UNITED NATIONS Press Services Office of Public Ixc'crroation United Nations, K,Y. (FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA — NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD)
Press Release SG/SM/251 12 February 1965
BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON TEB SjgSMTION. p YIET~MM
"I am greatly disturbed by recent events in South-East Asia, and particularly by the seriously deteriorating situation in Viet-Nam. My fear, frankly, is in regard to the dangerous possibilities of escalation, because such a situation, if it should cnce get out of control, would obviously pose the gravest threat to the peace of the world. "I have stated my views on this problem :n?ny times before. Only last year, when I was interviewed in Paris in July, I said thaL 'military methods have failed to find a solution of the South-East Asian problem for the last 10 years and I do not believe the same methods will bring about a peaceful settlement of the problem. I have always maintained that only political and diplomatic methods of negotiation and discussion may find a peaceful solution. I have suggested some time ago, that a return to the conference table might produce some results. That means, in effect, that a revival of the Geneva Conference may perhaps achieve some results. I am convinced of this because of the very critical situation in that area,' "I am conscious of course of my responsibilities under Article 99 of the Charter. I am also aware that there are many difficulties in the way of attempt- ing a United Nations solution to the problem, in view of its past history and the fact that some of the principal parties are not represented in the United Nations. Many world leaders who, I know, share this concern and anxiety have made other suggestions. At the present time it is not possible for me to say what would be the best means of discussing this serious situation in an atmosphere conducive to a positive solution; but I do feel very strongly that means must be found, and found urgently, within or outside the United Nations, of shifting the quest
(more) - 2 - Press Release SG/SM/251 12 February 1965 for a solution away from the field of battle to the conference table. In this connexion I believe that arrangements could bo devised under which a dialogue could take place between the principal parties with a view, among others, to preparing the ground for wider and more formal discussions. "Meanwhile I would like to appeal most earnestly to all the parties concerned for the utmost restraint in both, deeds and words, and I would urge them to refrain from any new acts which may lead to an escalation of the present conflict and to the aggravation of a situation which is already very serious. "I make this appeal ondst earnestly in the interest of the peace and well-being of the people of Viet-Warn and of the world at large."
* #** * CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP
Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: The Secretary-General X APPROVAL */ YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED
YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE
NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS
For y©ur cenvenience, I am attaching the twe earlier reperts referred to in Mr. Lehakuhl's memerandum ©f 3 March (even theugh y©u may have seen them already).
DATE: FROM: 8 Mar. '65 G» J. Janecek * UN ITE D NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRE FOR IRAQ
27J.2H MM Nouwas Sftwt 1/TgTV P. O. Be* 2OU, Abriyak ^ - Cabta : Omatpna •' 8*171-4 BAGHDAD
March 1965
ftf.
TO ? Mr* WUliaa C. Powell, Chief, Centre Services, Office of Public Inform tion, United Rations, Eew
FROM 8 Elk Lehakuhl, Director, UHIC8 SUBJECT* Iraqi Paper Coea^ftta on TS 3?haat«-jVdtiiam'ana Paleetin®
Having started to keep you infonsed on this aeries of oojmaenta (our nwaoranda of 17th and 2^th February) * we had batter keep it vq?« Al-Balqd printed a third column by Mr. laaa Abdul Kadis* under the title *U thant and his Msaion to th© Jewish Occupied Aree* on 26 February (original enclosed)* He deals at length jpLth the material 1 seat Ma - the Seoratary-
oot Mr. Herman Ho <>jfc g^to.T,.,» ,J » Jf Jb iC^Jli ONITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRE FOR IRAQ
27J. 211 Abu NotoHU Stntt P. O. Box 2048, Almyok i,—le CMtu : Ornntprwj TVbpfau : 64171-4 BAGHDAD
24 February 1965 **f
TO » Mr. William C. Powell, Chief, Cerrtre Serviosa, Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York PROM : Dik Lehrokuhl, Director, UNTC, Baghdad SUBJECT: Iraqi Pftpigr Coamenta on U Thant, Viatmrn arid Palest! ri
further to crur memorandum of 17 February, we sf^.t to Mr, lasa Abdul Ksdir, the author of the column in al-R»lad» copy of the Secretary-General 'a statement on Vietnam, with a copy of the lett«r dated 26 January 19^5 from the Representative of Jordan addressed to the Senretary-Gwivral We referred to the article, but made no cfwmpnt apprt from drawing attention to the general services rendered by the Centre, and the availability of UN documentation. Our action waa evidently responsible for a follow-up comment which appeared in al-Balad on 20 February - and sumiary in English, enclosed*
oo: - Mr* Norman Ho Translation and auraaary of a ooluan published by th* . Baghdad Newspaper, AL-flAIAP 20 February 1965
UNITED RATIONS1. U TRAMP AND THE BIOODY FIGHTING- IN VIETNAM
By I sea Abdul Kadir
The director of UNIC took note of «y column published on Sunday lit February 1?65 under tha title "BUT U Thant shows interest in Jews before Others"* He aent n» the next day, care of thia paper, the text of a statement by Mr. Thant, the Secretary-General of the UN Organisation, issued on Friday 12 February OB the situation ia Vietnam in which he said: (follows abstracts fro® the Secretary- General's statement}e He (U Thant) did not neglect to point out bis responsibilities mentioned in article 99 of the Charter of the Organisation of which he is the Seerstary-Ge$*ral. But he considered fciaself unable to say what possible aeans there mould ba for discussing this serious situation* Nevertheless, he felt that means muat be found urgently, inside or outside the UN, to shift the quest for & solution away from the field of battle to the conference tableo
(Aft*r^pointing out that he wrote his column before the Secretary- general's statement of Vletnao was published, the author recalls that Ma headlines declared that the S®eretary^J«mral shewed interest ia the Jews "before* others* He emphasized that he did not say "to tha exclusion" of others}*
"In py story I expressed an opinion on tha interest the Secretary- General had shown the small Incidents on the armiatio line* It was obvious that by sending urgently representatives to the area fear investigation and research, the- SecretaryHJeneral-8©ecrad to ha1*?® considered these incidents more dangerous to peaco than the dreadful fighting in Vietnan. Other evidence to this effect ia that ha only issued a statement on the Vietnam situation, wfesress Article 99 points out that *the Secretary-General may bring to tha attention of tb® Security Council any matter which in hia opinion say threaten th® maintenance of international peace and security*. He did not t>rlcg - 2 -
this to the attention of the Security Council although he recognised that the situation in Vietnam was serious and that e deterioration could lead to a most serious threat' to world peaceo
"In concluding this cowsentary on the Statement, 1 would like the Director of UBTC to know that he would also serve the cause of peace if he coasraunicated the contents of iqy two columns to the Secretary-general* He (0 Thant) should know that the people of UB everywhere are watching him, and the way he is carrying out his duties, and they expect hie to do so impartially. Only in this tray can he serve the alas of the Charter of the Organization, for which he is bearing the burden of the secretariat. We hope he is doing that with the help of &od".
» **•«** *
f UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTRE FOR IRAQ
2W.2/1 Aim Nouwu Strait P.O. BoxaOt T • t A - Cofebt : OmttiprtM : 84171-4 BAGHDAD t _AMVI 17 1965 «—3* 57/fc
TO s EPe wllllaQ c« cM,afft centre Qffies Of pvftlie i tiaa, naltfld ^ttona,
iRIBJagf» paper g ffeaafe, ?Jefeaa aafl
traaalatioa AB& ort^iBal «f a politieal tifclch eppeor^A is tba Baghdad iaHjr eaawBtdag era the ellaged attlteia «f to article m* printed < ef!2 tost ffif u fttanit*a altn&ti ^ •*• v* i* TBAHSIATIOW 0? CQMSBffA&Y FOBLISHSD BY TBB 1BAQI DAILY *VMf> OS 14 JfmSMX 1965 United ffatiaaft' 17 Hunt Shows Coaeera for Jews Before Other* lase Abdul •Soae oaaasioaal and traiaportant events have oomired r$e®Qtly alosg the araistia&line «hieh had bean dram «p in Hi«Dd«® in i%9 as a t^^offaxy iHHrAer bstwe«E the Ki&gSoa of Jozdan aad th© Jewish esotjpied area ef Poles tiae» Soae ftggp»8iv* Jews, not more IB mssber than th® fingers •His fheughta inspired hia to delegate repff«a©atatlw3D followed by viKS»9 to raader assisteaoe end aervidea,to the area of Jewish ®$©sp- etioa aa wall a» to Jordan,, to iBresti®Btee here oad ther®v eoaeerni^g this ereat and that, sad to deterEise the faetors ^biefe led to thoa, as if ttie sittaatios seeded imreatigatloa or- as if soffij®tking was had to W •The two delegates and their aides arrived at those si.-tGss nade contact «ith the Jordanias ^ithorities as veil as with th® of the Jewish gango They held f pieni© along the amifltiesliae returned to Rev Tosk to wabmit %0 the naa who had delegated thea a export the oeatenta of vhioh were fsferloated** ^ \ •BeanaMle, the flgjitiag between Worth and Soeth ^©tesssjp @ad 1m ~ the area trader the ooatrol of the leftist group knotm fej ?i©t«€ong the Aaerieaas weald like to oeH esasssjaistf has bairn of the fighting)", " "But war *an, 9 Thant, vas not movedfeg rthes e battles wtdeh threatened peace not only la a part of Southeast Asia* He did net raaot ayqpathetioally for th« viottas of the ailitaxy nlda sad imt«c*a«&xy ^nrtallty. H» did not think of dale®fttljag a Of v0p*M«atatiTO to oostdaat an inv8ati0atiea or aak« eat eaquixy on too aggMsaion or th» aggresson who initiated the battles «MoM are still foiaf oa la a w«4d ^lioa is in nood of imdiata3%ed peaea after t*o tevtal voiid •Are the Je*a» in the opinion of 0 Yhant, enjoying priesl^r orer the Anerioans end the Viet»naaeaeT Baa %be Jewlah friendship » «idoh fca adaita no feels aiaae no paid a visit to the ooeapied part of Fileetine aoaooiianied by the fomese Pre*ideat several years ago, influenoed hla oore than the friendship of all the ti& oeabar nfttioaa vhioh he should feel in his oapaeity as the official representative of these natiensf Or is there aoMthiag here wfoioh nohody «an knov Private questions asked Bsputy Assistant Secretary of State Biehard I« Phillips at the Foreign Correspondents Aas0 , Mar 4, 1985 by Jemes Boyd, t)N Corespondent for the Washington Star* i 1) Is it true that the United States is taking no initiative to males contact with Hanoi and Peking either for a " dialogue" or for steps towards tt negotiation'* or anything else? No this is not true* We are irorkiag closely with oor friends such as France who is in contact with Hanoi and our own Ambassador baa been talking with Peking in Warsaw, Thea yoti are aot opposed to tit© suggestions made by the Secretary- Generiil both in Ms etatement of February IS, sod at his press conference last week about seeking a w diologae" towards more formal steps towards negotiation? Ans» Ho we are not at all opposed to the steps an& efforts of the Secretary-General along the lines of your question. All we are saying IB that as of nowf we have not gotten the idea that Hanoi or Peking want either a diologue or meaningful negotiations* GU ft***- ^juiSO UPI-49 (VIET NAM) VIENNA~~U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N. ADLAI E. STEVENSON DECLARED TODAY THE UNITED STATES WOULD REMAIN IN SOUTH VIST NAM UNTIL IT RECEIVED A "GUARANTEE" FROM THE COMMUNISTS THAT THEY WOULD RESPECT THE COUNTRYfS INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. "I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THERE IS SO MUCH CRITICISM OF U.S. EFFORTS TO PRESERVE THE INDEPENDENCE OF A COUNTRY SUBJECT TO ATTACK FROM THE OUTSIDE AND TO AMERICAN EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE SPREAD OF CHINESE COMMUNISM," STEVENSON TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE. "I AM PERPLEXED. OUR ACTIVITY SHOULD INVITE THE RESPECT OF MUCH OF THE WORLD. WE HAVE NO HINT THAT NORTH VIET NAM IS READY TO STOP INFILTRATION AND AGGRESSION." STEVENSON, WHO WAS THE OFFICIAL U.S. REPRESENTATIVE Af THE FUNERAL YESTERDAY OF AUSTRIAN PRESIDENT ADOLF SCHAERF YESTERDAY, MADE HIS REMARKS SHORTLY BEFORE EMPLANING FOR PARIS, WHERE HE PLANNED TO SPEND A DAY BEFORE RETURNING TO THE U.S. TURNING TO THE UNITED NATIONS, STEVENSON EXPRESSED THE CONVICTION THAT THE WORLD BODY WOULD WEATHER ITS CURRENT FINANCIAL STORM. "THREATS TO WORLD PEACE MAKE THE UiN. INDISPENSABLE," HE SAID. "IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE FIRST EXTERNAL ACT OF EVERY NEW COUNTRY IS TO APPLY FOR U.N. MEMBERSHIP. IT IS THE SOLE SECURITY OF SMALL COUNTRIES—THE LARGER ONES CAN TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES." 3/6-«TDl202PES 89th Congress, 1st Session ------House Document No. 136 Aggression From the North The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7839 Released February 1965 March 11, 1965.—Ordered to be printed U.S. Government Printing Office Washington : 1965 H. Con. Res. 338 Passed March 29,1965 Bghtpinth Congress of the Bnited States AT THE FIRST SESSION Begun and held at the City' of Washington on Monday, the fourth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five Concurrent'Resolution Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate co-nc-urring), That (a) there be printed as a House document the Department of State White Paper, issued February 17, 1965, relating to North Vietnam's campaign to conquer South Vietnam (Department of State Publication 7839). The copy for such House document shall be pre- pared under the supervision of the Joint Committee on Printing. (b) In addition to the usual number, there shall be printed sixty- three thousand six hundred additional copies of such House document of which twenty thousand shall be for the use of the Senate, and forty-three thousand six hundred for the use of the House of Representatives. SEC. 2. Copies of such document shall be prorated to Members of the Senate 'and House of Representatives for a period of sixty days, after •which the unused balance shall revert to the respective Senate and House Document Rooms. Attest: Ralph R. Roberts, Clerk of the House of Representatives. Attest: Felton M. Johnston, Secretary of the Senate, I "[Our purpose in Viet-Nam] is to join •s| in the defense and protection of freedom I of a brave people who are under attack 1 that is controlled and that is directed 3 I from outside their country." i PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON I February 17,1965 Contents Page Introduction 1 I. HANOI SUPPLIES THE KEY PERSONNEL FOE THE AHMED AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET- NAM 3 A. The Infiltration Process 5 B. Military Personnel 6 C. Infiltration of Native North Vietnamese 11 D. Infiltration of Viet Cong Agents . 12 II. HANOI SUPPLIES WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL TO ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH 14 III. NORTH VIET-NAM: BASE FOR CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH 20 IV. ORGANIZATION, DIRECTION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL OF THE ATTACK ON SOUTH VIET-NAM ARE CENTERED IN HANOI 22 A. Political Organization 22 1. The "Liberation Front" 22 B. Military Organization 23 C. Intelligence Organization 25 V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HANOI'S CAMPAIGN OF AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM ... 26 VI. CONCLUSION 29 APPENDIXES A. Findings of the International Control Commission 30 B. Maps of Infiltration Routes 31 C. Detail on Military Infiltration With Case Studies 33 D. List of Communist Weapons Captured in South Viet-Nam 38 E. Photos of Captured Viet Cong Weapons and Ammunition From External Communist Sources . 43 \ F. North Vietnamese Passports and Travel Documents Used by Liberation Front Officials . . 54 G. The People's Revolutionary Party (South) and the Lao Dong Party (North) Are One Com- munist Party 57 H. Charts of the Viet Cong Organization, North and South 59 I. Detail on Viet Cong Terrorism 62 100° 110° NORTH VIETNAM XUAN MAI A DONG HOI TCHEPONE DA NANG THAILAND 1 KONTUM^ • -v,*- i -> PLEIKU CAMBODIA BAN ME THUOT ..j' 10 105° 110° Introduction South Viet-Nam is fighting for its life against latter's undisguised attack, the planners in Hanoi a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack in- } lave tried desperately to conceal their hand. They spired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the have failed and their aggression is as real as that Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant ag- of an invading army. gression has been going on for years, but recently This report is a summary of the massive evi- the pace has quickened and the threat has now dence of North Vietnamese aggression obtained become acute. by the Government of South Viet-Nam. This evi- The war in Viet-Nam is a new kind of war, a dence has been jointly analyzed by South Viet- fact as yet poorly understood in most parts of the namese and American experts. world. Much of the confusion that prevails in The evidence shows that the hard core of the the thinking of many people, and even many gov- Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam were ernments, stems from this basic misunderstand- trained in the North and ordered into the South ing. For in Viet-Nam a totally new brand of by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the aggression has been loosed against an independent Viet Cong (VC), the officers and much of the people who want to make their own way in peace cadre, many of the technicians, political orga- and freedom. nizers, and propagandists have come from the Viet-Nam is not another Greece, where indige- North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It nous guerrilla forces used friendly neighboring shows that the training of essential military per- territory as a sanctuary. sonnel and their infiltration into the South is di- Viet-Nam is not another Malaya, where Com- rected by the Military High Command in Hanoi. munist guerrillas were, for the most part, physi- (See section I.) cally distinguishable from the peaceful majority The evidence shows that many of the weapons they sought to control. and much of the ammunition and other supplies Viet-Nam. is not another Philippines, where used by the Viet Cong have been sent into South Communist guerrillas were physically separated Viet-Nam from Hanoi. In recent months new from the source of their moral and physical sup- types of weapons have been introduced in the VC port. army, for which all ammunition must come from Above all, the war in Viet-Nam is not a spon- outside sources. Communist China and other Com- taneous and local rebellion against the established munist states have been the prime suppliers of government. these weapons and ammunition, and they have There are elements in the Communist program been channeled primarily through North Viet- of conquest directed against South Viet-Nam com- Nam. (See section II.) mon to each of the previous areas of aggression and The directing force behind the effort to con- subversion. But there is one fundamental differ- quer South Viet-Nam is the Communist Party in ence. In Viet-Nam a Communist government has the North, the Lao Dong (Workers) Party. As set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in every Communist state, the party is an integral in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it part of the regime itself. North Vietnamese offi- has used every resource of its own government to cials have expressed their firm determination to ab- carry out its carefully planned program of con- sorb South Viet-Nam into the Communist world. cealed aggression. North Viet-Nam's commitment (See section III.) to seize control of the South is no less total than Through its Central Committee, which controls was the commitment of the regime in North Korea the government of the North, the Lao Dong Party in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the directs the total political and military effort of the Viet Cong. The Military High Command in the fense of the freedom and independence of its land North trains the military men and sends them into and its people. South Viet-Nam. The Central Research Agency, In 1961 the Department of State issued a report North Viet-Nam's central intelligence organiza- called A Threat to the Peace. It described North tion, directs the elaborate espionage and subversion Viet-Nam's program to seize South Viet-Nam. effort. The extensive political-military organiza- The evidence in that report had been presented by tion in the North which directs the Viet Cong war the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to effort is described in section IV. the International Control Commission (I.C.C.). Under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists A special report by the I.C.C. in .Tune 1962 upheld have established an extensive machine for carry- the validity of that evidence. The Commission ing on the war within South Viet-Nam. The focal held that there was "sufficient evidence to show point is the Central Office for South Viet-Nam beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam with its political and military subsections and had sent arms and men into South Viet-Nam to other specialized agencies. A subordinate part of carry out subversion with the aim of overthrow- this Central Office is the Liberation Front for ing the legal Government there. The I.C.C. South Viet-Nam. The front was formed at Ha- found the authorities in Hanoi in specific viola- tion of four provisions of the Geneva accords of noi's order in 1960. Its principal function is to 1 influence opinion abroad and to create the false 1954. impression that the aggression in South Viet-Nam Since then, new and even more impressive evi- is an indigenous rebellion against the established dence of Hanoi's aggression has accumulated. government. (See section IV.) The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citi- For more than 10 years the people and the Gov- zens and to the world. It is important for free ernment of South Viet-Nam, exercising the in- men to know what has been happening in Viet- herent right of self-defense, have fought back Nam, and how, and why. That is the purpose of against these efforts to extend Communist power this report. south across the 17th parallel. The United States has responded to the appeals of the Government 1 For the text of pertinent sections of the I.C.C. report, of the Republic of Viet-Nam for help in this de- see appendix A. I. Hanoi Supplies the Key Personnel for the Armed Aggression Against South Viet-Nam The hard core of the Communist forces attacking years. It can reasonably be assumed that still South Viet-Nam are men trained in North Viet- other infiltration groups have entered the South Nam. They are ordered into the South and re- for which there is no evidence yet available. main under the military discipline of the Military To some the level of infiltration from the North High Command in Hanoi. Special training camps may seem modest in comparison with the total operated by the North Vietnamese army give polit- size of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet- ical and military training to the infiltrators. In- Nam. But one-for-one calculations are totally creasingly the forces sent into the South are native misleading in the kind of warfare going on in North Vietnamese who have never seen South Viet-Nani. First, a high proportion of infiltrators Viet-Nam. A special infiltration unit, the 70th from the North are well-trained officers, cadres, Transportation Group, is responsible for moving and specialists. Second, it has long been realized men from North Viet-Nam into the South via in- that in guerrilla combat the burdens of defense filtration trails through Laos. Another special are vastly heavier than those of attack. In Malaya, unit, the maritime infiltration group, sends weap- the Philippines, and elsewhere a ratio of at least ons and supplies and agents by sea into the South. 10-to-l in favor of the forces of order was re- The infiltration rate has been increasing. From quired to meet successfully the threat of the guer- 1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establishing its in- rillas' hit-and-run tactics. filtration pipeline, at least 1,800 men, and pos- In the calculus of guerrilla warfare the scale sibly 2,700 more, moved into South Viet-Nam from of North Vietnamese infiltration into the South the North. The flow increased to a minimum of takes on a very different meaning. For the in- B,700 in 1961 and at least 5,400 in 1962. There filtration of 5,000 guerrilla fighters in a given year was a modest decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed is the equivaJent of marching perhaps 50,000 infiltrators, though later evidence is likely to raise regular troops across the border, in terms of the this figure. burden placed on the defenders. For 1964 the evidence is still incomplete. How- Above all, the number of proved and probable ever, it already shows that a minimum of 4,400 infiltrators from the North should be seen in infiltrators entered the South, and it is estimated relation to the size of the VC forces. It is now more than 3,000 others were sent in. estimated that the Viet Cong number approxi- There is usually a time lag between the entry mately 35,000 so-called hard-core forces, and an- of infiltrating troops and the discovery of clear other 60,000-80,000 local forces. It is thus ap- evidence they have entered. This fact, plus col- parent that infiltrators from the North—allowing lateral evidence of increased use of the infiltration for casualties—make up the majority of the so- routes, suggests strongly that 1964 was probably the year of greatest infiltration so far. called hard-core Viet Cong. Personnel from the Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 VC officers, sol- North, in short, are now and have always been the diers, and technicians are known to have entered backbone of the entire VC operation. South Viet-Nam under orders from Hanoi. Addi- It is true that many of the lower level elements tional information indicates that an estimated of the VC forces a-re recruited within South Viet- 17,000 more infiltrators were dispatched to the Nam. However, the thousands of reported cases South by the regime in Hanoi during the past 6 of VC kidnapings and terrorism make it abun- 45-760 O-65-2 XUAN MAI (September 1, 1963) DONG HOI 3, 1963) IN LAOS (September 4, 1963) THAILAND J CROSSED BORDER (September 20" 1963) l- CAMBODIA jl SOUTH (\ VIETNAM CAPTURED _tr DESTINATION (November 26, 1963) Map s/ioioing infiltration route from the North by which a group of North Vietnamese troops, including VC Sgt. Huynh Van Toy, entered South Viet-Nam in Sept. 1963. dantly clear that threats and other pressures by The map on page 4 shows the infiltration route the Viet Cong play a major part in such recruit- from North Viet-Nam to the South followed by ment. VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay and a group of North Vietnamese army officers and men in September 1963. Tay was captured during an engagement in A. THE INFILTRATION PROCESS Cliuong Tliien Province in April 1964. Local guides lead the infiltration groups along The infiltration routes supply hard-core units the secret trails. Generally they direct the in.7 with most of their officers and noncommissioned filtrators from halfway between two stations, personnel. This source helps fill the gaps left by through their own base station, and on halfway battle casualties, illness, and defection and insures to the next supply base. Thus the guides are kept continued control by Hanoi. Also, as the nature in ignorance of all but their own way-stations. of the conflict has changed, North Viet-Nam has Only group leaders are permitted to talk with supplied the Viet Cong with technical specialists the guides in order to preserve maximum security. via the infiltration routes. These have included The men are discouraged from asking where they men trained in armor and ordnance, antiaircraft, are or where they are going.1 and communications as well as medical corps- The same system of trails and guides used along men and transport experts. the Lao infiltration routes is used within South There is no single infiltration route from the Viet-Nam itself. Viet Cong infiltrators may re- North to South Viet-Nam. But by far the biggest port directly to a reassignment center in the high- percentage of infiltrators follow the same general lands as soon as they enter South Viet-Nam. But course. The principal training center for North in the past year or more some groups have moved Vietnamese army men assigned to join the Viet down trails in South Viet-Nam to provinces along Cong has been at Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Re- the Cambodian border and near Saigon before cently captured Viet Cong have also reported an receiving their unit assignment. Within South infiltration training camp at Thanh Hoa. After Viet-Nam infiltration and supplies are handled by completion of their training course—which in- VC units such as the Nam Son Transportation volves political and propaganda work as well as Group. military subjects—infiltrating units are moved to At the Laos border crossing point infiltrators Vinh on the east coast. Many have made stop- are reequipped. Their North Vietnamese army overs at a staging area in Dong Hoi where addi- uniforms must be turned in. They must give up tional training is conducted. From there they all personal papers, letters, notebooks, and photo- go by truck to the Laos border. graphs that might be incriminating. Document Then, usually after several days' rest, infiltra- control over the infiltrators has been tightened tors move southward through Laos. Generally considerably over the past 2 years. A number of they move along the Laos-South Viet-Nam border. Vietnamese infiltrators have told of being fitted Responsibility for infiltration from North Viet- out with Lao "neutralist" uniforms for their pas- Nam through Laos belongs to the 70th Trans- sage through Laos. portation Group of the North Vietnamese army. Infiltration groups are usually issued a set of After a time the infiltration groups turn east- black civilian pajama-like clothes, two unmarked ward, entering South Viet-Nam in Quang Nam, uniforms, rubber sandals, a sweater, a hammock, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Kontum, or another of mosquito netting, and waterproof sheeting. They the border provinces. carry a 3-5 day supply of food. A packet of The Communists have established regular lanes medicines and bandages is usually provided. for infiltration with way-stations established about 1 day's march apart. The way-stations are The size of infiltration groups varies widely. equipped to quarter and feed the Viet Cong pass- Prisoners have mentioned units as small as 5 men ing through. Infiltrators who suffer from malaria and as large as 500. Generally the groups number or other illnesses stay at the stations until they 40-50. When they arrive in South Viet-Nam these recover sufficiently to join another passing group 1 For additional maps of the routes taken by VC in- moving south. filtrators into South Viet-Nam, see appendix B. groups are usually split up and assigned to various the Indochina War. As a regular in the Viet VC units as replacements, although some have Minh forces, he was moved to North Viet-Nam. remained intact. He became an officer in the so-called People's Army. In March 1962 Major Dan received orders to B. MILITARY PERSONNEL prepare to move to South Viet-Nam. He had been exposed to massive propaganda in the North The following are individual case histories of which told of the destitution of the peasants in North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi re- the South and said that the Americans had taken gime into South Viet-Nam. They are only an over the French role of colonialists. He said later illustrative group. They show that the leader- that an important reason for his decision to sur- ship and specialized personnel for the guerrilla render was that he discovered these propaganda war in South Viet-Nam consists in large part of themes were lies. He found the peasants more members of the North Viet-Nam armed forces, prosperous than the people in the North. And trained in the North and subject to the command he recognized quickly that he was not fighting and discipline of Hanoi. the Americans but his own people. With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan left 1. Tran Quoc Dan Hanoi on March 23,1962. They traveled through the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the Dan was a VC major, commander of the 60th Viet Cong First Regiment in central Viet-Nam. Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th Group The 35-year-old major took part in 45 actions of the Thon-Kim Battalion). Disillusioned with and was wounded once in an unsuccessful VC fighting his own countrymen and with commu- attack on an outpost. As time passed he became nism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he sur- increasingly discouraged by his experience as a rendered to the authorities in South Viet-Nam on VC troop commander. Most of all, he said, he February 11,196S. was tired of killing other Vietnamese. After At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary several months of soul-searching he decided to army (Viet Minh) and fought against the French surrender to the authorities of the Republic of forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended Viet-Nam. He has volunteered to do "anything to serve the national cause" of South Viet-Nam 2. Vo Thoi Sergeant Vo Thoi (Communist Party alias Vo Bien) was a.n assistant squad leader in the VC Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the night of October 7, 1963, his unit attacked An Tuong village in Binh Dinh Province. After overrunning the village, Vo's company was assigned to set up an ambush against Republic of Viet-Nam troops rushing to defend the village. In the ensuing fight Vo was seriously wounded. He was picked up by local farmers and turned over to the authorities. Vo's life and experiences were similar to those of thousands of Viet Cong. Born in Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went through 5 years of school and then worked on his parents' small farm. Dur- : \ ing the war against the French he joined the Viet Minh forces. When the fighting ended, he was transferred to North Viet-Nam with his unit, the Maj. Tran Quoc Dan. 210th Regiment. He remained in the North Viet- 6 they stopped at a way-station for a full day's rest. One company dropped off at Thua Thien Province. Vo and the remainder of the group marched on to Pleiku Province. Two fully armed companies from a neighboring province were assigned to the battalion. The assignment given to the battalion was to harass strategic hamlets in the Hoai An district of Binh Dinh. to round up cattle and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the Government forces, and to recruit local youth for service with the Viet Cong. 3. Nguyen Thao Nguyen Thao was a VC weapons technician. A native of Khanh Hoa province in South Viet- Nam, he joined the Viet Minh in 1950. He worked at a secret arsenal manufacturing weapons for use by the guerrilla forces. He went to North VC Sgt. Vo Thai. namese army until 1960 when he was sent to work on a state farm in Nghe An Province. Vo said 3,000 men and women worked on the farm, of whom 400 were soldiers. In September 1962 Vo was told he must join the newly activated 22d Bat- talion. All the members of the battalion came from provinces in South Viet-Nam, from Quang Tri to Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary battalion; two-thirds of its members were cadre with ranks up to senior captain. The group was put through an advanced train- ing course that lasted 6 months. The training pro- gram included combat tactics for units from squad to company and the techniques of guerrilla and counterguerrilla fighting. There were heavy doses of political indoctrination. On March 5, 1983, the 22d Battalion received orders to move south. They -were transported in trucks from Nghe An Province to Dong Hoi in Quang Binh, just north of the 17th parallel. From there the unit was moved westward to the Lao border. Then the more than 300 men began walking to the south following mountain trails in Laos and the Viet-Nam border area. They marched by day, rested at night. Every fifth day Nguyen Thao, VC weapons technician. Viet-Nam after the Geneva accords were signed arrival at the arsenal he decided to defect. He in 1954. In North Viet-Nam he attended a tech- asked permission to rejoin his family and to work nical school specializing in arms manufacture. in a national defense factory and continue his He received special training in foreign small arms studies. and artillery. At the end of 1962 he was ordered to Ha Dong 4. Nguyen Viet Le to attend a special course of political training in preparation for infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. This VC soldier was born in Quang Nam Prov- On completion of the training course he was as- ince in South Viet-Nam. He served with the signed to a group of 14 men who would move 305th Division of the Viet Minh and moved to to the south together. Nguyen Thao said the North Viet-Nam in 1954. In April 1961 Nguyen group was composed of 4 armament specialists, 2 Viet Le and his unit, the 50th Battalion, moved chemical engineers, and 8 middle-level technical into Laos. He said the unit remained in Laos cadre. for 2 months, during which it fought in four bat- They left Ha Dong in March 1963, crossed into tles alongside the Pathet Lao. During these en- Laos, and reached their destination in the north- gagements one of the battalion's four companies ern part of South Viet-Nam in May. Nguyen was badly mauled and had to be returned to North Thao went to work at a secret VC arsenal near Viet-Nam. the Quang Ngai border. Fifty men, some local The other three companies were assigned to workers, manned the arsenal weapons section. The South Viet-Nam. They arrived in Quang Ngai group manufactured mines and grenades for the Province in the summer of 1961. For a month VC units in the area and repaired weapons. they rested and waited for orders. They took part Nguyen Thao said he soon realized from talking in a major action against an outpost of the Govern- with the local workers at the arsenal that most of ment of South Viet-Nam in September. Nguyen what he had heard in the North about conditions Viet Le was captured during a battle in Quang in South Viet-Nam was wrong. He said the 'Com- Ngai Province in April 1962. munists had deceived him. Two months after his 5. Nguyen True Corp. Nguyen True was born in 1933, the son of a farmer in Phu Yen Province in South Viet- Nam. From 1949 to 1954 he served as a courier and then as a guerrilla fighter with the Viet Minh. In early 1955 he boarded a Soviet ship and moved with his unit, the 40th Battalion, to North Viet-Nam. He remained in the army, but in 1959, bothered by illness, he went to work on a state farm. In August 1962 Nguyen True was notified that he was back in the army and that he was being sent to South Viet-Nam. He reported to the Xuan Mai training center and underwent 6 months of military and political reeducation. His unit was the newly activated 22d Battalion. The training course was completed in February 1963, but de- parture for South Viet-Nam was delayed until April. For infiltration purposes the battalion was di- vided into two groups. On April 27 , Nguyen True and his group boarded trucks at Xuan Mai. Nguyen Viet Le. They went first to Vinh, then on to Dong Hoi, and 8 finally to the Laos-North Viet-Nam border. iron ore deposits were nearby, and the hill people There they doffed their North Vietnamese army had long used the iron to make knives and simple uniforms and put on black peasants clothing. tools. Cam's job was building kilns to smelt the The march to the south began, sometimes in Lao ore. The Viet Cong hoped to use the iron for territory, sometimes in Viet-Nam. They passed mines and grenades. through Thua Thien Province, then Quang Nam, On August 4, 1963, Sergeant Cam went to a Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, and finally to their nearby village to buy salt for his group. On his destination, Pleiku. Each day they had a new return he found his comrades had gone to one of guide, generally one of the mountain people of the their cultivated fields to gather corn, and he joined area. them. The group was interrupted at their work Nguyen said that he and most of the troops who by a Vietnamese Ranger company. After a brief were sent north after the Indochina War wanted to fight Cam was taken prisoner. return to their homes and rejoin their families. In August 1963 Nguyen True was sent out on a 7. Nguyen Hong Thai foraging expedition to find food for his unit. He took the opportunity to defect to Government Thai, 32 years old, was born and grew up in forces at An Tuc in Binh Dinh Province. Quang Ngai Province in South Viet-Nam. After service with the Viet Minh he was moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. After 3 years of military serv- 6. Nguyen Cam ice he was assigned to a military farm. In Decem- Cam is the son of a. farmer in Quang Tin Prov- ber 1961 he was recalled to his former unit, the ince. Born in 1929, he joined the Viet Minh youth 305th Division, and went to the special training group in his home village in 1946. In one year camp at Xuan Mai in preparation for fighting with he became a guerrilla fighter. In 1954, as the the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam. Indochina War was drawing to a close, he was Training began in January 1962 and lasted for serving with the Viet Minh 20th Battalion. In 4 months. The training group, designated the May 1955 he -went to North Viet-Nam with his 32cl Battalion, was composed of 650 men who came unit. from various branches of the North Vietnamese Ill health caused his transfer to an agricultural camp in 1958. By 1960 he was back in uniform, serving in the 210th Regiment. In May of that year he was assigned to a small group that was to set up a metallurgical workshop. Early in 1961 he was sent to a metallurgical class in Nghe An Province. They were taught a simple form of cast-iron production, simple blast furnace con- struction, and similar skills. Their instructor was an engineer from the Hanoi Industrial Depart- ment. Their special course completed, Cam and his group of 35 men prepared to go to South Viet- Nam. They went by truck from their training center at Nghe An to the Lao border. After 19 days marching through Laos, they arrived in the vicinity of Tchepone. There they waited for 3 days until food supplies could be airdropped by a North Vietnamese plane. Nineteen days of walk- ing took them to the Laos-South Viet-Nam border. Delayed en route by illness, Cam finally reached his destination in November 1961. It was a secret VC iron foundry in Kontum Province. Several Nguyen Hong Thai. army—engineers, artillery, airborne, transport, marines, and some factory workers and students. Three-fourths of the training was military (guer- rilla tactics, ambushes, sabotage, etc.) and one- fourth was political. In the latter, heavy emphasis was laid on the necessity for armed seizure of pow- er in the South. Group 32 was divided into sections and began infiltrating to the south on July 14, 1962. It moved in three groups. Thai said it took his group more than 55 days to travel from North Viet-Nam through Laos to Quang Ngai Province in the south. He reported that all the communi- cations and liaison stations on the route to South Viet-Nam are now operated by the army of North Viet-Nam. Soon after his arrival in South Viet- Nam, Thai was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. He was made a platoon leader in the 20th Viet Cong Highland Battalion. In February 1963 the unit moved from Quang Nam to Kontum Province. Combat conditions and the rigors of guerrilla Dao Kien Lap. life began to depress Thai. He said 'he wanted They traveled through Laos and along the Viet- only to rejoin his family and live in peace. In Nam border. They had to stop for several weeks September he asked and received permission to in Quang Nam Province to recuperate from their visit his family in Quang Ngai. When he got travels. On October 1 they were directed by guides home, he surrendered to a South Vietnamese Army to a VC station in Ban Me Thuot. post. Dao said he had by then decided to defect to the Government authorities in the South. He set off 8. Dao Kien Lap with one companion, but they were separated as they crossed a swiftly flowing river. Dao gave Lap is a civilian radio technician. He has been himself up at a Government post in Ban Me Thuot a member of the Communist Party in North Viet- on October 13,1963. Nam since 1955. In February 1963 he was selected for assignment to South Viet-Nam Where he was to work with the Liberation Front. He infil- 9. Tran Ngoc Linh trated into South Viet-Nam with a group of about Linh was a Viet Cong senior sergeant, leader of 70 civilian specialists. They included doctors, a reconnaissance platoon. He is the son of a mid- pharmacists, union organizers, radio specialists, dle-class farm family in Tay Ninh Province. He propagandists, and youth organizers. One of the served with the Viet Minh against the French and infiltrators in Dao's group was a man named Binh, moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. He spent the publisher of the newspaper Labor of the Lao Dong next 7 years in the North Vietnamese army. In Party. Another was a member of the city soviet September 1962 Linh was assigned to the Xuan of Hanoi. Mai training center at Ha Dong to prepare for The specialists in Dao's group received 3 months duty in South Viet-Nam. His group was given of basic military training at Son Tay, and then a 4-month refresher course in infantry tactics with departed for the South in mid-June. Their orders emphasis on guerrilla fighting. Then he received were to report to the Central Office of the Viet 6 months of special training in the use of machine- Cong in South Viet-Nam where they Avould be as- guns against aircraft. Antiaircraft training has signed according to their individual specialties. become an increasingly important part of the prep- Dao and Binh were to help run a radio station of aration of North Vietnamese troops assigned to the Liberation Front. the Viet Cong. 10 Linh and about 120 others made up the 406th to reenter South Viet-Nam. Violating the Geneva Infiltration Group commanded by Senior Captain accords of 1954 and 1962, they used the territory of Nguyen Van Do. They were divided into four neighboring Laos to infiltrate into the South. platoons. During the final 2 weeks of preparation They are the means by which Communist North each member of the group was issued new equip- Viet-Nam is carrying out its program of con- 1 ment.—black, pajama-like uniforms, a khaki uni- quest in South Viet-Nam. form, a hammock, mosquito netting, rubber san- dals, and other supplies, including two packets pf medicine. C. INFILTRATION OF NATIVE In the early morning hours of July 4, 1963, his NORTH VIETNAMESE group started its journey from the Xuan Mai training center outside Hanoi. The convoy of six The Communist authorities in Hanoi are now Molotov trucks moved south along Highway 2.1 assigning native North Vietnamese in increasing to Nghe An Province and then on to Quang Binh. numbers to join the VC forces in South Viet- On July 7 they arrived at the final processing; sta- Nam. Heretofore, those in charge of the infiltra- tion near the Laos-North Viet-Nam border. There tion effort have sought to fill their quotas with they turned in their North Vietnamese Army uni- soldiers and others born in the South. The 90,- forms as well as all personal papers and anything 000 troops that moved from South Viet-Nam to else that might identify them as coming fr,om the the North when the Geneva accords ended the North. But their departure for the South was Indochina War have provided an invaluable delayed for several weeks. In August they set reservoir for this purpose. Now, apparently, that off through Laos. source is running dry. The casualty rate has been Twice along the way Linh had to stop at liaison high, and obviously many of those who were in stations because of illness. When the infiltrators fighting trim 10 years ago are no longer up to the recovered from their illnesses, they were formed rigors of guerrilla war. into special groups to continue their penetration In any case, reports of infiltration by native into South Viet-Nam. Linh reported being de- North Vietnamese in significant numbers have layed once for 8 days, and the second time for 10 been received in Saigon for several months. It days. is estimated that as many as 75 percent of the Finally, in the first week of November 1963, more than 4,400 Viet Cong who are known to have Linh was sufficiently recovered to begin the final entered the South in the first 8 months of 1964 leg of his journey to a VC center where he was to were natives of North Viet-Nam. be assigned to a combat unit. He and three others Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Province who had been similarly delayed by attacks of ma- in North Veit-Nam in 1936. He was captured by laria and other sickness made up a group. They South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He moved through the jungles of Quang Due Prov- described himself as a military security officer. ince near the Cambodian border. On the morning He infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in April 1964 of November 9 they crossed the Srepok River. with a group of 34 police and security officers There they ran into a unit of the South Viet- from the North. namese Army. One of the infiltrators was killed, Another native North Vietnamese captured in Linh was taken prisoner, and the other two Viet the South was VC Private First Class Vo Quyen. Cong escaped. His home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was a member of the 2d Battalion of the North Viet- These are typical Viet Cong. There are many namese army's 9th Regiment. He said the entire other officers like Trail Quoc Dan, technicians like battalion had infiltrated into South Viet-Nam Nguyen Thao, and simple soldiers like Nguyen between February and May last year. He was True. They were born in South Viet-Nam, captured in an action in Quang Tri Province on fought against the French, and then went north Jnlv 4. He told interrogators that the bulk of and served in the army of North Viet-Nam. They 1 See flppendix 0 for additional details on military were ordered by the Communist rulers in Hanoi infiltrators. 45-760 O-65-3 11 his unit was composed of young draftees from along the infiltration trails through Laos; others North Viet-Nam. are carried by boats along the coasts and Le Pham Hung, also a. private first class, was landed at prearranged sites. A special maritime captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Province. He infiltration group has been developed in. North is a native of Nam Dinh in North Viet-Nam. Viet-Nam, with its operations centered in Ha Drafted for military service in May 1963, he was Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces just north of the in the 324th Division. His group, consisting solely 17th parallel. of 90 North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in May 1964. He reported that 1. Maritime Infiltration another company of North Vietnamese entered the South at the same time as his unit. The following case illustrates the methods of A former member of the 90th VO Battalion re- maritime infiltration of secret agents used by the ported that his unit had 'been reinforced by native Communist regime in North Viet-Nam: North Vietnamese troops earlier this year. Le In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelligence Thua Phuong, an information cadre and a native agent named Nguyen Viet Duong began training of Quang Ngai Province in the South, surrendered to infiltrate South Viet-Nam. A native south- erner, he had fought against the French and had to Government forces on April 23, 1964. He said gone to North Viet-Nam after the war ended. Se- that the 90th Battalion had received 80 North lected for intelligence work, he was assigned to the Vietnamese replacements in February. Central Research Agency in 1959. A medical technician named Hoang Thimg was After a period of intensive instruction in radio captured in Thua Thien Province on July 4,1964. transmission, coding and decoding, and other skills He said he had infiltrated into the South in late of the intelligence trade, he was given false identity 1963 with a group of 200 Viet Cong, the majority papers and other supplies and was transported to of whom were ethnic northerners, 120 of them the South. His principal task was to set up a cell draftees. of agents to collect military information. He flew These reports destroy one more fiction which from Hanoi to Dong Hoi, and from there the mari- the authorities in Hanoi have sought so long to time infiltration group took him by boat to South promote—that the fighting in the South was a Viet-Nam. That was in August 1962. matter for the South Vietnamese. They underline In January 1963 Duong reported to Hanoi that Hanoi's determination to press its campaign of he had run into difficulties. His money and conquest with every available resource. papers had been lost, and he had been forced to take refuge with VC contacts in another province. Another agent was selected to go to South Viet- D. INFILTRATION OF VIET CONG Nam. One of his assignments was to contact AGENTS Duong, find out details of what happened to him, and help Duong reestablish himself as a VC agent. No effort to subvert another nation as elaborate The man selected for the task was Senior Captain as that being conducted by the Ho Chi Minh re- Tran Van Tan of the Central Research Agency. gime against South Viet-Nam can succeed without Tan had already been picked to go to the South an intelligence-gathering organization. Recogniz- to establish a clandestine VC communications cen- ing this, the authorities in Hanoi have developed ter. Making contact with Duong was one of his an extensive espionage effort. An essential part, secondary assignments. After intensive prepara- of that effort is the regular assignment of secret tions Tan was ready to move to South Viet-Nam agents from the North to South Viet-Nam. in March. He was transferred to an embarkation The heart of the VC intelligence organization base of the maritime infiltration group just north is the Central Research Agency in Hanoi (see sec- of the 17th parallel. tion IV, C). Communist agents are regularly dis- He was joined by three other VC agents and the patched from North Viet-Nam, sometimes for captain and three crewmen of the boat that would brief assignments but often for long periods. take them south. All were given false identity Many of these agents move into South Viet-Nam papers to conform to their false names. They 12 also were provided -with fishermen's permits, village. He was recruited for propaganda work South Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards in the South in the fall of 1962. He was one of or military discharge papers. The boat captain 40 young persons enrolled in a special political received a boat registration book, crew lists, and training course given by the Communist Party several South Vietnamese permits to conduct in his district. business. The first phase of the training consisted of The agents and boatmen were given cover stories political indoctrination covering such subjects as to tell if captured. Each man had to memorize the advance of communism, the North Vietnamese not only the details of his own story but the names plan for winning control of the country, the re- and some details about each of the others. The sponsibility of youth in furthering this plan, the agents had to become familiar with simple boat war in the South, and the need for propaganda procedures so they could pass as legitimate fisher- supporting the Liberation Front. men. Those who successfully completed the first phase The expedition left the embarkation port on were selected for the second level of training, the April 4. In addition to the four agents the boat so-called technical training phase. 