Map of the Philippines……………………………………………………………...…...199 vi
C. The Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc-Political Map………………………………………...…200
D. Map of Aceh……………………………………………………………………………..201
E. Map of Myanmar……….…………………………………………………………….....202
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LIST OF FIGURES
Number Page
1.1 A Matrix of Security Studies…………………………………………………………..…15
3.1 Issue areas covered by AMMTC/APSC Blueprint after 9/11……………………...……..94
4.1 The ASEAN-led Coordinating Mechanism………………………………………..……140
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LIST OF TABLES
Number Page
2.1 Australian and ASEAN contributions to INTERFET…………………………………….33
2.2 Contributions by ASEAN members to the UN PKOs (as at July 2010) …………………54
3.1 ASEAN’s counter-terrorism cooperation efforts by external lines……………………….67
4.1 2004 tsunami death toll in Southeast Asian countries………………………………..…107
4.2 ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise……………...…122
4.3 The ASEAN-led Coordinating Mechanism…………………………………………..…139
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AADMER ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia; Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia ACAMM ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting ACCORD ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerozus Drugs ACDM ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management ACTC ASEAN Centre for Combating Transnational Crime ADGC ASEAN Directors-General of Customs ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting AEC ASEAN Economic Community AEGDM ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management AFP Australian Federal Police AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines AHA Centre ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management AHTF ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission AMMTC ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APEC EPWG APEC Emergency Preparedness Working Group ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ARF-SOM ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials’ Meeting ARF-VDR ARF Voluntary Demonstration of Response ARPDM ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management ASC/APSC ASEAN Security Community/ASEAN Political-Security Community ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations x
ASEAN-ISIS ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies ASEANPOL ASEAN Chiefs of National Police ASG Abu Sayyaf Group ASIO Australian Secret Intelligence Organization ASLOM ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting ASOD ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters ATTIC ARF Transnational Threat Information Centre BIN Badan Intelijen Negara; Indonesian State Intelligence Agency BNPB Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana; National Agency for Disaster Management (Indonesia) BRMMCT Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism CBMs confidence building measures CCCH Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities COHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement CPC Civilian Protection Component CPB Communist Party of Burma CPM Communist Party of Malaysia CPP Cambodian People’s Party CSCA Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe DOD Defence Officials’ Dialogue DRR Disaster Risk Reduction EAS East Asia Summit E-IMET expanded international military education and training ERAT Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN) EU European Union FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FDI foreign direct investment
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FMF Foreign Military Financing FY fiscal year GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka; Free Aceh Movement GoI Government of Indonesia GPOI Global Peace Operation Initiative GRP Government of the Republic of the Philippines HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief HDC Henry Dunant Centre IAPTC International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres ICLEC Indonesia Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy IMET international military education and training IMF International Monetary Fund IMT International Monitoring Team INTERFET International Force for East Timor ISG Inter-Sessional Support Group ISM Inter-Sessional Meeting ISM CT-TC Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime ISM-DR Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief JI Jemaah Islamiyah JSC Joint Security Committee LMTs Local Monitoring Teams LST landing ship, tank MCDA Military and Civil Defense Assets (ARF) MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MLAA Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement MLSA Mutual Logistics Support Agreement MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army MNLF Moro National Liberation Front xii
MoU Memorandum of Understanding NADR non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, de-mining and related programs NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NDA New Democratic Army NDAA National Democratic Alliance Army NDPCC National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee (Myanmar) NGO non-governmental organisation NLD National League for Democracy (Myanmar) NPCSD North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue NTS non-traditional security OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) ODCCP Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN) OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PACOM Pacific Command PD preventive diplomacy PKOs peacekeeping operations PMC Post-Ministerial Conference POLRI Polisi Republic Indonesia; Indonesian National Police SAF Singapore Armed Forces SALW small arms and light weapons SAS Special Air Service (Australia) SEARCCT Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council SOM Senior Officials Meeting SOMTC Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime SOPs standard operating procedures SPDC State Peace and Development Council TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia TCG Tripartite Core Group (ASEAN) xiii
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia; Indonesian National Armed Forces UN United Nations UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor UNDAC UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination UNTAC United Nations Transnational Authority in Cambodia UNTAET UN Transnational Authority in East Timor USAID US Agency for International Development USINDO US-Indonesia Society USIP United States Institute of Peace USNS United States Naval Ship UWSA United Wa State Army VAP Vientiane Action Program WFP World Food Programme (UN) WMD weapons of mass destruction ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION From its inception in 1967, ASEAN has many achievements. Given its sheer diversity and heterogeneity among member states, ASEAN improved the climate of regional relations and reduced the likelihood of military means to resolve disputes. In addition, ASEAN arranged annual meetings at highest level of leadership from Southeast Asian countries to discuss and promote cooperation in an agenda of political, economic, and security issues (Mutalib, 1997, pp. 75-78).
The establishment of the ARF further represented a milestone in ASEAN’s expansion of security agenda in Asia-Pacific. The ARF was the first and most inclusive security forum in the region that brought together all ‘like-minded’ states and ‘non like-minded’ states, and its value is demonstrated in a regional opportunity to promote confidence-building measures
(CBMs), develop the sophisticated practice of transparency, and exchange different views on security (Findlay, 1996, pp. 238-239).
This record of Southeast Asian countries playing well apparently came to an end in the late
1990s due to a round of troubles to which ASEAN and the ARF have limited competence to respond effectively. These included the elections in East Timor leading to its independence following by a campaign of violence in 1999; the deadly terrorist attacks in the US on 11
September 2001 (commonly referred to as 9/11); and the Southeast Asian tsunami in 2004 that were neither territorial disputes nor military confrontations but rather challenges to social stability and, therefore, to the political legitimacy of governments.
The primary reason for ASEAN’s and the ARF’s inability to promote rapid and effective multilateral cooperation in responding to these issues is their adoption of security-related concepts, namely comprehensive security and cooperative security. It claims that ASEAN has applied a bottom-up approach to security from the national level to achieve a long-run regional stability. However, the actual responses in Southeast Asia have mostly occurred at 1 the national and sub-regional levels, although the Association has issued joint declarations and statements with the great powers, and the Defence Ministers were brought together to address these challenges. Even the national base has sometimes been weak because of different strategic perceptions, limited resources and divergent political imperatives of the member states, which have undermined measures adopted at the multilateral level. With regard to the ARF, the promotion of ASEAN’s norms and principles in the Forum constrained the effective solutions to these problems.
Therefore, the main purpose of this dissertation is to explore how ASEAN and the ARF have dealt with these issues in recent years, and what individual countries’ strategic thinking affected when tackling these threats. To begin with, this dissertation commences with a brief historical analysis of the adoption of the comprehensive and cooperative security notions in
ASEAN and the ARF, and distinctly defines the boundaries of references in NTS. The aim is to provide a precise guidance for following chapters to evaluate the correlations between the notions and empirical evidences of the exiting security mechanism in Southeast Asia. The following chapters of case studies focus on the years that followed the East Timor crisis in
1999, as it was a turning point that most national, sub-regional and multilateral efforts were initiated, including the participation of armed forces from Southeast Asian countries.
1. Literature Review: The Emergence of the Concepts and Their Definitions 1.1 ASEAN as a comprehensive and cooperative security regime
The comprehensive security notion was first coined in Japan in the 1970s. The Japanese interpretation of ‘comprehensive’ or ‘overall security’ (sogo anzen bosbo) was developed as an alternative to the concept of ‘national security’ based on Japan’s military policy in the period of wartime expansionism and aggression. Following a series of government studies on comprehensive security under such circumstance, the ‘Report on Comprehensive National
Security’ was submitted to Prime Minister, Masayoshi Ito, in July 1980. The Report
2 enumerated six objectives: closer military and general cooperation with the US; increasing
Japan’s capacity to defend its own territory; improvement in relations with China and the
Soviet Union; attainment of energy security; achievement of food security; and mechanisms for coping with major earthquakes (Chapman, et al., 1983, pp. xiii-xviii).1
Similar with Japan, Southeast Asian countries also defined security in comprehensive terms.
Dewitt indicates that “[a]t least three ASEAN members-Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore- have developed distinctive notions of security which go beyond military objectives and instruments, while the Philippines also has recently developed a similar doctrine to guide its approach to security” (1994, p. 3).2 Japan’s comprehensive security concept responded almost exclusively to changing international environment. In contrast, ASEAN members have adopted comprehensive security primarily to deal predominantly with internal concerns. Lizee and Peou argues that ASEAN’s comprehensive security was “based on the proposition that national security does not only reside in the absence of external military hostility but also in the presence of socio-economic development within military boundaries” (1993, p. 2).
ASEAN members dealt with their internal concerns through the adoption of national and regional resilience principles, which could be traced to the policy measures employed by
Indonesia and Malaysia to resolve multidimensional nature of domestic security problems.
Translated from an Indonesian term ‘Ketahanan Nasional’, the idea of national resilience
1 Humanitarian aid and economic cooperation with developing countries have been more salient than other policies that Japanese government has used to respond to the multidimensional nature of threats (Wong, 1991, pp. 53-55). 2 Singapore has pursued a comprehensive approach through the concept of ‘Total Defence’ which has five constitutive elements: “psychological defence”, “social defence”, “economic defence”, “civil defence”, and “military defence” (Capie and Evans, 2007, p. 71). Singapore’s interpretation of comprehensive security was largely internally focused and there were no explicit terms like ‘national resilience’ and ‘comprehensive security’; Thai scholars have also offered their own interpretation of a comprehensive security concept. See Panitan Wattanayagorn (1998), ‘Thailand: The Elite’s Shifting Conceptions of Security’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Standford: Standard University Press, pp. 417-444. 3 originated at the beginning of the New Order Regime. 3 It was discussed and debated by
Indonesia’s National Defence Board between 1968 and 1972 and was formally accepted as a national doctrine in 1973 in the ‘Guidelines of State Policy.’ In addition, Indonesia’s interpretation of comprehensive security was influenced by the struggle against Dutch colonialism and the subsequent desire to build a united Indonesian state, which linked the participation of the military (ABRI, or Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) and its dual functions in Indonesia’s political system. Therefore, the emphasis of comprehensive security was “on maintaining internal security and stability to deny opportunities for infiltration and subversion. The focus has been on internal threats such as ethnic, religious, racial and intergroup conflicts…drug addiction and trafficking, and criminal acts.” The means through which national resilience was to be built included “ideological, political, economic, sociocultural, and security-cum-defence” policies with “top priority” being accorded to economic development (Alagappa, 1988, pp. 58-61).
Malaysia’s concept of comprehensive security placed a similar priority on economic development and non-military threats, although the concept was perceived that internal security concerns were more immediate and urgent. The origins of Malaysia’s interpretation of comprehensive security dated back to war against the banned Communist Part of Malaysia
(CPM) during 1948-60. The government worried that although communist ideology had only limited appeal in relatively affluent Malaysia, and the recurring guerrillas were under control, they might attempt to exploit latent racial and religious cleavages within Malaysian society to threaten the government. Therefore, developing a domestic political consensus became a main
3 The idea of national resilience was advanced by President Suharto when he assumed power in 1965 and was officially proclaimed in Indonesian national security doctrine in 1973. Suharto in a seminar in 1974 indicated that national resilience covered “the strengthening of all the component elements in the development of a nation in its entirety, thus consisting of resilience in the ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military fields” (1975, p. 8).
4 task for successive Malaysian governments (Alagappa, 1988, pp. 63-65).
While Malaysian government placed priority on internal security threats, it has always had an important external and regional dimension as well. In a speech entitled ‘Malaysia’s Doctrine of Comprehensive Security’ in Singapore in 1984, Deputy Prime Minister, Dato Musa Hitam, identified Malaysia’s doctrine of comprehensive security, including “a secure Southeast Asia” and “a strong and effective ASEAN community.” He argued these goals required adherence to the principle of non-intervention and “the building of a structure of trust, confidence and goodwill between the ASEAN states” (Hitam, 1984, pp. 94, 96). Malaysia also acknowledged some external security concerns from great power rivalry and the Cambodia conflict, in general these were considered to be less immediate and urgent. Malaysian authorities recognized the need to adopt political, socioeconomic, and military policies to deal with the multidimensional concept of security problems, but there was no attempt to formulate a formal national security doctrine along these lines until the late 1970s and early 1980s that terms like ‘national resilience’ and ‘comprehensive security’ crept into the Malaysian vocabulary (Alagappa, 1988, pp. 65-68).4
It is acknowledged that national resilience was taken as a bottom-up approach to achieve regional stability in the long run. Huxley indicates that there was a consensus “between leaders of ASEAN’s members that the attainment of ‘resilience’ at the national level in each of the ASEAN countries will contribute to a wider ‘regional resilience’ which will eventually form the basis for Southeast Asia’s security against external as well as internal threats” (1993, p. 4). President Suharto also claimed that if “each member-country develops its own ‘national resilience’, gradually a ‘regional resilience’ may emerge, i.e. the ability of member-countries
4 In contrast to Indonesia which translated national resilience into official acceptance and formulation, Malaysian senior officials have used the term to be known by Malaysians as the government’s policy in informal speeches. See Dato Musa Hitam (1984), ‘Malaysia’s Doctrine of Comprehensive Security’, speech at the Fourteenth Anniversary Dinner Harvard Club of Singapore, Foreign Affairs Malaysia (March), Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 94-99. 5 to settle jointly their common problems and look after their future and well-being together”
(1975, p. 8). In other words, ASEAN members anticipated that national resilience could be put into practice to underpin regional cooperation in non-military sphere to secure domestic stability and regime survival.
The concepts of national and regional resilience were officially introduced in the historic first
ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976. The Bali Summit led to the establishment of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The
Declaration of ASEAN Concord confirmed that the “stability of each member state and of the
ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience” (ASEAN, 1976a). In addition, the TAC required ASEAN member states “shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as well as internal subversive activities” (ASEAN, 1976b). 5 In short, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the TAC reflected ASEAN’s commitment to security emphasizing the indivisibility of national and regional stability.
In addition, the Bali Summit helped ASEAN evolve into a ‘cooperative security’ institution.
Emmers argues that “a shared approach to security and a code of conduct for regulating intra- mural relations and managing existing or potential disputes” produced by the Bali Summit
“was essential for the development of ASEAN as a regime for cooperative security” (2003, pp.
5 With regard to the non-interference principle, ASEAN had already adhered to principles of United Nations (UN) and articulated in the ASEAN Declaration of 1967: “the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation” under the rules of UN Charter (ASEAN, 1967).
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20-21). The modes of conflict avoidance and management codified within the Declaration of
ASEAN Concord and the TAC represented ASEAN’s cooperative security arrangement. The
Declaration of ASEAN Concord called for ASEAN members to “rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences” (ASEAN, 1976a). The TAC required member states to resolve disputes via dialogue and consultation rather than military means, and articulated UN’s role as the last resource before ASEAN members resorting to their peaceful approaches to manage disputes between themselves (ASEAN, 1976b). In addition, the TAC produced a High Council as a conflict avoidance and management mechanism, which was a soft institution consisting of ministerial level representatives from member states.
The Treaty stipulated that the purpose of High Council “shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation” (ASEAN, 1976b). Therefore, the shared approaches to security formulated in the
Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the TAC portrayed ASEAN as a cooperative security regime to avoid the outbreak of conflict, and encouraged member states to deal with security matters by non-military methods.
Many observers attribute the development of informal mechanisms of negotiation and consultation for regional conflict management to the ‘ASEAN Way’. Narine indicates that the
‘ASEAN Way’ “is based on the Malay cultural approach to decision making, which requires decision making through consultation and consensus” (1998, p. 6). Acharya also refers the
‘ASEAN Way’ to “a distinctive approach to dispute-settlement and regional cooperation developed by the members of ASEAN with a view to ensuring regional peace and stability”, which “is not so much about the substance or structure of multilateral interactions, but a claim about the process through which such interactions are carried out. This approach involves a high degree of discreetness, informality, pragmatism, expediency, consensus-building, and non-confrontational bargaining styles” (1997, pp. 328-329).
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Moreover, some ASEAN government leaders had emphasised the success of the ‘ASEAN
Way’ to reconcile the divergent interests and perspectives of member states in the past, and reiterated its importance when they faced the 1997 Asian economic crisis. They believed that
ASEAN could resolve new problems in the future on the basis of the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Goh,
1999; Pitsuwan, 1999). However, it is not the aim of this dissertation to provide a substantive analysis of the informal mechanisms developed in social-cultural context and their responses to NTS issues. The dissertation does evaluate the effectiveness of security concepts articulated in ASEAN’s security outlooks to deal with NTS threats, and the implication of strategic thinking at the national level. It is hoped that these evaluations may provide some valuable background to future research and analysis on the topic.
1.2 The ARF as a cooperative security regime
The concept of cooperative security was reframed from common security,6 which emerged in
Europe during the Cold War as an alternative to nuclear deterrence between East-West
6 The common security notion was articulated and defined in the 1982 Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the leadership of the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. The report proposed several criteria of common security, including: “All nations have a legitimate right to security”; “Military forces is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between nations”; “Restraint is necessary in expression of national policy”; “Security cannot be attained through military superiority”; “Reduction and qualitative limitations of armaments are necessary for common security”; “‘Linkages’ between arms negotiations and political events should be avoided” (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, 1982, pp. 8-10). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (later the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE), which proposed multilateral security approaches to deal with regional conflicts and the linkage between domestic affairs and international relations through 1970s and 1980s, enhanced the notion of common security. Dewitt argues that the meeting “represented the operationalization of the core principles of common security”, and its goal “was to reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of war by securing adherence to a set of norms and rules that constrain the conflictual behavior of the regional actors” in East and West bloc (1994, p. 5). The Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975 as a final stage of the CSCE, and three follow-up meetings to the CSCE further presented representative countries’ consensus to strengthen international peace and security through the promotion of human rights and social and economic development, and the program of confidence-building and crisis management (European Navigator, 2006, pp. 2-5). 8 rivalries. In 1980s, the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, tried to introduce the common security notion in Asia-Pacific because Soviet Union was not only threatened by US multilateral military alliance in Asia, but afraid its exclusion from the economic development of the region. Therefore, Gorbachev proposed the idea of an ‘Asia Forum’ and Vladivostok initiative, which were the outgrowth of the success of the CSCE to enhancing cooperation and stability in Asia-Pacific (Buszynski, 1992, pp. 57-63).
Following Gorbachev, the next proposal to introduce the common security concept in Asia-
Pacific came from Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, and Australian
Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans. Clark argued that “the time has come to develop institutions of dialogue in the Pacific”, and envisaged a ‘Pacific adaption’ of the CSCE during his speeches in Canada, Japan, and Indonesia (Capie and Evans cited in Clark, 2007, p. 61).
Evans was inspired by a Professor of Australian National University, Stuart Harris, whose idea to start CBMs in responding to potential threats from massive economic and political changes in Asia-Pacific after the Cold War (Harris, 1990). Evans then proposed a Europe- style Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) to resolve political and economic problems (Agence France Presse, 1990).
The introduction of the common security notion in Asia-Pacific initially led to skepticism and ambivalence within ASEAN, which feared that these proposals mentioned above could cause adversaries between major powers. In addition, the proposals would undermine ASEAN’s existing norms of cooperation approaches, and provide chance for external intervention.
Acharya argues that ASEAN avoided the idea of military-security cooperation in the CSCE
“because of fears of provoking its Cold War adversaries, Vietnam and China, which had denounced ASEAN as a new front for the now-defunct American-backed Southeast Asian
Treaty Organization.” In addition, common security could undermine the 1971 framework of
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) to allow the existence of external powers
9 in regional security. CBMs of the CSCE that “imposed formal, reciprocal, and binding obligations, and allowed intrusive verification” challenged ASEAN’s informal mechanisms of negotiation and consultation to settle disputes, and the intent of the CSCE to link domestic politics and international relations through human rights promotion could give external powers an excuse to intervene in ASEAN’s domestic affairs (2004, pp. 256-257). In short,
ASEAN rejected the Europe-style common security notion because powerful states would set military strategies in the region, which may invoke intra-ASEAN tensions and result in internal instability. Furthermore, the link between domestic and international security on the human rights issue, and the formal security cooperation mechanisms developed in the CSCE were incompatible with the principle of non-interference and existing non-legalistic approaches within ASEAN.
However, the changing security environment in the post Cold War era has raised ASEAN leaders’ awareness that bilateral security arrangements were insufficient to maintain stability in Asia-Pacific. The US strategic withdrawal from military bases in the Philippines in 1992, the highlighted territorial disputes in the South China Sea along with the regional consequence of a powerful China, and potential conflicts on the Korean Peninsula as well as the expansion of ASEAN membership all became the major focus of ASEAN’s security outlook in the early 1990s (Leifer, 1996, pp. 16-19; Morada, 2010, pp. 14-15). Meanwhile, the
Canadian government in 1991 envisaged the cooperative security concept in the North Pacific
Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD), which inspired ASEAN to develop multilateral models on security issues. Acharya argues that “the NPCSD, being the first government- backed multilateral security consultations to take place within the Asia-Pacific region, added a sense of urgency to ASEAN’s own ideas about regional security consultations. Certainly, it impressed on ASEAN the need to respond to the growing number of proposals from
‘outsiders’, which, if pursued, would deeply affect security management in its own
10 geostrategic environment” (1995, p. 185).
There are similarities and differences between the ideas of common security developed in the
CSCE and cooperative security in the NPCSD. Emmers indicates that both concepts “aim to engage all regional players without excluding political and economic systems or adversaries”, but cooperative security “favors a more gradual approach to the institutionalisation of relations and recognises the necessity of maintaining, at least at first, existing bilateral alliances” in Asia-Pacific (2004a, pp. 7-8). In addition, Dewitt defines cooperative security in the following manner:
cooperative security acknowledges the primacy of state interests, the realities of territorial defence, the inevitability of competing and, at times, conflicting interests, and the increasing interpenetrability of states, other actors within the region, and of global politics…the habit of dialogue accompanied by regular and informal undertakings facilitates a movement towards political transparency...an explicit identification of problems which place not only the nation-state but also subnational units as well as transnational or regional arenas in dire peril: demographic factors; large or distinct population movements; illicit or unregulated flow of drugs, technology, or information; equitable access to scarce resources, markets, and strategic minerals; air, land, and marine pollution and degradation; global ecological changes; and human rights abuses, for example (1994, pp. 8-9).
ASEAN became more receptive toward cooperative security because the proposal maintained exiting bilateral arrangements for regional stability, and allowed multilateral institutions to develop steadily through informal process until a favourable condition for more formal multilateral arrangements. In addition, the idea that security threats came from state and non- state actors resonated well with ASEAN’s doctrine of ‘regional resilience’ (Acharya, 2004, p.
258; Dewitt, 1994, p. 7). In other words, ASEAN members were more receptive to cooperative security because the notion recognized the value of ASEAN as a cooperative security institution with looser and more consultative mechanisms, and allowed a more 11 gradual institutionalization of relations in Southeast Asia. In addition, the idea of cooperative security to cover security threats in military fields as well as less traditional concerns fitted well into the principle of regional resilience articulated in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the TAC.
ASEAN could successfully develop a multilateral security forum in Asia-Pacific because of the efforts from ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS),7 and the existing model like ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) as a basis to expand security dialogues among member and non-member countries.
At its meeting in June 1991, ASEAN-ISIS produced a memorandum: “A Time for Initiative” urging the development of a multilateral security institution (ASEAN-ISIS, 1991, pp. 2-4). In addition, the existing ASEAN’s model such as ASEAN-PMC was confirmed in leaders meeting in Singapore in 1992 “to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in the region as well as intra-ASEAN dialogues on ASEAN security cooperation” (ASEAN, 1992), and the ASEAN-ISIS meeting also motivated Japan officially proposing ASEAN-PMC to be turned into a new regional security institution (Acharya, 2004, p. 258). Therefore, the Foreign
Ministers from ASEAN countries and the seven dialogue partners8 at the first ASEAN-PMC
Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), which was organized in Singapore in May 1993, decided to invite the Foreign Ministers of China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea to a special session in Singapore in July the same year that would coincide with the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting (AMM). Later on, the ARF came into life in a dinner on 25 July 19939
7 Formed in 1988, ASEAN-ISIS usually organizes ‘track-two’ conferences to encourage cooperation and coordination of activities among ASEAN and Western scholars and policymakers, and to promote policy- oriented studies of, and exchange viewpoints on multilateral security in Southeast Asia. 8 Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the US, Canada, and the European Union (EU). 9 Several research institutes also established the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) as a ‘track-two’ dialogue to provide an informal mechanism for scholars and officials to discuss challenges facing the region and promote regional political-security cooperation through non-governmental approaches. 12 and ran the first working session in Bangkok in 1994.
Significantly, ASEAN has played a leading role in promoting its norms within the ARF. Leifer argues that ASEAN’s model appeared to be the most appropriate in the post-Cold War period because “regional tensions were no longer expressed in a tangible and imminent common threat that called for a countervailing military coalition”, and the ARF presented “no unpalatable political or economic demands on potential members” (1996, p. 26). 10 The example could be seen in the 1994 ARF chairman’s statement, in which the participants declared to “foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues” and “endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations between states” in
Asia-Pacific region (ARF, 1994). The second meeting held in Brunei in 1995 confirmed
ASEAN’s leading role in organising activities of the ARF, and envisaged three stages of informal and non-legalistic security cooperation: “the promotion of confidence-building, development of preventive diplomacy, and elaboration of approaches to conflicts” (ARF,
1995b).11
Likewise, the ARF as a cooperative security institution acknowledges inclusive participation in Asia-Pacific. Leifer argues that the reason was ASEAN members’ acknowledgement of
10 The chairman of the supervisory board of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, Jusuf Wanandi, was quoted by Sydney Morning Herald as saying the creation of the Forum marked “a transformation of ASEAN’s idea of comprehensive security based on the so-called doctrine of the 1971 zone of peace, freedom and neutrality” (Murdoch, 1994). 11 The original third stage was ‘conflict resolution mechanisms’, but it was amended to ‘elaboration of approaches to conflicts’ because China opposed any reference to conflict resolution due to the Taiwan issue and avoided that the ARF might one day be turned into a structured arrangement to resolve conflicts (Emmers, 2004b, p. 137). In addition, the second ARF meeting established Inter-Sessional Support Groups (ISGs) and Inter- Sessional Meetings (ISMs), to be co-chaired by an ASEAN and non-ASEAN participants that were held between annual ARF-SOM to make recommendations to the Forum in implementing proposals (ARF, 1995b). ISGs have been organized on CBMs and Preventive Diplomacy (PD), and ISMs are responsible to deal with PKOs, disaster relief, search and rescue missions, and terrorism and related problems. 13 their inability in dealing effectively with the post-Cold War security issues facing the region.
Hence, ASEAN was forced to expand its strategic horizon in order to manage these new security problems (1996, p. 25).
1.3 Non-traditional security in Southeast Asia
The security discourses since the early 1990s have led to an alternative or a much broader view of security, and such thinking could be traced to the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The report proposed the concept of human security and outlined seven specific elements in, namely: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political, which took the notion of security beyond the traditional defence and military-oriented security of a state to include the security concerns of individuals and communities (United Nations Development Programme, 1994).
However, the UNDP definition of human security is vague and there exists mutual effects between non-military threats to human beings and states, and this provides academic researchers little guidance to study what human security exactly means. Therefore, the dissertation adopts Paris’s ‘Matrix of Security Studies’, especially Cell 2 which “contains works that address non-military threats to the national security of states” (see Figure 1.1)
(2001, pp. 98-99), and this is also in concert with Mathews’s argument (1989) considering state other than non-state actors as the salient object of security.
To be precise, the dissertation adopts the idea of NTS to offer guidance for research. There are several elements of NTS:
First, the non-traditional security approach concentrates exclusively on the state, government and society at large (as opposed to the individual and sub-national groups)…Second, it aims to protect against indirect violence, especially economic and criminal activities, and makes no mention of the possibility of states being a threat to their own citizens. Third, in responding to threats ‘non-traditional security’ emphasizes state instruments and cooperative action with neighbouring governments. There is no mention of non-state actors or civil society as actors in 14
building security. Fourth, it emphasizes principles of sovereignty and non- interference and avoids human rights, humanitarian intervention and democracy ( Capie and Evans cited in Song, 2007, p. 175).
Figure 1.1 A Matrix of Security Studies The Source of the Security Threat
Military Military, Nonmilitary, or Both
Cell 1 Cell 2
National security Redefined security States (conventional realist approach (ex. Environmental and to security studies) economic security) Security Cell 4 for Cell 3 Whom Human security Societies, Intrastate security (ex. Environmental and Groups, and (ex. Civil war, ethnic conflict, economic threats to the survival Individuals and democide) of societies, groups, and
individuals) Source: Compiled by author from Paris (2001, p. 98)
NTS is not a novel or uncommon idea among Southeast Asian countries because of its similar themes found in comprehensive and cooperative security. Acharya argues that comprehensive security in the region “was a fundamentally statist notion despite its claims to proffer an alternative to conventional national security” (2001, p. 452). Anthony also argues that comprehensive security typically regards the state “as the primary unit of analysis; it is the main actor in defining and providing security” (2004, p. 161). The overlap is also in cooperative security. Since ASEAN had dropped the Europe-style multilateral security arrangement, which linked domestic and international security on the human rights issue, the
15
ARF developed as a cooperative security institution is not like “the CSCE/OCSE’s ‘human dimension’, which deals with issues related to human rights, democratisation, and self- determination” (Acharya, 2001, p. 457). Therefore, the dissertation adopts NTS concept to analyse ASEAN’s and the ARF’s responses to the threats beyond conventional security of a state because it resonates with the security discourses that have been conceptualized in
Southeast Asia.
NTS had already been embraced by ASEAN and the ARF. ASEAN and China at their Sixth
Summit in 2002 issued a joint declaration on ‘Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional
Security Issues’. It listed the priorities of cooperation on “trafficking in illegal drugs, people smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money-laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime.” The approaches to deal with these NTS issues were to deepen existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to strengthen information exchange, personnel exchange and capacity building, practical cooperation and joint research. In addition, the Declaration noted that these forms of cooperation should be formulated “on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia” (ASEAN, 2002e).
In March 2005, the ARF held a seminar on ‘Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Non- traditional Security Issues’. The participants recognized the threats from terrorism, “illicit drugs, infectious diseases, HIV/AIDS, people smuggling and human trafficking, corruption, money laundering, cyber crime, piracy, environmental degradation and illegal logging” to regional stability. The meeting concluded that these threats “were more diversified and had both intrastate and interstate implications and propagated more rapidly than traditional ones and their effects were increasingly complex.” Therefore, ARF members outlined a range of actions to effectively respond to NTS issues, including strengthening intelligence exchange among members, “early warning mechanisms particularly in the area of major natural
16 disasters and infectious diseases”, and the publication of an ARF annual Non-Traditional
Security Outlook. However, the respect of national sovereignty and the non-intervention principle when conducting cooperation were reaffirmed by the participants (ARF, 2005a). In other words, the new security concerns in Southeast Asia were reflected in the emergence of
NTS concept in ASEAN and the ARF, as well as the rethinking of security approaches to advance this idea. However, the broadening security concerns and the recommended resolutions could at times be at odds, particularly when examining the influence of traditional concepts of sovereignty and non-interference in the responses to these NTS issues.
