China’s Southern Tang Dynasty, 937–976

The Southern Tang was one of ’s minor dynasties and one of the great states in China in the tenth century. Although often regarded as one of several states preceding the much better known (960–1279), the Southern Tang dynasty was in fact the key state in this period, preserving cultural values and artefacts from the former great Tang dynasty (618–907) that were to form the basis of Song rule and thereby presenting the Song with a direct link to the Tang and its traditions. Drawing mainly on primary Chinese sources, this is the first book in English to provide a comprehensive overview of the Southern Tang and full coverage of the military, cultural and political history of the period. It focuses on a successful, albeit short-lived, attempt to set up an independent regional state in the modern provinces of and and establishes the Southern Tang dynasty in its own right. It follows the rise of the Southern Tang state to become the predominant claimant of the Tang heritage and the expansionist policies of the second ruler, culminating in the occupation and annexation of two of the Southern Tang’s neighbours, Min () and Chu (). Finally, the narrative describes the decline of the dynasty under its last ruler, the famous poet Yu, and its ultimate surrender to the Song dynasty.

Johannes L. Kurz is Senior Lecturer in the History Department at Universiti Brunei Darussalam. He is the author of Das Kompilationsprojekt Song Taizongs (reg. 976–996) (2003). Asian States and Empires Edited by Peter Lorge, Vanderbilt University

The importance of Asia will continue to grow in the twenty-first century, but remarkably little is available in English on the history of the polities that constitute this critical area. Most current work on Asia is hindered by the extremely limited state of knowledge of the Asian past in general, and the history of Asian states and empires in particular. Asian States and Empires is a book series that will provide detailed accounts of the history of states and empires across Asia from earliest times until the present. It aims to explain and describe the formation, maintenance and collapse of Asian states and empires, and the means by which this was accomplished, making available the history of more than half the world’s population at a level of detail comparable to the history of Western polities. In so doing, it will demonstrate that Asian peoples and civilizations had their own histories apart from the West, and provide the basis for understanding contemporary Asia in terms of its actual histories, rather than broad generalizations informed by Western categories of knowledge.

1. The Third Chinese Revolutionary Civil War, 1945–49 An analysis of communist strategy and leadership Christopher R. Lew

2. China's Southern Tang Dynasty, 937–976 Johannes L. Kurz

3. War, Culture and Society in Early Modern South Asia, 1740–1849 Kaushik Roy China’s Southern Tang Dynasty, 937–976

Johannes L. Kurz First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2011 Johannes L. Kurz Typeset in Times New Roman by Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, Devon Printed and bound in Great Britain by The MPG Books Group All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kurz, Johannes L. China's Southern Tang dynasty, 937–976/Johannes L. Kurz. – 1st ed. p. cm. – (Asian states and empires) Includes bibliographical references. 1. China – History – Southern Tang kingdom, 937–975. I. Title. DS749.7.K87 2011 951Ј.018 – dc22 2010039196

ISBN 978–0–415–45496–4 (hbk) ISBN 978–0–203–82861–8 (ebk) Contents

Acknowledgements vii Introduction ix xi Map of the Southern Tang state and its neighbours xiii List of abbreviations xv

1 The state of Wu 1

2 The founding of the Southern Tang and the reign of 23

3 The reign of 41

4 The reign of and the decline of the Southern Tang 91

5 Epilogue 115

Notes 119 Bibliography 129 Index 133

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Peter Lorge, who asked me in early 2007 if I would be willing to contribute a volume on Southern Tang history to the present series. I am grateful to friends and colleagues who provided many texts that otherwise I would have found hard to retrieve while working and living in Brunei. Among these are Matthias Kaun, Head of the excellent East Asian collection at the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, Anne Labitzky-Wagner, librarian at the Institute of Chinese Studies in Heidelberg, and Birgit Mayr. Hugh R. Clark kindly sent me his draft chapter on the history of the Ten States, many years before it was finally published in the Cambridge History of China. My appreciation goes to all the scholars whose work I have drawn upon in writing this history of the Southern Tang. Their names are listed in the notes and the bibliography. Dawn Clare was so kind as to read through the first draft and eliminate the most obvious English language and style flaws. Special thanks go to my wife Doris who, over the past twenty years, has supported my interest in the Southern Tang and has read through various versions of the present book. Any remaining errors and, unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own.

Johannes L. Kurz Bandar Seri Begawan, January 2011

Introduction

Pre-modern Chinese history is characterized by a succession of dynasties, starting with the Qin in 221 BC and ending with the Qing in 1911. During this period, the Chinese Empire was fragmented twice, from 420 to 589 and again from 907 to 960. The last period is called the Period of the Five Dynasties and Ten States. This designation is the result of historiographical conventions that were established by the first Song emperor, Taizu (r. 960–976), in the early Northern Song period (960–1126). Official historians of the Song accordingly had to treat only the Five Dynasties, that is, the states in the northern half of China, as legitimate predecessors of the Song, for Taizu had served the last of these himself, whereas they had to categorize those states that were located in their majority to the south of the Yangzi River as illegitimate. The present book deals with one of the most powerful and influential among the southern states, the Southern Tang (936–976). The importance of the Southern Tang within the framework of tenth-century Chinese history has long been underestimated because of the historiographical conventions of the Song. Where the northern dynasties focused on the military, the Southern Tang, especially under the first ruler, Li Bian (r. 936–943), undertook to build a civil bureaucracy, thus benefitting the peaceful development of the state. The Southern Tang Empire actively adopted the heritage of the Tang dynasty and similarly pursued a policy of cultural restoration. This policy created a pool of talented scholars versed in the literary traditions, a rich palace collection, including books produced during the Tang dynasty, as well as renowned paintings and calligraphic masterpieces. The imperial aspirations of the Southern Tang during the rule of the second emperor, Li Jing (r. 943–961), quickly dissolved under the pressure, first, from the (951–959) and then the Song, and the Southern Tang hence survived as a dependent kingdom only. Considering the fact that the Song dynasty employed a number of Southern Tang officials in one of the most impressive projects aimed at the restoration of the cultural heritage, and used the Southern Tang art and book collection x Introduction as a foundation for its own palace collections, we may regard the Southern Tang as the true facilitator between the Tang and the Song dynasties. The impact of the Southern Tang on the early Song dynasty may explain why there is a larger number of historical works surviving on this state than on any of the other dynasties and states of the period in question. For better readability of the text, I have tried to limit the sources for the depiction of the history of the Southern Tang and have relied mainly on two chronological histories of the Chinese Empire. For the period from the founding of the state of Wu (905) to the penultimate year of the reign of the second Southern Tang emperor (959), I have drawn on the Comprehensive mirror for aid in government () by (1019–1086); for the period of the reign of the last Southern Tang ruler, from 960 to 976, I have used ’s (1115–1184) Long draft of the continuation of the Zizhi tongjian ( Zizhi tongjian changbian). These two major sources were, where necessary, supplemented with information taken from original primary sources that are listed in the bibliography. Chinese historical works tend to relate events in a detailed and factual manner. I have followed the original works along this line, but, where it seemed appropriate, I have quoted speech in order to liven up the text. Speeches for the most part may have been inserted by historiographers to make character flaws or superior rhetorics more evident. Thus, they may not be historically accurate, but they convey a sense of how historians understood events and actions. It is a feature of Southern Tang history that important events were connected with political or military actions, such as the take-over of power by Li Bian in 936, the war campaigns of Li Jing against his neighbours, his defensive actions against the Later Zhou in the late , and the struggle of Li Yu against the Song armies in 975. Hence, these events occupy a large part of the present book, showing the rise of the Southern Tang as a major player in southern Chinese politics in the first half of the tenth century, and the declining power of this southern state in the face of increasing northern pressure towards the end of the tenth century. Dynasties

Tang 618–907

The Five Dynasties The Ten States

Later Liang 907–923 Wu 902–936 923–936 Southern Tang 937–976 Later Jin 936–947 907–978 Later Han 947–950 Chu 907–951 Later Zhou 951–959 Min 909–945 917–971 903–925 933–965 (Nanping) 924–963 951–979

Song 960–1279

Kaifeng

LATER JIN Huai

Jinling Huainan

Yangzi

Qiantang

Jiangling WUYUE

Hongzhou Tanzhou SOUTHERN TANG

CHU

MIN

Quanzhou

SOUTHERN HAN Xingwang fu

Map of the Southern Tang state and its neighbours (c. 943) Note: Dotted lines show boundaries of modern provinces

Abbreviations

These abbreviations only appear in the Notes section (pp. 119–128).