'In this the carried six carefully sealed boxes containing a trainees were given their mission in the South. generator, several radios, some weapons, and a Vy was told he should infiltrate into South Viet- large supply of South Vietnamese currency. They Nam and there surrender to the authorities, de- also carried some chemicals and materials for scribing himself as a defector who was "tired of making false identification papers. Their desti- the miserable life in the North." He was to say nation was a landing site on the coast of Phuoc he wanted to complete his schooling, which was Tuy Province. impossible in the North. He was told to ask Soon after leaving North Viet-Nam the VC boat to live with relatives in the South so he could go encountered high winds and rough seas. On April to school. Once his story was accepted and he 7 the storm became violent. The boat tossed and was enrolled in a school, he was to begin his work threatened to capsize. Strong northeasterly winds of propagandizing other students. He was to forced it ever closer to shore. Finally the boat wait for 3 or 4 months, however, until he was no captain, Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be longer the subject of local suspicion. He was thrown overboard. This was done, and the boat assigned to work under an older agent to whom then was beached. The eight men decided to split he had to report regularly. up into pairs and try to make contact with VC A third member of the team was a younger man forces. They buried their false papers and set who was to assist Vy. The three were to infil- out. Six of the eight were captured almost imme- trate into South Viet-Nam separately and to meet diately by authorities in Thua Thien Province, there at a rendezvous point. and the other two were taken several days later. At first Vy was to do no more than to observe his fellow students carefully, collecting biographi- 2. Student Propaganda Agents cal data on them and studying their personalities, capabilities, and aspirations. He was then to se- The student population of South Viet-Nam is an lect those he thought might be most influenced by important target group for VC propagandists. Communist, propaganda and try to make friends These agents seek to win adherents for the Com- with them. munist cause among young workers, students in Once he had selected targets, he was to begin to high schools and universities, and the younger influence them favorably toward the North and officers and enlisted men in the Armed Forces of to implant Communist propaganda. He was re- the Republic of Viet-Nam. Typical of the agents sent into South Viet- sponsible then for bringing into his organization Nam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a 19- those he had influenced effectively. These individ- year-old VC propagandist. He is a native of the uals were to be given their own propaganda assign- Vinh Linh District in North Viet-Nam, just north ments to work on other students. of the Demilitarized Zone. He was a member of Students who wanted to evade military service a Communist Party youth group in his native in the Government forces were considered prime 13 targets. Where possible, Vy was to help them pleted a special 6-month course in July 1962. get to North Viet-Nam. He was also told to make The training included political indoctrination, but contact with any students who had been picked up most of the time was spent on such things as use by the authorities for suspected Communist activi- of weapons, preparing booby traps, and methods ties. These, too, were to be helped to escape to of sabotage. He was also given instruction in North Viet-Nam. Any useful information con- methods for enlisting help from hoodlums, draft cerning developments in the South or military ac- dodgers, and VC sympathizers. Once in South tivities were to be reported through his superior, Viet-Nam, he was to organize a small unit for Nguyen Van Phong. sabotage and the collection of information. On In case he became suspect, he was either to make specific assignment by his superiors he was to be his own way back to North Viet-Nam or to go into ready to sabotage ships in Saigon harbor and to the jungle and try to contact a VC unit. blow up gasoline and oil storage points and Viet- Vy entered South Viet-Nam on January 2,1963, namese Army installations. He was told to be by swimming across the Ben Hai River. He en- prepared to assassinate Vietnamese officials and countered an elderly farmer who led him to the American personnel. local authorities hi Hai Gu. There he told his In September 1962 Bui was given his mission story but it was not believed. He then admitted his assignment. He was to hide aboard a foreign true mission. ship. When discovered, he was to claim to be a refugee who wanted to "escape" to South Viet- Nam. He was given an automatic pistol with 3. Other Agents silencer, some explosive devices, and a small knife The Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam that could inject poison into the body of a victim. send their agents into South Viet-Nam by a wide Bui stole aboard a foreign ship in Haiphong variety of means. A few like Nguyen Van Vy harbor. After 3 days at sea—when he was sure cross the demilitarized zone, more infiltrate by the ship would not txirn around—Bui surrendered sea, and still more along the infiltration routes to the ship's captain. When the ship arrived in through Laos. But there are other methods for Bangkok, Bui was turned over to the Thai author- entering South Viet-Nam. VC espionage agent ities. They in turn released him to the South Tran Van Bui attempted one such method. Vietnamese as he had requested. But in Saigon Bui was a graduate of the espionage training his true mission was disclosed and he made a full school in Haiphong, North Viet-Nam. He com- confession. II. Hanoi Supplies Weapons, Ammunition., and Other War Materiel to Its Forces in the South When Hanoi launched the VC campaign of ter- for the Viet Cong. But as the pace of the war ror, violence, and subversion in earnest in 1959, has quickened, requirements for up-to-date arms the Communist forces relied mainly on stocks of and special types of weapons have risen to a point weapons and ammunition left over from the war where the Viet Cong cannot rely on captured against the French. Supplies sent in from North stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to re- Viet-Nam came largely from the same source. As equip its forces in the South with Communist- the military campaign progressed, the Viet Cong produced weapons. depended heavily on weapons captured from the Large and increasing quantities of military Armed Forces in South Viet-Nam. This remains supplies are entering South Viet-Nam from out- an important source of weapons and ammunition side the country. The principal supply point is 14 North Viet-Nam, which provides a convenient One captured Viet Cong told his captors that channel for materiel that originates in Communist his entire company had been supplied recently China and other Communist countries. with modern Chinese weapons. The reequipping An increasing number of weapons from external of VC units with a type of weapons that re- Communist sources have been seized in the South. quire ammunition and parts from outside South These include such weapons as 57mm. and 75mm. Viet-Nam indicates the growing confidence of the recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket authorities in Hanoi in the effectiveness of thedr launchers, large mortars, and antitank mines. supply lines into the South. A new group of Chinese Communist-manufac- Incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's elaborate tured weapons has recently appeared in VC program to supply its forces in the South with hands. These include the 7.62 semiautomatic car- weapons, ammunition, and other supplies has ac- bine, 7.62 light machinegun, and the 7.62 assault cumulated over the years. Dramatic new proof rifle. These weapons and ammunition for them, was exposed just as this report was being manufactured in Communist China in 1962, were completed. first captured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter Province. Similar weapons have since been seized pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast in each of the four Corps areas of South Viet- sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship Nam. Also captured have been Chinese Com- of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully cam- munist antitank grenade launchers and ammuni- ouflaged and moored just offshore along the coast tion made in China in 1963. of Phu Yen Province. Fighter planes that ap- Chinese Communist 75 mm. recoilless rifle captured in An Xuyen Province in Sept. 1963. 15 Part of the hull (left) of a North Vietnamese cargo ship which delivered a huge supply of arms and ammunition to the Viet Cong. It was sunk along the coast of Phu Yen Province by South Vietnamese aircraft. More than 100 tons of military supplies were seined. preached the vessel met machinegun fire from •aboard identified the vessel as having come from guns on the deck of the ship and from the shore North Viet-Nam. A newspaper in the cabin was as well. A Vietnamese Air Force strike was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. launched against the vessel, and Vietnamese Gov- The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of ernment troops moved into the area. They seized weapons and more than a million rounds of am- the ship after a bitter fight -with the Viet Cong. munition—were almost all of Communist origin, The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, largely from Communist China and Czechoslo- had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammuni- vakia, as well as North Viet-Nam. At least 100 tion, and other supplies. Documents found on tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship and on the bodies of several Viet Cong the ship. 16 Part of the huge stock of Chinese and other Communist weapons and ammunition seized from the Viet Cong in Phu Yen Province in Feb. 1965. A North Vietnamese military cargo vessel ichich delivered the arms teas sunk. More than 100 tons of weapons and ammunition were captured. (For other pictures of this incident, see appendix E.) A preliminary survey of the cache near the —more than 1,000 rounds of 75 mm. recoilless sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the following rifle ammunition; supplies and weapons: —one 57 mm. recoilless rifle; —2 heavy machineguns; —approximately 1 million rounds of small-arms —2,000, 7.92 Mauser rifles; ammunition; —more than 100, 7.62 carbines; —more than 1,000 stick grenades; —1,000 submachineguns; —500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges; —15 light machineguns; —500 rifles; —2,000 rounds of 82 mm. mortar ammunition; —500 pounds of medical supplies (with labels —500 antitank grenades; from North Viet-Nam, Communist China, —500 rounds of 57 mm. recoilless rifle ammu- Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, nition ; and other sources). 17 ARM OF yif:t»iA« noi: .« E A IT H_ IK 01D FLU! NA^f ••NG'tm« HOAKG iONG "OTMmHfjl POSfTiON TEACHER'' - RANK UNIT CUITORI B ATI A LION S-.y*'-1 '•"". •••*-• ^^ eye TYie document reproduced above is a personal health record issued by the army of North Viet-Nam to its personnel. It bears the name Nguyen Hoang Long. It teas found on the body of a Viet Cong killed when a North Vietnamese military cargo ship was sunk along the coast of South Viet-Nam's Phu Yen Province in Feb. 1965. Another document in the same name was a permit from the North Vietnamese army for Sgt. Long to have leave in Haiphong in Sept. 1964. The ship was fairly new and had been made in unmistakably clear that what is happening in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship South Viet-Nam is not an internal affair but part included three North Vietnamese nautical charts of a large-scale carefully directed and supported (one of the Haiphong area and one of Hong Gay, program of armed attack on a sovereign state and both in North Viet-Nam, and one of the Tra Vinh a free people. area of South Viet-Nam). The military health There have been previous seizures of large records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. stocks of ammunition and weapons and other mili- One man had a political history sheet showing he tary supplies that could only have come from was a member of the 338th Division of the North Communist sources outside South Viet-Nam. In Vietnamese army. (See Appendix E.) December 1963 a Eepublic of Viet-Nam force at- Also aboard the North Vietnamese ship were: tacked a VC stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province an instruction book for a Chinese Communist southwest of Saigon. A large cache of VC equip- navigational device; postcards and letters to ad- ment was seized. Included in the captured stocks dresses in North Viet-Nam; snapshots, including were the following weapons and ammunition, all one of a group of men in North Vietnamese army of Chinese Communist manufacture: uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government. —One 90 mm. rocket launcher; Members of the I.C.C. and representatives of —2 carbines (type 53); the free press visited the sunken North Vietnamese —120 rounds of 75 mm. recoilless rifle ammuni- ship and viewed its cargo. The incident itself tion ; underlined in the most dramatic form that Hanoi —120 detonating fuzes for recoilless rifle am- is behind the continuing campaign of aggression munition ; aimed at conquering South Viet-Nam. It made —14,000 rounds of 7.62 (type P) ammunition; —160,000 rounds of 7.62 carbine ammunition; -—150 fuzes for mortar shells; —100,000 rounds of 7.92 Mauser-type ammuni- tion ; —110 Ibs. (approximate) of TNT; —Two 60 mm. mortars. These weapons and ammunition are the same as those used in the North Vietnamese army. Some of the 7.62 mm. ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.1 Materiel is sent into South Viet-Nam from the North by a variety of methods—overland, by river and canal, and by sea. In one instance Vietnamese troops discovered a cache in which the 75 mm. am- munition alone weighed approximately iy2 tons. It has been estimated that it would require more than 150 porters to carry this quantity of ammuni- tion over rough terrain. However, a few sampans, each manned by a few men, could transport it with little difficulty. It is worth noting, in this con- nection, that the delta where the cache of materiel was seized has 460 miles of seacoast as well as 1 On Jan. 29, 1964. the Government of the Republic of 120 rounds of Chinese Communist 75 mm. ammunition Viet-Nam supplied the International Control Commission for recoilless rifle—part of the huge cache of VC with a list of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment weapons and supplies captured at Dinh Tuong in Dec. of Communist origin captured in South Viet-Nam since 1963. June 1962. The list is summarized in appendix D. 45-760 O-65-4 19 2,500 miles of canals navigable by large water phosphorus made in Communist China has been craft and another 2,200 miles of canals over which among the chemicals captured from the Viet Cong. sampans can move easily. Much of the transport The Communists have shown extreme sensitivity of large stocks of ammunition is undoubtedly to exposure of the fact that war materiel is going waterborne for at least much of its travel into to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam, Commu- South Viet-Nam.2 nist China, and other Communist countries. A Large quantities of chemical components for secret document captured from a VC agent last explosives have been sent into South Viet-Nam for year reflected this sensitivity. The document was the Viet Cong. During 1963 there were at least sent from VC military headquarters in Bien Hoa 15 incidents in which boats, junks, or sampans were Province to subordinate units. It ordered them seized with explosives aboard. More than 20 tons to "pay special attention to the removal of all the of potassium chlorate or nitrate were captured. markings and letters on weapons of. all types cur- rently employed by units and agencies and manu- All these cases were in the delta area, and the ma- factured by friendly East European democratic jority were on or near the Mekong River. Eed countries or by China." It said incriminating 2 Photographs of additional Viet Cong weapons and marking should be chiseled off "so that the enemy ammunition of Communist origin are contained in ap- cannot use it as a propaganda theme every time pendix E. he captures these weapons." III. North Viet-Nam: Base for Conquest of the South The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi tured as an organization established and run by in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its the people in the South themselves. At the 1960 members: "to carry out the socialist revolution in Lao Dong Party Congress the tone was different. North Viet-Nam" and "to liberate South Viet- Then, even before the front existed, the Com- Nam." munist leaders were issuing orders for the group The resolutions ,of the congress described the that was being organized behind the scenes in Ha- effort to destroy the legal Government in South noi. "This front must rally . . ."; "The aims of Viet-Nam as follows: "The revolution in the South its struggle are . . ."; "The front must carry is a protracted, hard, and complex process of out . . ."—this is the way Hanoi and the Com- struggle, combining many forms of struggle of munist Party addressed the "Liberation Front" great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower even before its founding. to higher, and taking as its basis the building, The Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is consolidation, and development of the revolution- neither independent nor southern, and what it ary power of the masses." seeks is not liberation but subjugation of the At the September meeting the Communist lead- South. ers in the North called for formation of "a broad In his address to the Third Lao Dong Party national united front." Three months later Ha- Congress, party and government leader Ho Chi noi announced creation of the "Front for Libera- Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the socialist tion of the South." This is the organization that revolution in the North and, at the same time, to Communist propaganda now credits with guiding step up the national democratic people's revolution the forces of subversion in the South; it is pic- in the South." 20 The year before, writing for Red Flag, the tion Government" would be established; this gov- Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had ernment would agree with the North Vietnamese said much the same thing: government in Hanoi regarding national reunifi- We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are cation "under one form or another." It takes building it in only one part of the country, while in the little imagination to understand the form that is other part we still have to direct ant! bring to a olose the intended. middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution. "Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though South Ill the same vein, the commander-in-chief of the Viet-Nam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means, North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, the party policy of achieving peaceful national spoke at the 1960 party congress of the need to reunification is still correct." "step up the national democratic people's revolu- The official government radio in Hanoi is used tion in the South." Earlier in the year, writing both overtly and covertly to support the Viet for the Oommunist Party journal Hoc Tap in Cong effort in South Viet-Nam. Captured agents Hanoi, General Giap described the North as have testified that the broadcasts are used some- 1 1 "the revolutionary base for the whole country.' ' times to send instructions in veiled code to Viet Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and first Cong representatives in the South. secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more Hoc Tap stated frankly in March 1963: "They explicit when he talked at the party congress about [the authorities in South Viet-Nam] are well the struggle in the South and the party's role. aware that North Viet-Nam is the -firm base for After noting the difficulties involved in overthrow- the southern revolution and the point on which it ing the existing order in South Viet-Nam, Le leans, and that our party is the steady and expe- Duan said: rienced vanguard unit of the working class and Hence the southern people's revolutionary struggle people and is the brain and factor that decides all will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple victories of the revolution." process but a complicated one, combining many varied In April 1964 the Central Committee of the Lao forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation, and Dong Party issued a directive to all party echelons. development of the revolutionary force of the masses. It stated: "When the forces of the enemy and the In this process, we must constantly intensify our soli- plots of the enemy are considered, it is realized darity and. the organisation and education of the people of that the cadres, party members, and people in ti/r South North Viet-Nam must . . . increase their sense of Another high official of the Hanoi regime, responsibility in regard to the South Viet-Nam Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ Hoc revolution by giving positive and practical sup- Tap in April 1961, expressed confidence in the port to South Viet-Nam in every •field.'''' success of the struggle to remove the legal Gov- Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in a Hanoi news- ernment in South Viet-Nam because: "North paper in May 1963, underlined the importance of Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and the role of the North Vietnamese army in Hanoi's strengthened, is providing good support to tlie plans to unify Viet-Nam under Communist rule: South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving ax a strong base for the struggle for national "Our party set forth two strategic tasks to be reunification." carried out at the same time: to transform and He outlined the steps by which the Communists build socialism in the North and to struggle to expect to achieve control over all Viet-Nam as unify the cotmtry. Our army is an instrument of follows: The "Liberation Front" would destroy the class struggle in carrying out these two stra- the present Government in the South; a "Coali- tegic tasks?"1 21 IV. Organization., Direction., Command., and Control of the Attack on South Viet-Nam Are Centered in Hanoi The VC military and political apparatus in Under the Central Office are six regional units, South Viet-Nam is an extension of an elaborate V through IX plus the special zone of Saigon/ military and political structure in North Viet-Nam Cholon/Gia Dinh. A regional committee respon- which directs and supplies it with the tools for sible to the Central Office directs VC activities in conquest. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown each region. Each regional committee has special- that it is ready to allocate every resource that can ized units responsible for liaison, propaganda, be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or training, personnel, subversive activities, espio- equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legit- nage, military bases, and the like. imate Government in South Viet-Nam. and of Below each regional committee are similarly bringing all Viet-Nam under Communist rule. structured units at the province and district lev- els. At the base of the Communist pyramid are the individual party cells, which may be organized A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION on a geographic base or within social or occupa- tional groups. The elaborateness of the party unit Political direction and control of the Viet Cong and the extent to which it operates openly or un- is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e. the Com- derground is determined mainly by the extent of munist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents VC control over the area concerned. are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political 1. The "Liberation Front" nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering The National Front for the Liberation of South facilities of the party are also at the disposal of Viet-Nam is the screen behind which the Commu- the Viet Cong. nists carry out their program of conquest. It is Overall direction of the VC movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the the creature of the Communist Government in Ha- Lao Dong Party. Within the Central Commit- noi. As noted above the Communist Party in the tee a special Reunification Department has been North demanded establishment of such a "front" established. This has replaced the "Committee three months before its formation was actually an- for Supervision of the South" mentioned in intel- nounced in December 1960. It was designed to ligence reports 2 years ago. It lays down broad create the illusion that the Viet Cong campaign of strategy for the movement to conquer South Viet- subversion was truly indigenous to South Viet- Nam. Nam rather than an externally directed Commu- Until March 1962 there were two principal ad- nist plan. ministrative divisions in the VC structure in the The front has won support primarily from the South. One was the Interzone of South-Central Communist world. Its radio faithfully repeats Viet-Nam (sometimes called Interzone 5); the the propaganda themes of Hanoi and Peiping. other was the Nambo Region. In a 1962 reorga- When its representatives travel abroad, they do nization these were merged into one, called the so with North Vietnamese passports and sponsor- Central Office for South Viet-Nam. The Central ship.1 The front's program copies that of the Lao Committee, through its Reunification Department, issues directives to the Central Office, which trans- Dong Party in North Viet-Nam. lates them into specific orders for the appropriate 1 Pictures of North Vietnamese passports and travel subordinate command. documents used by front officials are in appendix F. 22 In late 1061, in still another effort to conceal the In addition to its supervision of the general extent of Communist domination of the front, the military effort of the VC, the military section of Communists announced formation of a new Marx- the Central Office is believed to have direct com- ist political unit, the People's Revolutionary mand of tAvo regimental headquarters and a num- Party (PRP). This mechanism provided a way ber of security companies. to explain the Communist presence in the front The hard core of the VC military organization while at the same time making it appear that the is the full-time regular unit usually based on a Communist voice was only one of several affiliated province or region. These are well-trained and organizations in the front. The PRP itself highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. They follow claimed direct descent from the original Indo- a rigid training schedule that is roughly two- chinese Communist Party and from the North thirds military and one-third political in content. Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi.2 .This compares with the 50-50 proportion for dis- trict units and the TO percent political and 30 per- cent military content of the village guerrilla's B. MILITARY ORGANIZATION training. The size of the Viet Cong regular forces has Military affairs of the Viet Cong are the respon- grown steadily in recent years. For example, the sibility of High Command of the People's Army Viet. Cong have five regimental headquarters com- of North Viet-Xam and the Ministry of Defense, pared with two in 1961. And the main VC force under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party. is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than These responsibilities include operational plans, before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. assignments of individuals and regular units, Hard-core VC strength now is estimated at about training programs, infiltration of military person- 35,000, whereas it was less than 20,000 in 1961. nel and supplies, military communications, tacti- The main force battalions are well armed with cal intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six a variety of effective weapons including 75-nim. military regions are the same as those of the VC recoilless rifles and 81-82-mm. mortars. The com- political organization. panies and smaller units are equally well equipped The military structure of the Viet Cong is an and have 57-mm. recoilless rifles and 60-mm. integral part of the political machinery that con- mortars in their inventory. It is estimated that the trols every facet of VC activity in South Viet-Nam Viet Cong have at least 130 81-mm. mortars and under Hanoi's overall direction. Each political 300 60-mm. mortars. There is no precise estimate headquarters from the Central Office down to the for the number of recoilless rifles in their hands, village has a military component which controls but it is believed that most main force units are day-to-day military operations. Similarly, each equipped with them. In at least one recent, action military headquarters has a political element, an the Viet Cong employed a 75-mm. pack howitzer. individual or a small staff. This meshing of poli- This mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500 tical and military activity is designed to insure the closest cooperation in support of the total yards, will increase the Viet Cong capabilities Communist mission. It also gives assurance of to launch long-range attacks against many sta- political control over the military. tionary targets in the country. Associated with the Central Office, believed to Supporting the main force units of the Viet. be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a military Cong are an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-time headquarters. Through this headquarters, as well guerrillas. They are generally organized at the as through other channels, Hanoi maintains direct district level where there are likely to be several contact with its principal military units in the companies of 50 or more men each. These troops South. receive only half pay, which means they must work at least part of the time to eke out a- living. 2 For evidence that the People's Revolutionary Party in the South and the Communist Lao Dong Party in the Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the dis- North are one Party, see appendix G. trict are the part-time, village-based guerrillas. 23 The smoking ruins of a Cao Dai temple in Tan Hanh village, Vinh Long Province, burned down by VC terrorists on Aug. 10, 1964. The 64-year-old caretaker died in the flames. They are available for assignment by higher head- Later, he was transferred to a Communist military quarters and are used for harassment and sabo- unit in another province. After learning of the tage. They are expected to warn nearby VC units Government's "Open Arms" program, he decided of the approach of any force of the legal govern- to defect from the VC. In May 1964, he walked ment. They provide a pool for recruitment into into a Government outpost and asked for the VC district forces. protection. The record shows that many of the village guer- Money to pay the regular VC units comes from rillas are dragooned into service with the Viet a variety of sources. Funds are sent from Hanoi. Cong. Some are kidnaped; others are threat- "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. ened; still others join to prevent their families Landowners and plantation operators often must from being harmed. Once in the Viet Cong net, pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having many are reluctant to leave for fear of punishment their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation by the authorities or reprisal by the Communists. companies have been forced to pay the VC or face Lam Van Chuoi is a typical example. He was the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. a member of the Village Civil Defense force in his Officials and wealthy people have been kidnaped home village in Kien Giang province. In March for ransom. The VC have often stopped buses 1960, he was kidnaped by the Viet Cong and kept and taken the money and valua-bles of all on board. a prisoner in the highlands for one month. There For the most part, the VC have concentrated he was subjected to intense propaganda and indoc- their, attention on individuals, isolated or poorly trination. He was returned to his village but kept defended outposts, and small centers of popula- under close observation and steady pressure. tion. They have mercilessly killed or kidnaped Finally, he was convinced he must join the VC. thousands of village chiefs and other local officials. 24 But over the past year the VC have moved into It operates through special units at Haiphong and larger unit operations. Their ability to operate at Hongay. on. a battalion-level or larger has substantially A second special center is responsible for VC increased. intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demar- cation line," the border with South Viet-Nam. C. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North Viet-Nam, is responsible for sending agents and A key element in the Viet Cong effort is an elab- supplies to the South by sea. It also cooperates orate organization in Hanoi called the Central with the North Vietnamese army in planning and Research Agency (C.R.A.) (Cue Nghien-Cuu carrying out infiltration. The C.R.A. maintains Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelli- intelligence bases in Laos and other countries. ence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus Inside South Viet-Nam the Viet Cong have a of its operation is on South Viet-Nam. This agen- large intelligence network. Some of its units cy is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities are responsible far receiving and sending on agents of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Viet- arriving from the North. They feed and give namese armed forces for information, personnel, instructions to groups infiltrating into South Viet- and facilities. Nam. They take delivery of equipment and sup- The C.R.A. reportedly operates under the close plies received from the North and relay them to personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some Viet Cong units in the South. of the top officials in the Hanoi government re- Many Viet Cong agents have been captured in portedly sit on its directing committee, including Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier the C.R.A. to penetrate all Republic of Viet-Nam Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other Giap. specialized organizations. Party and military Considerable information on the organization intelligence units and agents work closely with of the C.R.A. has become available from captured the C.R.A. Viet Cong agents and from the work of intelli- Each of the main centers operating under C-R.A. gence agents of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Much headquarters has its own sections and units de- of this information cannot be made public for signed to carry out its main functions. The cen- security reasons, but it is possible to describe the ter at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main in- C.R.A. organization and its operations in broad filtration effort of the Viet Cong, has separate outline. sections for radio communications, coding, docu- The headquarters of the C.R.A. in Hanoi is mentation and training, and liaison. It also has divided into six main sections, not including a specialized units for infiltration through the special code unit. The six sections are respon- mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" sible for administration, cadres, communications, in the mountain area. espionage, research, and training. Each section The C.R.A. maintains a large and expanding has units to handle the specialized activities of radio communications network. Agents also are its particular area of responsibility. The research used to carry messages, usually in secret writing section, for example, has subsections that handle or memorized. political, economic, and military affaire respec- Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelli- gence operation in support of the Viet Cong is tively. 1 C.R.A. headquarters directs a number of special one of the most extensive of its kind in the world. centers for overseas operations. One such center 1 Charts of the VC organizational structure are in maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas. appendix H. 25 V. A Brief History of Hanoi s Campaign of Aggression Against South Viet-Nam While negotiating an end to the Indochina War Production of textiles increased in the South at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making more than 20 percent in one year (1958). In the plans to take ov&r all former French territory in same year, South Viet-Nam's sugar crop increased Southeast Asia. When Viet-Nam was parti- more than 100 percent. Despite North Viet- tioned, thousands of carefully selected party mem- Nam's vastly larger industrial complex, South bers were ordered to remain in place in the South Viet-Nam's per capita gross national product in and keep their secret apparatus intact to help pro- 1960 was estimated at $110 a person while it was mote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were only $70 in the North. stored away for future use. Guerrilla fighters re- More than 900,000 refugees who had fled from joined their families to await the party's call. Communist rule in the North were successfully Others withdrew to remote jungle and mountain settled in South Viet-Nam. An agrarian reform hideouts. The majority—an estimated 90,000— program was instituted. The elementary school were moved to North Viet-Nam. population nearly quadrupled between 1956 and Hanoi's original calculation was that all of 1960. And so it went—a record of steady im- Viet-Nam would fall under its control without provement in the lives of the people. It was resort to force. For this purpose, Communist intolerable for the rulers in Hanoi; under peace- cadres were ordered to penetrate official and non- ful conditions, the South was outstripping the official agencies, to propagandize and sow con- North. They were losing the battle of peaceful fusion, and generally to use all means short of competition and decided to use violence and terror open violence to aggravate war-torn conditions to gain their ends. and to weaken South Viet-Nam's Government and After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and ex- social fabric. panded its covert political and military machinery South Viet-Nam's refusal to fall in with in the South. Defectors were replaced by trained Hanoi's scheme for peaceful takeover came as a personnel from party ranks in the North. Mili- heavy blow to the Communists. Meantime, the tary units and political cells were enlarged and Government had stepped up efforts to blunt Viet were given new leaders, equipment, and intensi- Cong subversion and to expose Communist agents. fied training. Recruitment was pushed. In short, Morale in the Communist organization in the Hanoi and its forces in the South prepared to take South dropped sharply. Defections were numer- by force and violence what they had failed to ous. achieve by other means. Among South Vietnamese, hope rose that their By 1958 the use of terror by the Viet Cong in- nation could have a peaceful and independent creased appreciably. It was used both to win pres- future, free of Communist domination. The tige and to back up demands for support from the country went to work. The years after 1955 were people, support that political and propaganda ap- a period of steady progress and growing pros- peals had failed to produce. It was also designed perity. to embarrass the Government in Saigon and raise Food production levels of the prewar years doubts about its ability to maintain internal order were reached and surpassed. While per capita and to assure the personal security of its, people. food output was dropping 10 percent in the North From 1959 through 1961, the pace of Viet Cong from 1956 to 1960, it rose 20 percent in the South. terrorism and armed attacks accelerated substan- By 1963, it had risen 30 percent—despite the dis- tially. ruption in the countryside caused by intensified The situation at the end of 1961 was so grave Viet Cong military attacks and terrorism. The that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam authorities in the North admitted openly to con- asked the United States for increased military as- tinuing annual failures to achieve food produc- sistance. That request was met. Meantime, the tion goals. program of strategic hamlets, designed to improve 26 The wreckage of a civilian bus destroyed by a Viet Cong mine on Mar. 22, 1964, in Long An Province; 22 civilian passengers, including 6 children, were killed in the incident. the peasant's livelihood and give him some protec- tary and political apparatus by increased infiltra- tion against Viet Cong harassment and pressure, tion. Increasingly they struck at remote outposts was pushed energetically. and the most vulnerable of the new strategic ham- But the Viet Cong did not stand still. To meet lets and expanded their campaign of aggressive the changing situation, they tightened their orga- attacks, sabotage, and terror. nization and adopted new tactics, with increasing Any official, worker, or establishment that rep- emphasis on terrorism, sabotage, and armed at- resents a service to the people by the Government tacks by small groups. They also introduced from in Saigon is fair game for the Viet Cong. Schools the North technicians in fields such as armor and have been among their favorite targets. Through antiaircraft. Heavier weapons were sent in to the harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage regular guerrilla forces. of buildings, the Viet Cong succeeded in closing The military and insurgency situation was com- hundreds of schools and interrupting the education plicated by a quite separate internal political of tens of thousands of youngsters. struggle in South Viet-Nam, which led in Novem- Hospitals and medical clinics have often been ber 1963 to the removal of the Diem government attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and its replacement with a new one. Effective and also because such attacks provide the Viet power was placed in the hands of a Military Revo- Cong with needed medical supplies. The Com- lutionary Council. There have been a number of munists have encouraged people in rural areas to changes in the leadership and composition of the oppose the Government's antimalaria teams, and Government in Saigon in the ensuing period. some of the workers have been killed. Village These internal developments and distractions and town offices, police stations, and agricultural gave the Viet Cong an invaluable opportunity, research stations are high on the list of preferred and they took advantage of it. Viet Cong agents targets for the Viet Cong. did what they could to encourage disaffection and In 1964, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs to exploit demonstrations in Saigon and elsewhere. and other Government officials were killed out- In the countryside the Communists consolidated right by the Viet Cong and 1,131 were kidnaped. their hold over some areas and enlarged their mili- More than 1,350 civilians were killed in bombings 45-760 O-65-5 27 The maternity hospital of My Phuoc Toy in Dinh Tuong Province, destroyed by Viet Cong terrorists on Apr. 8, 1964 and other acts of sabotage. And at least 8,400 until it has been completely rooted out and this civilians were kidnaped by the Viet Cong.1 land enjoys the peace which it deserves." Today the war in Viet-Nam has reached new President Johnson has repeatedly stressed that levels of intensity. The elaborate effort by the the United States' goal is to see peace secured in Communist regime in North Viet-Nam to conquer Southeast Asia. But he has noted that "that will the South has grown, not diminished. Military come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in men, technicians, political organizers, propagan- peace." dists, and secret agents have been infiltrating into Though it has been apparent for years that the the Republic of Viet-Nam from the North in regime in Hanoi was conducting a campaign of growing numbers. The flow of Communist-sup- conquest against South Viet-Nam, the Government plied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, in Saigon and the Government of the United has increased. Communications links with Hanoi States both hoped that the danger could be met are extensive. Despite the heavy casualties of 3 within South Viet-Nam itself. The hope that any years of fighting, the hard-core VC force is con- widening of the conflict might be avoided was siderably larger now than it was at the end of stated frequently. 1961. The leaders in Hanoi chose to respond with The Government in Saigon has undertaken greater violence. They apparently interpreted vigorous action to meet the new threat. The restraint as indicating lack of will. Their efforts United States and other free countries have in- were pressed with greater vigor and armed attacks creased their assistance to the Vietnamese Govern- and incidents of terror multiplied. ment and people. Secretary of State Dean Rusk Clearly the restraint of the past was not provid- visited Viet-Nam in 1964, and he promised the ing adequately for the defense of South Viet-Nam Vietnamese: "We shall remain at your side until against Hanoi's open aggression. It was mutually the aggression from the North has been defeated, agreed between the Governments of the Republic 1 For additional details of VC terrorism, see appendix I. of Viet-Nam and the United States that further 28 means for providing for South Viet-Nam's defense Until the regime in Hanoi decides to halt its were required. Therefore, air strikes have been intervention in the South, or until effective steps made against some of the military assembly points are taken to maintain peace and security in the and supply bases from which North Viet-Nam is area, the Governments of South Viet-Nam and conducting its aggression against the South. the United States will continue necessary measures These strikes constitute a limited response fitted to of defense against the Communist armed aggres- the aggression that produced them. sion coming from North Viet-Nam. VI. Conclusion The evidence presented in this report could be the freedom and security of South Viet-Nam. multiplied many times with similar examples of The people of South Viet-Nam have chosen to the drive of the Hanoi regime to extend its rule resist this threat. At their request, the United over South Viet-Nam. States has taken its place beside them in their de- The record is conclusive. It establishes beyond fensive struggle. question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a The United States seeks no territory, no military carefully conceived plan of aggression against the bases, no favored position. But we have learned South. It shows that North Viet-Nam has inten- the meaning of aggression elsewhere in the post- sified its efforts in the years since it was condemned war world, and we have met it. by the International Control Commission. It If peace can be restored in South Viet-Nam, the proves that Hanoi continues to press its system- United States will be ready at once to reduce ite atic program of armed aggression into South Viet- military involvement. But it will not abandon Nam. This aggression violates the United Nations friends who want to remain free. It will do what Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva must be done to help them. The choice now be- accords of 1954 and of 1962 to which North tween peace and continued and increasingly de- Viet-Nam is a party. It shatters the peace of structive conflict is one for the authorities in Southeast Asia. It is a fundamental threat to Hanoi to make. 29 APPENDIX A Findings of the International Control Commission (See Introduction, page 1) On June 2, 1962, the International Commission ther conclusion that there is evidence to show that the for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam (I.C.C.) PAVN [People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and sup- sent a special report to the Governments of the porting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed United Kingdom and of the Soviet Union in their at the overthrow of the Administration in the South. The role as Cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, on use of the Zone in the North for such activities is in Indo-China. The I.C.C. is composed of delegates violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on from India (chairman), Canada, and Poland. the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam. In its report the I.C.C. noted the following find- The I.C.C. report then stated: ings of the Commission's Legal Committee: The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Having examined the complaints and the supporting Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show material sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Com- beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated mittee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific instances. The Polish there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed per- delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis sonnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the with the object of supporting, organising and carrying Commission will take action as appropriate in each in- out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed dividual case. against the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, The full text of the I.C.C. report is contained in 19, 34 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hos- a publication, "Special Report to the Co-Chairmen tilities in Viet-Nam. of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China" issued In examining the complaints and the supporting mate- rial in particular documentary material sent by the South by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the De- Vietnamese Mission, the Committee has come to the fur- partment of State on July 2, 1962. 30 APPENDIX B Infiltration of Military Personnel From North Viet-Nam Into South Viet-Nam (See section I, B.) 1. Map showing the route over which Huynh Due Tha, deputy commander of a Viet Cong company, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam from the North in Mar .-Apr. 1962. Tha surrendered to Government forces in July 1963. (MARCH 9, 1962] 10- 2. Map showing the infiltration route of VC Master Sergeant Tran Him Hung, who was taken prisoner in June 1963. 100 105° 110° .,^'^.r-^.r- NORTH t \ VIETNAM \--7-I /- .L^- * \** '^) XUAN MAI .