2. Research Approach
The discipline of political science is applied in the analysis of the dissertation. Keeping analyses within the discipline of political science can provide a logical coherence, and
“precise and clear definitions of key concepts and justified derivations” as accepted criteria to judge whether a group of evidences is adequate to support the argument (Stoker, 1995, p. 3).
In addition, the dissertation will use the quantitative approach to answer the research question.
The chosen data analysis processes are interaction model and time-series models, which mean two or more ‘independent’ variables have some influence determined by other variables upon a ‘dependent’ variable, and “a very large number of temporal aggregates-such as monthly economic statistics and published opinion polls spanning a period of ten, twenty or thirty years” (Miller, 1995, pp. 160-163). Therefore, the dissertation will analyse the collection of data from governmental publications, empirical studies and mass media reports in a time series. The purpose is to examine how external powers, the domestic political circumstances and strategic perceptions interacted with the existing regional mechanisms and individual
Southeast Asian countries in their responses to the NTS issues.
3. Chapters Structure
The purpose of Chapter II, Chapter III, and Chapter IV is to achieve the stated aim of the
17 dissertation. Chapter II is divided into two sections. The first section demonstrates how the shortcomings of norms and code of conduct in ASEAN and the ARF originating from comprehensive and cooperative security undermined their abilities to involve in the formulation of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to resolve the intrastate conflicts in East
Timor, Aceh, and the southern Philippines. The second section examines the development of the issue of peacekeeping in the ARF, the lessons that ASEAN members learned following their involvements in PKOs listed above and their contributions to the UN PKOs in other parts of the world. The aim of this chapter is to assess the prospect of a regional peacekeeping force.
Chapter III analyses how the security outlook based on comprehensive and cooperative security in ASEAN and the ARF created a gap between declarations of intent to cooperate against transnational crimes and terrorism, and the actual implementation of the cooperation at the working level. This chapter examines not only the responses at the regional level, but the sub-regional cooperation and responses that occurred at the national level via enhanced relations with external powers. This chapter aims to analyze the extent to which internal political and strategic calculations, and the external powers from PKOs, could influence any initiatives adopted to respond to transnational crimes and terrorist threats at the regional level.
Chapter IV assesses how the adoption of comprehensive and cooperative security in ASEAN and the ARF affected the responses to the 2004 tsunami and Cyclone Nargis at the regional and the national level. In addition, the influences from these two natural disasters on the development of regional disaster management mechanisms and the national strategic thinking of major disaster-affected countries will be examined. The aim of this chapter is to assess if
Southeast Asian countries would take a somewhat more proactive and positive stance to better respond to future natural disasters compared to the involvements in PKOs and the cooperation against transnational crimes and terrorism. Finally, Chapter V will summarize the main
18 arguments of this study and discusses possible directions for research with similar topic within Southeast Asia.
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CHAPTER TWO PEACEKEEPING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER THE COLD WAR 1. Introduction
The experiences of communal tensions and divided non-communist and communist blocs had caused Southeast Asian countries to create ASEAN in 1967 as a stable structure for regional reconciliation. In 1976 Southeast Asian countries further adopted the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security to enhance their ability of preventing hostilities between member states from threatening regional stability. This security doctrine is reflected in the loose manner of conflict management framework in ASEAN, which has even failed to initiate the formulation of PKOs12 to resolving member states’ intra-conflicts. In contrast to
ASEAN, the ARF has explicit discussions on PKOs, but the Forum played no role in responding to intrastate conflicts in Southeast Asia since it had been a cooperative security regime and endorsed the norms of ASEAN in 1990s. In addition to the institutional restraints, the distinct national interests and the limited military capacities among Southeast Asian countries impeded their attempt to make a unit of peacekeeping force to resolve domestic violence in the region after the Cold War.
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the challenges that Southeast Asian countries would face if they wanted to create a regional peacekeeping force which meets the UN standard in the post Cold War era, and the prospect of PKOs in the region. The first section highlights the voluntary manner and the non-interference principle reflected in the conflict resolution mechanisms in ASEAN. In addition, it reviews the approaches about peacekeeping in the
ARF during 1994-1997. The aim of this section is to present the reason why ASEAN and the
ARF failed to involve in the formulation of PKOs to resolve the intrastate conflicts that
12 The definition of PKOs in this chapter based on the term ‘peacekeeping’ in Johan Galtung (1975), ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding’, in J. Galtung (ed.), Peace, War and Defence-Essays in Peace Research, Vol. 2, Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, pp. 282-304. 20 occurred in the region.
The second section demonstrates ASEAN members’ responses to the East Timor crisis, Aceh’s journey from war to peace in post-Suharto regime, and the conflict in the southern Philippines from 2001 to present. The final section will examine the development of the issue of peacekeeping in the ARF and the lessons that ASEAN members learned from these PKOs in the region, and ASEAN countries’ individual contributions to the UN PKOs in other parts of the world. Depending on these examinations, this section concludes that weakly developed regional conflict management with different national interests and limited military capabilities among ASEAN members make the formation of rapid and effective peacekeeping force difficult. Hence, the possible development of PKOs in Southeast Asia will be a multinational force comprising the voluntary unarmed military contingents from ASEAN members but will not necessarily play a leading role. This force will be supported by financial assistance from non-ASEAN countries and an international programme under UN authorisation.
2. The Processes and Mechanisms of Conflict Management in ASEAN
ASEAN was created in 1967 with a region consisting of regional conflicts and divided non- communist and communist blocs. The intramural disputes between Malaysia and Indonesia over the formation of the Federation of Malay in 1963, the territorial dispute on Sabah between the Philippines and Malaysia, and the internal communist insurgencies from Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia all left lingering tensions that threatened regional security. Therefore, five countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand came together in the interest of regional cooperation to boost intramural stability and peace. Leifer argues that
“ASEAN began its corporate life as a diplomatic device for subregional reconciliation” and
“has provided a stable structure of relations for managing and containing tensions among governments of a corresponding political disposition” (1989, p. 150).
ASEAN adopted the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 to institutionalise conflict management
21 mechanisms for regional stability. Jawhar indicates that the adoption of the Bangkok
Declaration articulated “a framework for consultation on subject of mutual interests as a means of fostering better understanding, good neighbourliness and cooperation on the one hand and constraining the emergence or exacerbation of bilateral misunderstanding and disputes on the other.” In this framework, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), the
ASEAN Summit, and other periodic meetings among the Foreign Ministers have been used increasingly to discuss regional and international issues, particularly political and security matters over time (1993, p. 213). This framework of conflict management was highlighted at the Bali Summit in 1976, in which ASEAN became a cooperative security regime. The
Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which was produced at the Summit, outlined two dominant themes of action under the sub-section of political cooperation for the subject of conflict management: “settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means as soon as possible”;
“strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of views, coordinating position and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions” (ASEAN, 1976a). In this regard, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord underscored ASEAN’s obvious place to achieve regional stability through peaceful arrangements like consultations and mediation.
Another mechanism for conflict management is the TAC. 13 Differing the Declaration of
ASEAN Concord, the Treaty officially proclaimed rules to regulate relations between the members in order to secure regional stability and prosperity. Anthony argues that the TAC
“provides the arrangement and the legal instrument for member states to order their relations according to explicitly prescribed, universally-accepted principles, and provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes” (1998, p. 49).These basic principles were articulated as:
13 The TAC is part of ZOPFAN, which was produced in 1971 to prevent great powers from pursuing disputes in the region and leading to intra-ASEAN tensions during the Cold War (Narine, 1998, pp. 2-5). 22
Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; Renunciation of the threat or use of force; Effective cooperation among themselves (ASEAN, 1976b).
In addition to its established norms among the members according to explicitly prescribed principles, the TAC also created a mechanism for the pacific settlement of disputes: the High
Council. In Article 14, the Treaty indicated “a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the contracting parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes”, and in Article 15 a High Council was enabled “to recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation” (ASEAN, 1976b).
However, no ASEAN members intended to constitute this High Council in order to settle disputes since 1976. Muntarbhorn notes some caveats limit the TAC as an effective mechanism for conflict management:
There is no specific provision that the representatives in the High Council must be lawyers. If they are politicians, the approach would tend to be political rather than legal. The role of High Council only comes into play in the event that no solution is resolved through direct negotiations. If the disputing parties have not negotiated with each other directly, and failed to reach a solution, the High Council is not empowered to take the initiative in dispute settlement. There is no compulsion for the parties to utilize the High Council, nor is there a means of imposing sanctions on the parties. The voluntary nature of the mechanism is thus based upon compromise, rather than binding decisions. Moreover, the ASEAN mechanism is not exclusive in that the disputing parties may use other modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33 (1) of the United Nations Charter (1986, p. 19).
23
Actually, ASEAN members prefer to settle disputes bilaterally rather than to utilize the multilateral mechanism provided in the TAC. Anthony argues that “no dispute has been brought to ASEAN, as a sub-regional entity, to resolve. Bilateral disputes have been left to the parties concerned to be resolved or managed bilaterally. ASEAN through its formal mechanism, has so far provided only a framework for member-states to structure their relationships with each other” (1998, p. 50). In addition, the principle of non-interference prevents ASEAN members from developing more effective regionally-centred conflict resolution mechanisms. This principle dovetails with ASEAN’s security outlook based on comprehensive security, which emanates from the policy measures employed by Indonesia and Malaysia to resolve multidimensional nature of domestic security problems.14
The Cambodian crisis in 1990s is a good example to present ASEAN’s emphasis on peaceful means and the non-intervention principle when resolving intrastate conflicts. The United
Nations Transnational Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was established in 1992 after the warring Cambodian factions officially invited the UN to intervene to create a peaceful environment for fair elections in their country, was the first UN PKOs in Southeast Asia that
ASEAN members participated in individually15 to implement the Paris Peace Agreement of
October 1991 (Peou, 1998, p. 443).
The UN-organised elections in May 1993 produced a coalition between the Cambodian
People’s Party (CPP) led by Second Prime Minister, Hun Sen, and the royalist party (known as Funcinpec) led by First Prime Minister, Norodom Ranariddh. However, the situation in
Cambodia exploded into violence when Hun Sen conducted a brutal coup to oust Norodom
14 The non-intervention principle has been a favourite theme by ASEAN leaders in public addresses. For instance, Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, at the thirtieth AMM in 1997 claimed that “[w]e will resolve our problem in our own way and in our own time”, and “Asean will not become a military alliance in order to protect themselves” depending on regional autonomy (Mahathir, 1997). 15 ASEAN countries that sent troops and civilian police to UNTAC were Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore (United Nations, 1995b, p. 23). 24
Ranariddh in 1997. The crisis led to the creation of the ASEAN Troika, which was composed of three Foreign Ministers from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, to restore political stability in Cambodia after the invitation of Hun Sen and the Foreign Minister of Cambodia,
Ung Huot. The purpose of the Troika was to mediate the political crisis in Cambodia and informed the Cambodian interlocutors about ASEAN’s concern to hold a credible election through “shuttle diplomacy.” Finally, ASEAN members sent electoral observers to facilitate the general election in Cambodia in 1998 (Jarasa, 1999, pp. 210-212).
The Troika could be seen as a successful approach that ASEAN took by its own efforts after the invitation of Cambodia to prevent any escalation of the conflict without any material or military support to warring factions in the coup (Peou, 2000, p. 390), and this successful experience led to the formal establishment of the ASEAN Troika in the ASEAN Third
Informal Summit in the Philippines in 1999 (ASEAN, 1999b). The ASEAN paper articulated that the purpose of the Troika “is to enable ASEAN to address in a timely manner urgent and important regional political and security issues.” The principles of the Troika as stipulated, however, must be compatible with the principles enshrined in the TAC, particularly “the core principles of consensus and non-interference” in domestic affairs of ASEAN members
(ASEAN, 2000a). Thus, its constrained mandate stipulates ASEAN’s dilemma to resolve intrastate conflicts, and nothing much has been said nor reported about its progress since the
Terms of Reference of the Troika were completed in 2000.
Therefore, it can be concluded that ASEAN as a regime for cooperative and comprehensive security presented its loose manner in the framework of conflict management and the TAC, and the insistence on non-intervention principle. Member states were encouraged to settle inter-disputes bilaterally before resorting to help from the UN,16 and this also demonstrated
16 Anthony indicates that recently ASEAN members have preferred to resort to official dispute resolution mechanism outside the region, like the International Court of Justice, in resolving bilateral disputes as opposed to the regional management mechanisms (1998, p. 62). 25 their limited ability to develop regionally-centred institutions resolving intrastate conflicts or only use diplomatic means to prevent any escalation of the domestic threats. This is the reason why ASEAN was unable to rapidly and effectively involve in the formulation of PKOs to stop the atrocities in the region after the Cold War.
3. An Overview of the ARF’s Approaches to Peacekeeping during 1994-1997
Compared to ASEAN, the ARF had explicit discussions on the subject of peacekeeping since
1994. The ARF members at the first Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok mentioned the issue of
PKOs such as regional peacekeeping training centre, and decided to discuss the theme in 1995
(ARF, 1994). During the second Meeting in Brunei on 1 August 1995, the ARF members not only envisaged three stages of informal security cooperation in the Concept Paper: confidence-building, PD, and elaboration of approaches to conflicts, but it also established
ISMs to be co-chaired by an ASEAN and non-ASEAN participants that were held between annual ARF-SOM. A series of ISMs were convened to deal with cooperative activities, including peacekeeping (ARF, 1995b).
The Concept Paper suggested two complementary approaches for security cooperation: one based on ASEAN’s experience and the other on “the implementation of concrete confidence- building measures.” Annexes A and B were also listed in the Concept Paper, the former to be implemented in the immediate future and the latter in the longer run. The issue of peacekeeping mentioned in Annex A was to hold “Seminars/Workshops on peacekeeping issues” and the “Exchange of information and experience relating to UN Peacekeeping
Operations.” Annex B referred the need to “[e]xplore the possibility of establishing a peacekeeping centre” (ARF, 1995a).
The first ARF ISM on PKOs was held in Kuala Lumpur in 1996. Co-chaired by Malaysia and
Canada, this ISM concentrated on the presentation of three papers: Current Status on United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Malaysia), Training for Peace Support Operations
26
(Canada), and Standby Arrangements (UN). On the first topic, ARF members focused on the
UN’s leading role in peacekeeping, and encouraging individual contributions to UN arrangements. On the second issue, the participants “recognised that cooperation between the
ARF participants in peacekeeping activities would be beneficial” (ARF, 1996a). The cooperation was stipulated to include the sharing of training programmes, coordination between national peacekeeping centres, and the establishment of a series of seminars on peacekeeping. Therefore, the participants highlighted the importance of a regional “train the trainers” workshop. On the final issue, the participants merely encouraged ARF members to
“consider taking part in the Standby Arrangements in order to facilitate the planning and deployment of UN peacekeeping operations” (ARF, 1996a).
Basically, ARF members decided to organise the ISM annually to discuss peacekeeping.
Unexpectedly, the third ARF in Jakarta in 1996 announced the extension of the ISM on PKOs for another year to implement the recommendations from the ARF ISM in April 1996, including the convening of two ARF seminars (ARF, 1996b). The ‘Train the Trainers’ workshop was held in Kuala Lumpur in 1997 and co-chaired by Malaysia and Australia. It covered subjects on UN PKOs and training, civil and military roles in PKOs, the sharing of training experience, approaches to training requirements and the complexities of supporting
UN PKOs. The workshop in a summary report stressed the “central role of the UN in peacekeeping and the need to understand the role of the UN peacekeeping operations within the total UN framework.” The workshop also submitted recommendations to the ISM on
PKOs, including a one-year extension of the ISM to provide an additional course on PKOs training (ARF, 1997b). Thus, a Demining Seminar was hosted by New Zealand in April 1997.
ARF countries reached a consensus within the seminar to “make a recommendation to the
United Nations that responsibility for all aspects of UN demining operations reside within a single UN body under the direct control of the UN Secretary General” (ARF, 1997c).
27
Finally, the ARF made a report about the implementation of the ‘Train the Trainers’ workshop and Technical Demining Seminar on peacekeeping. The main focus of the report was again on the UN PKOs and training. On UN operation, ARF members were encouraged “to support the peacekeeping capacity of the UN through the loan of military and civilian Personnel and through bilateral arrangements.” On the training, the report indicated the establishment of the
International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) dealing with the issues of peacekeeping on research, education, and training. The report also encouraged ARF members to add contact points in IAPTC to gather the latest information about the training options. In addition, the participants agreed to cooperate further on the subject of peacekeeping and concluded that “the momentum is sufficiently strong for this peacekeeping operation to continue among interested ARF countries without the requirement for a formal extension of the ISM on PKO” (ARF, 1997d).
In short, the voluntary individual contributions to PKOs under UN’s arrangement and the focus on sharing training experience have dominated the agenda of the ARF since 1994.
Hence, the Forum failed to involve in a response to help Southeast Asian countries resolve intra-conflicts.
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4. ASEAN members’ Responses to PKOs in Southeast Asia 4.1 East Timor17
The East Timor crisis came about as a sequence of events extending back to the downfall of
President Suharto in 1998, and Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie came as an interim successor and announced on 27 January 1999 that the East Timorese would be able to vote to choose special autonomy or independence. 18 Subsequently, the United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET), which consisted of numbers of international and local staffs, UN volunteers, and civilian police, was formed to organise a referendum in East Timor.19 On 4 September 1999,
17 The involvement of ASEAN in the East Timor issue dated from Indonesian invasion of East Timor on 7 December 1975, which was once a Portuguese colony. When the UN adopted Resolution 3485 to condemn Indonesian military intervention (United Nations, 1975a), only Singapore abstained on the resolution (Morrison and Suhrke, 1978, p. 188). The other ASEAN members (Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines), which had established close relations with Indonesia, voted against this resolution (Singh, 1996, p. 101). Since Indonesia refused to accept General Assembly Resolution 3485, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 384 on 22 December 1975 to require Indonesia “to withdraw without delay all of its forces from the Territory” (United Nations, 1975b). Similar resolutions calling for Indonesian withdrawal and the right of the East Timorese to self-determination were put to the General Assembly each year between 1976 and 1982 (the demand to withdraw Indonesian troops was dropped after 1976). From 1977, Singapore joined the other ASEAN members in supporting the Indonesian position on the East Timor issue (Singh, 1996, pp. 102-108). Beginning in 1982, the General Assembly mandated the Secretary-General of the UN to sponsor regular talks between Portugal and Indonesia to resolve the status of the territory. However, the international community did not pay more attention on East Timor until the Dili massacre on 12 November 1991, and the dialogues between Portugal and Indonesia under UN auspices assumed new importance following the massacre. In the talks Portugal preferred the involvement of East Timorese for the prospect of the act of self-determination, but Indonesia wanted to discuss the issue on a basis between the two governments without the participation of pro- independence East Timorese representatives. From 1995 The UN-sponsored dialogues involving Indonesian, East Timorese and Portuguese representatives were held on an annual basis in Austria (McDougall, 1998, pp. 216-217). This new development, however, did not affect other ASEAN members’ support for Indonesia in the name of regional solidarity (Kraft, 2000, p. 5). 18 Habibie’s announcement was influenced by a letter from Prime Minister John Howard calling on Indonesia to grant East Timor greater autonomy, although Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, expressed anger at what he saw as Australian intervention in Indonesia’s affairs (Fischer, 2000, pp. 9-18). 19 An agreement signed by Indonesia and Portugal in New York on 5 May 1999 led to the establishment of 29 the result of referendum was announced. Almost 80 per cent of the East Timorese had voted for independence, and this became the signal for pro-Indonesian militia and the Indonesian
Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesiai, TNI) 20 to launch a campaign of violence throughout East Timor. UNAMET personnel were targeted and many East Timorese were killed or forcibly displaced to West Timor. Under continuing pressure from the international community21 and the US22 to resolve the conflict, the Government of Indonesia (the GoI) on
12 September 1999 reluctantly accepted the establishment of an international peacekeeping force to restore peace and security to East Timor (Hernandez, 2000, pp. 73-74).
ASEAN did not involve in the formulation of a response to the crisis due to several political and strategic considerations among its members. Firstly, ASEAN countries feared that supporting self-determination for the East Timorese could lead to internal instability in
Southeast Asia. Dupont argues that “Singapore and Malaysia had already encountered
UNAMET, whereby the two governments requested the Secretary-General to conduct a referendum in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese accepted or rejected a special autonomy within the unitary Republic of Indonesia (United Nations, 1999). 20 When the police separated from ABRI, the Indonesian Armed Forces became known as the TNI (Kingsbury, 2000, p. 320). 21 The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, on 7 September gave Indonesia 24 hours to restore order or “the international community will have to consider what other measures it can take” (Greenlees and Garran, 1999); The International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended loan talks with Indonesia on 10 September, and concurrently postponed the next round of loans until the East Timor crisis ended (Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 2000, p. 137); The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leader’s Meeting, which commenced on 12-13 September in Auckland, provided a forum for world leaders to exchange information on the East Timor crisis and formulate a multinational force to intervene (Asia Times, 1999). 22 General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, had delivered a message to the Commander of the TNI, General Wiranto, that the US would suspend the economic assistance to Indonesia for its economic recovery from the Asian economic crisis, particularly through the IMF. The message was underlined by the Dennies C. Blair, Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command (PACOM), when he informed General Wiranto that the US was cutting off the military relations with Indonesia (Becker, 1999). Later on, Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, made the US message clear to win Indonesia’s acquiescence to the entry of intervention forces for the peace in East Timor (Economist, 1999). 30 difficulties in stemming the flow of illegal migrants and refugees from Indonesia during the economic crisis, while Thailand and the Philippines were mindful of their conflict with
Muslim separatist movements in their southern provinces”, and East Timor’s separation could worsen this situation (2000, p. 164). Secondly, the national resilience notion aroused ASEAN members’ concern about the human right issue taken by Western countries as a pretext for unilateral armed intervention in the domestic affairs of Southeast Asia. Dupont indicates that
“Southeast Asians generally believe that humanitarian intervention could subvert the region’s dominant non-intervention norm, weakening political and social cohesion and allowing the
West to call into question the legitimacy of governments and regimes not of their liking”
(2000, p. 165). Therefore, ASEAN states initially did not have appropriate responses to the crisis.
Although ASEAN did not quickly respond to the crisis, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1264 on 15 September 1999 to create an international Force for East Timor
(INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and Australia played a leading role in this multinational force (Newsday, 1999). ASEAN members played a relatively secondary role in
INTERFET because of lack of experience and severe military budget handicapped by the
Asian economic crisis in 1997. Dupont indicates that “ASEAN defence forces, with the exception of Malaysia, had little previous experience in UN operations and were initially hesitant about their ability to turn war fighters into peacekeepers” (2000, p. 165). As evidenced by the examples described, the 1997 economic crisis had a major impact on the regional defence force. Regional air forces in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines were forced to cut fighter and strike operations and even reduce their modernisation programmes, and regional navies of Thailand and the Philippines turned the emphasis on maintenance and training instead of offshore patrol (Farrer, 1999, p. 34; Grazebrook, 1999, p. 36).
In addition to lack of experiences in peacekeeping and limited military budgets to deploy
31 peace-enforcers, a division within ASEAN affected its contribution to INTERFET. Burma was sympathetic to Indonesia and opposed any external intervention in East Timor; Vietnam was unenthusiastic about INTERFET and even refused to let Thai peacekeepers fly through its airspace except during daytime when Thailand played a major role in INTERFET
(Vatikiotis, Dolven, and Crispin, 1999). With regard to other ASEAN members, McDougall indicates that some countries had considerable sympathy for the plight of the East Timorese, but they “needed to consider how their stance on intervention in East Timor was likely to affect their relations with Indonesia” (2001, p. 176). The Philippines and Thailand were most sympathetic to the East Timor crisis and rapidly responded to Indonesia’s acceptance of
INTERFET. Filipino President, Joseph Estrada, stated the support of INTERFET and emphasized Indonesia’s acceptance (Xinhua News Agency, 1999a), and Thai Foreign Minister,
Surin Pitsuwan, said his country was “willing and ready to help our closest friend, Indonesia, on the East Timor issue” (Xinhua News Agency, 1999b); Singapore did not clearly express its support for INTERFET and put more emphasis on the need to view the East Timor crisis as an international issue,23 and its consideration was to reduce “potential for causing intra-ASEAN divisions, in particular tensions between Singapore and Indonesia” (McDougall, 2001, p. 177).
However, Singapore indicated that ASEAN should assist East Timorese, and Australia and
Indonesia were responsible to bring about normalcy in East Timor (Xinhua News Agency,
1999d).
Although there were divided positions among ASEAN toward INTERFET, Indonesia requested ASEAN members taking a prominent role in INTERFET to minimise Australia’s influence in East Timor.24 After a meeting between Surin and TNI commander Chief General
23 In an interview on 28 October 1999, Singapore Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, argued that East Timor “was not a problem created by ASEAN…It was and is an international problem. It remains an issue with the United Nations” (Xinhua News Agency, 1999d). 24 Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, was most vocal to criticize Western countries’ attitudes 32
Wiranto on the morning of 14 September 1999 in Jakarta, Indonesia accepted ASEAN member states’ troops to be deployed to East Timor as part of INTERFET. By the time that
INTERFET, head by Australian Maj.-Gen. Peter Cosgrove with Maj.-Gen. Songkitti
Chakkrabhat of Thailand as deputy commander, established its presence in East Timor on 20
September, around one quarter personnel of INTERFET were contributed by ASEAN members.25
Table 2.1 Australian and ASEAN contributions to INTERFET 5,500 personnel, including amphibious lift, 9x C-130, 15x S-70A, 2x B707 Australia Australian major-general Peter Cosgrove was the commander
1,580 personnel, including combat troops, medical and engineering teams, Thailand technicians, 1x naval ship, 1x C-130 Thai major-general Songkitti Chakkrabhat was the deputy commander
The 1,200 personnel, including army engineers, medical and other support Philippines troops, 1x C-130
Singapore 254 personnel, including 1x medical team, 1x C-130, 2x heavy landing ships
Malaysia 30 personnel who were mainly interpreters
Source: Compiled by author from Dupont (2000, p. 167) and Canadiansoldiers (2009)
By 25 October 1999, the UN Transnational Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was formed under Resolution 1272 to govern the administration of East Timor until formal independence.
UNTAET formally replaced INTERFET in February 2000, and a Filipino Lieutenant-General,
towards the East Timor crisis, and he especially pointed that Australia intended to get benefits from East Timor’s independence through its involvement in PKOs (Australian, 1999). Therefore, Mahathir expressed the view that Australia had been “heavy-handed” in dealing with the East Timor crisis, and the Australian role should be scaled down in INTERFET, and ASEAN members should send more troops in PKOs in East Timor (Xinhua News Agency, 1999c). 25 Table 2.1gives details on ASEAN countries’ contributions to INTERFET. 33
Jamie de los Santos, took over the leadership from Australia to become the commander of
UNTAET (United Nations, 2001).
4.2 Aceh26
Compared to the large scale of military contribution in the East Timor crisis, ASEAN countries only provided unarmed military observers in Aceh’s journey from war to peace in the post-Suharto era. This can be divided into two stages. The first stage began when
Megawati Sukarnoputri succeeded Abdurrahman Wahid as Indonesian President in 2001.
Although Megawati was a democratically elected president, she closely cooperated with the
TNI to get political benefits, because TNI’s support was essential to Megawati’s administration to maintain territorial integrity and to win the 2004 election (McBeth and
Vatikiotis, 2002). Jemadu also argues that “the indispensable role of the TNI in resolving the national identity question in Aceh coincides with its increasing attempts to strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis Indonesian civilian leaders” after the collapse of Suharto’s regime (2004, p. 328). Therefore, Megawati inclined to take firmer measures to resolve conflict in Aceh,27 while she also continued to pursue a non-military solution28 by resuming talks with GAM leaders under Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) auspices.29 Finally, a new round
26 Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) was formed in 1976 with the object of seceding from the Republic of Indonesia via violence approaches. GAM’s armed insurgency had escalated since the downfall of President Suharto in 1998, and the Indonesian public blamed that the escalation of conflict derived from Jakarta’s conduct of military operations in Aceh and its inability to resolve the problem in the post-Suharto era. For a detailed discussion of the background of GAM’s rebellion, see Rizal Sukma (2004), Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons, Washington: East-West Center. 27 Megawati in February 2002 approved a plan to reinstate Aceh’s own military command (Kodam), which had been rejected by Presidents Habibie and Wahid. 28 Megawati’s administration signed the special autonomy law in July 2001 in the hope of reducing support for independence in Aceh. The content of the law constituted a substantial devolution of political authority and gave Aceh a greater share of income from its natural resources. In addition, the law allowed Aceh to base its legal system on Islamic Sharia (International Crisis Group, 2002, pp. 12-14). 29 HDC facilitated a first round of direct talks between the GoI and GAM on 27 January 2000. On 12 May 2000, 34 of peace talks began in February 2002 and a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA)30 was signed by the two sides on December 9.
Following the signing of COHA, the Joint Security Committee (JSC) was set up, which was a tri-partite monitoring mechanism consisting of representatives of GAM, the GoI and a neutral third-party in the form of unarmed military personnel from Thailand and the Philippines. JSC was responsible for the actual implementation of COHA, including the establishment of Peace
Zones in Aceh to facilitate disarmament between the TNI and GAM and pave the way for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction (Iyer, 2003, pp. 10-13).
With regard to the role of a third-party to end increasing violence in Aceh, the GoI initially rejected any international involvement due to its heightened concern over sovereignty by the independence of East Timor in 2002. Even the UN was not welcome to mediate the conflicts between the TNI and GAM because its role was widely condemned in Indonesia due to TNI’s withdrawal from East Timor (Barron and Burke, 2008, p. 11). Thus, an International Crisis
Group expert on Aceh, Sidney Jones, described GoI’s reaction to any sign of UN presence as
“allergic” (Eastley, 2003). 31 However, ASEAN countries, especially Thailand and the
Philippines, were wary that GAM might trigger the possible revival of secessionist aspirations in their countries. Pura (1999) argues that “militant Acehnese separatists espouse the creation of an Islamic state as a goal…could also resonate in Thailand and the Philippines, where
Muslim separatist movements in Pattani and Mindanao, respectively, have waxed and waned for years.” Therefore, Indonesia allowed HDC as a broker to facilitate the peace process between the GoI and GAM, and recruit regional observers from Thailand and the Philippines the GoI and GAM signed an agreement in Davos, Switzerland, called ‘Joint Understanding for Humanitarian Pause for Aceh’ to halt the occurrence of violence enabling them to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. 30 A report from the International Crisis Group argues that COHA was not really a peace agreement but an agreed framework to help the two parties work toward peace (2003, pp. 2-3). 31 Barron and Burke indicate that the concerns of external intervention led the GoI to request the engagement of HDC as a non-governmental organisation (NGO) to bring the peace in Aceh (2008, p. 11). 35 to staff JSC. Finally the Joint Monitoring Force under the command of a Thai Maj. Gen,
Thanongsuk Tuvinun, was established and arrived in Aceh in 2002 (Xinhua News Agency,
2002).
In fact COHA only ushered in a brief period of reduced conflict in Aceh. One reason32 was the JSC’s inability to effectively prevent the TNI and GAM from violating the implementation of COHA. Huber argues that the “lack of credible third-party guarantees-due to the very structure of the JSC-eroded the parties’ confidence in the process and quickly doomed implementation”, including “the establishment of peace zones, other demilitarization measures, and most crucially the imposition of sanctions for truce breaking” (2004, p. 32).
