“Counter-Terrorism Strategy in : Adapting to a Changed Threat”

An Open Forum with

Shari Villarosa Deputy Coordinator for Regional Affairs, US State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism

And

Dr. Julie Chernov Hwang Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Goucher College

November 17, 2011

Many changes have occurred in the International Relations at Goucher leadership structure of terrorist activities College. in Indonesia since the incidence of the 2002 Bali bombing, the twin bombing of Our panel discussed (1) the United Marriott and Ritz-Carlton in 2009, and States engagement with Indonesia in other attacks. These include both the counter-terrorism activities, (2) the perceived structural changes and the changing trends in terror methods and degree of fragmentation in the terrorist other aspects of terrorism and counter- movement. As such, measures to counter terrorism, and (3) the current status of radicalization and terrorism have since Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and its affiliates changed and become better understood. and splinters in Indonesia.

On November 17, 2011, USINDO Shari Villarosa began with an overview hosted an open forum on the nature of of the evolution of terrorist threats in terrorism in Indonesia and the response Indonesia. Prior to 2002 Bali bombing, of American and Indonesian counter- JI was led by people who were trained in terrorism strategy, with Shari Villarosa, Afghanistan, including those with links the Deputy Coordinator for Regional to Al Qaeda (AQ) and their global anti- Affairs at the US State Department Western ideology. Since then, their Office of the Coordinator for Counter- ranks have depleted due to internal Terrorism, and Dr. Julie Chernov struggle, imprisonment, and/or death. Hwang, an Assistant Professor in the The organization splintered between Department of Political Science and those who opposed violence (or focused www.usindo.org - 1 - Villarosa and Chernov Hwang, 11-17-11

more on proselytization) and those who threats. Foreign targets are also not off were interested in pursuing violent limits. A prominent terrorist, Abu Umar, methods. was arrested earlier this month, and six alleged members of his group were also Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), arrested in , suspected of planning including some JI splinter groups, gained a bombing of the embassy in prominence, not as a group but as a Jakarta. Some other people from the network of like-minded extremists. same group were also detained in Sabah, However, these groups have also , for planning attacks in weakened after the Indonesian police Malaysia and the . raided their training camp in Aceh in February 2010. The discovery of the With regard to counter-terrorism camp led to the prosecution and activities, Villarosa commended conviction of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, a Indonesia’s strategy and efforts to founder of JI, along with several others counter radicalization and terrorism. (some cases are still in process). Indonesia’s commitment has enabled dedicated police officers and prosecutors Bombing of such tourists areas as Bali to work together since 2006 and and hotels that cater to foreigners, successfully prosecuted 152 cases, with Villarosa argued, have also evolved. 112 cases still pending (including Aceh While this development should not be training camp cases). Indonesia also taken to suggest that foreigners are no continues to prosecute Umar Patek, one longer a target, recent trends indicate of the Bali bombing suspects, who was that smaller groups tended to focus more recently extradited from Pakistan and on targeting local interests (letter bombs will be put on trial early next year. targeted to security officials and Indonesia recently adopted a civilian led prominent moderate religious leaders, approach, through the establishment of suicide bombing of a police mosque and BNPT (counter-terrorism coordinating a church, and attempted pipe bombing of body) to combine efforts by police, a church). military, judiciary system, and civilians in sustainable counter-terrorism According to Villarosa, the shift in the activities. This corresponds to the focus and methods of terrorist threats Obama administration’s approach to could represent (a) a reaction against the counter-terrorism. considerable success of the police in capturing terrorist suspects, (b) a Villarosa emphasized that the US reaction against the loss of leaders with strongly support the rule of law approach sophisticated training and attack Indonesia is taking and have noted its planning expertise, or (c) a resurgence of success. However, some improvements Darul Islam (DI), a strain of thought are still needed. Court sentences have seeking to establish an Islamic state that been relatively short; they should predated Indonesian independence. The commensurate with the crime. The trial degradation of terrorist groups by of Ba’asyir in the Aceh camp case also Indonesian authorities does not demonstrates a need for appropriate necessarily suggest that individual legislation on training activity and terrorists no longer pose dangerous material supports for terrorist