(March 23, 1962) 20° LAOS *-\ ^(March 26, 1962] IN LAOS VfCHEPONE "&- CROSSED/" BORDER £V > DESTINATION _ 15° 1 (April 21, 1962) KU*r" -- 10' 100 105° 110° 32 APPENDIX C Detail on Military Infiltration With Case Studies (See section I, B and O.) The following table shows the scale of infiltration of military personnel from North Viet-Nam into the South since 1959. The confirmed list is based on information on infiltration groups from at least two independent sources. Year Confirmed Estimated Total additional 1959-60 1,800 2, 700 4,500 1961 3, 750 1, 650 5,400 1962 5,400 7, 000 12, 400 1963 4,200 3, 200 7,400 1964 4,400 3,000 7, 400 Total 19, 550 17, 550 37, 100 Photographs and brief case histories of typical Viet Cong who were sent into South Viet-Nam by the authorities in Hanoi follow. Name: Le Van Thanh Alias: Huu Tain Date and place of birth: July 12, 1936, Hoa Hao hamlet, Cat Tai vil- lage, Phu Cat district (Binh Dinh) Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Lt, formerly platoon leader of signal platoon of 3d Bn., 90th Regt., 324th Div. VC position in South Viet-Nam: Platoon leader of signal platoon of 95th Bn., 2d Regt., 5th Inter-Region Date entered South Viet-Nam: Departed Nov. 27, 1961, arrived Do Xa station early Feb. 1962 Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied to Government at Xhon Loc post, Xghia Hanh district (Quang Ngai) May 24, 1962 33 Name: La Thanh Alias: Nguyen Ba Tong - La Giau Date and place of birth: 1928, Can Tho city (Phong Dinh) Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Sr. sgt., formerly squad leader in charge of construction of barracks for 338th Div. VC position in South Viet-Nam: Squad leader, 8th Squad, 3d Platoon, 3d Co., 218B Bn. (War Zone L>) Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed Apr. 4, 1962, arrived War Zone D early Aug. 1962 Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Cau Song Be (bridge) post Sept. 8,1962, with 1 MAS 36 Name: Le Van Quyen Alias: Ho Hai, Hong Thanh Date and place of birth: 1929, Tan Binh Than village, Cho Gao district (My Tho) Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Lt., formerly assigned to 338th Brigade as instructor on heavy weapons such as 57 mm. recoilless rifle and maehinegun VC position in South Viet-Nam: Platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 2d Co., Infiltration Group 15 Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; de- parted Apr. 3, 1962, arrived Suoi Da (War Zone D) Sept. 10, 1962 Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Hieu Liem dis- trict (Phuoc Thanh) Oct. 7, 1962 34 Name: Nguyen Van Do Party name: Thanh Minn Infiltration alias: Nguyen Thuan Date and place of birth: 1923, Thuan Giao village, Lai Thieu district (Binh Duong) Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Sr. capt. (Bn. comdr.) 1st Bn., 338th Brigade VC position in South Viet-Nam: Subject was to be appointed comdr. of Phuoc Tuy Province Main Force Battalion Date entered South Viet-Nam: Conidr. of Infiltration Group H. 26; departed Xuan Mai, Ha Dong (North Viet-Nam) July 4,1963; arrived Ban Me Thuot Oct. 23,1963 Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied at Ban Don post, Ban Me Thuot, Oct. 23, 1963, while guiding Group H.26 to Hai Yen Zone Name: Nguyen Thanh Phi Party name: Hung Phuong Infiltration alias: Nguyen Tu Date and place of birth: Nov. 16, 1926, Thanh Van village, Thanh Chuong district (Nghe An) Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Doctor, chief of internal disease section, Tiep Viet Hospital VC position in South Viet-Nam: Doctor, health team leader, 5th Region base construction group (Do Xa) Date entered South Viet-Nam: Mar. 1962 Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Viet- namese Armed Forces May 4, 1963, with 1 12mm. Colt pistol and 5 rounds 35 Name: Le Van Net Party name: Le Hung Tien Infiltration alias: Le Na Date and place of birth: 1924, Tan Hiep village, Go Cong, Diuh Tuong Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Discharged Lt., served in Co Dinh chronrite mine (Thanh Hoa) with grade of sr. sgt. VC position in South Viet-Nam: Sr. sgt.. 6th Squad, 2d Platoon, Infil- tration Group H.26 Date entered South Viet-Nam: Late June 1963 with Infiltration Group H.26 Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured Nov. 16, 1963, by inhabitants in strategic hamlet in Ban Me Thuot (Darlac) with 1 Communist Chinese rifle and 70 rounds Name: Van Cong Khanh. Party name: Pham Tien Date and place of birth: 1924, An Hoi village, Chau Thanh district (Kien Hoa) Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Discharged and reassigned to Co Dinh chroniite mine (Thanh Hoa) as sr. sgt. VC position in South Viet-Nam: Aspirant, leader of 7th Squad, 3d Platoon, 608th Engineer Co. subordinate to Hdqtrs. Region 7 Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Group 49, infiltrated into South Viet-Nam Mar. 18, 1962 Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured Nov. 23, 1962, in Bung Dia hamlet 36 Name: Nguyen Thanh Hoa Party name: Quoc Infiltration alias: Nguyen Quoc Trung Date and place of birth: 1917, Phong Coc village, Ha Nam canton (Quaug Yen) Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Capt, discharged and reassigned to Chi Ne agricultural camp May 1957 VC position in South Viet-Nam: Comdr., 4th Main Force Battalion Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 52; departed Xuan Mai Apr. 13, 1961, arrived about Aug. 1961 Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Viet- namese Armed Forces with 1 PA 38 (pistol) in Quon Long (Dinh Tuong) Aug. 1962 Name: Tran van Khoa Alias: Tran Hong Hai Date and place of birth: 1935, Giong Gach hamlet, An Hiep village, Ba Tri district, Ben Tre Province (Kien Hoa) Rank and position in North Viet-Nam: Sgt, formerly driver of Trans- portation Group 3 of (Hanoi) Logistical Bureau VC position in South Viet-Nam: Member of 46th Infiltration Co.; cover designation V.2 (infiltrated unit) Date entered South Viet-Nam: Accompanied the 46th Infiltration Co.; departed for South Viet-Nam Apr. 17, 1962 Date, place, and circumstance of capture: Captured by South Viet- namese Rangers in ambush (after being wounded) along with 1 MAS 36 July 7, 1962, in Phuoe Long Province 37 APPENDIX D List of Communist Weapons Captured in South Viet-Nam (See section II.) On January 29, 1964, the Government of Viet-Nam submitted to the International Control Com- mission a list of weapons and other military equipment which had been captured from the Viet Cong. The weapons and equipment came from Communist sources outside South Viet-Nam and obviously had been introduced clandestinely into the country in support of the Viet Cong campaign of conquest directed by Hanoi. I. CHINESE COMMUNIST ORIGIN Type Quantity Date of capture Place 75-mm, recoilless rifle 1 9/10/63 . . An Xuyen Province 1 12/2-6/63 . An Xuyen Province 1 12/22/63. . Dinh Tuong Total 3 57-mm. recoilless gun 1 11/25/62 . Phuoc Chau in Quang Tin (1 gun and 7 gun carriages) 12/5/62 . Phu Bon (1 gun carriage) 2 8/31/63 . Province of Quang Ngai Total 3 guns (8 gun carriages) Shells for 75-mm. gun (shells bear 8 11/24/63 . . Province of An Xuyen markings in Chinese characters. On some shells, markings were scratched out and replaced by "American" markings.) 120 12/22/63 Operation Due Thang at Dinh Tuong Total 128 Shells for 57-mm. gun 49 11/25/62 Phuoc Chau, Province of Quang Tin 8 2/20/63 Viet Cong attack on the post of Ben Heo (Tay Ninh) 33 5/24/63 On a Viet Cong vessel on the Bassac River 6 8/31/63 Quang Ngai 1 10/8/63 Province of Binh Dinh 58 12/22/63 Dinh Tuong Total 155 38 I. CHINESE COMMUNIST ORIGIN— Continued Type Quantity Date of capture Place 80-mm. mortar 1 3/25/63 . . Province of Tav Ninh 1 1/7/63 . . . Phuoc Thanh 2 12/22/63 . . Dinh Tuong Total 3 Shells for 60-mm. mortar 18 9/10/63 . . Province of An Xuyen 165 12/22/63 . . Dinh Tuong Total 183 90-mm. bazooka 1 12/22/63 . . Dinh Tuong. Caliber 27-mm. rocket launcher . . 2 6/10/62 . . Provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Due. Total 3 Caliber 7.92-mm. model 08 Maxim 2 9/10/63 . . Province of An Xuyen machinegun 4 12/21/63. . Chuong Thien Total 6 MP-82 rocket 142 4/24/63 . . Quang Ngai TNT explosives 365 charges 6/13/62 . . Quang Due 43 11/25/62. . Phuoc Chau (Quang Tin) 29 5/7/63. . . Can Tho 140 12/22/63. . Dinh Tuong Total 577 charges R-ed phosphorous 5 kg. 4/19/63 . . Province of Kien Phong Potassium chlorate 17 tons Sept '62 On a Viet Cong vessel at Phu Quoe 2 tons 4/19/63 . . Province of Kien Phong 150 kg. 7/10-15/63 . Phu Quoc Total 19 tons 155 kg. Cartridges for 7.92-mm. 100, 000 12/22/63 . . Dinh Tuong machinegun. Detonating fuses for 60-mm. 150 . . do . . Do. mortar shell. 39 II. SOVIET ORIGIN Type Quantity Date of capture Place MP 82 rifle 5/10/62 . . Binh Dinh Launching cartridges . . do . . Do. Mossin Nagant carbine (with auto- 1 6/13/63 . . Kien Phong matic bayonet). 2 7/13/63 . . Long An 5 7/20/63 . . Dinh Tuong 7 9/8/63 . . Dinh Tuong Total 15 Rifles 6 10/6/63 . . Long An 1 10/19/63 . Dinh Tuong 11 11/6/63 . . Vinh Binh 1 11/17/63 . Dinh Tuong 1 11/25/63 . Hau Nghia 1 12/6/63 . . Dinh Tuong 8 12/7/63 . . Phong Dinh 1 12/12/63 . Kien Tuong 1 12/13/63 . An Xuyen 1 12/16/63 . Kien Giang 1 . . . do . . Ba Xuyen 3 . . . do . . An Xuyen 1 12/17/63 . Phong Dinh 1 12/20/63 . Kien Hoa 6 12/21/63 . Chuong Thien 2 1 '2/22/63 . Dinh Tuong Total 46 Automatic pistol 1 10/19/63 Phan Thiet Grenades 5 Long An 160, 000 12/22/63 Dinh Tuong Submachinegun (machine pistol) . . 2 9/23/63 . . Long Xuyen 40 III. CZECH ORIGIN Type Quantity Date of capture Place 7.65-mm. automatic pistol .... 1 1/2/63 . . . On person of Viet Cong leader arrested at Phu Yen K— 50 submachinegun 2 11/25/62 . . Quang Tin 1 11/29/62 . . Phuoc Long 7 4/24/63 . . Quang Ngai 5 5/9/63 . . . Quang Tin 2 7/11/63 . . Operation Hau Giang 3 8/31/63 . . Quang Ngai 1 9/8/63 . . . Dinh Tuong 1 9/16/63 . . Long An 1 10/17/63. . Quang Nam 2 11/13/63. . Phu Yen 1 _. do At Hue 9 10/8/63 . . Binh Dinh 1 Operation Phuoc Binh Thang 1 12/20/63. . Kien Hoa 1 12/26/63. . Chuong Thien 1 12/17/63. . Long Xuyen Total 40 Rifles 9 9/10/63 An !!XIIVGII 1 10/19/63. . Chuong Thien 1 11/6/63 . . Ba Xuyen 2 11/9/63 . . Chuong Thien 3 11/13/63. . Kien Giang 1 11/17/63. . Ba Xuyen 2 11/26/63. . Hau Nghia 1 12/2/63 . . Phong Dinh 6 12/21/63. . Chuong Thien Total 26 41 III. CZECH ORIGIN—Continued Type Quantity Date o( capture Place 14, 000 12/22/63 . . Dinh Tuong Grenade launcher 1 7/14/63 . . Long An 3 5 antitank bazooka . . 1 12/22/63 . Din Tuong IV. (a) WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MODIFIED BY THE REGULAR ARMY OP NORTH VIET-NAM Type Quantity Date of capture Place Modified MAT-49 16 11/25/62 . Quang Tin 2 12/ 5/63 . . Phu Bon 6 11/13/63 . . Total 24 12.7-mm machinegun 2 11/24/63 Operation at Due Ho& IV. (b) MATERIEL AND 'EQUIPMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MANUFACTURE Uniform 12/21/62 . . Phuoc Thanh Helmets 16 10/8-10/63 . Kien Hoa Socks . . (No number given) 12/21/62 . Phuoc Thanh Sweaters (made in Ha Dong) ...... do Do. Belts (made in Hajioi) . . . . do . . Do Mess Kits (made in Haiphong) . . ... do Do. 42 APPENDIX E Photos of Captured Viet Cong Weapons and Ammunition From External Communist Sources (See section II.) The following are photographs of some of the many weapons and the large stocks of ammunition supplied to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam from external Communist sources. ^fimf^i -^M^If^M T ' • '• •' '*t «*••'*< ''i*'* •"'• '•' * ' -- :'-''-» '"'•'°%VlS»«'i1:^-'^i^l^S - • •''.{• *.*•'$>;.': • ."• S^MfS^V^t^l^w/^'aJ • -i -••: v -i-;^v*fs*^M'S^r^« : f ? ' . tr i-f ~. u'- .;.f ' *.'*$' - &&\•%*'*-mF%iv i,'.-1. ;i -* ?i-Aa-;»|J%$S North Vietnamese nautical chart of Haiphong harbor and channel. It was found aboard the North Vietnamese cargo vessel that delivered weapons, ammunition, and other supplies to the Viet Cong. It was sunk by the South Vietnamese Air Force along the coast of Phu Yen Province on Feb. 16, 1965. (For details, see section II, pp. 15-17.) 43 .. _. vtvirtv-v-s; GIAV NGH1 PHEP !» A , :; . . MUit"? ^> .1 >.;> Tin Ibu8c : ...-..... Quy cicli :.. _____ J. . x ' ' SS Itrwng S«J krtpi soil Lo : .._-. J4MWW..1' Hpi dong-'36n^ g6l : .J Ngiffri d6ng libra: packing slip found in one of the many boxes of military supplies dis- covered at the site of the sunken North Vietnamese ship in Phu Yen. It shows clearly that the supplies originated in Hanoi. More than 100 tons of weapons and ammunition were found, as well as medicines and other supplies. f^W-Sn vc &* kheB*eh Part o/ a document captured aboard the sunken North Vietnamese munitions supply ship in Phu Yen in February 1965. The heading shows it originated in North Viet-Nam's navy headquarters, Group 125. It carries the nota- tion "K.35" believed to be the designation of the sunken, ship or its unit. Part of the huge supply of Communist weapons and ammunition seized in Phu Yen Province from the Viet Cong Feb. 1965. These are 82 mm. mor- tar shells made in Communist China. Chinese Communist PC—2 antitank am- munition. This was part of the more than 100 tons of weapons and ammu- nition delivered to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam and captured from the Viet Cong in Phu Yen Province in Feb. 1965. 46 A closeup view of the wreckage of the North Vietnamese supply ship sunk off the coast of South Viet-Nam's Phu Yen Province. It had delivered a large supply of arms, ammunition, and other materiel to the Viet Cong. 47 .*». Chinese Communist 7.92 mm. heavy machinegun captured from the Viet Cong in An Xuyen in Sept. 1963. A 200-gram block of Chinese Communist TNT captured North Vietnamese Kl mm. mortar captured in Kontum at Quang Ngai in Apr. 1962. in Oct. 1960. Communist Chinese stick grenades, submachineguns, and other weapons captured front the Viet Cong in Quang Tin Province in Nov. 1962. 49 Chinese Communist 60 mm. mortar shell, one of several picked up after a battle in Phu Yen in July 1963. 50 <_& T^ yi ' fe i , •• "^Ss?1 ''"'!* o v ' i ' 1 , , * -|~ ' * 6* J '*» i4 Chinese Communist 7.62 mm. carbine seized in Dink Tuong in Sept. 1963. 51 Chinese markings on 75 mm. recoilless rifle shells captured at Dinh Tuong in Dec. 1963. * c'- , ;-¥ *v ^-v^* M ?w "r w i ^i» "l , " s y V J T *J V 1 i- ^^sSi Vjl, ., AvJ »A* SL 'r^ \ f, ! * ,,&«, Gun sight of Chinese Communist manufacture. It teas mounted on a VC machinegun captured in Long An in Nov. 1963. 53 APPENDIX F North Vietnamese Passports and Travel Documents Used by Liberation Front Officials (See section IV, A, 1.) Huynh Van Nghia and Nguyen Van Tien are officials of the "National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam." Though they profess to be citizens of South Viet-Nam, their ties are with and their sup- port comes from North Viet-Nam and the Communist regime in Hanoi. In 1963, when the two men traveled abroad on front business, they traveled as North Vietnamese with passports and other docu- ments issued by the Hanoi regime. Photographs of these documents follow: Huynh Van Nghia's passport. 54 Second page of his North Viet-Nam passport, including Nghia's picture. « a Immunisation card for travel abroad issued by the Hanoi regime to Huynh Van Nghia. 55 itWUHIH «WC«iU!«ltl tU VlfT ttl P*SSEK)RT •fca.U':J 5^ss!37S:^.5Sv Front page of Nguyen Van Tien's North Vietnamese passport (No. 640). Tien's picture and description in his North Vietnamese passport. 56 APPENDIX G The People's Revolutionary Party (South) and the Lao Dong Party (North) Are One Communist Party (See section IV, A.) Iii May 1962 a military force of the Government Central Committee, one must not tell the people or party of Viet-Nam captured a number of Viet Cong sympathizers that the People's Revolutionary Party and the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam are one. One must not documents in Ba Xuyen Province. One of these say that it is only a tactic, because it would not be good for documents contained instructions from the pro- the enemy to know. . . . vincial committee of the Lao Dong Party (Com- munist Party) in Ba Xuyen to the party's district A third party circular, dated December 8, 1961, committees concerning formation of the new Peo- said: ple's Eevolutionary Party (PRP). Study the instructions so that you will be able to Pertinent sections of the instruction, dated execute them. In passing them to D2V, D2. and K, be December 7,1961, follow: very careful that the documents do not fall into enemy hands. After D2N/C has passed to the sections, destroy To D2 and K, the written documents immediately. . . . In regard to the foundation of the People's Revolu- tionary Party of South Viet-Nam, the creation of this The originals and translations of the above doc- party is only a matter of strategy; it needs to be ex- uments were submitted to the International Con- plained within the party; and, to deceive the enemy, it trol Commission by the Government of Viet-Nam is necessary that the new party be given the outward on May 30,1962.1 appearance corresponding to a division of the party (Lao Dong) into two and the foundation of a new party, so In 1964 new rules and regulations were promul- that the enemy cannot use it in his propaganda. gated for the People's Revolutionary Party. A Within the party, it is necessary to explain that the copy of the new rules was captured from the Viet founding of the People's Revolutionary Party has the purpose of isolating the Americans and the Ngo Dinh Cong in Chuong Thien Province in November Diem regime, and to counter their accusations of an in- 1964. A photograph of the captured document vasion of the South by the North. It is means of sup- appears on the next page. Key portions of porting our sabotage of the Geneva agreement, of advanc- the instructions said that new rules and regula- ing the plan of invasion of the South, and at the same time permitting the Front for Liberation of the South to tions had been approved for the PRP, "but the recruit new adherents, and to gain the sympathy of non- real nature of those rules and regulations is that alined countries in Southeast Asia. they still are the rules and regulations of the Viet- The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appear- Nam Lao Dong Party (in North Viet-Nam)." ance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam (Viet-Minh The instructions added: "... we should realize Communist Party), 'unified from North to South, under that our country is one country, that the Viet- the direction of the central executive committee of the namese People's Revolutionary Party and the party, the chief of which is President Ho. . . . During these explanations, take care to keep this Viet-Nam Lao Dong Party are one party. . . . strictly secret, especially in South Viet-Nam, so that the There is nothing different between the two enemy does not perceive our purpose. . . . parties." Do not put these explanations in party bulletins, . . . 1 Another party circular of the same date said: For picture of captured documents and text, see the white paper "Communist Viet Minn Aggressive Policy," The reasons for the change in the party's name must published by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, be kept strictly secret. According to instructions of the Saigon, July 1962. 57 G H I -T H I > _ #a:|. urfjB '•&* cbi a%:a£cfe ^a ll^g *»Cinfc ta la 1, Ban: g JfB(MVH Tdl B^BR l^o flftcg. V$ thai :'-»htf^I*4pg..J. 8»>;a$ng;'ilft 'HfTa 1n«i.-la ^Mtaji ^&jg cda ^•.•JjSl^tf ''*jp jap-i' '*o. -«bo. B^g.. •;:a .= th^ co may dilm J^c.u]: - ata* thao noi <^fr fgs^i slag jfljSTi '!• tat OB i | ^. |e tais ofifijf ah|a la 1 ohiob Zlgudl vH(^:»» CO?the Cong jutiau. j.a fWiig TJ.»U. xroufs axaa.t: rules and regulations (p. J^ for People's Revolutionary Party captured from Viet Cong in Nov. 1964. 58 APPENDIX H Charts of the Viet Cong Organization, North and South (See section IV.) Lines of control, political and military, from the Hanoi regime to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam. LINES OF CONTROL IN NORTH YIET-NAM'S DIRECTION OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM 1 (POLICY DETERMINATION] NORTH VIE [NAM LAO DONG (POLICY EXECUTION] COMMUNIST ( :ENTRAL COMMITTEE j 1 1 REUNIFICATION DEPT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 1 1 (CLANDESTINE 1 (MILITARY ACTION] INTELLIGENCE (POLITICAL ACTION] OPERATIONS] 1 i 1 MINISTRY OF RESEARCH REUNIFICATION NATIONAL DEFENSE AGENCY COMMISSION / fi *// CENTRAL OFFICE FOR NATIONAL FRONT FOR — » SOUTH VIET-NAM (COSVN) " THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIET-NAM (NFLSVN) REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND MILITARY REGIONS SUBPROVINCIAL POLITICAL 1 CLANDESTINE 1 COMMITTEES MILITARY AND INTELU GENCE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROGRAMS PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS OPERATIONS TO INFLUENCE WORLD OPINION 59 APPENDIX H—Continued Organization of the Viet Cong Apparatus—the Central Office for South Viet-Nam Lao Dong (Workers) Party, i.e. Communist Party Sec. Gen.: Ho Chi Minh Hanoi Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party Reunification Department Nguyen Van Vinh Central Office For South Viet-Nam Agencies Regional Committees "1 Secretariat National Front For The v 1 Liberation of South VI Viet- Nam -L Liaison VII | 1 ] VIII 1 | i Military Affairs Overseas Activity i ix 1 1 Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh | Espionage | Propaganda Bases Provincial Committees Propaganda & Liberation News ~u Training Agency 1 1 , 1 Personnel 1, 11 Popular Fronts 1 U^ ^. District Finance Committees ~L Town and Village Cells APPENDIX H—Continued Organization of the Central Research Agency in Hanoi Lao Dong Party DRV Armed Forces CENTRAL RESEARCH Intelligence Section AGENCY Intelligence Section Hanoi I Coding Section Cadres Administration Espionage Communications Training Section Section Section Section Section Special Centers Center for Center for Liaison Center for Demarcation with foreign countries Laos-Cambodia Zone Haiphong Vinh Hongay Vinh Linh CENTRAL OFFICE FOR Infiltration SOUTH VIET NAM Into South Viet-Nam Base for Base for Base for South-Central Saigon Nambo Interzone Interzone APPENDIX I Detail on Viet Cong Terrorism (See section V.) The following table lists the Government officials and other civilians killed, wounded, or missing as a result of Viet. Cong terrorist activities during 1964. Combat casualties are not included. VILLAGE, DISTRICT, AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jane July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dee. Killed 47 34 49 30 25 31 45 36 46 48 21 24 Wounded 14 16 24 9 8 9 14 15 13 10 22 7 Kidnaped 93 113 91 67 74 132 93 103 144 69 52 100 Total . . 154 163 164 106 107 172 152 154 203 127 95 131 OTHER CIVILIANS Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Killed Ill 110 138 115 105 110 181 103 132 100 66 88 Wounded 146 174 239 218 163 173 194 122 203 90 94 154 Kidnaped. . . . 694 590 1 531 647 727 483 964 834 778 477 200 498 Total 951 874 1 908 980 995 766 1 339 1 059 1 113 667 360 740 The following table shows the number of incidents of Viet Cong terrorism, sabotage, forced propaganda sessions, and armed attacks during 1964. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Attacks ...... 223 217 203 220 175 140 184 113 118 83 60 96 Terrorism 1, 244 1, 389 1 632 1, 738 1, 418 1, 390 2, 123 1, 775 1 938 1, 790 1, 391 1 719 Sabotage 129 201 158 169 217 176 286 315 482 480 247 318 Propaganda . . 174 271 167 157 140 162 224 173 178 197 109 128 Some of the consequences of Viet Cong terrorism are shown in the accompanying photographs. 62 o/ a /reig/u train derailed by a Viet Cong mine at Thu Due, northeast of Saigon, on Jan. 17, 1965. The engine was destroyed and two Vietnamese trainmen were seriously wounded. -J^-'-^^s^^ Viet Cong destroyed this railway bridge at Vinh Binh in 1962. The transportation system of Viet.Nam favorite VC target. Vinh Binh village hospital destroyed by Communist terrorist in 1962. The Viet Cong usually seize all medicines for their own use in such attacks. This bus carried civilian passengers between Kien Binh and Mac Hoa in Kien Tuong Province. On May 3, 1964, it was destroyed by a Viet Cong mine; 14 pas- sengers were killed and 15 were injured. Many of the victims were women and children. 64 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : (965 O—45-760 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE / February 20, 1965 U Thant Receives Statement of Support Secretary General U Thant today received a statement of support for his call for negotiations to end the war in Vietnam from about 400 individual participants in the Pacem in Terris Convocation. The statement of support was drawn up and circulated by participants acting in- dependently of the conference, which itself took no policy positions, in keeping with a commitment to the participants of many countries and diverse views. Pope John's affirmation "that disputes which arise between states should not be resolved by recourse to arms, but rather by negotiation" was quoted in the state- ment. It found a corollary in the Secretary General's appeal that "means must be found, and found urgently, within or outside the United Nations of shifting the quest for a solution (of the Vietnam war) away from the field of battle to the con- ference table." U Thant's statement was made on February 12. Among the endorsers of the statement were Steve Allen, Harry Belafonte, Allan Knight Chalmers, Clark Eichelberger, Jerome Frank, Zelma George, Ray Gibbons, The Rev. Gerald Grant, S.J., Rev. Dana McLean Greeley, Hudson Hoagland, Ralph Holstein, H. Stuart Hughes, Edward Lamb, Hans Morgenthau, James Patton, Linus Pauling, Victor Reuther, Herman Reissig, Howard Schomer, Sister Thomasine, Maurice Visscher, and Jerry Voorhis. Among the initiators of the statement of support were Lisa Howard, Homer A. Jacl., Donald Keys, Stewart Meacham, and Herman Will. The full text of the statement is attached. This is not a statement of the Pacem in Terris Convocation but a statement signed by individuals acting in their per- sonal capacities. Statement of Appreciation and Support We,,,, the undersigned participants in the convocation on Pacem in Terris, individually feel moifed at this difficult moment in history to rejoice on restudying the Encyclical of the late Pope John XXIII. We reaffirm that his words increase in pertinence: "Men are becoming more and more convinced that disputes which arise between states should not be resolved by recourse to arms, but rather by negotiation. . . .By meeting and negotiating, men may come to discover better the bonds that unite them together." In £he spirit of Pacem in Tarris we express our deep appreciation and support of the recent urgent initiative by United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, in the light of what he called "the seriously deteriorating situation in Vietnam" with its "dangerous possibilities of escalation" posing "the gravest threat to the peace of the xrorld." As Americans, we support the Secretary-General's appeal to restrain the fighting and begin negotiating: 1. "I... appeal most earnestly to all the parties concerned for the utmost restraint in both deeds and words, and... urge them to refrain from any new acts which may lead to an escalation of the present conflict and to the aggravation of a situation which is already very serious." ;. 2. "Means must be found, and found urgently, within or outside the United Nat-ton: of shifting the quest for a solution away from the field of battle to the conference table . . . iArrangements could be devised under which a dialogue could take place between the principal parties with a view, among others, to preparing the ground for wider and more formal discussions. .. .A revival of the Geneva Conference may perhaps achieve some results...." In supporting U Thant 's initiative and commending it to all world statesmen, we emphasis? that the peace is not "an empty- sounding word," for in Vietnam as elsewhere it must, in the/words of Pope John, be "founded on truth, built according to justice, vivified and integrated by charity, and put into practice in freedom." (Signed) NAME ADDRESS 1. 4. 5. (The above Statement of Support is being privately and unofficially circulated by a group of participants at the International Convocation on Pacem in Terris. Participants are invited to attach their signatures. Additional copies will be available on Saturday noon for further use by all signatories in their local churches and synagogues and by the press.) I. CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: SG APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURI NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPER' Per your instructions. DATE: 3-9 9 March 1965 IN ANSWE?. TO QTJEEIBS (GIVEN AT 12 o'clock press briefing) 1. The Secretary-General has made no new proposals regarding Viet-Nam. 2. Published stories on this subject are more or less along the lines on which the Secretary-General has been exploring—before his press con- ference on 24 February—ways and means of achieving a peaceful settlement of this problem. J A16WX (THANT BID) VIET NAM (2*0) BY JOHN M. HIGHTOWER AP SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT WASHINGTON, MARCH 9 (AP)-THE UNITED STATES POLITELY DISMISSED TODAY A NEW BID FROM U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON A VIETNAMESE PEACE AGREEMENT. A SPOKESMAN SAID IT IS STILL AWAITING SOME INDICATION THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE READY TO , "STOP THE AGGRESSION." "WE HAVE TOLD THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE APPRECIATE HIS SUGGESTIONS," SAID STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICER MARSHALL WRIGHT, "AND WE HOPE THAT ALL CHANNELS WILL BE HELD OPEN. "STILL HOPING FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, WE ALSO STILL AWAIT SOME INDICATION THAT THE AGGRESSORS ARE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT STOPPING THE AGGRESSION." WRIGHT WAS ASKED AT A NEWS CONFERENCE WHETHER HE WAS SUGGESTING SOME EASING OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD TALKS BY HINTING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK ON THE BASIS OF "INDICATIONS" THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE PREPARED TO STOP SUPPORTING THE COM- MUNIST GUERRILLA FORCES IN THE SOUTH. WRIGHT WOULD SAY ONLY THAT HIS STATEMENT DID NOT PROVIDE ANY NEW DEPARTURE IN AMERICAN POLICY. FROM OTHER SOURCES IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT EXPLORATORY TALKS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IF THE REDS "GAVE ANY INDICATION" OF READINESS TO HALT THE ASSAULT ON THE SOUTH. AlTtfX BUT OFFICIALS INSIST PRIVATELY AS WELL AS PUBLICLY THAT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN ANY ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD REQUIRE ADVANCE EVIDENCE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH VIET NAM, WRIGHT WAS TOLD THAT PUBLISHED REPORTS SAID U THANT HAD SENT SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS TO SEVERAL OF THE PRINCIPAL POWERS INVOLVED IN THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT. WRIGHT SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS RECEIVED SUGGESTIONS FROM THANT AT VARIOUS TIMES ABOUT "PROCEDURES FOR EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT," "BUT NEITHER FROM THIS SOURCE NOR ANY OTHER," WRIGHT SAID, "DO WE ANY INDICATION THAT, WHATEVER THE PROCEDURES, THE HANOI REGIME IS PREPARED TO STOP TRYING TO TAKE OVER SOUTH VIET NAM BY VIOLENCE.* LT217PES \ ITEM STOP PQ VIETNAM SITUATION PARA '& MISTER GORDON CAMPBELL MBRKT MORAY AND NAIRN UNBRKT ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER WHETHER HE WILL SEEK TO MEET PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA PARA MISTER ZILLIACUS BRKT MANCHESTER GORTON UNBRKT ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER WHETHER HE WILL ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH PRESIDENT DE GAULLES APPROACH TO THE SOVIET PRIME MINISTER WITH A VIEW TO A JOINT INITIATIVE FOR ENDING THE WAR IN VIETNAM THROUGH A CONFERENCE OF THE POWERS WHICH MET AT GENEVA IN NINETEEN FIFTYFOUR AND NINETEEN SIXTYTWO IN ORDER TO MAKE PEACE IN VIETNAM COMMA LAOS AND CAMBODIA PARA MISTER PHILIP NOEL HYPHEN BAKER BRKT DERBY SOUTH UNBRKT ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER WHETHER HE WILL MAKE A FURTHER STATEMENT ABOUT THE DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS ON THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM ON WHICH HE HAS BEEN ENGAGED PARA MISTER ANTHONY KERSHAW BRKT STROUD UNBRKT ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER WHETHER HE WILL SEEK A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN ORDER TO CONCERT POLICIES TOWARDS SOUTH EAST ASIA PARA BRKT ALL FOUR QUESTIONS WERE TAKEN TOGETHER UNBRKT PARA HAROLD WILSON COLON AS I TOLD THE HOUSE BEFORE WHAT WOULD STOP THE FIGHTING WOULD BE THE PROPER OBSERVANCE OF THE NINETEEN FIFTYFOUR GENEVA AGREEMENTS THUS PUTTING AN END TO THE AGGRESSION BY THE NORTH AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM PARA ' AS THE HOUSE KNOWS WE HAVE IN OUR TRADITIONAL ROLE AS COCHAIFMAN BEEN ENGAGED IN DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS OF A CONFIDENTIAL NATURE STOP IT IS THE VIEW OF HER MAJESTYS GOVERNMENT THAT IF THERE IS GENUINE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES THEN TALKS IN SOME FORM SHOULD BE STARTED STOP BUT FOR THE MOMEN/T THE FORM IS OF LESS ACCOUNT THAN THE o BASIS OF TALKS STOP OUR OWN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO SEEING IF THIS BASIS EXISTS STOP AS I HAVE ALREADY TOLD THE HOUSE go WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WHO WERE GIVEN OUR VIEWS ON THIS PROBLEM ON FEBRUARY TWENTY STOP WE ARE NOW AWAITING THEIR REPLY AND WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT THROUGH THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL AS WELL AS TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WHICH WILL I HOPE BE AFFORDED BY MISTER GROMYKOS VISIT TO LONDON NEXT WEEK PARA O t-l MY RIGHT HONORABLE FRIEND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL BE PAYING A VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON THE TWENTYSECOND AND TWENTYTHIRD OF MARCH WHEN VIETNAM WILL BE AMONG THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED THOUGH THIS IS NOT THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE MEETING PARA MEANWHILE WE WILL CONTINUE OUR DIPLOMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH A o VIEW TO ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH STANDS SOME CHANCE OF p< ASSURING A LASTING GEUINE SETTLEMENT STOP THE HOUSE WILL NOT EXPECT ME TO SAY MORE PARA HgH HJ MISTER CAMPBELL COLON I THANK THE PRIME MINISTER FOR MAKING THAT STATEMENT ABOUT THE DIPLOMATIC POSITION STOP CAN HE GIVE AN ASSURANCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT ARE SUPPORTING THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THE ACTION WHICH THEY HAVE TAKEN IN THEIR COMMITMENT TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM QUERY PARA HfPI H WILSON COLON I HAVE DEALT WITH THIS SITUATION ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS STOP I HAVE SAID THAT AS WE ALL RECOGNISE IF THE NINETEEN FIFTYFOUR AGREEMENT WERE HONOURED IN FULL THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM AND IT IS CERTAINLY THE CASE DASH I THINK THAT THIS NEEDS TO BE UNDERSTOOD UNDASH THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS IN FACT OFFERED TO WITHDRAW AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES FROM VIETNAM IN THE EVENT OF A PROMPT AND ASSURED CESSATION OF AGGRESSION BY HANOI PARA MISTER ZILLIACUS COLON WHILE ADDING MY THANKS TO MY RIGHT HONORABLE FRIEND FOR HIS REPLY MAY I ASK HIM WHETHER HE HAS READ THE MAJORITY REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY COMMISSION F 'HI POINTING OUT THAT AMERICAN ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE NINETEEN FIFTYFOUR AGREEMENTS OR RATHER OF THE go ~ AMERICAN UNDERTAKING TO DO NOTHING BY FORCE TO UPSET THOSE AGREEMENTS QUERY DOES HE RECALL THAT ON MARCH FIVE AND JUNE THIRTY LAST YEAR HE HIMSELF URGED THE THEN PRIME MINISTER TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE OPPOSED THE EXTENSION OF THE WAR TO NORTH VIETNAM QUERY FINALLY DOES MY RIGHT HONORABLE FRIEND RECOGNISE THAT THE COURSE OUTLINED IN MY QUESTION NUMBER Q SIX IS BEING URGED ON HIM BY A LARGE NUMBER OF HIS FOLLOWERS IN THIS HOUSE BY THE LIBERAL PARTY go BY THE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION BY THE NATIONAL UNION OF RAILWAYMEN AND BY AN INFLUENTIAL SECTION OF THE PRESS QUERY WILL W HE NOT TAKE ACTION IN THAT SENSE QUERY PARA H WILSON COLON FIRST I HAVE READ THE MAJORITY REPORT OF THE CONTROL COMMISSION AND THE MINORITY REPORT STOP TO GET A GOOD BALANCED VIEW I THINK THAT ONE NEEDS TO READ BOTH STOP I WELL !zb REMEMBER THE OCCASIONS WHEN I PUT ACROSS THE FLOOR OF THE HOUSE TO (/>'(- ^. THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION THE PROPOSITION WHICH MY HONORABLE FRIEND HAS NOT INCORRECTLY QUOTED STOP BUT THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS NOT OF DEGREE BUT OF KIND PARA A YEAR AGO THE GENERAL SUPPOSITION WAS THAT THE FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS A SPONTANEOUS SO HYPHEN CALLED NATIONALIST RISING ON : W THE PART OF THE VIET CONG PEOPLE STOP BUT NOW THERE IS NO ATTEMPT AT ALL TO DENY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF NORTH VIETNAM WHO HAVE SAID THAT THEY ARE FIGHTING A WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM STOP THAT MAKES A VERY BIG z DIFFERENCE I THINK IN TERMS OF OUR ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM STOP WE Q HAVE NEVER SOUGHT TO SEE THE WAR EXTENDED STOP I STILL THINK IT -^ RIGHT DASH I HAVE JUST QUOTED WHAT MISTER ADLAI STEVENSON SAID UNDASH 3^ THAT IF THERE WERE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF A CESSATION OF THE AGGRESSION BY NORTH VIETNAM THE UNITED STATES ARE PREPARED TO TAKE THEIR TROOPS OUT STOP THE OTHER THING WHICH MY HONORABLE FRIEND HAS IN MIND WOULD THEN AUTOMATICALLY FOLLOW PARA MISTER KERSHAW-COLON IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ADVICE WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER MAY BE RECEIVING FROM THE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS UNION AND PRESUMABLY FROM THE UNPAID GENERAL SECRETARY WILL HE BEAR IN MIND THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE HOUSE VERY MUCH WELCOMES HIS ANSWER THIS AFTERNOON QUERY WILL HE BEAR IN MIND THAT APPEASEMENT IS NOT THE WAY TO GET A SOLUTION IN VIETNAM QUERY PARA H WILSON COLON I AM NOT FRANKLY IN NEED OF COMPLIMENTS FROM THE HONORABLE GENTLEMAN STOP I THINK THAT THE ISSUE WHICH WE ARE DEALING WITH THIS AFTERNOON IS TOO SERIOUS FOR THE KIND OF LOW HYPHEN LEVEL TOMFOOLERY WHICH HE LIKES TO INDULGE IN PARA MISTER HEFFER COLON IS MY RIGHT HONORABLE FRIEND AWARE THAT THERE IS A GROWING ANXIETY IN THIS COUNTRY AT CONSTANT AND CONTINUAL REPEATS BOTH IN THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH PRESS SUGGESTING THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT TAKEN SUFFICIENT ACTION IN RELATION TO INITIATIVES IN THIS DIRECTION BECAUSE OF CERTAIN COMMITMENTS WHICH WE HAVE ENTERED INTO WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT QUERY WOULD HE REPUDIATE THESE SUGGESTIONS QUERY PARA H WILSON COLON IF THERE IS ONE THING ON WHICH PERHAPS I DISAGREE WITH MY HONORABLE FRIEND IT IS HIS ASSUMPTION THAT THE ANXIETIES TO WHICH HE REFERS ARE NOT SHARED BY EVERY HONORABLE AND MEMBER ON BOTH SIDES OF THE HOUSE AND CERTAINLY BY THE GOVERNMENT STOP OF COURSE WE UNDERSTAND WHEN HONORABLE MEMBERS SIGN MOTIONS BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE ASSUMED THAT WHEN HONORABLE MEMBERS GO TO SLEEP AT NIGHT THEIR CHEEKS ARE FUSED WITH THAT VIRTUE WHICH AFFECTS ALL OF US WHEN WE HAVE SJGNED MOTIONS UNDASH I HAVE SIGNED MANY MOTIONS UNDASH THERE ARE NOT SOME PEOPLE STAYING UP LONG INTO THE NIGHT ON THE TELEPHONE TRYING TO ACHIEVE THE VERY OBJECTIVE WHICH I AM SURE WAS THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THOSE WHO SIGNED THE MOTION PARA M MISTER SRI«OND COLON WHILE APPRECIATING THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND WITHOUT CASTING ANY DOUBT ON THE MOTIVES OF THE AMERICANS IN SOUTH VIETNAM MAY I ASK THE PRIME MINISTER WHETHER HE IS AWARE THAT IT IS NOT ONLY IN THIS COUNTRY BUT IN VERY RESPECTABLE CIRCLES IN AMERICA ITSELF THAT THERE IS WIDESPREAD ANXIETY ABOUT THE END OF THE PRESENT OPERATION QUERY CAN THE RIGHT HONORABLE GENTLEMAN TELL US WHETHER HE HAS RECEIVED FROM THE AMERICANS ANY INDICATION ABOUT WHETHER THEY THINK THAT THE PRESENT OPERATION WILL HELP TOWARDS THE RESUMPTION OF CONVERSATIONS WHICH HE HIMSELF SAID IS SO DESIRABLE QUERY PARA FURTHER CAN THE RIGHT HONORABLE GENTLEMAN SAY WHETHER THERE IS ANY PROSPECT OF GETTING POLITICAL STABILITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM BECAUSE UNLESS THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM ARE ENLISTED IN DEFENCE OF THEIR OWN FREEDOM AND UNLESS WE GET SOME FORM OF REASONABLY STABLE ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WE APPEAR TO BE IN DANGER OF I SINKING INTO AN ABSOLUTELY BOTTOMLESS BOG QUERY PARA H WILSON COLON I AGREE WITH THE RIGHT HONORABLE GENTLEMAN STOP THE ANXIETIES WHICH HE HAS EXPRESSED ARE EXPRESSED VERY WIDELY [El IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD DASH IN THIS COUNTRY AND IN MANY OTHERS AS HE HAS SAID STOP I THINK THAT I AM INTERPRETING HIM RIGHT WHEN I SAY THAT I DO NOT THINK IT WILL HELP PARTICULARLY TO START EXAMINING MOTIVES STOP WE ARE MORE INTERESTED IN GETTING RESULTS THAN EXAMINING MOTIVES OR DORING ANY SORT OF ANALYSIS OF THAT KIND PARA WITH REGARD TO THE ESSENTIAL NEED FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIL 00 I ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM DASH AND THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY THERE UNDASH I WOULD MUCH AGREE WITH WHAT THE RIGHT HONORABLE GENTLEMAN HAS IN MIND STOP BUT WE MUST RECOGNISE THAT IT IS NOT CONDUCIVE TO POLITICAL STABLITY OF ANY KIND IF PEOPLE ARE NOT ALLOWED TO GO ABOUT DAILY WORK AND ON THEIR FARMS ESPECIALLY IN THE VILLAGES BECAUSE OF THIS CONTINUED VIOLENCE PARA MISTER PHILIP NOEL HYPHEN BAKER COLON WILL MY RIGHT HONORABLE FRIEND THE PRIME MINISTER BEAR IN MIND THAT IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN A DANGEROUS ESCALATION IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH MAY THREATEN THE PEACE OF THE WORLD AND THAT IN ANY ACTION WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH RUSSIA FRANCE CANADA OR ANYBODY ELSE THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE WILL GIVE HIM SUPPORT SINCE THEY AGREE WITH THE VIEW OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS THAT NO SETTLEMENT CAN COME FROM FURTHER FIGHTING AND THAT A CEASE FIRE IS URGENTLY REQUIRED QUERY PARA H WILSON COLON MY RIGHT HONORABLE FRIEND HAS THROUGHOUT THIS VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM EXPRESSED THE ANXIETIES WHICH HE AND SO MANY FEEL IN A RESTRAINED AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY STOP WHEN HE REFERRED JUST NOW TO ESCALATION I THINK THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO WHAT I HAD IN MIND WHEN I SAID THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW WEEKS REPRESENT NOT MERELY AN INTENSIFICATION IN THE DEGREE OF FIGHTING BUT A DIFFERENCE IN KIND DASH A DIFFERENCE IN KIND WHICH RESULTS FROM THE NOW QUITE CLEAR COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO PERPETUATE THIS WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM TAKING IT OUT OF THE CONCEPT OF A CIVIL WAR AND THE RESPONSE WHICH HAS INEVITABLY FOLLOWED THAT DISCLOSURE AND THAT DETERMINATION STOP THAT IS WHY I THINK THAT MY RIGHT HONORABLE FRIEND IS QUITE RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THIS CARRIES WITH IT VERY GRAVE DANGERS PARA CR.lJ (4-59^ ROUTING SLIP Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. .S(? — ^ ^ APPROVAL «< YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS DATE: FROM: COMPLIMENTARY COPY 'UBLISHED IN TWO SECTIONS: THIS SECTION FOR MEN Please limit direct quotes to 250 words, with credit to The Insider's Newsletter. FOR RELEASE &UNDAY 6PM JLJLJLO(JLVJL\^JL k3 JL.Newsletter AN EVERY MONDAY REPORT FOR BUSY MEN WHO NEED TO KNOW WHAT'S GOING ON New York, N.Y., March 8, 1965 THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OPEN SECRET Critics of U.S. actions in Vietnam who have written the Presi- dent to protest are receiving a form letter (No. 4/32b-1264BT) from the State Department which is a stronger explanation of U.S. policy than any official pronouncement so far from either LBJ or Dean Rusk. The letter reads in part: "We are involved in Vietnam because... our involvement is essential to American security.. .If armed Com- munist subversion succeeds in Southeast Asia, we may well see it again--and soon--in Africa, in the Middle East, and in our own hem- isphere." Enclosure No. 2 adds: "Aggression feeds on success, and it is far better to face up to the aggressors while they are still weak and unsure of themselves, rather than to try to ignore them and have to oppose them later on when they have grown strong and confident" --a reference to Red China, which has developed an atomic bomb but hasn't yet had time to build a nuclear arsenal around it. Note: The White House received nearly 20,000 communications on Vietnam in February, a volume of mail surpassed only during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. REVIVAL MEETING IN MOSCOW: The conference of Commu- nist parties that opened in Moscow last week demonstrates that the new Soviet leaders have failed in their first major diplomatic offen- sive against Peking. Premier Aleksei Kosygin went to North Vietnam and to North Korea hoping to win at least one Communist country away from Red China. When the conference opened without a repre- sentative from either North Vietnam or North Korea, it became ap- parent that Kosygin had failed. What's more, the absence of Rumania from the conference shows that Moscow has lost ground in the Sino- Soviet dispute. Rumania is not Peking's gain, but it is Moscow's loss because Rumania now wants to maintain a neutral position. THE OLD ADAM FOR PUERTO RICO? At the age of 56, Adam Clayton Powell, the Harlem Congressman, appears to be seeking a constituency in a warmer climate. Sources in Puerto Rico claim that demonstrations against U.S. embassies abroad. The raid on the resi- Powell has designs on the Commonwealth's chronically "out" Repub- dence of the ambassador to Indonesia, for example, came as Wash- lican Statehood party, with an eye to becoming Governor. Leaders ington was trying to persuade Sukarno not to seize American property. of the controlling Popular Democratic party appear not to be worried. Checking back, they found that demonstrations had been put to similar They note that although Powell's wife is Puerto Rican and he owns a diversionary use in Egypt and elsewhere. The analysts feel that if home on the island, he would still be looked on as a carpetbagger at enough such patterns are'discovered, it may be possible to predict, a time when Puerto Ricans are exhibiting great concern over a "cul- probably through the use of a computer, when and where demonstra- tural identity" and self-respect. Neutral observers are not so sure. Powell may find it easy to persuade Statehood party leaders that there tions will occur. What to do then is a problem they are also working is little to be gained by continuing their affiliation with the mainland on. Note: Seven House members have formulated what is undoubted- Republican organization. He also possesses the political charisma ly the most original proposal yet to resist demonstrations. They have to rally the island's Negroes and the disaffected. Unemployment suggested that large detachments of U. S. Marines be stationed at hovers around 12 or 13 per cent of the labor force, and migration to U.S. embassies abroad. and from the mainland now just about balances out. Also, as long as Powell remains in Congress, there is little the opposition can do, DIVIDE AND BE CONQUERED: Defense Secretary McNamara's for fear Powell will retaliate with his influence over some of the ap- controversial plan to merge the Army Reserve and the National Guard propriations important to Puerto Rico. could well slip through Congress while petulant legislators--who don't really want the plan--fight among themselves. Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), chairman of the House Armed Forces subcommittee DE GAULLE--THE SWEET SMELL OF ROSES: France, which on Reserve forces, proposed holding joint hearings with the Senate until a few years ago was a pariah in the Middle East as a result of so as to present a united front against the McNamara plan. Now he's Suez and Algeria, may be the one Western country to gain from the hopping mad because Sen. John Stennis' (D-Miss.) Senate Prepared- existing crisis in the area. On the day Walter Ulbricht of East Ger- ness subcommittee stole his thunder and held hearings first. many arrived in Egypt and West Germany announced it was cutting off economic aid to Cairo, France was signing one economic agree- ment with Nasser and beginning talks on another. These moves fol- ON THE INSIDE; Asian diplomats report President Sukarno of low the month-long discussions between Nasser and de Gaulle's mis- Indonesia has concluded that his departure from the UN was a mis - sionary-at-large, Edgar Faure. The French wooing of the Egyptian take. Subandrio, foreign minister of Indonesia, has approached leader will certainly produce new friction with Bonn, if not the U.S. several Asian capitals suggesting that the conflict with Malaysia be Observers expect West Germany to invoke the Franco-German submitted to a large Asian conference, including India and Japan, to treaty, which calls for "coordination" of foreign policy. Note: The advance a compromise solution permitting Indonesia to return to the Israelis signed the arms agreement with West Germany that is the UN without losing face.. .Democrats are backing broadened coverage underlying cause of the crisis because they feared their close mili- for Medicare, after becoming convinced the public was anticipating tary collaboration with France was not going to last. This was in more than it was going to get from the King-Anderson Bill. The 1960 when it became apparent to the Israelis that, once the Algerian AMA's last-minute publicity campaign directed to this point paid war ended, de Gaulle would sacrifice his relationship with them to off--if not exactly as the AMA hoped. Key to the AMA campaign was re-establish French influence with the Arab world. The new crisis a Gallup Poll early in January indicating not even one person in four is apparently the opportunity the General has been waiting for. realized King-Anderson would not pay doctor bills.. .The French gov- ernment has expelled Sergei Pavlov, chief of the Paris office of Aero- flot, the Soviet airline, on charges of industrial espionage. The ex- HOW TO HANDICAP A RIOT: State Department analysts have pulsion lends credibility to reports that Russia is pressing develop- discovered some revealing coincidences about the "spontaneous" ment of its own supersonic airliner and aiming to get it airborne ahead of the Anglo-French Concorde.. .The item concerning Senator Kuchel in last week's issue of The Insider's Newsletter fell victim THE INSIDER'S NEWSLETTER, Vol. 7, No. 10, March 8, 1965. Published weekly by Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, to a machine with hiccups. The next Presidential election is, of Inc. at 111 Tenth Street, Des Molnes, Iowa 50304. Sold by subscription only. Subscriptions (via surface mail): U.S.A., course, in 1968 and the California gubernatorial elections in 1966. one year $18.00; Canada, $19.00; other foreign, $19.50. Sent air mail at extra cost. (Extra copy price 600 both sections.) Second-class postage paid at Des Moines, Iowa. Printed in U.S.A. Editorial and executive offices at 488 Madison Ave., New York, N. Y. 10022. Postmaster: Send form 3579 to 111 Tenth Street. Oes Moines, Iowa 50304. PAGE 2 FOR MEN PAGE 3 FOR MEN WALL STREET'S TAX BASE: Annual dollar volume on the New York Stock Exchange has increased fivefold since 1954--from $12 billion to $60 billion. The standard Wall Street explanation for the Inside Business increase is that more and more people are investing in equity issues FACTS AND VIEWS TO HELP YOU DO BETTER IN BUSINESS to protect against declining dollar values. Now Prof. Leo Barnes, a business economist, advances a theory that links the income tax ad- vantages of long-term capital gains to the widespread public interest ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION--BAIT WITH A HOOK in stocks. Some 9 million families currently earn $10,000 or more a year, compared to 3.5 million in 1954. Professor Barnes thinks President Johnson's effort to sugarcoat the balance of payments this growing affluence and the consequent rise in individual income restraints placed on business with a promise of further liberalization tax rates explain not only the increase in investors, but the relative of depreciation rules did not quite succeed. The accelerated depreci- increase in stock prices as well. Stocks that once sold at price- ation schedules, first adopted in 1962, provide industry with $700 earnings ratios of 10 may be wortb multiples of 20 or more to inves- million in annual tax savings. But after demonstrations of gratitude tors inhigh tax brackets--provided a long-term gain was realized. over the announcement that these benefits would be extended and in- At the top tax rate of 70 per cent, Barnes estimates that stocks are creased, businessmen have begun to note that the tax savings also worth twice what they are to an investor who pays less than 30 per contribute substantially to the alleviation of international money prob- cent. Note: Further reductions in income tax rates, though likely lems. Because they permit a more rapid return on invested capital, to stimulate the economy, could depress stock multiples. and at a higher rate, they discourage the flow of investment capital abroad. Instead, the money goes into modernization and expansion INVENTION MOTHERS NECESSITY: Worried by the depletion of domestic facilities. These plant improvements enhance the U.S. 