JBZ Jiangbiao zhi JNBL Jiangnan bielu JYS Jiangnan yeshi LNTS Lu You Nan Tang shu MNTS Ma Ling Nan Tang shu SGCQ Shiguo chunqiu SS Songshi XZZTJ Xu zizhi tongjian changbian ZZTJ Zizhi tongjian

1 The state of Wu

After the Huang Chao rebellion (874–884), which rocked the Chinese Empire to its very foundations, and prior to the demise of the Tang dynasty in 907, regional commanders had already gained various degrees of autonomy from the increasingly weak Tang court in Chang’an. In what historians of the Song dynasty came to label the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten States, the empire was divided largely into two parts. In the north, the heartland of , five dynasties succeeded each other until 960. South of the Yangzi, the situation was quite different, as the topography favoured the creation of a number of states that existed simultaneously, the last of which only surrendered to the Song in 978. One of the most successful regional warlords during the last decades of the Tang was Xingmi (852–905). Coming from very humble origins, Yang had become a soldier and risen through the ranks to the position of prefect of Luzhou (in modern-day ) in 883. After Gao Pian (c. 822–887), the governor of the Huainan region, had been murdered in 887, Yang Xingmi, in the ensuing fight for possession of Huainan, gained the upper hand against his main opponent Sun Ru (?–892). His position was bolstered by the court, which appointed him surveillance commissioner1 of Xuanzhou, an important city in Jiangnan that Yang had taken in the same year. The seizure of Xuanzhou set him on a course of confrontation with Zhong Zhuan (?–906), who had taken advantage of the Huang Chao rebellion to set himself up in Jiangnan. After he had finally beaten Sun Ru in 892, Yang made Guangling (Yangzhou) his headquarters, receiving the title of governor of Huainan, as well as an honorary appointment as grand mentor of the Tang emperor.2 In the following years, he expanded his power throughout Jiangnan and inevitably clashed with (852–932), who, at the time, held sway over part of the Yangzi delta and territories in the region of modern-day Zhejiang province. Upon Yang Xingmi’s death in 905, the territory of the state that came eventually to be known as Wu comprised, basically, the larger regions of Huainan and Jiangnan, or roughly the modern-day provinces of south Anhui, Jiangsu and Jiangxi, as well as parts of , and a total of twenty-nine 2 The state of Wu prefectures. The northernmost town was Haizhou (near modern-day , in Jiangsu), and the southernmost city was Qianzhou (modern- day Ganzhou, in Jiangxi). The most important city in the west was Ezhou (in the vicinity of modern-day Wuhan, in Hubei), and the most important city in the east, for its strategic location on the , was . The Huai River in the north was a natural border and defence against incursions from the north, and the south was relatively well protected by the mountain ranges that separate southern Jiangxi from the states of Chu in Hunan, Southern Han in Guangdong and Min in Fujian. The border with the state of Wuyue roughly followed the Huaiyu mountain range. The Yangzi and its tributaries and canals in the northern part of the Wu territory provided easy access to the western and eastern areas, while the network in the south facilitated intraregional traffic. The borders in the west, south and east remained relatively stable until towards the end of the Southern Tang dynasty. The real concern for the Wu, as well as the Southern Tang, dynasties was always the state of Wuyue to the east, as well as the dynasties that succeeded each other north of the Huai River. The major grain cultivated then and now in Anhui, Jiangsu and Jiangxi is rice, and one of the more important natural resources found in all three provinces is copper. Because of their warm climate, the regions of Huainan and Jiangnan were ideal for the growing of mulberry trees, whose leaves are the staple food of the silkworm. In 905, Yang Xingmi was succeeded by his eldest son, (885–908). Yang Wo was responsible for the seizure of Jiangxi in 907, which, until this time, had been in the hands of Zhong Zhuan and his son. During his short reign, Yang Wo had to deal with incursions by the rulers of Wuyue and Chu, as well as the newly established dynasty in the north, the Later Liang, the first of the Five Dynasties. The new ruler of Wu did not submit to the emperor of the Later Liang, whom he regarded as a usurper, and made that evident by continuing the last reign title of the Tang, ‘Heavenly assistance’ (Tianyou), instead of adopting the Later Liang reign title ‘Peace initiated’ (Kaiping). Yang Wo’s tenure was threatened from the start because two of his father’s commanders, (862–927) and Zhang Hao, agreed to take over power from the Yang family. The two military officials had control over the army, and Yang Wo had always been suspicious of them. From the scarce evidence surviving, it appears that either Xu and Zhang would strike at Yang, or Yang would take decisive action against Xu and Zhang. Originally, Xu and Zhang had agreed to split the territory between themselves and submit to Later Liang rule. After they had murdered Yang Wo, however, Zhang Hao wanted to become ruler of the territory of Wu. This displeased Xu Wen, who feared to be murdered by Zhang. He enquired about the best course of action from Yan Keqiu (?–930), his advisor, who The state of Wu 3 explained that Zhang Hao did not possess the qualities needed to become ruler. When Zhang Hao tried to force the leading officials into accepting his accession to the throne, Yan Keqiu stopped him by pointing out that the ministers of the Yang family surely would follow him, but that they would be more pleased if another Yang family member were appointed king. A young ruler could be more easily manipulated by Zhang, and Yang Xingmi’s officials would find this arrangement more suitable. Thus, Yang Longyan was chosen as the new ruler of Wu. Yang Longyan was the second son of Yang Xingmi and, at the time of his accession to the throne, was about nine years old. Soon after this, the relationship between Xu Wen and Zhang Hao deteriorated considerably. Li Chengsi, a close friend of Zhang Hao, suspected that Yan Keqiu was a partisan of Xu Wen, for he had spoiled Zhang’s plan to send Xu Wen away from the capital. Therefore, he talked Zhang into sending some robbers to break into Yan Keqiu’s residence to kill him, but instead they only looted the place, without murdering Yan. This incident convinced Yan that he should give his support to Xu Wen, whom he immedi - ately advised to get rid of Zhang. Consequently, Zhang and his followers were put to death. As Xu Wen had wisely left it to Zhang and his men to murder Yang Wo, he now appeared to the people as the upright avenger of a regicide. With this, the peaceful reconstruction of the territories under the control of Wu started. Xu Wen’s adopted son, Xu Zhigao, the future first emperor of the Southern Tang, was in his early teens at the time of Xu Wen’s ascent. The early childhood years of Xu Zhigao are obscure. All sources agree that he was born in Pengcheng, in the district of in modern- day Jiangsu province, to a commoner named Li Rong and his wife, Liu, on 7 January 889.3 The newborn received the ‘milk name’ Pengnu. As for his father, Li Rong, there exist two different narratives. Most sources say that he left his family because he was unreliable and loved to roam the country - side following his interests in Buddhism and Daoism. This, together with his frequent disappearances, earned him the ambiguous nickname Li, ‘Who follows the way’, among the people who knew him. In a text from the early eleventh century, Li Rong is depicted as a sword for hire and a local strongman. When Yang Xingmi rose to prominence in Huainan in the 890s, he joined a band of pirates who devastated the region around Haozhou on the Huai River, in modern-day Anhui, and Liangxian in Henan. When Yang Xingmi heard about these actions, he led an army against Li Rong, defeated him and took him prisoner. Yang wanted the whole family of Li Rong executed, but a monk in Haozhou, who was an acquaintance of Yang, begged for the life of the young son of Li Rong and asked to raise him as a Buddhist monk. The majority of historical texts record that his paternal uncle, Li Qiu, rescued the young boy and his mother and brought them to Haozhou.4 Soon after their arrival, the mother died, and the boy was given shelter at the 4 The state of Wu Kaiyuan monastery in Haozhou.5 In an alternative description of events, an older sister of the little boy, who had become a Buddhist nun, had made the acquaintance of Li, the wife of Xu Wen. As Li had the same surname as the boy, she asked her husband to adopt the boy.6 This contradicts the story as told in other texts, in which Yang Xingmi, passing through Haozhou in 895, noticed the remarkable physical appearance of the boy and therefore adopted him as his son. As his own sons disliked the idea of an orphan becoming their brother, Yang asked his general, Xu Wen, to take care of the boy.7 The day before Yang’s request, Xu Wen is said to have dreamed of several tens of yellow dragons swimming in the water. He caught one of them and then woke up.8 Li cared very much about the boy and raised him like her own child.9 The boy received the family name Xu and the given name Zhigao.10 Once, Xu Zhigao accompanied Xu Wen on a military campaign, but, as he did not follow orders, Xu Wen drove him away with a cane. Xu Zhigao nevertheless returned to the Xu residence. This made Xu Wen pity the boy and like him even more. As Xu Zhigao was a precocious boy at the age of nine, and as his siblings were all much younger, he was made the head of the household when his adopted father was away on duty. When his brothers were older, they liked to go hunting on horseback in their spare time, whereas Xu Zhigao, apart from practising archery, studied characters and accounting.11 As Xu Wen doubted his military abilities, Zhigao often asked for military appointments to gain experience and, being of quick comprehension, he swiftly rose through the ranks to become division commander. After he had come of age, he married the daughter of the prefect of Shengzhou, . When Xu Wen once fell ill, it was Xu Zhigao and his wife who looked after him the whole time, while his adopted brothers did not take much notice of their father’s illness. Xu Wen was moved to say: ‘Alas, even though you are from a different family, I have no one who is closer to me.’12 Shortly afterwards, Xu Zhigao’s wife died, and he grieved a long time for her before he took the maid of his late wife as his main consort.