Since COHA was unravelling and JSC was unable to halt the collapse of the agreement,
President Megawati imposed martial law in May 2003, and then launched a massive military operation in Aceh (Sukma, 2004, p. 21).33
The second stage that ASEAN countries contributed to end the bloody violence in Aceh began in the post-tsunami period. The 2004 tsunami caused the huge scale of human loss in Aceh as well as sustained disruption for economic activities in Indonesia. In this context, the GoI and
GAM became aware of the importance of peace process for the post-tsunami reconstruction.
Jemadu argues that the infrastructure and economic activities like trade, agriculture, and fishery had destructive consequence after the tsunami. Although the official budgets and donors from the international community were available for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, “the maintenance of those infrastructures is always hampered by the lack of security for the contractors and workers of public works.” Therefore, political interaction
32 For more details about factors leading to the collapse of COHA, see Huber (2004). 33 The GoI agreed to negotiate with GAM’s Sweden-based leadership at an international conference in Tokyo on 17 May 2003 before taking the military solution as the last resort. GoI’s two demands-that GAM accepted the special autonomy arrangement for Aceh and agreed to immediate disarmament-were rejected by GAM representatives. When the Tokyo meeting ended in failure, President Megawati decided to impose martial law across Aceh and launched military operations in the province (Aspinall and Crouch, 2003, pp. 43-45). 36 between the GoI and GAM was essential to create peaceful conflict resolution for the post- tsunami reconstruction (2006, pp. 22-23).
GAM declared a unilateral ceasefire and announced its willingness to participate in the relief operation in the first place.34 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also sent a government negotiating team to talk with GAM leaders facilitated by the former President of Finland,
Martti Ahtisaari. 35 Meanwhile, the pressure from the international humanitarian agencies pushed the GoI and GAM to recreate peaceful conflict resolution. Barron and Burke argue that “[w]ith a rising number of minor clashes between GAM and military troops, agencies rapidly had to build knowledge on how to operate in a sometimes tense environment...With billions of dollars of support for reconstruction, some donors were concerned that continued conflict would damage the sustainability of their disaster recovery investments and began to investigate how they could support a peace deal if it arrived” (2008, pp. 18-19). Jemadu also indicates that “[b]oth the Indonesian government and GAM realised that it would be in their political interests to show the public that each of them really cared about the suffering of the
Acehnese caused by the tsunami...Each party tried to keep public relations as if they were competing for sympathy from the Acehnese people and the international community” (2006, p.
30). In short, the domestic consideration for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction, and the response to international agencies’ requirement for internal stability prompted the GoI and
GAM to renew negotiations on a peace agreement.
34 Besides the effects of the tsunami, the impact of TNI’s massive military operation on GAM since the adoption of the martial law also forced GAM to explore an exit strategy. In addition, GAM faced an internal tension among field commanders on the authority to make military decisions. Therefore, a faction of GAM looked for a tangible result from the peace process to resolve these problems (International Crisis Group, 2005, pp. 4-6). 35 Before President Yudhoyono invited GAM to renew negotiations on a peace agreement, Vice President Jusuf Kalla planned to take a secret and informal initiative (the Kalla Initiative) for peace in Aceh. However, Kalla Initiative turned in failure because it was leaked and some GAM leaders did not support it (International Crisis Group, 2005, pp. 1-3). 37
After a series of talks, the GoI and GAM signed the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) in August 2005 and the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was established. The AMM consisted of the representatives of militaries, governments, and freelance specialists from EU countries (Norway and Switzerland) as well as ASEAN members (Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Singapore), and it was in effect responsible for monitoring every aspect of the agreement, including the destruction of weapons, the legal arrangements, and amnesty and human rights issues.36
Undeniably, GoI’s adherence to the non-intervention principle and the tight timetable set by the context of the tsunami narrowed AMM’s mandate in the peace process. Aspinall argues that “the relative bargaining power that one of the negotiating parties-the Indonesian government-had in the negotiations and its hostility toward extensive international role and…the limited time horizon for international involvement set by the context of the Indian
Ocean tsunami” that AMM became a temporary mechanism with a limited mandate (2008, p.
12). AMM was conscious that GoI’s support was essential for progress toward peace.
Therefore, it put the relations with the GoI as a priority to hold regular meetings with the government compared to informal interactions with GAM. In addition, AMM members allowed Indonesian police to monitor their tasks under the pretext of a safety guarantee.
However, AMM members were forced to pay less attention to human right issues and the reintegration of former combatants after their departure (Barron and Burke, 2008, pp. 25-30).
Although AMM’s limited role attracted criticism, it has facilitated the peace agreement between the GoI and GAM and provided the foundations for future work on reconstruction and peacebuilding in Aceh which was once a war-torn province of Indonesia.
36 Article 5.2 of MoU articulated the tasks of AMM. 38
4.3 The southern Philippines37
ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia, became involved in the peace process in the southern
Philippines when Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office in January 2001.38 In contrast to
President Joseph Estrada’s ‘all out war’ policy resulting in escalating conflict, Arroyo sought the assistance of Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad, and Indonesian President,
Abdurrahman Wahid, to convince the MILF to resume peace talks. Mahathir responded positively to the Philippines’s request because of the national resilience concept led to
Malaysia’s major concern on a potential threat to its national stability caused by the neighbouring insurgencies. Lingga indicates that the kidnapping for ransom “by the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG) showed the capability of terrorists to cross borders and harm Malaysia’s tourist industry. In addition, the Malaysian state of Sabah has been host to hundreds of thousand of refugees from the southern Philippines since war broke out in 1971, which has
37 The conflict in southern Philippines originated from the continuing assertion of the Bangsamoro people for restoration of their independence. Since 1578, the Spaniards attempted to conquer the southern Muslim states and attacked Sulu and Mindanao, where the Bangsamoro people had established sovereign and independent administrative and political systems for centuries. The war continued and lasted for 320 years, but the Bangsamoro people never gave up their claim for independence even when the Spaniards were defeated by the US in 1898 and ceded the Bangsamoro territories. At this time the resistance of the Bangsamoro people was not as fierce as the conflicts between the Spanish colonialists because of the US military policy coupled with the introduction of education system, and the establishment of local governments. The US policy earned the goodwill of the Bangsamoro people, who expressed their interest to be part of the US rather than to be included in the Philippines. However, the Bangsamoro people continued to assert their rights to independence after their territories were made part of the Philippines by the US in the grant of independence in 1946. In addition to historical experience from the Spanish-American colonization, the economic deprivation, and the lack of basic services and political participation under the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) are roots of the conflict in southern Philippines (Jubair, 2007, pp. 61-62). These root causes led to the establishment of two groups: the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) founded in 1969, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) founded in 1977. They rebelled against the GRP including anti-Muslim militias: the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to regain independence through revolutionary means. 38 Indonesia also had involvement in the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the signing of the 1996 Peace Accord between the GRP and the MNLF (Lingga, 2005, pp. 47-48). 39 caused security problems in the state” (2007, p. 45).
With the help of Mahathir who sent his top aide to meet Chairman of the MILF, Salamat
Hashim, the MILF was persuaded to resume peace talks. Hashim sent his top deputy, Al-Haj
Murad Ebrahim, to Malaysia to meet the Presidential adviser to the Peace Process, Eduardo
Ermita, for secret talks that not even Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, Jesus Dureza, was not informed. On 24 March 2001 Murad and Ermita signed an agreement on the resumption of talks. Both sides followed up with commitments to suspend military action, and re- organised their respective negotiating panels, with Dureza heading the GRP panel, and Murad heading the MILF’s (Guiam, 2003).
Malaysia’s involvement did facilitate the GRP-MILF peace negotiations.39 Santos describes the functions of Malaysia’s role as third-party facilitator, including:
go-between conveying positions of the parties; providing a conductive atmosphere and facilities; presence in the talks as ‘referee’ and to witness commitments and understandings; help bridge differences by shuttling between the parties; administration of the talks; and record and keep minutes, to detail what had actually been agreed upon (2005, pp. 23-24).
Although the progress in the GRP-MILF peace negotiations was undermined by several setbacks,40 the process could not continue without Malaysia’s mediation. Lingga indicates that
39 Santos indicates a “diplomatic stage” of the GRP-MILF peace talks with Malaysia’s involvement from March 2001 to February 2003 The stage included the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace talks, another three rounds of formal peace talks, the Tripoli Agreement on Peace, Implementing Guidelines on the ceasefire and on the rehabilitation of refugees and development of conflict affected areas, the prominence and predominance of back channel talks, a Joint Communique on Criminal Interdiction, the four Congressional hearings on these recent agreements, the MILF-MNLF unity process, the Manual of Instructions for the Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs), and the ‘Buliok offensive’ (2005, pp. 6-7). 40 For causes that disrupted the GRP-MILF peace negotiations, see Santos (2005, pp. 7-19).
40
“[e]ach time the GRP and MILF negotiating panels reached a point of disagreement that might lead to a stalemate, Malaysia has been helpful in suggesting alternatives.” For instance,
Malaysia “used behind-the-scenes negotiations to break the impasse” when the GRP refused to sign the Implementing Guidelines on the rehabilitation of refugees and development of conflict affected areas. Malaysia also invited the two parties to explore new ideas on the resumption of the formal negotiations when the AFP launched its campaign to attack the
MILF in February 2003 (Buliok offensive) (2007, p. 50).
In addition, Malaysia had led the International Monitoring Team (IMT) since 2004, which was chiefly composed of Malaysian peacekeepers with smaller contingents from Brunei
Darussalam, Libya, Canada, and Japan, to monitor the ceasefire. The presence of the IMT significantly reduced conflicts between the AFP and the MILF, but Malaysia withdrew its troops from the IMT in September 2008 because the peace process was bogged down (Jacinto,
2008).41 Malaysia did not perform its facilitative and mediation roles until the GRP and the
MILF suspended military action after a outbreak of conflict, and they agreed to allow peace brokers to involve in the resumption of negotiations (Agence France Presse, 2009). 42 On
February 28 2010, the IMT led by Major General, Datuk Baharom Bin Hamzah, restarted monitoring operation in ceasefire, reconstruction and rehabilitation, socio-economic development, and the Civilian Protection Component (CPC) in the southern Philippines
41 After Malaysia facilitator, Datuk Othman bin Abd Razak, shuttled between the GRP and the MILF, the signing of the peace panels’ Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, which was the last issue of the 2001 Tripoli Agreement on Peace, was aborted in March 2008. On 21 April, Malaysian Foreign Minister, Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim, announced the withdrawal of Malaysian forces from the IMT when their current mandate ended in September. Three days later, Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, confirmed Yatim’s statement because Kuala Lumpur wanted progress in the peace process (Diaz, 2008). 42 A round of peace talks was halted in September 2008 because the Philippines Supreme Court rejected a proposed deal granting the Muslims in the southern Philippines to expand their so-called ‘ancestral domain’. The MILF seized on the court’s order as an excuse to launch a violent attack, and this led to the forceful response by the AFP (Bosworth, et al., 2008). 41
(Arguillas, 2010). But whether Malaysia can broker a deal that will get the GRP-MILF peace negotiations back on track remains to be seen.
5. Lessons to be Learned 5.1 The development of peacekeeping in the ARF: constraints and opportunities
The endorsement of the principle of non-interference by the ARF constrained its ability to stem the gross violations of human rights in Southeast Asian countries and participate in
PKOs.
Since the termination of the ISM on PKOs in 1997, the ARF made no progress on the issue of peacekeeping. The Foreign Ministers Meeting in Bangkok in 2000, only mentioned the activities of the UNTAET and the importance of peace-building in East Timor, and the
Ministers emphasized “the importance of confidence-building measures (CBMs) to the overall ARF process” with work on the overlap between CBMs and PD also receiving attention. In addition, the meeting indicated that “the ARF should continue to develop at a pace comfortable to all participants, decision be made by consensus, and confidence-building remain key to the process. The Ministers expressed support to ASEAN in exercising its leading role in the ARF” (ARF, 2000). From 2001 to 2003, the ARF annual Ministerial
Meeting hardly discussed the issue of peacekeeping. Its main focus was the potential implementation of PD. The ARF adopted a Paper on ‘Concept and Principles of Preventive
Diplomacy’ in July 2001. The PD was defined as a “consensual diplomatic and political action taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties” to prevent conflict between states rather than within states. Furthermore, the PD measures were applied to enhance cooperation, trust, and understanding among states, instead of a response to a regional crisis (ARF, 2001a).
However, PKOs contributed to by ASEAN members were only mentioned at the ARF’s
42
Ministerial Meeting on 18 June 2003. The participants stated that they respected “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Indonesia. They recognized the efforts of the Indonesian Government to restore peace and order in Aceh. The Ministers expressed their appreciation to the Philippines and Thailand for their contribution in providing monitoring teams as requested by Indonesian in the recent efforts to resolve the Aceh problem through dialogue” (ARF, 2003d). Despite the statement to support Indonesia’s territorial integrity and affirm ASEAN’s role in JSC, the Ministers made no effort to discuss the likelihood of a peacekeeping force to facilitate effectively the implementation of a peace agreement between involved parties in the future. Thus, it can be concluded that the importance of peacekeeping in the ARF was marginalised after the East Timor crisis. The Ministers repeatedly emphasized the central role of confidence building in the institutional process, and excluded references to formulate a response of protecting people against forms of tyranny under the PD.
However, the ARF Defence Officials’ Dialogue (DOD), which was held in Brunei on 31
October 2007, was a turning point for the future discussion of PKOs. The defence and military officials at the meeting recognised that the role of armed forces was not limited to the protection of national security. They indicated a need to improve the rapid-response capability of troops to accomplish multilateral tasks including peacekeeping (ARF, 2007d). The ARF also emphasized the importance of military exercises beyond seminars and training workshops for PKOs. The participants in the DOD in Canada in April 2008, stressed that
“increased emphasis should be given to advancing beyond dialogue to more concrete, practical activities”, including “coordinating individual national military responses to crisis more effectively, developing joint security strategies for future scenarios, supporting internal policy development, improving information gathering and exchange, instituting desk top and, eventually, appropriate field exercises, and supporting the capacity building of all participants” to strengthen the ARF’s implementation of peacekeeping (ARF, 2008b).
43
The DOD in Singapore in October 2008 restated that “member countries could build on existing frameworks to conduct multilateral exercises which would enhance inter-operability amongst the militaries in-theatre” (ARF, 2008f) to effectively carry out the mission of peacekeeping. In 2009 and 2010, the DOD did not address the issue of peacekeeping; In 2010, the ARF Ministerial Meeting in Vietnam emphasized the central role of CBMs in the institutional process but did not discuss PKOs (ARF, 2010c). However, the Ministers associated with the ‘Hanoi Plan of Action’ explicitly indicated the 2020 goal for implementing peacekeeping activities. The proposal included:
(1) Compile a list of peacekeeping best practices and lessons learned including inputs from UN and other regional organizations; (2) Update on a regular basis the list of ARF peacekeeping contact points to facilitate information sharing; (3) Support the convening of ARF Meeting of Peacekeeping Experts or some other mutually agreed modalities on a regular basis; (4) Promote networking among ARF Participants’ peacekeeping centres to encourage cooperation among them in such areas as training and seminars; (5) Hold ARF joint training and planning activities, including to conduct desk- top and scenario-based planning exercises for the ARF on peacekeeping operation exercises as and when appropriate with the consent of ARF Participants (ARF, 2010b).
The aim of the ‘Hanoi Plan of Action’ was reaffirmed by the DOD in 2011, in which the participants agreed “that collaboration between ARF peacekeeping centres is a priority” (ARF,
2011b). In short, the issue of peacekeeping was limited to sharing experiences and holding workshops in the ARF, which derived from the focus on CBMs and PD in institutional process, and the endorsement of the principle of non-intervention. However, the increasing discussion by Defence Officials about PKOs provided a chance to prioritize the issue in the
ARF.
44
5.2 Evaluation of the advantages and the disadvantages in ASEAN’s contributions to PKOs in East Timor, Aceh, and the southern Philippines
In contrast to the ARF, some ASEAN members did play significant roles in INTERFET, the implementation of the peace agreement between the GoI and GAM (especially the second stage), and the IMT in the southern Philippines. However, ASEAN’s passive responses to conflict and meagre contributions to PKOs, especially during the East Timor crisis, had incurred criticism (Lee, 1999). In response to the criticisms, ASEAN’s former Secretary-
General, Rodolfo C. Severino, declared that “only the UN could legitimately and capably undertake the peacekeeping operation and mobilise the massive resources necessary” for the
East Timor crisis, and ASEAN members “undertook consultations, arrived at consensus, and let individual members decide what specific contributions to make to the UN effort. Any other course would not have been possible, desirable or effective” (Severino, 2000).
Although the crisis in East Timor exposed ASEAN’s inadequacy in response to a conflict that required a military intervention, ASEAN members started to discuss the likelihood of their own peacekeeping force. The idea was originally mentioned by Thai former Deputy Foreign
Minister, Sukhumbhand Paribatra. Mr. Sukhumbhand opposed INTERFET led by Western countries and claimed that “we [could] solve the region’s problems ourselves, with the co- operation of countries outside the region”, and “we [had] to show our readiness to step forward as a united group” (Alford, 1999). In 2004, Indonesia proposed the formation of a regional peacekeeping force under the framework of ASC. Marty Natalegawa, as an acting director general of the GoI, remarked that “ASEAN countries should know one another better than anyone else and therefore we should have the option for ASEAN countries to take advantage of an ASEAN peacekeeping force to be deployed if they so wish” (ASEAN, 2004b).
Four months later, however, the proposal was objected to by ASEAN officials, citing problems in military capacities and doctrines among the member states to establish a regional
45 peacekeeping force (Asian Political News, 2004).
Besides military capacities and doctrines in ASEAN, other advantages or disadvantages that can contribute or impede the formation of a regional peacekeeping force deserve discussion.
Actually, the likelihood of ASEAN’s peacekeeping force was orginally discussed in 1994.
Wanandi and Mochtan argue that “Indonesia and Malaysia are regular members of the UN peacekeeping forces, while Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are actively involved in the more recent operations. The sharing of experience among these countries will help not only in ensuring the formation of a well-informed ASEAN peacekeeping contingent, but also lead to better preparation and planning of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Force as a whole” (1994, p. 9).
In the development of this argument, PKOs in East Timor and Aceh could provide experiences for a prospective regional peacekeeping force. In Aceh, AMM staffs initially faced a problem to engage with the local actors in complex political and social situation, because the tight timetable for the operation reduced a chance for AMM to gain the local knowledge before its departure (Barron and Burke, 2008, pp. 28-29).
However, the professional peacekeepers from ASEAN members do not have this problem. For example, the Filipino peacekeepers have clear perception that “[e]thnic and racial affiliation plays an important role in peacekeeping in Asian societies as it foster better relationship between peacekeepers and the community where they work” through experience gained from long-term counterinsurgency missions (Coballes, 2007, pp. 7, 10); Thai armed forces learned the lesson “to maintain close contact with local civilians who are very vulnerable and will have to deal with groups that are very sensitive about the force’s presence” in its participation in various UN PKOs (Srinual, 2002, p. 53). This experience enabled Thai armed forces were easier to establish good relations with East Timorese and get advice to accomplish the mission compared to Australian contingents in INTERFET (Srinual, 2002, p. 54). In other words, the advantage of ASEAN peacekeepers are a better understanding of local culture than Western
46 countries in ethnic-based Southeast Asia to establish good relations with indigenous people, and an efficient solution to the problems of target population within time-intensive PKOs.
Another consideration to form a regional peacekeeping force is the availability of funding to support operations. In East Timor, a reason that ASEAN members had a limited independent intervention capacity was their military budgets were handicapped by the 1997 economic crisis. In addition, Clause 9 of Resolution 1264 explicitly “stresse[d] that the expenses for the force will be borne by the participating Member States concerned” (Coleman, 2007, p. 254), because INTERFET was an UN-mandated coalition of the willing rather than an UN operation that was designed to include burden-sharing mechanism. However, Resolution 1264 requested the Security Council to create a Trust Fund in supporting INTERFET, and developing countries were eligible to be reimbursed from Trust Fund resources (Coleman,
2007, p. 256). Coupled with Japan’s contribution of approximately US$100 million to the UN
Trust Fund in early October 1999, the pressure of developing countries to shoulder costs in
INTERFET could be reduced (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999). Therefore, the financial burden of sending contingents would not be a major consideration among ASEAN members if they wanted to form a regional peacekeeping force under UN authorization. The majority of ASEAN members are developing countries and are eligible to be reimbursed from
Trust Fund resources, and they can cooperate with non-ASEAN countries like Japan to get financial assistance.
In addition to the understanding of local background and the available funding to support contingents, a high level of interoperability is essential for multinational coalition forces to operate in PKOs. Interoperability means that “armed forces should develop common doctrines, standardized communications, and command and control procedures” prior to deployment, and this could be achieve through “combined exercises with other forces and disseminating the lessons learnt throughout the defence force” (Ryan, 2000a, pp. 5, 19). The East Timor
47 crisis demonstrated that INTERFET consisted of the multinational forces with a gap in defence capabilities and military doctrines. INTERFET not only had to provide security assurance but to obtain local people’s trust as a basis for UNTAET to attain its mission of nation building. To respond to similar PKOs anywhere in Southeast Asia at any time, a coalition of forces should be trained together in joint exercises to make contingents better prepared on coordinated operational cultures and capabilities before its deployment.
The regular training seminars on the issue of peacekeeping in the ARF, and the joint peacekeeping exercises proposed by the DOD, can provide a platform for ASEAN members to learn lessons from the UN PKOs where they involve and develop interoperability for a prospect peacekeeping force. In addition, the US has conducted Global Peace Operation
Initiative (GPOI)43 to help more countries bolster their military capacities for the UN PKOs since 2004, and the regional peacekeeping operations training centres supported by GPOI will allow ASEAN members to build a network to share information and personnel on PKO training and exercises. Therefore, the training workshops and proposed joint military exercise in the ARF, and GPOI fund in support of the availability of peacekeeping training, are good conditions for ASEAN members to coordinate different military doctrines and capabilities,
43 The GPOI was established after the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit (participants were Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the US plus representatives from EU) to build the capacity and professionalism of peacekeepers, as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them for UN- endorsed PKOs. The military forces from six ASEAN countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have taken part in GPOI programs, and personnel from Singapore had also participated in GPOI training events. In addition, GPOI provides assistance to support regional peacekeeping operations training centres in Cambodia, Indonesia, and Thailand. See Nina M. Serafino (2009), The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report, (March), 9th, pp. 1-17; In addition, the Defence Ministers in the Fifth ADMM adopted ‘the Concept Paper on the Establishment of ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network’, which was aimed to utilize existing regional peacekeeping operations training centres “to conduct planning, training, and exchange of experiences for peacekeeping operations” for the maintenance of regional stability (ASEAN, 2011b).
48 and build high morale to form a peacekeeping force.
However, there is an emergent consensus in the UN to require countries to form ad hoc coalitions for PKOs at relative short notice in the post Cold War era. ASEAN would face several challenges to meet this standard if it wanted to establish a regional peacekeeping force.
The Brahimi Report, which looked at experiences on the nexus between peace-building and peacekeeping in twentieth century and presented key recommendations to achieve success in these efforts in the future, recommends that countries contributing to PKOs “should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another…to form several coherent brigade-size forces…ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within
90 days for complex peacekeeping operations” (United Nations, 2000, p. 20).
Indonesia’s proposal in 2004 for a regional peacekeeping force was similar to the UN recommendations to rapidly deploy troops from ASEAN members in responding to intra- conflicts. The actual contribution of ASEAN countries to the East Timor crisis, the peace process in Aceh after Suharto regime, and the GRP-MILF peace talks, however, indicated that
ASEAN was unable to act in times of the regional crises due to the institutional restraints and the distinct national interests among its member states. ASEAN members did not quickly involve in the formulation of a response to the East Timor crisis because they stood solidly behind a firm insistence on non-interference under the UN Charter. Although the Security
Council finally adopted Resolution 1264 to provide legitimacy for INTERFET, the political restraints and the concerns of Malaysia, Thailand, and the GRP about their bilateral relations with the GoI affected their size and objective of participation.44
44 According to the evidence, Malaysia only sent 30 interpreters because it wanted to maintain good relations with Indonesia to avoid disruption to business and trade interests between two countries (Mahadzir, 1999, p. 13); The GRP rapidly made a commitment to the involvement in INTERFET. However, it only dispatched a ‘Humanitarian Task Force’ comprising engineer and medical units because most of military resources were put 49
In addition, ASEAN’s passive responses to the peace process in Aceh and the GRP-MILF peace talks were guided by national interests of its member states and inherited institutional restrictions. The idea of national resilience in Indonesia pushed the cooperation between the
GoI and the TNI to prevent GAM from threatening territorial integrity and stability of the regime, and led to COHA being constantly breached. The national resilience concept also limited Thai and the Filipino participants to unarmed military observers in JSC, and made
“AMM was designed as a small, rapidly deployable mechanism with a limited, realizable mandate” to facilitate the peace agreement between the GoI and GAM (Barron and Burke,
2008, p. 23). In addition, the third-party roles of ASEAN members in the peace process in
Aceh and the GRP-MILF peace talks demonstrated the provision of Article 16 and 17 of TAC, which allowed peace settlement to be managed under a loose nature regional arrangement and upon the agreement of the host government (ASEAN, 1976b).45 All these factors constrained
ASEAN’s ability to form a rapid and effective multinational force for PKOs in the region.
on alleviating the internal security threat in the south (Ryan, 2000b, p. 52); Thai troops sought to avoid military confrontation with the TNI and “made their participation conditional on being assigned a geographical sector of East Timor where the risk of military confrontation was low and the scope for humanitarian action abundant” (Coleman, 2007, p. 272). 45 ASEAN articulated the conflict resolution strategy in the 2004 Vientiane Action Program (VAP). The strategy encouraged ASEAN countries to utilize national peacekeeping centres to develop regional arrangements for the maintenance of stability, but these arrangements should be built “upon the existing modes of pacific settlement of disputes to strengthen them with additional mechanisms as needed” (ASEAN, 2004e, p. 8). The 2007 ASEAN Charter reiterated the settlement of disputes in Chapter Eight. Article 22 declared that ASEAN members “shall endeavour to resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation and negotiation.” Article 23 declared that parties to a dispute “may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary General of ASEAN, acting in an ex-officio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation” (ASEAN, 2007c, p. 23). The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) blueprint, which was unveiled in 2009, embraced an early warning mechanism to defuse conflict. The blueprint stated that: “More efforts are needed in strengthening the existing modes of pacific settlement of disputes to avoid or settle future disputes” under the framework of the TAC (ASEAN, 2009b, pp. 11-12).
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The lack of leadership was another unfavourable condition for ASEAN to form an effective regional peacekeeping force. The experience of INTERFET demonstrated that the leading country had to share responsibility with other countries to shoulder financial costs. Coleman argues that “[m]ost of INTERFET’s non-Western participants were developing nations whose defence forces disposed of only limited financial resources and equipment stocks” (2007, p.
274). Although these countries were eligible to receive the UN Trust Fund, they would be reimbursed at the end of operation, and Trust Fund resources only covered force deployment and maintenance costs rather than capital investments such as the purchase of equipment.
Therefore Australia, being a leading country, took several measures to provide financial loans and “the necessary equipment, ranging from socks and uniforms to engineering equipment”
(2007, p. 275).
Other lessons learned from INTERFET were the offer of the amphibious and naval forces from the leading country to transport personnel and equipment for rapid deployment, protect safety of other contingents, and provide logistic support. Cotton notes the lessons learned by the Australian military in INTERFET:
[T]he coalition leader had to be prepared to provide whatever support was necessary for the force components. This included not only food and shelter, but also on occasion munitions, communications facilities and transport. When inserting the force, the INTERFET command had to have the demonstrated capability to protect it from any possible attack. Once inserted, the commander needed to have on hand whatever systems might be needed to deal with antagonists. Consequently, the INTERFET force, though charged with peace-keeping duties, had to be protected by advanced air and sea units, and its commander had to have available heavy armour and artillery for rapid deployment (2004, p. 87).
Scott also points that amphibious capacities were essential to transport a bulk of personnel and equipments to Dili Harbour which was difficult for heavy cargo, and gunfire of maritime 51 forces was essential to secure land contingents’ operation in East Timor (2000, pp. 28-29).
Furthermore, the military budgets of Asian countries, especially ASEAN members, were deeply affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and this prevented ASEAN countries from participating, even playing a leading role in INTERFET. Ryan argues that “[a]s a result of the
Asian economic crisis, the smaller and middle-level Asian states are in no position to take the lead in arranging regional defence relationships that will enhance the possibility of forming coalitions” (2000a, p. 18). The lesson learned from INTERFET demonstrated not only
ASEAN members’ incapability to take a lead to transport the multinational troops at short notice and provide a protective umbrella for the land forces in the operation, but their dependence on other developed countries to share financial burden. Besides these limitations on the national forces, ASEAN’s institutional restraints and distinct national interests among its member states can impede the formation of a peacekeeping force when crises suddenly erupt.
6. Conclusion
Since ASEAN’s leading role in the ARF has been confirmed in 1995, the norms and the political constraints of the Association can become its disadvantages that look counter- productive against the benefits on the training and exercise mechanisms offered by the Forum.
Because these difficulties have not been overcome after the East Timor crisis, the formation of a regional rapid and effective peacekeeping force will remain unrealistic in the near term.
Although ASEAN members could share information and lessons learned from the UN PKOs through the regional peacekeeping centres and the training workshops in the ARF, Table 2.2 demonstrates that police and specialists play a major role in individual contributions to these operations with small parts of military. Therefore, it can be concluded that the future development of PKOs in Southeast Asia will be a multinational force comprising the voluntary unarmed military combatants from ASEAN members but will not necessarily play a
52 leading role. This force will be supported by financial assistance from non-ASEAN countries and GPOI, and operate under UN authorization. The next chapter will examine how the security outlook based on comprehensive and cooperative security in ASEAN and the ARF created a gap between declarations of intent to cooperate against transnational crimes and terrorism, and the actual implementation of the cooperation at the working level.
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Table 2.2 Contributions by ASEAN members to the UN PKOs (as at July 2010) Country UN Mission contribution MINUSTAH 7 police MONUSCO 16 experts on mission, 175 troops 139 formed police units, 2 experts on UNAMID mission, 1troops Indonesia UNIFIL 1,327 troops UNMIL 1 expert on mission UNMIN 5 experts on mission UNMIS 10 police, 9 experts on mission MINURSO 12 experts on mission, 20 troops MONUSCO 17 experts on mission UNAMID 45 police, 12 troops UNIFIL 741 troops Malaysia UNMIL 6 experts on mission UNMIN 7 experts on mission UNMIS 5 police, 6 experts on mission 75 police, 140 formed police units, 2 UNMIT experts on mission MINUSTAH 37 police, 157 troops UNAMID 109 police UNDOF 344 troops 31 police, 2 experts on mission, 117 UNMIL The Philippines troops UNMIS 44 police, 11 experts on mission UNMIT 155 police, 4 experts on mission UNMOGIP 3 experts on mission UNOCI 3 experts on mission, 3 troops Singapore UNMIT 21 police, 2 experts on mission MINUSTAH 19 police Thailand UNAMID 9 experts on mission, 10 troops UNMIT 24 police
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Source: Compiled by author from UN Mission’s Summary detailed by Country (2010)
MINURSO= United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH= United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti MONUSCO=United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo UNAMID= African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNDOF= United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNIFIL= United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIL= United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIN= United Nations Mission in Nepal
UNMIS= United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMIT= United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP= United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI= United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
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CHAPTER THREE REGIONAL AND NATIONAL RESPONSES TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES AND TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. Introduction
The security outlook based on comprehensive and cooperative security prompted ASEAN and the ARF to become increasingly aware of the threat of transnational crimes 46 to regional security at an early stage of the institution building process. However, the principle of non- intervention created a gap between declarations of intent to cooperate against transnational crimes and an actual formation of the cohesive mechanism to coordinate member countries’ capability to implement these agreements.