's of magnetic iron ore deposits, the Bureau .of Mines went to work on competitive position in export markets. The businessmen don't mind a method for extracting iron from nonmagnetic taconite --and came President Johnson having it both ways, but they think he should go up with a solution to the problem of abandoned auto graveyards. The further with measures to strengthen American business and encour- new process combines scrap metal with taconite under intense heat. age exports. They contend that even the liberal depreciation rules The melted scrap absorbs oxygen from the ore, causing a molecular are not as generous as those in France, Germany and Japan. And change that renders the taconite magnetic, and the mixture is then they wonder what happened to plans for special tax concessions for ready for magnetic separating techniques. Rust is an important in- all profits earned through export--a key factor in Germany's favor- gredient in the molecular change, so junked cars are prime candi - able trade balance. dates for the scrap portion of the input. The bureau estimates that a medium -sized plant could convert 5 million tons of taconite ore A REGULATORY AGENCY FOR BANKS? The White House has annually, with the aid of 600,000 tons of scrap. Abundant taconite been sounding out opinion about the oft-proposed but never-enacted reserves have been largely ignored because the ore did not respond Federal Banking Commission. The FBC would be a five-man group, to magnetic separation. The number of scrapped vehicles moved up with staggered terms of 10 years each, that would pull together all sharply in 1963 and has now reached more than 6 million a year-- the state and Federal regulatory functions now carried out--some- enough for 50 million tons of ore. times at cross purposes--by the Federal Reserve Board, Currency Comptroller James J. Saxon and the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor- OUR MAN IN PARIS: Most famous American in Paris right now poration. The Fed would retain its monetary control authority; isn't Lyndon Johnson or Kim Novak but Thomas Drumm, who holds Saxon might be named one of the commissioners if he steers clear the customarily humdrum post of commercial attache'at the U.S. of further tangles with Congress, his colleagues or the banking in- Embassy. Within the past month, Drumm has been praised by three dustry; the FDIC would continue its present functions, as an arm of widely-circulated French magazines, crediting him with being the the commission. The White House is seeking support for the re- major force behind last year's 26 per cent increase in U.S. exports vived FBC plan as a way to resolve its present problems with Saxon to France. Sample of the prose lauding Drumm: "The man who made and remove the Administration from direct involvement in the regu- it possible to sell tinned American hamburgers in France doubts lation of banking. This would sever the lines of complaint which now nothing. . .In the course of last month, Drumm received 1,208 visit- run directly to the White House and may become active soon, with ors, wrote 691 letters and answered 1,880 telephone calls.. .For him, Congress taking an increasing interest in banking affairs. there is always a market to exploit, a deal to make." PAGE 4 FOR MEN PAGE 5 FOR MEN OLYMPIA PRESS, R. I. P. SHOTS IN THE DARK: Prompted by a Massachusetts ruling that it is permissible to ask an employe his age only after he's been hired, Maurice Girodias earned a reputation publishing books that were Industrial Relations News complains: "Questions as to birthplace, considered unpublishable, but success has put him out of business. naturalization, foreign military service, change of name, maiden Girodias, founder of Olympia Press, published Lolita and other graph - name, and anything to do with race, religion, or color have already ic works and sold them without qualms to Americans and Britishers been ruled out.. .Now that sex is included under the Civil Rights Act passing through Paris. "I'm all for the corruption of youth," he said. in the list of elements involved in discrimination, can it be that fu- "Corruption is an essential part of education. What I'm against is ture employment interviews will take place behind a curtain with an the square world." But the square world was for him and gobbled up application blank including only one question --How much?" most of his books, and that was the beginning of his end. Girodias1 success induced established publishers to challenge censorship laws in England and America and now almost any book can be published NOTES OF THE WEEK almost anywhere and at a lower price than Olympia Press can do it. That put Girodias out of business and out of funds. But he says this Fowl -Mouth Note: A Prof. Erich Baumer of West Germany has makes him happy. "I hate money," he confesses. "I control my hate published a dissertation on the language of chickens, which he has so badly that now and again 1 make money, and 1 am very ashamed." . learned to imitate after 60 years of study. There are 30 basic sounds A little misery will nevertheless come his way when his last book, in chicken talk, he says, and once those are mastered understanding The Olympia Reader, a collection of the juiciest sections of all the all else is relatively easy. books he has published, goes on sale. Snake-Pit Note: The superintendent of Dixmont State Hospital in Pittsburgh, trying to get more state funds, recently invited legisla- DISTRIBUTING INCOME, ARMY STYLE: The Defense Depart- tors on a guided tour of its facilities--"some of the worst of any men- ment recently issued a ruling that senior officers cannot solicit tal hospital in the state." Thirty lawmakers were invited, 13 accept- money from, or sell anything to, junior officers--a regulation that ed--and 3 showed up. highlights a growing moonlighting problem within the armed forces. A major abuse this ruling was meant to correct involves insurance Word-on-the-Home-Front Note: From an advisory letter sent companies and mutual funds that recruit officers as part-time sales- last week to customers of a brokerage firm: "With airlines moving men. Some time ago, Defense officials also found it necessary to to the forefront the market was able to take the latest bombing inci- write to insurance companies, requesting that they stop hounding the dent in Vietnam in stride and put on an excellent showing." parents of recent inductees to buy policies--some of which wouldn't • •• pay off if the insured's death or disability were service-connected. The Department is considering a review of the adequacy of its own INSIDE THIS CHANGING WORLD: A University of California insurance programs for GI's. researcher has come up with an ingenious method for increasing the size of hams. He has raised the height of feed troughs so his pigs have to stand up on their hind legs while they're eating, and claims '64 WINES--OK 'BUT NOT GAY': Final word on the celebrated to have gotten hams as much as 6 per cent thicker than the average official proclamation that France's 1964 wines would be the "vintage .. .This season's collegiate fad--the successor to phone-booth stuff- of the century" comes from Revue du Vin, authoritative publication ing and goldfish swallowing--is the marathon shower. Wrinkled stu- devoted to French wines: "Generally speaking, the 1964 red wines dents at New Mexico University are currently trying to break the will be rather austere with a beautiful color. They will be excellent record set by Utah University students who spent 76 straight hours but not really exciting, precociously virile but not gay. The dry under the shower.. .The pattern of industry moving from New England white wines will have more class but lack vigor. The sweet white to the South is repeating itself in an unexpected way. Resorts in wines have suffered too much to be awarded many of the numerous Virginia, Tennessee and West Virginia--which have some of the stars in the little pocket guides that the gourmets consult in secret." highest mountains in the East--have spent millions on snowmaking Final final word: At least three famous Bordeaux wine producers-- facilities and are attracting many skiers who used to go north for Lafite, Margaux and Mouton-Rothschild --will not be selling a large their holidays... While the White House works out ways to restore part of their red wines under their own label. natural beauty to the land, sign manufacturers are busily promoting PAGE 6 FOR MEN PAGE 7 FOR MEN a new market--high schools. Students are urged to make their class gift a sign, similar to those in front of drive-in movies, to keep the world informed of upcoming sports and social events. .. For half a century, the late Speaker Sam Rayburn was re-elected from a solidly Democratic rural district in northeast Texas, the most sparsely pop- ulated district in the state and one of the smallest in the nation. Rayburn1 s political power in Washington effectively kept the district intact for years, but now voters from his home county are up in arms over the Texas Legislature's proposal to redraw the district and add 60,000 new voters from highly conservative Dallas County. SOME ORANGEMAN, NO DOUBT: Irish visitors to Boston on St. Patrick's Day this year are in for the same surprise other Irish- men have been getting for the past 188 years. At the end of a proper- ly Bostonian day of restrained revelry, late in the evening as bars are closing, Irish-looking patrons will be informed that what they've just been celebrating isn't St. Patrick's Day at all, it's a Boston-only holiday called Evacuation Day, which marks the date General Howe withdrew his British troops from the city, and set out after George Washington. True sons of the auld sod are advised to do their cele- brating in South Boston, where St. Patrick^s honored on March 17. POOR SCHNITZ IS ALIVE: Wilhelm Schnitz of West Germany was in dire financial straits when a doctor told him he had intestinal cancer and only a few weeks to live. Deciding he had little to lose if caught, he turned to pickpocketing. He was arrested several times but the soft-hearted police released him each time because of his condition. Schnitz then decided to go into the big time before he faced his big moment, and he committed a serious robbery. He was again caught, but this time the police did not let him go and the judge was not sympathetic. A disappointed Schnitz concluded that it didn't matter much, since he was going to die in a short while anyhow. That was 14 years ago and Schnitz is still serving his sentence. His disposition is not very good, but his health is perfect. Send The Insider's Newsletter to: SUBSCRIPTION RATES ONE YEAR (52 issues) NAMF APPRFSS ^rface (US, Possessions D $18.00 MI \ Canada D $19.00 RITV 5T4TF Ntal> 1 nthrr Fnrriun D $19.50 zip code v B (~1 This is a gift order. j'US, Can, Mex. D $22.00 Sepfl gift rard signprt- D $26.00 My name 1 Other Foreign n $31.00 aririr»c<: [D Remittance Enclosed d Bill me later THE INSIDER'S Subscription office: Ul Tenth Street Oes Moines, Iowa 50304 NEWSLETTER Editorial office: 488 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10022 PAGE 8 FOR MEN EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS GIVEN IN THE AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT BY THE HONOURABLE PAUL HASLUCK, MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ON 23RD MARCH 1965 South Vietnam In Laos, notwithstanding the fact that there is an international agreement for the neutrality of Laos, Communist Chira describes the-territory held by the Communist-controlled Pathet Lao as "the liberated area". The clear inference is that the remainder has still to be liberated, Peking has recently served notice that Thailand is in danger of becoming the object of what might be called conquest by subversion. Chinese radio and news agencie? are now publishing the programme of an organisation describing itself as thrj "Thailand Patriotic Front" which, from Peking, calls for the overthrow of what it calls the "Fascist" Thai Government. Radio Hanoi is also broadcast- ing the same material. What is happening in South Vietnam is not a local rebellion caused by internal discontent, but the application of the methods and doctrines of communist guerilla warfare first evolved in China and then successfully used in North Vietnam. The Peking and Hanoi regimes have both come to power through guerilla warfare and both share the Asian communist doctrine evolved by the Chinese. The practical application in neighbouring areas is clear. Neither Peking nor Hanoi has yet had to commit large-scale conventional forces in South Vietnam for external aggression. A dissident communist-controlled movement was created for guerilla warfare against the established social order and government. Lines of communications and support from outside were organised. Given the natural elements of instability in many of the newly- established countries of the region, and their social, ethnic and communal problems, there are understandable opportunities for such tactics. It is nearly three years since the International Control Commission in Vietnam condemned the violation by North Vietnam of the 1954- Geneva Agreements by the despatch of arms and rnen from the north, and the incitement and encouragement of hostilities in the south. The rate of infiltration from north to south increased until, in 1964, it is estimated that 10,000 Viet Cong terrorists trained and armed by the north were sent to the south. I draw the attention of members to the document recently distributed to the United Nations by the United States describing the extent of this new form of international aggression. Copies are available in the Parliamentary Library. We have considerable information of the same character from Australian sources. At any one time, the Viet Cong maintains a hard core of guerillas in military formation of some thirty to forty thousand anrl they are supported by an irregular force of another eighty thousand. This total force of something over one hundred thousand has established itself through methods of coercion and terrorism in large parts of the South Vietnamese countryside. In some areas it has been able to introduce its own system of administrative control. This it has done, not by the attraction of some programme of economic and social reform, but by the exercise of power through terror. The Viet Cong maintain their control as a determined minority relying on fear, despair, war-weariness and the political disintegration of the opponents. Are these the circumstances in which,the Asian communist powers having taken such steps to advance their policies, all other powers who are opposed to such policies should look the other way and do nothing? /What the United States has chosen •2- What the United States has chosen to do in South Vietnam appears to the Australian Government as the recognition and acceptance of the great responsibilities which their own greatness has laid on them. We are told from time to time that, while external aid can help, it is for the people of South Vietnam themselves to establish a political regime which will withstand internal subversion. We must remember, however, that the South Vietnamese are not dealing simply with a situation of local unrest, but with a large-scale campaign of assassination and terrorism directed from outside. It would be a dangerous thing to argue that, because subversive elements inspired from outside have achieved some success in creating instability within a country, these elements thereby earn the right to become the Government of that country. In South Vietnam one may ask what future security, freedom and religious tolerance there would be for the millions of people who have committed themselves to resistance against communism. It is also unrealistic to claim that if only the influence of three great powers were removed there would be a sudden and blissful peace in South Vietnam. To whom would withdrawal leave the land? Not to the local population. There is a campaign in Australia at the present time among a section of our population that might be summed up in the words sometimes chalked on walls abroad: "Yankee, go home". Let those who are approached to support this campaign ask themselves what the phrase means. It means simply that the North Vietnamese and the Chinese are the only foreigners to be allowed in South Vietnam and therefore this is a campaign which, in its results, would favour Asian communism. This was seldom heard of when Asian communism was making gains: it has grown in strength when Asian communism is being checked. In the circumstances that now exist, the United States could not withdraw from South Vietnam without abandoning the responsibilities that belong to power or the principles they are trying to uphold. The United States could not withdraw without necessarily considering the world-wide impact of such a withdrawal on the broader strategies of world politics. If the United States did withdraw, the same conflict would be renewed somewhere else. Within a brief period the struggle now taking place in South Vietnam would be shifted to Thailand. If there was abandonment of Thailand, it would shift to Malaysia - to Indonesia, to Burma, to India and further. Nothing would be ended and no stability would be achieved by yielding in South Vietnam. It is not a valid policy to call for negotiation unless there is a clear idea what is to be the outcome of negotiations. If negotiation is simply to mean an end of resistance to aggression and the success of aggression, then a plainer word for it would be defeat for those resisting Asian communism. Fortunately, we have the declaration of President Johnson who, on 17th February, set out the United States position on Vietnam in the following words: "Our purpose, our objective there is clear. That purpose and that objective is to join in the defence and protection of the freedom of a brave people who are under an attack that is controlled and this is directed from outside their country. We have no ambition there for ourselves, We seek no dominion. We seek no conquest. We seek no wider war. But we must all understand that we will persist in the defence of freedom, and our continuing actions will be those which are justified and those that are made necessary by the con- tinuing aggression of others. These actions will be measured and fitting and adequate. Our stamina and the stamina of the American people is equal to the task". /Australia's own analysis -3- Australia1 s own analysis of the situation has brought us to the belief that the United States action is necessary for the defeat of aggression against Asian peoples and is also an essential step towards the building in Asia of the conditions of peace and progress. We also believe that in their resistance to China they are preventing an alteration in the world balance of power which would be in favour of the communists and which would increase the risk of world war. Consequently, Australia firmly supports that stand by the United States and the decisions reached that targets in North Vietnam should be attacked. Should North Vietnam not be exposed to military risk, we would be permitting North Vietnam to remain a privileged sanctuary from which a military campaign of subversion and aggression against the south can be maintained and exploited in- definitely and with immunity. It is asserted by communists that the United States and her allies by acting thus are creating the risk of a wider war. But the alternative would be to allot..' the systematic mounting of campaigns of guerilla warfare and terrorism to undermine nan-communist governments one after another in South East Asia. In other words, the communist powers would be free to conduct a wider war on an advancing front of subversive and guerilla activity. At the moment, contacts are being made and the positions of the various powers involved are being explored in order to determine whether there are real prospects for negotiation. We should be clear about the position as it now stands, Hanoi and the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam will negotiate on certain conditions. Those conditions include the prior withdrawal of United States forces from South Vietnam. Their policy, supported by China, is to remove the United States from the area. A study of Hanoi and the National Liberation Front documentation also makes it clear that what they are seeking ig the replacement of the present government in Saigon, not even by a coalition or neutralist government, but by a government which is communist led and controlled. Such a government would be the instrument of the Hanoi regime, the National Liberation Front itself having been created by the North Vietnam Communist Party. There clearly would have to be a considerable change in this position before there could be formal negotiations at a Conference table. For the moment the government believes that the best course lies in the exploration and assessment of the positions of the parties in order to establish whether a basis of political understanding can be reached. We would, of course,be favourable to negotiation in the right circumstances and we would hope as fervently as anyone that a true and lasting peace might be established. PRESS-RELEASE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 136 EAST 67th STREET, NEW YORK 21, N.Y. March 25 , 1965 GROMIKO'S LETTER TO SUAN THYUI, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM "Comrade Suan Thyui, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Demo- cratic Republic of Vietnam. Hanoi. Esteemed Comrade Minister, I received Your letter of March 22, reporting new aggressive acts of the United States against the people of South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam creating a highly dange- rous situation in Indochina. The Government and people of the Soviet Union brand with ignominy the imperialist aggression of the United States of Ameri- ca in Vietnam and demand that the USA strictly abide by the Geneva Agreement, immediately discontinue military operations against the DRV, recall the forces of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam and withdraw the military equipment there from so that the Vietnamese people could settle their affairs themselves. Taking, under an agreement with the DRV government, the necessary measures to protect the security and strengthen the defence potential of the fraternal socialist country, the Soviet Union declares its full solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people against armed banditry of American impe- rialism. In connection with your appeal the Soviet Government, as a co-Chairman, proposed to the British co-Chairman that a joint message be addressed to all countries signatories of the Geneva Agreement. It is proposed that this message should emphatically denounce the American aggressive actions in Vietnam and that their immediate discontinuation and strict observance of the Geneva Agreements be demanded of the United States Government. Respectfully yours A.GROMYEO, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, the USSR, MOSCOW March 24, 1965". PRESS-RELEASE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS #18 136 EAST 67th STREET, NEW YORK 21, N.Y. 'March 26,1965 U.S. CRIMES AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ( Soviet note to U. S. Government ) "The Soviet Government resolutely condemns the use of poison gases by the United States of America against the population of South Vietnam," says a note forwarded today by the USSR Foreign Ministry to the United States Embassy in Moscow. The Soviet Government expects that the Government of the United States whould weigh most seriously the responsibility it is assuming by resorting to such inhuman act as the use of chemical weapons and would take the neces- sary measures to end immediately the use of poisons in South Vietnam. "No state must proceed in its policy, in its conduct in international affairs from the assumption that it may do what is prohibited to all states. Is it not clear that serious dangers would arise in the world if this thesis were not observed and if it were replaced by arbitrariness. " It is also legitimate to raise another question, the Soviet Government points out, how can one issue statements on a desire for an improvement in the world situation, for the development of cooperation between states, call for observance of the United Nations Charter, as United States representatives often do, yet at the same time flout the fundamental generally recognised rules of international law, sanctified by international treaties, the United Nations Charter and the entire practice of international relations. The Government of the United States is naturally aware of the fact that the use of suffocating, poisonous and other similar gases is long since banned and resolutely condemned by the peoples of the world. This ban is a universally recognized norm of international law, the note says. "The Government of the United States should realise the grave responsi- bility it is assuming for the crimes against the Vietnamese people and the consequences this could entail. " ********* Americans for Democratic Action / 1341 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. ***)/ Washington, D. C. 20036 April 1, 1965 TO: FOREIGN POLICY COMMISSION FROM: Roy Benne.tt ' ' ' ' •••••'• Settlement in South Vietnam The policy of U. S. regular bombings of North Vietnam commenced since February 1965 has opened a new phase in .the ten-year commitment to the South Vietnamese Govern- ment. Prior to that time U. S..' Government leaders assured the American people that our military personnel commitment was "advisory" and the war would be lost or won only by the unity and determination of the South Vietnamese people themselves. By the beginning of this year, the war was as reported by qualified observers, all but lost, and what lay .ahead was bitter and possibly disastrous defeat. The new American commitment essentially transformed the character of the war from one of American support to an.American open-ended engagement. The policy of"holding the line" characteristic of the last several years collapsed with the accelerated rotation of Vietnamese-governments and the sharp increase in the desertion of their troops. The fundamental assumption underlying the present "measured escalation" - as officially stated - is that it will achieve an "honorable settlement" ultimately per- mitting the withdrawal of American forces. With this estimate ADA does not agree '- along with almost all of the United States' major allies and neutral nations. The widening of the war to the north and the diplomatic policy pursued coineidentally" with it, we believe, will more likely lead to complete U. S. takeover of the formerly "limited war". Such an escalation much more likely will lead to the involvement of North Viet- namese regular forces, Mainland China and ultimately will compel intervention by the Soviet Union. Taken at a much lower level of involvement, military analysts have es- timated the possible need for up to 1,000,000 U.S. ground troops, complementary logis- tical forces, partial mobilization of the economy, and a wide extension of the draft. A'DA does not argue- the moral or legal issues^which have been adduced to justify the present escalation - although these have been widely" attacked at home and abroad. It does, hox\rever, disagree with a diplomatic policy which has confused its friends, supplied ammunition to its enemies, and threatens to destory the tenuous detente labori- ously built up with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. ADA accepts the fact that the President's aims - as distinguished from his policy - are not different from its own. It believes, however, the most disturbing feature of present administration policy is its lack of definition, its emphasis on seeking a- mili- tary to the virtual exclusion of a political solution. In the spirit of offering con- crete alternatives, ADA proposes the following: 1. Statement of Political Goals. ADA believes the .Government of the United States seeks no territory, special economic interest or .political hegemony in Southeast Asia. It believes solution to the • problems of :South Vietnam cannot be separated - as they have been - from those which con- cern the other former Indo Chinese states, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. ADA believes that Southeast Asia can be removed from the cockpit of world conflict S88$3$ by A ' neutralization 4S '"htr rnrfrfrBTr^-Ht fr-Hlitffift • nnr _tfmipinrifHin_jtJIP irHJrn'ion 'i"rF~Hl_ifi1 mnli mill A zonal neutralization of the separate states would simplify rather than com- plicate effective implementation of an agreement. Effective neutralization will require guaranties by the major powers who participated in the Geneva Conference of 1964 and 1962 and could include additionally those powers contiguous to the area; India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia. The Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. The failure of the 1954 Geneva agreements cannot be ascribed to U. S. failure to be a signatory or to the Ngo Diem regime's unilateral denunciation of the Geneva agree- ment in 1955. Nor can it be ascribed exclusively to North Vietnam infiltration of cadres and supplies as described in the U. S. "White Paper". The failure was due funda- mentally to the absence of provision .for enforcing the agreements reached. More precise- ly, it was due to the failure to create an implementing peace-keeping force adequate to cope with border control and numerous other problems - including internal political problems - which resulted in the breakdoxra of the partial neutralization. - 2 - ,'••." A true neutralized zone requires effective border control, an internal peace- keeping presence and, especially, the prior right granted to the force to enter the boundaries of any signatory neturalized state to observe, check upon or mediate com- plaints of violation by any power signatory to the instruments of agreement. The costs of the peace-keeping force would be borne by all parties to the agree- ment (probably in similar percentages as their U.N. dues assessments). Troops would be supplied by neutral African,- Latin and Scandinavian nations with the host nation's approval made part of the agreement. All logistical forces would be supplied by the major powers, that is, ships, planes, tanks, trucks, etc. Since only three nations in all probability would require more than minimum forces - Laos, North Vietnam and South • Vietnam1'- the contributions in men, material and funds would probably not be burdensome on any' nation. Some seventeen neutral nations have already indicated willingness to supply forces for such purposes. Thus no probkem should be encountered in meeting the needs of this situation even if it is considered desirable to exclude from military forces all Asian or Oceanic nations. Since four pox-jers (U.S., Soviet Union, Britain, France) would be responsible for almost two-thirds of the funds and since three of these '£our have already indicated a sympathy with this methodological solution, no problem of contributions should be encountered. ' 2'. Initiatives Toward Negotiation Uith the Aim of Achieving Settlement. Having settled the concrete nature of the "honorable peace" We seek, the U. S. should call for (a) a conference of concerned powers or the reconvening of a broadened •Geneva Conference of 1954; and, (b) once a conference is agreed to, the U. S. should announce in: advance its proposal that the first agenda item should be negotiation for a total inspected cease fire. As a warrant of its intentions, the United States should, at the time Of its public announcement of a conference call, state its decision to cease bombing of North Vietnam,JesaBB^p388w££B^spaaaS&. If the bombings have served - to esffibcerbate the situation and to limit the flexibility of forces in Hanoi friendly to negotiation, this U. S. action will permi't the Vietnamese Government to accept the offer without loss of honor.. It has been fl£££SSB8s£P stated in Peking that it would negotiate under one of two conditions: ,. (a) Complete U.S. withdrawal. (b) No prior conditions of any kind. The first is patently impossible since U.S. withdrawal could not be matched other than by the withdrawal of northern forces which at present Hanoi contends do not exist. The second, however, should pose no problem for the United States and meets the proposal suggested herein. The holding of a conference even if met by a refusal of Peking to participate, as long as it is not supported by any other powers, would still be possible. Peking under these circumstances might be opposed to a successful conclusion but could not prevent'it. At the s ame time, it cannot noxj be predicted that Mainland China will refuse to particpate. It has done so on tx/o other occasions, and with unity of all other power's'might do so again. The only present certainty is that efforts by the United States and Mainland China to negotiate terms at arms length, through public state- ments and with a variety of prior conditions, is, xjithout doubt, doomed to failure. The proposed conference should be held in a neutral city, and the United States should accept the good offices already offered, of the U. N. Secretary-General, the ... British, French and Indian Governments to intervene with Hanoi and, if necessary, with- Peking. All matters relating to the peace-keeping force - the only real guarantee the agreement will,work - x;ould be made a part of the final instrument, including troop contributions, terms of commitment, funds, logistical forces and the control apparatus. Clarity on the latter is of decisive importance. Even if the U.S. participates in the peace-keeping implementation, the control machinery must operate outside the U.N. until1 such ^time as North and. South Vietnam and Mainland China are themselves U.N. members. 3.' The' Internal Structure of the Neutralized Zone. . i. ..-..• '••>•••• ' • :•' • Ideally, once cessation of all hostilities has been achieved and all non- indigenous military forces removed and native forces disarmed, a free democratic play of political forces xtfithin the protected area x^ould be desirable. It is not the aim of the United States to freeze political change in any nation. Unfortunately, in the war-torn-- situation prevailing in South Vietnam, it x;ould be denying reality to suggest that there exists an :immediate possibility of pdlitidal stability. At least for a period, a repre- sentative coalition government supported by all guarantor poxjers x-;ill probably be necessary.. This resembles the Laotion pattern, but under the conditions of a monitored settlement'it should work much more effectively than in the past. The aim is to provide representation for all political and social groupings, permit time for pacification and allow for internal negotiation, discussion and settlement without outside interference. - 3 - Doubtless this will be one of the most difficult aspects for conference agreement. The Chinese and North Vietnamese can be expected to demand a dominant role for the National Liberation?Front- (the Viet Cong). "Hie United States and other-Western powers will undoubtedly reject granting such a role which would pre-determine a:;futurs Viet Cong government. However, to the degree that internal flexibility can be .permitted, it would be desirable that many of these problems find their solution without-,:big power political .interference. The Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided for free elections to be held in 195$, Possibly a more realistic term of years might be set for ,the suggested internal political freeze. The term, however, cannot be without specific limit. Free elections, this time supervised by the peace-keeping force, should have a. realistic possibility of success. In any event, even after free elections the proposed zonal neutralizationrwpuld • remain, in force and subject to continued big power, guaranties. Therefore, whatever the complexion of the government that finally evolvedv^'it can in no way affect the vital interest of any nation or bloc of nations. As a neutral.and non- *. l -. •! ••;]••••• J aligned zone, these nations would be prohibited from joining any military alliance, East or West. 4. Economic Aid and Development Program. The major powers, in addition to being responsible for the costs of peace-keeping, should offer a multilateral economic aid program. The Mekong River delta program is of enormous value but is only one example. This U.N. program which has sur- vived the continuing war involves the joint activity of twenty-two nations and has already spent close to $100,000,000 for surveys and pre-investment purposes. It is to Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam what the Aswan Dam is to Egypt and the Volta River Dam is to Ghana. Much more than this needs to be done. North Vietnam, only marginally assisted by the Mekong River project, can be brought closer to the other nations of this zone through economic development programs, trade and aid projects. It also should be the aim of U.S. forces - if Mainland China is a cooperating signatory - to seek ways of regu- larizing trade and normal cultural relations between her and the other members of the conference. A final tangential but highly significant result of a broadly based settlement would be to undergird the United Nations at its weakest point. The resolution of big pow- er conflict over Southeast Asia more than any other single crisis has paralyzed the working out of a peace-keeping settlement. On two levels an agreement could assist in making more viable the entire U.N. operation. First, by greatly reducing world cold war tensions between the great powers, peace-keeping differences could be resolved. Second, so long as cold and hot war continues, the possibility of sizable economic de- velopment programs for the less developed countries has no prospect of success. •vV A it -!< ic -!- -V Addenda United Nations experience with UNEF (Suez) and UNOC (Congo) provides rich exper- ience which can be placed at the service of a Southeast Asian peace-keeping agency. The results were of a positive and a negative nature. But both will serve as a useful guide for the future. The U.S. and the S.U. (July 1964) have indicated acceptance of the principle of exclusive use of neutral and small nations' military forces with big power logistical support. Although the control mechanism remains to be worked out, it is neither insoluble nor possibly even difficult. Pacification and neutralization of Southeast Asia are in the interest of every major power including Mainland China. Whatever economic advantage China might gain from political domination of the area could be more than equalled by peaceful development projects of which she could be made a part. The problems that arose in the Congo operation, in addition to the cold war con- flict between the Soviet Union and the United States, were products of inexperience with new institutional forms and, for that time, a tremendously large force. It is fair to assume that a force created out of a treaty arrangement, or its equivalent, will find many problems solved because of the desire of the participating powers to cooperate. If any other assumption is made, the peace-keeping force will fail. It is an implementing mechanism, not an enforcement agency capable of imposing its will on the great powers. UNOC, operating under conditions of the virtual absence of government, employed 20,000 troops. Given a cooperation of host governments, forces several times that size could be obtained and deployed, It is, however, unlikely a force of this size will be necessary. _ 4 - , .The United States at present is spending over $600,000,000 annually in South Vietnam. Even a huge peace-keeping operation would cost a fraction of this sum. -Using U. S. dues contribution as a guide, it would be responsible for' 32% of the cost; the Soviet Union 1770; and Great Britain and France approximately 870 each. The' Congo costs, for almost four years, ran to less than $150,000,000 totali If a South> east Asia force were four times as large, the annual cost to the United States' would' be under one-tenth of its present financial commitment to South Vietnam. ,-.,,,•.• The United Nations which would be one of the greatest beneficiaries of a suc- cessful settlement would also be one of its most significant contributors', Its re- sources in skilled:executive personnel, mediation and pacification experience and military command knowledge are today unique. This result of fifteen years of border control and peace-.keeping work in all parts of the world now can be drawn upon to ;assi;s,£.resolution of this crisis. • .. . . . '•••'•• ..; , ; Ki:, ! ."• ::':.•'.. ' :' • ' •.;•'.: •• < • _ 0 - ; JAPANESE SOCIALIST PARTY AND ITS PROPOSALS ON VIET-NAM According to a Kyodo Press Report, the opposition Socialist Party decided, at a meeting of its Central Executive Committee, to meet with Prime Minister Sato on 1 April 1965 to discuss the Vietnamese question. The Socialist proposals consist of two parts: (a) there should be convened a summit meeting of leaders of Asian governments. The countries to be invited are the People's Republic of China, North Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, Burma and Indonesia; and (b) as an alternative to (a), there should be convened a conference of peoples on the peace in East Asia. This conference would be non-governmental in nature. The objective being pursued by the Japanese Socialist Party in this situation is to bring about the suspension of US attacks on North Viet-Nam and to initiate diplomatic talks on the peace in Indochina. The outcome of the meeting with Mr. Sato and his reaction to the Socialist proposals is not yet known. Dear Reunses: I have just come from a press conference with Mr. McClowsky, head of the News media for the State Department. He said a number of things which may be of interest to you* In regard to Harlan Cleveland's remakrs on the United Nations to the effect that " the UN might well have a role in supervising an agreement if one c can be reached", Mr* McClowsky felt this &$$$&&&fi$$j^u*applied to the future. He did not see any role that the United Nations could play at the moment in the Vietnam crisis other than what the Secretary-General might decide to do on his own. He was aware of newspaper reports to the effect that U Thant might take a trip to Hanoi and Peking but nothing through official channels. On intensive questioning, he revealed that the United States would neither " encourage" or discourage" such a trip. On the question of a possible cease-fire and negotiations, he made it clear that the United States did not intend to publicize any conditions but simply sit back and studyfi " developments" and then reach a decision privately whether to negotiate* I might say this is very close to what Walter Lippmann accused the United States of doing in today's Herald Tribune. That we are offering what amounts to " unconditional surrender" prior to any cease— fire and negotiations* Actually this is only part of the package* We are also saying that North Vietnam must stop the aggression, leave South Vietnam alone and that all must go back to the situation of 1954. In a condition where you have 90/& of South Vietnam under the control of the Vietcong, such a condition is rather unrealistic to say the least* Yugoslav bulletin Published by the Yugoslav Information Center, 816 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10021 Vol. IV No,, 340 Embargoed until 5: p.m. EST, ipril 1, 1965 APPEAL OF HE^ffiS OF ST^TE we, the undersigned Heads of state or government, have noted with great concern the aggravation of existing tensions and conflicts in South-East <\sia and in certain regions of Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, arising from oppression and foreign intervention, and regret the present deadlock in the United Nations which prevents it from exercising fully its responsibility in maintaining and safeguarding peace; we solemnly reaffirm the right of peoples to self-determination and the principle that all states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; we reaffirm our dedication to the principle of the inviolability of, and respect for, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states; v:e express our conviction that recourse to force and pressure in various forms is contrary to the rights of the people of Vietnam to peace, freedom and independence, and can only lead to the aggravation of the conflict in that area and to its transformation into a more generalized war with catastrophic conse- quences ; we are deeply concerned at the aggravation of the situation in Vietnam and are convinced that it is the consequence of foreign intervention in various forms, including military intervention, which impedes the implementation of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam; we are firmly convinced that, irrespective of possible differences in appraising various elements in the existing situation in Vietnam, the only way leading to the termination of the conflict consists in seeklng__a.,p.e&£e£ul solu- ti^n_th^ough_negotia_tions. We therefore make an urgent appeal to the parties A copy of this material has been filed wifh the Registration Section, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C, where the registration statement of the Yugoslav Information Center, 816 Fifth Avenue, New York N. Y 10021, as an agency of the Yugoslav Government, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, is available for inspection. The fact of registration does not indicate approval of this material by the Government of the United States of America. -2- ccn^err.cd to start such negotiations? as soon as possible, without posing any preconditions, so that a political solution to the problem .of Vietnam may be found in accordance with the legitimitate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in the spirit of the Geneva agreementS:on Vietnam and of the Declaration of the Conference of Non-aligned Countries held in Cairo. We invite the governments of all countries interested in maintenance of world peace to associate themselves, as soon as possible, with this appeal. March 15, 1965 Mohammad Yussuf, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Afghanistan .Ahmed Ben Bella, President of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria Dudley Senanayake, Prime Minister of Ceylon Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus Kaile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia Dr. Kw.rr.me Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana Sekcu Toure, President of the Republic of Guinea Lai Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India Marshal Abdul Salam Mohamed Aref, President of the Republic of Iraq Jomo Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya Mahandra Sir Bikram Shah Deva, King of Nepal General Mohamad Amin El-Hafez, President of the Syrian .Arab Republic Habib Bourguiba, President of the Republic of Tunisia Dr. A. Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic Josip Eroz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Press Release No. 4519 April 2, 1965 Following is the text of a letter from Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Ambassador Rifa'i, President of the United Nations Security Council; Dear Mr. President: In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on March 27, 1965, the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union asked that there be circu- lated as a Security Council document what he described as "a note of March 26 from the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States" (S/6260). In actual fact, the communication to which the Soviet Representative referred was rejected by the United States Embassy in Moscow. The reason was simple: the Soviet communication was based on the completely false allegation that poison- ous gases are being used in South Viet-Nam in connection with resistance to the aggressive campaign of conquest being waged by North Viet-Nam against the Republic of Viet-Nam. Poisonous gases, the use of which would rightfully concern the conscience of humanity, have not been used in Viet-Nam, nor is there any intention of employing them. The materials which were employed in Viet-Nam are commonly used by police forces in riot control in many parts -of the world and are commonly accepted as appropriate for such purposes. They are non-toxic and of course are not prohibited by the Geneva Convention of 1925, nor by any other understandings on the subject. These facts were of course entirely familiar to the Soviet Union when it drafted the tendentious and willfully misleading communication referred to above. The United States is, of course, assisting — and will continue to assist — the Republic of Viet-Nam in repelling subversion, terrorism, and infiltration. At the same time, there is nothing the United States desires more than to have peace restored to that country as quickly as possible. The position of the United States Government on the matter raised in the Soviet communication was made incontrovertibly clear by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in a statement on March 24, the substance of which is attached. I would be grateful if you would have this letter and its attachment circulated as a Security Council document. Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration. Adlai E. Stevenson. MORE Portions of Statement made by the United States Secretary of State on March 24, 1965 "How, we can understand the concern around the world and in this country about the specter of gas warfare. These memories go back to World War I, when tens of thousands were killed or maimed by what might be called 'military gases.1 "This is not involved here. "Ue are talking about a gas which has been commonly adopted by the police forces of the world as riot control agents — gases that are available commercially, and have been used on many occasions,, some in this country; and on many occasions in other countries, "Now, why Is tear gas a part of the equipment of police forces? "It is because police forces \tfould like to be able to use the minimum force that is required for the maintenance of law and order. It is a minimum Instrument. And my information is that certain situations arose in South Vietnam where this problem presented itself. "On one occasion, for example, the Viet Cong had seized a village, was holding the villagers in hostage, and was firing through these villagers at mixed crowds outside the village. "The decision was made to employ tear gas to try to deal with that situation as a riot control type of problem, in order to avoid the problem of whether to use artillery or aerial bombs that would inflict great damage upon innocent people. "There is no question here about gas warfare, nor gas in contravention of established conventions . . . "... We are not engaged in gas warfare. It is against our policy to do so, as it is against the policies of most other governments that I know about. "But we are reminded, when something of this sort comes up,, of the nature of the war in South Vietnam. It isn't a comfortable and easy war ... It is a mean, dirty struggle carried out tirithout regard to ordinary norms of conduct by the Viet Congo "Those who are concerned about tear gas, I would hope would be concerned about the fact that during 1964 over four hundred civilian officials were killed, and over a thousand were kidnapped in South Vietnam — village chiefs, school teachers, public health officers. Among other civilians, thirteen hundred were killed, over eight thousand were kidnapped, entire village populations have been kidnapped and their villages burned to the ground, and families of those who were in the armed forces were held as hostages. -2- "There Is nothing more urgent, from the point of view of the United States, than that peace be restored to that country as quickly as possible, find peace can be restored if Hanoi will stop infiltrating militarily-trained personnel into South Vietnam, stop the sending of arms into South Vietnam, and stop directing these operations aimed at taking over South Vietnam against the wishes of the people of that country." **/ VIET NAM - A 0# & e+ P flK "I*" ' ^ 2_n n s ?J o S UL: i n-* D £ *? ADA, for three years, has opposed escalation of the war in Viet Nam. / j"r? It has similarly opposed a policy of unilateral withdraws! . ' The U.S. policy A. of bombings in North Viet Warn since Feb. 1965 has opened a new and dangerous phase . »-} MThe fundamental assumption underlying the present "measured escalation" as/officially stated is that it will achieve an "honorable settlement" f *Srrn m*/^ ultimately .ygwch Parry the withdrawal of American forces. ADA's concern is that the option chosen, however well intended, potentially runs the risks of deep involvement with the North Viet Namese .-. /.rco^ regular military forces, mainland China, and conceivably could fail to achieve the purpose for which it is intended. It believes however that while our military response has been hard and clear the corrosponding diplomatic initiative has beeen implied, indirect, and lackiaeg visibility and definition. In the spirit of offering concrete alternatives ADA proposed the following; f &G 1 — That the President of the U.S. announce a readiness to iHiniiiu^a a broad international conference of concerned powers or a reconvening of the Geneva Conference of 1954i <*-ITH cease the bombing of North Viet Nam, ^Biy JSJJUIM Plnnl jinn Timl If the bombings ^jtfHtBfff"^"a^i°nmfeljie3^^ Lur liggr exacerbated the situation and limited the flexibility of forces in Hanoi friendly to negotiation — the U.S. action will p*e™rniit ^e Viet Namese government to accept the invitation without loss of honor. 3 — Following the successful implementation of a cease-fire, the Conference shall be charged with the establishment of an independent zone of former Indo-Chinese states free of interference from all outSfi.de'. powers. A peacekeeping force, preferably supplied by the United Nations, shall establish border control and truce observation teams within the neutralized area. k-- -Finally , ADA applauds the President's support of the Mekong River basin program, a U.N. project supported by 25 nations—as an example of the type of project which could assist these nations on the road to economic viability. This project is to Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand what the Aswan Dam is to Egypt + and~the Volta River Dam is to Ghana. But the project is only a beginning. Worth Viet Nam, only marginally assisted by the Mekong River project can be brought closer to the other nations of this area through economic development programs, trade and aid projects. It should also be the aim of the U.S.