Table 1.1 Adopted brothers of Xu Zhigao

Xu Zhixun1 (?–918), oldest son of Xu Wen

Xu Zhixun2 (?–934), second son of Xu Wen Xu Zhihui, third son of Xu Wen Xu Zhijian (?–931), fourth son of Xu Wen Xu Zhizheng (?–after 943), fifth son of Xu Wen Xu Zhi’e (?–939), sixth son of Xu Wen13 The state of Wu 5 This girl, with the family name Song, had lost her parents as well and, as a child, had drifted among the military, where she had been found by Wang Rong, who brought her home and made her a servant.14 Later, she became a maidservant of Xu Zhigao’s first wife, Wang.15 After the latter had passed away, Xu Wen suggested elevating the status of Song to main wife, as she had already borne a son, the future emperor Yuanzong. Xu Wen, accordingly, conferred noble titles on Song.16 Because of their shared experiences and fates, Xu Zhigao and his second wife were very close. According to the relevant sources, Xu Zhigao had an impressive appearance. He was tall, with a wide forehead and a prominent nose. His voice was clear and loud, and people found it hard to keep up with him because of his stride. A physiognomist observing Xu Zhigao once noticed that he had ‘a dragon’s stride and a tiger’s step’, which certainly were the attributes of a leader.17 He served Xu Wen with devotion, and it was this attitude that had impressed Yang Xingmi, who remarked once that, among the sons of all his generals, none surpassed Xu Zhigao.18 In the summer of 909, when he was about twenty years old, Xu Zhigao was transferred to be defence commissioner of Shengzhou and concurrent commander of the war junks. This unit was stationed at Shengzhou. One year later, in 910, Xu Zhigao was promoted to deputy commissioner of Shengzhou and, in this capacity, was responsible for the administration of the prefecture. A chance to earn more merits and experience was presented to Xu Zhigao when Li Yu and a few other, highly decorated officers of Yang Xingmi rebelled in early 912. They had been watching the rise of Xu Wen to power very closely and had been envious of his career, which took him from lowly company commander to head of the government. In 912, (861–937), on a mission to Wuyue, passed through Xuanzhou. He handed an order from Xu Wen to Li Yu, summoning him to court to pay his respects to the new king, Yang Longyan. Li Yu initially agreed to comply, but, when Xu Jie continued by saying that if he did not attend people would accuse him of rebellion, he became angry and refused to obey. He addressed Xu Jie: ‘You say that I rebel, but killing the Director of the Chancellery (i.e. Xu Wen) is not an act of sedition!’ After Xu Jie had transmitted this answer to Xu Wen, Xu Wen ordered Li Yu to be replaced, as a punishment for his disobedience. He thereupon dispatched his general, Chai Zaiyong (?–935), with a detachment of troops to make sure that Wang Tan, the newly appointed prefect of Xuanzhou, was installed there. In this campaign, Xu Zhigao served as Chai Zaiyong’s deputy. As Li Yu was not permitting anyone to enter Xuanzhou, Chai Zaiyong attacked the city, but failed to conquer it for a month. Li only gave up his resistance when his youngest son was captured and brought before the city walls. Upon Xu Wen’s order, the whole of Li Yu’s family was executed, and all the generals now knew there was no way around Xu Wen.19 6 The state of Wu Xu Zhigao was rewarded for his service with promotion to the post of prefect of Shengzhou. He used Shengzhou to build a power base and to gather a trusted, but relatively small, group of followers and advisors. He actively recruited able men by circulating a letter calling for talented men and thus secured the services of Song Qiqiu (887–959) and Zhou Zong. The biog - raphies of Song and Zhong yield some information about their lives prior to Xu Zhigao’s move to Runzhou modern-day Zhenjiang, Jiangsu, in 917. Song Qiqiu was the son of Song Cheng, who had organized a rebellion in Jiangxi in the . As the Tang court was not able to bring that rebellion led by Zhong Zhuan under control, Zhong Zhuan was appointed governor of Hongzhou (), and Song Cheng became his deputy. Song Qiqiu was born in Hongzhou, but lost his father when he was a little boy. He studied hard all by himself, without any teacher, and, from his readings of philosophical works, he developed a knack for politics and political strategies. Searching for employment in the province, Song attempted to make contact with Rao Dongtian, who was prefect of Luling (Ji’an, in southern Jiangxi) and happened to be a good friend of Xu Zhigao.20 Rao agreed to receive Song, and Song managed to win him as a patron, but Rao soon afterwards took up another position in Guangling. After his arrival there, he fell ill and, in his last will, he recommended Song to Xu Zhigao. Song was in dire need of help, having only limited financial means that merely allowed him to travel to Guangling. He did not know how to proceed, but fortunately, next to his room in the boarding house, lived a singing girl named Wei. When she heard him lament his bad luck, she lent him some money with which he was able to purchase a proper cap. With the respectable attire of a scholar, he went to see Xu Zhigao, and Xu welcomed him into his retinue.21 For all the help she had given him, Song made the singing girl his consort. Soon Song became Xu Zhigao’s closest advisor. Xu erected a pavilion in the middle of a pool, to which he and Song frequently withdrew to discuss matters in secret. A second building, with removable walls, served as another location for their meetings. In the building was a fireplace, and they used their fingers to write characters in the ashes. When they were finished, they erased what they had written.22 It is evident from these safety precautions that the discussions of the two men did not at all concern the running of the prefecture, but certainly centred around the establishment of Xu as an influential official within the administration of the state of Wu. Zhou Zong, a native of Guangling, entered the service of Xu Zhigao as chief steward. He once offered his advice on how to arrange the lodgings of the emperor of Wu, when the latter came to visit Jinling. Xu Zhigao found his suggestion practical and followed it, and, from then on, Zhou Zong was involved in all high-level discussions.23 Because of his direct involvement in the running of Shengzhou and his close contact with Xu Zhigao, Song Qiqiu disliked him profoundly, for Song considered himself the chief advisor to Xu Zhigao and did not want any other official to interfere.24 The state of Wu 7 Unlike his colleagues, who were often military men and not familiar with the management of districts and prefectures, Xu Zhigao made an effort to learn as much as possible about administrative work. Song advised Xu Zhigao to look after the rural population, to drill his troops and to restore buildings and fortifications that had fallen into ruin during the tenure of the previous prefects. Thus, one of Xu Zhigao’s first projects included the building of the city walls of Shengzhou in 914,27 and, in the same year, he was conferred with the title of acting minister of education. Similarly, he supported the expan- sion of the city into a major trading centre, and gradually Shengzhou became a wealthy city. Xu Wen noticed these developments in Shengzhou when he made a tour of his fiefdom of in 917. The emperor of Wu had con- ferred on Xu Wen the title of duke of Qi and granted him the fiefdom in 915 as a reward for his services. The fiefdom of Qi consisted of the six prefectures of Shengzhou, Runzhou, Changzhou, Xuanzhou, Shezhou and Chizhou. Upon the advice of Chen Yanqian (?–925), one of his followers, Xu Wen made Shengzhou his headquarters and transferred Xu Zhigao to become military training commissioner of Runzhou, his own original head- quarters. Even though Xu Zhigao asked to be transferred to Xuanzhou, Xu Wen insisted on him moving to Runzhou. When Song Qiqiu explained to him the advantage of being closer to the Wu capital in Guangling, Xu Zhigao acquiesced and took up office in Runzhou. Xu Wen, meanwhile, delegated all administrative matters of Shengzhou to Chen Yanqian. Chen continued the good work of Xu Zhigao, and soon people in the Jiang and Huai regions were said to have praised his achievements.28 When he took up his post in Runzhou, Xu Zhigao was given the honorary title of acting grand guardian of the Wu ruler and the position of military training commissioner of Runzhou. A chance to change his fortunes came when his adopted brother, Xu