The overriding influence of the non-interference principle was again presented in the aftermath of 9/11. ASEAN members, especially the heads of state and government, demonstrated a rhetorical commitment to an anti-terror agenda, and developed a nuanced policy to signal their divergence from US anti-terrorism strategy. Although the security officials and police chiefs arranged a series of multilateral meetings to promote practical counter-terrorism cooperation, ASEAN did not make progress in establishing common criteria in dealing with terrorist threats. This led to operational responses mostly occurring at the national and sub-regional levels.
At the national level, ASEAN members tried to develop a more effective counter-terrorism
46 The UN defined transnational crime as “offences whose inception, perpetration and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country”, and the categories of transnational crime in this article were justified by part of the ‘Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders’. These are: money laundering, terrorist activities, theft of art and cultural objects, theft of intellectual property, illicit traffic in arms, aircraft hijacking, sea piracy, land hijacking, insurance fraud, computer crime, environmental crime, trafficking in persons, trade in human body parts, illicit drug trafficking, fraudulent bankruptcy, infiltration of legal business, corruption and bribery of public officials, and finally other offences committed by organized criminal groups (United Nations, 1995a, pp. 4, 6-14). 56 strategy, and gain political, economic, and security benefits through enhanced relations with external powers. However, ASEAN members’ common non-intervention mindset could undermine these extra-regional supports to the effectiveness of national counter-terrorism responses. With regard to other forms of sub-regional cooperation, the positions of ASEAN member governments were shaped by very different assessments of internal political and strategic calculations, and this meant that ASEAN was not equipped to offer a sustained response to terrorism. Therefore, it can be argued that national resilience in Southeast Asia cannot facilitate any initiatives adopted to develop counter-terrorism strategies and measures at the regional level. Similar to ASEAN, ARF members indicated their willingness to work together to combat terrorism. The confirmed leading role of ASEAN in the institutional process, however, has impeded the ARF from establishing a well-structured mechanism in responding to terrorist threat to date.
This chapter illustrates that the non-interference principle and respect for state sovereignty have restricted the ability of Southeast Asian countries to develop practical cooperation in dealing with transnational crimes and terrorism. The first section demonstrates the rhetorical commitment of ASEAN and the ARF to combating transnational crimes, especially drug trafficking in their early years. However, their declarations and meetings resulted in little that was concrete.
The second section presents ASEAN’s enduring pattern of cooperation to respond to transnational crimes, and inter alia, terrorism after 9/11. ASEAN adopted a nuanced policy to signal a major divergence from the US-led counter-terrorism campaign because many member states were wary of US intentions in the region. Yet, a series of terrorist attacks put considerable pressure on ASEAN members to form a collective position to prevent terrorism from threatening economic competitiveness. In practice, however, regional cooperation was limited in responding to reoccurring terrorist activities because of ASEAN’s adherence to the
57 non-intervention principle.
It appears that practical responses have been extra-regional. In the test case of Indonesia and the Philippines, the third section examines the extent to which domestic political agendas, and the 1999 East Timor crisis on human right violations and the GRP-MILF peace talks drove individual countries to seek extra-regional cooperation with either the US or Australia, to combat terrorism. According to the evidence, this section argues that the effectiveness of extra-regional cooperation to deal with terrorism could be undermined if such cooperation infringed upon national sovereignty, thus limiting initiative to adopt counter-terrorism cooperation at the multilateral level.
The final section shows similar responses to terrorism by the ARF. Since ASEAN was the driving force in the institution building process as confirmed in the early stage by ARF, the inability of the Forum to implement concrete measures to prevent terrorist threats seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
2. Initial Responses to Transnational Crimes
2.1 ASEAN
ASEAN emphasized the seriousness of transnational crimes, and recognized the need to deal with its danger at an early stage of the institution building process. At the Bali Summit in
1976, ASEAN member states first discussed the issue of abuse and illegal trafficking of drugs and adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord which called for “[i]ntensification of cooperation among member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs”
(ASEAN, 1976a). Subsequently, the ‘ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuses of Narcotics Drugs’ was adopted in Manila, and this led to some initial proposals in responding to the issue of narcotics (ASEAN, 1976c).
Indeed, the expanded membership to embrace Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Laos in July
58
1997 compelled ASEAN to take more concrete measures against drug trafficking, because these two countries, especially Myanmar, were the best-known cultivators of opium poppies in the region.47 Notably, Myanmar dramatically expanded its opium cultivation in the wake of
1988 social unrest and an unrelated mutiny of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in
1989.48 In the aftermath of the uprising, it became imperative for the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC)49 to assume that these demonstrators would accept military resources from any border insurgencies, especially the CPB. The latter had vast quantities of munitions and split into four different regional resistance armies: the United Wa State Army
(UWSA); the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA); the National
Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA); the New Democratic Army (NDA) after the 1989 mutiny (Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1995).50 In fear of a potential alliance between these four groups and other ethnic rebels, as well as Burmese pro-democracy actors living along the Thai border to overthrow the military regime, the SLORC therefore not only signed a ceasefire agreement with these mutineers, but granted unofficial permission to cultivate opium and heroin in order to sustain their livelihoods (Lintner, 1990, pp. 52-54).
Another reason for the rise of drug trade in Southeast Asia was the Asian economic crisis in
1997. The economic downturn in the region reduced the budgets of Southeast Asian countries
47 The Golden Triangle, which overlaps the mountains of Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, is one of most extensive opium-producing area in Asia. 48 On 8 August 1988, social unrest erupted through the culmination of a long series of events: the withdrawal of the newly replaced Burmese currency in September 1987, and the harsh treatment of students by police in March 1988, after a brawl in a Rangoon teashop. These events finally resulted in the ruling military junta violently repressing widespread pro-democracy protests against economic mismanagement and political oppression (Selth, 2008a, p. 8), and forced large Burmese demonstrators to flee to the Thai-Burmese frontier. 49 The SLORC was reconstituted as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. After the 2010 election, Senior General, Than Shwe, dissolved the SPDC and Former Prime Minister, Thein Sein, will become the new president of Maynmar (Irrawaddy, 2011). 50 The internal rebellions were firstly triggered by China’s reduction of aid to CPB (Lintner, 1990, pp. 39-46). 59 especially Thailand, which perceived the production of narcotics in Myanmar as a significant national security threat, to develop effective mechanisms against drug trafficking (Skehan,
1998). Meanwhile, the US also expressed its concern with the spillover of drug production in
Myanmar at the 1997 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC). 51 Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright, alleged that “drug traffickers who once spent their days leading mule train down jungle tracks are now leading lights in Burma’s new market economy and leading figures in its new political order” (ASEAN, 1997b). Although the US provided direct material assistance to Myanmar to upgrade the latter’s counternarcotics efforts since 1974 (Maung,
1991, p. 198), this assistance had been suspended since 1988 as a response to the brutal repression of the pro-democracy movements (US Department of State, 1997).
ASEAN members may consider Dr. Albright’s wording as an offense to the non-interference principle. However, they decided to take stronger actions in order to address drug trafficking problems, and declared that they saw “well before 2020 a Southeast Asia free of illicit drugs, free of their production, processing, trafficking and use” when introducing the ASEAN Vision
2020 at second informal summit in December 1997 (ASEAN, 1997c). To achieve this objective, ASEAN countries issued a ‘Joint Declaration for a Drug-Free ASEAN’ during their
1998 AMM, which affirmed that the illicit drug trade “could escalate to such a level where perpetrators can pose serious political and security threats to the region.” Finally, the Foreign
Ministers recommended measures including the strengthening of linkages between the different ASEAN bodies involved with narcotics, the adoption of tougher national laws, and a better sharing of information and more collaboration with dialogue partners, to eradicate the illegal trafficking of drugs in Southeast Asia (ASEAN, 1998). However, the questions of financial support and a monitoring mechanism to supervise the progress of anti-drug
51 With regard to Laos, the US stated its support for alternative crop programme to eliminate opium cultivation (ASEAN, 1997b). 60 implementations were not addressed in the declaration.
The goal of creating a drug-free region was later advanced to 2015 during the 2000 AMM in
Bangkok (ASEAN, 2000c). In October 2000, ASEAN further organised the International
Congress, ‘In Pursuit of a Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 Sharing the Vision, Leading the Change’ in association with the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
(ODCCP), and formulated a new plan of action: the ASEAN and China Cooperative
Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD). The ACCORD relied on four major approaches: proactively advocating civic awareness on the dangers of drugs and social response; building consensus and sharing best practices on demand reduction; strengthening the rule of law by an enhanced network of control measures and improved law enforcement co-operation and legislative review; and eliminating the supply of illicit drugs by boosting alternative development programmes and community participation in the eradication of illicit crops. Most importantly, it showed the ambition of ASEAN and China to tackle the issue of drug trafficking through the consideration of funding, and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and target dates (ASEAN, 2000d).
By contrast, although ASEAN members expanded their security concerns in the mid-1990s, there were no tangible results in dealing with other forms of transnational crimes at the ministerial level. At the AMM in July 1996, the Foreign Ministers demanded “attention on such issues as narcotics, economic crimes, including money laundering, environment and illegal migration”, which were perceived as threats to regional stability (ASEAN, 1996). In addition, the Thirtieth AMM in July 1997, stressed the necessity for sustained regional cooperation to address the problems of terrorism, narcotics, arms smuggling, piracy and human trafficking (ASEAN, 1997a). However, the result came to the heads of state and governments of ASEAN “resolved to take firm and stern measures to combat transnational crimes” at their second informal summit in Malaysia in mid-December 1997 (ASEAN,
61
1997d).
To further express their collective stand to eradicate the risk of transnational crimes, ASEAN countries adopted ‘the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime’ on 20 December 1997.
Several ministers of interior and home affairs noted the decision of 1996 AMM to prevent the threat of transnational crimes from undermining the long-term viability of ASEAN, and in response recognized “the need for clear and effective regional modalities to combat these forms of crimes.” Consequently, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime
(AMMTC) agreed to meet at least once every two years and coordinate actions of other bodies involved with the issue, including the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters
(ASOD) and the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANPOL). The declaration also encouraged ASEAN members to sign bilateral treaties and mutual assistance agreements, to assign police liaison officers in other Southeast Asian capitals, to exchange and disseminate information and explore ways of extending cooperation with dialogue partners, the UN, and other organizations (ASEAN, 1997e).
Moreover, ‘the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime’, which was endorsed by interior ministers in the Second AMMTC in 1999, expressed the ASEAN members’ ambition to institutionalize regional cooperation in dealing with transnational crimes. In the
Plan of Action, the Ministers not only agreed that AMMTC would oversee the activities of
ASEAN exiting organizations, such as ASOD, ASEANPOL, and the ASEAN Directors-
General of Customs (ADGC), but decided to form a Senior Officials’ Meeting on
Transnational Crime (SOMTC) to prepare for the formation of the ASEAN Centre for
Combating Transnational Crime (ACTC) in order to consolidate collective efforts (ASEAN,
1999a).
In short, ASEAN approved the necessity of strengthening linkages with countries and international organizations beyond the region to combat transnational crimes depending on
62 the idea of inclusiveness with regard to cooperative security. In addition, by expanding membership to Myanmar and Laos in 1997 the issue of drug trafficking came to dominate agendas among ASEAN Ministers, and led to the formation of more tangible strategy before
9/11. However, ASEAN did not form a cohesive institution which had the authority to coordinate member countries’ capability to prevent these transnational crimes from threatening regional stability.
2.2. The ARF
Transnational crimes did not appear on the ARF agenda until 1996, at which at this time the participants “agreed to consider at the next ARF meetings the question of drug trafficking and other related trans-national issues such as economic crimes, including money laundering, which could constitute threats to the security of the countries of the region” (ARF, 1996b).
However, the Foreign Ministers during the subsequent ARF only indicated the role of the
ASEAN PMC in responding to drug trafficking issue following the expanded membership of
Myanmar and Laos in 1997 (ARF, 1997e).
ARF participants started to seriously perceive the threat of transnational crimes to regional security in 1998 (ARF, 1998b), when they formed a project on counter-narcotics and one on preventing and combating the illicit trafficking of conventional small arms that were included as medium-term (second basket) CBMs (ARF, 1998a). Later on, the Foreign Ministers specified three transnational crimes: the illegal accumulation of small arms and light weapons
(SALW), piracy, and illegal migration on the agenda in Singapore in July 1999 (ARF, 1999b).
Subsequently, ARF members called for greater cooperation from bilateral to international level, because they recognized that piracy, illegal migration, and illegal trafficking in SALW
“could not only pose challenges to regional peace and stability, but also impair individual countries’ efforts in promoting national economic development and improving people’s livelihood”, and “noted the seriousness of the implications of drug production and trafficking
63 as well as the need to address other issues such as money laundering, corruption and computer crime” (ARF, 2000). The ARF members in Hanoi in July 2001 again recognized that
“transnational crimes could not only have potentially serious impacts on regional peace and security, but also pose a threat to the national economic development and social well-being of all states”, and “underlined the importance of greater bilateral, regional and international cooperative efforts in this regard” (ARF, 2001b). However, no concrete and practical measures were developed to deal with these transnational crimes in spite of the generality of wording. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the ARF has made limited progress toward a well- structured mechanism to respond to transnational crimes before 9/11.
3. After 9/11
3.1 ASEAN’s initial responses to terrorism from 9/11 to the 2002 Bali
Bombings
Not surprisingly, counter-terrorism dominated ASEAN’s agenda following 9/11. At the
ASEAN Summit in November 2001, terrorism was perceived as a “formidable challenge to regional and international peace and stability as well as economic development” (ASEAN,
2001c). In addition, prior to the Summit the Philippines was reported to call for the formation of a coalition, which would include five original ASEAN members, to share intelligence, conduct joint border patrols, and forge a peacekeeping force, to crackdown on terrorist activities in the region (Nation, 2001). At the same time, the ASEAN leaders issued the
‘ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism’ to manifest their common rhetorical position and willingness to combat terrorism in adherence with international law and the UN Charter. This Declaration articulated practical measures to battle terrorism, including the improvement of national mechanisms to combat terrorism, the ratification of all anti-terrorist conventions, more cooperation among law enforcement agencies and better exchanges of intelligence (ASEAN, 2001b). 64
However, how such a joint stance be coordinated at the regional level to deter terrorism was a key question. Collins indicates that ASEAN was “unable to achieve a coordinated response among its entire membership” to combat terrorism except undertaking some cooperative action below the level of ASEAN (2003, p. 207). An ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting, for example, had been cancelled due to lack of consensus to issue a joint position paper on counter-terrorism at the ASEAN Summit in November 2001 (Brandon, 2001). A senior
ASEAN official therefore cautioned that the proposal of the Summit needed detailed and lengthy discussion (Nation, 2001). Because no concrete steps were taken among ASEAN heads of state and government, the ten ASEAN army chiefs held a meeting in Manila the same year, and recognized the danger of transnational challenges with terrorism as the first priority on their list. They were also concerned that the al-Qaeda was looking for shelter in
Southeast Asia after US involvement in Afghanistan, and therefore began to strengthen defence and intelligence capabilities to combat terrorism (Bangkok Post, 2001). In addition, the military intelligence directors of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brunei met in Kuala Lumpur in late January 2002 to discuss informally intelligence exchange and to intensify the cooperation against terrorism (Richardson, 2002).
Following the informal meeting of military intelligence chiefs, ASEAN Foreign Ministers held a two-day retreat that was aimed at intensifying regional cooperation to combat terrorism
(Bangkok Post, 2002). In addition, the ‘Agreement on Information Exchange and
Establishment of Communication Procedures’ was signed by Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines on 7 May 2002, which sought to devise measures to tackle transnational criminal activities including a terrorism component (ASEAN, 2002a). 52 Therefore, it can be acknowledged that ASEAN leaders could not reach consensus to fight the regional terrorist
52 Following these three countries, Thailand, Cambodia, and Brunei also acceded to the agreement (Agence France Presse, 2003b). 65 threat besides a series of multilateral arrangements made by the security officials to promote cooperative responses to the issue.
Despite a lack of joint action plan to cooperate at the operational level to tackle threats of terrorism, Southeast Asian countries consistently took efforts to crackdown on terrorist activities in the region. The AMMTC held a Special Meeting on Terrorism in May 2002 that emphasized “the urgency for a cohesive and united approach to effectively combat terrorism”, including intelligence sharing, the coordination of anti-terror laws among ASEAN countries, airport security, bomb detection, and the formation of national anti-terrorism units as a contact point. 53 However, all participants of the meeting still recognized that “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and domestic laws of each ASEAN Member Country shall be respected and upheld in undertaking the fight against terrorism” (ASEAN, 2002b). In addition, ASEAN police chiefs appealed to national governments to adopt laws to combat transnational crimes, especially to facilitate the extradition and prosecution of suspected terrorists after the meeting of ASEANOPOL in Phnom Penh in May 2002 (Reuters, 2002). ASEAN leaders also issued another Declaration on Terrorism during their Summit in early November 2002 in responding to the devastating attacks in Bali in October.54 However, the heads of state and government of
ASEAN in the document only stipulated their determination to carry out the anti-terror measures adopted previously, and “to intensify our efforts, collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of terrorist groups in the region” (ASEAN, 2002d).
After the Bali bombings and the successful cooperation that occurred between the Indonesian
National Police (Polisi Republic Indonesia, POLRI) and the police forces of other countries to
53 The initiative was proposed by Singapore to establish a Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (in Singapore) staffed with external and internal intelligence agencies personally. Its main purpose was to integrate and coordinate various intelligence from Southeast Asian countries (Karniol, 2002). 54 A series of attacks also perpetrated around the southern Philippines port of Zamboanga city on the 2, 17, and 21 October, 2002. The Abu Sayyaf was suspected of planning these blasts (Laude, 2002). 66 arrest the perpetrators of terror and uncover their networks in the region,55 ASEAN police chiefs met in Jakarta in 2003 and proposed an anti-terrorism task force for each country to strengthen regional anti-terrorist collaboration. The meeting did not come to a consensus, however, because different existing national laws caused the participants to have difficulties to consider terrorism as an extraditable offence at the regional level (ASEAN, 2003a). Hence,
ASEAN leaders’ unwillingness to pool their sovereignty in exchanging information on suspected terrorists, coordinating surveillance of their actions, and establishing extradition agreements limited ASEAN’s response to terrorism from 9/11 to the 2002 Bali bombings.
3.2 ASEAN’s responses to the US role in counter-terrorism and its aftermath
Table 3.1 illustrates that ASEAN succeeded in defining a common position towards external powers in dealing with terrorism, which was the same way in responding to transnational crimes. Table 3.1 ASEAN’s counter-terrorism cooperation efforts by external lines Countries Policy Cooperation Date Involved
4 ASEAN- Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the November, China Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues 2002 27-28 ASEAN- Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism January, EU 2003
55 President Megawati agreed to the formation of a joint team, comprised 10 countries with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a key contributor to assist POLRI in investigations into the bombings (Lawler, 2004).
67
12 ASEAN- Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action December, Japan 2003 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 10 ASEAN- Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the People’s January, China Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Non- 2004 traditional Security Issues 10 ASEAN Joint Communique of the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial January, Plus Three Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC+3) 2004 30 ASEAN- ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation in the Fight November, Japan Against International Terrorism 2004 30 ASEAN Joint Communique of the Second ASEAN Plus Three November, Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC+3) 2005 Joint Statement of the Ninth ASEAN-Japan Summit 13 ASEAN- Deepening and Broadening of ASEAN-Japan Strategic December, Japan Partnership 2005 28-29 ASEAN- ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue June, Japan 2006 7 ASEAN Joint Communiqué of the Third ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial November, Plus Three Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC+3) 2007 11-12 ASEAN- The Fourth ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue August, Japan 2009 Joint Statement of the 1st ASEAN Plus People’s Republic of 18 ASEAN- China Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (1st November, China AMMTC+China) 2009
68
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Association of 18 ASEAN- Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the November, China People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Non- 2009 traditional Security Issues 18 ASEAN Joint Statement of the Fourth ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial November, Plus Three Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC+3) 2009 22-24 ASEAN- The Fifth ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue June, Japan 2010 The 6th ASEAN-Japan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue and Japan's International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The 9-11 ASEAN- Elimination of Terrorism within ASEAN ties directly to February, Japan the Security of Japan 2011
Source: Compiled by author from ASEAN official website and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Undeniably, the US played the most important part of ASEAN’s responses to terrorist threats in the wake of 9/11. ASEAN members were initially shocked and expressed their sympathy for victims of the terrible attacks,56 while expressed swiftly their concern and anger when the images shown on television of the war in Afghanistan launched by the US on 8 October
2001.57 This concern led to ASEAN leaders to emphasize that they rejected “any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race” in the ‘ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to
Counter Terrorism’ (ASEAN, 2001b) to avoid raising emotional reaction that could result in
56 ASEAN Standing Committees Chairman’s Letter to US Secretary of State Colin Powell on Terrorists Attack (ASEAN, 2001a). 57 Indonesia and Malaysia have significant Muslim populations, and Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand also have sizeable Muslim minorities. Therefore, the heads of state and government of ASEAN voiced their concern with Afghan innocents caught in American-led bombing campaign during the ASEAN Summit in 2001 (Reuters, 2001). 69 massive disturbances in the region.
By early January 2002, it was revealed that 28 terrorist suspects had been arrested in
Singapore and Malaysia for plotting bomb attacks on the US and Israeli embassies in
Singapore (Lopez, 2002). Amid growing fear about the seriousness of terrorist threats to the region, ASEAN and the US signed a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism, which stipulated “the importance of having a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity-building”, including border surveillance, detection of the movement of terrorist funds, and to comply with the UN resolutions on terrorism (ASEAN, 2002c), while some
ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Vietnam sought reassurances that the principle of non- intervention would be respected in any clause in the declaration (Voice of America, 2002). In fear that highly sensitive nationalism would undermine bilateral cooperation in counter- terrorism, Secretary of State, Colin Powell, pledged that the Declaration would not result in a permanent return of US troops, and it was only to develop a more intimate relationship between ASEAN and the US (Agence France Presse, 2002b).
The US invasion of Iraq in March 200358 was another major factor in the way that ASEAN’s relations with the US evolved in counter-terrorism. The US decision to go to war against Iraq without an explicit mandate from the UN Security Council was worrisome for ASEAN members, because they entrenched adherence with the UN Charter and international law in the ASEAN Declaration of 1967 based on comprehensive security. The degree of wariness was presented at the Thirty-Sixth AMM in Phnom Penh in June 2003, in which Foreign
Ministers “envisioned a vital role for the United Nations in this endeavour in accordance with the UN’s responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security…[and]
58 President Bush maintained the US had “irrefutable proof” that Saddam Hussein determined to possess and develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Therefore, the US decided to take “the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security” in 2003 (White House, 2002, pp. 14-15). 70 facilitate a situation that would enable the people of Iraq to govern themselves as soon as possible” (ASEAN, 2003b). Meanwhile, during their Bali summit ASEAN leaders indicated that “current developments in Iraq and the Middle East remained cause for great concern” following the US invasion, and reaffirmed their position “that the United Nations must continue to play a central role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation” of that country
(ASEAN, 2003d).
The inauguration of Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in
July 2003 also exposed ASEAN’s divergence from the US-led global war on terrorism.
Located in Kuala Lumpur with US funding, the regional counter-terrorism centre is responsible for housing researchers and holding training seminars. It is now funded and administrated locally with a minor role for the US. Because Southeast Asian countries with
Islamic populations were skeptical that the US focus might be anti-Muslim, the centre did not become a mechanism for using US expertise to coordinate regional intelligence for joint operations (Montlake, 2003).59
Actually, terrorism in Southeast Asia not only caused ASEAN to signal its divergence from
US strategy, but, inter alia, partly became a reason that compelled ASEAN members to form a collective position to reduce the catastrophic impact on regional economic security.60 Collins argues that the Southeast Asian countries was “already suffering from foreign direct investment (FDI) competition from China and suspicion that the region’s structural
59 Malaysia Deputy Defence Minister, Mohd Shafie Apdal, stated that training experts from the US would become a minority of the personnel in the centre. In addition, Apdal said that Malaysia was still opposed to the Iraq war to clarify Malaysia’s stand in the US anti-terrorism campaign (New Strait Times, 2003). 60 Indonesia’s economy and political position in Southeast Asia had been undermined by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1999 secession of East Timor. Therefore, when Indonesia chaired ASEAN during 2002- 03, it took the 2002 and 2003 Bali and Jakarta Marriott terrorist attacks as initiatives to propose an ASC in order “to restore Jakarta to ASEAN leadership by acknowledging the importance of fighting terrorism transnationally to the Association’s future” (Simon, 2006, p. 105). 71 deficiencies exposed in the 1997-98 economic crisis have not been resolved”, and the negative image created by terrorists might make ASEAN lose out in the wider economic benefits if it took little action against terrorism (2003, p. 204). After experiencing another terrorist attack in Jakarta on 5 August 2003,61 therefore, nine ASEAN army chiefs met in
Kuala Lumpur and called for joint cooperation to combat terrorism.62ASEAN leaders at their
Ninth Summit in Bali also proposed the establishment of an ASC to improve regional cooperation in dealing with terrorism and a series of transnational threats, which was perceived as a necessity for the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) comprising a single production base and market of 530 million people by 2020 (Ng, 2003).
However, the heads of state and government of ASEAN were anxious to dispel the image of a military pact. Hence, they claimed that the ASC was essentially just tied to exiting policies and agreements in accordance with comprehensive security and was not “a defense pact, military alliance or a joint foreign policy” (ASEAN, 2003c).
Therefore, it can be argued that ASEAN, on one hand, exposed a divergence in the US-led campaign to wage war against terrorism, and, on the other, the bombings occurred in Bali and
Jakarta had put considerable pressure on ASEAN to form a collective position to deal with terrorist activities, especially to improve the image of Southeast Asia as an insecure region to foreign investors. Because ASEAN had taken regional resilience as a goal, it needed to enhance regional efforts to prevent terrorism from threatening economic competitiveness.
Leifer argues that in contrast to the European model, ASEAN “prime object of the collective enterprise was to consolidate national sovereignty and not to supersede it” (1999, p. 28).
61 The suicide bombing occurred in the Marriott Hotel, south Jakarta, Indonesia on 5 August 2003 and killed 14 people and injured 150 (New York Post, 2003). 62 Army chiefs of ASEAN at the Fourth ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM) in Kuala Lumpur agreed to enhance the regional cooperation in deterring terrorism, including networking among military intelligence and exchanging ideas about how to combat terrorism (Asian Defence and Diplomacy, 2003). 72
Furthermore, ASEAN had a “shared belief in the positive relationship between economic development and security served to reinforce the commitment to regional reconciliation as a way of avoiding any diversion of scarce resources away from such linked priorities” (Leifer,
1999, p. 27). Since terrorists could operate across borders, effective counter-terror cooperation had to begin with established extradition agreements and shared information on suspected terrorists. However, collective emphasis of ASEAN on the non-interference principle that reflected in the ASC impaired regional efforts to deter terrorism and recover economic development eventually.
Later on, ASEAN sought to establish a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA), a convention on counter-terrorism, as well as an ASEAN extradition treaty in the 2004 VAP in dealing with terrorist threat (ASEAN, 2004e, p. 7).63 The MLAA called for comprehensive assistance for the member countries’ law enforcements to respond to criminal matters. Yet, under Article 3, Section 1(F), the agreement stated that the requested party may refuse assistance if, in its opinion “the provision of assistance would affect the sovereignty, security…or essential interests of the Requested Party” (ASEAN, 2004d, p. 8). This substantially undermined the effectiveness of the agreement in support of regional counter- terrorism cooperation.
Despite the underdeveloped regional mechanism, ASEAN consistently undertook some cooperative action in counter-terrorism. On 5 February 2004, 25 delegates from Asia-Pacific countries participated in the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism
(BRMMCT) co-chaired by Indonesia and Australia. The purpose of the meeting was to boost coordination and cooperation of information-sharing, particularly the provision of high-tech equipment in investigating and preventing terror attacks. In addition, Indonesia and Australia
63 The ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism was to be established under the joint drafting group between ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and SOMTC; The ASEAN extradition treaty was established under the purview of the ASEAN Senior Law Officials Meeting (ASLOM) (ASEAN, 2004e, pp. 30-31). 73 announced the forthcoming establishment of the Indonesia Centre for Law Enforcement
Cooperation (ICLEC) in regional capacity-building and operational roles, and forming complementary relations with the existing SEARCCT and the International Law Enforcement
Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok to bolster regional effort in counter-terrorism (ASEAN, 2004a).
Apparently, the effectiveness of these regional efforts did not prevent terrorist attacks in
Jakarta in 2004,64 and in Bali in 2005,65 respectively, and ASEAN only reiterated sympathy for the victims of terrorist attacks and its support to Indonesia to combat terrorism.66 ASEAN leaders did not take a major step forward in dealing with terrorism until 2007 when they adopted the ‘ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism’ at the Twelfth ASEAN Summit. The
Convention not only articulated the counter-terrorism measures, but proposed the designation of a coordinating mechanism in each ASEAN country to enhance cooperation to deter terrorism.
However, the non-intervention principle still guided ASEAN leaders when they adopted the
Convention. Article 12 of the Convention required ASEAN members “in conformity with their respective domestic laws, afford the widest measure of assistance in connection with investigation or criminal proceedings” besides countries which signed ‘the Treaty on Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters’ in Malaysia in November 2004.67 In addition, Article
64 A bombing exploded outside the Australian embassy at Jakarta on 9 September 2004, in which 9 people were killed and 160 were injured (Newcastle Herald, 2004). 64 A series of suicide bombs were detonated at two sites in Jimbaran Beach Resort and Kuta (both in Bali) on 1 October 2005, and more than 100 people were wounded and 25 people were killed (Sheridan and Childs, 2005). 65 Statement by H.E. Somsavat Lengsavad, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao’s People Democratic Republic, Chairman of the 38th ASEAN Standing Committee in connection to the terrorist bombing in Jakarta on 9th September 2004 (ASEAN, 2004c); ‘ASEAN Strongly Condemns Terrorist Attacks in Bali, Indonesia’ Statement by the 39th Chair of the ASC (ASEAN, 2005d). 66 Eight ASEAN members signed the Treaty, including：Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam (ASEAN, 2004d).
74
13 encouraged rather than obligated ASEAN countries without extradition treaty to consider the Convention as a legal basis for extradition to combat terrorism (ASEAN, 2007a).