—if Mainland China is a cooperating signatory to the agreement— to seek ways of regularizing trade and normal cultural relations between her and other members of the conference. The roots of the present crisis far antedates the Johnson Administraticn. Flexibility, and creative diplomacy are today's imperatives if the ti.S. is to liquidate this dangerous legacy. T.1 iir il^irnrrl-tTBTrT^^rfrf^^ 'PERMANENT MISSION OF JAPAN 8 April 1965 TO THE UNITED NATIONS PRESS RELEASE STATEMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AMBASSADOR AKIRA MATSUI The statement made by President Johnson, at Johns Hopkins University yesterday, while expressing the American determination to carry on the military effort in Vietnam, made it quite clear at the same time that the intention of the United States is not to expand the conflict, but to seek a peaceful settlement through "unconditional discussions". President Johnson's concrete proposals on Vietnam are con- sistent with views that have been expressed by the Japanese Govern- ment and are accordingly welcome. President Johnson also stated the American Government's intention to provide an investment of one billion dollars to raise standards of living and secure the economic and social welfare of the peoples of South East Asia, in particular those of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, in accordance with a plan to be initiated by the Secretary- General of the United Nations, thereby solving, once and for all, the confusing situation now prevailing in that region. The Japanese Government has always maintained that improvement of the economic and social welfare of the peoples concerned is the most important -2- factor for the peace and stability of Asia, Therefore, Japan stands ready to cooperate positively in efforts to those ends. It is sincerely hoped that through such means the independence and stability of South Vietnam will be secured as soon as possible and the confusion prevalent in South East Asia terminated. PRESS-RELEASE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS N 25 136 EAST 67th STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. A^r 11 19 TQ6 5 JOINT SOVIET-VIETNAMESE COMMUNIQUE MOSCOW, April 18. TASS. Following is the full text of the Joint Soviet-Vietnamese Communique: A party and government delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, headed by comrade Le Suan, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers'Party of Vietnam, was in the Soviet Union from April 10 to 17 this year on a friendship visit at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government. During the stay in Moscow of the party and government delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam there was an exchange of opinion on the situation obtaining in the region of Indochina as a result of the aggressive actions of the United States against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the extension of American armed intervention in South Vietnam. Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade A.M. Kosygin, member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, comrade N.V. Pcdgorny, member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and. Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade Y.V. Andropov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Coinmit-tee, comrade A.A- Grom.ykoj member of the CPSU Central Committee and Foreign Min.i stc-r of the USSR, comrade R.Y. Malinovsky, member of the CPSU Cenv..i"/il Commitx-ee and Minister of Defence of the USSR, and comrade S«A, Skachkov, Alternate member of the CPSU Central. Committee and Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for external economic relations, took part in the conversation on the Soviet side. - 2 - Comrade Le Suan, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers Party, comrade Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the Political Buro of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, Deputy Premier and Minister of defence, and comrade Nguyen Guy Trinh, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers'Party, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam took part in the talks on the Vietnamese side. The Central Committee of the CPSU, the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers'Party, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam resolutely denounce the piratical actions of American imperialism in the region of Indo-China, the armed intervention spearheaded against the freedomloving people of South Vietnam, the open acts of aggression and piratical attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The imperialist expansionist policy carried through by the United States of America is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Vietnam, it is aimed at the frustration of the peaceful reunification of the country and the conversion of South Vietnam into a factual colony and military place d'armes of the United States. In violation of the Geneva Agreements, the United States set up its military bases on the territory of South Vietnam, and illegally send there its armed forces and weapons. It un- leashed a bloody war of extermination against the Vietnamese people, resorting to barbarous means against the peaceful popu- lation including napalm bombs and poison gas. It is with anger and indignation that the peoples of the world are protesting against the atrocities perpetrated by the aggressors on Vietnamese soil, they will never forgive and forget these crimes of imperialism. The aggressive actions of the United States in Vietnam create a threat to the peace not only in South East Asia, but also aggravate tension throughout the world, increase the danger of a military conflict with grievous consequences for all the peoples of the world. The Central Committee of the CPSU, the Soviet Government, the entire Soviet people are expressing fraternal solidarity with the people of Vietnam who are waging a heroic just struggle against the American aggressors. The party and government delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pointed out that the international soli^a- rity and manysided assistance rendered by the Soviet Union make an important contribution to the strengthening of the defence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, its ability to give a - 3 — rebuff to the military provocations of imperialists. The frater- nal support of the USSR and other socialist countries strengt- hen the Vietnamese peoples faith in the ultimate victory of their just cause. The party and government delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the profound gratitude of the Vietnamese people, the Vietnamese WorkersfParty and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the fraternal Soviet people, the CPSU and the Government of the USSR for the great fraternal international support and assistance. This support and assistance to a great extent strengthen the force.3 of the Vietnamese people in their struggle in defence of the security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and in the struggl against the barbarous aggression by American imperialism in South Vietnam. The party and government delegation of the Democ- ratic Republic of Vietnam express gratitude for th.3 fraternal hearty welcome accorded it by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government during the stay in the Soviet Ur,icn0 The Vietnamese people also highly appreciate the constant support of the Soviet people which finds its expression in numerous meetings and rallies of protest against the aggression by American imperialism, in letters of the Soviet working people expressing a desire to volunteer in order to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese brothers against the aggressors. If the United States aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is intensified, the Soviet Government, in case of necessity, given an appeal by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, will consent to the departure for Vietnam of Soviet citizens who, guided by the sentiment of proletarian internationalism, express a desire to fight for the just cause of the Vietnamese people, for the maintenance of the socialist achievements of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Having discussed the situation in South Vietnam, the CP5IJ Central Committee, the Soviet Government and ^he Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers'Party and the Government of the Democ- ratic Republic of Vietnam consider that the National Front of Liberation is the genuine exponent of the. will and aspirations of the people of South Vietnam, its only legitimate representa- tive. The program of the Front enjoys the broad support of tne mass of the people because it proclaims independence, democracy, peace, an end to imperialist intervention and the formation in South Vietnam of a national, democratic coalition government carrying through a policy of independence and neutrality in full conformity with the Geneva Agreements of 1954» -4 - It was noted during the talks that the statement of the Central Committee of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front of March 22 this year met with a positive response in the Soviet Union and enlisted support. The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express their firm confidence that the just struggle by the people of South Vietnam waged under the leadership of the National Liberation Front will be crowned with a complete victory. No matter what means the imperialists resort to, they will not succeed in enslaving the people upholding their inde- pendence and freedom. During the talks the Party and government delegations of the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam expressed their evaluation of the recent statement made by the United States President in connection with the situation in Vietnam. This statement shows that the United States is still keeping a course for the extension of the acts of aggression against the Democra- tic Republic of Vietnam, for the further spreading of the war against the people of South Vietnam and does not seek to explore avenues leading to a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese problem, It is significant that the statement by the United States President on a so-called peaceful settlement has been made at time when further bombings of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are taking place, when there are further movements of American military units and weapons to South Vietnam to step up the bloody aggression against the people of South Vietnam — and these aggressive actions continue. The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam agree that a solution of the Vietnamese problem calls for an immediate end to the aggressive actions by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In conformity with the Geneva Agreements the Government of the United States must evacuate its forces, servicemen and arms from South Vietnam, put an end to the aggression against South Vietnam and the infringement of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In the period before the peaceful reunification of Vietnam it is necessary, according to the Geneva Agreements, that the two parts of Vietnam have no military alliances with other countries, have no foreign military bases and servicemen on their territory. The affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by itself on the basis of the program of the National Liberation Front. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam must be effected by the Vietnamese people themselves without outside intervention. - 5 - There also was an exchange of opinion on questions pertain- ing to the situation in Laos and Cambodia in connection with the ceaseless United States intervention in the affairs of those countries. A realistic way to a solution of these problems is scrupulous compliance with the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. For these purposes it would be useful to convene the relevant international conferences. Examining the questions of measures to strengthen the defence potential of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the party and government delegations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the USSR noted with satisfaction that the earlier understanding on these questions is being implemented to the envisaged extent and procedure. The CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers'Party, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reached an understanding on further steps designed to safeguard the security and defer:',! the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vlobn-sm which is an objective of aggressive actions by American imperialism and agreed on appropriate measures for these purposes. The Soviet Union reaffirmed its readiness to continue rendering the necessary assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the repulsion of United States aggression. The party and government delegations of the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam emphasized that in conditions of activization of the imperialist forces, their attempts to suppres; the liberation movement of the peoples, unity of action and strengthening of the solidarity of the Socialist countries, of all, who are coming out against imperialism and colonialism, for freedom and independence of the peoples, is more necessary than ever before. Guided by the interests of safeguarding peace, freedom and independence of the peoples, the Soviet Union and the Dsraoc.valr.ic Republic of Vietnam appeal to the governments and peoples of all countries to take the necessary steps in order to put an end to the imperialist aggression by the United States in the region of Indochina. The continuation and extension of the American aggression in Vietnam is a provocation not only against one socialist country-- the Democratic Republic of Vietnam -- but also against all So- cialist countries. At the same time this American aggression is a provocation against the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, against all peaceloving peoples, against all who cherish the cause of peace and national indepen- dence. The interests of peace and internetio.n?l security call for curbing the forces of imperialism and aggression that encroach on the freedom and rights of the Vieo/ia^se peopler PRESS-RELEASE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS N 25 136 EAST 67th STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. April 19, 1965 JOINT SOVIET-VIETNAMESE COMMUNIQUE MOSCOW, April Ig. TASS. Following is the full text of the Joint Soviet-Vietnamese Communique: A party and government delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, headed by comrade Le Suan, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers'Party of Vietnam, was in the Soviet Union from April 10 to I? this year on a friendship visit at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government. During the stay in Moscow of the party and government delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam there was an exchange of opinion on the situation obtaining in the region of Indochina as a result of the aggressive actions of the United States against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the extension of American armed intervention in South Vietnam, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade A.N. Kosygin, member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, comrade N.V* Podgorny, member o:'" the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and" Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade Y,V» Andropov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade A.A, GrornykOj member of the CPSU Central Committee and Foreign Minister of the USSR, comrade R.Y. Malinovsky, member of the CPSU Geniu^l Committee and Minister of Defence of the USSR, and comrade S*A. Skachkov, Alternate member of the CPSU Central Coirim.itt.ee and Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Minisrers of the USSR for external economic relations, took part in the conversation on the Soviet side* - 2 - Comrade Le Suan, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers Party, comrade Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the Political Buro of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, Deputy Premier and Minister of defence, and comrade Nguyen Guy Trinh, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers'Party, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam took part in the talks on the Vietnamese side. The Central Committee of the CPSU, the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers'Party, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam resolutely denounce the piratical actions of American imperialism in the region of Indo-China, the armed intervention spearheaded against the freedomloving people of South Vietnam, the open acts of aggression and piratical attacks on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The imperialist expansionist policy carried through by the United States of America is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Vietnam, it is aimed at the frustration of the peaceful reunification of the country and the conversion of South Vietnam into a factual colony and military place d'armes of the United States, In violation of the Geneva Agreements, the United States set up its military bases on the territory of South Vietnam, and illegally send there its armed forces and weapons* It un- leashed a bloody war of extermination against the Vietnamese people, resorting to barbarous means against the peaceful popu- lation including napalm bombs and poison gas. It is with anger and indignation that the peoples of the world are protesting against the atrocities perpetrated by the aggressors on Vietnamese soil, they will never forgive and forget these crimes of imperialism. The aggressive actions of the United States in Vietnam create a threat to the peace not only in South East Asia, but also aggravate tension throughout the world, increase the danger of a military conflict with grievous consequences for all the peoples of the world. The Central Committee of the CPSU, the Soviet Government, the entire Soviet people are expressing fraternal solidarity with the people of Vietnam who are waging a heroic just struggle against the American aggressors. The party and government delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pointed out that the international soli^-a- rity and manysided assistance rendered by the Soviet Union make an important contribution to the strengthening of the defence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, its ability to give a — 3 — rebuff to the military provocations of imperialists. The frater- nal support of the USSR and other socialist countries strengt- hen the Vietnamese peoples faith in the ultimate victory of their just cause. The party and government delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the profound gratitude of the Vietnamese people, the Vietnamese WorkersfParty and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the fraternal Soviet people, the CPSU and the Government of the USSR for the great fraternal international support and assistance. This support and assistance to a great extent strengthen the forces of the Vietnamese people in their struggle in defence of the security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and in the struggl against the barbarous aggression by American imperialism in South Vietnam. The party and government delegation of the Democ- ratic Republic of Vietnam express gratitude for th,3 fraternal hearty welcome accorded it by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government during the stay in the Soviet Union,, The Vietnamese people also highly appreciate the constant support of the Soviet people which finds its expression in numerous meetings and rallies of protest against the aggression by American imperialism, in letters of the Soviet working people expressing a desire to volunteer in order to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Vietnamese brothers against the aggressors. If the United States aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is intensified, the Soviet Government, in case of necessity, given an appeal by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, will consent to the departure for Vietnam of Soviet citizens who, guided by the sentiment of proletarian internationalism, express a desire to fight for the just cause of the Vietnamese people, for the maintenance of the socialist achievements of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Having discussed the situation in South Vietnam, the CP3TJ Central Committee, the Soviet Government and L,-he Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers'Party and the Government of the Democ- ratic Republic of Vietnam consider that the National Front of Liberation is the genuine exponent of the will and aspirations of the people of South Vietnam, its only legitimate representa- tive. The program of the Front enjoys the: broad support of the mass of the people because it proclaims independence, democracy, peace, an end to imperialist intervention, and the formation in South Vietnam of a national, democratic coalition government carrying through a policy of independence and neutrality in full conformity with the Geneva Agreements of 1954. -4 - It was noted during the talks that the statement of the Central Committee of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front of March 22 this year met with a positive response in the Soviet Union and enlisted support. The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express their firm confidence that the just struggle by the people of South Vietnam waged under the leadership of the National Liberation Front will be crowned with a complete victory. No matter what means the imperialists resort to, they will not succeed in enslaving the people upholding their inde- pendence and freedom. During the talks the Party and government delegations of the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam expressed their evaluation of the recent statement made by the United States President in connection with the situation in Vietnam. This statement shows that the United States is still keeping a course for the extension of the acts of aggression against the Democra- tic Republic of Vietnam, for the further spreading of the war against the people of South Vietnam and does not seek to explore avenues leading to a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese problem, It is significant that the statement by the United States President on a so-called peaceful settlement has been made at time when further bombings of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are taking place, when there are further movements of American military units and weapons to South Vietnam to step up the bloody aggression against the people of South Vietnam — and these aggressive actions continue. The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam agree that a solution of the Vietnamese problem calls for an immediate end to the aggressive actions by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In conformity with the Geneva Agreements the Government of the United States must evacuate its forces, servicemen and arms from South Vietnam, put an end to the aggression against South Vietnam and the infringement of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In the period before the peaceful reunification of Vietnam it is necessary, according to the Geneva Agreements, that the two parts of Vietnam have no military alliances with other countries, have no foreign military bases and servicemen on their territory. The affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by itself on the basis of the program of the National Liberation Front. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam must be effected by the Vietnamese people themselves without outside intervention. - 5 - There also was an exchange of opinion on questions pertain- ing to the situation in Laos and Cambodia in connection with the ceaseless United States intervention in the affairs of those countries. A realistic way to a solution of these problems is scrupulous compliance with the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. For these purposes it would be useful to convene the relevant international conferences. Examining the questions of measures to strengthen the defence potential of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the party and government delegations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the USSR noted with satisfaction that the earlier understanding on these questions is being implemented to the envisaged extent and procedure. The CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet Government and the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers'Party, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reached an understanding on further steps designed to safeguard the security and defor:d the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of V.'.otnsm which is an objective of aggressive actions by American imperialism and agreed on appropriate measures for these purposes. The Soviet Union reaffirmed its readiness to continue rendering the necessar- assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the repulsion of United States aggression. The party and government delegations of the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam emphasized that in conditions of activization of the imperialist forces, their attempts to suppres; the liberation movement of the peoples, unity of action and strengthening of the solidarity of the Socialist countries, of all, who are coming out against imperialism and colonialism, for freedom and independence of the peoples, is more necessary than ever before. Guided by the interests of safeguarding peace, freedom and independence of the peoples, the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam appeal to the governments and peoples of all countries to take the necessary steps in order to put an end to the imperialist aggression by the United States in the region of Indochina. The continuation and extension of the American aggression in Vietnam is a provocation not only against one socialist country— the Democratic Republic of Vietnam — but also against all So- cialist countries. At the same time this American aggressjon is a provocation against the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, against all peaceloving peoples, against all who cherish the cause of pea^e and national indepen- dence. The interests of peace and international security call for curbing the forces of imperialism and aggression that encroach on the freedom and rights of the Vietnamese people„ CR.J.3 (4- ROUTING SUP Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: APPROVAL X>< YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS JAMES BOYD 3O BUTTON PLACE NEW YORK 22, N. Y. May 15, 1965 Memo to the Secretary-General Dear Mr. Secretary-General: I thought you would "be interested in my line of reasoning. There is also the speculation amongst the press that in a round about way, the United States might have encouraged the so-called Constitutional Government of the D.R. to send the telegram asking for the meeting of the Security Council etc in order to get out of an increasingly unhappy situation.This in turn suggests "another way" for the U. N. to get involved in Vietnam. Supposedly the Saigon Government could make a similar appeal under Art 35, par. 2. This is probably a long shot but I do believe that the sooner Vietnam comes under the umbrella of U.N. surveillance and control the better off the world will be. And there is just a chance now that the United States is realising it has gotten itself into a real mire that has no bottem and thus may be looking for a way out.India may have the answer provided steps are taken to get the U.K. involved polijjcally as it is involved economically. Sincerely yours, James Boyd UNITED STATIONS REPORT May 15, 1965 VIETNAM A.KD TEE UNITES NATIONS James Boyd U.N. Correspondent The greatest and continued concern of Secretary-General U Thant is the war in Vietnam. He is clearly aware that this war is the most serious threat to the existence of the United Nations since its beginning in 1945 because it contains th3 saeds which could lead to a nuclear war between the Great Powers.This would mean the end of civilization and the United Nations, But the question of how the United Nations could become involved has so far defied all the experts.The raasons are that none of the parties directly concerned want the United Nations to interfere plus the fact that three of them, Saigon, Hanoi and Peking IVwf* the United States. This policyt however, was sorely tested v/hen Bed China attacked its northern borders,,.Nevertheless, India has persisted inapite of the fact that today she is now under an even greater threat with Sad China explowing its second nuclear bomb last week. The reaction of India was to appeal to the 114 United Nations Disarmament Commission to take immediate steps to stop the proliferation > of nuclear weapons and ,more importantly,ask4¥^that the United Nations safeguard the security of countries which may be threatened by Powers having nuclear weapons,This is quite consistent with the respect and support India has had for the United Nations Charter ever since it became a Member of the Organisation.In various U.N.Peacekeeping ventures, India has often supplied troops and military personnelle and is presently among the leaders in the Committee of 33 working to devise new rules and methods -3- to control U.N,Peacekeeping,To them the United Nations is the only way to remain huetral and yst protected. This brings us back to the Vietnam problem. What happens in Southeast Asia is as much a concern to India as to what happens in Latin America tc the United States,It has now presented a peace plan,What may come under immediate reconsideration is the idea of the Afro-Asian police force in view of the fate & of a similar force created by the C.A.S. for the Dominican Republic,This force was unable tc act which in turn brought about an immediate requeat froia a certain faction of the Dominican ."Republic for intervention of the Secretary- General "with, a viov/ to action by the United .Nations. "Uzide? such" terras for help, the Security Council was able to act at once aaad with unanimity to send a fact-finding U.IT, team immediately iiito tha area,call for a cease-fire,and report back to the Council* In view of India's reliance on the United Nations,this \ > ( particular development may suggest somethino g similar concerning \ X Vietnam-^ First,, j^ the difficulties of creat.ing a Afro-Asian neace \ /• '•• force without some kind of direction and control by the United Nations in order to avoid criticism.Second, «rf-the need to get the true facts so that the Security Council can act,The kind of appeal made by a representa±ive of the Dominican Republic *^>%4^..t-C-®*"^ii eiroumventa all obstacles such as the tssssA of "any Neither of the Council taking an official position for or against such action. Therefore it would appear that India could initiate much the same ^«~s.^'?VVf^^J, f* ara^Kiegsn '''regarding Vietnam without incurring the opposition of either the United States or the Soviet Union.This in turn would lead to a much needed, , on-the-spot objective repqrt of what the true situation is and above all,what the people of Tietnam want. —4- The only international organisation that has the respect and trust of most nations and peoples of the world with the exception of Red China is the United Nations, When the Secretary-General makes a report of conditions on @$fefsCypFus,forin8tance,i;hls report is accepted without question by Members of the Council,This is not true when representatives of Cyprus,Turkey and Greece give their contradictory views of the situation,, Quite obviously eorae one is lying or esaggeratingj^uch the same trouble applies to Vietnam.lt is next to Impossible to suggest ways towards a peaceful solution . if the true story is not So far India has not mentioned any role that the United Nations might play .Nevertheless, the fate of the O.A. 3, and. its peace force in the Dominican "Republic might suggest ^ change of '-ipproach. Certainly if India plans to be consistent, it will sooner or later want the United Nations involved., This immediate example of hew the Security Council can act and ac o fagt may point the way -A-r V-A. nr tv~* to a similar movement in order to g®* the Secretary-General get the peace machine the rolling which is &&& special mandate and competence of the United Nations. THOUGHTS ON HOW TO FIGHT THE WAR IN VIETNAM Two observers comment on the question: Can sent the interview to Malcolm W. Browne, chief the Vietnam war be won? The first is Herman of the Associated Press bureau in Saigon and Kahn, director of Hudson Institute, whose latest author of the new book, The New Face of book is, On Escalation: Metaphors and Sce- War, to ask his comments on Mr. Kahn's narios. His comments made up part of a copy- observations, and they appear on the oppo- righted interview in U.S. News & World Report site page. An editorial comment on these and in its issue of June 7, 1965. War/Peace Report the foregoing pages appears on page 12. —and they always make the following One member of our staff, Frank comment: Armbruster, has looked, for example, THE INTERVIEW "Often, the government troops had at the various insurgency wars that WITH HERMAN KAHN: us where we were desperate: where we have been won by the U.S. govern- were either going to die or surrender ment. In most cases the government or be caught. But the government side had a very small number of troops. Q. What has to be done now? troops didn't realize it, and they went Look at the U.S. cavalry—they were A. We have locked ourselves into back to their barracks. It was because usually outnumbered by the Indians an unfortunate situation in Vietnam, they couldn't see how close to success they fought. Look at Magsaysay (for- and the best thing to do if it is possible they were." mer president of the Philippines)—he is to win, and, in some meaningful This is mostly a question of intensity had only one division in the Philip- sense, I would guess it can be done. and dedication. It's like prospecting. pines in an area in which there was Q. What would you do on the If you have a theory you're going to something like 30,000 or 40,000 guer- ground about cleaning up the make a strike, then eventually you usu- rillas. guerrillas? ally do. If you have a feeling you're It's almost a dead giveaway that, if A. We have been doing some think- not going to, you give up very fast. you try to outnumber the guerrillas 20 ing on our own—not any official gov- Q. Do Americans have any apti- to 1. as we do nowadays, something is ernment study—about this, and we tude for that kind of war, though? wrong. You may argue that these wars think there are some tactics that might A. Our State Department and our today are ideological wars, so it's hard- be pushed harder. military often do not. But we do have er now. But it probably isn't that much One of them is to treat the problems people in this country who can do it. different. as being, in part, an organizational and Many members of our police depart- If you'll examine these past wars, police-type problem—the kind of prob- ments, or intelligence service ought to you'll find that in every case there was lem you find when you're policing a be able to do it. That's how they oper- a guerrilla weakness which was ex- big city. ate normally—though, admittedly, in ploited by the government. For ex- The way to break up a gang of mob- a different environment. ample, in the spring and summer, the sters in a big city is to capture the On the whole, people in this country Indians were the best light cavalry leader. When he is replaced, capture are not used to doing dirty tricks and this country has ever seen. But they the replacement, and so on. playing rough. It doesn't come natur- couldn't get anywhere in the winter. What could be done in many areas ally to most of us, and it isn't pleasant. So the government generals learned to is to infiltrate the Viet Cong move- But, in this kind of war, one's stan- campaign in the winter. ment with classical methods—inform- dards are almost automatically going Q. How can you apply that to ers, double agents, sweethearts who to be lower than in a normal set-piece Vietnam? have been jilted, bribery, threats. battle. And I believe even Lincoln put A. It's something we are still study- Q. How does that apply to in- some thousands of people in jail and ing. Obviously, you have got to find surgency? suspended habeas corpus during the out what the Viet Cong weaknesses A. In Vietnam, you find the leader Civil War. are. and exploit them. of a local area and go and get him. I don't want to be on the side of I'd also argue that probably the You capture him like the Canadian saying, "Let's be rough." I'm on the main thing you have to do is teach Mounties "get their man." You track other side, typically. But, in this kind the Vietnamese Army to be aggressive him down and put a price on his head. of war, you must either drop your —do whatever it takes to make them Somebody will then be appointed to standards or get out. aggressive. Before that can be accom- fill his place. You get the second man. Q. If what you are talking about Somebody gets appointed to his place. worked out, would it clean up Viet- plished, you have to raise morale. You get the third man—right down the nam more quickly than bombing We found in Greece that just giving line. This requires, by the way, a cer- North Vietnam? recruits good officers, good equipment tain real intensity in operation. You're A. Most likely. But that's only one and regular pay fixed up morale really pushing hard. of many things that we're thinking enough. This often happens. I have talked with guerrillas, rebels about. I had some contact during World 10 WAR/PEACE REPORT popular support whereas Bao Dai was Powers" in general reaffirmed these for talks, as provided for in the cease- seen for what he was, a puppet of the agreements. fire agreement, on questions relating,- French. A South Vietnamese delegation rep- to trade, communications, etc., betwee^ By the end of 1953 the French had resenting the Bao Dai government the North and the South. All of concluded they could not win the war made a protest declaration, in which ^vertures were rebuffed by Ngo Dinh unless the United States intervened it objected to the division of the coun-1 D^em. whmrnv- exercised power in the 5 with direct military participation. Sec- try, the date of the elections, and some i South with the support of the United retary of State Dulles proposed massive &ther matters. It specifically wanted States. Hn also marie several proposals U.S. air and naval support, but this the United Nations to exercise tempo- for the holding of talks for the elec- was rejected as impracticable in a study rary control over all of Vietnam and tions. These were also rebuffed or ig- made by General Ridgway. Tli to supervise compliance with the cease- nored by Diem. There was little doubt offered Bidault, the French _____ n__ • fire agreement. that Ho Chi Minh would have won the minister, the use of two nuclear bombs, elections in the South as well as in the t) ~ which rjidault rejected for fear thejf U.S. Declined to Sign North. use would escalate the war and bring On July 21. the last day of the con- With the defeat of the Binh Xuyen JJommunist ('hina and thp Snvi^f ference, Walter Bedell Smith, acting and the armed sects which had chal- the conflict^"' for the United States, declined to ac- lenged his authority, Diemjjecame con- In the spring of 1954 the French cept the agreement and instead issued fident of his power. He stepped up his were at last willing to go to the con- a unilateral declaration, in which he authoritarianism and repression, en-' ference table with the Vietminh. stated that the United States ''will re- tried desperately to keep France^ _ frain from the threat or use ot force elements. In 1957. with the encourage- war. Failing in that, he refused to take to disturbl' the agreement, and thatthe ment of Washington, Diem launched a/- a direct part in the armistice negotia- United States would continue to work series of veritable man hunts. The pp\ tions that ensued at Geneva. Just as for the unification of Vietnam ''through lice under his brother Ngo Dinh Can, \ the Indochinese discussions started. free elections supervised by the U.N. greatly augmented in numbers, em- news came of the great French disaster to" jnsure that they are conducted ployed the most brutal methods. The at Dienbienphu. fairly." police drive was ostensibly aimed The Geneva Conference got under Prime Minister Nehru of India, against communists, but liberals, demo- way on May 8, 1954. At that time the speaking for the neutralist nations, crats, socialists, and all who disagreed, military map strongly favored the Viet- hailed the Geneva agreements as "one with Diem openly were affected. "niinh. who controlled nearly everything of the outstanding achievements of the Hunted down like wild animals, the liorth of the 17th parallel and piuLrafely postwar era." The Soviet Union ap- communists began to fight back and to 4fi per cent south ot that parallel. Four peared to be somewhat indifferent, glad return brutality for brutality. Inform- agreements were concluded at the Ge- mainly that the war was over and that ers, village chiefs who had presided neva Conference : ( 1) a ceasefire agree- there had been no escalation. over the denunciations, and others im- ment for Vietnam., (2) _a ceasefirS illes, however, was bit- plicated in the man hunts were shot. agreement for Laos, (3) a ceasefire" terlydisappomted and regarded tfie Peasants began giving assistance to agreement for Cambodia, and T4T~a Geneva agreements not as a settlement, the communists and the sects. Increas- Final Declaration of the Participating ' but merely as a battle lost. He was de- ing numbers began deserting the vil- Powers. termined that South Vietnam would ' lages to take up arms. At the end of The Vietnam ceasefire agreement was under no circumstances come under March, 1959, Diem candidly admitted signed by Ta Quang Buu, vice minister" the control of a communist regime. that "at the present time Vietnam is a / of Defense for the D.R.V., and by Gen- Ho Chi Minh made several proposals nation at war." I eral Delteil for the French Union \_Eorces in Indochina. Among its prin- cipal provisions were the following: 111 a '"provisional military demarca- tion line" was to be established at ap- proximately the 17th parallel, (2) mili- tary forces of the two sides were to re- group in their respective zones within 300 days. (3) nationalelections were to be held in boTh~ zones oli~jTrry~2T). 1956, under the supervision of an In- ternational Supervisory Commission composed of Indian, Canadian~and~PbI- ~tsti~ representatives, f4~5compliance with the ceaseh re ^provisions was to be supervised by international control commissions, chaired by the Indian member, and 15) the introduction of / nrw militnry^equipriierit orTKe^estab- lishment of Joreign military bases was rnbited. A "Final DeclaratiorToTthe 'Roscoe Drummond and Gaslon Coblentz, Duel at the Brink (Doubleday and Co., 1960) pp. 121-122. all the Western countries, yours is the able to do this that the Americans of the regular battalions of the N.L.F. one whose language, culture and spirit have had to intervene more and more when they redouble their pressure in is most familiar to us. Almost all of us directly in the conflict, trying to estab- Central Vietnam, particularly in the in South Vietnam are of French cul- lish this balance themselves. To pro- vicinity of Danang? They seek for ture. pose negotiations without conditions, themselves a position of strength that "At the same time, to speak frankly as President Johnson did in his Balti- would place the United States in the to you, we find that the policy France more speech, without at the same time worst possible situation. has advocated in Indochina is not real- increasing the military pressure, would In deciding at the Honolulu confer- istic enough. Calling a conference to dangerously discourage his friends in ence to increase their military effort in decide about neutralization of South Vietnam. The same thing happened in Vietnam, the Americans wanted to Vietnam was still a good idea in 1963. 1954. when just the announcement of make their determination clear: Either But today the ratio of forces has a Geneva conference, even before the negotiations without conditions or war changed, for our side. You tend to disaster of Dienbienphu, made the to the hilt. In principle, I believe they picture yourselves as arbitrators, medi- number of desertions in the Vietnam- are right. But perhaps they are ad- ators—but we don't need you to make ese armv skyrocket. dressing the wrong party. It is to those peace or to make the Americans leave. The "position of strength" theory is they are fighting that they must offer It is afterward that we will appeal to not popular in the West. Yet one must the choice, not to those who are merely France as the country best able to help be realistic. After all, what is the goal aiding them. us in the economic and cultural fields. Stop trying to impose your solutions on us." ''Would you be disposed to meet a A COMMENT FROM MOSCOW representative of the French govern- ment to tell him your point of view?" "Certainly. But not just like that. Not Dang Quang Minh, head oj the recently-opened Permanent Mission of right away. For everything that I've the South Vietnam National Liberation Front in Moscow, commented on just told you is still vague. We must Chaffard's article in an interview with New Times, a Soviet weekly maga- first have some precise ideas about zine, in its May 26 issue. Part of his comments follows: what we want to say to France and some serious plans to propose to them. "Now the National Liberation Front this one. For the soldiers will not re- But our intention is real. We are await, (N.L.F.) controls four-fifths of South main in the village, and the Viet Cong ing only some better indications that Vietnam's territory with an aggregate will return and punish them. So if they the French government knows what we population of 10 million. Some time want, the soldiers can demolish the represent and has decided to take us ago, in an article about the Front, moat and the pales themselves. . . . seriously." George? Chaffard of the Paris L'- ''Saigon troops cannot remain in the Express cited more or less the same village. The puppet government has not figures but added that he thought the enough men to garrison every more- Front leaders were somewhat exagger- or-less big village. And so, although I was on my way back to Paris when ating the size of the liberated zones, Saigon troops do 'infiltrate' into the Viet Cong leaders, on April 20, 'inasmuch as. in spite of everything, N.L.F.-controlIed territory, they gain published a communique repeating that many of these areas are still accessible nothing by it: all they still really have "any solution to the Vietnam problem to the Saigon army.' Chaffard has been is the narrow strip of highway with will lose its practical and positive sig- writing about Vietnam for a long time the military posts. nificance if it is undertaken without but he still has no clear idea about the "It is not so easy to keep these posts the participation of the N.L.F." Their specific situation in the South. It is not either. They have to be supplied with organization, they affirmed, exercises a question of some area being accessi- everything, from munitions to food- authority over three-fourths of South ble to Saigon troops. The puppet army stuffs. Militarily, they are of little value. Vietnamese territory, directly control- even maintains posts in some of the That is why the Saigon authorities ling nine million people in that land. areas controlled by the N.L.F., and often withdraw their troops from them. I think that the leaders were exag- nevertheless they are under our con- "The areas controlled by the Front gerating a little on the extent of the trol. are not a single mass. They are more "liberated zones," since, in spite of "Look here. That [pointing to a like powerful wedges splitting the everything, many of these areas are rough, hand-drawn map] is a strategic whole of the South Vietnamese coun- still accessible to the Saigon army. But highway linking two large populated tryside. The strategy of our liberation the N.L.F. figure on the number of points. There are several army posts struggle is the 'strategy of wedges' and people under Viet Cong authority along the highway and around them it also underlies the Front's political seems close to the truth—though that are villages whose population supports activity. means that eight or nine million more the Front. The peasants surround their "Take, for instance, our attitude to Vietnamese have escaped the author- villages with moats, set traps and erect the local Saigon officials. The Front ity of the Viet Cong. bamboo pales. Let us suppose that a has no intention of dissolving the civil If the Saigon authorities and the unit from an army post approaches a administration everywhere. The men non-communist organizations could village. The commander orders the working in it are local men. This is show themselves capable of forming a peasants to remove the obstacles. The where they were born, this is where common front, they could easily peasants refuse, saying they have been their houses and land are. They will achieve a balance with their adver- 'forced to do it by the Viet Cong.' They not turn against their fellow villagers saries and meet them on equal terms are peaceful peasants, they say, they whatever their political views may be. in a political dialogue. It is because do not want to quarrel with anyone That is why, though paid by Saigon, they have not yet shown themselves and are ready to obey any order but they carry out N.L.F. orders. JULY, 1965 7 ''There is yet another, purely mili- to act in unfavorable conditions and, not yet turned all of them into 'fighting tary, advantage the situation offers the finally, deprives regular forces of the hamlets.' That is what we call the vil- Front. The U.S. interventionists and superiority they usually enjoy over ir- lages whose population is capable of Saigon troops are regular forces. They regular forces. That, I think, is one of repulsing enemy attacks without the are strong in ordinary conditions, when the main causes of the failure of most assistance of the regular N.L.F. forces. there are front lines, rear areas and of the large-scale operations undertaken "In the zones where we have estab- flanks, when large units can coordinate against us by the Saigon forces and lished a network of 'fighting hamlets,' their actions or cover one another. the interventionists in 1963 and 1964. "The 'strategy of wedges' upsets the "When we speak of N.L.F.