Zhixun1, the deputy commissioner-in-chief of the internal and external armies, started to behave arrogantly and erratically. Xu Zhixun1 had been left in the Wu capital to keep the royal family under control and, in addition to his high military appointment, also held a high civil administration position as joint manager of affairs with the secretariat–chancellery.

In 918, Xu Zhixun1 threatened to kill (863–940), the military commissioner of Weiwu and magistrate of Fuzhou1. Xu Zhixun1 had learned that Li Decheng possessed numerous singing girls in his household, whom he coveted. When he requested them from Li Decheng, Li refused to hand them over, explaining that they were either too old or nursing babies.

Xu Zhixun1 treated Yang Longyan with disrespect as well. When the ruler invited him to take part in a theatrical play, he subjected him to ridicule by pulling at the ruler’s cap. Some time later, he killed one of Yang Longyan’s personal aides, and Yang’s adjutants were so frightened that they did not dare tell Xu Wen about it.29 8 The state of Wu

28 Both Xu Zhixun1 and his younger brother Zhixun2 (?–934) disliked Xu Zhigao and they did not consider him a real brother, while only the third brother, Xu Zhijian (?–931), treated Zhigao with the respect due an older brother. Xu Zhixun1 threatened to kill Xu Zhigao when the latter refused an invitation to drink. When he invited Xu Zhigao a second time, he hid some men in armour to assassinate him. Xu Zhijian stepped on Xu Zhigao’s foot to warn him, and Xu Zhigao rose, excused himself by saying he needed to go to the toilet and then ran away. Zhixun1 took a sword and gave it to his aide Diao Yanneng, with the order to catch Zhigao and murder him on the road. Diao Yanneng, on horseback, easily caught up with Zhigao, showed him the sword and then returned, reporting that Zhigao had escaped. The constant menace to Xu Zhigao’s life was only removed when Xu Zhixun1 evoked the anger of Zhu Jin (867–918), a very high-ranking and powerful civil and military figure in the state of Wu. Zhu had sent his courtesans with his regards to Zhixun1 and, as in the previous affair with Li Decheng, Xu Zhixun1 wanted to make Zhu’s courtesans his own. Under - standably, Zhu Jin opposed this idea, but had no means to react. Xu Zhixun1, furthermore, was very envious of Zhu Jin’s positions – Zhu was military commissioner of Pinglu, grand councillor and deputy commander-in-chief of all circuits – which he thought were higher than his. Thus, he created Jinghuai Military Prefecture in Sizhou and appointed Zhu as its head. This made Zhu even more furious, but on the outside he continued to serve Xu Zhixun1 respectfully. After Xu Zhixun1 had sent apologies for his previous actions, Zhu Jin invited him for a banquet, where he personally poured him wine. He called for his favourite courtesan to join and entertain them with her singing, and then presented Xu Zhixun1 with his favourite horse. In order to view the horse, Zhu Jin led Xu Zhixun1 into the main hall, where they met Zhu Jin’s wife. When she bowed to him and he replied with a bow, Zhu Jin hit him over the head with his official tablet and ordered his soldiers to cut off his head. The whole commotion was covered by the noise of two horses in a side room that were made to neigh and kick, so that no one outside the hall could notice what was going on inside.29 Xu Zhixun1’s retinue dispersed as Zhu Jin emerged from the hall with their master’s head. He went straight to the imperial palace to tell the Wu ruler that he had eliminated Xu Zhixun1 forever, but Yang Longyan hid his face and said he did not want to know anything about it. By this time, news of Xu Zhixun1’s murder had spread in the palace, and officials came to look for Zhu Jin, after they had locked the palace gates and called for the guards. Zhu Jin attempted to escape by jumping from the palace wall, but he broke his legs and consequently committed suicide.30 As soon as Xu Zhigao in Runzhou learnt about the events in Guangling, he led his troops across the Yangzi to restore order in the capital and the imperial palace. The proximity of Runzhou to Guangling indeed turned out The state of Wu 9 to be advantageous. Once the unrest caused by Xu Zhixun1’s murder had subsided, Xu Wen made the ruler of Wu appoint Xu Zhigao as successor to Xu Zhixun1. With that, Xu Zhigao was now the second in command after Xu Wen, and he set out to install a capable civil administration. The people who had suffered under the mismanagement of the state by Xu Zhixun1 soon praised him for his good work.31 Song Qiqiu is credited with convincing Xu Zhigao actively to search for talented men capable of supporting him in his future endeavours. For this reason, Xu established the ‘Pavilion for receiving guests’ and invited talented men who were currently unemployed to his residence.32 In 919, Xu Wen convinced the ruler of Wu to move towards a declaration of independence from the Later Liang. Military action in and around the strategically important prefecture of Anzhou, which controlled one of the major junctions of communication, trade and transport north of the Yangzi River, in present-day Hubei, preceded the formal secession from the northern dynasty.33 The subsequent proclamation of Yang Longyan as independent ruler of the Wu dynasty was definitely a result of the loss of authority of the Later Liang. The autonomy that the Later Liang had granted the Wu state was transformed into the reality of an independent empire. In the spring of 919, Xu Wen proceeded to Guangling, at the head of all the civil and military officials, and suggested that the king of Wu adopt the imperial title, which the latter refused. Nevertheless, in the summer of the same year, Yang Longyan ascended the throne formally as king of Wu. Accordingly, the state of Wu dropped the Tang reign title ‘Heavenly assistance’ and adopted the reign title ‘Martial righteousness’ (Wuyi). Following time-honoured tradition, the new king proclaimed a general amnesty and built a temple for the imperial ancestors. Furthermore, the bureaucracy was transformed into an imperial bureaucracy, with all the necessary departments and ministries, and the royal palace was decorated with imperial insignia. Lastly, in order to show that he considered himself a successor to the Tang, the new king adopted the element ‘metal’ for his dynasty, because the Tang had ruled under the element ‘earth’.34 The model for the administration of Wu was the Tang bureaucratic system, which was introduced alongside the military establishment. Owing to the

