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Home , Esmael Mangudadatu, Isnilon Hapilon, Maguindanao massacre, Mamasapano clash

2020-4074-AJSS – 11 JAN 2021

1 Paramilitaries, generators of capital flow. Examples 2 from , the 3 4 “Capital drives beyond every spatial barrier,” wrote Marx. In case of 5 Mindanao, the national, the local capital is intermingled with the 6 international big capital and the two are often joined, in achieving their best 7 interests. And as in Russian matryoshkas, one capital often hides another. 8 Mindanao is a playground of various geo-political interests‟ between foreign 9 and local elites. Conveniently, the already-existing insurgencies, 10 paramilitary units or purposefully created units are the pawns which are 11 moved - often by the use of some ideology - in order to generate big capital 12 for the account of these elites (Sidel 1989, McCoy 2009). If lucky, skillful 13 and violent enough, some paramilitary-leaders can benefit from their role, 14 and become, at their turn, a new elite in a society shaped by the big capital. 15 While, others, clever in sensing the social changes just continue to ride the 16 „wave‟ their ascendance enabled, ensuring themselves and for their progeny, 17 a secure position in high layer of the social strata. 18 19 Keywords: insurgency, private armies, Muslim extremism, communist 20 rebellion, China 21 22 23 Introduction 24 25 The armed violence -scene of Mindanao is extremely complex. This 26 complexity stems partially from the turbulent history of this part of the world 27 but also from its social conditions and traditional practices of violence on this 28 island. Additionally, the Philippines are a fairly young nation-state, created 29 after the subsequent Spanish, American and Japanese occupations. It has a 30 fairly week central power, which stretched over a geographically complex area 31 made of thousands of islands coupled with an ever-shifting political scene just 32 adds to this complexity (Sidel 1989, Kerkvliet 2002). 33 For starters, Mindanao is a setting for the two longest insurgency 34 movements in this part of the world. Secondly, as well as in other parts of the 35 Philippines, it is a playground to various paramilitary units, which sometimes 36 act as private armies and sometimes are created with an unique, goal-oriented 37 purpose. These units usually serve either the private interests of some local 38 warlord or landlord, often acting according to their private interest or they act 39 as proxies for the state or benefiting some other stakeholder, such as private 40 companies. Thirdly, it is a home of several terrorist units, which are using 41 armed violence under a banner of some kind of ideology, but are mainly land- 42 and sea-pirates, motivated uniquely by spoils. 43 It is well-demonstrated that the local economic and political elites benefit 44 from the violence of these armed actors -which for the sake of simplicity I will 45 refer with a generic term of „paramilitary‟. It is also known that violence 46 created some of the local political elite and new elite is created by violence as 47 we speak. However, due to the upper-mentioned facets which make up the

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1 complexity of the Mindanaoan case, it is often difficult to assess the interplay 2 between the local, the national and international levels of interests. 3 How to see through this complexity? 4 For starters, I propose some preliminary word about the paramilitary scene 5 in this part of the world. 6 Secondly, I suggest mentioning a couple of big „players‟ from the 7 international level who are either present since historically (as f.i. the US) or 8 more than a half of century (China & ) in Mindanao or have put their 9 feet in the past decades (wahhabism). These international players bring with 10 them strong political and economic interests which are usually wrapped up 11 with a concordant ideology and blur the line between means and the goal. They 12 too are present on the paramilitary-scene of Mindanao. 13 Finally, I intend to examine three particular cases in which paramilitary 14 violence either sustained the exiting economic-political elite, either challenged 15 it or wiped-it out. These three cases are illustrations and will shed lights on the 16 international levels of the big capital, because „behind the curtain‟, they are the 17 forces that move the violence-actors as chess-players on the board. Seemingly, 18 these episodes of violence are ideologically and structurally distant, but what 19 they all have in common is either that they challenge or restore the existent 20 social order. The basic intent is to set a comfortable ground for the big capital 21 to strive. And after all said and done: it is the big capital which will resurge as 22 always victorious. 23 24 25 Paramilitary players in Mindanao 26 27 One of the oldest conflicts which occasionally result in an outburst of 28 violence is the so called „Moro insurgency‟. The open hostilities which last 29 since the 1970es between the Philippine government and several Moro 30 insurgent groups are one of the most notorious armed conflicts in this part of 31 the world. For describing the tensions and the open acts of organized violence 32 the term „insurgencies‟ is often used in the related bibliography to describe the 33 armed groups which rebel against the Philippine state (Cruz de Castro 2019). 34 The term „insurgencies‟ used to describe these armed groups is a point of a 35 view of a state whose monopoly over violence in the Weberian manner is 36 challenged by the mere existence of these groups. The English word 37 „insurgent‟ comes from the Latin insurgentem and means „one who rises in 38 revolt‟. That means that the concept of „insurgencies‟ covers a semantic field 39 according to which there is a certain „status quo‟ which the „insurgent‟ refuses 40 and therefore revolts against it. However, this term does not cover the actual 41 motifs, causes and the inner mechanism of a revolt. I argue that the use of the 42 concept „insurgency‟ for describing the efforts of the Moro population should 43 be used carefully: because in order to rebel against a „status quo‟ – a status quo 44 first has to exist. Considering that the Philippines are fairly young nation-state, 45 and that the Moro-insurgency existed already during the American occupation 46 (the s.c. in1899–1913) and continued when Mindanao and