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organization. Indonesia recognizes this pluralism and religious tolerance. In the loophole and tries to create legislation to short term, the goal is to play a address it to be consistent with the constructive role in de-radicalization international principles and guidelines. efforts through working directly with the department of correction and local The law against terror financing also NGOs. needs to be strengthened. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF, a global Villarosa also highlighted religious standard setting body to protect the violence (distinct from but related to international financial system from terrorism), seen as rising in Indonesia. money laundering or terror finance risk) The International Crisis Group recently identified shortfalls in Indonesia and reported that religious tolerance was recommended actions to address some of challenged and increasingly strained. the deficiencies. These include The recent Ambon clash raised fear of adequately criminalizing the financing of the return of communal violence. While terrorist groups and individuals, communal tension remains, the grass- establishing and implementing adequate root peace advocates and local officials procedure to identify and freeze terrorist managed to keep violence from growing. assets, and amending the law to fully implement the 1999 international In conclusion, Villarosa emphasized that convention for the suppression of the Indonesia is now seen as a leader in financing of terrorism. counter-terrorism issues in regional and multilateral fora. Indonesia is a founding Another important area for action is member of the recently launched Global countering violence extremism to dry up Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), and the pool of recruits for terrorist presently co-chairing Southeast Asia organizations. This can be done in working group with Australia. Indonesia various ways, including de-legitimizing has shown remarkable political will, violence, countering the message that both of the government and the people, justifies violence (by important to develop an effective strategy and interlocutors who can appeal to the adapted to the changing threat of potential recruits), and providing terrorism. positive constructive alternatives. Following Villarosa’s presentation, Dr. The radicalization issue received new Julie Chernov Hwang shared her recent focus when Aceh camp members were research on the disengagement of identified as former prisoners who Indonesia’s jihadis and discussed why JI became radicalized in prison when they is now fragmented and cannot retain a come in contact with convicted common vision ( jihadi is used as it is the terrorists. According to Villarosa, NGOs preferred term used by the people have also become involved in mobilizing interviewed). In 2002, JI possibly was a society against violent extremists. One hierarchical structured organization with international NGO has a long-term goal a central command, with a possible link in establishing an environment where to AQ, and sought to establish an Islamic government and civil society can state in Indonesia. Today, we have a exercise their ability to advance

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clearer picture. JI today is a cell of its Under Abdullah Sungkar, JI’s dakwah former self. also meant socialization and education about the method and approach used to Dr. Chernov Hwang posed the following support the goal of Islamist state before critical questions to understand the revolution can occur. Many JI members Salafi jihadi landscape in Indonesia that today believe Nordin Top’s action is has shifted dramatically in the past counterproductive. It risks alienating decade: (1) what is the current status of many people from the goal of JI; (2) how to best understand the establishing an Islamic state. They fragmentation that is happening and why believe Indonesia is not an appropriate they keep happening; (3) why the jihadis place for jihad, it is not the time, and disengaged from violence and what were bombing is counterproductive. This view the motivational factors; and (4) what is is championed by Abu Rustam and the implication of this shift to our widely supported by many. understanding of terrorism and counter- terrorism. Since Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa, many JI splinters emerged. Their goal is the According to Dr. Chernov Hwang, same, but their preferred method is radicalism in Indonesia is not new. It different. Hambali, for example, did not existed since the Padri rebellion in the seek approval from the central 19 th century, in the independence era command. This fragmentation, Dr. when DI sought an Islamic state in Chernov Hwang hypothesized, was due Indonesia, and it existed underground to the weak JI leadership since the death during Suharto era. JI and its affiliates of Abdullah Sungkar, who was described are the recent reincarnation of the radical as both firm and charismatic. Ba’asyir fringe within a minority that seeks to on the other hand, is perceived as not establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. strong enough to project JI vision and Today JI does not function as an strategy. organization. Instead of structure, they use their study circles and pengajian The Lintas tanzim project in Aceh (teaching in certain areas) led by specific attempted to find an alternative path clerics. Many of these clerics adopt a between Top’s approach and JI mainstream JI position, which is dakwah mainstream strategy through their (Islam propagation) first, but jihad later. training camp. A similar attempt has Others prefer Nordin Top’s approach of failed in Poso, and now they also have iterated attacks. JI members are bound failed in Aceh. by marriage, kinship, common experience of training, and some Dr. Chernov Hwang elaborated the common business partnership. factors that motivated individual JI fragmentation is about attitude and members to disengage (cease using ideology. They may agree on the idea of violence). These are based on behavior an Islamist state, but they do not agree and highly complex factors (rational, on the method and approach to jihad to emotional, psychological, relational). achieve this goal. The majority of her research respondents (JI and its splinters in Jawa and