Table 1.2 Rulers of Wu

Yang Xingmi, canonized as Taizu Xiaowu Huangdi (852–905), r. 904–905 Yang Wo, canonized as Liezu Jing Huangdi (885–908), r. 905–908, oldest son of Yang Xingmi Yang Longyan, canonized as Gaozu Xuan Huangdi (897–920), r. 908–920, second son of Yang Xingmi , canonized as Rui Huangdi (r. 920–937), r. 921–937, fourth son of Yang Xingmi 10 The state of Wu turmoil since the start of the century, military officials had been in charge of running the state up to this point. The capital of Wu remained in Guangling. It was the seat of the government and the court of the rulers of Wu. The basic administrative organization consisted of the Three Depart - ments, two of which were designed to serve and assist the ruler, while the third one handled the actual management of the state. The first two, the chancellery and the secretariat, prepared imperial proclamations and advised the ruler on policies; the department of state affairs controlled the six ministries, which dealt with rites, personnel, revenue, war, justice and works. The heads of the chancellery, secretariat and the department of state affairs were, by default, grand councillors and formed an advisory body for the ruler. The director and deputy director of the bureau of military affairs had command over the military. During the Tang dynasty, this office was almost exclusively staffed by eunuchs, but, during the Wu as well as the Southern Tang, its staff predominantly consisted of officials from the regular bureaucratic ranks. The local administration of the state was based on prefectures (zhou), which typically included one to three districts (xian). The prefecture was supervised by a prefect, and districts were managed by magistrates. Prefects also acted as local heads of military forces, which for the most part consisted of militia recruited from all able-bodied men within a prefecture. In areas close to enemy territory or of strategic importance, such as the borders with the northern dynasties along the Huai River, or the borders with Wuyue and Chu, military prefectures (jun) were established under military commissioners, who had regular army troops under their command. All close relatives of the Wu emperor received titles to reflect their imperial status, and Xu Zhigao was promoted to left vice director of the department of state affairs and participant in determining governmental matters.35 Xu Wen, appointed as grand preceptor of the king of Wu after the proclamation of independence, did not care much about government matters. Xu Zhigao, thus, was the de facto head of the administration and, in the following years, initiated a number of laws and reforms to further develop the state. The people, again, were so impressed with his work that they referred to him as vice director of the government.36 The Wu dynasty relied heavily on tax revenue for running the admin - istration of the state. Taxes were collected by the districts twice annually, in summer and in autumn, and were, for the most part, paid in kind. was preferred over payments in kind; however, in practice, many people still paid the summer tax in cloth and the autumn tax – after the harvest – in grain or rice. Moreover, the state could also demand forced-labour services from all men between the ages of twenty and sixty years, for public building of granaries, city walls, canals, dykes and so forth. In the Tang dynasty, the tax revenue was distributed between the imperial treasury in the capital, The state of Wu 11 the provinces and the local prefectures. The sources provide no information on how the Wu and Southern Tang states handled taxes. As they did not introduce provinces, tax revenues may well have been split between the capital and the prefectures. Yang Longyan had been opposed to the founding of the independent state of Wu, but could not oppose the Xu family. Once he realized he was a mere puppet in the hands of Xu Wen and his sons, he turned to alcohol and, as a result of his alcohol consumption, died on 18 June 920, at the age of only twenty-four. Some of Xu Wen’s officials believed that now there was a chance to establish a new state under the rule of the Xu family, but Xu Wen rejected any such plans. Instead, on 7 July, he proclaimed Yang Pu (900–937), Yang Longyan’s younger brother, as the new ruler of Wu.37 In the second year of Yang Pu’s reign, in 921, efforts were undertaken to remedy the revenue situation of the state by introducing registers listing all arable land and its owners. Fixed taxes were set according to the size and grade of the fields, which meant that owners of first-class fields had to pay more than those holding second- and third-class fields, producing smaller harvests. The taxes had to be paid in copper cash, and, where copper cash was not readily available, gold and silver bullion were accepted. The head tax to be paid was based on payments submitted on the land tax. Song Qiqiu suggested permitting tax payments in kind, such as grain, rice and silk, as, otherwise, people would not be compelled to get the best out of their fields. As an incentive for people to resuscitate sericulture in regions previously suffering from warfare, Song furthermore wanted to raise the price for raw silk and silk fabrics and, simultaneously, to fix the price of cotton. Another measure in Song’s plan asked for the remittance of the head tax that had already been paid. The majority of the court officials rejected this plan, because district officials would lose a certain amount of their income, which they received through the taxes. Song sought the support of Xu Zhigao, the grand councillor, and Xu understood that Song wanted to strengthen the agricultural sector. He therefore readily implemented Song’s policy, and it is said that, within ten years, agriculture flourished again in Jiangnan. After the overthrow of the Later Liang in 923 by the Later Tang dynasty, its first emperor, Zhuangzong (Li Cunxu, r. 923–936), tried to impose his authority by sending orders to the Wu court, but these were not followed by Wu. Only when the Later Tang changed the tone of its letters and began to treat Wu as an opponent did the Wu ruler send an envoy with gifts to the court of the Later Tang. The follow-up official mission from Wu submitted a memorial that, in essence, acknowledged the superiority of the Later Tang over the Wu state. The address of the Later Tang ruler as emperor in the memorial empha - sized the inferior status of the Wu ruler.38 Consequently, the Later Tang 12 The state of Wu considered diplomatic missions from Wu as tribute missions. For Wu, the distinction between gift and tribute did not matter much, as long as their acceptance ensured continued peace at the northern borders. With the accession of Mingzong (Li Siyuan, r. 926–933), the superficially harmonious relationship between Wu and the Later Tang was severely tested. Gao Jixing (r. 924–928), taking advantage of the fall of the Later Liang, declared himself ruler of the state of Jingnan, which consisted of three prefectures on the middle reaches of the Yangzi. He adopted the Wu reign title ‘Obedient righteousness’ (Shunyi, 921–926), in order to secure protec- tion from his eastern neighbour. After Mingzong had come to the throne, Gao changed his loyalty to the new dynasty and, to prove his submission, adopted the Later Tang reign title ‘Heavenly perfection’ (Tiancheng, 926–929). He then asked the court of the Later Tang to acknowledge him as prefect of these territories in 927. The court did not permit this and appointed a new prefect instead. Gao Jixing thereupon committed a major mistake by murdering a Later Tang envoy who had travelled up-river to Sichuan. As a result, the Later Tang stripped Gao of all the ranks and titles they had awarded him previously and dispatched an army against him. In support of the Later Tang attack, army units from the state of Chu in Hunan advanced on Jingnan from three different directions.39 In the face of this massive build-up of forces against him, Gao chose to defend himself behind the walls of his capital Jiangling and called on Wu for help. Wu responded by sending a detachment of naval forces.40 The Later Tang attack on Jiangling did not progress well, owing to the extreme weather conditions in this southern region during summer. Many of the northern troops, including their commander, suffered from the heat and diseases endemic to the area. Therefore, the Later Tang court appointed a new commander to renew the attack on Jiangling, but to no avail. Finally, Mingzong ordered the withdrawal of the army.41 At this time, a tribute mission of Chu returning from the Later Liang court was intercepted by Jingnan, whose troops captured presents consisting of ten fine horses and two beautiful girls. It was evident that Gao had no intention at all of giving in to the pressure from the northern dynasty, nor from his southern neighbour in Chu. Wu was the only state left to which he could offer his allegiance, and therefore he sent the horses and the girls he had taken from the Chu emissaries to the Wu court. Xu Wen did not want to confront the Later Liang and declined Gao’s offer. He explained his refusal by saying that Gao had been a long-time vassal of the northern dynasty, and that it would be difficult for Wu to come to the support of Jingnan because of the great distances involved. He nevertheless accepted the presents, but suggested that Gao should submit to the Later Tang.42 In the winter of 927, Xu Wen, on the advice of Xu Jie, wanted to replace Xu Zhigao with his natural second son Xu Zhixun2 and transfer power in The state of Wu 13 the Wu government to him. Some years earlier, Chen Yanqian had already urged Xu Wen to name one of his natural sons as his successor in his last will, instead of Xu Zhigao. Xu Zhigao knew this and tried to persuade 43 Chen to change his mind, but he did not succeed. Xu Zhixun2, for his part, was eager to assume the position of his father and sideline Xu Zhigao. He was supported by Xu Jie and Yan Keqiu, another senior minister in the Wu administration. Initially, Xu Wen had rejected the proposal, because Xu Zhixun2 lacked the stature of Xu Zhigao. Lady Chen, one of Xu Wen’s consorts, similarly scolded Zhixun2: ‘We have adopted Zhigao from when he was in poor circumstances, how can we discard him now that he has achieved wealth and influence!’ Xu Wen, before his death on 21 November 927, wanted to go to court with all the military leaders to encourage the Wu ruler to declare himself emperor. As he fell ill, he sent Xu Zhixun2 to the court with a written statement proposing the founding of an empire. When Xu Zhigao learnt about the opposition of his adopted father to his succession, he drafted a memorial to the throne, asking for dismissal from his current positions. He had been about to submit his resignation to the throne on the very day that Xu Wen died, and consequently he refrained from sending it. Xu Zhixun2, who was on his way to Guangling, hastily returned to Jinling when he learned about his father’s death. Therefore, the letter with the suggestion of him instead of Xu Zhigao as the new head of the administration never reached the throne. Yang Pu was very obedient and followed the plan designed by Xu Wen, when he assumed imperial status on 29 November 927. On 13 December, he introduced a new reign title, ‘Aspiring chastity’ (Qianzhen), and pro - claimed a general amnesty. On 25 December, he conferred the title of empress dowager on his mother, Wang. Yang Pu also promoted Xu Zhigao, in a bid to keep him at bay. In addition to the positions that he already had, the Wu emperor appointed him commander-in-chief of all internal and external military matters.44 After Xu Zhixun2 had arrived in Jinling, the Wu emperor confirmed him in all the positions his father had held. This set the scene for future quarrels between Xu Zhigao and Xu Zhixun2, who were now the civil and the military head of state, respectively. Xu Zhigao, at this point, already could have taken over the state, but he hesitated and was content with the successive appointments as director of the chancellery, secretariat director, and commander-in-chief of all internal and external military matters. In addition, the emperor also conferred on him the title of duke of Xunyang, which was later changed to duke of Yuzhang. Yang Pu, in his new capacity as emperor of Wu, awarded posthumous imperial titles on his predecessors. He conferred on his immediate predeces- sor, Yang Longyan, the Gaozu, a title usually reserved for 14 The state of Wu dynastic founders. The reason for this was probably Yang Longyan’s proclamation of independence from the northern dynasty. An Zhonghui (?–931), minister of the Later Tang, urged his emperor to punish the disobedient Wu with a military campaign, but his suggestion was rejected.45 Early in 928, the Wu court sent envoys to the Later Tang court to clarify matters, and the Later Tang sent a diplomatic mission in response. As the Wu felt that no rites had been violated when Yang Pu proclaimed himself emperor, but An Zhonghui insisted that he had, diplomatic relations between the two states were suspended, and they regarded each other as foes.46 In the spring of 928, hostilities erupted again between Chu and Jingnan. The Chu naval forces inflicted a crushing defeat on Gao Jixing, which forced him to ask Chu for peace. To underline his peaceful intentions, Gao sent back the Chu envoy he had arrested earlier. The Chu general Wang Huan explained to his king, (r. 907–930), why it was necessary to leave Jingnan intact as an independent state. The strategic location of Jingnan, between the Later Tang in the north, the state of Shu to the west and the state of Wu to the east, represented a useful buffer against attacks from the three other states.47 Wu had grown suspicious of Chu’s success against Jingnan, and so naval forces were dispatched to launch a naval attack against Yuezhou. The original plan provided for a simultaneous attack on the city from Jingnan. However, Xu Dexun, grand councillor at the Chu court, set a trap for the advancing Wu forces. When they approached Yuezhou, they were attacked, not only from the front, but also from the back. The Wu detachment was utterly defeated by the Chu army, and its commanders were taken prisoner.48 After the failure of the military campaign, Wu sent envoys to negotiate a peace with Chu and asked for the return of the captured Wu generals. This peace settlement did not end the war between Jingnan and Chu though. On 28 June 928, after Gao Jixing officially asked to be recognized as a vassal of Wu again, Wu enfeoffed him as king of Qin. The Later Tang subsequently commanded Chu to renew its war with Jingnan. In the very first battle between the two armies, Gao’s nephew challenged the Chu commander to a duel, in which he was killed. As a result, Gao once more asked the Later Tang for peace.49 Three months later, in the autumn of 928, Jingnan initiated yet another campaign against Chu. This time, the Jingnan troops were able to seize Yuezhou and to take its prefect prisoner as well.50 Gao Jixing died shortly after this successful campaign, on 28 January 929, and Wu appointed his son, Gao Conghui, as his successor as military governor of Jingnan and director of the chancellery.51