Being the first legally binding anti-terrorism agreement since the 9/11, the ‘ASEAN
Convention on Counter Terrorism’ indeed symbolized a turning point of ASEAN’s efforts in responding to terrorism. The Convention provided a basis for ASEAN leaders to promote the implementation of a comprehensive plan of action on counter-terrorism for the establishment of APSC during their Fourteenth Summit in 2009 (ASEAN, 2009b, p. 13). The threat of terrorism was significantly reduced by Southeast Asian countries (Schmitt, 2008) before it reoccurred in Jakarta in 2009.68 Part of the reason for the 2009 Jakarta bombings was that not all ASEAN members acceded to ‘the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters’
(until 2011, the Treaty was ratified only by Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam), which was the legal basis for cooperation under the Convention. Recently only the Singapore, Thailand, the
Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Brunei Darussalam ratified the Convention (ASEAN,
2011a).
With regard to ASEAN army chiefs, military intelligence directors, and police chiefs, although they recognized the danger of terrorism to political stability in Southeast Asia, no practical measures was taken by these officials. 69 This was further reflected in the First
ADMM-Plus in October, 2010, in which Defence Ministers reaffirmed their collective stand
“to share information, build vital networks and enhance capabilities to combat the threat of terrorism”, and agreed to take counter-terrorism as a area where the member countries could cooperate for a start (ASEAN, 2010c). Therefore, it can be argued that officials in ASEAN,
68 Twin bombs were detonated at the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, which caused 9 fatalities and injured more than 50 people on 17 July 2009 (Deutsch, 2009). 69 For example, an Filipino intelligence official revealed that intelligence community in Southeast Asia was warned by Western countries of possible attack before the Bali bombing in 2005. However, the blast was not prevented because Southeast Asian counties could not get the exact details of terrorist’s plot (Gomez, 2005). 75 especially the heads of state and government have demonstrated their strong ambition to combat terrorism, and the adoption of the ‘ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism’ represented their consolidated efforts since the 9/11. However, the process of domestic ratification could become an insurmountable obstacle to impair the effectiveness of the
Convention, because state sovereignty was endorsed firmly by ASEAN member governments, and this caused ASEAN consistently to emphasize a common rhetorical position rather than initiate better counter-terrorism acts in practice.
4. National Counter-Terrorism Measures
4.1 Indonesia-US
A week after 9/11, Indonesian President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, visited the US and denounced the attacks as “barbaric and indiscriminate acts carried out against innocent civilians” and agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation with the US to combat terrorism (White
House, 2001). In addition, Indonesia reportedly offered overflight rights for US military support aircraft in preventing terrorist acts (Blair, 2002). In response, President Bush pledged more than US$600 million in financial aid for Indonesia (White House, 2001). When
President Megawati returned to Jakarta, however, she modified her tone as to tread carefully in responding to the US anti-terrorism campaign. For instance, Megawati was silent in the face of rising Islamic extremist rhetoric and unwilling to provide protection for American citizens in Indonesia. This led to the repatriation of some US embassy personnel on 27
September 2001 and resulted in the US annoyance (Far Eastern Economic Review, 2001).
Furthermore, the GoI issued a six point statement in response to the US military attacks in
Afghanistan in October. 70 However, this statement was difficult to satisfy the rising anti-
70 Statement by the Government of Indonesia on the United States Military Action in Afghanistan (Mail Archive, 2001).
76
American sentiment, and led to Megawati to change her tone and say that “it is unacceptable that someone, a group or even a government…attack people or another country for whatever reason” (Jakarta Post, 2001). The statement was not explicitly directed at the US but many political observers interpreted it as “a retreat from her support on the war on terror” (Hafidz,
2003, p. 5). This ambivalence toward the cooperation with the US in counter-terrorism was further underlined in July 2001 when the GoI discovered al-Qaeda members were planning to attack the US Embassy in Jakarta. Instead of arresting them, however, the terrorists were merely pressured to leave the country (Stratfor, 2002). In addition, the director of Indonesia’s
State Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN), Abdulah Mahmud Hendropriyono, in a public statement in late 2001 maintained that al-Qaeda had set up terrorist training camps in the country in order to persuade the GoI to cooperate with the US closely in the war on terrorism. Several Islamic groups denounced him and the GoI swiftly backed down, probably fearing a nationwide backlash (Bonner and Perlez, 2002a).
The lack of Indonesia’s political resolve in counter-terrorism was also demonstrated on combating terrorist funding. Instead of ratifying the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 on the suppression of the financing of terrorism,71 the GoI issued a presidential decree that did not allow the government to freeze bank accounts of suspected terrorists unless the “owner
[was] officially a suspect or proven guilty in a criminal case” (Simanjuntak and Siboro, 2001).
Indonesia acknowledged its flaws in responding to terrorism, but Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Hassan Wirajuda, appealed to the international community to have patience because of limitations in the “internal security act or laws on subversion” (Jakarta Post, 2002a).
Although there were divergences between Indonesia and the US in dealing with terrorist threats, practical security cooperation continued at the senior official and working level. One
71 The UN Security Council issued the resolution following the 9/11 attacks to suppress the movement, organization and fund-raising activities of terrorist groups (United Nations, 2001).
77 of the alleged leaders of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, Omar Al-Farouq, was arrested in June
2002 in West Java and immediately handed over to US custody for interrogation (Hafidz,
2003, pp. 12-13). In addition, several Bush administration officials such as Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, a former US ambassador to Jakarta, pushed vigorously to allow closer ties with the TNI (Kurlantzick, 2002, p. 423). Following the 9/11 attacks, the US
Congress took the initiative during fiscal year (FY) 2001-2003 to approve funds for the
Department of Defence to provide counterintelligence training for the POLRI. The TNI also received financial assistance through Expanded International Military Education and Training
(E-IMET), 72 which was designed to provide training in human rights and respect for democracy (Manyin, et al., 2004, p. 45). Human rights activists deservedly criticised the decision to renew support for Indonesia’s military,73 but Bush administration officials insisted that most of the new aid would involve the provision of non-lethal equipment and support for civilian policing (Bonner and Perlez, 2002b).
It is notable that the 2002 Bali bombings animated Indonesia’s response to terrorist threat.74
72 In 2002, however, the US Congress again tightened the ban on International Military and Training (IMET) funding to express its concern in the murders of two US teachers in Papua, which implicated the TNI (Roberts, 2006). 73 US-Indonesian military ties were first restricted after the TNI’s massacre in 1991 in East Timor. The massacre prompted human rights groups to demand that Congress sanction the TNI. Consequently, the US Congress blocked TNI’s participation in the IMET program in October 1992 under the ‘Leahy Amendment’. In the mid- 1990s, the State Department and Congress imposed further bans on the sale and supply of military equipment. However, the Congress in 1995 restored some military training funding under the E-IMET program, which purported to be an ‘education program’ briefing officers on issues of human rights, military justice and civilian control of military. After the TNI conducted a campaign of violence against pro-independence supporters in East Timor in 1999, the Clinton administration banned all joint military exercises and commercial arms sales to Indonesia (Biddle, 2002). 74 Indonesia had denied the existence of a terrorist network within its borders until the Bali blasts (Suryadinata, 2004, p. 89). The terrorist attacks alone had threatened Indonesia’s economy, whose FDI dropped by 11 percent, added 70 percent plunged domestic investment and 600,000 jobless people (Jakarta Post, 2002b). Therefore, Indonesia changed its perception and took more effective measures to tackle terrorist threats after the 2002 Bali 78
The terrorist attacks prompted the GoI to promulgate two antiterrorist executive presidential decrees on 18 October 2002 and arrested Ali Gufron (Mukhlas) and Abu Bakar Bashir, who were allegedly blamed for the attacks and linked to an extremist group-Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI). 75 This political resolve, however, could not demonstrate credibility of Megawati administration to adopt a more coordinated approach in counter-terrorism, because it appeared reluctant to deal with domestic skepticism about the US motives behind the bombing
(McBeth, 2002) and a continuing mistrust of the BIN and the POLRI in the terrorist attacks investigation (Desker, 2002b).76
The US decision to attack Iraq in 2003 caused another policy shift in Indonesia. Unlike the
US actions in Afghanistan, Megawati had little choice but to categorically oppose the US-led invasion of Iraq and described the action as “an act of aggression” (Jakarta Post, 2003a).
Megawati even praised Iraqis for defending their nation against American forces in April
(Jakarta Post, 2003b). After the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 2003, although the GoI was willing to condemn terrorist violence, it refused to name JI as the organization behind the attack, “for fear of offending Muslim leaders, for whom the term Jemaah
Islamiyah connotes the broader Muslim community” (Jones, 2003). According to Hafidz, this was in large part out of fear of an Islamic backlash, because “[h]eightened tension within the
bombings. 75 Ali Gufron and two other Islamic militants: Imam Samudra and Amrozi Nurhasyim were executed on 9 November 2008 for their involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings (BBC, 2008b); Abu Bakar Bashir was arrested in 2010 and sentenced to fifteen years jail for charges of the connection to the 2002 Bali bombings and the funding to a JI training camp in Aceh (Alford, 2011b). 76 There has been a long-standing rivalry between the BIN and the POLRI since their separation in 1999. TNI commander, Endriartono Sutarto, stressed that there would not be any coordination between the BIN and the POLRI to prevent terrorism, and the TNI would not intervene to improve capabilities of the POLRI if it was lacking (BBC, 2003c). This inter-service rivalry that undermined response to terrorism was demonstrated in Bali where the POLRI had files on members of JI 6 months prior to the bombings in 2002, but it were not provided with a threat assessment from the BIN to determine how to deal with terrorist acts (Ressa, 2004). 79
Muslim community would create prolonged instability, which in turn would undermine economic recovery and hurt Megawati’s chances for re-election” in 2004 (2003, pp. 2-6).
Despite the US disappointment at GoI’s counter-terrorism posture, some US senior officials privately told Indonesian diplomats in Washington that they understood the Iraq war put
Megawati in “an extremely difficult position” (Jakarta Post, 2003c). In addition, President
Bush finally visited Bali in October 2003 where he expressed support for President
Megawati’s actions against terrorism (Associated Press Newswires, 2003).
After the election of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004, bilateral cooperation between the GoI and the US in counter-terrorism made significant progress (mainly due to the
US response to the 2004 tsunami which opened a window of opportunity to improve bilateral relations). Donald Keyser, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and
Pacific Affairs, stated in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that counter-terrorism was at the top of the priority list for strategic foreign assistance goals in
FY2005, and the US intended to continue training and to expand the POLRI’s Counter- terrorism Task Force (Detachment 88) under the Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related programs (NADR) account (US Department of State, 2004); Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice, in February 2005 announced the resumption of Indonesia’s full participation in IMET, and the export of lethal defence articles to Indonesia was finally restarted on 29 March 2006 (Myerscough, 2006); Indonesia also participated in the ‘Theatre
Security Cooperation Program’ with the US Pacific Command (PACOM), which included counter-terrorism seminars to promote security cooperation as well as subject matter expert exchanges (Congressional Record, 2005, p. 1161); Indonesia Marines and the US Navy Seals held a joint anti-terror exercise in May 2005 (Ibrahim, 2005); In February 2006 Admiral
William Fallon, the PACOM Commander, announced that the US would help train Indonesian noncommissioned officers to help them develop their technical skills (Gittler, 2006).
80
Indeed, President Yudhoyono has made enormous efforts in combating terrorism.77 Part of the success came from GoI’s deployment of multi-agency intelligence teams in provinces through the country in information exchanges (BBC, 2004), and its program of deradicalisation, which sought to reclaim both the terrorists and their families for normal society in addition to preventing, deterring, and punishing them (Sheridan, 2008). In August
2007, Yudhoyono in his state of union address stated that “the acts of terrorism that have caused unrest in our society in the past years have been handled…We have succeeded in preventing and tackling the acts of terrorism in the country” (Dow Jones Newswires, 2007).
Even Michael Mukasey, the US Attorney General, praised Indonesia’s efforts in combating terrorism during a visit to Jakarta in June 2008:
Like Indonesia, the United States has faced terrorist threats and terrorist attacks. We share the challenge of combating violent extremists, while protecting basic civil liberties in the process. Indonesia has been effective in the apprehension and conviction of terrorists and extremists organizations (Collins, 2008).
However, Indonesia remains under threat from terrorists despite its more effective counter- terrorism activities (Jakarta Post, 2011a).78 In responding to this potential threat to national
77 Indonesian authorities reportedly captured two key JI members, Zarkasih and Abu Dujana, in early June 2007, including bomb making materials and ammunition for new terror attack (Kurlantzick, 2007); Azahari Husin, a Malaysian who helped to plan the 2002 Bali bombings, was shot dead by police in November 2005. Faiz Fauzan, another Malaysian helped plot the 2005 Bali bombings, was arrested in May 2008 (Agence France Presse, 2008a); Noordin Mohammad Top, a JI member who was suspected of being behind the 2003 JW Marriot Hotel in Jakarta bombings, the 2004 Australian Embassy in Jakarta bombings, the 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2009 JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton in Jakarta bombings, was killed in September 2009 (Gelling and Mydans, 2009); In February 2010, Indonesia discovered a JI training camp in Aceh that was led by Dulmatin, an alleged leading member of JI who was suspected of planning the 2002 Bali bombings. The next month, Dulmatin was killed in a raid in Jakarta (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 1). Following the 2009 Jakarta bombings, Indonesian police were successful in disrupting plans for attacks by terrorists, including a plot to assassinate President Yudhoyono (Jakarta Post, 2010). 78 For example, a huge arsenal of guns and bomb-making materials were discovered in a raid in Central Java in 81 security, Yudhoyono indicated that he intended to introduce tougher anti-terror measures and use Kopassus special forces in the struggle against terrorism. How to deal with criticism on the possible human right violations due to an abusive role of Kopassus remains a continuing challenge for the GoI (Jakarta Post, 2009).79 Given this reality, it can be argued that domestic political agendas still drive Indonesia’s motivation to seek US assistance on developing its counter-terrorism capabilities, and this will limit its action against terrorists within its borders.
4.2 Indonesia-Australia
Although Indonesia-Australia relations were strained by the latter’s support of the independence referendum in East Timor, and its decision to lead INTERFET in 1999, the former’s inaction on the anti-terrorism front increased the friction with its neighbours and led to more diplomatic isolation.80 Therefore, Indonesia and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism cooperation in early 2002 because a better relationship with Australia would give Indonesia much-needed military and diplomatic support in the region (Stratfor, 2002).
Following the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia bitterly resented remarks attributed to
Australian Prime Minister John Howard that Australia was the US ‘deputy sheriff’ in
Southeast Asia, and Howard’s subsequent assertion of the right to launch pre-emptive strikes against countries in the region if there were no alternative means of saving Australia from
March 2007. This revealed JI’s plan for the terrorist attack “twice as big as the 2002 Bali bombings” (Thompson, 2007). 79 Kopassus has been accused of human rights violations in East Timor, Papua, and the capital Jakarta (Pathoni, 2002). 80 Indonesia’s inability or refusal to detain terrorist suspects wanted by Singapore and Malaysia within its borders had caused regional resentment. In the spring of 2002, Singapore asked Indonesia to arrest Abu Bakar Bashir, an Indonesian cleric allegedly linked to JI which was planning attacks in the island city-state, but the GoI said that there was no evidence about Baasyir’s commitment in any crimes (Bonner and Perlez, 2002a). Moreover, the GoI ignored intelligence provided by Malaysia about a cache of bomb-making supplies on Batam, an Indonesian island nearby Singapore (Desker, 2002a, pp. 11-12). 82 terrorist attacks. However, the danger posed by the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people including 88 Australians underscored the necessity for closer cooperation between two countries. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) provided the technical capacity as well as the forensic skills for the POLRI to find the perpetrators involved in the attack (Baker, 2003).81
Later on, AFP officers were even on hand to assist the POLRI to apprehend 11 key suspects in a series of raids across Central Java (Greenlees, 2002).
The 2002 Bali bombings also motivated Indonesia and Australia to co-chair the BRMMCT to develop regional counter-terrorist capabilities and most importantly, to jointly establish the
ICLEC. The ICLEC focuses on training activities in anti-terrorism, including tracking and incarceration of terrorists, law enforcement education, financial investigation, and threat assessments (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004).82 But in fact, the GoI remained suspicious about Australia’s motives originating from the notion of national resilience. This was particularly clear when Australia provoked the ire of the GoI on the issue of sovereignty by announcing an extended maritime identification zone aimed at pre-empting terrorist attacks up to 1,000 nautical miles from the homeland (Marsh and Donnan, 2004).
Although the GoI had been wary of Australia, the latter’s swift and generous contribution to the 2004 tsunami helped Indonesia-Australia relations reach to a new point to build a more comprehensive partnership on 4 April 2005. Bilateral counter-terrorism strategy was therefore focused on closer cooperation between two countries’ “police forces, immigration and customs officials and security and intelligence agencies” (Department of Foreign Affairs and
81 Meanwhile, Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate and the US National Security Agency cooperated together in tracking the mobile phones used by the bombers (Chulov, 2006, p. 3). 82 In March 2007, the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Australia co-chaired the Sub-Regional Ministerial Conference on Counter-Terrorism, which was attended by officials from Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. The Conference aimed to follow up the process of BRMMCT to enhance regional cooperation in countering terrorism financing, investigations, prosecutions, and intelligence-sharing (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007). 83
Trade, 2005). 83 The closer cooperation also paved the way for the creation of ‘Australia-
Indonesia Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation’ (Lombok Treaty) in
November 2006 that sought to strengthen and expand security cooperation in defence and law enforcement, counter-terrorism, intelligence, maritime security and emergency relief, and issues relating to the proliferation of WMD.84 However, the non-intervention principle still played a leading role in the Agreement, which required Indonesia and Australia to show
“[m]utual respect and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and political independence of each other”, and “shall not in any manner support or participate in activities by any person or entity which constitutes a threat to the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity” of another country (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006). In other words, Indonesia still benefits from Australia’s advanced skills and resources in counter- terrorism through enhanced bilateral relations. However, Indonesia may not make a breakthrough in response to terrorism at the regional level because of its adherence to the non- intervention principle.
83 The AFP again assisted the POLRI in bomb-data analysis and victim identification in the aftermath of the 2005 Bali bombings (McLennan, 2005). 84 During a visit to Indonesia in June 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stated that he and President Yudhoyono agreed to expand security cooperation combating terrorism within the framework of the Lombok Treaty (Voice of America, 2008b). 84
4.3 Philippines-US85
In contrast to her Indonesian counterpart, President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, threw her support behind US efforts to combat terrorism soon after 9/11. In late 2001,
President Arroyo allowed US forces to overfly its air space and facilities, including Clark Air
Base and Subic bay as a transit and staging ground for US forces en route in supporting
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan (Rabasa, 2003, p. 54). She later issued a 14- stage counter-terrorism program to enhance intelligence cooperation with the US, and passed a law to prevent money-laundering operations from financing terrorists. Significantly,
President Arroyo announced that the Philippines was ready “to pay a price” to the US anti- terrorist campaign (Wall Street Journal, 2001).
Being the most vocal supporter of the US war on terrorism in Southeast Asia, Arroyo’s reward was increased US assistance, totaling more than US$100 million in military financing and equipment.86 This included a huge package of cooperation in trade expansion, agriculture and fisheries modernization, poverty reduction, anti-corruption, and debt write-offs during a summit meeting in the US in November 2001 (CBS Interactive Business Network, 2001). In
January 2002, the US approved the participation of 650 troops as well as 150 Special Forces
85 Similarly, Australia signed an agreement on counter-terrorism with the Philippines in 2003, and provided AUS$5million of assistance. The Australian Special Air Service (SAS) and intelligence officers of the Australian Secret Intelligence Organization (ASIO) have also been dispatched since 2005 to cooperate with the AFP in the search for two JI members, Azahari Husin and Noordin Top, who involved in the 2005 Bali bombings (Wright, 2005). In 2006, the SAS participated in a US-Philippine military campaign to hunt down the ASG that was believed to harbor senior JI terrorists Umar Patek and Dulmatin, who were responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings (Sheridan, 2006). However, this section focuses on Philippine-US cooperation because of word restraints. 86 The US initially made provisions for 1 C-130B Hercules transport aircraft and 8 UH-1H Iroquois utility helicopters, 350 grenade launchers, 25 mortars, some sniper rifles, night vision and thermal-imaging goggles (Karniol, 2001). According to one account, the US also promised a 360-ton Cyclone-class coastal patrol craft, which was part of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) budget that increased ten-fold from $1.9 million in 2001 to $19 million in FY 2002 (Castro, 2003, p. 981). 85 in a joint exercise (Balikatan 02) with the Philippine on the southern island of Basilan to train the AFP in counter-terrorism tactics (Perlez, 2002b).87 In November the two countries also signed a new Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) that granted the US the right to stockpile essential equipment and supplies except major armaments in the Philippines (Vanzi,
2002).
For the GRP, the purpose in cooperating with the US was not only to fight the ASG-a radical insurgent Islamist group engaged in murder and kidnapping for ransom in southern
Philippines as well as Malaysia, but to get other benefits. The significant US economic assistance has pumped resources into GRP’s economy to boost recovery from the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Doronila, 2002). US extended military aid also helped the AFP, whose hardware had deteriorated to an almost unusable state, to gain access to vital equipment.
According to US officials, “a large initially outlay [was] needed to prevent further deterioration of essential AFP capacities and reverse years of logistical neglect, with an emphasis on fundamental operations and maintenance tasks to bolster basic sustainability of key AFP assets” (US Department of State, 2002). In addition, enhanced cooperation with the
US in renewed military ties served the Arroyo regimes’ political purpose. Kraft and Joseph argue that the package of military aid requested from the US “is questionable in terms of what the AFP needs in its anti-Abu Sayyaf campaign”, and conclude that “some believe that the
Arroyo administration may just be taking advantage and using the anti-terrorism campaign of the US to court the AFP” (2003, p. 147). In other words, the policy of alignment in the US war on terrorism helped the Philippines deal with its economic, security, and political concerns.
87 Most of the US troops were assigned to the AFP as advisors at the battalion level near the city of Zamboanga, across the waterway from Basilan. However, Special Forces would accompany the AFP into jungle of Basilan and they were allowed to shoot in self-defence under Pentagon rules (Perlez, 2002b).
86
Against these benefits, aligning closely with the US also highlighted the ambivalent nature of public opinion in the Philippines. Although polling showed high levels of popular support for
US military presence in the south to get rid of the ASG,88 Filipino nationalists and left-wing groups protested the presence of US troops (Lerner, 2002). Some factions in the AFP even claimed that the use of US forces against the ASG violated constitutional provisions banning foreign military in combat on Filipino soil. 89 Therefore, these sensitivities complicated negotiations surrounding the initial US deployment in 2002, meaning some US troops were in the Philippines before terms of reference for the exercises were even finalized (Perlez,
2002a). 90 Indeed, public opinion about preserving Filipino sovereignty has made US involvement in counter-terrorism a politically sensitive issue.
Perhaps the most dramatic indication of the limits of cooperation came when US officials prematurely considered a more extended assistance program to the Philippines in February
2003 in response to increasing clashes between the AFP and the ASG in the south.91 After a
88 The improved military technology reportedly led to the capture and speculated assassination of Abu Sabaya, the spokesperson of the ASG (Alipala, Micabalo, and Burgonio, 2002); The results of Balikatan 02 have allegedly improved the peace and stability in the south (BusinessWorld, 2002a). 89 According to an interview with AFP officials, Radics argues that the MLSA would allow the US to enter the Philippines and receive the same type of services it would have on its own military bases (2004, p. 120). 90 The GRP rejected the US initial suggestion to call the exercises ‘Freedom Eagle’. Instead, the name ‘Balikatan’ was chosen, meaning ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’. The GRP also disavowed any description of the exercises as ‘joint’ (Perlez, 2002a). In June 2002, the US approved moving US force advisors to the Philippines company level. However, the change must still be authorised by the GRP (Graham, 2002). Although this plan was never implemented on Basilan, Pentagon officials set a deadline of 31 July 2002, the official termination date of the Balikatan exercises. A new timetable would have to be re-negotiated (Niksch, 2007, p. 11); In early 2003, Vice President Teofisto Guingona quit his position as Foreign Secretary to object the MLSA and joint US- Philippine exercises (Xinhua News Agency, 2003a). 91 In February, 2003, Pentagon officials described a plan under which the US would commit 350 Special Operations Forces to operate with the AFP down to the platoon level of 20 to 30 soldiers on the island of Jolo. Another 400 support troops would be at Zamboanga on the Mindanao mainland. Positioned offshore of Jolo would be a navy task force of 1,300 navy personnel and 1,000 US Marines equipped with Cobra attack helicopters and Harrier AV-8B planes to serve as a backup force and provide logistical assistance (Graham, 2003). 87 brief meeting on 4 February 2003, Arroyo and AFP commanders reportedly agreed to the plan for a second phase of US-Philippine joint military mission (Nakashima and Graham, 2003).
However, the draft agreement immediately caused the controversy and nationalist opposition, 92 which questioned the constitutionality of the plan to allow foreign troops engaging in combat on Filipino soil. The Pentagon was therefore forced to shelve the program, and the GRP claimed that the new troops would continue to be engaged only as trainers
(Nakashima, 2003).
Public opinion was also demonstrated in protests against the war in Iraq, as the public worried about the consequences of US actions for peace in the south.93 In responding to this anti-
American backlash, Presidential spokesman, Ignacio Bunye, stated that the Philippines would not make any hasty decision to sever diplomatic ties with Iraq even it has signed on as a member of the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’, and the Philippines only sent humanitarian and peacekeeping troops and made sure that overseas Filipino workers’ welfare would not be put at risk (Maglalang, 2003).94
Despite this mixed sentiment, President Arroyo visited the White House in May 2003. The US not only announced a new US $100 million military and economic aid program, but designated the Philippines a “major non-NATO ally” to reward her staunch support in the US
92 A poll conducted revealed that 62 percent of Filipinos approved of the US military assistance to fight the ASG, versus 21 percent disapproved. Another survey showed that Muslim and Filipinos had mixed sentiment toward the US troops on this issue-42 percent approved and 39 disapproved (Mangahas, 2004). 93 A survey taken by the Social Weather Stations group in March 2003 found that 76 percent of Filipinos expected that the US decision to attack Iraq would lead to a greater danger of terrorist attacks in the Philippines (Mangahas, 2003). Also a group of Filipino legislators in February 2003 launched a coalition opposed to the impending US-led invasion of Iraq, claiming that it “could aggravate the situation in Mindanao” (Xinhua News Agency, 2003b). 94 Arroyo offered a 500-person team of military and police peacekeepers, medical workers, and engineers, and expected that the US could fund this humanitarian contingent. Foreign Secretary, Blasé Ople, even stated that the Philippines hoped for 100,000 jobs in reconstruction of Iraq (Simon, 2003). 88 counter-terrorism campaign and its war in Iraq (Simon, 2003). In addition, President Bush described the US-Philippine military alliance as “a rock of stability in the Pacific”, and committed the US to “provide technical assistance and field expertise and funding” to help modernise the AFP during his one-day visit to Manila in October 2003 (White House,
2003).95
Meanwhile, the Philippines and the US implemented alternative schemes for military training and support of the AFP against the ASG. In July 2005, the US forces and the AFP launched a joint operation on Mindanao to capture the leader of ASG, Khaddafy Janjalani.96 The US provided intelligence and communications support, including the employment of a P3-Orion surveillance aircraft, and the deployment of Navy Seal and Army Special forces working with
AFP ground units. The rules of engagement restricting US personnel to a non-combat role despite self-defence if they were attacked were also employed (Bonner and Conde, 2005).
Later on, the AFP announced a series of new joint Philippine-US military exercises in the southern island of Jolo scheduled for 20 February-5 March 2006. This exercise, dubbed
Balikatan Shoulder-to-Shoulder 2006, was expected to improve interoperability of the AFP and US military, and assist the AFP in intelligence collection and surveillance. Humanitarian and civic action projects would also be emphasized (Xinhua News Agency, 2006).97
However, the potential to turn public opinion against the US still existed. According to
95 This close anti-terrorism cooperation served to limit the friction between the Philippines and the US in 2004 when President Arroyo withdrew the small AFP contingent from Iraq to help release a Filipino contract worker held hostage by Iraqi insurgents (Niksch, 2007). 96 In January 2007, a major success came when the AFP killed and confirmed the bodies of Khaddafy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, a senior leader of the ASG (New York Post, 2007). However, the terrorist threat still exists after Janjalani’s death (Hookway, 2007). 97 The US has taken the initiative in civic action projects (medical services, water purification installations, farm markets, renovation of schools) in the southern islands of Philippine since 2002 not only to improve life for the residents, but help to neutralize public support for the ASG (Schmitt, 2002). These projects appear to have achieved this goal (Montlake, 2007). 89
Tarrazona (2007), although Arroyo and the most AFP officials responsible for economic, security, and political purposes favoured maintaining some sort of US military presence in the country, the increased Philippine-US military cooperation against the ASG and incidents involving US military personnel and Filipino civilians, have resulted in the local opposition charging that the US was plotting to establish a permanent military base in Mindanao. 98
Hence, this kind of national backlashes likely would reemerge again if the US military role was prolonged and/or expanded in scope.
In addition to the reaction toward US military presence to combat the ASG, the disagreement between the GRP and the US to classify the MILF a terrorist group constituted to an anti-US sentiment in the Philippines. The US considered placing the MILF on the US list of terrorist groups. The GRP opposed such a move, however, fearing doing so would potentially jeopardize its efforts in the peace process on Mindanao (Dow Jones Newswires, 2005).
Actually, much available evidence pointed to an interdependent relationship between the
MILF, the ASG, JI, and al-Qaeda, including joint terror training and involvement in terror plots. 99 This growing level of cooperation was a significant concern to the US, which
98 A US Marine, Lance Cpl. Daniel Smith, was convicted of raping a Filipino woman on 4 December 2005 while he was in the Philippines for a military exercise. This case drew much publicity in the Philippines and especially when Mr. Smith was sentenced to 40 years in prison and the US insisted that he remain in custody pending an appeal (Montlake, 2007); In early 2006, the US military presence drew a protest march by Muslim civilian groups over the increasing presence of US military forces on humanitarian projects and military operations in the southern islands of Philippines (Mogato, 2006a); A former AFP officer, Lieutenant Senior Grade, Nancy Gadian, who had been involved in Balikatan 02, charged that US soldiers were “embedded” with AFP combat units on Mindanao and in the Sulu islands in intelligence gathering. In addition, US military had established separate bases in these regions (Evangelista, 2009). 99 There have been reports of links between the MILF and al-Qaeda. In January 2002, Singapore officials stated that an MILF trainer and bomb-maker assisted the group of 13 al Qaeda-linked suspects, who were arrested for plotting to attack US and other foreign targets in Singapore (Mydans, 2002). Also an allegation reportedly made by AFP officials who claimed that al-Qaeda gave active aid to MILF’s call for independence (Lerner, 2001); 5 suspects, who were responsible for the attack in the FitMart Department Store in General Santos City on 22 April 2002, were arrested on 6 May in the Philippines. The police asserted that they were all members of the MNLF 90 complained that the MILF factions supported other terrorist groups to use its territory for a safe haven. As Admiral William Fallon, Commander-in-Chief of PACOM stated:
The Government of the Philippines (GOP), bolstered by US training and support, achieved success in 2004 against the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); however, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) appears to pose a greater threat to US and allied interests in the region. JI became more active in the Philippines in 2004 and continued to train with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and supported ASG and MILF attack operations. While the GOP efforts likely disrupted attacks, the JI and associated groups have shown resilience and continue training future Southeast Asian terrorists (2005, p. 6).