-controlled the population actively opposes the conventional rules of warfare. It territory, we do not mean that the de- enemy and is building a new life. There sharply reduces the possibility of stra- gree and character of control is every- the administration is wholly in the tegic and tactical interaction, compels where the same. We have demolished hands of the Front—from the economy the enemy to disperse his forces and all the 'strategic hamlets,' but we have to the maintenance of public order." HOW IT ALL STARTED IN VIETNAM The origins of the Vietnam war have been widely forgotten by the public. One example: How many Americans realize that in the early stages of the war the U.S. was giving aid to Ho Chi Minb? By Lawrence H. Battistini JTresident Roosevelt, in a memoran- With the collapse of the Japanese armed Japanese troops and employed dum on Indochina in January of 1944, war effort. Bao Dai, who had been them in operations against the Viet- wrote to Secretary of State Cordell collaborating with the Japanese, on minh. Hearing about this. General Mac- Hull: "France has had the country—• August 29, 1945, abdicated and trans- Arthur in Tokyo angrily declared to an thirty million inhabitants—for nearly ferred his powers to the Vietminh, who American journalist: "If there is any- one hundred years, and the people are were in effective administrative control thing that makes my blood boil it is to worse off than, they were at the begin- of most of Vietnam. On September 2, see our allies in Indochina and Java ning. France has milked it for one Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the inde- deploying Japanese troops to reconquer hundred years. The people of Indochina pendence of Vietnam in the name of these little people we promised to liber, are entitled to something better than the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. ate." What General MacArthur may that." President Roosevelt actually pro- On that same day. ironically enough. not have known was that the "little posed to Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek General Vo Nguyen Giap spoke of people" who were resisting reconquest that at the end of the war Indochina "particularly intimate relations" with were the Vietminh under the leadership should be placed under an international the United States and China. Perhaps of Ho Chi Minh. trusteeship to prepare it for independ- he said this because many U.S. officers ence. But events were already in motion in Vietnam had implied in speeches that would bring a far different future that the Vietnamese could count on to Indochina. U.S. support. The Japanese began moving into In- With the Democratic Republic of Early in 1946 the French made a dochina as early as 1939, and the Vietnam in administrative control of deal with Kuomintang China, which French colonial administrators there most of the country, the Indochinese then withdrew its occupation troops. collaborated with them. In that year problem might have been settled then With the complete withdrawal of the Ho Chi Minh organized a coalition, the and there, had not the French been British and Kuomintang Chinese Viet-Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh (the assisted in returning, with transport troops, the French, now heavily rein- Vietminh Independence League), service and military supplies. forced, proceeded to restore their co- known as the Vietminh for short. In At the Potsdam Conference of July, lonial dominion. France made a pre- December, 1940, the Vietminh engaged 1945, the military decision was made tense of making an accommodation in open rebellion in Cochin-China. Ho for the British to take the surrender of with the D.R.V. and engaged in some Chi Minh proclaimed that the aim of all Japanese forces south of the 16th discussions, but in bad faith. Fighting the Vietminh was to fight both Japan- parallel in Indochina, and for the broke out in December, 1946, and what ese and French "Fascist imperialism" Kuomintang Chinese to take the sur- French writers on the subject call "The for the attainment of national inde- render of all forces north of that par- First Indochinese Colonial War" got pendence. allel. The occupation forces of Kuo- under way. In the closing months of World War mintang China recognized the Demo- With the war going badly against II, the Vietminh were aided with sup- cratic Republic of Vietnam (the them, the French in 1949 granted nom- plies and equipment by units of the D.R.V.) in their zone and cooperated inal independence to Vietnam, as well U.S. Office of Strategic Services based with it. This was not so in the south- as to Laos and Cambodia, and installed in Kunminsr, China. Later they were ern zone, where the British occupation Bao Dai as their puppet head of state joined bv O.S.S. collaborators. forces under General Gvacey from the in Vietnam. After the outbreak of the very beginning paved the way for the Korean War in June, 1950, the United Lawrence H. Battistini is a professor return of the French to power. States began supplying massive assist- of social science at Michigan State At first the French were very weak, ance to the French, but even this did University. but with British support they even re- not turn the tide, for the Vietminh had 8 WAR/PEACE REPORT RISE BY J. ROBERT MOSK8N LOOK SENIOR EDITOR |HE WEST GERMANS are restless. They sunrise that the German people would seek their many to extend its statute of limitations, which want to regain what Chancellor Ludwig national identity.. . . We say 20 years is enough.", would have ended the agony of the war-crime Erhard calls the Ansehen and Rang—the Adds Vice-Chancellor Erich Mende, head of the trials—an extension that the majority of Ger- prestige and rank—with which Germany smaller Free Democratic parry (FDP), which is in mans reportedly opposed. TheychargethatAmer,- used to swagger. They are frustrated in their de- the coalition government with the powerful CDU ica_presses WestjGermany~to increased rearm- sire to unite their divided Fatherland; they are and its Bavarian wing, the csu (Christian Social ament, not onlytp defend Europe, but to limit fed up with American domination. Union): "There is a feeling 20 years after World German capacity~to"make goods that wtUjgrn- The rising sense of German nationalism, as War II of being a people." pete in world markets. And they suggest that it grows, can crack the fragile truce in Europe's West Germany's leaders frequently blame America" and her allies are in no hurry to see cold war. Left to themselves, the Germans would the Americans for their troubles. The Germans Germany reunified into em Vaterland. reject the present division of Europe and take the tolerate our domination because they need Twenty years is a long time in any marriage, initiative to reunite their nation. They are no They believe an American especially one in which the bride was longer willing to sit in the back of the bus. military presence deters subdued caveman-style and forced to The shadow over the Federal Republic of the Russians. Says a right- obey her conquering lord and master. Germany is not that of a Nazi rebirth^ but of a wing Bavarian politician, Speaking in Heidelberg last Memorial new nationalism born or both impatience and "If America would have Day, American Ambassador George C. pride. A recent investigative trip from Munich to to send 15 divisions to South Viet- McGhee said that it was time to accept Hamburg and from Berlin to Saarbrikken shows nam, the Russians would move the Germans as full partners and to get how strongly the Germans feel the time has come into Western Europe." rid of "a negative attitude that is badly for Germany to exert herself again. West German leaders in out of date." And he added, "Peace can- All German politicians today must talk of Bonn accuse Americans and their not be secure while this division at the "national substance," "national achievement," policies heart of Europe persists." "national pride." Increasingly, this is what the that permitted ex-Nazis to climb Eagerness to cut American apron West Germans want to hear. Chancellor Erhard, to high positions in the govern-" strings drew West Germans toward leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), ment/'i'hey say theJJ.S. secretly French President Charles de Gaulle's now urges Germans to "be aware of themselves nationalistic evangelism. Says one an- . . . proud, but by no means arrogant and over- Egypt build rockets in order to alyst, "De Gaulle was very popular at bearing. ..." West Berlin's Mayor, Willy Brandt, counter Nasser's threat to caJLLn times when he had anti-American atti- chairman of the opposition Social Democratic Soviet scientists. They insist that tudes." Some were attracted to the con- party (SPD), says, "It was as inevitable as the American iews'Turced 'WesfGef-' cept of a Christlkhes Abendland—z. Cath- .. . —=™™__^ • The Germans dream of their former gSorses, and blame the Americans for their troubles. LOOK 12-14-65 119 olic West— which would leave the U.S., Great the Big Powers. It should be settled directly be- Khrushchev to Bonn to discuss the problem, and\ Britain and Scandinavia on the outside looking tween the two parts of Germany. Brandt slyly Khrushchev had accepted just before his dis- ) in. Even today, a few, like former Chancellor asked the Czech Communist whether he really / missal. Now, Erhard findsRussia' s new rulers less [ Konrad Adenauer and former Defense Minister wanted the two German governments to get to- \willing to talk. He sees this reluctance as a sign of ____ — j - — "** Franz JoseF Strauss, stitTTTover around the gether if their first move would be to have the their "insecurity and weakness." But he says, ;£ De~Gaulle flame. chief of staff of the West German Army and the "This, of course, does not mean that we will not — fc ""^ But French blandishments have become less chief of staff of the East German Army create a always be ready to talk with the Soviets." alluring as De Gaulle expresses a death wish to single German General Staff. The Czech was hor- In West Berlin, Mayor Brandt has under- push the U.S. out of Europe, courts the Russians rified, beat a hasty retreat and said he did not taken a program of "small steps"—trade, cultural and hints he would accept the Oder-Neisse bouricT- mean that at all. exchange, passes for Berliners—to build bridges ary, leaving the eastern third oFGermany in Pol- This fear of a strong Germany is the great- to the East. "This is a little bit of reunification ish hands. Says one American official in Bonn; est barrier to reunification. Some German leaders and keeps alive the substance of the nation." hopefully, "De Gaulle only reveals his plans one 6e the prospect of West Germany sharing in the Until recently, West Germans believed re- veil at a time. As more and more is revealed, it be- mtrol of NATO's nuclear arms as a trap that unification might come when the Soviets got tired comes less attractive and contains some danger ill make reunification impossible; of supporting a bankrupt East Germany. But since for Germany." The German nationalists finally the Berlin Wall stemmed the loss of East Ger-= discovered that De Gaulle is himself a nationalist EUNIFICATION is THE issue that sits wait- many's labor force, its economy has steadily im- —but a French nationalist. ing like a silent cat. Few people in West proved. As Bjan^^a^^TJifire-was^uime when De Gaulle's errors have made it unlikely or East Germany believe in their hearts people thought we would—get-East Germany R 4 now that the West Germans will switch masters that reunification can be achieved quickly, but ugh misery. No one believes thatanv rnoreT ' in midstream. One of the most skilled American even fewer believe that their Germany will re-: •Sotne now dream that Communist CnTna7~By observers of German developments says, "The main divided forever; pushing the Soviet Union and the West closer to- French have made boo- boos handling the Ger- "Our leaders tell people lies about reunifica- gether, will make it possible to reunify Germany; mans. De Gaulle's arrogance has come through." tion, not for evil reasons, but they dare not say It is a dream of desperation; So instead of following the Pied Piper of Paris; the truth," warns a German political analyst in Despite all the difficulties, the pressures for t-hp ggp-cr Opfmans-^f^rga^y m makf derisjnns Cologne. "This makes democracy weak in Ger- reunification are much more intense than they and deals on their own; many." And savs Helmut Schmidt, the rising were a decade ago. As long as the Big Powers are Much of the demand for an independent young Social Democratic leader in Hamburg who unwilling or unable to move toward a solution, foreign policy is rooted in West Germany's spec- would have become defense minister if Brandt "this issue remains the greatest spur toward the tacular economic progress. "The unexpected cor- had won last September's national election," Any-^ "Hardening of German nationalism. Says Brandt, ner from which nationalism comes is the country 's one who comes up with a master plan for reuni- None of the democratic parties in the Federal growing industrial power and lessening political fication is either an idiot or a liar." He adds can- Republic can shirk the responsibility. If they fail power," say? CnnrnH Ahlprc a lpar)in^g 120 LOOK 12-14-65 Energetic industrialists take And finally, waiting in the wings is the pride in their up-from-the-ashes who forced Strauss out of the cabinet over the small National Democratic German party (NDP), economic achievement, but bemoan Der Spiegel affair. As a result of this postelection which seeks to pool the right-wing, pro-Nazi and infighting, some of the keenest German analysts militant elements. Hitler enthusiasts are still Germany's political impotence. predict privately that Erhard cannot last out his around. Late this October, more than 1.000 SS four-year term. veterans rallied in Rendsbutg^nd-ckeetcd-thcir-- If Erhard stumbles, several things could former commander. So far, men like these are decisive and bumbling. His square face, draped happen. Someone like 41-year-old Rainer Barzel, only an insignificant cloud on the horizon, but an with jowls, is one only a beer-drinking German the able, tough parliamentary leader orrtTetTDU- economic reversal, Allied actions that the Ger- could love. His political style has a quality of csu,~rmght take cnarge. Or fcrhard's^CDU arid mans find indigestible or a political vacuum might tubby well-being with an underlayer of arro- "Brandt's_SPD_rnight form what the Germans like turn many frustrated Germans to the extremists. gance frequently found in academics risen to high to refer to as a Grand Coalition. This would make places. He is admired as the architect of the eco- for strong government, which most Germans > EPTEMBER'S national election and the later nomic boom, but even his partisans whisper that still admire, but leave a hapless opposition and political in-fighting have left West Ger- he lacks Das FingerspitzengefiM— sensitivity. bode badly for democracy in West Germany. many with the threat of a dangerous po- Like a lumbering bear, Erhard, the former Or, finally, even more disastrous would be litical vacuum. Although the SPD received 12 economics professor, is constantly nipped by yap- the emergence of a strongman to fill the politi- million votes, its defeat virtually eliminated ping political dogs. Adenauer and Strauss have cal vacuum. The most visible strongman around Mayor Brandt from any future race for the chan- attacked both Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroder, is Franz Josef Strauss, the Bavarian "Butcher's cellorship, and Jbrhard's thumping victory was who has been less willing to play De Gaulle's game son who combines political skill with emotional immediately undermined by violent brawling and wants more contacts with the East bloc; and instability. Comments one political observer ^ri within the coalition. Many regard Erhard as in- pragmatic Frpp Demnrrat-ir parfy rht'pf TV/fcnHe, itrauss sown Munich, "He gets a thousand peo- continued DRAWINGS BY RONALD SEARLE LOOK 12-11-45 121 pie on their feet cheering like in Hitler's time." "Strauss and the whole government acted like Bonn from one party to another. "It's a new thing Strauss was a major political power until the damn fools without regard for democratic forms. and nottested," he says. "This system is not fit to Der Spiegel affair of October, 1962, in which he, Today, German politician-watchers refuse to survive a real crisis." as minister of defense, had the offices of the out- count Strauss out of the nation's future. At the Brandt offers a final warning: "It would be spoken newsmagazine searched and sealed, and moment, he is a "Buhmann"—a villain—and fre- dangerous if things are left as they are for years its publisher Rudolf Augstein and editor Conrad quently called "dangerous"; but if the Germans to come." Then the militants, the impatient, the Ahlers (then vacationing in Spain) arrested for grow tired of democratic politics, they might turn extremists could say, as they did after World War "suspected treason. "Themagazinehad published back to him for decisiveness and action. I, that the democratic leaders failed. an article about the ineptness of the German Hans-Ulrich Kempski, the respected chief How West Germany's leaders who believe / Army in NATO maneuvers and Strauss's insis- correspondent of the Suddeutscbe Zeitung, says, in democratic principles can keep control for the V tenreon a pnlicynf nuclear retaliation. Last May, "We can say today that Erhard's second term al- long run, in the face of the odds against unify- charges against the two men were finally dis- ready carries the seed of decay. The real as well as ing Germany, is hard to see. If the impatience for missed by the federal supreme court. the personal contrasts within the coalition are too reunification continues to grow, the mounting Brandt calls Strauss "a man who has stood great to make this government truly operative. sense of German pride and nationalism could up before the German Parliament in 1962 and ... In any case, the government will be pretty again turn into something more dangerous. repeatedly lied ... and never has felt the necessity impotent." Such impotence could weaken democ- There is nothing abnormal about an en- to correct this. One cannot build a democracy if racy inside West Germany and accelerate the rise ergetic, proud country wanting to bind up its a responsible minister lies to the elected members of German nationalism. wounds and flex its national muscles. But the of the Parliament." How solid is democracy in West Germany German's course record in nationalism has been The Der Spiegel affair revealed much about today? No one knows, but many responsible Ger- shaky ever since Count Otto von Bismarck first postwar Germany: A top cabinet member felt mans are clearly worried. "We don't know how punched his way into Austria and France and it proper to suppress press criticism. German pub- people will react to an economic crisis," says proclaimed the German Reich in the Hall of lic reaction was slow to jell; after the news broke, Brandt. "One could only really tell if we got into Mirrors at Versailles 95 years ago next month. several days of silence and apathy passed before trouble. My hope is we will not get into trouble. Since then, the Germans have never learned to intellectuals and the press started to raise a public And in Hamburg, Ahlers says the German people combine nationalism and a free society. fuss. Chancellor Adenauer told the Bundestag: are not yet enthusiastic about democracy. In 16 ' 'We didn 't need Americans to teach us about "We are faced with an abyss of treason. . . ." years, they have never yet transferred power in freedom," a Bonn official exclaimed angrily. But The Social Democrats called on Adenauer the fact is, Germany has attempted democratic and Strauss to resign, and finally, Mende threat- government only after defeat and humiliation in ened to break up the ruling coalition if Strauss The world watches as Germans two world wars. were not kicked out of the cabinet. Mende forced try to build bridges, and hopes they The veneer of democracy in West Germany Adenauer's hand, and Strauss was shipped back /" is thin. Says Conrad Ahlers, "You must never for- to Bavaria. A knowing American in Bonn says, don't fall on their faces. ( get that Germany is not a democratic country." END 122 LOOK 12-14-65 ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION T0t The Secretary-General Aj FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER X3C FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION Date: FROM: 28 July 1965 DE:George J. Janecek Director, EHD/OPI CR. 13 {13-64) Cobl* Addrcu : OMNIP8ESS eiie UKgrophique , OMNIPRESS T«Upbon« i 23153 - 10939 I*l*phone : 25153 • 20959 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INFORMATION CENTRE, CAIRO CENTRE D'INFORMATION, LE CAIRE SH. H, SHAMS. TAGHtl BLDC. (GARDEN QTY) CAIIO, U.A.R. Coira, .. 2«i 20 July 1965 TO: Mr. Norman Ho, Chief, Briefing Section, ERD-OPI, PECMj • Alj Khalil, Acting Director, UNIC, Cairo SUBJECT: Press Report from Cairo THE SECRETARY GEMHUL AND VIETNAM "Al-Ahram", Cairo leading daily carried a frontpage dispatch from Paris cabled by its correspondent Levon Keahiahian (Correspondent at UN Headquarters) under headline " U Thant Plays a More Positive Role in Vietnam11, The dispatch says that reliable sources assert that, the Secretary General has decided to take a more positive role to end the war in Vietnam* f. The correspondent adds that U Thant will nominate Anbassadcr Qnar Adel of the Sudan as personal representative of the Secretary General in Vietnam and Mill send him shortly to Hanoi* ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION The Secretary-General FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION XX POUR INFORMATION Date: FROM: DE: 29 July «65 George Janecek, OPI CR.13(i:U64) UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION SEF7ICE NSW DELHI Name of Paper TL^^LJL**, f*f**t 6^jt^lL^\^^. ------r^WHr^;; Road to Hanoi HE road to Hanoi is paved of being reduced to men more T 'with good intentions. So it desperate straits than those in w«ttW seem judging from the which they now find themselves. ruah of men and missions, each Mr Robert McNamara's assess. bearing his or its particular raent has the appearance of be- olrte branch to the North Viet- ing gloomily realistic. h the most deleterious hn- Ghana's President whose hope* of teaching joun deejned brighter President Nkruma£ started on the road but tbe-Ja*:iB^e ^ thai his envoy, »_ ™B aentatt^wf |he. Arpwfeajj Armah, Ghana* ttgh Commw- ^ j^ gt^,™, puVjjf j Bicker in'Londlto, is already on rict.t;nopf ,nvjeWfflii Is his way to Hanoi reinforce* «» tesfstono* there may establish feeltng th« »gi< ttwmpst "ceptf™* the, tact' that chatr«ra In Asiai hjediators %lM North Viet- ^ ^^ to ^ pj^jpitat^ by naijiese are *;.:fjtej' non-aVaneo ouUlde force. "this was the.{ members o^;,tfo«tAlr£-.A»a« ^^ flf ^^ Kotftan ^^ j,,^ p-oxtp. Indeed,'Pekfng ha» *p- dec1a»*d. fiThts is the point off liqiielv hinteq^jhSt'Ho^(?i tWgnt |h? c^flfct in Vietnam. I bu- nt, least be pi^rcifc4fl:^|ft V> tytjpe that Asia will .V rnore , these spokesrnfeOj The cKWttw ctable *'-•-the futur• e •"i —f th- e^'out - o( (i parallel mo-fe by Cairo sntt. iW^'i e same to both " Now Delhi are re'pbrtadly a\» " Leine canvassed. • '•. i .'-J-j tn'/wia, iiqetudihEr! felcmcil to share that; Whether these envo*K . ^f ( 1 paradoxfoally; B3v''Mr peaf - and goodwill will innivi-j — jMlnted qut. itv '• is dozily or colleetive'y succeed in thawing Hanoi's intranricen- ce to the point of inducing it solution. to (. come to the conferen- b'ind cannot prerend*ffiat th'e'l ct ,t"bl«- itfinff «n .Vjfit Gonff, .aided and controlled ...M -,,...r.^^,T wthdrawa1t,o< ^o^ff.^ol/ars an ^a'rtny ' the) Afjiencan, forces ip -Syl" ' Vi«ln Name of Paper r States WJld make available their . hersMp i.! -. c :. N 0; '.lie two Viptnams, OK .?e;-.iijte stall's. do?s I'll! diplomatic support for cer- n't pre;-art;r, !.!ieL- reuotricailon tain basic assumptions on which v a- no3u bio;;—interim or oiherwi*»— ; ln '!-e lu".;.c N.<- drcs 1' ora- Alternatives in couid be founded. Judlct Ln? hnldLj.' .•( :, Otlieva- type coutcrerne ai an- ancillary ".' Communist empire measure. What it does is to en- j1 able the , intenvnional1 'Ctininiunffy ''' There an undoubtedly dlffl- tn Ifjent vi"! Influ^nc* In a sltua- •hUtlaa bribe - - - tiou which has bpcorte, for It, m • - v. •• • yqm. 73w matter of fundamental concern. By SHtV SIIASTKI ^ torn beta 4 dfiftlOtftr1 dSe*m» i«e«d by **• the OEA ta v^ttoam l» the THE MTERIiA HO^iAl practical dWBculft "ot tdm the enemy. It U Jta& -e'fttuali nny th»t thU enway li tb« 1 of conwnuWsga. jtor a controversy. It Is not. for wrttnple,1' liica any other "#&' — bfyooci rjuaaticn ttyi the viet.cong r an idea. Y«j cannot iteoot *n li a wln-r of Uig annert forces of second tWoclUQ«r Concern at you can only ettoot the men .*nd Korlh Viotnam. Like-;isp then? ,w ot thin nJ0veftieDI women la who$e minds It ft lodged. nnlv the tmrw s\u:Rosflon that jd up )>y C^ln But. by wStay them, i*a ! teiperlollsm.- "m first CrteMt thore is A Govi rrim«n' in Squill «efvatlona with regard to t nartjrji of the*. HUfijry Vleinam which can function by'. if trt Torca by the OSA. Th» tnat trie popular consent. Thus two of the looks to the derl**3Jl)«n against an Idea makes It all (tee important asrirnpdnhn "MffiTnfl US action in to tar u it I mot*-attractive, "(""Then the "Etonian* policy fail (or l*ck cA certainty.. Ui threw C" did no* If the USA is unable tajonrf to an enemy whieh la seem thai, if ...... ,— two means of llftuif" tb»< to adhere to thrTot. muaiaaj.. the effect could jiutsMi from ,_ 1*9 propositiona. Wst, be.tt th&t the two Vieniaikitf th^i?d tto A more ootent ^jiptori»fl buUt up br ttese coia war Mcply to encoufige -Iterth Viet&ari to be •-o greater °indWlind«n«t froo. iifeato . are. to — 1 for furtter deve- China. "Mfieh rather It wfll bring tt thq, partlsHn Vimr doser to Chlnai" - ' '•• i • r ' •; ill)''1;'1 • i.. ft fringe — . the only means of reunifica- ittltude of the unconftnt States' is for one .or "the other aid* Twofold Cfietny Tt it. of course, a. pnlnfu] . *«> "conquer" tri« i Other tt to^S these Btafethto • f»nnuUtP rejected. Sewndly. fuU faith and : credit ha«jt* be givuv to.gehuin* points under c'vurfistfcTuvs cMfferpnt "iHWrttion *arJ"^rtean!rir ariti- prottot Boutr^vtefcaa. In ..thy Irrii t»nw which originally brought . qolonlar 'moTdnfienu. 1W «mll all lorth tl-c u^elj'.tlon "U?L ^MfflJt* MiV oevementA "aggrewion'' t»L fold —> the .Viet Cpntf ftijii'J|Wftt* ied." Hie olftswc*! '-cold •*.'" not onljC' «nr members of the TJN. fth oc- US Milan 1« (one of stoprcssJW-; tton». I^would, ot legal basw is providad i rebellion agwnst a friendly C30V-., tv^pell out whameg or "R#munur« «„; . the cmmenti or of assisting ih rcpftl-\wltiout the «m>eiotation "Of cota^t * aa^niSi th'k' t ling a foreign invasttin, or para? acnt at th« part{fii§; Btft it'woul4(Ba „ **^T* - ." * one 'w. the other;- is •» ttiRtfe « be' Jie]p.fttl U th» non-tttl?nid -|,1 "(i ' ' • . > i - = -. . ' *L( •. > . rr "t Js ->i Wi A ^W H H Wl lift "ft -.. • J» -I -•• UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION SERVICE JiEW DELHI Name of Paper "Ifa, mlnally at least a "U.N. peace VIETNAM force" nilght render the way to negotiation^ easier. It Is with |\NE of the reasons why the the United Nations that- the " NNorth Vietnamese Govern- Viet Cong would .negotiate, not ment has consistently refused Wltfr the Unttefl .States. ' iftn peace parleys is that it is con- might be saved on both sides. fident of success. The Com- It vm be a scarred face that monwealth Mission and? TASS STATEMENT ON U.S. AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM "It was with wrath and indignation that the Soviet people learned about the new move of the government of the United States of America directed towards escalation of the aggression against the Vietnamese people. It was decided to send additionally 5O,OOO American soldiers to South Vietnam. This is another provocation of American imperialism which is trying to break the will of the people of Vietnam in their heroic struggle for freedom and independence. On August 2nd the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued a statement resolutely denouncing the policy adopted by the United States Government of stepping up further the war in Vietnam, of sharpening still more the situation in Indochina and South-East Asia. "American imperialists have resorted to the policy of widening military operations", says the Statement of the DRV Government, "in the hope of making up for their defeats, of extricating themselves from an embarrassing situation and preventing the disintegration of the puppet government and army in South Vietnam". The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam proclaims the firm determination of the Vietnamese people to fight the American aggressors and their Saigon puppets till complete victory in the name of the freedom and independence of their homeland. At the same time the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam indicates the way for a settlement in Vietnam, based on strict observance of the 1954 Geneva agreements. The Soviet Union, loyal to the principles of fraternal solidarity and proletarian internationalism, firmly sides with the Vietnamese people in their just struggle against the aggression by American imperialism. The Soviet people support the Statement of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and emphatically denounce the new act of aggression by the Government of the United States against the Vietnamese people. 2. The Soviet Union has been and will be rendering all necessary assistance in the consolidation of the defence potential of the fraternal socialist country — the Democratic Republic of Vietnam — for repulsing the American aggression. The American invaders already feel the results of this assistance. The gallant struggle of the Vietnamese people both in the North and in the South enjoys increasing support of other fraternal countries, of all progressive mankind. This struggle has most convincingly shown to the world that it is impossible to subjugate the people fighting for a right cause. No military build-up in Vietnam will help the United States to break the will of the Vietnamese people. To cover up their reckless actions American aggressors hypocritically talk about "peace" negotiations. If the United States really wants the talk about striving for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem to be taken seriously, words must be backed by concrete deeds and the aggression against the Vietnamese people ended at once. So far, however, the ruling circles of the United States tend to aggravate the conflict, undertaking actions which in no way make peace in Vietnam nearer. The latest evidence of the continuing aggraasive policy of the United States is the request of the American Government for increasing appropriations for the war in Vietnam by 1.7 thousand million dollars. The solution of the Vietnamese problem in the interest of the people of Vietnam, in the interest of peace can be found only on the road of strict observance of the 1954 Geneva agreements on the basis of the program set forth by the DRV Government on April 8 of the current year and by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam on March 22. The United States must stop the barbarous bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, discontinue the aggressive war in South Vietnam and withdraw its forces and weapons from that country. Let the Vietnamese people shape their destiny themselves. TASS is authorised to state that in the leading circles of the Soviet Union the new steps of the United States Government are regarded as aggressive acts tending to widen the war in Vietnam. The statesmen who frame the policy of the Unit ed States should not delude themselves into thinking that American aggression would go unpunished. Without question it will evoke ever increasing rebuff and finally will suffer disgraceful defeat. The just cause of the Vietnamese people will triumph". TASS, Moscow, August 6, 1965 PRESS-RELEASE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS September 14,1965 136 EAST 67th STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. KOSYGIN'S REPLY TO APPEAL BY NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS "There is a good, just basis for active efforts by champions of a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese conflict", Alexei Kosygin points out in his reply to an appeal by a group of winners of the Nobel Peace Prize. The appeal speaks of the need of achieving an end to the war in Vietnam. "Peace in Vietnam, notes the Head of the Soviet Government, can be achieved only by way of a strict observance of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, the immediate ending by the United States of its barbaric bombings of DRV territory and interference into the domestic affairs of South Vietnam." Kosygin writes that it would be "completely unwarranted to put the aggressor and the victim of aggression on the same footing." "To abolish evil it is necessary to eliminate its causes. And the essence of the present conflict — and this is clear to the entire world — consists precisely in that the United States is engaged in barefaced aggression against a small country, Vietnam, whose people are upholding their freedom and independence, the sacred right to determine their destiny themselves." Among those who signed the appeal to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers were Norman Angel, Boyd-Orr, Georges Dominique Pyr, Philip Noel-Baker, Martin Luther King and Linus Pauling. TASS, Moscow, September 13, 1965 UNITED NATIONS Press Services Office of Public Information United Nations} N.Y. (FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA — NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD) Note Wo. 3245 15 November 1965 NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS In response to queries regarding an article by Eric Sevareid in the Look magazine issue of 30 November 19^5, referring to certain initiatives taken by the Secretary-General in his efforts towards a peaceful settlement in Viet- nam, a spokesman for U Thant stated: ''The Secretary-General has no comment to make on this matter: By virtue of his office, he considers his conversations and discussions with representatives of Member States privileged and confidential." * #>•£*• # A157WX (insert) (130) Insert Washington—Stevenson—Viet ETam negotiations report Y%rfr&6 (A136) insert after 8th graf beginning z x z time was z z z Stevenson's knowledge." McMamara issued a statement saying it was "totally false" that he on two occasions in the fall and winter of 1964 opposed peace talks with North ¥iet Earn. "There is not one word of truth in the remarks made about me or the position attributed to me in the article," McKFamara said. "My position has long been known. It is that we should search in every possible way for a peaceful settlement in Viet Ham and should be prepared for unconditional discussions with the governments concerned, in large groups or small ones, at any time and any place. "That was my position in 1964. It is my position today. And it will continue to be my position. "Allegations or speculation to the contrary are without any substance whatever and are harmful to the people and government of the United States." There was no immediate comment from the State Department. Stevenson felt z z z picking up 9"tk g^af a-s before. LT 1109 AES •* \M*4*- QuCuAj&fto^ OCM. (g^w*-jWNi •^H^f^ts^ -k ow 6d44ttUL /"JUUw*-^ fo^ UPI-41 V (VIET NAM) NEW YORK—ADLAI STEVENSON BLAMED DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT ^ MCNAMARA FOR REFUSING A NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFER TO TALK PEACE IN THE I AUTUMN OF 1964, ACCORDING TO AN ARTICLE IN THE CURRENT ISSUE OF LOOK I MAGAZINE. i THE AUTHOR OF THE ARTICLE, RADIO AND TELEVISION REPORTER ERIC I SEVAREID, SAID STEVENSON TOLD HIM PRIVATELY TWO DAYS BEFORE THE U.N. I AMBASSADOR DIED OF A HEART ATTACK THAT MCNAMARA ALSO TURNED DOWN A | CEASE FIRE SUGGESTION MADE BY U THANT, U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL. I SEVAREID, A CLOSE FRIEND OF STEVENSON'S, WROTE: ! "EARLY IN THE AUTUMN OF 1964, HE WENT ON, U THANT, THE U.N. I SECRETARY GENERAL, HAD PRIVATELY OBTAINED AGREEMENT FROM I, AUTHORITIES IN NORTH VIET NAM THAT THEY WOULD SEND AN EMISSARY I TO TALK WITH AN AMERICAN EMISSARY, IN RANGOON, BURMA. SOMEONE I IN WASHINGTON INSISTED THAT THIS ATTEMPT BE POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER I THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. WHEN THE ELECTION WAS OVER, U THANT 1 AGAINST PURSUED THE MATTER? HANOI WAS WILLING TO SEND ITS MAN, | BUT DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT MCNAMARA, ADLAI WENT ON, FLATLY I OPPOSED THE ATTEMPT. HE SAID THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ! WOULD HAVE TO BE INFORMED AND THAT THIS WOULD HAVE A DEMORALIZING I EFFECT ON THEM? THAT GOVERNMENT WAS SHAKY ENOUGH, AS IT WAS." I SEVAREID SAID WASHINGTON OFFICIALS HAVE BRUSHED OFF REPORTS THAT I THE NORTH VIET NAM PEACE OFFER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY SAYING *THAT I THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY SERIOUS PEACE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FALL AND WINTER,* I SEVAREID SAID STEVENSON DESCRIBED THANT AS "FURIOUS" OVER THE I FAILURE OF HIS PATIENT EFFORTS. EVENTUALLY THE U.N. CHIEF PROPOSED AN OUTRIGHT CEASEFIRE WITH A TRUCE LINE TO BE DRAWN ACROSS VIET NAM AND NEIGHBORING LAOS. *U THANT, * WROTE SEVAREID *THEN MADE A REMARKABLE SUGGESTION: UNITED STATES OFFICIALS COULD WRITE THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE OFFER, EXACTLY AS THEY SAW FIT, AND HE, U THANT, WOULD ANNOUNCE IT IN EXACTLY THOSE WORDS. AGAIN, SO SO STEVENSON SAID TO ME, MCNAMARA TURNED THIS DOWN, AND FROM SECRETARY RUSK THERE WAS NO RESPONSE, TO STEVENSON'S KNOWLEDGE.* SEVAREID SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT STEVENSON BELIEVED THESE OPPORTUNITIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEIZED "WHATEVER THEIR ULTIMATE RESULT.* STEVENSON GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS "HARDLY SIMPATICO* WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND STATED THAT HE COULDN'T MAKE RUSK OUT BECAUSE HE WAS *SO SORT OF WOODEN," THE REPORTER WROTE, "I HAD THE FEELING THAT HE HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CAPACITIES, BUT NO WARM REGARD FOR HIM AS A PERSON,** SEVAREID SAID. 11/15— TD/GE1105A 4JPI-103 ADD VIET NAM, NEW YORK NEITHER U.N, NOR U.S. SPOKESMEN ISSUED COMPLETE DENIAL OF THE SEVAREID STORY. A U.N. SPOKESMAN SAID: "THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS NO COMMENT ON THIS MATTER. BY VIRTUE OF HIS OFFICE HE CONSIDER S CONVERSATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMBER STATES PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL.w A U.S. DELEGATION SPOKESMAN READ A STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT SAYING THAT "THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD, AMBASSADOR STEVENSON HAD A NUMBER OF CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF WORKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN VIET NAM, w "IT IS NOT TRUE," THE STATEMENT SAID, "THAT U THANT AT ANY TIME SAID HE WOULD ACCEPT ANY FORMULATION CONCERNING A CEASE-FIRE THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT PROPOSE, ALTHOUGH HE DID ADVANCE HIS OWN SUGGEST- IONS REGARDING A CEASE-FIRE FOR OUR COMMENT, IT WOULD BE HIGHLY INAPPROPRIATE TO DISCLOSE THE DETAILS OF ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THAT WERE DISCUSSED.* THE SPOKESMAN SAID MCNAMARA DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE U.S. HANDLING OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE SEVAREID ARTICLE. 11/15—-GEH8P UPI-48 ADD VIET NAM, NEW YORK CUPI-41) IN WASHINGTON, MCNAMARA SAID THE REPORT WAS "TOTALLY FALSE. w IN A STATEMENT ISSUED TODAY, HE SAID "THERE IS NOT ONE WORD OF TRUTH IN THE REMARKS MADE ABOUT ME OR THE POSITION ATTRIBUTED TO ME IN THE ARTICLE." HE ADDED: "MY POSITION HAS LONG BEEN KNOWN. IT is THAT WE SHOULD SEARCH IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN VIET NAM AND SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, IN LARGE GROUPS OR SMALL ONES, AT ANY TIME AND ANY PLACE." 11/15 —GE1121A UPI-10S ADD VIET NAM, NEW YORK IN WASHINGTON THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID TODAY THE U.S. REJECTED AT LEAST ONE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFER IN THE AUTUMN OF 1964 TO MEET FOR PEACE TALKS BECAUSE IT DID NOT BELIEVE THE COMMUNISTS WERE PREPARED FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS. THE DEPARTMENT DENIED, HOWEVER, THAT IT TURNED DOWN A SUBSEQUENT SUGGESTION BY THANT THAT HE MAKE A VIET NAM TRUCE PROPOSAL FOR WHICH HE WOULD LET THE U.S. WRITE THEDETAILED TERMS FOR A CEASE FIRE. THE DEPARTMENT ISSUED THE STATEMENT IN COMMENTING ON THE LOOK MAGAZINE ARTICLE, 11/15 —GEiDP200PES UPI-10S (FOW JONES 1 PM AVERAGES) "W .TMD.S—Q52.7.9 UP. .1.50 s. 20 RAILS 239^40, UP 0*85 J // SA13WX . 'URGENT FIRST LEAD VIET NAM PEACE PROBE VAGHINGTON,. NOV. 15 CaP)-THI 3Vn.'I DI;',-.R _\-.LU\ CONFIRMED TODAY THAT U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL ITTHANT SENT WORD IN THE FALL OF 1964 •THAT NORTH VIET NAM WAS WILLING TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES AT RANDOON, BURMA. -A S THE UNITED STATES REJECTED' TYE OFFER, A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID, BECAUSE "ALL OUR INDICATIONS WERE.THAT THERE WAS •• NO SERIOUS INTENT ON THE OTHER SIDE." PRESS OFFICER ROBERT J. MCCLOSKEY ALSO TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE • THAT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. MCNAMARA DID NOT JOIN IN ---- MAKIMG-'THE-BECdESION AGAINST- TALKS AT THAT TIME* HE SAID MCNAMARA ' MAY HAVE EXPRESSED SOME'OPINION BUT DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE DECISION MAKING. ' • . • MCCLOSKEY SAID THAT ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THE UNITED STATES HAD RECEIVED ROUND-ABOUT REPORTS OF CONTACTS WITH'THE NORTH VIET- • NAMESE. • "ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTAL EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO US," 'MCCLOSKEY SAID,' "WE DID NOT BELIEVE AT ANY TIME THAT NORTH VIET NAM WAS AVAILABLE FOR SERIOUS PEACE TALKS." ERIC SEVAREID. RADIO AND TELEVISION COMMENTATOR, WROTE IN AN -ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN LOOK MAGAZINE HE WAS INFORMED OF THE 1964 ' SITUATION BY THE LATE U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON. EA14WX ' MCCLOSKEY SAID THAT THE BASIC U.S. POLICY ON PEACE TALKS WITH • NORTH VIET NAM TODAY WAS LAID DOWN BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON APRIL 7. JOHNSON SAID THAT THAT TIME THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS READY TO ENTER INTO UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS. • UNDER QUESTIONING AT A NEWS CONFERENCE, MCCLOSKEY SAID HE ' THOUGHT THAT IN '1964 THE UNITED STATES WAS WILLING TO "ENTER INTO MEANINGFUL"TALKS" AND HE THOUGHT THAT WAS THE ATTITUDE TODAY. "I THINK WETRE INSISTING ON THE RIGHT TO MAKE OUR OWN INTERPRE- TATION ON ANY INITIATIVES PROPOSED TO US5" HE SAID. BUT, HE DE- CLARED THE UNITED STATES HAS- NOT -HAD ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE COM- MUNIST SIDE IN THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS INTERESTED IN PEACE TALKS. : SEVAREID WRITES THAT X X X'3RD GRAF A136WX -0- (EDS: IN FIRST.GRAF ABOVE,1ST GRAF AT END READ IT X X X RANGOON, BURMA.) - ' JA158PES Dear Hamsess I would like to put the record straight as "best I can regarding today's HEW YORK TIMES story headlined n Hanoi& Rebuffs U Thant." Yesterday Ambassador Gold"berg held a press briefing. In the course of the questions he said the last time he talked to the Secretary-General about Vietnam " was about three weeks or four weeks ago." He further said " We have had conversations with the Secretary-General. I have said repeatedly that I regard those conversations to be priveleged conversations, unless he is willing to disclose their contents." In vieYir of the official reaction of the Secretary-General as disclosed by you at today's briefing, speculation is that this is a rather clumsy attempt of the US trying to get off the hook for rejection of the 1964 offer from Hanoi ^ "•' • * • .1 as initiated by U Thant. It may be of interest for you to know that Ambassador Goldberg saw Mr. Middleton in private after yesterday's briefing. I trust and hope the " boss" will hold the line and not be tempted to reply in kind even : on the surface he is being blamed or accused of things that have not happened. JB x-/*^ 4 Summary of remarks by Mr. George Ball when leaving U.N. Headquarters (From Darius Jhabvala) Mr. Ball indicated that his "very private talks" with the Secretary- General did include the subject of Viet H"am« He described the Secretary-General as "a very wise man with rich experience" who has proved to be "useful and indispensable." Mr. Ball indicated that he would make a full report to President Johnson on his conversation with the Secretary-General. £A6QFX AFL-CIO COUNCIL C3.30) SAM FRANC IS CO?TB BUST £A60 C220) TOKYO, THURSDAY, DEC. 9 (AP)-HO CHI MINH. IN AM INTERVIEW WITH A BRITISH JOURNALIST BROADCAST TODAY BY HANOI'RADIO. ACCUSED PRESIDENT JOHNSON OF WANTING NEITHER PEACE NOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT TOLD FREE LANCE JOURNALIST FELIX GREENE THAT JOHNSON'S OFFER OF UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS "MEANS THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE MUST ACCEPT U.S. CONDITIONS." THE BROADCAST SAID. "AS A MATTER OF FACT," HO CONTINUED, "AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN HE TALKS A LOT ABOUT PEACE DISCUSSIONS, THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS ARE FURTHER EXPANDING THE WAR OF AGGRESSION IN SOUTH VIET NAM. MASSIVELY SENDING THEIR TENDS OF THOUSANDS OF U.S. TROOPS AND EXTENDING THE ESCALATION IN NORTH VIET NAM." HO AVOIDED DIRECT ANSWERS TO TWO QUESTIONS: "ARE YOU NOT ALREADY RECEIVING GREAT QUANTITIES OF MILITARY AID FROM CHINA? WOULD YOU PERHAPS NOT BE READY TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE IF IT WERE NOT FOR PRESSURE FROM CHINA?" HE SAID "AS FOR THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE, THEY ARE FRATERNAL RELATIONS AS CLOSE AS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LIPS AND THE TEETH. CHINA'S SYMPATHY, SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO VIET NAM IS MOST VALUABLE AND EFFECTIVE."' HE SAID THE TIES BETWEEN HIS COUNTRY AND SOUTH VIET NAM ARE LIKE THOSE BETWEEN THE U.S. SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN STATES. SO NORTH VIET NAM IS "BOUND TO EXTEND" SUPPORT TO VIET CONG GUERRILLAS IN THE SOUTH AND THE VIET CONG ARE "DUTY BOUND TO FIGHT" TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTH, HE SAID. DH4 50PES PRESS-RELEASE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 136 EAST 67th STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. BY THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS IN CONNECTION WITH UNITED STATES AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. resolutely denounces the armed intervention by the United States in South Vietnam and the aggressi* against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Responsibility for the continuation of such a policy and its possible consequences wholy rests with the United States administration. A more than 160,000-man strong United States army, using barbarous methods and means including napalm toxic and poisonous substances is waging large-scale military operations against the South Vietnamese people; American bombers are raiding peace ful towns and villages, industrial enterprises and irrigation networks, schools and hospitals in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, The United States aggression in Vietnam constitutes flouting of the rules of international law, flagrant violation of the Geneva Agree- ments of 1954 which the United States administration itself solemnly pledged to observe. It gave rise to aggravation of international tension, creates a threat to universal peace. The continuation of aggression, the movement of more and more contingents of American troops and armaments to Vietnam by the United States Government with the object of forcibly suppressing the national liberation, patriotic movement of the Vietnamese people, led by their genuine representative — the National Front of Liberation of South Vietnam, whose fifth anniversary falls due on December 20 — can but lead to the escalation of the military conflict and the further aggravation of the situation in Indo-China and throughout the world. The heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against imperial- ist aggression, for their freedom and independence, which sets an examp. of staunchness and unshakable courage, meets with the warm sympathy and full support of all freedom-loving peoples of the world. The Soviet Union, discharging its international duty, rendered, is rendering and will render the Vietnamese people utmost support and assistance in the struggle against aggression by American imperialism. Peace in Vietnam can be restored only provided a- strict observance of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, termination of U.S. aggression against the sovereign State of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and armed intervention in South Vietnam, withdrawal of the troops of the U.S. and its allies from South Vietnam, liquidation of all American military bases in the country, respect for the right of the Vietnamese people to settle their affairs themselves, without any outside interference The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Unanimously approves the policy and practical actions of the Soviet Government in support of the just struggle of the fraternal Viet- namese people against the imperialist aggression of the United States; Fully shares the position of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the South Vietnam National Liberation Front concerning the settlement of the Vietnamese problem. The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics calls upon the parliaments and governmens of all countries to take for their part all the necessary measures to secure termination by the United States of America of its aggression in Vietnam and to enable the Viet- namese people to settle their internal affairs themselves. Strengthening of unity of action and cohesion of the Socialist States, of all peace-loving countries in providing support and assistance to the heroic Vietnamese people will contribute to the earliest curbing of the forces of imperialism and aggression which are encroaching on the freedom and sacred rights of the Vietnamese people, to the restoration of peace in Vietnam. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is convinced that the just cause of the Vietnamese people will triumph, that the aggressive actions of the war-like circles of American imperialism will suffer an inevitable defeat, that peace and security of the peoples of South East Asia will be ensured. THE SUPREME SOVIET OF TEE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW DECEMBER 9, 1965. ADD 1 TALKS 9 WASHINGTON CUPl-129') RUSK SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE *SOME AMBIGUITY** AS TO tfHETHER HC WAS REALLY OFFERING UNCONDITIONAL PEACE TALKS. THE AMBIGUITY GENERALLY REVOLVED AROUND HO'S REPETITION OF NORTH VIET NAM'S FAKOUC SFOUR POINTS*" WHICH INCLUDE WITHDRAWAL OF U*3» TROOPS AND A SETTLEMENT ACCORDING TO THE "PROGRAM" OF THE VIET CONG, "&7E ARE THUS FAR FROM PERSUADED? * WROTE RUSK, "THAT THE STATEMENTS... QUOTED BY YOUR ITALIAN SOURCES INDICATE" A REAL WILLINGNESS FOR UNCONDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.w BUT RUSK SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD *8E PLEASED" TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHERS PERHAPS IN THE LIGHT OF FURTHER SOUNDINGS'- ITALIAN SOURCES MIGHT MAKE WITH HANOI. Ob5 DEC* 13 FANFANI REPLIED THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF RUSK'S LETTER HAD BEEN DELIVERED IN THE HANDS OF *A -QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE* TO BE FORWARDED TO HANOI. LATER THE SAME DAY FANFANI TOLD GOLDBERG RUSK'S REPLY HAD ALREADY REACHED HANOI. SO FAR? OFFICIALS SAID FRIDAY, THERE HAS BEEN NO REPLY FROM HANOI. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAIDS "IT IS NOW Up TO HANOI TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WISHES TO MOVE THIS QUESTION FHOM THE BATTLEFIELD TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. ME WOULD WELCOME'A STRAIGHTFORWARD EXPRESSION OF HANOI'S VIEWS. WE AWAIT HANOI'S REACTION.* U.S. OFFICIALS ARE NOT CALLING HO'CHI MINH'S TALK WITH THE ITALIANS A WPEACE FEELER." THE PURPOSE OF RUSK'S MESSAGE BACK TO HANOI, THEY SAID. WAS TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS* INDEED, MEANT AS ONE. ' SOME OFFICIALS EXPRESSED PRIVATE DOUBT THE EXCHANGE WOULD AMOUNT TO ANYTHING. THE STATE DEPARTMENT MADE PUBLIC THE OTHERWISE SECRET EXCHANGE AFTER WORD LEAKED OUT THAT MADE IT APPEAR'THE UNITED STATES HAD REJECTED A NEW HANOI PEACE BID* THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID. "THE UNITED STATES REJECTED WO PROPOSALSo* 12/17—GE427P w : ., - urgent Washington 2nd add viet-peaee x xx anyone. , fanfani wrifSals© told jehnsen that the text of the report he had received said "the governmentin hanci is prepared to onitiate negotl - ations without first requiring actual withdrawal ©f the aerican tr©ops." / the state department released the w text of Fanfani's nov. 2© (s ^pf letter t© presidaPbm Johns en and the text of a reply by secretary ©f state dean rusk to fanfani ©n dec. *f, fanfani 'flmiflatiBreulhas informed rusk that a suMmary of the request by rusk for clarification had been forwarded to hanoi, the capital ©f north viet nais and has fc been delivered. state department (fficials said the Trarenhwmw next move is up t© hanoi. bulletin wwBfttotmsratftTOTOij Washington, dec. 17 (AP)- top 7eade s of north viet nam have made a new probe on the possibility of Vietnamese peace negotatiens and the united states has asked for a clarification ©f conditions laid down by then, the state department disclosed today. bulletin matter Washington—1st add vietnaa x x x today. a report 01 the peace feeler sent to president johnsen by Italian f©ref&n minister araintore fanfani, president ©f the u. n. general assembly, quoted president H© chi minh of north viet nam as having told intermediaries: "I am prepared to gowr anywhere; to meet anyone." **t X;X' TO HANOI, : RUSK -WROTE FA NF AMI THAT ill1..: APPEARED' -THAT HANO". WOULD EE BILLING ' TO.-ENTEB_NEGOTIATIONS:ON-!THE:-EASIS1O.F -THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT. .THAT: AGREEMENT CALLED FOR THE: INtEPEFlDEN'CS OF VDITNAl'i, FREK O.F OUTSIDE 'INTERFERENCE. , ; : • -; ; .'H': - ' :A ' :,:;i • ' . : NEGOTIAN••••RUSK«"5AIT 10 MDS w THONE : UNITETHE . BASID 'STATES 'OT S,m iWCUUE GEMEVr BE A"SILLIN AGJ1EEHEIITG TOS EllGAG"WITHOUE T:n ANY .'QUALIFICATIONS'-'O.R CO MBIT IONS." • '•; . . RUSK SAID, HOWEVER, 'THAT .THE -UNITED "'STATES DO::S HOT AGREE • WITH A-POSITION TAKEN ' BY -NORTH- V JET NAM IM WAKING THE NSW PEACE 'APPROACH' THAT A, 'TOUR-POINT PEACE PLAN ADVOCATED BY NORTH VIET HAM' •CONSTITUTES. WAN ;AUTHENT.IC, INTERPRETATION 07 THE' GENEVA AGREEMENTS- • ,: Of -19 54."- ^ - - i -v-",-;.-,.-,.,.,..^,,, ^-•-f^t^rff^ ^_ • ; i .';;'•';,- A Rl Q* ar't, •'••• \ ' • •',.•"<;?•'•* i'-.J- i; ..^ ••rf----r-7*! r.r.1^ ,.,/ . A519S5fl Pi JB PLU) i%. .' •••.. • •• . _ :-• -.,.,• •:,'•.;. ...,- • '' V! " ' v f. ; ; ; i; •" ' ^";v!o. WX-LT358PES ;.^ ^^';" 'i"'!;. ;!i!:^r i: :•'-,' '' . •. : 1 ; .' •! ••-.'/ •-'!•.".• • - • . ' ,' ;•-.•• ,'J :'.'•'.'•'; j : • :i '• ; I•• ! 'I;' . ''-•• • ! •-'£A5Uix''•'••-<;': " '••"'••'•••• '•£ : : - - •';• • «M:$-^:.:-;' : .' - : . U R G E .N-T --.-': .. '-::. ' •" i'>--;,V :' ' , . ' WASHINGTON—FOURTH ADD VIET-PEACE (A49 ) X X OF 1954," •• - THE OTHER CONDITION ON I'JHICH -HUSK, ASKED CLARIFICATION WAS A 'HANOI CALL FOR A ..CEASE-FIRE PRIOR TO THE'OPEHIMG OF NEGOTIATIONS, .SPECIFICALLY "THE CESSATION,-,.OT-'ALL' BELLIGERENT OPERATIONS-- --INCLUDING1 THEREFORE :'ALSQ :THE-CESSATION OT DEBARKATION OF FURTHER AMERICAN..'TROOPS." '• •;,- •'' .'•-''•' ''.''^ :.'• '••''•'•"THE UNITED STATES." .RUSK SAID, "WOULD BE. PREPARED -FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT THE IMPOSITION OF ANY CONDITIONS' OF THIS •: NATURE." ;';' •• '.i • ,. •'.: •.••:• >' ' ' "HOWEVER. IT 'A-REDUCTION OR'.CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WERE TO 'BE "ARRANGED PRIOR-TO ..NEGOTIATIONS j 'IT SEEMS SELF-EVIDENT THAT IT WOULD. HAVE TO BE ON AM EQUITABLE AND 'RECIPROCAL BASIS. "IF THERE WERE A CESSATION'OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES. OK THE ONE SIDE,'THERE WOULD; HAVE-TO:.-BE-AH EQUIVALENT CESSATION OF • .: MILITARY' ACTIVATES' ON .THE: OTHER.. , I'.'.:,'1 ' - ' . !; "TOE. FORMULATION PROPOSED BY'. HAKOI *S', LEADERS DOES NOT APPEAR. TO. MEET THIS TEST. TO R-'; EXAMPLE,'IN THAT^IT. IMPOSES NO RESTRAINT ON THE'CONTINUED INFILTRATION. OF -JORCES AND | EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH 1 : TO SOUTH VIET NAM, ; v .- ,.,v '•;; •; -,,; • •'•• •.. '• - ;_ • ,• - . A52WX' v':-':':'' ' ' - -'• ;• (•'••"' •' '•'"' '•''• ""' ::'' . - • IN SUMMARY, AFTER REVIEWING THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY HO •AND PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG, RUSK'WROTE TO' ?AKM' Afll S '-,.' "WE ARE THUS FAR FROM' PERSUADED'• THAT STATEMENTS 'BY HO CHI MINH AND PHAM VAN DONG QUOTED'. BY ..YOUR ITALIAN SOURCES INDICATE A REAL WILLINGNESS FOR UHCONDlTlONAL'.'HEGOTIATlOnS , " v!fWE WOULD BE PLEASED,'FOR ,OUR PART-, HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS Of THE; CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH ABOVE AND PERHAPS IN LIGHT OF ANY FURTHER.. SOUNDINGS YOUR SOURCES .NAY MAKE WITH HANOI TO DISCUSS . THIS MATTER FURTHER WITH. YOU," .' •-..', : • /THE TWO" INTERMEDIARIES WHO REPORTED TO F AM v AMI ON THEIR TALKS WITH HO AND PHAM VAN DONG . WERE IDENTIFIE1.) TO U. 3. OFFICIALS ^ 'PROFESSOR LA PERA. FORMER MAYOR OF TLOr RE?;:Tp:iMEET. ANYONE," ! B*«S"A!i?^*!(^ra?^Wo? ifl??^ KE HAD ; : AMTRTPAM THOOPS •"• ;' • .-. ' .' >';!!••• 'I S^^^^^^^^l^^^^WTHE STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASED 'THE TEXT OF. FAMTANI'S MOV^. 