Meanwhile, Xu Zhixun2 and Xu Zhigao locked horns over the succession of Li Jian, the military commissioner of Wuchang and director of the The state of Wu 15 chancellery, in the autumn of 929. Xu Zhixun2 favoured Li Jian’s son, Yanzhong, who was his brother-in-law, but Xu Zhigao wanted Chai Zaiyong, a tested and experienced military officer, to take over. Wuchang was the westernmost military prefecture on the Yangzi and guarded Wu against potential incursions from Chu. In the end, Xu Zhigao convinced the Wu 52 emperor to appoint his candidate, instead of Xu Zhixun2’s. In Jinling, Xu Zhixun2’s behaviour not only offended his own brothers, but also made Xu Jie rethink his loyalty, which he switched secretly to Xu Zhigao.

Xu Zhixun2 tried again to put Xu Zhigao under pressure and remove him as the de facto head of state. He was in control of considerable military power and therefore felt strong enough to challenge Xu Zhigao’s position. Xu Zhigao’s advisor, Wang Lingmou, the internal commissioner of the bureau of military affairs in Guangling, cheered him up by saying:

You have been managing the government for a long time already, and you have guided the emperor in ruling the state. Who would dare not

to follow you! Zhixun2 is young and he has not spread benevolence and trust among the people because he lacks the ability to do so!53

Zhou Tingwang, a retainer of Xu Zhixun2, advised him to buy support among the court officials to prepare for a take-over from Xu Zhigao. Xu

Zhixun2 thus sent Zhou to Jiangdu – the designation used for Guangling since the proclamation of the empire of Wu – to make his ambitions known. After his arrival in the capital, Zhou Tingwang visited his old friend Zhou Zong, the personal aide of Xu Zhigao. Zhou Zong pretended to switch his loyalty to Xu Zhixun2 and so learned about Xu Zhixun2’s plans. In return, Zhou Zong told him about Xu Zhigao’s designs. Zhou Tingwang then returned to Jinling, believing that he had found an ally in Zhou Zong, and reported the good news to Xu Zhixun2. Xu Zhixun2 therefore did not expect any foul play when, in late 929, he appeared for an audience at court. Xu Zhigao had waited patiently for just such an opportunity to rid himself of his opponent. One source alleges that the summons to court was a ruse by Xu Zhigao, who lodged Xu Zhixun2 in his residence and put him under guard, not permitting him to see the ruler.