Even the US Embassy Charge d’Affaires, Joseph Mussomeli, said that Mindanao could become a next Afghanistan because of the growing threat from JI, the ASG, and the MILF factions (Vanzi, 2005). These remarks unsurprisingly caused outcry from the GRP, especially
President Arroyo (Hranjski, 2005). The MILF also denied the allegation and claimed that it was focusing on the resumption of peace negotiation with the GRP (Hranjski, 2005).100
and the MILF and linked to the ASG (BusinessWorld, 2002b); On 4 March 2003, a terrorist attack blasted outside the arrivals terminal at Davao City airport and it was believed to have been carried out with members of the ASG along with the help of the MILF (BBC, 2003a); In another case, two of the bombers responsible for the 2005 Valentine’s Day attack in Makati admitted that the ASG recruited them, and they were trained by JI in a MILF camp (Papa and Esguerra, 2005); Evidence suggested that JI had provided funds to the MILF in exchange for the movement of 21 JI members facilitated by the MILF for training in its camps in Mindanao (Marzan, 2005); The Sulawesi-Mindanao arc-the Celebes and Sulu Seas and the surrounding land-has been identified as an important “logistical and transportation hub” for JI and the MILF to exchange equipment, explosives, and to forge stronger networks (Rabasa, 2007). 100 The MILF has been increasingly involved in bombings and cease-fire violations since the peace process became deadlocked in late 2006. This long-running insurgency against the GRP indicated that the MILF wanted “leverage to force the government back to the negotiation table, and at the same time as an omen of tactics that will be employed should war resume” (Abuza, 2007). 91
Meanwhile, President Bush voiced support for the GRP-MILF peace talks 101 as the best means to de-link the network between the MILF, the ASG, and JI (Reuters, 2005). However, a new US military role in Mindanao increased the risk of armed encounters between US military personnel and the MILF, and this could undermine the GRP-MILF peace negotiations
(Mogato, 2006a). In addition, an escalation of violence could be led by Muslim civilian protesters allied with the MILF over intervention of US military forces on their own soil
(Mogato, 2006b). In other words, the GRP seized the US anti-terrorist campaign as an opportunity to call for US help in the economic recovery and military capability improvement, and it also arrested wanted terrorists through joint training and joint operations with the US.
But in fact, the principle of non-intervention toward the increasing US military presence in the domestic counter-terrorism strategy as well as the peace process restricted the ability of
Philippines to engender practical responses in dealing with terrorist threats.
5. The Implication for ASEAN in Counter-Terrorism102 It could be argued that bilateral and trilateral cooperation, and informal joint training programs have mostly occurred in dealing with the counter-terror issue in Southeast Asia
(Sukma, 2007, p. 34).103 Because intra-ASEAN relations are still influenced by feelings of
101 By June 2003, the US, through a letter from Assistant Secretary of State, James A. Kelly responding to a second letter from MILF Chairman, Salamat Hashim, to President Bush in May, decided to get more directly involved in the GRP-MILF peace talks and tasked the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to support the renewed negotiations. Martin and Tuminez indicate that USIP would not supplant Malaysia, and the mission of USIP was unwilling to provide financial support in development aid until the MILF signed an agreement with the GRP. USIP also had to inform the State Department “of significant developments, advise on appropriate government responses, and, if the negotiations were not leading to a satisfactory settlement, recommend an end to U.S engagement” (2008, pp. 4-5). However, Santos argues that Malaysia might exclude the US (even USIP) direct involvement in the peace process because its presence could just escalate the conflict (2005, p. 26). 102 Figure 3.1below shows that ASEAN countries since 9/11 have put renewed emphasis on building capacities to deal with people smuggling and drug trafficking except terrorism. In addition, illegal, unregistered and unregulated fishing is the issue that ASEAN intends to concentrate in future. 103 With regard to bilateral cooperation, for example, Indonesia sent the POLRI to the Philippines to confirm the 92 suspicion and competition, collaboration and intelligence sharing, which are key elements for regional counter-terrorism cooperation, continue to be restricted. Hence Tan argues that
“regional cooperation in countering terrorism has not been well coordinated and has continued to be ad hoc, due to the constraints of conflicting national interests and mutual suspicions” among ASEAN members (2003, p. 107).
At the national level, Indonesia and the Philippines, utilised extra-regional cooperation with the US and a lesser extent Australia to obtain provided economic, security, and political benefits. This cooperation also led to a number of key terrorist arrests. 104 However, the principle of non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty limited these external supports in the development of domestic counter-terrorism capabilities. In other words, national resilience in Southeast Asia is weak, and therefore it cannot be translated into wider regional resilience in responding to terrorism.
statements given by Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, an Indonesian with links to JI, and then investigated if JI supported any attack operations in the Philippines (BBC, 2002); The Defence Ministers of Malaysia and Indonesia met on 28 January 2002. They agreed to increase their share of military intelligence to combat terrorism (Agence France Presse, 2002a); Malaysian armed forces patrolled waters between Sabah and the southern Philippines to interdict MILF militants fleeting crack-down of the AFP (BBC, 2003b); Indonesia and the Philippines vowed full cooperation to probe suspected terrorists involved the Davao blasts in March 2003 (Agence France Presse, 2003a); Indonesia arrested and deported Mas Selamat Kastari to Singapore in 2006. Mas Selamat is a leader of JI’s Singapore cell who once plotted to crash a plane into Changi Airportand and fled the city-state in December 2001 (Ghani, 2006). Although Mas Selemat Kastari escaped from the Whitley Road Detention Centre in Singapore on 27 February 2008, he was rearrested by Malaysia’s and Singapore’s security agencies in Malaysia on 1 April 2009 (Saripi, 2009). In April 2007 Singapore and Indonesia signed an Extradition Treaty with another defence agreement to allow military exercises conducting in both countries’ territories to combat terrorism. However, the treaty still needs to be ratified by the Indonesian parliament (Jakarta Post, 2011b). 104 Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), who involved a series of terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia, was arrested in central Thailand in 2003 and sent to Guantanamo Bay (BBC, 2006); A major suspect for the 2002 Bali bombings: Umar Patek was captured in Pakistan in March 2011 (Alford, 2011a).
93
Figure 3.1
Source: Compiled by author
94
6. Counter-Terrorism Agenda in the ARF
In tandem with ASEAN’s Counter Terrorism Declaration in November 2001 in Brunei, the
Chairman of the ARF stated that regional governments had undertaken “to use all necessary and available means to pursue, capture and punish those responsible for these attacks and to prevent additional attacks” (ARF, 2001c). In addition, the participants attending the ISG expressed their commitment “to prevent and combat all forms of terrorist acts” and to
“cooperate at the regional level towards joint practical counter-terrorism measures” (ARF,
2001d).105
The urgency of practical cooperation in counter-terrorism has been perceived by the ARF members since 2002. In late July 2002, the ARF issued a ‘Statement on Measures Against
Terrorist Financing’ to halt terrorist financial transfers (ARF, 2002b). The participants at the
Ninth ARF not only gave their support for the Statement, but articulated several actions that could strengthen anti-terror cooperation, including the establishment of an Inter-Sessional
Meetings on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC), the implementation of several UN resolutions designed to stop the financing of terrorism as well as the strengthening national mechanisms to combat terrorism (ARF, 2002d). Moreover, combating international terrorism was recommended as “an immediate step” by the Ministers for the Forum’s future direction (ARF, 2002c).
The 2002 Bali bombings and the US decision to attack Iraq in 2003 led ARF members to reiterate their common position in dealing with terrorism, 106 and reaffirm their rhetorical
105 The subsequent ISG on CBMs in April 2002 shared the similar view that “terrorism had become an immediate, direct and long term threat to the peace and stability of each and every country in the region and the world at large, and renewed their commitment towards concerted efforts to combat terrorism” (ARF, 2002a). 106 The Chairman of the ARF restated its sympathy for victims of the 2002 Bali bombings and its decision to take concrete efforts in counter-terrorism (ARF, 2002e). 95 commitment to advance regional capabilities to combat it. The inaugural ISM on CT-TC noted “general agreement that terrorism constituted a dangerous threat to regional stability and security…participants recognised that it needed to be addressed through cooperative action at the national, regional and international levels” (ARF, 2003a).107 At its Phnom Penh
Tenth Annual Meeting, the ARF again emphasized the threat of terrorism at the global level and concluded that the Forum’s work in combating terrorism had advanced the ARF to preventive diplomacy. However, ASEAN’s leading role was consistently acknowledged by the
ARF for “the need to proceed at a pace comfortable to all” (ARF, 2003d). At the same time,
ARF members emphasized the rejection of “any attempt to associate terrorism with any religion, race, nationality or ethnic group” (ARF, 2003d). In other words, the ARF was eager to develop practical counter-terrorism cooperation, and it had signaled its divergence in the
US-led campaign to wage war against terrorism. The efficacy of the Forum to address the issue, however, was problematic at best since ASEAN’s leading role was reaffirmed in the institution process of the ARF.
The following ARF meetings have evidenced the non-intervention principle as a barrier to practical cooperation in counter-terrorism since ASEAN remains the driving force in the ARF process. The Eleventh ARF Ministerial Meeting termed counter-terrorism cooperation “a milestone in the ARF’s development of a preventive role” (ARF, 2004). The participants at the succeeding Third ISM on CT-TC in Bangkok in 2005 decided to widen bilateral cooperation
107 The ISM also proposed the ‘ARF Statement on Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Action on Border Security’ to implement practical cooperative measures on movement of people, goods, and document security and capacity building more generally (ARF, 2003c). Outside the ISM CT-TC, some ARF members took the initiative in counter-terrorism cooperation. For example, Singapore and Australia hosted an ‘ARF Workshop on Managing the Consequences of a Major Terrorist Attack’ in June 2003, which included an interactive desktop exercise based on a hypothetical attack involving the use of chemical and radiological dispersion devices in densely populated areas. Participants were invited to engage the exercise and discuss the coordinated strategies in responding to a future terrorist threat (ARF, 2003b). 96 as a preliminary stage towards a future multilateral arrangement through better information sharing and intelligence exchange (ARF, 2005b). In addition, ARF members issued another statement in July 2005 aimed at enhancing cooperation in counter-terrorism through information sharing and intelligence exchange, combating document fraud, and law enforcement cooperation. However, they also recognised that “appropriate protections for sensitive and national security information obtained from other and adequate respect for and protection of personal privacy and other human rights” were essential to achieve the goal
(ARF, 2005c).108
The Fourth ISM CT-TC, which was co-chaired by China and Brunei Darussalam in Beijing in
2006, recognized that despite the lasting counter-terrorism efforts, “terrorism still poses a serious threat to regional and global peace and stability” (ARF, 2006a). Therefore, some participants discussed the availability of national contact points between ARF members for intelligence cooperation and information sharing to fight against terrorism, while the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of individual countries was still emphasized (ARF,
2006a).109
The focus on finding new ways to address terrorism was only slightly reformulated in the
ISM CT-TC in 2007 (ARF, 2007a). The Sixth ISM on CT-TC in Indonesia in 2008, however, was a turning point to promote the counter-terrorism cooperation in the ARF. The US in the meeting proposed an ARF Work Plan for Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime with a view “to build regional capacity in counter-terrorism and to focus the ARF on concrete cooperation” (ARF, 2008a). The participants agreed that the initiatives taken by CT-TC in
108 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in London and Sharm el-Sheikh, the ARF member states at the Twelfth Meeting underlined the urgency to sign the ‘International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism’ to preventing WMD from falling into terrorist hands (ARF, 2005d). 109 The specific role of the military to combat terrorism has been mentioned since the 2006 ARF DOD, but participants were required to respect national sovereignty when they develop regional cooperation (ARF, 2006b).
97 dealing with terrorism should take concrete measures and expressed “support in principle” for the US proposal (ARF, 2008a). 110 By the time of the Fifteenth ARF in Singapore, the members ultimately agreed to support the idea of a Work Plan on CT-TC. The senior officials of the member countries were tasked to work out the details, including a list of lead countries or co-sponsors as well as specific projects (ARF, 2008e).
Following the Fifteenth ARF, the delegations of the ARF DOD in October 2008 expressed their willingness to contribute to the implementation of the Work Plan. They also emphasized the importance to develop “seamless linkages” between national, regional, international counter-terrorism mechanisms, and conduct multilateral military exercises to enhance both domestic and regional capacities to rapidly combat terrorism (ARF, 2008f).111 In addition, the
ARF members on 23 July 2009 in Thailand issued an ‘ARF Vision Statement’, which presented their pledge to “[m]ake the ARF an action-oriented mechanism that develops concrete and effective responses to the common challenges” like terrorism in the Asia-Pacific
(ARF, 2009b).112 Furthermore, the Eighth ISM CT-TC in Brunei Darussalam in 2010 stressed
110 With regard to the military’s role, the participants in the ARF DOD in April 2008 reported the need for armed forces to work jointly with other government agencies to achieve a “whole of government approach” in responding to terrorist threat (ARF, 2008b). In addition, the ARF DOD in May noted counter-terrorism as a priority for cooperation that had been recognized in the ‘Three Year Working Programme’ of ADMM (ARF, 2008d). In the ARF DOD in 2011, the participants further recommended the proposal of an ARF Transnational Threat Information Centre (ATTIC), which is a counter-terrorism mechanism in information-sharing, to be endorsed by ISG (ARF, 2011b). 111 Because the meeting was held after the Beijing Olympic Games, the participants highlighted the importance of coordination between national governments and international organisations to prevent massive terrorist attack in “high profile events” (ARF, 2008f). 112 ARF member countries’ agreement to implement practical counter-terrorism cooperation was highlighted in the Chairman’s Statement at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting in Thailand. The agreement included the wider networks of national contact points between the member states for intelligence cooperation and information sharing, and the adoption of the Work Plan to fight against terrorism (ARF, 2009c). Furthermore, the ARF adopted the Plan of Action to implement the ARF Vision Statement in May 2010, which articulated their more recent practical counter-terrorism focus has involved greater efforts to develop appropriate regional framework 98
“the need for countries to put in place necessary national legislation as well as establish mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and extradition arrangements.” The status of implementation of the Work Plan and the importance to prevent WMD from falling into terrorist hands were also emphasized (ARF, 2010a).113
As noted above, it could be argued that differences over the US invasion of Iraq did not impede the ARF’s conduct of a number of activities in relation to counter-terrorism. The
Foreign and Defence Ministers have identified practical counter-terrorism cooperation in recent years, including a desktop exercise under ARF auspices and proposed military exercises. However, the ARF’s record in effectively developing appropriate regional frameworks for implementation has remained quite limited. Notably, the desktop exercises relating to terrorist attacks were not regularised within the context of the ARF. The participants at the Seventh ISM on CT-TC “recognised the importance of the ASEAN
Political Security Community Blueprint, ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism that has provided guidance for ASEAN and ARF efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crimes”
(ARF, 2009a). However, it was clear from the language used that implementation in these areas would be hampered by the principle of non-intervention to legislate and ratify concrete cooperation. In other words, the Forum is rhetorically committed to an anti-terror agenda with a view to develop long-term counter-terrorism strategies and measures, but the leading role of
ASEAN in the institution process has impeded the ARF from establishing a structured collaborative enforcement mechanism in responding to terrorism.
7. Conclusion
ASEAN had formulated a common rhetorical position to combat transnational crimes since the Bali Summit in 1976, and drug trafficking has dominated the agenda due to the expanded by 2020 (ARF, 2010b). 113 The same objective was focused on the Seventeenth ARF Ministerial Meeting (ARF, 2010c).
99 membership of Myanmar and Laos, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis. However, ASEAN has not developed a practical cooperation to prevent these transnational crimes from threatening regional stability.
In the wake of 9/11, ASEAN members have consistently indicated their willingness to work together to deal with transnational crimes, and inter alia, terrorism. Despite its nuanced policy on US anti-terrorism strategy to balance domestic responses of some member states, terrorism constituted a perceptual challenge to the credibility of ASEAN to resolve its regional problems. These constraints that restricted regional counter-terrorism measures included the endorsement of state sovereignty by ASEAN member governments to emphasize a common rhetorical position rather than initiate practical counter-terrorism acts, feelings of suspicion and competition in sharing intelligence, and growing tension among individual countries to handle terrorism by themselves. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that the response to terrorism in Southeast Asia has occurred at a sub-ASEAN level through bilateral and trilateral cooperation, and informal joint training programs.
National level responses seem have become the cornerstone of ASEAN’s battle against terrorism because the member states could gain skills and resources through cooperation with external powers. From the case studies of Indonesia and the Philippines, however, the principle of non-intervention and respect for state sovereignty imposed constraints on these external supports in the development of domestic counter-terrorism capabilities. This means national resilience in Southeast Asia is weak, which cannot be translated into wider regional resilience to respond to terrorism.
With regard to the ARF, it had made limited progress toward a well-structured mechanism to combat transnational crimes before 9/11. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Forum was rhetorically committed to developing long-term counter-terrorism strategies and measures, but it was unable to implement these agreements at the working level. Since the leading role of ASEAN
100 has been confirmed in the institution building process of the ARF in 1994, the inability of the
Forum to establish structured collaborative enforcement mechanisms in responding to terrorism seems unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.
The next chapter will assesses how the adoption of comprehensive and cooperative security in
ASEAN and the ARF affected the responses to the 2004 tsunami and Cyclone Nargis at the regional and the national level.
101
CHAPTER FOUR THE EFFECTS OF THE 2004 TSUNAMI AND CYCLONE NARGIS UPON DISASTER MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS AND STRATEGIC THINKING AT THE REGIONAL AND THE NATIONAL LEVELS
1. Introduction
Since Southeast Asian countries adopted the concept of comprehensive and cooperative security in 1976, the principle of non-intervention has become an important part of their national security policies to foster cooperation against military threats. The negative influence of the non-interference principle, however, was evident in the lack of central organisation to coordinate joint relief efforts in responding to the 2004 tsunami. Actually, it can also be argued that the negative response indicates Southeast Asian countries inclined to ignore dealing with non-military threats before the tsunami struck the region.
After the suffering experience in the 2004 tsunami, Southeast Asian countries started to pay greater attention to the development of disaster management mechanisms at both regional and national level. Indonesia being the hardest affected country114even made its relation with
Western aid providing countries, especially Australia and the US to reach a new point.
However, the improvement of regional disaster management mechanisms was not reflected in the response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008. One reason why the relief operation was delayed was
Myanmar’s xenophobia toward Western countries, especially the appearance of US military assets. Another reason was the ‘ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency
Response’ (AADMER) being a legally binding agreement required participants to be guided by principles, noting “[t]he sovereignty, territorial and national unity of the Parties shall be respected, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty of Amity and
114 Except the 2004 tsunami, approximately 1,300 people died in the Sumatra earthquake in March 2005, and 5,782 people was killed by the 2006 May Java earthquake in Indonesia. 102
Cooperation in Southeast Asia” when implementing relief operations (ASEAN, 2005b).
Even the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management
(AHA Centre) was created to facilitate “cooperation and co-ordination among the Parties, and with relevant United Nations and international organisations” in humanitarian assistance
(ASEAN, 2005b) rather than supplant the role of national countries (both providing and receiving countries) in managing joint emergency response. In addition, its effectiveness in risk identification and monitoring may take years to develop because AADMER did not come into force to obligate all ASEAN members to establish the National Focal Point for collecting information about natural disasters until 2009.
Similar to ASEAN, the ARF took national sovereignty as a basis to organize joint disaster cooperation. For example, the participants in the Fifth ISM on Disaster Relief (ISM-DR) highlighted that “it is of the utmost importance in providing humanitarian assistance to have the consent of the national government and to adhere to the designed time frame given by the national government” (ARF, 2005e). The ARF Statement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response also underlined that “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of states must be fully respected in accordance with the charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country” (ARF, 2006c).
Furthermore, the ARF Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) was underdeveloped, and the ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism was therefore merely designed to facilitate the delivery of joint relief assistance to
Myanmar’s victims.
However, the huge human toll of the 2004 tsunami and Nargis has injected urgency into the humanitarian dimension of Southeast Asian countries’ security outlook. Compared to distinct national interests in forming a regional peacekeeping force and counter-terrorism strategy,
103
Southeast Asian countries have reached a consensus to provide regional support to national disaster preparedness mitigating the impacts of natural hazards, and improving effective responses in the wake of natural disasters through cooperation with other countries beyond the region.
This chapter will focus mainly on the phase of ‘Emergency Relief’ and a lesser extent
‘Prevention and Mitigation’, which was defined by ‘Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on
Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami’ in 2005 (ASEAN, 2005a), 115 to demonstrate the influence of the 2004 tsunami and Cyclone Nargis on the development of regional disaster management mechanisms, and the national strategic thinking of two major disaster-affected countries: Indonesia and Myanmar. The first section reviews briefly the underdeveloped regional disaster management mechanisms before the unprecedented catastrophe caused by the tsunami in 2004. The second section describes the responses to the 2004 tsunami by
Indonesia, individual ASEAN members, and two major Western countries: Australia and the
US. The reason to focus only on Indonesia for discussion is that Aceh province of Indonesia was the hardest hit region of all affected areas, and it was also a conflict-affected region that had long been closed off by the TNI. Based on the evidences of responses, this section will examine two issues: firstly, the effect of the 2004 tsunami on Indonesia’s national disaster management mechanisms and its strategic cooperation with Australia and the US; secondly, whether this cooperation and substantial assistance pledged and committed by Australia and the US during the relief operation affected Indonesia’s concern about the possible intervention in its domestic affairs in Aceh.
The third section is divided into two parts. The first part presents the development of the mechanisms in ASEAN and the ARF before Cyclone Nargis. The second part highlights not
115 Besides the phase of ‘Emergency Relief’ and ‘Prevention and Mitigation’, the meeting was described as an opportunity to strengthen the response to the tsunami in terms of ‘Rehabilitation and Reconstruction’ in the region (ASEAN, 2005a). 104 only the root causes of Myanmar’s xenophobia toward the US since 1988, which led to
Myanmar to obstruct US military from distributing assistance to vulnerable groups after the cyclone, but the implication of an US role to Myanmar’s strategic perspectives. The final section underlines ASEAN’s limited institutional capacity in responding to Nargis, and argues that individual capacities of Southeast Asian countries still play a major role to cope with natural disasters. Compared to the prospect of a regional peacekeeping force and the counter- terrorism strategy, however, Southeast Asian countries in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami and Nargis are increasingly taking a somewhat more proactive and positive stance to better respond to future natural disasters.
2. The Development of Regional Disaster Management before the 2004 Tsunami
2.1 ASEAN
Mechanisms aimed at fostering cooperation against natural disasters had been remained highly underdeveloped within ASEAN since 1967. In 1971, regional disaster management experts formed the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) and met every two years “to enhance cooperation in disaster management in order to minimize the adverse consequences of disasters on the economic and social development of ASEAN members”
(Bildan, 2003, p. 11). Five years later, the five original members of ASEAN: Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, held a meeting in Manila on 26 June 1976 and signed the ‘ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disaster’. The
Declaration indicated that mutual assistance was necessary to provide materials and medical supplies in case of a natural catastrophe because each member state had inadequate capacity to deliver relief to victims in affected-countries. Also each member was supposed to designate a national government agency as an internal coordinating body to gather and exchange data about natural disasters, and undertake relief cooperation plans (ASEAN, 1976d). However,
105 the creation of a central institution that had authority to coordinate humanitarian assistance provided by ASEAN members in relief operations was not mentioned in the Declaration.
Furthermore, ASEAN did not manage to build up a highly structured disaster management mechanism at either the Twelfth Meeting of the AEGDM in 2002,116 or the Declaration of
Bali Concord II in 2003.117 Even though ASEAN established an internet-based system, which was designed “for the rapid exchange of strong earthquake data among the ASEAN member countries” and to “analyse the data for possible tsunami threats arising from the strong earthquake”, at the Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Meteorology and Geophysics held in Indonesia in 2000 (ASEAN, 2000b), in fact it was not developed sufficiently to alleviate the impact of the 2004 tsunami.
2.2 The ARF
The issue of disaster relief was first discussed in the ARF ISM-DR in 1997. However, the
ARF suspended the ISM in May 2000 amid different concerns among participants, for instance, the role of military in relief operations and the need to respect the national sovereignty of disaster-affected country. At the First ISM-DR held on 19-20 February 1997 in
Wellington, participants noted that “international cooperation must be fully sensitive to the needs and approaches of the recipient country. International efforts should supplement, not supplant, national mechanisms. They should foster self-sufficiency, and enhance local preparedness” (ARF, 1997a). Also the Third ISM-DR co-chaired by Russia and Vietnam in
1999 proclaimed that “national and multilateral military capabilities should be engaged in
116 The meeting agreed to restructure the AEGDM into an ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and endorsed the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM). The ARPDM outlines ASEAN’s regional strategy, priority areas and activities in disaster management (Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, 2002). 117 The proposal for an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) was introduced in the Bali Concord II in 2003 together with the creation of similar economic and security communities. It only mentioned to promote cooperation in disaster management without identifying any institutional mechanisms (ASEAN, 2003c). 106 disaster relief operations according to the concrete circumstances and the regulations in each country, in a transparent manner, but only upon the request of the country suffering damage”
(ARF, 1999a). In other words, both ASEAN and the ARF had not paid much attention to build effective disaster management mechanisms before the unprecedented catastrophe caused by the tsunami in 2004.
3. The Responses to the 2004 Tsunami
Table 4.1demonstrates the huge scale of human loss caused by a tsunami on the 26 December
2004 in four Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Malaysia. Table 4.1 2004 tsunami death toll in Southeast Asian countries Country where Deaths Missing Displaced deaths occurred
Indonesia 131,338 113,937 500,000
Thailand 5,395 2,993 N/A
Myanmar 90 N/A N/A
Malaysia 68 N/A N/A
Source: Compiled by author from BBC (2005), CNN (2005), and Washington Post (2005)
Aceh province in Indonesia stood out as the most devastated area in terms of the death toll, and was a conflict-affected region that had long been closed off by the TNI. Although the tsunami caused sustained suffering for many Acehnese, in the first day the GoI, whose concern was external intervention that originated from the national resilience concept, seemed quite reluctant to open immediately the province for the participation of international agencies in providing emergency and relief assistance to the survivors. Sukma argues that the GoI
“headed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice-President Jusuf Kalla (SBY-JK), soon realised that it would have to act against features that had characterised Indonesia for decades” in responding to the tsunami disaster, for example “the emergence of xenophobia-
107 both within government and the society-in accepting the presence of international assistance, especially the involvement of foreign troops in the emergency relief operations” (2006, pp.
214-215). However, the GoI realised that it could not cope with the scale of tragedy and needed significant external assistance when the extent of the devastation was clear. Therefore,
President Yudhoyono opened Aceh to foreign aid workers to provide emergency relief on 27
December 2004.
At the national level, Indonesia’s National Coordinating Body for Disaster Management
(Bandan Koordinasi Nasinal Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungsi, Bakornas
PBP)118 based in Jakarta, was responsible for the coordination of disaster relief after President
Yudhoyono lifted the ban on foreign aid workers (Wlharta, et al., 2008, p. 89). Vice-president,
Jusuf Kalla, also sent the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare, Alwi Shihhad, to take control of the Aceh provincial disaster management offices (Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksana
Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungsi, Satkorlaks) on the third day of the tsunami (Wlharta, et al., 2008, p. 90).
Meanwhile, TNI troops that were already in Aceh for security duties were instructed to redeploy for humanitarian assistance. The TNI dispatched amphibious vehicles and excavators to ferry engineering battalions in order to clear roads for reconstruction of emergency bridges and re-establish the link between Banda Aceh and the south-western part of the province (Bennett, et al., 2006, p. 21; Wlharta, et al., 2008, pp. 90-91). In addition, the
TNI was given a task of liaising with and coordinating foreign military assets on behalf of the
Government in operational control (Harkin, 2006, p. 4; Wlharta, et al., 2008, p. 92).
118 Bakomas PBP’s tasks includes “formulating disaster management policy, preparing and issuing guidelines and directives, and coordinating disaster management before, during and after a disaster”, and “preparing and issuing guidelines and directives on disaster prevention, mitigation, rescue, rehabilitation and reconstruction” (Wlharta, et al., 2008, p. 89).
108
It is clear that ASEAN had not developed an effective mechanism to mitigate the impact of the tsunami, and the major contributions were all forms of assistance individually provided by
ASEAN members to Indonesia. Wlharta, et al indicate that the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)
C-130 Hercules aircraft landed in Medan on 28 December 2004 to carry medical and relief supplies, and the SAF Chinook and Super Puma helicopters “effectively helped maintain a constant air bridge between Medan, Meulaboh and Banda Aceh, providing access and transportation of relief supplies and evacuating the injured” over the past few weeks (2008, pp.
92-93). Loo and Ho also note that the SAF swiftly delivered hundreds of tents, groundsheets, blankets and other supplies to Medan. Its Landing Ship, Tank (LST) and Fast Craft “brought engineers equipment like bulldozers, excavators and cranes to establish beach landing points and cleared supply routes from the coast to the devastated city of Meulaboh” (2005, pp. 1-
2).119
Other ASEAN members also immediately mobilised their resources for disaster relief after the tsunami: Malaysia deployed its Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team to
Indonesia (Yusoff, 2005), and dispatched one of its Royal Navy logistic vessels to provide emergency relief and other humanitarian assistance to the victims (Cheong, 2005); Brunei not only sent two units of Blackhawk helicopters and one unit of CN-235s to help the relief operation but provided financial assistance (Sukma, 2006, p. 222); Thailand, Laos, Cambodia,
Vietnam, and the Philippines also sent aid to Indonesia.120
119 The SAF was able to swiftly deploy troops for relief operation because it had established close relationship with the TNI “in exercises, personnel exchanges, and attending each other’s training courses, which has resulted in the development of mutual respect, understanding as well as trust on the ground” (Loo and Ho, 2005, p. 2). 120 President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, authorized the formation of a humanitarian team tasked with providing medical and civic services in Indonesia (Asia Pulse, 2005); Vietnamese Prime Minister, Phan Van Khai, decided to donate US $ 150,000 and ordered the Ministry of Public Health to prepare health workers and medicine and diarrhea vaccines to send to Indonesia if necessary (Xinhua News Agency, 2004); Thailand and Laos contributed US $ 10 million or less financial assistance (Margesson, 2005, p. 4); Cambodia donated US $ 100,000 (AsiaFinest, 2004). 109
With regard to Western countries, Australia and the US helped the TNI with medical evacuation and distribution of essential supplies when the GoI faced a myriad of logistical challenge to access affected regions.121 The enormous congestion at airports and roads caused by heavily damaged transport in coastal regions of Aceh hampered the TNI to immediately distribute relief to the vulnerable groups. Hoffman indicates that “[s]ome of the supplies slowly filtered out to those in need, but much remained painfully out of reach at airports strained by the sudden influx of flights, ill-equipped even to offload planes and unreachable by conventional transport” in the post-tsunami situation (2005, p. 10). Margesson also notes that the TNI was unable to transport a bulk of injuries to medical facilities and provide logistic support to the communities on the west coast of Aceh because of limited helicopter fleet (2005, p. 23).