20 ; LETTER TO;/PRESIDENT , JOHNSON AND; THE TEXT OF. A .REPLY BY SECRETATli °F. FANS^HAS^lflFORflEn RUSK THAT ; A SUMMARY OT A REQUEST BY RUSK,^ TqR\CLARI7ICATIOH HAD BEFJ^IpRWAXDED TO .HANOI; THE CAPITAL OF HO*TH E IS UP TO HANOI ," POINTS MADE BY GOLDBERG MISSliN PFT.SS C©NF. I [7 DEC. CIRC. 5 PM 1. DOCUMENTS BEING MADE PUBLIC WITH O.K. FANFAN I AND RESIDENT J©HNS@N Ti) SET REC©RD STRAIGHT F6LL8WING TiDAY'S PUBLICATliN ST ©IMS P@ST DISPATCH STSRY THAT U.S. KW&X HAD "REJECTED" A RECENT HAM® I PEACE FEELER. U.S. WISHED TO KEEP REC©RD STRAIGHT. IN T©UCH WITH LAP IRA 2. G9LDBER® RECEIVED INDIRECTLY, VIA PRIVATE U.S. SOURCES/ SAME ACCOUNT ©F LAP IRA AKKKKMXX HAN© 1 C©NVERSAT 3. U.S. RESPONSE T® FANFAN I SHiWED THAT U.S. "RE JECTED N® PR©P©SAL." IT WAS AN "AFFIRMATIVE REPLM." "H©PEFULLY, CONTACTS WILL B" C©NTINUED." ASKED IF PUBLICATI©N LIKELY HAMPEP FURTHER CONTACTS, GOLDBERG SAID C0ULD NST JUDGE ®NE VHg¥ Qp. ©THER . THE P©|NT WAS T© KEEP THE REC0RD STRAIGHTA AFTER ST0RY IN AN IMPORTANT U.S. NEWSPAPER. ASKED IF HE HAD RECEIVED ©THER FEELERS, REPLIED Ni. LATER, SAID THAT IT WAS N6W UP T@ HAN©I Ti SAY IF WISHED T® MiVE CfNFLICT FR®M BATTLEFIELD T© CONFERENCE TABLE. U.S. WELCQMED ANY INITIATIVE T© THIS END. 4. IN ANSWER Ti ©NE QUESTISN, DESCRIBED HAN©1 APPRQACH AS A "MESSAGE,/too " P©INTED @UT THAT THE U.S. HAD REPLIED IN WRITING, ANDAAUTH®RIZED FANFANI T® PASS ©N SAID WRITTEN ANSWER T© HAN©I. ASKED ST. 5. INDICATED THAT STATE DEPARTMENT HAD SWSMiXBKMlMLQU IS POST DISP. MBXMXnXRMHKffiSMXngagUMfflXXX IF THOUGHT PURL I CAT[0N ITS ST0RY IN NATI6NAL INTEREST. DID NOT WISH BLAME PAPER ®R SOURCE -- WHICH WAS ®NE OF U.S. PRIVATE PARTIES REFERRED T0 IN 2., AND WH© WAS OBVIOUSLY UNAWARE @F U.S. RESPiNSE. (M0RE) G0LDBER 17 DEC. 2 BUT STRESSED IMP0RTANCE 0F BEING ABLE CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS CONFIDENTIALLY. 6. SAID THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD BEEN INFORMED OF EXCHANGE. 7. REAFFIRMED U.S. PREPARED UNC©NDITIQNAL NEG©TI AT IiNS. 8. STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES THAT RESPONSE FR0M RUSK (SECSND LETTER) VERY CAREFULLY W0RKED SUT. G©LBERG 17 DEC 3 9. ASKED. IF'THIS WAS CONSIDERED AN 9FFICIAL U.N. MATTER OR WHETHER FAMFAl ACTING IN PRIVATE CAPACITY, GOLDBERG SAID LATTER. I CHECKED WITH HIM LATER IN CONNECTION FANFANMS "AS PRESIDENT QF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY QFTHE U.N., AS MEMBER ©FTHE ITALIAN G0VERNMENT AS A SINCERE FRIE0D OF THE U.S. ETC.(B0TTSM FIRST B SIDE FIRST LETTER). SAID FANFAN HAD T®LD HIM WAS ACTING AS PRIVATE PERS0N. fttT^^ 'T'^'l^i^r'i^K***''1*^1"1^"-- > r . AHINTORE FANFAM1, T lWEWtt. TODAY m WAS WORKING SO IRI VIET " HIS OVN GOVERNMENT IN HI'S HONOR 3WEN : 'SlSPlCll^fliPf'^^IftfcH^ilil: lit: Ms^ ft TOT NAH—'SG M BOINS* S4ECT AT THE F»0« M POINT OF WSHT -FEftCoEr AEFFORT -SERIOUS S ON fiECtETARY RVSK MAY MEET HOISTH VZETIIAHESE r I ) ^**Y^l^ltWO'^,Wf'*psrHS?3^ • • vi/^-Hsi-.'MBt'i'H'! i1'*'"..'!1!1-/'••'"•' ' '•' "• :' JCORED A NEW APPEAt ST POPE PAUL AMERICAN WILLINCMESS TO WOVE HIE W*iw3 » «jir-WfrSHff -itilil • ArrowM.SwT ft *v f*'tmoNL * W4tw»Tt Jhttwqi «tT lUfSTEPPED AHY DIRECT COWWEWT OM If THE POPE OF THE HEED ' ASlAj" VOTERS THE POPE THE DESPAIH OF ASIA* FOR ;E OF ACCRESSION* >my"'TKE PRESIDENT IS AW HEtWISS I5X J«AY WEET WITH , ,.t THIS WEEK AND rH« TRANSMITTED EARLIER CD THE MEETING IftKCUY' RELATED TO THE rasSAGES mtO SAW NORTH if AW BRITAIN' WERE WORKING ~ BE TRYIN6 iif ii;i¥lie MIT SUCK " ESO.VE IS WHETHER TO RAStO* OR TO POT ti«.SWK,M,Jw..fl.ll*IK fttei til 1 1 ; re REACHED THE If ESI i, , . .• -I-;-. . i tl^'JR '/* •-.-i-r i ! t,«*nw ' '''' jfe^^iifii^i'fe m WEBBERS OF THE fttlURWED FROM A. WORLD »: C8IWINCED THAT THE ifllT NAM AT THIS TIME. TO B0« STATES CANNOT KEASED AT TO BE HO SUES THAT L C-OKTZfRIE iW'lilliOp" IK SOUTH VIET" E DEFENSE FUNDS. lMiiiiin^^(Rli!!p3(.'':fK]>«ii!l!!'i!:i.''ii'':.'-' •!^^1t^l^i^ilB.'i^.flM-:jl!jiJiliLi'iix^^[••v^ '.Mi. '.'.' .'• !.• ;- ^ ^^^^^^^•-^^^jiii^i^^ . A IM^HV-J fX^T UPI-110 &r (VIET NAM) UNITED NATIONS—ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AMINTORE FANFANI, PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SAID TODAY HE WAS WORKING SO SECRETLY FOR PEACE IN VIET NAM THAT EEVEN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT IN ROME IS NOT INFORMED OF HIS ACTIVITIES. FANFANI MADE THE DISCLOSURE AT A LUNCH IN HIS HONOR GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR SALVADORE P. LOPEZ OF THE PHILIPPINES. LOPEZ PRAISED FANFANI'S ROLE IN CONVEYING PURPORTED PEACE FEELERS FROM NORTH VIET NAM AND SEEKING TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ITALIAN DIPLOMAT REPLIED: "I AM UNDER A STRICT RULE OF SILENCE ON VIET NAM—SO STRICT THAT MY OWN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT KNOW WHAT I AM DOING. I REGRET THAT I AM UNABLE TO COMMENT ON THE SUBJECT AT THE PRESENT TIME BEYOND SAYING THAT, NATURALLY, FROM MY POINT OF VIEW, I AM DEEPLY INTERESTED IN PROMOTING PEACE IN THAT COUNTRY." IN ROME, GIOVANNI MALAGODI, LEADER OF THE MODERATE RIGHT WING LIBERAL OPPOSITION, CRITICIZED FANFANI'S PEACE EFFORTS AS "RIDICULOUS* AND ACCUSED THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF A SERIOUS LACK OF JUDGMENT IN PASSING PURPORTED HANOI PEACE FEELERS ON TO WASHINGTON. IN WASHINGTON, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID SECRETARY RUSK MAY MEET WITH FANFANI THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS THE PURPORTED NORTH VIETNAMESE PEACE FEELERS. 12/20—N409PES UPI-10S (VIET NAM) WASHINGTON— -THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY WELCOMED A NEW APPEAL BY POPE PAUL VI FOR PEACE IN VIET NAM AND REITERATED AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO MOVE FROM THE BATTLEFIELD TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE "ANY TIME THE OTHER SIDE IS READY." BUT PRESS SECRETARY BILL D. MOVERS SIDESTEPPED ANY DIRECT COMMENT ON THE POPE'S STATEMENT SUNDAY THAT HE HOPED THE UNITED STATES,, WILL A COMMUNIST OFFERS OF A LULL IN FIGHTING ON CHRISTMAS EVE, THE POPE FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD AND SPECIFICALLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA," MOVERS HTH THE OBJECTIVES THE POPE EXPRESSED IN HIS STATEMENT OF AN END TO CONFLICT AND THE DESPAIR OF WAR. WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO BRING PEACE TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, FOR WE ARE AWARE OF THE SUFFERING THAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF AGGRESSION. WE WANT TO END THAT SUFFERING, AND LIKE THE POPE, THE PRESIDENT IS HOPEFUL THAT THE CONFLICT CAN BE RESOLVED.* MOYERS SAID THE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACE NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN SPELLED OUT REPEATEDLY BY THE PRESIDENT AND REMAINS UNCHANGED: "WE WILL TALK UNCONDITIONALLY ANY TIME THE OTHER SIDE IS READY." IN CONTINUING DIPLOMATIC PROBES, SECRETARY RUSK MAY MEET WITH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT AMINTORE FANFANI THIS WEEK AND DISCUSS THE PURPORTED PEACE FEELERS FANFANI TRANSMITTED EARLIER FROM NORTH VIET NAM. A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID FANFANI REQUESTED THE MEETING SEVERAL WEEKS AGO AND THAT IT WAS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MESSAGES RELAYED THROUGH HIM BY TWO ITALIAN PROFESSORS WHO SAW NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH ON NOV. 11. FANFANI WAS EXPECTED TO SEE RUSK IN WASHINGTON. THEIR MEETING WAS ANNOUNCED AS THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN WERE WORKING QUIETLY TO EXPLORE THE SLIM POSSIBILITY THAT HABOI MIGHT BE TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR PEACE TALKS BEHIND RED CHINA'S BACK. ON THE SURFACE, NORTH VIET NAM IS LOUDLY DENYING ANY SUCH INTENT. THE PROBLEM DIPLOMATS ARE TRYING TO RESOLVE IS WHETHER TO BELIEVE THE BELLIGERENT PUBLIC REMARKS OF HANOI RADIO, OR TO PUT SOME STOCK IN THE PRIVATE PEACE FEELERS WHICH HAVE REACHED THE WEST THROUGH DEVIOUS CHANNELS. SEN. GEORGE D.AIKEN, R-VT., ONE OF THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE WHO JUST RETURNED FROM A WORLD FACT-FINDING TOUR, TOLD A REPORTER HE CAME HOME CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT ECALATE THE WAR IN VIET NAM AT THIS TIME, AS THE ADMINISTRATION IS REPORTED TO BE PREPARING TO DO. AT THE SAME TIME, AIKEN SAID, HE FEELS THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AFFORD TO PULL OUT OF VIET NAM WITHOUT A FIRM AGREEMENT FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT., WHO HEADED THE SENATORIAL GROUP, REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT SUNDAY. AT JOHNSON'S REQUEST, MANSFIELD PLANNED EARLY CONFERENCES WITH RUSK AND DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMARA. MANSFIELD SUBMITTED *A NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS* TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT THEIR NATURE WAS NOT DISCLOSED. MANSFIELD TOLD NEWSMEN TODAY THERE SEEMED TO BE NO QUESTION THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE ITS BUILDUP IN SOUTH VIET NAM AND THAT CONGRESS WILL HAVE TO PROVIDE MORE DEFENSE FUNDS, 12/20— RH-N402PES UBI-59 . LONDON—PRIM(WILSON) E MINISTER WILSON ANNOUNCED TODAY FRANCE AND ITALY HAVE JOINED THE U.S. IN BACKING BRITAIN'S OIL EMBARGO ON REBELLIOUS RHODESIA. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA HAD OFFERED ASSISTANCE TO AIR-LIFTING OIL SUPPLIES TO LAND-LOCKED ZAMBIA, THE AFRICAN-RULED NATION BORDERING ON RHODESIA. "THESE MEASURES ARE DIRECTED TO ONE PURPOSE ONLY -- TO RETURN RHODESIA TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE," WILSON TOLD PARLIAMENT. "THEY WILL MEAN GREAT INCONVENIENCE AND HARDSHIP BUT THEY ARE ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO GET THE QUICK SOLUTION THAT IS NEEDED TO AVOID A MUCH GREATER DISLOCATION AND HARDSHIP AND IF WE ARE TO AVOID THE IMMEASURABLE DANGERS OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION," HE SAID. WILSON, WHO RETURNED FROM HIS U.S.-CANADIAN TRIP FIVE HOURS EARLIER TODAY TO ADDRESS PARLIAMENT ON THE OIL SANCTIONS WHICH BRITAIN IMPOSED FRIDAY, SAID: "THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WELCOMES AND SUPPORTS OUR DECISION AND IS ADVISING ALL UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND ENTERPRISE TO CONFORM." *WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN DIPLOMATIC ACTION TO SEEK THE COOPERATION OF THE OTHER MAIN OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES. THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE AND ITALY ARE COOPERATING FULLY * WILSON SAID THE AMERICAN*GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ASSURED BY U.S. OIL COMPANIES THEY WOULD RECOGNIZE THE EMBARGO. THERE WERE STILL SEVERAL OIL-EXPORTING NATIONS ~ NOTABLY HOLLAND — WHICH HAD NOT ANSWERED THE BRITISH PLEA FOR SUPPORT. "I HAVE EVERY REASON TO THINK WE SHALL GET FULL COOPERATION," WILSON SAID. "IF NOT WE SHALL HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT ACTION WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO DEAL WITH ANY LEAKAGE." HE SAID BRITAIN DID NOT CONTEMPLATE THE NEED FOR ANY MILITARY BLOCKAGE AT THIS STAGE. "IF THERE WERE ANY SEEPAGE OR LEAKAGE BY ONE OR TWO SPIVS (BLACK MARKETEERSL — AND I GATHER IT IS POSSIBLE FOR SPIVS TO INVADE THE OIL TRADE — WE MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER THE MATTER IN CONSULTATION WITH OUR COLLEAGUES," WILSON SAID. HE ASSURED PARLIAMENT EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE TO SEE THAT RHODES IAN EMERGENCY SERVICES SUCH AS HOSPITALS WERE KEPT SUPPLIED WITH OIL BY THE UMTALI REFINERY. WILSON SAID THE OIL AIRLIFT TO ZAMBIA BEGAN YESTERDAY AND WOULD DEPEND FOR ITS SUCCESS ON COOPERATION FROM ZAMBIA'S NEIGHBORING AFRICAN STATES. ONE OTHER LIMITING FACTOR MIGHT BE ZAMBIA'S AIRFIELD CAPACITY. HE WARNED, "IT IS GOING TO TAKE TIME." 12/20—*GE 1150 A UPJ-72 (VIET) WASHINGTON—SEN. GEORGE D. AIKEN, R-VT. SAID TODAY HE FOUND NOTHING ON A FIVE-WEEKS ROUND-THE-WORLD FACT-FINDING TOUR TO CHANGE HIS OPINION THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT ESCALATE THE VIETNAMESE FIGHTING BUT CAN NOT AFFORD TO PULL OUT NOW WITHOUT A FIRM AGREEMENT FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. AIKEN, A HIGH-RANKING MEMBER OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WAS A MEMBER OF THE FIVE-MAN SENATORIAL MISSION HEADED BY DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD WHICH COVERED MORE THAN 30,000 MILES BEFORE RETURNING SATURDAY NIGHT. MANSFIELD, ALSO A MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS GROUP, REPORTED AT LENGTH TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT THE WHITE HOUSE YESTERDAY AND WAS ASKED BY THE PRESIDENT TO REPORT ALSO TO SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK AND DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMAR. AIKEN TOLD A REPORTER THAT MANSFIELD'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT WERE THOSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC LEADER HIMSELF BUT "I'M SURE THE GROUP WOULD APPROVE.* THE FIVE SENATORS ARE EXPECTED TO MAKE PUBLIC A JOINT REPORT ON THEIR FINDINGS SHORTLY AFTER THE NEW CONGRESS CONVENES JAN. 10. AIKEN SAID "WE HAVE AN ALMOST UNBELIEVABLE TASK (IN SOUTH VIET NAM) IF THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTS THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF SOME OF HIS ADVISERS" WHO ADVOCATE AN INTENSE STEPPING UP OF THE WAR, HOWEVER, HE SAID, "AS TO THE ULTIMATE RESULTS, THAT DEPENDS ON WHAT THE PRESIDENT DOES. THE VETERAN VERMONT REPUBLICAN, OBVIOUSLY NOT ENCOURAGED BY WHAT HE SAQ, SAID THE VIETNAMESE FIGHTING IS A *VICIOUS, CRUEL WAR.* HOWEVER, HE SAID, THIS NATION CAN NOT NOW AFFORD TO RUN OUT ON ITS SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALLIES. AIKEN SAID IN A JUNE 1964 SENATE SPEECH THAT AMERICA SHOULD NOT ESCALATE THE FIGHTING BUT ALSO SHOULD NOT PULL OUT OF SOUTH VIET NAM. EARLIER THIS YEAR, HE SAID ANY NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE ON A MULTI- LATERAL BASIS WITH THE U.N. PLAYING A KEY ROLE, HE TOLD UPI HE HAD SEEN NOTHING TO CHANGE EITHER POSITION. THE VERMONT SENATOR SAID "AS A FACT-FINDING MISSION I THINK WE WERE SUCCESSFUL" ALTHOUGH HE DECLINED TO REVEAL DETAILS OF THE GROUP'S RECOMMENDATIONS, "WE LOOKED, WE LISTENED, WE ASKED QUESTIONS, AND (MANSFIELD) HAS REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT," HE SAID. AIKEN SAID HE FELT THAT ON THE WHOLE U.S. NEWS REPORTERS WERE TRYING TO GIVE AN OBJECTIVE ACCOUNT" OF THE VIETNAMESE FIGHTING ALTHOUGH SOME DISPATCHES AT TIMES MIGHT BE MISLEADING, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO CASUALTY FIGURES AS REPORTED BY US. OFFICIALS. 12/20—'TD10 4PES UPI-77 (VIET NAM) WASHINGTON—SECRETARY RUSK MAY MEET WITH U.N. ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT AMINTORE FANFANI THIS WEEK AND DISCUSS THE PURPORTED PEACE FEELERS FROM NORTH VIET NAM, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID TODAY. A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID FANFANI REQUESTED THE MEETING SEVERAL WEEKS AGO AND IT WAS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MESSAGES RELAYED THROUGH HIM BY TWO ITALIAN PROFESSORS WHO SAW NORTH VIETNA- MESE PRESIDENT HO CHIN MINH. FANFANI IS EXPECTED TO SEE RUSK IN WASHINGTON, THE SPOKESMAN SAID. II THEY MAY DISCUSS U.N. MATTERS AND ITALIAN-AMERICAN AFFAIRS AS WELL AS II THE POSSIBILITY THAT NORTH VIET NAM IS TRYING TO MANEUVER ITSELF |- INTO PEACE TALKS BEHIND THE BACK OF ITS GIANT NEIGHBOR, RED CHINA, ! 12/20—GEU5P UPI-69 (DOMINICAN) SANTO DOMINGO—U.S. AND BRAZILIAN TROOP PATROLS IN COMBAT FORMATION TODAY BROKE UP A NUMBER OF SMALL-SCALE RIOTS IN DOWNTOWN SANTO DOMINGO. THE BRAZILIANS USED TEAR GAS ON TWO OCCASIONS TO DISPERSE MOBS. THE AMERICANS MET LITTLE RESISTANCE. THEY MARHED DOWN THE CENTER OF THE STREET WHILE BRAZILIANS GAVE THEM FLANKING SUPPORT WITH LINES THROWN UP AROUND INDEPENDENCE SQUARE. TODAY'S RIOTS FOLLOWED A PITCHED BATTLE SUNDAY BETWEEN SO-CALLED CONSTITUTIONALIST FORCES AND DOMINICAN AIR FORCE INFANTRYMEN IN THE NEARBY CITY OF SANTIAGO. U.S. PARATROOPS FLOWN INTO THE AREA BROKE UP THE BATTLE AFTER NINE HOURS OF FIGHTING. AT LEAST 26, AND POSSIBLY 40, PERSONS WERE KILLED. 12/20— TD1243PES UPI-70 (STOCKS) RHUPI-S6 (VIET TRUCE) WASHINGTON—THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY "WELCOMED* THE NEW APPEAL OF POPE PAUL VI FOR PEACE IN VIET NAM. BUT AVOIDED DIRECT COMMENT ON THE POPE'S ENDORSEMENT OF A CHRISTMAS TRUCE. THE PONTIFF EXPRESSED HOPE SUNDAY THWT THE UNITED STATES WILL ACCEPT COMMUNIST OFFERS OF A CEASE-FIRE ON CHRISTMAS DAY. HE SAID THIS COULD BE THE PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS FROM WHICH "EQUILIBIRUM AND PEACE MAY FOLLOW." IN RESPONSE TO PRESS INQUIRIES ABOUT THE POPE'S STATEMENT, PRESS SECRETARY MOYERS SAID: "WE SHARE HIS CONCERN AND IDENTIFY WITH THE OBJECTIVES THE POPE EXPRESSED IN HIS STATEMENT OF AN END TO CONFLICT AND THE DESPAIR OF WAR. WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO BRING PEACE TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, FOR WE ARE AWARE OF THE SUFFERING THAT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF AGGRESSION. WE WANT TO END THAT SUFFERING, AND LIKE THE POPE, THE PRESIDENT IS HOPEFUL THAT THE CONFLICT CAN BE RESOLVED," MOYERS SIDESTEPPED THE WHOLE QUESTION OF A CHRISTMAS TRUCE. HE WOULD SAY ONLY THAT "OUR POSTURE IS THE SAME AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IT WOULD REMAIN—WE WILL TALK UNCONDITIONALLY ANYTIME THE OTHER SIDE IS READY." HE MADE A POINT OF EMPHASIZING THE PRESIDENT'S HIGH REGARD FOR POPE PAUL, THE POPE AND THE PRESIDENT MET IN NEW YORK LAST OCT. 4 TO DISCUSS THEIR MUTUAL CONCERN FOR PEACE. "THE PRESIDENT WELCOMES THIS NEW EXPRESSION BY THE POPE OF THE NEED FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD AND SPECIFICALLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA," MOYERS SAID, "HE REGARDS THE POPE AS ONE OF THE GREAT MEN OF PEACE AND BELIEVES HIS CONCERN FOR PEACE IS AN INDICATION THAT MOST MEN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WANT PEACE.* 12/20—TD1230 PES RHUPI-74 (RED CHINA) . TOKYO—COMMUNIST CHINESE PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI TODAY VOWED TO SUPPORT THE VIET CONG "UNTIL FINAL VICTORY" OVER THE UNITED STATES. THE CHINESE PREMIER ALSO DENOUNCED U.S. INTEREST IN PEACE TALKS AS "TRICKS'* TO COVER UP ESCALATION OF THE WAR. IN A SPEECH CELEBRATING THE FITH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIET CONG POLITICAL FRONT, CHOU ALSO PROMISED THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE WOULD "FIGHT TO THE END"" TO BLOCK ANY ATTEMPTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO EXPAND THE WAR IN ASIA. CHOU'S SPEECH WAS MADE AT A PEKING RECEPTION FOR THE VIET CONG'S PERMANENT MISSION TO CHINA AND BROADCAST BY THE COMMUNIST NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY. CHOU REPEATED THE CHINESE POSITION THAT IT IS THE "BOUNDEDN INTER- NATIONAL DUTY" OF ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT NORTH VIET NAMfS WAR OF LIBERATION AND CHIDED RUSSIA FOR ITS "SHAM EFFORTS.* ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT NAME THE RUSSIANS, CHOU LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO THEM WHEN HE SAID THAT A NATION FAILING TO GIVE UNSWERING SUPPORT TO THE VIET CONG "IS CAPITALIZING ON THE REVOLU- TIONARY CAUSE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FOR A DIRTY DEAL WITH THE UNITED STATES..." CHOU'S SPEECH CAME A DAY AFTER NORTH VIET NAM HOTLY DENIED REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH HAD TOLD VISITING ITALIAN POLITI- CIANS HE WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE PEACE IN VIET NAM. GIORGIO LA PIRA, A LEFTWING CATHOLIC POLITICIAN AND PEACE CAMPAIGNER AND LONG-TIME FRIEND OF ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AMINTORE FANFANI, REPORTED HO TOLD HIM THIS DURING A RECENT VISIT TO HANOI AND HE TRANSMITTED THE INFORMATION THROUGH FANFANI TO WASHINGTON. (IN ROME, FANFANI CAME IN FOR SHARP CRITICISM FROM OPPOSITION LEADERS FOR RAISING FALSE PEACE HOPES BY FORWARDING THE "RIDICULOUS" LA PIRA REPORTS TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. THE OPPOSITION DEMANDED TO KNOW IF LA PIRA'S TRIP TO HANOI WAS SPONSORED BY THE GOVERNMENT.) "COME WHAT MAY THE CHINESE PEOPLE WILL UNSWERVINGLY SIDE WITH THE FRATERNAL VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND CONTRIBUTE ALL OUR EFFORTS TO THE DEFEAT OF U.S. IMPERIALISM UNTIL FINAL VICTORY," CHOU SAID. "THE CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE LONG BEEN PREPARED," HE SAID. "SHOULD U.S. IMPERIALISM INSIST ON GOING ALONG THE ROAD OF WAR EXPANSION AND ON HAVING ANOTHER TRIAL OF STRENGTH WITH THE CHINESE PEOPLE, THE CHINESE PEOPLE WILL RESOLUTELY TAKE UP THE CHALLENGE AND FIGHT TO THE END. HE WARNED THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO "EXTEND ITS WAR OF AGGRESSION TO THE WHOLE OF INDOCHINA AND TO CHINA" AND SAID ANY ATTEMPT AT THIS WOULD FAIL. 12/20— GE141P UNITED NATIONS Press Services Office of Public Information United Nations, N.Y. (FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD) Press Release GA/5153 20 December 1965 STATEMENT BY AMINTORE FANFANI, ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT, ON 20 DECEMBER The following is an excerpt from the remarks made by Amintore Fanfani, President of the General Assembly, at a luncheon given today in his honour by Aribassador Salvador P. Lopez of the Philippines: "I agreed with the Government of the United States to follow a strict rule of silence about the matter of Viet-Nam; a rule so strict that I did not inform anybody, not even the Italian Government. I regret not being able to comment at the present moment, except to say that, naturally, as every human being, I feel deeply interested in promoting peace." ,y. .y.-V-. * A A A UNITED NATIONS Press Services Office of Public Information United Nations, N. Y. (FOR USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA -- NOT AN OFFICIAL RECORD) Note No. 20 December 1965 At today's press briefing, in response to a question as to whether the Secretary-General, U Thant, had any comment to make on the recent Viet-Nam. truce appeal by Pope Paul VI, a United Nations spokesman made the following statement: "The Secretary-General wholeheartedly welcomes and endorses the appeal by His Holiness, the Pope, for a truce in Viet-Nam and sincerely hopes that all parties will heed it." *** * 23 December 1965 fhe Secretary-General wholeheartedly welcomes the announcement of the forthcoming truce in Vietnam and sincerely hopes that it will be followed by reflection, negotiation and finally peace. \ v~. "r'Ss Dec. 23, 1965 — Your Excellency; The following telegram was sent to President Johnson today from St. Louis, signed by the Catholic Cardinal, the Episcopal Bishop, the Methodist Bishop, and the head of the Jewish Rabbis* of that city, "Dear Mr. President, during this holy season we join with men of good will everywhere to hope for peace in God*s world* We pray you will be granted wisdom and strength to continue effectively your leadership at home and abroad. We pray that you will discover means to further extend the Christmas truce in Vietnam, fey so that by negotiations, peace with justice may be achieved. We have faith that you can save this world from disaster. God keep you." Religious organizations all over Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Kansas have been informed of this telegram and urged to take similar action* on the initiative of These aa±a actions were taken 3a^ friends of mine at Washington University in St. Louis on my — very private and personal — advice. I also have been in touch with peace leaders in New York, who intend to take similar action. I thought you might like to know. This is, of course, a confidential — and hurried -- communication. Mary and I wish you the very best holiday, and the best of everything beyond. Thank you for your work and influence for peace in the year 1965« Deepest personal regards, Donald Grant 1595 EDITION C HECK A M P M . PRESS MESSAGE T I ME FI LEO DEAD LINE . f W P. MARSHALL. PRESIDENT UPI-SS ^ (VIET) UNITED NATIONS—U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL THANT TODAY DECLINED TO CLARIFY HIS APPEAL FOR VIET CONG REPRESENTATION IN THE POST- WAR GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET NAM. A SPOKESMAN SAID THANT WOULD NOT COMMENT ON SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK'S OBSERVATION TODAY THAT THE POST-WAR GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET NAM AND NOT IMPOSED FROM OUTSIDE. HE SAID THANT LISTENED TO RUSKfS NEWS CONFERENCE ON THE RADIO. "THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID EVERYTHING HE WANTED TO SAY YESTERDAY,w HIS SPOKESMAN SAID. THANT TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE THURSDAY HE WONDERED WHETHER THE TIME HAD COME TO RAISE "SUCH PRACTICAL QUESTIONS AS WHAT TYPE OF GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIET NAM—REPRESENTATIVE, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, OF ALL THE SECTIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE—COULD TAKE OVER* AFTER THE WAR. "IF THE PARTIES WERE TO MAKE CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THIS ISSUE," HE SAID, WI THINK A REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY." 1 IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT NORTH VIET NAM WOULD WELCOME COMMUNIST I REPRESENTATION IN THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT AND THAT SOUTH VIET NAM I COULD BE EXPECTED TO OPPOSE IT. THAT LEFT THE ACCEPTANCE OF THANT'S I SUGGESTION UP TO THE UNITED STATES. I U.S. AMBASSADOR ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, SPEAKING TODAY AT FORDHAM I' UNIVERSITY IN NEW YORK, MADE NO REFERENCE TO THANT'S SUGGESTION. 1 GOLDBERG REPEATED THAT "HANOI HOLDS THE KEY* TO PEACE IN VIET 1 NAM AND SAID THE U.S. HAD HEARD NOTHING IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT JCHNSCK'S GLOBAL PEACE OFFENSIVE. 1/21 —BA1255PES ,ADD 4 VIET NAM, WASHINGTON CHAIRMAN J. WILLIAM FULERIGHT OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATION" COMMITTEE TOLD NEWSMEN THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVC'RS CONTINUATION CF THE BOMBING PAUSE AMD INCLUSION CF THE VIET CONG'- NATIONAL LIEERATICN FRONT] IN ANY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. BOTH MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED WITH RUSK TODAY AND FULERIGHT AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY WAS IN A "CROSSFIRE" BETWEEN ACTION" ON THE COMMITTEE WHICH HAVE DIFFERING VIEWS ON THESE QUESTIONS. "I HAVE NEVER SEEN AN ISSUE ON WHICH THERE HA" EEEN SUCH UNCERTAINTY, " FULERIGHT TOLD REPORTERS AFTER THE RUSK SESSION. "THERE WERE NO SUCH DIFFERENCES IN THE KOREAN WAR OR IN WOPLD WAR II...ONE REASON IS THAT THIS SITUATION ISN'T VERY CLEAR-CUT. IT CALLS FCD VERY DISCRIMINATING AND SUBTILE DISTINCTIONS...IT CAUSES SOUL- SEARCHING." FULERIGHT SAID HE PERSONALLY FEELS THAT THE "BCMBIXG PAITE OVGHT TO CONTINUE A LONGER TIKE FROM THE CONSIDERATION CF BOTH CURSELVE'" AND THE OTHERS INVOLVED." HE SAID 31-DAYS IS A "RATHER CHOPT TIME TO ALLOW ALL THE PERSONS CONCERNED TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION," AS TO INCLUDING THE VIET CONG IN NEGOTIATION". THE ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT SAID "THE POLICY CF NOT RECCGNI7ING THE VIET CONG AS A LEGITIMATE PARTY TO ANY CONFERENCE MAY BE VERY SIGNIFICANT AS TO WHETHER A CONFERENCE CAN BE SET UP." HE SAID THEY CEEM TO HIM TO BE WA PROPER PARTY TO NEGOTIATIONS." FULERIGHT SAID HE FELT RESUMPTION OF BOMBING "WOULD "TOP ANY EFFORTS TOWARD TRYING TO GET A CONFERENCE.'" HE SAID THE PAUSE SHOULD CONTINUE FOR THE "FORESEEABLE FUTURE" ~ BUT DECLINED TO DEFINE HOW LONG HE MEANT. MCNAMARA. WHO HAD A DATE WITH ANOTHER COMMITTEE THIS AFTERNOON, WAS TEMPORARILY EXCUSED BY THE COMBINED SENATE COMMITTEES AFTER THI" MORNING'S APPEARANCE. THEY CALLED FOR TESTIMONY THIS AFTERNOON FROM DR. HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, AND GEN. HAROLD X. JOHNSON, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. 1/24--GE150P V * UPI-122 „ ' ADD 5 VIET NAK, WASHINGTON FULERIGHT SAID HE BELIEVED THE UNITED STATE0 SHOULD "E:;HAV~T EVERY POSSIBILITY"--INCLUDING THE FAJCR CONCESSION OF AGREEING TC SEAT THE VIET CCNG AT THE CONFERENCE TAELE--BEFCPE A DECISION I" YA?F TC RE-^TE BOKBING. IN AN INTERVIEW FOR THE TELEVISION CAMERA", THE CHAIRMAN WA~ A~KEE WHAT RUSK'S REACTION TC THIS PRGPCSAL WA". AKD HE ^AID "It-PLY "HE DCE" NOT AGREE. " FULBRIGHT SAID IT WAS HI? OWN VIEW THAT THE ALTERNATIVE TC A PEACE CONFERENCE, THE ALTERNATIVE OF SO-CALLED OPEN END ESCALATION CF THE FIGHTING, HAS SUCH A "DANGEROUS IMPORT" THAT ALKOST ANYTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO AVOID IT. "SOKE PARTS OF CUR PROPOSALS COULD BE CHANGED WITHOUT ENDANGERING OUR INTERESTS, BUT WHICH KIGHT KAKE THE OVERTURES J-'CPE ATTRACTIVE TO OTHERS," HE SAID. HE ADDED THAT SINCE THE VIET CONG HAVE "ECRNE KOST OF THE BRUNT OF THE FIGHTING, THEY WOULD PROPERLY BE BROUGHT TC THE CONFERENCE TABLE." 1/24—DP202PES final In a small village in Vietnam recently, I had the opportunity to speak with a village elder. This man had seen 30 years of con- tinuous conflict, 2 sons had been lost in long passed military engage- ments, and his crude farm implements lay useless behind his home. He was an exhausted man in an exhausted country. Without my asking, he related the needs of his village'— but he was really speaking for Vietnam. "We just want to be free from the terror and weapons of soldiers," he said. "We want our children to read, we don't want them to be sick all their lives, and we want to grow our own food % on our own land." . V > " • •'• This simple statement of human needs, so pathetically stated, was a crushing description of Vietnam. The months of hearings that I had conducted on Vietnam's refugee problems in the Senate, while dramatic in airing the personal hurt of people caught in war, never produced such forceful testimony as did this man in the setting where ve talked. We have been involved ii} two conflicts in Vietnam. One has been the battle against the terror brought in the name of revolution by the Viet Cong guerrillas and the forces from the Worth. The conflict has been the object of American debate and attention on an almost unprecedented scale. Our government has taken a position in this endeavor that has been clear and firm. Regardless of individual views, most people both at home and abroad are well aware „ of this aspect of our policy in Vietnam. .- .. .. The second conflict in Vietnam — the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people themselves -- has not been waged ..'!,. ; with the same ferocity. There has been no one firm humanitarian po3$.ey :. . -irr.;'. *' -V.T.-I---.I ^/-^ vv^-y——?* .*''• ••' ';'.'.'.,V>. '••'*''.'•*'•-- 'v. >•• ' '-.- ;,.. . i •'«. i/yti - 2 - understood throughout our nation or th~ world. The struggle in Vietnam has not been one that has produced a concern for what happens to be the most important element in the Vietnam situation -- the velfare of the Vietnamese people themselves. Positive steps have been proposed by our President, who,has made clear his commitment to the velfare of the "ietnamese people. In a major address last April, the President discussed the two faces of the conflict in Vietnam. . He outlined a program for the economic and social betterment of all Southeast Asia. Later and more specifically, he established "Project Vietnam11, a program to encourage American civilian physicians to volunteer their services to Vietnam. In September of last year, he dis-patched an eminent specialist on rehabilitation of the handicapped, Dr. Howard Rusk, to undertake a special study in that country. The President's concern has stimulated progress in this area. o Yet greater efforts must be undertaken if we are to win the support of these people, for without them and their identification with the democratic governments of the world the lives of many Americans will have been given to no avail. In the voice of the village elder who described a nation's needs vas the clear implication that he vas indifferent as to who would supply 'those needs. Years of fear and deprivation had smothered the concerns he may have had for his own personal freedoms. He wanted physical security, edu- .'•;,' cation, health and some form of social justice. While it can be said - that we have actively sought to -orovide for his security, we have yet . .. ' ••-..;• : to fully meet hie remaining requests. And it is significant that it is free societies that can best provide these things. .-. It is the war for the hopes and aspirations of the people that must be escalated in Vietnam. In this land of 16 million peo-nle: - 3 - '-.-'• . •': '.„';••'. -- there are only 800 Vietnamese doctors, and 500 of these '-'• . - •'..;',. . :.'•'•..-" are in the armed forces, leaving the remainder for the ••;. ... ^i;:../ .../'' :•:••' ', entire civilian population .. , ' .'...• >••'/ . — only 28 hospitals have surgical facilities, but 17 of '; .; ;i>.".-.;•' . ,-,..-,;• •":••'. these facilities are idle for lack of physicians- '•'•';• . •;'' '\r '••• of the children of Vietnam suffer from worms ; • — the vast majority of people are illiterate, and what ':•<,. ' •• school system did exist in the countryside has been nearly destroyed by war. School teachers have been prime targets of terrorists. In 19^5 alone, over 11,000 civil servants . " were killed, abducted, or wounded by the Viet Cong; a high '' ";'•' proportion of these being teachers * ..' -- the nation's production of food, once sufficient to serve, •> as a rice basket for Asia, is so depleted that rice must now be imported to feed thapopulace ! ' • — local government has been decimated; not one of the 16,000 villages and their officials have escaped assassination ." n ' ' ; or terror. Clearly whatever societal institutions had existed for the benefit of the Vietnamese before are by now ':^ / .i ' ' . r;r; ^ crippled or totally ruined by war. . •• V. Before I went to Vietnam, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee • ", ': on Refugees which I chair took testimony over four months in Senate ^,; :'•.,'•. hearings from some kO witnesses on the problem of Vietnam refugees. •'."•'.*-•''• Our Subcommittee was concerned with what was being done for the homeless N thousands; what provisions were being made for the estimated 100,000 v:^-;:/ * . ..•*.• -.• '•"•'. -'.'f.' orphans? Were we meeting the challenge of caring for the human..'; ., :,:':- :. :; L fall-out of war -- the very people that the Viet Cong claimed to' ' ? , - champion? And in a larger sense, with Vietnam almost a land of r- . k - refugees, was the United States beginning to engage in this more difficult battle for popular support? The "testimony given at these hearings indicated that our efforts in this area were not sufficient. The Saigon government, assisted by our AID officials had only the barest essentials of a program established to meet the needs of the refugees, although they .. had forecast the presence of 100,000 refugees by July of 1965. Even and when the estimate was proven wrong/the refugee count was greater than 600,000 people, there vas still no change in planning, no adequate program set up to handle this massive influx of South Vietnamese, according to a report by the General Accounting Office. And this occurred despite prior knowledge thatthe escalation of military activity would, and did, lead to a vast increase in displaced > civilians. Moreover, it was discouraging to hear the testimony of representatives of our own government imply again and again that in Vietnam the problem of refugees is just that -- a problem and a burden. « By now there are approximately one million such refugees in South Vietnam, or 6 percent of its population. It iEj as if the : population of the six New I&igland states were homeless in America. These are people whose villages have been overrun by the Viet Cong, or who are fleeing to urban areas to escape the crossfire of the : ;'. ; ' - . •"'.'•-' v fighting or the effect of the bombs from our planes. For the most •• • • .„!*'>'• part they are grouped around the major population centers on the -''.':•"•• coast-line, but hundreds of smaller centers lie inland. .' ... ; While in Vietnam, I saw for myself the indifference of the, ," , Saigon government to the plight of their own. Government.; officials '.}',, assured me that the refugee situation was well'in hand -- yet I >': ,,: - , Inspected one camp of over 600 people without a toilet. Construction was started on seven refugee camps in anticipation of ray visit. Work stopped when my plans were temporarily altered. It began again when it was possible for me to go. Many other aspects of my visits to these camps did not ring true. People applauded when our party enetered a camp -- thanks to minor officials moving through the refugee crowd as cheerleaders. Blanket? were distributed in our presence and repossessed when we left. "i's: paint on buildings was still wet and roads vere freshly cleared and bulldozed. In essence, the behavior of these officials * was more typical of people concealing a lack of effort than of men doing their best at a difficult task. To them these refugees are a burden -- but to me they can be one of our strongest assets in Vietnam. I recognize that historically it has always been difficult to attend to the concerns of the civilian population in the midst of war. And in Vietnam, the by-product of escalation has been a refugee flow that would tax eve^n the most resourceful officials. It is encouraging that in August our AID officials established a separate refugee program for Vietnam. And we know that the many voluntary agencies in the field have patiently continued their traditional work -- despite hardships and personal can^c-rs. But nowperhaps the opportunity presents itself for a greater devotion of our energies to the refugee problem. Kow more can be done to focus our attention on the Vietnamese people themselves. I would suggest that first, the United States government must express an overall humanitarian policy in Vietnam that will rival in resolve and resources our military effort. This expression - 6 - by our government must be so forceful that there will be no danger of the Saigon government misreading our desires. The basis of this policy would recognize the potential in e million refugees — indeed that of all the people of Vietnam — the potential to educate, train and employ them in useful tasks. Experiences in other refugee situations in Asia illustrate what can be done to productively employ and train idle hands. Cottage industries established through private industry or voluntary agencies assist the handicapped or the young and old. Cooperative farms could be organized and built by the refugees themselves, as could resettlement villages, schools or water conservation projects. It logically follows that this policy direction would imply the need for more adequate facilities at refugee centers. These centers should be equipped for the activity rather than the storage of people. Second, this strong expression of government policy should be directed to the rebirth of democratic political action among these •people to enhance their future rdle in their village or nation's life. And within these settlements, people who before had at least exercised free choice in the choosing of village leaders could experience greater forms of representation. Depending upon the time that we would expect people to remain in such settlements, representative government could be fostered. Each refugee camp could elect a council to serve their interests in the camp itself. And on a national level, refugee representatives could be present in Saigon to assure thatthe immediate needs of this growing -population are met. The meaning and experience of this kind of activity cannot be minimized in a nation where the idea of a central government responding. - 7 - to individual needs is novel. Third, to assist in these endeavors it would be wise to recruit men of other nations who have a unique "background and experience in the problems of refugees. The men who mastered the problems of refugees following World War II, those who vorked In the deserts of ~"'in '••! ••in I i maun n i in mm imint .im.^^.*-] _.i ,.._ .__ .„ ._.„_-._.-__ ..r^,-,—..—.-jE^a,. jj-.nr i i ilii'i" >-"!-_-^ L '-1 fl T I ' -- r '' " •" r " " ~ '" *'"'' *~"LJ"g^^^^T~*fa the Middle East and more recently in the camps of Algeria have much to offer us. They could be called for this humanitarian purpose, to advise or refugee problems, and to assist as intermediaries vith the central government and our own armed forces. Our renewed humanitarian commitment to the people of Vietnam would also provide for the presence of*a refugee official at the highest policy-making level at our Embassy in Saigon. This man, responsible only to the Ambassador and the President., vould be involved in all decisions, -whether military or civilian. He would also be a coordinator of the government and voluntary agency efforts. Such experts could enlighten both government and people. Their presence could be the promise of great international efforts, not only in Vietnam but in all of Southeast Asia. For the educational and other programs needed in 'refugee camps are but a small measure of the needs throughout this country and the neighboring states. Finally,,and most importantly, I do not consider it visionary to consider an international force to assist the developing areas of Sputheajstjftsia. The presence of men whose only concern is the health . . • of the population, the education of children, the bringing of simp.1* technologies to remote lands, or the development of civilian administrators vould be an important defense against; future political instability and resultant aggression. - a - This force of dedicated people would be truly international. It would not tie a unilaterial American effort. It vould enroll the citizens of every country in the free world — but especially the citizens of Asia. They vould bring an emphasis of peace and stability to a part of the -world that has known too much war. ' Their accepted presence in any nation vould be symbolic of that nation's desire to improve the conditions under which their people live, • . regerdless of ideology. Such an international effort could be international^ fostered. rg!B1 | f ..nMlllimmi •wrrt-i.'-.Tfm H!|—^-y-'iJJiiJi-'-u^i •ii-i.—^^•^i_»«.-JJi.ui^Me'^TrrTrr There are voluntary- agencies established on a world-wide basis to oversee this work a_nd_ass 1st in thev,effort* ' :- I recently had the opportunity to address the leaders of these agencies in Geneva about Vietnam. I was taken by their warm response to my suggestions of their greater involvement and that of their nations in the civilian effort in Vietnam. But even more appropriately, a way might be found to involve j the one organization of international harmony — the United Nations. 11 For it is this body that can ""best demand the resources, talent, and • goodwill among free nations for a concerted development effort. The work of this force, involving thousands of men and *bmen would be available to all. Teams of health specialists attacking 'entire areas suffering from recurrent outbreaks of disease, public health specialists .constructing sanitation and sewage systems, teams of agricultural specialists adapting their knowledge to the differing farm conditions and advising and constructing the necessary tools and systems needed for efficient food production is within the realm of possibility. Entire school systems could be established; adequate communcations with centers of safety and government could be devised;!\: .. ..'.1 -. V '»*,*••;'*.:•• _ C _ 1 - VJ *', and local governments strengthened in their methods and procedures for administering to local needs. Begardless of the conditions in Vietnam in the months ahead,, such a proposal expressing our true concern for the people of Southeast Asia should he aired "before the nations of the vorld. For what cannot "be fully accomplished in the military turmoil of Vietnam immediately, can now "be undertaken in the more secure nations in that rvart of the world. 'Je know that developed nations in the past havt:- displayed an amazing capability to undertake the complex task of war. Cannot the hameesing of equal energy for these peaceful purposes also "be achieved? To the extent that -re leave Vietnam one day with more to mrrk our presence than des traction3 we will have met our true commitment to the Vietnamese. And to the extent that we plan and act now to assure against a recurrence of a Vietnam elsewhere in Southeast Asia, we will have met the challenge of the future in Asia. f 1 SG: » 29 Jan> !966 From Press Officer on duty today: Correspondents are asking in regard to the appeal by Pope Paul: 1. If there were any previous consultations v between SG and Vatican before appeal was Vio^- made. Was appeal made with consent of SG 2. If SG received letter from Pope Paul about 0(X'' the appeal 3« ^I f SG has any comment~~s, t o make*~>~*. -f •_^ UP I-8 (VIET-POPE) VATICAN CITY—POPE PAUL VI SUGGESTED TODAY THAT ARBITRATION BY U.N.-APPOINTED NEUTRAL NATIONS MIGHT END THE FIGHTING IN VIET NAM. "WHO KNOWS WHETHER U.N. ARBITRATION, ENTRUSTED TO NEUTRAL NATIONS, MIGHT NOT TOMORROW—WE WISH IT WERE EVEN TODAY—SOLVE THE TERRIBLE (VIET NAM) QUESTION?* THE POPE SAID IN A SPEECH TO ITALIAN NEWSMEN, "WE WILL PRAY TO GOD FOR THIS." THE POPE'S REMARK NEAR THE END OF A SPEECH TO LEADERS OF THE UNION OF THE ITALIAN CATHOLIC PRESS WAS HIS FIRST SPECIFIC SUGGESTION ON VIET NAM SINCE HIS CALL LAST MONTH FOR A CHRISTMAS TRUCE. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD RECOMMENDED A METHOD OF PEACE NEGOTIATION. ALL OF HIS PREVIOUS PEACE APPEALS--INCLUDING PRECEDENT-BREAKING NEW YEAR'S EVE MESSAGES TO THE LEADERS OF RUSSIA, RED CHINA AND NORTH AND SOUTH VIET NAM—ADVOCATED NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL TERMS * THE POPE MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS URGING A JUST PEACE. OTHERWISE, HE SAID. THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE NEGATIVE11 FOR THE WORLD. HE SAID HE HAD "RELIABLE AND AUTHORITATIVE" INFORMATION THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PEACE OFFENSIVE WAS SINCERE. HE SAID THE COMMUNISTS ASSUMED A *GRAVE, VERY GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY1* IN REFUSING "REASONABLE AND HONORABLE* NEGOTIATIONS. rtr%T TALKS, HE SAID, ARE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO LEAVING THE WORLD TO *THE ARMS, EVER MORE TERRIBLE ARMS." „ ,,,»,„ THE PEOPLE ARE LOOKING ON,* HE EXCLAIMED, "AND GOD WILL HAVE TO JUDGE US." (IN WASHINGTON, AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT ON THE POOPE'S PROPOSAL. IT APPEARED THAT FORMAL WORD OF THE PONTIFF'S STATEMENT HAD NOT YET REACHED THE U.S. CAPITAL.) OBSERVERS BELIEVED THE POPE'S CALL FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS WAS CALCULATED TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE NEUTRALIST "THIRD WORLD" WHILE KEEPING BIG POWER POLITICS OUT OF THE PEACE TALKS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THE POPE WAS OUTSPOKEN IN DEFENDING JOHNSON'S PEACE OFFENSIVE AND IN CONDEMNING THE LACK OF RESPONSE FROM THE COMMUNISTS. "YOU KNOW WHAT THE OUTCOME OF OUR MODEST BUT DARING ATTEMPTS WAS," THE PONTIFF SAID OF HIS OWN VIET NAM PEACE APPEALS, *FIRST OF ALL, THEY ARE PART OF THAT PEDAGOGY OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE TO WHICH WE ARE COMMITTED BY OUR MINISTRY, AND WHATEVER THEIR POLITICAL OUTCOME THEY ALWAYS RETAIN THEIR MORAL VALUE. AND UNDER THIS ASPECT, WE MUST BE VERY GRATEFUL TO ALL THOSE WHO RESPONDED TO OUR PEACE APPEAL. "MANY STATESMEN ECHOED OUR HUMBLE VOICE: GOD BLESS THEM. A "PEACE OFFENSIVEw HAS SPREAD IN THE WORLD: HERE IS AT LEAST ONE GOOD CONSEQUENCE, PERHAPS NOT UNCONNECTED WITH OUT INTERVENTION. THIS "PEACE OFFENSIVEw DESERVES ITS PLACE IN HISTORY. "WE HAVE HAD RELIABLE AND AUTHORITATIVE EVIDENCE THAT LEADS US TO THINK THAT IT WAS REALLY AIMED AT SOLVING THE CONFLICT BY MEANS OF REASONABLE AND HONORABLE NEGOTIATIONS. RECEPTION"IT IS :T OI BT Ei sREGRETTE A GRAVED ,THA VERT YI TGRAV HAES RESPONSIBILITSO FAR MET NOY POSITIVTO REJECE T NEGOTIATIONS, BY NOW THE ONLY WAY OF ENDING THE CONFLICT WITHOUT LEAVING THE MISSION TO THE ARMS, EVER MORE TERRIBLE ARMS. THE PEOPLES ARE LOOKING ON! AND GOD WILL HAVE TO JUDGE US! K^rSI MUST CONTINUE TO WISH AND HOPE THAT THE APPEALS FOR NEGOTIATED PEACE WILL NOT BE DISAPPOINTED, AND THAT A SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE WILL NOT BE SOUGHT THROUGH FORCE AND DESTRUCTION, WHOSE CONSEQUENCES ARE ALWAYS UNPREDICTABLE." *WE WILL PRAY TO GOD FOR THIS.W 1/29—TD904AES FOR IKFORMATION OF UNITED MELONS SECRETARIAT ONtY 51 January 1966 DAILT PRESS BRIEFING William Powell said that no time had been set so far for the Security Council meeting. Correspondents would be informed of further developments. On other matters, he said that a release would be issued today on the appointment of Mrs. Marietta Tree as the Secretary-General's personal representative on the United Nations International School Development Fund. A release had been put out on Saturday regarding the final meeting of General Marambio with the military representatives of India and Pakistan on 29 January. A background release had been issued on the Expert Committee on Finances. Since then, the representative of Brazil, Setta Camara, had been named, and it was hoped that the Argentine representative would be named soon. In reply to questions, Ramses Nassif said that the Secretary-General had seen Mr. Goldberg 31 January 1966 SECOND PRESS BRIEFING BiT FRANCIS W. CABEE33TER (UNITED STATES) At Frank Carpenter's second briefing today he said that Ambassador Goldberg had seen both the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. The request for a Council meeting was part of the continuing initiative by the United States in search of peace, a search which was still in effect today. He did not know when the Council would meet. The United States wanted "a full, comprehensive and reasoned debate, and a full airing of the matter". In the United States view, this would be one of the most important meetings of the Council. Answering questions on a background basis he said that "It is understood that the United States would have no objections to having the Peoples' Republic of China and North Viet-Nam heard in the debate. As for hearing the Viet-Cong, the United States is understood to have made no commitment. It was, however, pointed out that the Council in the past had heard 'people' who were involved in a particular problem, but it was the Council itself, not individual members, who made decisions on such a matter". He declined to comment on anything attributed to the Secretary-General at today's Office of Public Information briefing. In reply to further questions, he said the Secretary-General had been kept informed by telephone about what was going on. The President's statement had been the first information other Council members had received of the United States request. Asked if the last paragraph of the request, quoting the Pope Paul's suggestion of neutral arbitration, was an indication of what could be expected in the United States resolution, Mr. Carpenter said the United States was not committed to the Pope's initiative but reference to it in the letter could be taken as United States interest. The calling of the Council meeting had not, hox*ever, been "triggered" by the Pope's initiative. * #*# # FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONItf 31 January 1966 THIRD PRESS BRIEFING BY FRANCIS W. CARPENTER (UNITED STATES) Mr. Carpenter, at his third briefing today, handed out copies of the United States resolution on Viet-Nam. In reply to questions on who would be the "appropriate interested governments" in the discussions mentioned in the first operative of the draft, he said that this was subject to consultations in the Council. He said the Viet-Cong was not a Government, in the view of the United States. He said the resolution did not, in effect, look for a new Geneva Conference. It looked for a "pre-conference set-up" looking toward application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. Before discussion began on the substantive issues in the Council, he said he expected discussion on participation in the debate. He did not know when the Council would meet, but thought perhaps tomorrow. * *** * FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY 2 February 1966 PRESS BRIEFING BY ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) Ambassador Goldberg said: "The United States is naturally very gratified by the vote taken today. It is a vindication not of the United States position... but of the United Nations Charter and the role the Security Council must play under the constitutional scheme of the United Nations". Pessimistic accounts of the United Nations role in this matter had been proved wrong, and "we are confident the Security Council will play a constructive role in the matter^because we are entirely confident of the correctness of our basic position, namely that the proper place for a solution of this conflict is the conference table not the battlefield". The agenda debate had shown an overwhelming sentiment in favour of going to a conference at Geneva and this was what the United States resolution asked for, he said. The United States is ready to go to Geneva today and would be there if both co-Chairmen of the agreements had agreed. The United States had presented its resolution early because it had expected procedural debates and had wanted the Council to know in advance what the United States motives were. The procedure now being followed was exactly the same he had followed as President of the Council on the Kashmir issue — adoption of the agenda, consultations and then public debate. In reply to questions, he said he expected a consensus to develop as it had on Kashmir, and he had indeed seen the consensus already in the debate in favour of a resumed Geneva Conference. He did not know when the debate would resume. The questions of invitations would be part of the consultations. As for Viet Cong participation on "equal footing", he said nobody had proposed rewriting the Geneva Accords but"only implementing them. A week before the United States came to the Council he had held con- sultations but had been told that would not be helpful to the peace efforts. However, when Ho Chi Minh rejected the peace efforts, the circumstances had changed and the United States had brought the matter to the Council. Bombing could be halted if there was a reciprocal gesture, he said. #• *## * HO mow iiitYtr SOTOT ASD FRENCH OPWITIOW TO Us flRdPOSEB !Tf ^ ©S ?I1TMAM OR WAWCS HTABlINr*! AMD MAIN WTOs 1» BflHl FAPFR^ WUTTffl BfFORf e©!IHCli PROCETSINCS KROWW f!t!0« MIOT FACTION TO AKCRICAM KOVT A«TJ PO«s«:lB!LITTr« NATIONS* FARA TJICg OF IHPtA FIW» »» SOFAI? ^I2«ATIOR IS TH^SAT TO FIACf ? URATIOW« COOIB FtlWCTIOH AS FACTOR OF RESTRAINT I? f*mt I» RELATION TO HANOI AHB m$tm MfS AT tEAST IN REtATIOW MORE EITIF^F ELEWTJSTc 18 USA 1T5EM.EEEEEE IW 0«!A ITSELF. BY AJ*PFALIWG TO -|Jr=A HA«5 INDICATED WHILE If SEEN COKPFLLT!) RF«U*JT BOFFINS t €9M?€TIVE Of «?EKffIN€*CEA'S(iTlRE ffClPEACITtIL NEGOTIATION? BBT OBJECTIVE OF SECT ING CEASEFIRE AN8 PFACEFHl A9ANB6ff£1». ALTKOS6H C©tJK€Ii PBeCTCTIWC« «OT trPTLY BF FRUItFlli aBOTt PERHAPS WCKT HFLPF«l COlltS? W01EB BF TO M)TKORI?