When Xu Zhixun2 complained about his treatment and demanded an audience with the emperor, Xu Zhigao told him:

Your running of the administration (in Jinling) has been oppressive. When the emperor heard about it, he at once wanted to mete out some punishment to you. I expect you to send in an apology from my residence. Besides, I am afraid the emperor is busy. So what do you want to see him for?54 16 The state of Wu

Xu Zhixun2 accused Xu Zhigao of unfilial behaviour, saying: ‘When the late prince [i.e. Xu Wen] passed away, you did not come immediately to attend his burial, how was that possible?’ Xu Zhigao replied: ‘You were waiting with a drawn sword for me, so how could I have dared to come! You are an official, yet you don imperial robes and imperial insignia, how is that possible!’ He had learned, through Zhou Tingwang’s discussions with Zhou Zong, that Xu Zhixun2, who had been responsible for the defence of the lower Yangzi region against Wuyue, had accepted precious gifts from the king of Wuyue. These gifts consisted of vessels ornamented with phoenixes and dragons, which were symbols of royal power. As Xu Zhixun2 had not rejected these, the evidence for Xu Zhigao’s case against him – that is, the intention to murder Xu Zhigao and to assume the imperial position – appeared solid. The troops in Jinling that had originally been under Xu Zhixun2’s command were given a new commander by Xu Zhigao, and they were moved to Jiangdu. Zhou Tingwang’s role again came up when Xu Zhixun2 told Xu Zhigao that he knew what the latter was planning. Xu Zhigao ended the whole affair by revealing that he knew about Xu Zhixun2’s plans, too, and Zhou Tingwang was executed as a result.55 The Wu emperor made Xu Zhixun2 army commander and military commissioner of Zhenhai military prefecture, situated opposite Yangzhou on the southern side of the Yangzi, but he was not given permission to leave the capital for his new position, which otherwise would have required him to take up residence in Runzhou.56 Xu Zhigao wasted no time and at once took over all government matters. In the same month, on 31 December 929, the Wu emperor adopted the honorific title of ‘Sage cultivated and filial emperor’ (Ruisheng wenming guangxiao huangdi), proclaimed a general amnesty and retrospectively changed the reign title to ‘Great peace’ (Dahe).57 Xu Zhigao did not really trust Xu Zhixun2, even after he had eliminated him as a direct political opponent. At one point, he attempted to murder him with a goblet of poisoned wine, but Xu Zhixun2, wary of his adopted brother, drank wine from a different vessel. A musician named Shen Jiangao saved the ensuing awkward situation by drinking the poisoned wine and 58 died as a consequence. Hence, Xu Zhixun2’s suspicions had been fully justified. In the spring of 930, Gao Conghui, ruler of Jingnan, sent envoys to the Wu court. They reported that Jingnan was to cease all relations with Wu, as the ancestral tombs of the Gao family were located in Shenzhou (in modern Henan). Gao Conghui was afraid that the Later Tang would destroy the tombs as punishment for his allegiance to Wu. As a consequence, Wu dispatched an army to teach Gao a lesson, but the campaign was unsuccessful.59 The state of Wu 17 Only two months later, Wang Zhuanzheng, the military commander of Haizhou, rebelled against Wu and defected to the Later Tang. This was a serious problem, because Haizhou was the prefecture where most of the salt traded in Wu was produced. Wang Zhuanzheng had grown disaffected when he learned that, instead of taking the place of the previous military training commissioner, Chen Xuan, he was to be recalled to Yangzhou. He there fore killed Chen Xuan, looted and destroyed Haizhou and made away with the troops under his command. Xu Zhigao assumed responsibility for this disaster and spared the life of Wang’s wife and children. Haizhou, in the meantime, had been taken by Wang Yan, who had hurried there with his troops from his post in Lianshui, about ninety kilometres to the south of Haizhou. When the situation had calmed down, Wang Yan was appointed magistrate of Haizhou. Xu Zhigao used Wang Zhuanzheng’s defection to establish better relations with the military circles that had been suspicious of him. Wang Zhuanzheng had contacted his uncle, Wang Yu, prefect of Guangzhou1 south of the Huai River (in modern Henan), about his chances of returning to Wu. Wang Yu immediately had the messenger arrested and for this loyal act was generously rewarded by Xu Zhigao. News about this spread among the military officers and the troops, and Xu Zhigao finally gained their trust, as they recognized him as a fair and just leader.60 In the spring of 931, Xu Zhigao attempted to give Song Qiqiu the position of grand councillor. Song, however, wanted to measure how essential and important he was to and within the top echelons of the administration and resigned from all his posts. He retired to Hongzhou under the pretence of attending the reburial of his father and moved to Mount Jiuhua, about two hundred kilometres north of Hongzhou, in present-day Anhui. When he asked permission to live as a recluse on the mountain, both the Wu emperor and Xu Zhigao sent letters urging him to come back. This must have pleased Song, yet he was unwilling to leave the Yingtian Monastery at Mount Jiuhua. Only when Xu Jingtong, at the behest of his father, travelled to see Song and summon him back to court did the latter finally accept. Upon his return, he assumed a high position in the department of state affairs, and the Yingtian Monastery was renamed ‘Summoning the sage’ (Zhengxian) Monastery in his honour.61 In late 931, Xu Zhigao informed the Wu court that he wanted to retire and take up residence in Jinling. The Wu emperor complied, giving him, in addition, the military commissionerships of both Ningguo and Zhenhai, the two military prefectures adjacent to Jinling. The withdrawal of Xu Zhigao can be understood as preparation for future operations, for he did not lose sight of the court. Before Xu Zhigao left the capital to take up residence in Jinling on 21 January 931, he appointed his son, Jingtong, minister of education and manager of affairs, i.e. grand councillor, in Guangling, to keep an eye on the emperor and the imperial court. Wang Lingmou and Song Qiqiu 18 The state of Wu were given positions as left and right directors of the department of state affairs, as well as joint managers of affairs with the secretariat–chancellery, in order to assist Xu Jingtong. All three of them constituted the advisory body for the emperor of Wu. Thus, Xu Zhigao was controlling the govern - ment and the court, and it was only a matter of time before he would take power in Wu.62 In 932, he established the Institute for the Reverence of Sages (Lixian yuan) in Jinling. He was aware that a good collection of books would attract scholars at a time when knowledge was not much in vogue among many of the rulers in northern and in southern China, because of the constant wars and conflicts on Chinese territory. The book collection eventually numbered in the tens of thousands of volumes. The institute was created as a place for the collection of paintings, books, board games and musical instruments that would become the private palace collection of the Southern Tang. In addition, the institute served as a place where Xu Zhigao would withdraw to talk with scholars.63 Among the most prominent scholars that he had discussions with were Sun Cheng (?–956) and (?–958).64 Hailing from , Sun Cheng had passed the jinshi (or doctoral) examination during the Later Liang dynasty. To pass this prestigious exam- ination, candidates had to possess thorough knowledge in history, philosophy and literature, as well as calligraphy. The successful candidates would be eligible for a career in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy. Sun, instead of seeking official employment, pursued a career as a Daoist priest in a temple at Mount Lu. When the Later Tang was established, he left Mount Lu to become an official of the Later Tang but, being implicated in a rebellion, was forced to flee from the north. He had just reached the Huai River when his pursuers caught up with him. A man of quick wit, he kept his cool and pretended to look for lice in the seams of his clothes and gnaw them with his teeth. The pursuers were so appalled by this sight that they let him go. Once he had crossed the Huai River, spies sent out by Xu Zhigao to look out for talented men soon noticed Sun, who was disguised as a Buddhist monk and had shaved his head. They invited him to court and thus, in 926, he entered the service of Xu Zhigao.65 Chen Jue, in contrast, was a southerner from Hailing district, close to the Wu capital. He had caught the attention of Song Qiqiu, who recommended him to Xu Zhigao. After the extension of the city walls of Jinling by almost ten kilometres in 932,66 Song Qiqiu suggested that Xu Zhigao move the imperial family of Wu from Yangzhou to Jinling. Before the transfer of the imperial family, Xu Zhigao ordered the construction of an imperial palace in Jinling in 933.67 Either out of genuine concern or as a means to portray himself as a man caring for the common population – or maybe both – Xu Zhigao released all his courtesans and destroyed all musical instruments in the palace after a series of natural calamities, such as fires and floods, saying that he could The state of Wu 19 not bear to enjoy music and entertainment when the common people suffered hardships.68 The Wu emperor, in the winter of the same year, wanted to award Xu Zhigao more titles, which Xu refused to accept, except for those he already had held previously. He rejected the title of grand preceptor of the emperor, as well as that of grand councillor, because they would have required his regular attendance at court, and that would have been running counter to his aspirations. Prior to these events, Wu Guang, a local strongman of Jianzhou1 (modern Jian’ou), in the territory of Min in Fujian, had come to Xinzhou (modern Shangrao, in Jiangxi), asking for support against Min. Jiang Yanhui, the prefect of Xinzhou, immediately dispatched his troops in an attack on 69 Jianzhou1, without authorization from the court. At first, the campaign went well, and Jiang Yanhui defeated a detachment of Min forces at Pucheng, a town about eighty kilometres south-east of Xinzhou, in early 934. By this time, Xu Zhigao had learnt about the insubordination of Jiang Yanhui and ordered him back into Wu territory. Jiang obliged, for more Min troops, as well as detachments from Wuyue, were on their way to attack him. Before he was able to withdraw, the combined Min and Wuyue forces struck, and he was heavily defeated. Jiang barely escaped with his life and was lucky enough to be spared execution, for the inspector-general Zhang Zhongjin was given the blame for everything and beheaded. The reason for Jiang’s mild punishment was that he was the son-in-law of the Wu emperor, Taizu, and a good friend of (?–937), the crown prince of Wu. Xu Zhigao then negotiated a peace with Min that lasted until the reign of the second Southern Tang emperor. Meanwhile, the intended transfer of the court from Yangzhou to Jinling had met with official resistance, even among the supporters of Xu Zhigao, such as Zhou Zong, who warned Xu about the enormous costs as well as the changing political situation. Zhou Zong pointed out that Xu Wen had always made sure that he was residing outside the capital and the Wu court. Since that had become the norm, Xu Zhigao would have to shift his headquarters from the west, i.e. Jinling, to the east, i.e. Yangzhou. The Wu emperor therefore sent Song Qiqiu to Xu Zhigao with the order to cancel the transfer of the capital. By then, Xu Zhigao had already moved to a new residence in Jinling – on 11 February 935 – to give his old residence to the ruler of Wu.70 Xu Zhigao felt that he had to act quickly, if he wanted to usurp power, but he was uncertain about his backing among the officials, because the emperor of Wu had not committed any serious mistakes so far. Therefore, Xu believed that he could not easily orchestrate a take-over. Song Qiqiu, his closest advisor, similarly believed that the time was not yet right for an attempt to claim the throne. 20 The state of Wu However, unlike his adopted father, Xu Zhigao was not content with merely controlling the Wu court and administration. He definitely harboured concrete plans to establish himself as ruler and remove the Yang family. The longer he waited, the less likely he would be able to carry out his plans however. Age was playing on his mind as well, for he was close to fifty years old already. One morning he remarked to Zhou Zong: ‘The state is safe and I am old, how is that?’ Zhou Zong interpreted this as a hint to begin the usurpation, and so he went to Jiangdu to inform officials at the court of the impending coup d’état. When Song Qiqiu heard about this, he immediately wrote to Xu Zhigao that the time and conditions for such a move were not yet right. He then travelled from Jiangdu to Jinling and suggested that Xu execute Zhou as a scapegoat, in a show of loyalty to the Yang family. Xu Zhigao did not follow Song’s advice to get rid of Zhou, but merely demoted Zhou and posted him to a distant prefecture. At this point, Li Jianxun (?–952) and Xu Jie interfered by stating that Xu Zhigao possessed the backing of the bureaucracy and therefore should proceed with the take-over. In addition, he should also reinstate Zhou Zong. This display of support from two influential officials showed Xu Zhigao that Song had acted out of rather personal reasons against Zhou Zong, and from this time onwards he was very wary of his former closest advisor.71 In late 934, the emperor of Wu wanted to confer a number of titles on Xu Zhigao, among them those of great grand chancellor, revered father and prince of Qi. In addition, he wanted to give him the Nine Insignia (jiuxi), which in the past rulers had bestowed on their most loyal and meritorious vassals. Xu declined all these honours. In 935, Xu Zhigao summoned his son Jingtong to Jinling. He wanted to give his second and favourite son, Jingqian (916–935), who in that year married the favourite daughter of the emperor of Wu,72 a chance to learn about government matters in Guangling. He therefore made Jingqian manager of the affairs of the Wu court and appointed Jingtong to positions he himself had held previously. Xu Jingqian received appointments as chief military commissioner of the armies to the right and the left, left vice director of the department of state affairs and participant in determining governmental matters.73 In the spring of 935, Jingqian was appointed joint manager of affairs with the secretariat–chancellery and manager of the affairs of the left and right armies. This meant that, nominally, Jingqian was now the head of both the civil as well as the military establishment in Wu. Because of his very young age – Jingqian was about nineteen at the time – Xu Zhigao summoned Chen Jue, who worked in the department of state affairs, to assist his son in his duties. He addressed Chen Jue:

In my youth I have discussed matters with Song Zisong, and he gave me good advice in difficult times. Sometimes I sent Zisong back to his The state of Wu 21 place in anger, and sometimes Zisong angrily ruffled his robe and stood up in anger. His clothes thrown in a basket, he wanted to leave through the Qinhuai Gate, but I usually had the gates of the residence closed to stop him. Now I am old and still have not achieved finishing all matters at hand. Jingqian is young and already serves as head of government, and that is why I submit my son to your instruction.74

Song Qiqiu must have welcomed this appointment, because Chen was his follower and thus he could hope to influence future developments through him. Xu Jingtong, for his part, was given (902–970) as advisor. Han had arrived in Wu in 926 as a refugee from the north, where his father had been implicated in an uprising against the Later Tang. In Wu, he was employed, most probably on account of his jinshi degree, as admin- istrative assistant in a number of districts, but made not much of an impression there.75 Xu Zhigao dealt with his remaining adopted brothers quite carefully. When he learnt that Xu Zhi’e had started to use his position as military training commissioner in Runzhou to set up unauthorized trade, he was about to punish Xu Zhi’e. However, one of his advisors suggested that he dismiss the whole matter, in order not to make Xu Zhi’e a martyr for the Xu cause, especially in light of the treatment that Xu Zhixun2 had experienced after Xu Wen’s death at the hands of Zhigao. So, rather than punishing Xu Zhi’e, Xu Zhigao treated him very generously.76 Towards the end of 935, Xu Zhigao again had several high titles conferred upon him by the Wu emperor, including those of revered father, grand preceptor, great grand councillor and field marshal-in-chief. In addition, he was given his own fiefdom, Qi, which consisted of ten prefectures, as well as the title prince of Qi. Xu Zhigao declined the titles of revered father and grand councillor, but accepted the others. Refusal of the titles clearly showed that he did not want to be drawn any further into the Yang family and that he was not satisfied to be a grand councillor only. Qi, as a matter of fact, split the ‘intestines’ of the Wu state and created a state within a state, depriving the imperial family in Yangzhou of their links with the southern provinces and those on the eastern coast.77 In 936, Xu Zhigao set up a grand marshal’s headquarters in Jinling, with a proper bureaucracy structured along the lines of the civil administration, consisting of departments of personnel, revenue, rites, war, justice, works, and salt and iron. With this, Xu Zhigao had put everything in place for a take-over of power.78 His son Xu Jingtong became deputy commander-in-chief of all prefectures, defender-in-chief and vice field marshal. Song Qiqiu and Xu Jie received appointments as left and right adjutants in the headquarters of the field marshal.79 22 The state of Wu In the summer of this year, Xu Jingqian, who had fallen ill,80 was replaced by the third son of Xu Zhigao, Jingsui (920–958), as supervisor of the Wu court. Having arranged everything for a neat take-over by planting his sons and his group of advisors in key positions, Xu Zhigao now had only to take one last step to assume the position of emperor. Bibliography

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