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Poso/Palu) went through various core issue is implementation. What is disengagement processes: (a) migrated required is not more capacity building, from active to non-active role; (b) but assistance in ensuring the court migrated from jihad centric to dakwah system and buildings are suitable for centric role; and (c) migrated from terrorist proceeding, in witness supporting terror action to dakwah protection as well as prosecutors’ safety, centric or non-active role. and in improving the prison condition. How do you see other country can assist She identified the following common us? drivers toward disengagement: (1) pronounced disillusionment with Shari- I think capacity building is still bombing and other factors (roles, needed. It is a continuum; threats and mindsets, ideology); (2) development of tactics evolve. However, I agree with the relationship with those outside the jihadi need for more assistance. The real issue circles; (3) change of priorities; (4) law is the state did not provide adequate enforcement soft approaches; and (5) resources. The international community cost benefit analysis. is prepared to work with Indonesia. Prison reform and de-radicalization do The disengagement is conditional on the not need high tech solution all the time. existence of a valid fatwa and financial It can be a matter of separating those compensation (Jawa), or on the who proselytize from the regular expectation of being under attack again prisoners. The US and other nations are (Poso). The latter is more alarming as interested in assisting Indonesia to they view violence as likely to happen ensure the necessary security to have a again. Government religious tolerance fair judicial process. event, she argued, should include trust building and not merely ceremonial. Q: Three main issues are obvious: legislation, updating strategy, and inter- Dr. Chernov Hwang reiterated that JI is agency operational level. But the now fragmented. People who favor solution and the problem are mostly violence remain, and individuals with a political consensus. How do you see shared goal will find each other. this? Also, it is good if the US can offer However, those who disengaged by role courses to civilians (in addition to the of migration, she argued, should not be military) on how the US inter-agency dismissed either. Disengagement is a collaboration works. gradual process and it will take a long Is TNI currently doing anything to time before it has an impact. expand the role of military? How BNPT addresses this? A brief Q&A session followed the panel’s presentation. Shari- BNPT does bring in military component. The US believes a civilian Q: Counter-terrorism bilateral or led approach is the correct one. But there multilateral meetings usually focus on is a role for the military. A larger talk is three issues: strengthening the capacity needed to address the military territorial of police and law enforcement, legal control. The US has started with human reform, and judiciary process. But the rights training for Kopassus (army

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special force), as required by the Leahy What about their younger generation? law. Julie mentioned a good observation And what is the role of women? about the soft approach by the Indonesian police toward Julie- There is a younger generation in disengagement. And we try to get input JI schools. The older people, who fought from all actors involved to inform the in Afghanistan, saw all their gains and US and other countries on how to assist loss. They look down on the new Indonesia in counter-terrorism activities. recruits. Older recruits received strong indoctrination from DI, then from JI Q: What is the current status on JI and under Sungkar. Young recruits were AQ in Indonesia, and Abu Sayaf in the invited to several study groups and they Philippines? moved from one group to another. They do not have deep indoctrination, and can Shari- Abu Sayaf is now perceived as a easily move to another group that fits criminal organization (kidnapping for their needs. Not all young people in JI ransoms). In 2000, some JI members schools will become JI members or will were trained in the southern Philippines. be invited to become JI member. Some stayed and married local women, but we do not see any active training In terms of JI women, they are not like group now. There is a link to AQ for Hamas; they are not suicidal. They some individual members, but they are provide familial support and bringing in out of the picture. We do not see active extra money through side businesses. AQ leadership with various groups in They built alliances through marriage. Indonesia at this time. Shari- Recent information suggests that Julie- There maybe a more clear line 6- continuing violence may indicate a 7 years ago between AQ and JI. The resurgence of DI. But this is links to AQ are always tenuous. In generational. These are people who grew Malaysia it is more of admiration toward up in DI family. It is a very small AQ, but there is no link. It is more of a community; they are not wide spread. ‘tweet’ link. Ideas may go back and They are actively searching for recruits. forth, but the action is Currently, public high schools are the counterproductive. In the Philippines, most popular space to recruit. They under Sungkar’s leadership, everybody target young people from middle class should receive training and so they set family who are searching for higher up training camp. But this has ended a spirituality. long time ago. They now have mostly social relational links. They are more Julie- JI families are similar. But it can individual links to Abu Sayaf or to be that the father is DI member, the son MILF. The bombing group (Hambali, belongs to JI, and the grandchildren are Top, Azhari, etc) was a sub-group within affiliated to smaller groups. JI, when the central command still held a key role in leadership. Some studies suggest that public schools now teach more intolerance, and this Q: The statistics on the number of JI needs to be addressed. members who disengaged seems a lot.

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