£ SfCSS^y ACTIVE!.?) IN eeilCf^f PARTieUlAM.Y WITH HOSAtlGSTD A^IAK POBETrt AMD ?OVOWIOW T£ KVOIVF AYF rOR!"T3t WITH MWl CAN f«?TAlLBKl'i tmdUOTF BOt^ ©UOTF S© fyHTIftEB HOPES ®®f hWmT3 OF EARL? THROUCK HHATIOH*!, SECCeUNCIL^ ItlVOiVEHFWT IN WOT SF UNRICLPTtft. BWQBOTff. PAR A STATT«MA» MTO!?IAL O SE«8HPTIOR ©f BG*mif9S, A? WTHAI4T BEEN SIJICW TO POIWT 0«T, O W THAO SES«5Ef JOKl^ON HAS ^FHKI4?I) POPEf! «HItF APPEAR IWC ACCEPT IT §Y EVOE1W KFLF OF UHATH^NR • STATTffHAB Ca^HEI4fg QUOTE I? IWITATtON TO IWATlOtift ANTS ALL SOVT" WAe rFRIOUr, IT 5MPH1P IflnT KAVT ^ FIBS 0? AYE BOWS HWIIOIT* IF COMTSUtSCt * USA PROPOSED KVER TATO T^LACEf TRW XMDXAg ROtr CAK Bf POSITIVE* SHE CAR AHP TSOBLD SFfM, Witt IBS 1ST 18 BEVEtOfHFtlT ©F PROCESSES WHICH MA? te n»ST ^TFP BEVER9E tE^UHFTI©^ ©F SOWBIMC. IF TffiC COWFtRENCi: CAttCT TOf AYE SfteiFICI SKSfVNsTQIt EFFESf Wm.B * PI COBFKREWCE TOOtB ABtF FXttT PRESS WR3E OH BOTH «?IBFS THAW Ilf0IVIBttAL f 1TCS * Pft«A WlSBPgTAW TIMES SBITOBIAL I«f PIDS^XHISTIC fWIIW ©f Att OBRTACtE« IK WAT PtACEFBL «?rTTtFW«T A1H CeSCtUSER I» 5ltUATI6N ^© FULL BIFFtCCEffF^ &WB mm mn$% m » * fltlT CAH «t£ES 01? COt»FtB£im.Y «?e6€HsTF0f iS:^f?T OF SKtCtf V08L& P*5 »Ett T6 A?6I0 ASYTKIWC WI o OH I *T steiHmef AMERXCAH BOWSI«S BOT CMSCSRIf IS SURSXY TEWWESEB W HECOCNXTCMW THAT BtAWJT BOFf! 0 HOT ATTACH TO ¥A?EIMGTOW BUT m?$T BF FI3TFB FIRP*tY ON O or mmi Km FDTCIMS wt* TIS NOT BASHIHSTQH? io^^TiDF^ BUT ©F HABOI PT^IWB fffltCB WOW IR 0!ff«tTIO^ UWftUOTF . O UTTtfENS PATRIOT « 58 KB ITOB TALLY CONBtKH? 8g PR AFT RESOLUTION A THAT BELHI IT^l^PF? THAT MftBE BY «HA5fR! TO JQMN«Tew FBOH TgflTfPT THAT DIUF€T IT HiriD WITH HANOI* SiOTE »? t»£CI<;ION TAKE VIETNAM PROBLEM n siecomteii. is IBITOAIALLY CeNStlftte S5 BRAFT RESOLUTION A« SIIOTF ONE WO«T }ITP©€tlTICAL DIPLOMATIC BGCWEWTS IN HfCl^t HI5?TORY AMS SAYS IF WASHISCTOW WANT*? PEACE AN ENTIRELY NEB WILL HAVE TO Bf INITIATED. ftBOTF II. A6AIN PAfif It '**"> v~ CtoWSEWW? IIS BRAFT RESQltmON AS QUOTE OWE ftmCRXTICAL &XP10MATXC BOeiRflCHTR IN RECENT HJ^TOiY UNQUOTE AN0 THAT SEL1I BflHAFFY THAT USA XGNOHfD BY 9HA9TSX TO JOKNSTOR FROM TAsWTFHT tWAT BIH?€fT TAtTf«? 9 m HJELB trni HANOI* auerr ti^ SFCZ^XON TAKE virrwAM pwottfK TQ f^teeotffiext is sfcurrrrB AIL TBS WORF AS it KICHT FOICE 9 TO EXERCISE VfTO 0H AW ¥«! OPERATIVE lfS©itT?IOM * IMBtA STXtl FEEL? OW JNTCTVEMTIOR WILL FURTHER COffPLXCATE VXITVAR l*i01LER fKI€H CAW WfSOtfFB 0m,Y AT GEfTEVA TTPf CONFERENCE o NQNALXCKES WATSON PLAtlWS CONCILIATORY O NE9f>e!.ltX 4 O COL 4©- 4 e/j tIKK FOR ESFOEMATION OF UNITED JSATI01SS SECRETARIAT ONItf February 1966 PRESS BRIEFING BY FMHCIS CABEEMEB (UNITED STATES) At a press briefing at 4 p.m. today, Frank Carpenter of the United States delegation, vas asked if the United States was aware of any consultations actually going on at the present time. He said that the United States was not only aware of them, it was "actively consulting", not only with members of the Security Council, but also with other States, looking towards the possibility of a pre- conference conference. Asked about invitations, he said: "The presence of anybody at the conference is for the conference to decide." The United States assumed that those which had attended the Geneva Conference originally would come back. But it was not for the United States, or any individual State, to say that so-and-so should be invited; that was for the conference to decide. He said that Mr. Goldberg had attended this morning's meeting of the Committee on Peace-keeping, and had talked there with Mr. Fedorenko, but he did not know what they had talked about. Tomorrow Mr. Goldberg would tape for radio and TV, a Voice of America programme called "Press Conference U.S.A.". The transcript would be available at mid-day* In reply to a question, he said that Mr. Goldberg had gone to Washington yesterday afternoon for consultations with the State Department and had returned last nightt # New Delhi (AP) President H« Chi Hinh of North Viet Nam sent a letter to Indian President Sarvapelli Radhakrishnan last month aakinh hime to use his good offices for the restoration of peace in Viet Mam, the North Viet Nam Consulate General said today. A spokesman at the Consulate said the letter, delivered Jan. 24, was part of commonications He Chi Minh sent to some Heads of State and Government such as France's President de Eaulle. The spokesman quoted He as saying that India, as Chairman of the three-natiea ICC bore special responsibility for the restoration of peace in Viet Nam. It was understood India was in consultation with friendly Goverenments. It was learned that the letter was considered by the Cabinet and by an emergency sub-committee of the Cabinet. Sources indicated no reply has been made to HO, V UPI-S8 (VIET NAM) NEW DELHI—INFORMED SOURCES SAID TONIGHT COMMUNIST NORTH VIET NAM PRESIDENT HO CHI MINK HAS ASKED THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT IN A LETTER TO INITIATE PEACE MOVES IN VIET NAM. 2/S—DP103PES UPI-89 (VIET NAM) HONOLULU—PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN A DRAMATIC NEW PLAN INVOLVING THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA EARLY TODAY SUMMONED VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY TO FLY BACK TO SAIGON WITH LEADERS OF THE SOUTH VIET NAM GOVERNMENT • 2/S--DP104P UPI-90 ADD VIET NAM, NEW DELHI CUPI-SS) THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF THE REPORT. THE SOURCES SAIS HO, IN A LETTER TO INDIAN PRESIDENT SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN, SUGGESTED THAT AS NEUTRAL CHAIRMAN OF THE INTER- NATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION, INDIA SHOULD INITIATE THE PEACE MOVES. THE COMMBNICATION IS RECEIVING URGENT CONSIDERATION FROM PRIME MINISTER MRS. INDIRA GANDHI AND FOREIGN MINISTER SWARAN SINGH AND THEIR DVISERS, THE SOURCES SAID. HO ASKED INDIA TO STRIVE URGENTLY FOR PEACE IN VIET NAM, THE SOURCES SAID. 2/S--DP105PES UPI-91 ADD VIET NAM, HONOLULU CUPI-S9) THIS DEVELOPMENT CAME AS JOHNSON WOUND UP HIS PEACE-AND-WAR CONFERENCES WITH GEN. NGUYEN VANTIEU, CHIEF OF STATE OF SOUTH VIET NAM, AND PREMIER NGUYEN CAO KY. THE PRINCIPALS PLANNED TO ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE LATER TODAY. 2/S--DP10SPES UPI-92 ADD REVOLT SUPPLIES, EL PASO (UPI-25) DEFENSE ATTORNEY LEE A. CHAGRA SAID THE CHARGES WERE A FARCE. "MAYBE THEY (THE DEFENDANTS) HAVE TANKS AND SUBMARINES HIDDEN IN THEIR BACKYARDS.* HE SAID. THIS SOUNDS LIKE AMATEUR NIGHT." IN WASHINGTON, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT COUNTRIES THE ARMS WERE BOUND FOR. HE SAID THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE FIVE DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING WITH "SOME PARTIES IN MEXICO." 2/S--DP111PES __^ UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Press Release 4806 February 11, 1966 Statement "by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg,, United States Representative to the United Nations. I reported to the President yesterday, February 10, on the action of the United Nations Security Council inscribing the Vietnam problem on its agenda and on the consultations now being carried on among members to determine whether and in what manner the Council might assist in moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. The President reviewed the background of the decisions taken at Honolulu by the governments of the United States and of the Republic of Vietnam to continue vigorously to resist aggression, to pursue with equal vigor the search for a peaceful settlement, and to carry on a common struggle against social injustice, poverty, disease and ignorance. Now that I fcave returned to New York I will review my discussion with the President with the Secretary General and the representatives of member states on the Security Council and other representatives. The President asked me in this review to reaffirm that the goal of the United States in Vietnam is an honorable and just peace - peace at the earliest possible time. The President also asked me to reiterate his conviction that negotiations, either without conditions or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, could serve to work out a mutually acceptable political solution, restore peace and tranquility, and lay the groundwork for rehabilitation and progress throughout both North and South Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia. The President further believes that there might be a reciprocal reduction of hostilities, with or without negotiations, which might constitute a significant step toward peace. An honorable and just peace is the U. S. objective in Vietnam and it is for that reason that we have sought the help of friends and adversaries alike, in and out of the UE, to bring this tragic war to a rapid and peaceful end. We shall pursue that objective unremittingly until it is achieved. * FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLJT 9 February 1966 PRESS BRIEFING William Powell said that United States Ambassador Goldberg was to see the Secretary-General at 3:30 p.m. in the Secretary-General's conference room where they would sign a supplemental agreement to the 19^6 Headquarters Agreement to cover the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the United Nations Development Programme in the Alcoa Building. A press release would be issued this afternoon. He said Harold Graves, Director of Information of the International Bank would come to tomorrow's briefing to tell about a new development credit with some unusual features. Asked what was the delay in issuing the Organization of American States resolution regarding the Havana conference, Mr. Powell said it was his under- standing that the resolution had been submitted to the Secretariat without the customary request for circulation within terms of Article 5*)-, and as of last night such a request had not been received. He said he would check on a letter from the latin American Group on the same subject said to have been given to the Secretariat last night. In reply to a question, Ramses Nassif said the appointment with Ambassador Arkhurst of Ghana was at the Ambassador's request and he did not know the subject involved. Asked why Mr. Amachree had resigned from the Secretariat, and who was to re- place him, Mr. Nassif said that shortly before the Secretary-General had left for Trinidad and Tobago, Mr. Amachree had told him he wanted to go feack to Nigeria, for personal reasons, and resume his law practice. The Secretary-General had accepted the resignation with reluctance. It would be effective at the end of February. No decision had been made on a successor. (more) - 2 - In reply to other questions, Mr. Nassif said the Secretary-General had not been informed in advance of Vice-president Humphrey's trip or the Honolulu meeting. He would make inquiries on whether the Secretary-General had subsequently been in- formed of the results of the meeting or its progress. Asked if the various consultations the Secretary-General was holding were con- nected with the Secretary-General's own initiatives or those of the Security Council, Mr. Nassif said they were connected with the Secretary-General's own initiative. He said he could not give any progress report on those consultations. In reply to a question on when the Security Council would meet, Mr. Powell said the President of the Security Council was holding his private consultations on various matters and there was no indication of any Council meeting at this time. y y V- * A A A 11 February 1966 MOTES ONflitULFIM GB Y AMB. GOIDBeSG (U.S.) Arthur J. Goldberg of the U.S. held a press briefing at 12:30 p.m. today in Hoom 226. He said he felt he had a duty to report to the press here on his raeeting in Washington with President Johnson. After reading the attached statement, he replied to questions. He was asked first if the U.S. would b© willing to have the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam participate in a conf erene© as a separate entity so long as it -was not the sole spokesman for South Viet-Nam. He replied fey recalling statements fey President Johnson on this point. The President had said that there would be no difficulty in having the views of the H.L.f. represented at the conference table. This vrould not be an in- surmountable problem "if Hanoi wants peace." Groups could be represented at any peace conferenee. Despite what the U.S. press m seesied to think, this was not the obstacle to a peace conference, ins obstacle was the unwilling- ness of Hanoi to coaie to a ^eaee conference unconditionally, where all items could be discussed. %e U.i>. v;as vailing to be flexible, but Hanoi merely restated its old conditions and. added new ones, such as the one that the H.L.F. fee the sole representative of South ^let-Mam, This was not, and could not be, acceptable to tha U.S. The Government of South Viet-Hsus, said Mr. Goldberg, was recogni'^ed fey more than 70 countries, "and even the friends of the Viet- Cong do not recognize it as a governiasnt . " slaked how the U.S. would get General Ky to sit down with the Mr. Goldberg said that there was no argument between the U.-. and South Viet- Maia. It was natural that, after Ho Ghi Minn's statement that his objective was to "wipe out the Government of the South," the Government of the South should "stand against" it. The Governments of the U.S. and South Viet-Mam had a common desire to pursue the goal of peace through negotiations. On other questions, he said that the Ho Chi Minh letter to New Delhi did not seem to indicate a new position. As for the status of the discussions in the U.N., he said that the con sultations were "going on with vigor." He himself had met 12 ambassadors in one day and he assumed other members of the Security Council were consulting just as intensely. With regard to the U.S. resolution, he would say again that the U.S. recognised that it could be vetoed fey the Soviet Union. But that did not mean that the U.S. had abandoned its request to the Council to act "through aa resolution or other appropriate means, perhaps a statement of consensus or a statement by the President , " 1'he U.S. had not changed its po- sition. It had coBie here in the hope that the Council would "lend assistance in any appropriate way toward bringing about a conference" and the U.^. was "confident that the U.K. will fee able to play a constructive role in attempt- ing to bring about a peaeefttL settlement of the Viet-Nsun conflict." (He re- peated this last sentence several times in reply to different- uay (more) Mr» Goldberg ad$eei4 oa this point, that he had sever said that the U.M. could make pesce in Vist-Hasi. It took two to isake peace, and the efforts of the U»S, for peace were not feeing mat shed by the other side. Asked how long the present consultations ecmld go on before they "petered out," he said that this was a difficult problem, an "agonising" one, and reasonable mm time was needed to deal with it. He did not expect the consultations to "peter out." Asked how he envisaged a reciprocal reduction of hostilities without ne- gotiations, as referred to in. ths statement, he said that the U.S. had. hoped for a reduction of hostilities during the bombing paus. 'She U.S. had provided a unilateral reduetion of hostilities, but it had not been reciprocated. There had been a diminution for !Ia very short period, around the isam holidays," but then the other side had stepped up the nazafeer of A nutafeer of questions Krere asked about the Honolulu conference, and ther it might have uMergtined peae© efforts. He said hs had not found this to fee so. The U.S. had not changed its position at Honolulu. As stated before, the D.ti. would not be forced out of Viet-Kanu It supported South Viet-Kasa against aggression. It would equally pursue efforts for a peaceful settlement of the sonflict. The U.S. wanted peace, an honorable peace, in Viet-Nam. Many of the questions being addressed to the U.S. should more properly fee directed to Hanoi. (ri'h© press briefing eMed at 12:55 F.^. It was taped, and the U.S. made a transcript*) VETS DEMAND VIET A General speaks on Vietnam I PEACE ST. PETERSBURG, FLA, 6 JANUARY 1966 NO ONE IS BETTER QUALIFIED THAN VETERANS TO MAKE THE PUBLIC AWARE DEAR FELLOW VETERANS: THAT IT IS PATRIOTIC TO OPPOSE THE I AM VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN YOUR PLANS TO WAR IN VIETNAM. WE, WHO HAVE SERVED ORGANIZE A VETERANS' GROUP TO HELP END THE ILLEGAL OUR COUNTRY WITH HONOR. CANNOT BE AND IMMORAL WAR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 18 IMPOSINO UPON DROWNED OUT WITH THE JINQOIST CRIES THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH. OF "DRAFT-DODGER* AND "TRAITOR* WHEN WE MEET OUR RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY THIS WAR IS DEGRADING OUR PAST, DISHONOR I NO OUR TO SPEAK OUT. AND SPEAK OUT WE MUST PRESENT, AND IP CONTINUED WILL DESTROY ANY POSSIBILITY AGAINST A WAR CONTRARY TO BOTH AMER- OF US AS A PEOPLE AND NATION EVER LEAD INS IN BUILDING ICA'S INTERESTS AND ITS BEST TRADI- A WORTHY FUTURE FOR MAN. TIONS, A WAR DESTROYING OUR HONOR FRANKLY, I KNOW OF NO GROUP WITH A BETTER OR BEFORE THE WHOLE WORLD. GREATER RIGHT TO OPPOSE A WAR NOT IN THE INTEREST OF OUR GOVERNMENT IB VIRTUALLY THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY AN ALONE IN THIS DIRTY WAR BECAUSE IT: AGGRESSIVE WAR SUCH AS THE ONE NOW BEING IMPOSED UPON THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. 1. IB ILLEGAL 2. IS IMMORAL IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE HAVE WON THE RIGHT TO BE 3* 18 IN SUPPORT OF TYRANNY HEARD BECAUSE OF OUR SERVICE IN WAR. AND 1 AM CERTAIN 4. THREATENS TO ESCALATE INTO THAT OPPOSITION TO THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS NOT IN ANY THERMONUCLEAR WORLD WAR III, WAY DISLOYAL TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OR TO FROM WHICH NEITHER VETERANS THE U.S. SERVICE PERSONNEL FORCED TO FIGHT IT. NOR HUMAN CIVILIZATION ARE LIKELY TO EMERGE. IN FACT, I BELIEVE MAN OWES A HIGHER LOYALTY TO THE PEOPLE THAN TO ANY GOVERNMENT, LOCAL, STATE OR DEEPLY CONCERNED AS VETERANS NATIONAL. AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM IS NOT IN THE INTEREST| WITH THE NEED TO ORGANIZE EVERY OF ANYONE, NOT EVEN THE U.S. RULERS THAT ARE FORCING IT POSSIBLE PUBLIC ACTIVITY CALLING FOR UPON OUR PEOPLE AND THE SO-CALLED *ENEMY*. AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE VjETNAM WAR, WE INVITE YOU TO JOIN US IN THE WITH THE HOPE THAT YOU HAVE A SUCCESSFUL MEETING, FIRST PUBLIC MEETING OF... I AM, SINCERELY, HUGH B. HESTER BRIG. GEN., U.S. ARMY (RET.) VETERANS FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM PUBLIC PROTEST MEETING FRIDAY, JANUARY 28 7:45 P.M. PICK-CONGRESS HOTEL BELMONT ROOM CONGRESS & MICHIGAN 2ND FLOOR DONATION $1.00 CONTRIBUTIONS, MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS AND INQUIRIES MAY BE DIRECTED TO VETERANS FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM, Room 900, 22 W. Madison St., Chicago, 111. 60602 LABOR DONATED MR. EDITOR! MR. CONGRESSMAN! . PRESIDENT! ISNT THIS WHAT WE HUNG NAZI WAR CRIMINALS FOR AT NUREMBERG??? ^^—1^^^^^^^^^^^^^^— CHICAGO DAILY NEWS.] \Yank Attacks Scorch Thursday. Jan. 6, 1966 Towns Sh ielding Reds \ SAIGON (AP) — To break ers from the 173d Airborne but some were large with heavy one paratrooper as he picked I the back of the Viet Cong, U.S. Brigade began operations there wooden frames and neat gar- his way from one covered and Allied forces are adopting last weekend. dens. bunker to the next. These a program of destroying houses They laid their base camp Every cooking utensil was bunkers, some built years ago, and crops in areas that feed among the burned houses. smashed, every banana tree sev- others fresh, were in strategic and shield t h e Communist Within two miles of the para- ered, every mattress slashed. positions around every home forces. troopers' camp not a house and canal. For years, Americans refused was left standing. Constant ON THE first day, the men The Viet Cong had not to participate in "Scorched- pounding by artillery and of C Company found more chosen to defend them with earth" efforts, leaving them to> planes had reduced every build- than 60 Vietnamese women any show of determination. the Vietnamese. Now Ameri- ing to rubble. and children weeping as they THE AMERICAN para- cans are directly involved. They The paratroopers' mission lay in trenches around their troopers are remaining in the are trying to protect innocent was to move out farther, round devastated homes. These peo- people. up all the people they could ple were sent in helicopters to area, enlarging the scorched- earth zone. They know that The broad-based program find, evacuate them north of Bao Trai district, north of the the Viet Cong will rebuild the | includes the establishment of the river to resettlement camps, river, and resettled. razed homes when they leave, free-bombing zones in Viet and burn and destroy every- Their menfolk stayed hidden make new earthenware pots | Cong regions, killing rice crops thing edible or livable. in the canefields and the Patrols waded in neck-deep canals, sniping at the search- and breed new chickens. in enemy areas, and burning Capt. Henry Tucker of Co-1 other crops and homes. canals slicing through the cane- ing paratroopers and mining fields, crept stealthily down the trails. The province chief lumbus, Miss., said: THE RICH, intensely culti- high dikes, and pushed through had told the Americans that "Maybe if we can keep them I | vated flatlands south of the thick brush. every man south of the river busy rebuilding their houses Vaico Oriental River west of Every house they encoun- was a Viet Cong. and replanting the crops, then | Saigon are prime scorched- tered they burned to the "They must be either shootin' they'll have no time for shoot- ing." earth targets. U.S. paratroop- ground. Most were of thatch or diggin' all the time," said AS A VET I DEMAND 1. THAT THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY CEASE FIRE IN THIS CRIMINAL WAR. 2. THAT WE NEGOTIATE WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT ("VIET CONG") THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. FORCES FROM VIETNAM. WE ARE THERE AS AN INVADING ARMY FIGHTING THE WHOLE PEOPLE ("THE PROVINCE CHIEF HAD TOLO THE AMERICANS THAT EVERY MAN SOUTH OF THE RIVER WAS A VIET CONG."). WE ARE IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF PRESIDENT ElSENHOWERfS PLEDGE TO RESPECT THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS. THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS CLEARLY STATE THAT VIETNAM is ONE COUNTRY, NOT TWO, AND THAT NO FOREIGN TROOPS ARE TO BE ALLOWED THERE. VIETNAMESE CAN'T BE INVADERS IN VIETNAM. CHINESE AREN'T INVADING VIETNAM. AMERICANS ARE INVADING VIETNAM, AND I DEMAND AN IMMEDIATE END TO IT IN THE NAME OF OUR COUNTRY'S HONOR, FOR WHICH I FOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES . (PRINT BRANCH OF SERVICE HERE) NAME ADDRESS LABOR DONATED CITY & STATE FOR INFORMATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY 15 February 1966 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING William Powell said that he had had a rrumber of questions relating to African representation in the Secretariat in the light of yesterday's Trade and Development Board meeting (press release TAD/B/130) and drew attention to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Composition of the Secretariat (document A/6o?7)« Reading from the report, he said that in August 19^2 there had been 8l professional staff members from Africa and as of 31 August 19&5, there had been I2lf. As of 31 December, that figure had increased to 125. The desirable range for Africa was 90-199* Of the I2.k, he said, three were Under-Secretaries (Messrs. Gardner, Abdul Rahman and Amachree), two D2's, five Dl's and 13 P-5's, a total of 23 in what are regarded as top posts beginning with the P-5» Head of Section level. Between September and November 19^5, a recruitment mission, headed by Mr, N'Liba, the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa (EGA), and a national of the Cameroon, had gone to 19 African countries and as a result a further 8-10 appointments were in process. Asked if it was true that African countries did not want their best people to join the Secretariat, Mr. Powell said that was not the case. The problem for all developing countries, not just Africa, was that the cadres of trained people, though growing, were still limited and Governments had to decide if their people were more needed at home or in the Secretariat. As far as Dr. Prebisch's recruitment was concerned, he said that specialists such as econometricians were required, and they were difficult to find any- where, not just in Africa. (more) -fi- lm reply to another question, he said that because 8-10 posts were being processed, that did not mean that the recruitment mission to Africa had not found any other candidates. The Secretariat did not go on a blanket recruitment mission, but recruited for posts available at a given time. However, the mission also had obtained data on other candidates •whose applications were on file for when particular posts became open. Asked if Mr. M'Liba's mission was regarded as being a successful one, Mr. Powell said: "Yes". He said no decision had been reached on a replacement for Mr. Amachree and added, in reply to a further question, that it could be assumed that the replacement would be an African. To his knowledge, there had never been an official complaint to the Secretariat from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on discrimination against Africans in recruitment. Mr. Powell said the Financial Experts were expected to conclude the first phase of their work — the examination of the balance sheet — today and would then create a Committee of the Whole to draft its report. The Committee itself was expected to reconvene about lU March to approve the report which would be made available about 31 March. In April, the Com- mittee would begin the second phase of its work, examination of the finances and budgets of the United Nations family. He announced that the Crown Princess of Denmark would make an unofficial visit to the United Nations tomorrow, and have lunch with the Secretary- General. The list of guests would be available tomorrow. She would meet representatives of the Latin American countries in the West Foyer before lunch. The Princess is to visit Latin America later. After touring the Assembly Hall, she would meet Danish members of the Staff in the Trusteeship Council Chamber. In reply to a question, he said there were nine Danish members of the Staff, but he did not know how many were at Headquarters. The desirable range for Danes was 9-10* (more) - 5 - Asked about the United Nations1 involvement with Viet-Nam refugees, and whether the United Nations' policy regarding assistance to divided countries had changed, Mr. Powell said that was not the case. What were termed "national refugees" did not fall under the High Commissioner's mandate. He pointed out that a special Assembly resolution had been re- quired in the case of assistance to the refugees in Hong Kong. In reply to a question, he said that there was no schedule yet for re- convening the Committee of 33* Its reconvening did not depend on the report of the Financial Experts. Asked about a story (Journal American) today stating that the Pope and the Secretary-General stood ready to intervene in Viet-Nam should the Security Council fail to tfcke action, Ramses Nassif said he had not seen the story yet, and could make no comment on any aspect of it until he had read it. Mr. Nassif said he had nothing to add to what he had said yesterday about the Secretary-General's appointment with the Permanent Observer from the Vatican. He had no comment to a question on whether the Secretary- General had given the Observer a memorandum or message to transmit to the Vatican. Asked if the Secretary-General was still pursuing his efforts with the non-aligned countries, Mr. Nassif said that the Secretary-General was pursuing his independent efforts to find a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. He was asked if the Secretary-General was making these efforts by telephone since appointments connected with such efforts did not appear to be listed. Mr. Nassif said he would only say that the Secretary-General, naturally, had the privilege of conducting his own business in the manner he wished. (more) He was asked if he was suggesting that not all the Secretary- General's appointments were listed and said he was making no such suggestion. Asked what appointments were listed, Mr. Hassif "said most outside appointments. Appointments not connected with his staff, were listed. He agreed that the Secretary-General's appointments outside the building would not "be listed. Asked what happened if an Ambassador asked that an appointment with the Secretary-General not be listed, Mr. Wassif said he would have to do some research on that question. He said, in reply to another question, that he had not been suggesting that the Secretary-General :was having some appointments outside the building. -X-X-* #• FOR INFORMATION OF TOUTED NATIONS SECRETARIAT ONLY 16 February 1966 MILY PRESS BRIEFING William Powell drew attention to the programme for the visit of the Crown Princess of Denmark, posted on the third floor bulletin board, and said that the guest list for the Secretary-General1s luncheon would be posted immediately after the briefing. He said that correspondents could attend the seminar on ore concentration in water-short areas, and when films or slides were shown they could sit at floor level. He reminded correspondents of Mr. Prebisch's briefing at 2:^5 p-m. today. Mr. Powell said that at k p.m. Norway would present a cheque for $1^,000 to the United Nations International School Fund. The ceremony would take place in the office of Miss Julia Henderson, Chairman of the Trustees. Mrs. Marietta Tree, the Secretary-General's Personal Representative, would be present, as would some of the children from the School. Ramses Nassif said in reply to a question, that the Secretary-General's appointments today with the Ambassadors of the Soviet Union and Algeria were both at their requests. Asked for a comment on the French President's letter to Ho Chi Minn, Mr. Nassif said: "President de Gaulle's well-known views on Viet-Nam have been shared all along by the Secretary-General, and the Secretary-General believes that the three points -- neutrality, independence and non-interference — should continue to be the objective of all those who are seeking a peaceful solution to the Viet-Nam conflict." A correspondent said he did not recall that the three points had been made either in those terms or that order in the letter, and Mr. Nassif replied that the points were made in the letter. Asked for comment on the three stages for achieving peace, as suggested by President de Gaulle, Mr. Nassif said he had stated all that he was authorized to say. He said he did not know if the Secretary-General shared the reported view that the French President did not feel that the time for peace had arrived. - 2 - 16 February 1966 Asked if the three points in the Secretary-General's statement applied to Norfcfe and South Viet-Nam, Mr. Massif said they applied "to the whole of Viet-Warn11. In reply to a question, Mr. Powell said that there was, as yet, no de- cision on whether the Levy report on oil sanctions and Rhodesia would be made public. The report had not yet been submitted. * *## # FQR IHFGRMATIOM OF UNITED HATIOHS SECRETARIAT ONLY 17 February 1966 DAILY PRESS BRIEFDTG William Powell announced that the Greek delegation had informed the Secretariat that recent archeological research showed that the statue of "Zeus" presented by Greece to the United Nations in 1953 and standing in the General Assembly lobby, was actually a statue of Poseidon. He said that Jose Role-Bennett, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, had concluded his discussions in Ankara and had now arrived in Athens. Mr. Rolz-Bennett had told reporters in Ankara that he had received the views of Turkey on the resumption of the mediation efforts but could not go into the substance of the talks since he still had to elicit the views of two other interested Governments. In reply to a question, he said he could not say who would be the new Mediator or even what form the mediation would take. The Trade Board, he said, would conclude its session today. He drew attention to the backgrounder of ECOSOC, due to meet on 23 February (press release ECOSOC/2155) and said that the Secretary of the Council, Ismat Kittani, would attend OPI1s Monday briefing. Mr. Powell said he did not expect a report on the situation in the Dominican Republic. Information was awaited on the results of last night's appeal by the President of the Republic for an end to the general strike. - 2 - 1? February 1966 Mr. Powell said he had nothing on the reported agreement in Rawalpindi by India..and Pakistan to reduce their forces in Kashmir to the 19^9 level. He added that if the report was correct and the United Nations was asked to supervise the withdrawals,, this would fall within the present mandate of UNIPOM and would be in accord with the terms of paragraph F of the 19^9 cease-fire agreement stipulating the size of the force. Ramses Nassif, asked to comment on an item in today's issue of the New York Times , said the Secretary-General has no knowledge of the three require- ments reported to have been put forward by the Government of Hanoi for nego- tiations to end the Viet-Nam war. Regarding the three issues mentioned in a newspaper article today, he said the Secretary-General had repeatedly made his position clear on the following: "l) The question of the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam; "2) The question of the de-escalation by all parties of all military activities in South Viet-Nam; "?) The question of the participation of the National Liberation Front in any discussions or negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam." Asked about another point in the article reporting views attributed to the Secretary-General on a coalition government in Viet-Nam, Mr. Nassif said the Secretary-General had spoken at length on this point at his last press conference. Asked if the Secretary-General's private consultations had led him to believe, either from direct or indirect contact with Hanoi, that North Viet-Nam had changed its position on the "conditions'", Mr. Nassif said he did not know. Asked if the "highly qualified source" mentioned in the newspaper article was from the United Nations, Mr. Nassif said he did not know who the source was. When asked to deny that it was a United Nations source, Mr. Nassif said that since he did not know the source of the article he could not confirm or deny whether the source was from the United Nations or outside. Asked if the Secretary-General's acceptance of these three points meant that there was no divergence between the Secretary-General and North Viet-Nam, - 3 - 17 February 1966 Mr. Nassif said the statement that the Secretary-General had no knowledge of the points being made by Hanoi was important. Asked if the three points were the Secretary-General's, Mr. Wassif said the Secretary-General had mentioned these points on a number of occasions. He did not know, Mr. Nassif added, if the three points had been sent to Hanoi or, if they had, whether Hanoi had replied then. He said he would pass on to the Secretary-General, as requested, a question about whether the Secretary-General had been in contact with Hanoi through Burma. WITH THE COMPLIMENTS DF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE KINGDOM OF LAOS TO THE UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT MISSION OF 321 East 45th Street, New York 17, N. Y. • Telephone YU 6-0227 No 16 NEWS FROM LAOS NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION OF LAOS; PRELUDE TO THE SECOND DIEN BIEN PHU. The Ministry of the National Defense of Laos issued last week a communique which was as follows: After the Plain of Jars and the Plateau of Nakay, the North Vietnamese troops are actively infiltrating now in the Plateau of Bolovens in South Laos, the third strategic position of the Kingdom. In fact, since November 1965* reports on these mass in- filtrations of North Vietnamese troops in Laos come into evi- dence. The High Command of the Royal Armed Forces has, since the beginning of 1966, launched clean-up operations. So, the North Vietnamese positions in Laos are now precisely located: a) 2 North Vietnamese regiments located in the Ban Phone- Thateng region. From Thateng these elements are divided into 2 columns marching simultaneously on: 1) Mount Kongtoun-Paksong, inside the Plateau of Bolovens 2) Sapone, cutting therefore the retreat line from Saravane and Lao Ngam in the direction of Khong- sedone. b) 3 North Vietnamese batallions stationed at Nong Bok, 20 km. south of Lao Ngam. This group is also subdi- vided into 2 columns inarching on: 1) Nong Sai-Khamlay threatening the 4th Military Region Headquarters at Pakse 2) the Highway No 13 along the Mekong River, between Pakse and Khongsedone. • • • ft - 2 - c) 1 North Vietnamese regiment in the Phapho-Phalai region, also subdivided into 2 columns marching on: 1) Phiafay, district of Pathoumphon on Highway No 13 between Pakse and Khinak 2) Houei Sip-Champi, looking over the town of Paksong. d) 1 North Vietnamese batallion, south of the town of Attopeu, immobilizing the Royal Armed Forces in the region. e) 1 North Vietnamese regiment in the Kengsai region, on the Sekong River, north of Attopeu. The Defense Ministry communique asked why are these mass infiltrations from North Viet-Nam centered in the Bolovens, inside Laos ? And it gave 5 reasons: 1) To make sure of the North Vietnamese control of the entire 4th Military Region of Laos protecting the pro- vinces of Wapi, Saravane, Attopeu and Sedone. 2) To control by themselves the Ho-Chi-Minh Trail after more than 500 Lao Communist guerillas (Pathet Lao) had surrendered to the Royal Government, including a colonel and a lieutenant, this within a month only. 3) To avoiti the destruction of the North Vietnamese troops moving along the Ho-Chi-Minh Trail, by the Royal Air Force raids. 4) To encourage the Pathet Lao rebels to fight the govern- ment troops. 5) To try to install themselves on important strategic positions: the Plateau of Bolovens (in Laos) and the Plateau of Kontum (Ln South Viet-Nam) to extend a bigger war in South Vietnam. ******* In doing all these mass infiltrations through the Ho-Chi-Minh Trail to the Plateau of Bolovens (Laos) and the Plateau of Kontum (South Viet-Nam) the High Command of the North Vietnamese People's Army is preparing to win a decisive victory: the SECOND DIEN BIEN PHU. - 3 - One recalls that in the spring of 1954, a well dry season in Indo-China, before the French army capitulated in Dien Bien Phu, the North Vietnamese heavily invaded Laos (the Plain of Jars, Samneua, Thakhek and the royal city of Luang Prabang). They created confusion and diversion among the French defense lines in order to concentrate their only efforts on Dien Bien Phu and win the war. ******* THE HO-CHI-MINH TRAIL IN LAOS The Ho-Chi-Minh Trail originates from Muong Phine, in the Savannakhet Province, south of the seventeenth parallel, and ends at Ban Sen Luang, 50 km. east of Attopeu (Laos) before entering the High Plateau of Kontum and Ban Methuot, in South Viet-Nam. Since the Royal Air Force raids have been active, 3 other secondary trails have been created by the North Vietnamese in- filtrations: 1) Toward Hue, south of the 17th parallel and north of Danang: his trail starts from Tchepone through Muong Nong, Ban Bak, Ban Kleum and ends at Beluong on the Laos-South Viet-Nam border. 2) Toward the "Zone D" in South Viet-Nam: this trail starts from Muong Nong through Chavane and ends at Chanum before entering South Viet-Nam. 3) Toward Van Tat starting also at Muong Nong through Chavane, Ban Pakmaruk and ends at Kpenglem before entering South Viet-Nam. ******* Other trails inside Laos near the Cambodian border are built: 1) From Chavane to Ban Phone and Thateng 2) From Chavane to Kengsai 3) From Sen Luang to Sam Phya Ong. However, the supply line between Sen Luang (Laos) and South Viet-Nam is built for pedicabs and bicycles (as the North ...4 Vietnamese troops did in Dien Bien Phu), while the navigation on the Sekong River is operated by sampans or motorboats. On the other hand, for the first time since the beginning of the Viet-Nam war, our reconnaissance flights show the passage of an increasing number of armored cars going to South Viet-Nam through the Ho-Chi-Minh Trails. * * ***** NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS KILLED Vientiane. 22 February. 137 North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops were killed and more than 200 wounded, during the clean-up operations undertaken by the neutralist General Kong Le in Mount Phoukout, west of the Plain of Jars. 5 Pathet Lao guerillas were also captured. One neutralist spokesman stated that Radio Hanoi and Radio Khangkhay were "fantastic and liars" claiming the destruction of 305 Royal Air Force bombers and fighters. The Neutralist forces lost 48 soldiers and reported 3 missing after having crossed the Ngum River and controlled the important bridge on Highway No 7« ******* LAOS PROTESTS NORTH VIETNAM AGGRESSIONS Vientiane. February 23. At a press conference today, Mr. Phagna iiouasy, spokesman of the Royal Government of Laos stated, on behalf of Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma, that "we strongly protest against the Hanoi government for repeated aggressions against Laos." The spokesman explained with worry how serious the military situation in Laos is because of the powerful attacks launched by the North Vietnamese troops backing the Pathet Lao guerillas against the government Armed Forces, in various regions through- out the Kingdom. Mr. Bouasy appeals therefore to the world conscience and judgment to impartially condemn these stubborn aggressors. ...5 - 5 - Another spokesman of the Royal Armed Forces general staff indicated that more than 20.000 regular North Vietnamese troops are fighting now in Laos. Bloody fightings are taking place now, north of the Plain of Jars. The Royal Armed Forces are expecting in the very near future more heavy pressure in Central and South Laos. The military spokesman stated later that a North Vietnamese division is actually stationing in South Laos,only with the purpose of defending the Ho-Chi-Minh Trails leading through Laos to South Viet-Nam. New York, February 23, 1966. PrmtHkk Clayton Fritchey IXcwsda y "State of Affairs" I Specials Newsday, 550 Stewart Ave., Garden City LI, NY, 516 PI. 1-1234 FOR RELEASE MONDAY, MARCH 7, 1966 Q\y v Vri^ ' BY CLAYTON FRITCHEY Copyright, Newsday, 1966 Washington Two events of the last few days brilliantly illuminate the differences between the U.S. and other powers over the nature of the Communist threat to the free world. And the outlook for reconciling these disparate assessments is dim, indeed, for, as Defense Secretary Robert McNamara has just made plain, U,S. policy is based on the Chinese bark, whereas most of our allies are impressed only by the Chinese bite, or rather, in their eyes, lack of bite. One day last week, Mr. McNamara went, up to the "Hill" to give a group of senators a foreboding forecast of Chinese intentions. His proof was a threatening statement on future objectives by China's minister of defense, Lin Piao. Mr. McNamara was visibly alarmed. But on the same day, thousands of miles away, Red China was being forced out of Ghana, almost its last foothold in Africa. It was the latest in a series of xvorld-wide setbacks; and it vividly explained why the rest of the world is not_ so alarmed over China, In private, our leaders frankly wonder how the ether large nations can be so indifferent about Chinese "expansionism," especially India, Pakistan, and Japan which presumably would be in the greatest danger. But they in turn frankly ask, "What expansion?" Imperialistically, it appears to them that China over the last 10 years or so has been receding rather than expanding. It has not succeeded during the last decade in taking over a single country either by military conquest or subversion. On the contrary, it has lost out all over the Far East (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, India ),,in Cuba and Latin America, in Algeria and northern Africa, in Egypt and the Middle East. Now Africa is gone, too, after setbacks in -more- Fritchfy first add column for Monday 1 Burundi, Dahomey, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and lastly Ghana. There's no denying Lin Piao has a fierce bark, but up to now it has been nearly all bark and no bite. It is true that 15 years ago China reabsorbed Tibet, which had long been under Chinese soverignty before the ciTzdO. w£urr. And in 1962 there was a border incident with India. But even now India wants China in the United Nations, and only a few days ago the Pakistan foreign minister said, "It has been our belief from the beginning that there is no danger to the sub- continent from China, provided no uncalled-for provocation is aimed against that country." This is the kind of reaction that seemed to surprise and shock Vice President Humphrey when he recently toured Asia to talk up a united front against China. Outside the U.S. the prevailing view is that China may or may not mean what she says, but in any case it simply doesn't have what it takes to conquer the world or even the Far East. The fear of some prominent Americans of China chasing the U.S. out of the Pacific, seems to others not only far-fetched but ludi- crous: a contest between a country without a navy, or bases, or strategic air force, or operative nuclear power, against a country with all of these overwhelming advantages, y Some of our Asian friends also feel they know as much about their own continent as we do. They think, for instance, that the U.S. could do worse than listen to the friendly advice of one of the most distinguished Asians, U Thant, the Secretary-General of the U.N, \/ U Thant, in his quiet, courteous way, has been trying to suggest for some time that the belligerent talk of the Chinese leaders should not be taken too literally. "Where a country has been treated as an outcast, an outlaw and culprit," he said, it "is apt to act in a certain strange way," showing strong reaction, rigidities, and Ma certain arrogance ... When a country is obsessed with fear and sus- picion, all sorts of tensions are likely to develop, all sorts of unreasonable reactions are likely to come forth." -more- Fritchey second add column for Monday If U Thant' s diagnosis of China i.s correct, the time may be ripe for serious consideration of Senator Fulbright's new proposal for resolving the Vietnam conflict by neutralization of all of Southeast Asia. COPYRIGHT, NEWSDAY, 1966 The Ecumenical Bid For Peace HE effort to end the war in namese into negotiations. But T Vietnam will make fascin- this co-operation between the ating historical reading one day Vatican and Communist Hun- if for no other reason than the gary (whose foreign minister is disparate backgrounds of three a defrocked Catholic bishop) is of the key men in the peace not so strange when one con- offensive. from the Vietnamese debacle. 20th century." siders that a Jewish peddler's One is the politically-ambi- (Many political analysts feel It is interesting that the Pope son, a Buddhist mystic and a tious son of a Jewish peddler that Mr. Johnson may choose is using Communist Hungary's Roman Pontiff have had no from Chicago. The second is a Goldberg as his vice-presidential embassy in Hanoi as a channel difficulty in uniting for peace Buddhist mystic who by a running mate in 1968 or to be for pressuring the North Viet- in Vietnam. chance confluence of circum- U.S. Secretary of State if Dean stances has become the head of Rusk steps down). a powerful international organi- zation. The final member of the MEDITATION Born in Burma of Buddhist trio is the 212th successor of St. parents, U Thant practises a Peter. Buddhist prayer and meditation American U-N Ambassador Vietnam Arthur Goldberg, XJ-N Secre- ritual each morning before be- tary General U Thant and Pope IETNAM (."Ijand oS the South" in Armamese") is a seg- . General of the United Nations. Paul VI have been united by ment of French Indo-China, a union of French pro- j Having come to office as a re- tectorateV s which once represented France's major holdings in the horrors of the Vietnam sult of Dag Hammarskjold's the Far East. bloodshed which all three are tragic death in 1961, the slender The French first made their presence felt in the late exerting their utmost efforts to Burmese diplomat has since that 18th century, when they helped reunite the disintegrating end. time justly earned the right to Annamese empire and obtained trading rights. But subse- SECRET MEETING quent Annamese attempts to withdraw into isolation, be top man at the U-N. coupled with mistreatment of French nationals led to French How close the destinies of the U Thant is no partisan of U.S. seizure of the region in the latter half of the 19th century. three have become entwined involvement in Vietnam. In At the close of World War II, a republic of Vietnam was was illustrated at the end of De- fact, he was one of the early op- established by the Vietminh party, a coalition of Communist cember when Goldberg met se- ponents of American policy in and nationalist organizations who resisted the return of cretly late one evening with the Southeast Asia. But the Secre- French rule after Japanese occupation. Secretary General in the latter's tary General realizes that if THREE STATES IN FRENCH UNION private residence. A few hours peace is to be achieved, it must after that meeting Goldberg was come through compromise In 1949-50, Vietnam, as we know it, was created by the flying to Rome to talk with the which will allow all parties to union of three former Annamese states: Tonkin, or Backy Pope as the first start of the (now North Vietnam), Annam, or Trungky (Central Viet- save face. nam) and Cochin China, or Namky (South Vietnam). American peace offensive began As the Secretary General This new state was recognized as a French-ruled state in to take shape. gropes for some middle ground 1950 by a majority of nations. However, the Vietminh, led by When Arthur Goldberg, a in the crisis, it is clear that his still-president Ho Chi Minh (first elected in 1945), continued former judge on the U.S. Su- mi in obstacle is Red China its war against the French. In 1954, the fall of the fortress of preme Court, succeeded Adlai which is bent on creating as Dien Bien Phu marked the end of the French Far Eastern Stevenson at the U-N, he much trouble as possible for the empire. brought with him something Mr. Americans in Southeast Asia. If Since the North, under Ho. was determinedly Com- munist, and the South, headed by Bao Dai, the former Stevenson unfortunately never Peking were to join the peace emperor of Annam, was not, a Geneva conference in 1954 possessed — the confidence and offensive as Moscow surrep- divided the country roughly in half at the 17th parallel. full support of President Lyn- titiously has done, there is no The North, with an area of 63,000 square miles, bad a don Johnson. Although a loyal question that North Vietnam population of more than 17.000.000. The South, covering 66,- member of the Johnson entour- would have to enter into nego- 000 square miles, has a population of more than 16,000,000. age, Goldberg is no "yes man." tiations. Last month U Thant MANY GOVERNMENTS He makes his views known even demonstrated he recognizes the when he disagrees with the Red Chinese menace to peace Since then, the North has remained under the leadership president, and LB.T values the when he publicly compared Red of Ho. But the South has had a series of governments. Bao bespectacled Goldberg as a China to an individual suffering Dai was unseated by a referendum in October, 1955, which chose the ill-fated Ngo dinh Diem as head of South Vietnam. trusted — if not the most trust- from a nervous breakdown. His first act was to establish a new Republic of Vietnam ed — adviser. NEW ALLIANCE with himself as president, and to create a constitution and NO "WAR HAWK" Pope Paul has carried on the legislation assembly. Ngo dinh Diem himself was ousted, and By no stretch of the imagina- works of his predecessor Pope slain, by a military coup d'etat in 1963. Since then, various tion is Goldberg a "War Hawk" John XXIII who had worked factions of the South Vietnamese military have been strug- harder for peace than any Pope gling for authority, each replacing one of the others for a who favors escalation of the varying period. Vietnam fighting. On the con- since Benedict the XV tried to Rice is a chief product of both South and North Viet- trary, he wants the war ended end World War I. Paul's visit nam. Rubber is a major product in the South. Coal and ce- not only for humanitarian rea- to the U-N on Oct. 4 was a ment are important products of the North. sons but because his whole po- formal ratification of the al- Hanoi (population 800,000) is the capital and chief city litical future is tied up with the ready close Vat'can-U-N rela- of the North; Saigon, which, with its suburb of Cholong, has Johnson administration's efforts tionship which became known a population of 2,000,000, is the capital and most important to honorably extricate itself as the "Holy Alliance of the city of the South. ^JjJ^ChO "U/j- A „ >.. III >. —' , OifllX " otox I UNBIC T£ SO FROM BTR8Y* STATESMAN TUESEAY F3CNTPAGES IN2JES i 1 > s';*-;';*-;.LK*r *. « frf**^**O i i't fiit bf* Wi/*.Sv ~i t *'t*Hf 9s-ici-.iJit\- 1 T K "^ IP \Tw ;"* FOH CBJECtI?S! UT3uUOTS:» iSAB ^FH KEAI-S QUOTE UTKATJT SAID ¥SSTEH3AY THAT TBAg STILL FvSSlDU; TO KA?T Wi tNDEPSffflZJJT AHB KONALSGNSDvrETHAW t&SUBlUQTE A??3 THAT AIL COUNTRSES INVOLVED IK PKOByEM SHOUL9 ^ORK1 FC1 THIS OBJECTIVE* SOBSUOTS HAT COJ-tKUMlST ESS ALLOTTED TO APPROPRIATE ALL CBEDIT FOX NATIONALISM DASH THE SOEaUOTE HOST PCUERFUL FORCE IN THAT COUNTRY OR IN ANY OTHER PAST OF * F3 » • . THE tfOSLB UKSUEGUOTE HE SAID UN^UOTS* PARA UTKANT SAIB !IE COI-5« . VINCEDj REPOS7S MALKOTRA^ TSAT RO CHI KtMH ¥AKT£B AYE USIFIEB ' '• WITH IKDEPENDEMCE POSSIBLY CtfASA^JTEED BY BIG POWERS. PARA REf-'AIW- BSR ARTICLEf WHICH CARRIED CVER 'TO BACKPAfiEj * 7n — ^ P^/5S » ' , ^ i-; :." SEEKS STRAIGHTFORWARD ACCOUNT OF SECSEI-& KKOvW VIOS ONi SUCK *j} . SUBJECTS AS PEACEKEEPING TJ» FINANCES» BlSAPPOIMlT'Ern OVER SlO¥ PROGPvESS DEVELOPI^KT DECADE* REPRESENTATION CK , ETC._ON KASHMIR KALHOTBA WRITES 6UOTE OTKAKT WAS HAPPY B^B ItECEMT I\T)OPAK CONFLICT BUT ¥AS RELUCTANT COGENT 0?? KASHMIR AND SHOLE HISTORY OF OH HAKSLIKS OF THIS ISSUE UfittUOTE ENDS * OMSIPRESS NEffDELHI * COL