Naval assets and fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters provided by Australia and the US made up TNI’s inability in local disaster response. Australia swiftly dispatched four C-130 military transport aircraft to Banda Aceh airfield with medical and relief supplies on 27 December
2004, followed by one 707 aircraft, one II-76 aircraft and two Antonov aircraft to assist coordination and transportation of relief supplies to the affected regions within a week. Also the LST HMAS Kanimbla, which brought some sailors and engineers, arrived on 11 January
2005 with two Sea King helicopters and two Landing Craft to provide medical services and established a sea base for logistics (AusAID, 2005; Wlharta, et al., 2008, p. 92).
121 As the military forces of numerous countries converged toward the areas affected by the tsunami, President Bush announced the establishment of a ‘core-group’-consisting of the US, Australia, Japan, and India. Its purpose was to lead the relief operation “as it became clear that Australia, Japan and India had relief capabilities as well as military forces in the region, even though India was itself a major victim” (Weisman and Sanger, 2004). Within days, however, the ‘core group’ was dissolved and the UN officially played a leading role in the relief effort. As then Secretary of State Colin Powell noted, “The core group helped to catalyze the international response…But now having served its purpose, the core group will fold itself into the broader coordination efforts of the UN” (Shane and Bonner, 2005). 110
US President George W. Bush directed the US Pacific Command (PACOM) to launch
Operation Unified Assistance in responding to the tsunami.122 A strike group led by the US aircraft carrier, USS Abraham Lincoln, quickly left Hong Kong and arrived at Aceh to provide humanitarian assistance on 31 December 2004. The hospital ship United States Naval Ship
(USNS) Mercy and an expeditionary strike group: the USS Bonhomme Richard, the USS
Essex, and the USS Fort McHenry also proceeded from San Diego and Guam, respectively to support the relief operation from early January 2005. Twenty-eight US SH-60 Bravo helicopters and two US hovercrafts were dispatched from the ships to distribute food and water, and evacuate people in need of medical help from the isolated communities of Aceh
(Elleman, 2007, p. 10; Wlharta, et al., 2008, p. 93).
Notwithstanding the military assets from ASEAN members and Western countries made a significant contribution during the acute relief phase in Aceh, a sense of xenophobia toward the presence of large foreign military forces resulted in the TNI being afraid of losing control over Aceh. Vatikiotis (2005) argues that the TNI was anxious about the large presence of foreigners in a region previously closed to the international community. Therefore, it put restrictions on all foreign relief operations for safety reasons to reassert sovereign control over
Aceh, and all foreign military assets had to compromise with the GoI on deployment to respect for Indonesian sovereignty.123 President Yudhoyono apparently overrode suspicions against foreign troops from the TNI and stated that “the presence of foreign servicemen here is apolitical; they are conducting a humanitarian operation. After some time we will take over
122 PACOM established a multinational force headquarters in Utapao, Thailand. The annual US-Thai joint/combined Cobra Gold exercises had led Utapao to become a logistics hub of US relief effort and allowed for a faster response to the tsunami (Elleman, 2007, p. 28). 123 For example, PACOM was not allowed to base its contingents and equipments on land. Therefore, PACOM located its relief operation ashore in the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (Sipress and Nakashima, 2005).
111 the operation, but for now we are grateful for their presence” (Harsono, 2005). Although several TNI commanders started to cooperate with foreign military contingents in delivering relief supplies, the TNI on 11 and 12 January 2005 announced the termination of all foreign relief operations by 26 March 2005. The reason was to reconstruct Aceh and apparently “to protect aid workers from the GAM and prevent relief supplies from falling into hands of
GAM” (Margesson, 2005, p. 24). Therefore, it can be argued that the notion of national resilience had aroused Indonesia’s great concerns about the possible intervention from foreign military forces in domestic conflict in Aceh, even in the devastating consequence of the catastrophe.
4. Indonesia’s Improved Disaster Management
Indonesia’s passive response to the 2004 tsunami led it to consider more seriously the improvement of its disaster relief capacity. Firstly, Indonesia started to rethink its military priorities due to the lack of helicopter fleets to provide humanitarian assistance. Budiyanto argues that compared to the TNI which had only four C-130 aircraft available for relief operations, “US supporting the form of ship-based helicopter support (provided by the USS
Abraham Lincoln) and ship-born medical assistance (on board the USNS Mercy) greatly helped in distributing aid, evacuating casualties, and providing critical medical treatment to the victims” (2007, p. 3). As a result, Indonesia took efforts to strengthen the TNI’s capacity in future disaster operation. For instance, Indonesian Defence Minister, Yuwono Sudarsono, announced the postponement of the purchase of new combat aircraft such as Sukhoi Su-27,
Sukhoi Su-30s, and Mi-35 helicopters from Russia “in favour of cargo planes and helicopters suitable for relief efforts” two weeks after the tsunami (Agence France Presse, 2005).
Secondly, the poorly coordinated domestic disaster management structure prompted Indonesia to create a new disaster response mechanism to deal with natural disaster swiftly. Wlharta, et al. indicate that “Bakornas had neither real assets, nor implementation, policy-making or
112 enforcement powers” when the extent of the devastation was clear (2008, p. 89). In addition, less clarified responsibility and authority between the GoI and Satkorlaks, and different contact points provided by Satkorlaks complicated overall coordination of the humanitarian relief efforts (2008, p. 90). The Post-Tsunami Lessons Learned and Best Practices Workshop held in Indonesia in 2005 further noted the weakness of Indonesia’s disaster management framework:
The legal framework for disaster management in Indonesia emerged as somewhat weak, fragmentary and at times duplicative. Although complex command and control structures were put into place in response to this exceptional event, in practice there appeared to be no clear, unique attribution of roles and responsibilities among various components of the public administration. Ad hoc decrees and regulations were issued to respond to the emergency, creating structures with uncertain power and resourcing which were sometimes duplicative of what already existed (United Nations, 2005, pp. 2-3).
Hence, the GoI drafted new legislation and passed a disaster management law in 2007. The significant difference is that the new law “has overhauled disaster management structures, restructuring Bakornas, the poorly performing government body responsible for disaster management, and giving it a stronger and more operational role in directing disaster response.
The law also envisages the creation of provincial and district disaster management agencies with similar levels of authority” (Willitts-King, 2009). However, the implementation of new disaster management law to respond to the earthquake off Sumatra in September 2009124 was limited, because of a shortage of provincial and district resources allocated to disaster preparedness (Patrikainen, 2010).
124 The earthquake struck the Indonesian island of Sumatra and led to 1,115 deaths on 30 September 2009 (Antara News, 2009). 113
The National Agency for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana,
BNPB), which was established in 2008, aimed to revamp Bakornas. It extended beyond coordinating emergency relief efforts to encompass all phases of pre-disaster prevention, preparedness, post-disaster recovery, and played a successful role in coordinating humanitarian assistance from local and international level for rescue efforts in the 2009 earthquake (ReliefWeb, 2009). However, the vandalism on buoys from local inhabitants hindered rescue efforts of BNPB on pre-disaster prevention in responding to the West Sumatra tsunami in October 2010 (Patrikainen, 2010). 125 In other words, the disaster management mechanism in Indonesia has progressed well despite the instability since the 2004 tsunami.
More importantly, the national mechanism has helped Indonesia strengthen the principle of non-intervention to maintain a strong leadership in coordinating joint disaster response.
Last but not least, a substantial and significant contribution of foreign military contingents during the acute relief phase proved that military assets had better capacity than the civilian humanitarian community to support the relief operations. Therefore, Indonesia took efforts to develop a set of SOPs, which were designed to provide guidelines for ARF members, to promote the level of coordination between militaries and humanitarian agencies in responding to regional disasters. The Post-Tsunami Lessons Learned and Best Practices Workshop in
Indonesia also reached a consensus that the “role of the foreign militaries was generally considered as positive, although concerns were expressed over the level of coordination among the militaries themselves, between the militaries and the Indonesian government (at least initially) and, particularly, between the militaries and the humanitarian agencies” in disaster relief (United Nations, 2005, p. 4). As a result, Indonesia proposed the first ever ARF
Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief that was held in Jakarta on 1-2 May 2008 and co-chaired with Australia. The draft scenario for the exercise was a fictitious country in need of regional
125 However, the early warning system worked well when Merapi volcano erupted (Patrikainen, 2010). 114 emergency assistance when it faced natural disasters, and it was aimed “to improve civil and military coordination in disaster relief and to promote understanding and cooperation among
ARF participants in situations in which a coordinated multinational response would be required” (ARF, 2008c).
5. Indonesia’s Strategic Thinking
It can also be argued that the tsunami provided an opportunity for Indonesia to rebuild closer relations with two key aid-providing nations: Australia and the US. Indonesia-Australia relations had been badly disrupted since Australia played a leading role in the UN-backed multinational force in responding to the East Timor crisis in 1999. Although this situation was improved as a result of joint counter-terrorism activities after the 2002 Bali bombings,
Indonesia viewed Australia as the US ‘deputy sheriff’ in the region, which closely cooperated with the US and UK in the Iraq war, and showed its willingness to launch pre-emptive strikes against suspected terrorists (Hanson, 2005, p. 566; Huxley, 2005, p. 126). However, Indonesia started to forge a better relationship with Australia because the latter’s swift and generous contribution to the relief operation in 2004. This change could be seen when President
Yudhoyono came to Australia on 4 April 2005 to “bring Indonesia’s message of heartfelt thanks and gratitude, especially from the people of Aceh and North Sumatra, for the generous contribution and acts of compassion and solidarity shown by the people and Government of
Australia immediately after the tsunami.” President Yudhoyono also indicated that the
Indonesia-Australia relation became closer through “tsunami experience” (Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, 2005a). Even the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Imron Cotan, seemed to downplay the discontent about Australia’s intervention in East Timor (Banham, et al., 2005).
Australia’s assistance to Indonesia not only significantly reduced years of mutual suspicion but expanded some areas of security cooperation between two countries. Indonesian Foreign
Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, negotiated the visit of President Yudhoyono in Australia with his
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Australian counterparts in mid-March 2005. The President’s visit approved a set of agreements on various areas of cooperation between two countries, including “cooperation on counter-terrorism and people smuggling involving the two nations’ police forces, cooperation between the two defence forces, and territorial issues”, and the agreement was also designed to ensure that Australia would respect Indonesia’s borders and not support any operation of secessionist groups (Canberra Times, 2005). In short, the large amount of assistance pledged and committed by Australia in the 2004 relief operation deepened Indonesia-Australia relations in much broader areas of security cooperation.
Similar to Indonesia-Australia relations, bilateral relations between Indonesia and the US improved significantly after the tsunami. Indonesia’s relations with the US had been rocky since the TNI committed human rights violations in East Timor, and this caused the US to curb its military ties with the TNI through congressional restrictions in late 1990s and early
2000s, respectively (Myerscough, 2006). In addition, US military attacks in Afghanistan following 9/11 and its invasion of Iraq in 2003 worsened the US image amongst the population of Indonesia (Huxley, 2005, p. 125). However, the success of the US response to the tragic tsunami opened a window of opportunity to improve bilateral relations. John argues that the tremendous role of US military in the Aceh relief operation “made a strong positive impression on the people and government of Indonesia no other country was able to match our response. Scenes of US relief workers and soldiers working side-by-side with their
Indonesian counterparts showed Indonesians that the US is a friend. Public opinion toward the
US has since improved” (2005, p. 91).126 The improved bilateral relations were demonstrated at the national level when President Yudhoyono made speech at a dinner hosted by the US-
Indonesia Society (USINDO) on 25 May 2005. He stated that “there has been an incredibly
126 In fact, largely as a result of the US contribution in the 2004 tsunami, positive opinions of the US in Indonesia that had plummeted to 15 percent when the US attacked Iraq in 2003, rebounded to 38 percent in May 2006 (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006). 116 deep emotional connection between America and Indonesia since the tsunami. Mainstream
America became visually and emotionally, exposed to Indonesia’s tremendous agony” (Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, 2005b).
Improved Indonesia-America relations were further extended to the military area. The breakthrough in military-to-military relations began on 16 January 2005 when Deputy
Defence Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, visited Indonesia, and pleaded for the US Congress to reconsider the sanction on the TNI and to restore relations between the two countries in military areas (Sukma, 2005, p. 225). Since then, a series of decisions were made by the US government to revive some programs to provide security assistance for Indonesia. In February
2005, Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, announced a resumption of IMET funding for
Indonesia to increase professionalism of the TNI with respect to democratic values and human rights (John, 2005, p. 94; Myerscough, 2006). In May 2005, Rice decided to lift the ban on non-lethal foreign military sales to Indonesia even though the State Department’s annual human rights reports continued to show TNI’s poor record. In November the same year, the
State Department exercised a National Security Wavier provision provided in the FY 2005
Foreign Operation Appropriations Act to remove congressional restrictions on FMF and lethal defence articles, and the US finally announced the resumption of the export of lethal defence articles to Indonesia on 29 March 2006. These actions not only presented the restoration of normal US-Indonesia military relations before 1992 but supported TNI’s reform and its ability to effectively respond to national and regional disasters, and maintain regional stability
(Grady, 2007, p. 8; Myerscough, 2006).
The main purpose of restoration of Indonesia and US military-to-military relations after the tsunami was to enhance cooperation on counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia. John argues that although the effective counter-terrorism police force has been established to arrest and prosecute terrorists since the 2002 Bali bombings, President Yudhoyono still endeavoured to
117 share an interest with the US in order to address the causes of terrorism and prevent people from further violence (2005, p. 93). Huxley also argues that the compassion showed by the
US to vulnerable groups in the tsunami “may be indirectly useful in the struggle against
Jemaah Islamiah, the Indonesian-based but pan-Southeast Asian terrorist network allied with al-Qaeda, and similar groups”(2005, p. 125), and “Washington has continued to see Indonesia as strategically important because of its location astride vital sea lanes, and the Bush administration views the TNI as a potentially important ally in combating Jemaah Islamiah”
(2005, p. 126).
6. A Balance between Humanitarian Assistance and National Strategic Thinking
The huge scale of human loss caused by the 2004 tsunami prompted Indonesia to improve its national capacity in responding to natural disasters. In addition, a pattern of goodwill established by Australia and the US through their swift and generous responses to the tsunami provided a chance for Indonesia to reengage relations and enhance bilateral strategic cooperation with these two Western countries.
However, it remains to be seen whether this change would at least change Indonesia’s security policies toward humanitarian considerations. Since Indonesia officially incorporated the national resilience concept in its national doctrine in 1973, it did not take strengthening the armed forces as a priority for political stability, and rejects human rights issue taken as a pretext for external intervention in its domestic affairs. Therefore, how to deal with criticism on the possible human right violations from Western countries through restoration of military cooperation remains a continuing challenge for the GoI.
7. The Development of Regional Mechanisms in the Aftermath of the Tsunami
7.1 ASEAN
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Although ASEAN did not build up a highly structured disaster management mechanism, its member states demonstrated their humanitarian solidarity during the acute relief phase in the
2004 tsunami. Kassim argues that the tsunami provided a chance for three leaders from
Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia “to come together and act decisively to forge the region’s response to the tragedy” (2005, p. 2) and this “has shown an innate capacity of the three
ASEAN states to band together quickly and display empathy and care for each other in times of severe crisis” (2005, p. 3). Huxley also argues that “Singapore’s significant and well- publicised relief effort in Aceh (concentrated on the devastated west coast town, Meulaboh) may mitigate Indonesian perceptions of the city-state as an arrogant and self-interested outpost of Western influence. Economically buoyant Malaysia, another neighbour interested in Indonesia’s long-term stability, deployed relatively small military forces but emphasised its intent to assist Aceh’s long-term reconstruction” (2005, p. 126). In addition, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, Vietnam and the Philippines all supported the relief operation for Acehnese victims. Therefore, it can be acknowledged that the tsunami provided a basis for ASEAN members, to some extents, to rebuild cohesion for humanitarian consideration other than national interests.
This cohesion was well presented in the ‘Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on Aftermath of
Earthquake and Tsunami’, which was initiated by Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Hsien
Loong, on 6 January 2005 in Jakarta. At this Meeting, ASEAN leaders issued a ‘declaration on action to strengthen emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention on the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004’ and expressed their condolences and solidarity in relief and reconstruction for the survivors of the tsunami. In addition, ASEAN participants emphasised the need for international aid and confirmed the important role of the UN in relief operations. Therefore, they asked the UN to form a special agency for organising aid to the tsunami-affected countries (ASEAN, 2005a). Furthermore,
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ASEAN leaders in the Declaration indirectly acknowledged their incapacity in facing the tsunami disaster when they “underlined the need to coordinate better and ensure that those contributions would be effective and sustainable, to truly address the suffering of the victims and to prevent such calamity from recurring.” Therefore, ASEAN participants agreed to take efforts in establishing “regional mechanisms on disaster prevention and mitigation” (ASEAN,
2005a).127
To achieve these goals, ASEAN members signed AADMER at the Thirty-Eighth AMM in
July 2005. This agreement articulated the wide range of cooperation in disaster management, including: “identification of disaster risk, development of monitoring, assessment and early warning systems, standby arrangements for disaster relief and emergency response, exchange of information and technology, and the provision of mutual assistance.” In addition,
AADMER established the AHA Centre to collect and analyse data about natural disaster from a National Focal Point in each member state, and then disseminate information of risk level to
ASEAN countries for disaster prevention, monitoring, and mitigation (ASEAN, 2005b).
AADMER did not come into effect in responding to the Yogyakarta and Central Java earthquake in May 2006 because it had not been ratified by all ASEAN members. But in fact,
ACDM successfully coordinated the joint emergency response supplies in close coordination with the GoI under the framework of AADMER, and ASEAN countries have initiated the annual ASEAN regional disaster emergency response simulation exercise since 2005 to
127 This phase would be done by training military and civilian personnel in disaster relief as proposed in the “ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action”; implementing “ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communication Network” as provided for in the “ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Component of the Vientiane Action Programme”; establishing “regional instrument for disaster management and emergency response” and “regional tsunami warning system on the Indian Ocean and in the Southeast Asia region”. The declaration also confirmed the need to “[d]evelop and promote national and regional human and institutional capacity, transfer of know-how, technology and scientific knowledge” together with international cooperation (ASEAN, 2005a). 120 improve its natural disaster response capacity (ASEAN, 2006).128
7.2 The ARF
In November 2005, the ARF ISM-DR was reconvened in Bandung after the 2004 tsunami.
The meeting was aimed to assess the concrete capacities of individual countries in the relief operation and discuss how ARF participants could strengthen cooperation in responding to the future disaster emergencies. In addition, the meeting proposed to host field exercises and noted that a number of countries served as ‘shepherd’, consisting of Australia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the US, to coordinate the relevant recommendations of various ARF workshops in order to enhance the regional cooperation in disaster relief (ARF, 2005e).
Furthermore, ARF members released the ‘ARF Statement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response’ in responding to the resultant wider international efforts in 2004 tsunami and 2006 earthquake. ARF members in this Statement reaffirmed the leading role of the UN in coordinating joint efforts in disaster relief. They also announced the development of an ARF regional standby arrangement including SOPs to cooperate closely with the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In addition, these members declared that they would “endeavour to enhance cooperation that support and complements exiting regional and international disaster management and emergency response mechanisms” in four aspects: risk identification and monitoring, disaster prevention and
128 ASEAN conducted its first-ever “Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise’ (named ARDEX-05) in September 2005, which was designed to test the preparedness and internal coordination of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei in responding to a serious earthquake in peninsular Malaysia. The scope of this exercise was limited to a joint urban search and rescue operation in a cluster of high-rise buildings. The operation involved the Philippines as a Chief Referee, eighty rescue workers from Malaysia, undisclosed number of personnel from the Singapore Civil Defence Force, and six special squad members of the Brunei Fire Services Department. In addition, an evaluation meeting and a workshop followed to incorporate the lessons learned from the exercise into the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and Standard Operating Procedures under AADMER (ASEAN, 2005c). Table 4.2 demonstrates other annual regional disaster emergency response simulation exercises. 121
preparedness, emergency response and disaster relief, and capacity building (ARF, 2006c).
Subsequently, the Sixth ISM-DR in September 2006, reviewed regional disaster relief
cooperation, worked on stock-taking of disaster relief resources agenda, and proposed new
initiatives for disaster relief cooperation (ARF, 2006d). Indonesia at the Seventh ISM-DR,
which was held in Helsinki in October 2007, went further to notify the preparedness of the
first ARF Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief to be co-hosted with Australia in Jakarta on 1-2
May 2008. The aim of the exercise was to validate the ARF SOPs on HADR to improve the
effectiveness of ARF’s capacity in the natural disaster response (ARF, 2007c).
Table 4.2 ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise Time Scenario Hosting Country Participating Countries
Singapore, Brunei ARDEX-05 Earthquake Malaysia Darussalam, the Philippines
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei ARDEX-06 Flood Cambodia Darussalam, the Philippines, Thailand
Brunei Darussalam, Multi-storey ARDEX-07 Singapore Indonesia, Malaysia, the Apartment Collapse Philippines, Thailand
Brunei Darussalam, ARDEX-08 Typhoon Thailand Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore
ARDEX-09* TBC the Philippines TBC
ARDEX-10** TBA Indonesia TBA
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*the Philippines was scheduled to host ARDEX-09 by the end of October 2009, but the exercise was cancelled because Typhoon Ketsana struck the country. **ARDEX-10 should be held on 30 October to 5 November 2010, but the exercise was rescheduled to the end of November 2010 because the West Sumatra tsunami and Merapi volcano eruption occurred in Indonesia. Source: Compiled by author from ASEAN official website and Hardi (2010)
8. The Responses to Cyclone Nargis in 2008
On 2 and 3 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis severely struck Myanmar and caused the overwhelming loss of life (the Ayeyarwady Delta and southern Yangon Division were the hardest hit areas).129 Immediately after the cyclone, a National Disaster Preparedness Central
Committee (NDPCC) chaired by the Prime Minister, Thein Sein, held a meeting on 3 May
2008, and formed 10 Emergency Disaster Response Sub-committees to undertake the overall relief and recovery tasks. These relief operations included “the setting up a relief camps, field hospitals, verification and cremation of the dead, installation of a temporary communication system, clearance of the main roads, provision of fuel, opening of markets, restoring security in the affected areas and other relief activities” (ASEAN, 2008f, p. 38). Meanwhile, the
Myanmar armed forces (Tatmadaw) provided assistance to support NDPCC in the relief and rehabilitation effort (ASEAN, 2008f, pp. 40-41). 130 However, the Tatmadaw’s response to
Nargis still incurred criticism. Selth argues that the capacity of the Tatmadaw in the disaster operation “was patchy and weak”, despite the fact that it was “the only organisation in
129 According to official data, 84,537 people died, 53,836 were missing, and 19,359 were injured after the natural disaster. Estimates also suggested that the number of people displaced by Nargis stood at 800,000, with some 260,000 people living in camps or settlements in the initial days when Nargis struck the Delta. In addition, there was a widespread destruction in downed power, communication lines, and critical infrastructure. A large number of villages were also destroyed, crops were flattened, paddy fields were flooded with salt water and thousands of farm animals were killed (ASEAN, 2008f, p. 1). 130 Doctors and nurses from the Defence Services Medical Corps were sent to provide emergency medical care in the affected areas; fleets of military trucks and water buffaloes were dispatched to transport relief goods, seeds, and agricultural machinery in time for the planting season; the Air Force deployed its helicopters to evacuate people in need of medical help (ASEAN, 2008f, pp. 40-41). 123
Myanmar with the command structure, internal communications, manpower, resources and expertise to respond quickly to such a catastrophic event” (2008b, p. 387).
In common with the 2004 tsunami, the UN and the international community swiftly offered assistance in fear that the cyclone-ravaged region may face an outbreak of infectious diseases and starvation followed on the lack of food, clean water and shelter. In responding to the emergency and relief supplies provided by international agencies, the SPDC initially indicated in a briefing on 5 May 2008 that it would “be pleased to receive from any country and agency, disaster relief supplies such as tents, plastic sheets, corrugated iron sheets, food and medicines, blankets, clothing, communication equipment” (New Light of Myanmar, 2008, p. 9). Although the SPDC welcomed international relief supplies, it obstructed foreign aid workers from assessing and distributing assistance to the vulnerable groups in the Delta, where the official death toll climbed nearly 22,000 and caused an international concern (Associated Press
Newswires, 2008).
Given the magnitude of this humanitarian crisis, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, suggested to Myanmar’s leadership that the situation was at a critical moment, and emphasized “the importance of providing as much assistance as possible in the vital first few days following the cyclone’s impact.” Ban also urged Myanmar’s authorities to “respond to the outpouring of international support and solidarity by facilitating the arrival of aid workers, and the clearance of relief supplies in every way possible” (United Nations, 2008a). Despite the UN pled for a humanitarian response, and three ships of US navy: the USS Essex, the USS
Juneau, and the USS Harper’s Ferry that deployed in the Andaman Sea as a consequence of the Cobra Gold 2008 exercise would allow the relief effort to be speeded up significantly via aircraft (Voice of America, 2008a), the SPDC delayed in issuing visas to foreign aid workers and allowing relief into Myanmar.
However after a meeting with the US Charge d’Affairs, Shari Villarosa, on 9 May 2008, the
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SPDC granted permission to US aircraft to deliver relief supplies to Yangon (also known as
Rangoon) (Haacke, 2009, p. 164). Three days later Admiral Timothy Keating, the Commander of PACOM, led a top-level delegation and accompanied the first C-130 carrying US relief supplies for the millions of survivors of Nargis in Myanmar (Agence France Presse, 2008b).
While the SPDC agreed to allow US flights to distribute large quantities of supplies and equipment in subsequent days and weeks, the regime considered the “strings attached to the relief supplies carried by warships and military helicopters” as unacceptable to Burmese people (BBC, 2008a). Consequently, when the USS Essex group deployed itself off
Myanmar’s coast loaded with humanitarian aid, the SPDC refused permission to these US naval vessels to land in Myanmar, or delivering any supplies by helicopter (Selth, 2008b, p.
388), even though this assistance would allow quicker and larger aid contributions.
Faced with the SPDC’s resistance to international aid and the entry of foreign aid workers, and a letter delivered to the Senior General, Than Swe, for discussion about the relief cooperation between the UN and Myanmar remained unanswered, Ban Ki-moon on 12 May
2008 voiced his “deep concern-and immense frustration-at the unacceptable slow response to this grave humanitarian crisis” (United Nations, 2008b). Elizabeth Byrs, acting as a spokesperson of the UN OCHA, even “called for an air and sea corridor to channel aid in large quantities as quickly as possible” for larger scale of victims in the cyclone (United
Nations, 2008c).
Under considerable international pressure to meet the humanitarian needs of the survivors of
Nargis, ASEAN took efforts to broker Myanmar’s acceptance of relief aid from the international community. On 12 May 2008, representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat, the
World Bank, and the OCHA “met to discuss relief efforts, and medium and long-term measures for the victims of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar”, and they “pledged full support for the emerging ASEAN-led ‘Coalition of Mercy’ for the Myanmar relief effort” (ASEAN,
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2008d). In addition, ASEAN Secretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan, stated that:
We have worked 24/7 to raise a level of trust and to allow our rapid assessment team in. We are trying to get around a lot of suspicion and sensitivities and mistrust. Our utmost concern is for the 1.5 million victims of Cyclone Nargis who are awaiting assistance in all forms from the outside world now (ASEAN, 2008d).
Ultimately, the meeting paved the way not only for the SPDC to agree with the World Food
Programme (WFP) to mobilise ten helicopters in delivering relief supplies directly to the remote locations in the Delta (World Food Programme, 2008), but more importantly, for
Myanmar to accept international assistance through an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism.
The mechanism was formed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at a meeting on 19 May 2008, which was aimed to “facilitate the effective distribution and utilization of assistance from the international community, including the expeditious and effective deployment of relief workers, especially heath and medical personnel” and that it would not be politicised (ASEAN, 2008e).
Significantly, the special meeting in May 2008 was a watershed for the improvement of the relief operation in the Delta. Following visits to Myanmar by the UN’s Under-Secretary-
General, Sir John Holmes, and Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, in late May, the supplies began to flow more freely and the aid workers from ASEAN and the international community were allowed greater access to the disaster-affected areas (Scoop, 2008). By July 2008, the
Yangon-based Tripartite Core Group comprising representatives from the Government of
Myanmar, ASEAN, and the UN as a working mechanism for coordinating and facilitating relief supplies worked well, and even reconstruction made progress in Myanmar (United
Nations, 2008d).
9. Myanmar’s Fears of US Invasion since 1988
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Similar to the substantial assistance contributed in the 2004 tsunami, the US organised 185
US Agency for International Development (USAID) flights in responding to Nargis, which represented more than one third of all estimated relief flights (ASEAN, 2008f, p. 52).
However, Myanmar’s policy, which was also concerned about external intervention in the domestic conflict between the ethnic insurgent groups and the ruling regime, was in stark contrast to Indonesia’s decision to lift the ban on the US military delivering emergency and relief supplies to the survivors of the catastrophe.
This significant sense of xenophobia toward the US can be divided into three phases. The first phase started on 8 August 1988 when social unrest erupted because of the withdrawal of the newly replaced Burmese currency in September 1987, and the harsh treatment of students by police in March 1988 after a brawl in a Rangoon teashop. These events finally culminated in the bloody suppression by the ruling military junta of widespread pro-democracy protests against economic mismanagement and political oppression (Selth, 2008a, p. 8).
Following the uprising, the presence of five US naval vessels, including the aircraft carrier
USS Coral Sea on the morning of 12 September 1988, was detected off Myanmar’s territorial waters by the Tatmadaw and raised great concern. When the ruling regime lodged an official complaint and sought an explanation from the US embassy in Yangon, the latter stated that the fleet was for the evacuation of US embassy staffs in Myanmar to avoid threats from the aftermath of the uprising. This response failed to convince the military authorities, however, as 276 people, including some US embassy personnel, had already been evacuated by a chartered flight on the evening of 11 September. The next day, the US embassy issued a second statement to explain that a report about US vessels in Myanmar’s territorial waters was just a rumour (Myoe, 2007, p. 9).
In addition, many students streamed to the Thai-Burmese border camps after the 1988 uprising and took military training from Karen tribal militiamen, who had been fighting for
127 political autonomy since General Ne Win seized power in 1962. On 15 November 1988, an
US Congressman, Dana Rohrabacher, whose reported ambition was to reconceptualise the
Reagan Doctrine and “to institutionalize US assistance to freedom fighters around the world” including Myanmar, visited an insurgent training camp and addressed about 800 students seeking to bring down the SLORC. In a speech, Rohrabacher expressed his respect for the goal of these students. While Rohrabacher did not consider instantaneous forms of support, he reportedly did not rule out the provision of arms from the US (Grubbs, 1988).
Such provocative remarks following the sighting of an US naval fleet of the Myanmar’s coast worsened Myanmar’s fear of a link between the increase in insurgent activity and US influence. This sentiment was exemplified in the public statement of the sixty-ninth anniversary of the national day, when SLORC Chairman General, Saw Maung, claimed that external powers were “especially striving by various means to cause disintegration of the solidarity of all the national races, to sow discord and disunity within the armed forces and to bring about the disintegration of the state” (Xinhua News Agency, 1989).
The general election in May 1990 was the second phase in which Myanmar’s ruling regime continued to feel insecure and vulnerable about a future armed intervention by the US.131 The
SLORC’s refusal to accept the election result prompted the US to impose tough economic sanctions, including the decision not to renew a bilateral textile agreement in 1991 (Bray,
1992, p. 292), and a ban on any future investment by US companies after April 1997 (Smith,
1999, p. 430). But in fact, Myanmar was more sensitive to calls for regime change and other perceived threats to its independence and national sovereignty than to impose economic
131 In May 1990, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, which pursued a vigorous campaign for basic civil rights, won a resounding victory in the general election. But the election results were unable to persuade the SLORC to step down, which had initially promised when they took control in September 1988 that whichever party won the election could form a new government. For details, see Derek Tonkin (2007), ‘The 1990 elections in Myanmar: broken promises or a failure of communication?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 33-54. 128 sanctions. This concern was revealed in a press conference in June 1997 when the First
Secretary (Secretary-1) of the SLORC, Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, alleged that a number of conspirators “[had] been and [were] still planning to install a puppet government, one that would take orders from and do as bid by the western powers”, principally the US (Nyunt,
1997). In addition, a top-secret Tatmadaw document that was leaked to the Asian Times
Online demonstrated “three ways in which the United States might invade Myanmar-through agitating its citizens, in an alliance with insurgents and ceasefire groups or through a multinational coalition-led invasion.” This official document further identified US strategic ally Thailand as Myanmar’s “nearest enemy”, and the document revealed Tatmadaw’s worries that the US might use its annual joint Cobra Gold military exercises in Thailand as a cover to attack Myanmar (Blythe, 2006).
The anti-government protest in September 2007 (also called Saffron Revolution) was the third phase that contributed to Myanmar’s fear of an US threat.132 Following the crackdown by the military junta, the US Treasury Department announced new sanctions against the 14 senior officials of Myanmar who had assets in US banks or other financial institutions under US jurisdiction. The order also banned any US citizen from doing business with these targeted individuals (FOXNews, 2007).
The ruling regime was still concerned about external influences along the lines of the 2007 anti-government protest whenever the US renewed sanctions against Myanmar. In a press conference in 2007, SPDC Minister for Information stated that “incidents in last August and
September were the results of timely conspiracies of a western power and anti-government groups inside and outside the country well as at the border” to overthrow the regime in the
132 The protest was initially triggered by a decision of the ruling junta to sharply raise fuel prices. This mismanagement on fuel prices led to public anger across Myanmar and the arrest of pro-democracy activists. Finally, thousands of Buddhist monks became involved in the protest and this reportedly resulted in a renewed government crackdown in late September 2007 (Taylor, 2008, pp. 255-259). 129 name of democratization (New Light of Myanmar, 2007, pp. 5-6). As shown above, it can be argued that aggressive rhetoric, US military actions, and US renewed economic sanctions have all intensified the perception of a threat to the military regime’s stability since 1988.
Regardless of the possibility of external intervention to bring down the Myanmar’s ruling junta, it was this atmosphere of persistent fear and suspicion that caused the SPDC to obstruct the US military from unloading relief to thousands of victims in the aftermath of Nargis.
Furthermore, Myanmar’s persistent fear of external intervention to influence the way in which the military regime dealt with its domestic affairs could be traced to the day before Nargis. On
1 May 2008, President Bush announced a new Executive Order to block properties of targeted individuals who supported “a regime that exploits and oppresses the people of Burma.” In addition, the President condemned the SPDC’s proposed constitutional referendum, which was scheduled for 10 May, as “dangerously flawed”, and consistently expressed his commitment to help the people of Myanmar “in their struggle to free themselves from the regime’s tyranny” (White House, 2008a).
The critical statement against Myanmar was underpinned by the accusation from First Lady,
Laura Bush. Mrs. Bush said that the ruling regime failed to warn citizens ahead of the cyclone and confirmed that the President signed a legislation awarding the US Congressional Gold
Medal to NLD leader, Aung San Sun Kyi (White House, 2008b). In these circumstances, there was no doubt that the SPDC would not grant permission to US military to distribute supplies to Yangon. As McCartan (2008) observed, the ruling regime managed the crisis of Nargis
“more as a national security issue than humanitarian operation.” In other words, Myanmar resisted the entry of US naval vessels to support the relief operations because it was afraid that the US could use the cyclone as a pretext to intervene in its domestic affairs.
Referring to Myanmar’s refusal to allow the US to access the victims of Nargis, US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, on 8 May said that “[t]he death and destruction in Burma is not a
130 matter of politics, it’s a matter of saving lives” (Kellerhals, 2008). Even the Commander of
PACOM, Admiral Timothy Keating, assured the military regime that the US “had no military intentions”, and US military personnel or aircraft would leave Myanmar as soon as they were requested to do so. Keating also invited Myanmar’s civilian or military officials to inspect the aid supplies on its warships and observe the operation of helicopters in delivering aid
(Subicbaynews, 2008). However, the SPDC still mistrusted the real purpose of the US because it was convinced that the US contingents “could be carrying weapons to give to the people, they could give them ideas of how to overthrow the government” (Gecker, 2008). Indeed, the appeal of the US to divorce politics from disaster relief, and US assets’ assurances on non- military intention did not persuade the ruling junta that it was immune from US armed intervention.
10. Myanmar’s Strategic Thinking
Whether or not the US would support an insurgent group to overthrow the SPDC, and establish a new regime more to its liking, Myanmar’s concerns about an US invasion have been clearly genuine since 1988. After the 1988 uprising, the SLORC hastily imported more modern arms from China in order to upgrade the Tatmadaw’s equipment inventory.133 The most reasonable explanation for these purchases was that they were made to help Myanmar resist an US invasion force.
There were other indications that US armed intervention has always been an important element in the strategic calculations of Myanmar’s military leaders. For example, the ruling regime in 2005 decided to relocate Myanmar’s capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw, which
133 These arms orders included: T-63, T-69IIs; the Chinese version of the Soviet PT-76 light amphibious tanks (T83); armoured personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles; Norinco 107mm Type 63 multiple rocket launchers; 37mm single barrel anti-aircraft guns; HN 5A shouldered-fired air defence missiles and radar equipment. In addition, the Tatmadaw acquired Chinese-made F-7 jet fighters and NAMC A-5M close support aircraft; SAC Y-8D medium range transport planes; Hainan-class naval patrol boats plus radar equipment (Lintner, 1994). 131 sites 3.2 kilometres west of Pyinmana (a town in Mandalay Region), because the new city was considered more secure from US attack launched from the sea (Jagan, 2005). Similar strategic considerations motivated the Tatmadaw in 2002 to move its Western Command Headquarter from Sittwe (on the Rhakine coast) to Ann, an inland town in Rakhine State of Myanmar. This response was ineffective if the US attacked Myanmar with missiles and long-range aircraft, the rationale behind Tatmadaw’s decision was that “protracted people’s guerrilla warfare of attrition” could be effectively conducted in the mountains and jungles near Ann against US air and ground attacks (Myoe, 2006, pp. 6-7). In addition, a secret document that was leaked to
Irrawaddy in 2006 revealed that SPDC Chairman Senior General, Than Shwe, instructed the
Tatmadaw “to prepare for the worst and hope for the best.” He also warned the armed forces on the alert against “an alleged destruction plan by the US Central Intelligence Agency.” This document reportedly quoted a top military commander saying that, if the US bombed Yangon or Mandalay, all members of the NLD should be killed to prevent them being used as “US stooges” (Irrawaddy, 2006).
The modernisation of the Tatmadaw and the profound changes in the strategic perspectives revealed Myanmar’s deeply rooted fear of a possible US invasion. Selth argues that despite the Tatmadaw aimed to prevent renewed civil unrest and containing ethnic insurgent groups for decades, it now constitutes “a very large and well-equipped organization capable of exercising considerable power at home, and increasing influence abroad” (2002, pp. 253, 257).
In addition, most males are required to participate in paramilitary exercises as part of defence policy, which is aimed to help against an US armed intervention until Myanmar’s allies like
China come to their aid (Steinberg, 2006). In light of Myanmar’s ambition to enhance its armed forces and its new thinking on security policies, no one knows what might happen if
Myanmar improved its military capabilities in humanitarian assistance because Nargis demonstrated the Tatmadaw’s poor performance in disaster relief, or the new Myanmar
132 government would shift its defence orientation if the US wanted to rebuild its relations with the regime on counternarcotics cooperation. However, the development of military junta’s interpretation of threat in the future, which includes natural disaster, internal conflicts, and external invasion, must warrant closer examination.
11. Regional Mechanisms’ Responses to Nargis and Aftermath
11.1 ASEAN
Compared to the 2004 tsunami, ASEAN under the leadership of ASEAN Secretary-General,
Surin Pitsuwan, immediately took actions in responding to the cyclone. Two days after the cyclone struck, Dr. Surin informed the relevant National Focal Point in each member to be on high alert and pleaded with all ASEAN governments and civil societies to mobilise resources to help the victims in Myanmar. In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta established the
ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Disaster Assistance on 8 May 2008 to alleviate the risks caused by Nargis (ASEAN, 2009c, p. 10). With regard to initial bilateral assistance, the more significant contributors were Singapore and the Philippines, who sent experts to join the UN
Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team assembled in Bangkok to assess the extent of damage (ASEAN, 2009d, p. 10). Thailand also played a role as a mediator to persuade Myanmar to permit US military planes’ distribution of relief aid in Yangon on 8 May
2008 (Trend News Agency, 2008).
However, AADMER, created in 2005, did not speed up the humanitarian relief effort in
Myanmar because the agreement was guided by a principle to respect for the sovereignty of disaster-affected country. Therefore, Dr. Surin wrote to Myanmar’s ministers a week after the cyclone to inform them that ASEAN members were ready to provide assistance to support the relief operation. At the same time, Dr. Surin reminded Myanmar the ratification of AADMER and urged Myanmar “to consider the quick admission of the ASEAN relief and rescue teams to assist in Myanmar’s ongoing relief efforts” (ASEAN, 2008b). These actions by Dr. Surin
133 led to the SPDC to work in coordination with the ASEAN Secretariat and ACDM in order to assemble and deploy an ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) during 9-18
May 2008. The ERAT was made up of government officials and disaster management experts from ASEAN member states, and it was aimed “to gather and analyze assessment findings through consultations with senior government officials and field assessments” in providing targeted assistance to support the SPDC’s relief aid for the affected population (ASEAN,
2008c, p. 2). Finally, the ERAT concluded that “[t]here is the possibility of a potential second wave of deaths and morbidity due to diseases and nutritional deficiency which could be avoided through a more coordinated effort between the international community and the
Government of Myanmar.” Therefore, the ERAT proposed the establishment of a
‘Humanitarian Coalition for the Victims of Cyclone Nargis’ led by ASEAN in line with the
UN and other international organizations “to assist and support the Government of Myanmar with immediate, medium and long-term activities in response to Cyclone Nargis” (ASEAN,
2008c, pp. 2. 4). 134
The recommendations from ERAT prompted ASEAN Foreign Ministers to hold a special meeting on 19 May 2008. The meeting agreed to form an ASEAN-led coordination mechanism, which acted as a coordinating platform between Myanmar and the international community to implement urgent relief programmes. The Foreign Ministers initially set up the
ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) and an Advisory Group to conduct this approach.
Following an ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference held in Yangon on 25 May 2008 with a concluded agreement “on the need to urgently scale up relief efforts to ensure that all those in need were reached quickly and with adequate relief supplies”, ASEAN established a
Yangon-based Tripartite Core Group (TCG) and a Coordinating Office in Yangon to
134 The ERAT, which is comprised of members from Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, was dispatched to Thailand on 15 October 2011. Its mission is only to assess and identify flood-affected population under the supervision of Thai government (ASEAN, 2011c). 134 coordinate and facilitate, as well as monitor the flow of international assistance into Myanmar
(more details of the ASEAN-led coordination mechanism see Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 on pp.
138-139). In the late May 2008, ASEAN started to undertake the phases of recovery and rehabilitation (ASEAN, 2009d, pp. 10-13).
It can be argued that the devastating consequence of the catastrophe in the wake of Cyclone
Nargis highlighted the weakness of exiting disaster management mechanisms in ASEAN.
ASEAN only launched the ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Disaster Assistance depending on the principle of non-interference for post-Nargis relief (ASEAN, 2008a). In addition,
ASEAN’s role was established as a facilitator to help the donations from the member states and the international community delivering to vulnerable groups, but merely with regard to addressing Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis in the event. The function of the ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism in upholding the principle of non-intervention, led to the SPDC rather than regional organisations assuming authority to command and control relief efforts, and ensure that needs of victims were addressed in a adequately manner.
However, the inadequate response to the cyclone has compelled ASEAN to revisit its existing agreement on disaster relief. Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, at the opening of fortieth-first AMM on 21 July 2008 stated that Nargis “tested ASEAN’s unity” because “we could not ignore political developments in Myanmar, neither could we stand aside from this humanitarian crisis when so many lives had been lost and many more remained at risk” (Lee,
2008). After the meeting, ASEAN participants called for the full ratification of AADMER, and awaited the operationalisation of the ASEAN Standby Arrangements and standard operating procedures as well as a fully functional AHA Centre (ASEAN, 2008g). Finally,
AADMER was ratified by all members of ASEAN and came into force in December 2009
(ASEAN, 2009g). The ASEAN Standby Arrangements and standard operating procedures were also expected to be finalized in the near future (ASEAN, 2010a). Furthermore, the
135
ACDM launched the AADMER Work Programme for the period 2010 to 2015 because the
ARPDM was set to expire in 2010. The new programme is aimed at incorporating regional risk assessment and setting up a regional system for early warning and monitoring. In addition, the programme “seeks to develop a regional strategy for integrating disaster risk reduction into national development plans as well as urban and community action plans” to effectively respond to natural disasters (ASEAN, 2010b).
Furthermore, there have been signs that ASEAN cooperates with countries in Asia-Pacific to enhance the region’s capacity in disaster management. The first ACDM Plus Three Senior
Officials Meeting was held in Vientiane on 12-15 March 2007 (ASEAN, 2007d). In addition,
ASEAN articulated the objective of “disaster resilient nations and a safer region by the year
2015”, and the ACDM was tasked to enhance cooperation “with other regional organizations, particularly those in Asia and the Pacific” to implement the initiative in the Second Session of the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Geneva (ASEAN, 2009c). The goal of disaster-resilient region was further recognized in the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2009.
During the meeting in Thailand, EAS participating countries reaffirmed “the commitment of countries in the EAS to pursue effective disaster risk reduction in the spirit of partnership and cooperation in order to reduce the vulnerabilities and enhance the capacities of peoples to be more resilient and self-reliant in mitigating the impact of disasters.”135 EAS members even acknowledged ASEAN’s leadership and exiting regional framework and mechanisms to improve the capacity of the region to respond to natural disasters (ASEAN, 2009f). In other words, the idea of inclusiveness with regard to cooperative security has provided a basis for
ASEAN to not only develop institutions for conflict avoidance within Southeast Asia, but expand cooperative ties with countries in Asia-Pacific in disaster management.
ASEAN members also reached consensus to cooperate with other partners to strengthen their
135 More details see Cha-am Hua Hin Statement on EAS Disaster Management (ASEAN, 2009f). 136 military capacities for improving regional disaster management capacity in the aftermath of
Nargis. Notably, the Tatmadaw’s poor response and a substantial contribution of foreign military contingents during the acute relief phase reawakened ASEAN to the importance of the military in relief operations. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Tun
Razak, who is also Defence Minister, argued that natural disaster in Myanmar proved that the
“military is a critical component in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief” because it “has the capability and experience to handle such crisis situations” (Wahab, 2008). This viewpoint was recognised by ASEAN Defence Ministers. The Defence Ministers further issued a
‘Concept Paper on the Use of ASEAN Military Assets and Capacities in Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief’ to discuss the utilisation of ASEAN defence establishments and civil-military coordination in relief operations under AADMER (ASEAN, 2008h). Also in the Third ADMM in 2009, the participants emphasized the importance of joint military exercises to coordinate different military capacities among ASEAN members in support of timely disaster relief (ASEAN, 2009a). The Defence Ministers at the First ADMM-Plus in
October 2010 went further and agreed to take the disaster management as one of the important issues for starting cooperation through regional joint exercise (ASEAN, 2010c). They also agreed to establish a joint committee to coordinate the use of ASEAN military assets for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief during the Fifth ADMM in Indonesia (ASEAN,
2011b).
In short, the response to Cyclone Nargis has stimulated ASEAN to play a more active role in the arrangement for natural disaster preparedness and response,136 and most importantly, to build a connection with countries beyond Southeast Asia to improve the regional resilience, especially defence capacity in disaster relief. It cannot be predicted if these tendency would
136 In the wake of Typhoon Ketsana which hit the Philippines in September 2009, ASEAN established an ‘ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Emergency Relief’ to assist the affected populations (ASEAN, 2009e).
137 improve ASEAN’s effectiveness in relief operations, because the exiting disaster management mechanisms are still guided by the principle of non-intervention, and there is a difficulty to incorporate different ASEAN defence establishments in disaster management. It can be confirmed, however, that the catastrophe in the wake of Nargis has injected substance into the humanitarian dimension in the security outlooks among Southeast Asia countries to consistently improve their capacities against natural disasters in the future.
138
Table 4.3 The ASEAN-led Coordinating Mechanism Date of Mechanism Member Purpose Establishment
Supervise and advice the TCG; The ASEAN 20 high-level and senior Provided policy decisions and Humanitarian officials from ASEAN set the priorities and the targets 19 May 2008 task Force members for the implementation of the (AHFT) initiative Representatives from the neighbouring countries of Myanmar (i.e. China, India, and Bangladesh), the Assist the AHTF in providing Advisory Group UN, the Red Cross and relevant technical expertise and 19 May 2008 Red Crescent Movement, inputs the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and international NGOs
Coordinating, facilitating and Yangon-based 9 representatives from the monitoring the flow of Tripartite Core Government of Myanmar, 25 May 2008 international assistance to Group (TCG) ASEAN, and the UN Myanmar
Support the TCG; work closely Myanmar with representatives from the Central N/A Government of Myanmar and 25 May 2008 Coordinating the UN; provide secretariat Board (CCB) support for the AHTF
139
Figure 4.1 The ASEAN-led Coordinating Mechanism
Source: Compiled by author from ASEAN (2008f, pp. 46-47), and ASEAN (2009d, pp. 10, 12)
11.2 The ARF
Cyclone Nargis occurred merely hours after the first ARF Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief in Jakarta on 1-2 May 2008. However, the ARF SOPs on HADR, which was the primary objective of the exercise, did not validate to mitigate the impact of the cyclone. The Eighth
ARF ISM-DR was convened in Indonesia in December 2008, and the participants were largely concerned to develop SOPs to provide guidance for ARF members in joint emergency operations.137 For example, Australia “emphasized the need to validate the Guidance and to set up web-based tools for ARF participants to closely follow the progress of the development of the Guidance.” In addition, Indonesia suggested cooperation with Australia “to lead the process” to invite ARF participants to give suggestions for revising the Guidance before it
137 The ARF SOPs on HADR was named as ‘ARF Strategic Guidance for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief’ in 2008 tabletop exercise (ARF, 2008c). 140 moving to the validation (ARF, 2008c).
Furthermore, the ARF took a step forward to hold the Voluntary Demonstration of Response
(ARF-VDR) co-chaired by the Philippines and the US on 4-7 May 2009.138 The exercise was civilian led but also involved foreign military, and it featured a multinational relief operation in responding to request from a disaster-affected country. 139 The exercise mainly demonstrated land, air, and maritime search and rescue as well as the provision of medical assistance, and engineering and construction work (Positive News Media, 2009). Subsequently, the Ninth ISM-DR in September 2009 reviewed the ARF-VDR and proposed a continued disaster relief exercise to develop an ‘ARF Voluntary Model Arrangement on the Use of
Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets’ (MCDA). At the same time, the participants refined the ARF Strategic Guidance on HADR in proposed timeline in relief operation: search and rescue (0-48 hours), emergency relief (0-5days), and relief assistance (0-4weeks) (ARF,
2009d).
Ironically, a final draft of Strategic Guidance that incorporated the findings of the 2008 tabletop exercise and the outcome of the 2009 disaster relief exercise, was not forwarded to the ARF for adoption in response to Typhoon Ketsana.140 ARF member states in 2010 did not
138 Indonesia and Japan co-hosted the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx) on 15-19 March 2011 in Manado, Indonesia when earthquake and tsunami was occurring in eastern Japan (ARF, 2011a). In addition, Indonesia and Singapore will co-host the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (ASEAN HADR TTX) to be held in both countries in July 2011(ASEAN, 2011b). 139 With regard to the role of military in the ARF, the participants of the ARF DOD, which was held soon after Nargis, expressed their sympathy for victims of the catastrophe and noted the importance of disaster preparedness (ARF, 2008d). Furthermore, the participants during the ARF DODs in 2010 discussed the “whole- of-government approach” to enhance the coordination between civilian agencies and military forces in disaster relief (ARF, 2010a). They went further to propose the SOPs and Command-Control System, and ‘the ARF Disaster Relief Registration Scheme’ with voluntary model arrangement to advance the regional disaster relief capability (ARF, 2010c). 140 Typhoon Ketsana struck the Philippines in 2009. However, the relief efforts of the GRP were regrettably hampered by limited implementation of weather forecasting systems, broken disaster response mechanisms, and 141 explain why there was no joint effort to provide assistance for the Philippines, however, and they merely noted the function of MCDA to promote coordination between military and humanitarian agencies in response to regional disasters. In addition, the participants argued that the ARF Strategic Guidance should be revised to improve the effectiveness of ARF’s capacity in natural disaster response (ARF, 2010c).141
12. Conclusion
As shown above, the effect of the 2004 tsunami and Nargis can be induced at the national and regional levels. At the national level, different strategic thinking propelled Indonesia to make a faster decision than Myanmar on the acceptance of Western military assets, especially the
US in the relief operation. Indonesia has not only made progress in the relation between
Australia and the US since the 1999 East Timor crisis and 9/11, but improved its national disaster management mechanism. However, whether these disasters could affect the security outlooks of Indonesia and Myanmar in any fundamental way to change their national policies toward humanitarian considerations or a national strategy in the future is still an open question.
At the regional level, ASEAN has consistently advanced the effectiveness of the disaster management mechanisms after experiencing two major natural disasters. However, ASEAN
Standby Arrangements and standard operating procedures designed for relief operation have
limited resources of rescue teams due to graft and corruption in the GRP (South China Morning Post, 2009). 141 Although there was no concrete cooperation toward the Typhoon Ketsana, the Ministers of ARF in the ‘Hanoi Plan of Action’ explicitly indicated their aim to enhance regional disaster relief cooperation, including support to implement AADMER, and building a clear partnership with other international and regional organizations, like the UN and EAS, to complement the work of ASEAN on disaster management issues (ARF, 2010b). The participants of ARF in 2011 also agreed to expand disaster management cooperation via linkages between ADMM-Plus, EAS, and the AHA Centre, and they supported the strengthened cooperation between the ARF ISM on DR and the APEC Emergency Preparedness Working Group (APEC EPWG) (ARF, 2011c)
142 not been put into practice, and ASEAN still lacks a well-structured organisation, which has the authority for coordinating multilateral relief efforts. With regard to the ARF, its underdeveloped guidance to HADR, a voluntary manner of MCDA, and its deference to
ASEAN’s leading role in disaster relief, all indicate that the ARF can only provide a platform for joint efforts in disaster management.
Therefore, Southeast Asian countries will depend on ad hoc events to merely play a role of facilitator to help in delivery of regional and international humanitarian assistance to the victims in the region. In addition, the role of the UN will be reaffirmed because the regional mechanisms do not have a well-developed capacity and resources to coordinate humanitarian supplies and the military assets in responding to future natural disasters.
This suggests that individual countries in Southeast Asia presently have to rely on themselves to respond to natural disasters. Compared to the formation of a regional peacekeeping force and common criteria in dealing with transnational crimes and terrorism, however, the 2004 tsunami and Nargis have propelled ASEAN members to rebuild partnerships for humanitarian purposes, including denfence cooperation, with other countries beyond the region in relation to disaster relief because this is less politically charged. As a result, the humanitarian partnerships to better improve the disaster management mechanisms in Southeast Asia can be optimistically expected.
143
CHAPTER FIVE CONCLUSION
1. The Pursuit of Resilience against NTS Threats
This dissertation argues that ASEAN’s and the ARF’s models of security cooperation based on comprehensive security and cooperative security have been uneven in offering a sustained response to NTS issues. The national and the sub-regional efforts have mattered most when seeking to tackle these threats because the multilateral responses have been restricted by a series of domestic and regional constraints.
This argument is put forward through the analysis of national, sub-regional, and regional cooperation on intra-conflicts, transnational crimes and terrorism, and natural disasters in
Southeast Asia. Chapter II assessed the prospect of a regional peacekeeping force to resolve intra-conflicts in the region. It shows that weakly developed regional conflict management in
ASEAN originating from comprehensive and cooperative security, and different national interests and limited military capabilities among Southeast Asian countries make the formation of a rapid and effective peacekeeping force unrealistic in the near term. Although there has been an increasing discussion about PKOs by Defence Officials in the ARF, the adoption of cooperative security and the endorsement of ASEAN’s norms in the 1990s limited the issue of peacekeeping to sharing experiences and holding workshops in the Forum. The possible development of PKOs to resolve intrastate conflicts will therefore be a multinational force comprising the voluntary unarmed military contingents from ASEAN members but will not necessarily play a leading role. This force will be supported by financial assistance from non-ASEAN countries and an international programme under UN authorization.
Chapter III examined how the security outlook in ASEAN and the ARF, which was based comprehensive and cooperative security, influenced the responses to transnational crimes and terrorism. It showed how the Association and the Forum have formulated a common
144 rhetorical position toward external powers in responding to transnational crimes, and inter alia, terrorism after 9/11. Chapter III claimed that Southeast Asian countries could not initiate better counter-terrorism acts in practice because of the endorsement of state sovereignty, feelings of suspicion and competition in sharing intelligence, and different assessments of strategic calculations among ASEAN members. Therefore, bilateral and trilateral cooperation, including informal joint training programs, occurred mostly in dealing with these threats.
With regard to the ARF, the agreed leading role of ASEAN in the institution-building process has impeded the Forum to date from establishing a well-structured mechanism to respond to these problems.
Extra-regional cooperation has become the cornerstone of ASEAN’s battle against terrorism.
In the case studies of Indonesia and the Philippines, however, the principle of non- intervention and influence from PKOs imposed constraints on these external supports in the development of domestic counter-terrorism capabilities. This means the effectiveness of extra- regional cooperation to deal with terrorism could be undermined if such cooperation infringed upon national sovereignty, limiting initiatives adopted to develop counter-terrorism strategies and measures at the regional level.
Chapter IV examined ASEAN’s and the ARF’s responses to non-military threats through the adoption of comprehensive and cooperative security. It argued that cooperation at the regional level has not changed fundamentally in responding to the 2004 tsunami and Cyclone Nargis in
2008. Although ASEAN has consistently advanced the effectiveness of the disaster management mechanisms after experiencing two major natural disasters, the Association has not developed a well-structured organisation for coordinating multilateral relief efforts.
Similar to ASEAN, the ARF’s underdeveloped guidance for HADR, a voluntary manner of
MCDA, and its deference to ASEAN’s leading role in disaster relief all indicated that the
Forum could only provide a platform for joint efforts in disaster management.
145
At the national level, different strategic thinking propelled Indonesia to make faster decisions than Myanmar on the acceptance of Western military assets in the relief operation. Indonesia has not only made progress in its relations with Australia and the US since the 1999 East
Timor crisis and 9/11, but improved its national disaster management mechanism. However, whether these disasters could affect the security outlooks of Indonesia and Myanmar in any fundamental way to change their national policies toward humanitarian considerations or a national strategy in the future is still an open question.
Therefore, Southeast Asian countries will depend on ad hoc events to help in delivery of regional and international humanitarian assistance to the victims in the region. In addition, individual countries have to rely on themselves to respond to natural disasters. The role of the
UN will be reaffirmed because the regional mechanisms do not possess a well-developed capacity and resources to coordinate humanitarian supplies with the military assets in responding to future natural disasters.
However, Chapter IV argued that compared to the formation of a regional peacekeeping force and common criteria in dealing with transnational crimes and terrorism, the 2004 tsunami and
Nargis have propelled ASEAN members to rebuild partnerships for humanitarian purposes, including defence cooperation, with other countries beyond the region in relation to disaster relief because this is less politically charged. Therefore, the humanitarian partnerships to better improve the disaster management mechanisms in Southeast Asia can be optimistically expected.
2. Limitations of the Research and Further Considerations
Because of the time and word constraints placed on a Master level dissertation, this thesis had to omit several components from consideration. Some of these include the approaches to peacemaking and peacebuilding (Chapter II), Philippines-Australia cooperation in counter- terrorism (Chapter III), and the phase of ‘Rehabilitation and Reconstruction’ in disaster relief
146
(Chapter IV). It is hoped that future studies will examine these areas in conjunction with original research that stems from the dissertation to provide an in-depth analysis.
It is also important to acknowledge that the dynamics alluded to within Chapters II, III, and
IV are still developing. These dynamics cover the peace process in the southern Philippines,
ASEAN countries’ individual contributions to the UN PKOs, and other transnational crime issues apart from terrorism. In addition, it is a need to undertake further empirical studies and apply different research methodologies to examine the impact and usefulness of bilateral cooperation to tackle terrorist threats. This includes Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme to help counter the spread of radical extremist ideologies, and the Philippines’s socio- economic policies and development programmes financed by the US to tackle the wider root causes of terrorism.
Furthermore, difficulties that derive from domestic and regional circumstances to influence the attainment of national resilience against NTS threats need to be remembered. Most
Southeast Asian countries have remained states that suffer from economic difficulties, social inequalities, corruption, and poorly financed law enforcement agencies, and their bilateral relations are still influenced by feelings of suspicion and competition. In addition, the militaries across Southeast Asia have often played a prominent part in their respective national political systems. The transition of national political architecture within Indonesia by the armed forces’ reform movement, and an eventual handover to the army-backed civilian regime in post-election Myanmar deserve more in-depth study to examine the extent to which these domestic factors affect military spending patterns, the nature of military acquisitions, and/or regional collaboration in terms of police and intelligences regarding the NTS issues.
To conclude, this dissertation argues that ASEAN and the ARF emphasized a common rhetorical position rather than initiated a collective strategy in dealing with intra-state conflicts, transnational crimes and terrorism, and natural disasters in Southeast Asia; the
147 national and the sub-regional efforts therefore occurred mostly when seeking to tackle these threats. This dissertation refrains from offering an in-depth analysis on the complexity of the
NTS issues, and the link between domestic factors and communal instability that are alluded to in the case studies. It simply argued that ASEAN’s and the ARF’s models of security cooperation based on comprehensive security and cooperative security, that is, the commitment to national and regional resilience principles and non-legalistic approaches, have restricted the development of a sustained response at the multilateral level. While acknowledging the problems facing Southeast Asian countries, there has been an emergence of consensus in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami and Nargis, which takes a somewhat more proactive and positive stance in better responding to future natural disasters.
148
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Appendix A
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Appendix B
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Appendix C
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Appendix D
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Appendix E
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