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1 were joined to the Philippine Commonwealth territory of 1935, one has to 2 wonder which status quo is challenged. However and again, for the purpose of 3 simplicity, I suggest using the term of paramilitary instead of insurgency. 4 There are several armed groups leading an armed combat against the 5 Philippine state in the region of Mindanao. The Moro National Liberation 6 Front (MNLF) and its „branch‟ and later the political opponent in the ongoing 7 peace negations, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)1, are fighting for 8 years an armed and a political war in order to achieve territorial and cultural 9 autonomy from the Philippine state. This is was a conflict which lasted for 50 10 years, and it has been accompanied by more or less successful peace 11 negotiations between the representatives of these armed forces and the 12 Philippine state for almost the time. The ARMM and its inheritor BARMM are 13 one of the direct results of the armed struggle. 14 There are other armed groups terrorists, which operates in the Mindanao 15 region such as the Group (ASG), the Jemah Islammiah (JI) and 16 New People‟s Army (NPA). The difference between these armed groups is 17 their political orientation and their geographical area. Abu Sayyaf is a militant 18 Islamist (fundamentalist) group which operates mainly on the islands of 19 and Basilan and its goals are territorial and political independence. 20 The second insurgency group is the New People‟s Army (NPA) which was 21 created at the end of the 1960es and has been active in other parts of the 22 Philippine island, in the Cordillera of the Island or the . 23 However, one of its strongholds has been and still is Mindanao. The NPA is a 24 guerilla organization and has a revolutionary agenda and it is inspired by 25 Leninism-Marxim. 26 The conflict in Mindanao theoretically can be analyzed as according to the 27 „horizontal‟ v.s. „vertical‟ line, as suggested by Arcala-Hall (2017). The 28 „direction‟ means according to which path the conflict-players act: vertical - 29 oriented toward the power-holders or „up‟; or horizontal, toward „equals‟ - 30 groups in similar socio-economic situation. This second, the „horizontal‟ is a 31 conflict between the minority population – which are the Muslim Moros – and 32 the majority – the Christian Filipinos. The existence of Christian militias (such 33 as the armed group – „ilaga‟ meaning the “rats”) who fought against the 34 Moro armed groups just ads to the complexity of the conflict, making the 35 Mindanao situation more than a simple rebellion against the Philippine state, 36 which becomes hence a „vertical conflict‟, in which a group fight a mighty 37 opponent, the State (Arcala-Hall 2017). The horizontal dimension of the 38 Mindanao conflict-scene has also a religious facet to this conflict, because the 39 Moro population is Muslim, while the Philippine majority, not only at the 40 regional level, but also on the level of the whole state is Christian (Catholic). 41 This fact is strongly exploited on the international level, particularly since the 42 global was launched in 2001. There are several Islamist units in 43 Mindanao which are fundamentalists‟ organizations, the , the 44 Misuari Renegade/Breakaway Group (MRG/MBG) and Abu Sayyaf which is

1About MILF see more in Kreuzer(2005), Quimpo (2016) Flaan and Adam(2016)

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1 particularly present in this region. The Filipino-ISIS branch assaulted the city 2 of in the late spring of 2017. Several countries (US, , , 3 etc.) and the design these formations as a terrorist organization. 4 The fact that the MILF and the MNLF are also armed groups whose political 5 ideologies are far from fundamentalist but nevertheless contain elements of 6 religious ideology makes them suspects for either being partially 7 fundamentalist or being linked to radical groups. The conflict between the 8 Moro armed forces and the Philippine state can be therefore be also analyzed 9 under the conditions of religious tensions. 10 There is yet another layer to the general conflictual situation in this region, 11 besides the one between the minority vs. majority and Muslims and Christians. 12 Mindanao is a region rich in resources such as forests, mines and agriculture 13 and fishing. Regions with rich natural resources and weak state apparatus and 14 great social differences are prone to violent conflicts and regular outbursts of 15 armed conflicts (Le Billon 2001, Le Billon 2013, Lujala 2010). The corruption 16 rate is considerable: the Philippines are among the most corrupt countries in the 17 world, ranking 111th out of 180 surveyed in 2017, according to Transparency 18 International. Big international corporations which function in Mindanao are 19 often tools and sources of structural violence from which the poorest strata of 20 the population, particularly the Lumads suffer the most. The wide-spread 21 corruption hand in hand with international corporations which operate almost 22 without control in Mindanao generate systemic poverty: mayors of cities and 23 provincial governors often control private armies which are rented to these 24 companies as „securities‟ and aggravate the conflict with the local population. 25 The Philippine government tried to dismantle and integrate these private armies 26 in order to control the occasional violence and abuse of power, so in 1987 the 27 CAFGU (Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units) were created. However 28 this did not stop the creation of private armies, often labeled as „security‟, it 29 just added to the kaleidoscopic scenery of the private armies, insurgencies, 30 various security forces and (religious) militias. Politics in general are under a 31 control of politicians who are often members of prominent, „notable‟ rich 32 families, called „political families‟(McCoy 2009, Tehenkee 2007). The 33 political kin stemming from these family relations functions as a form of (neo) 34 feudal landlords, controlling territories – which they own or which belong to 35 the communities of which they represent politically (Teehankee 2007, 36 Teehankee & Thompson 2016). In this way agricultural and natural resources 37 as well as „their‟ electorate is controlled. They are also the main factors in the 38 negotiations with international corporations of which they are often 39 shareholders. Philippine law is not respected, as for instance the labor code or 40 the minimum wage prescribed by law. Social injustices are created and the 41 cleavages between the social strata seem to be insurmountable. The political 42 dynasties often own private armies (security) which compete over the 43 monopoly of violence in the region (Sidel 1989, Anderson 1988, Kreuzer 44 2016). These units serve foremost their (private) masters. If the interests of 45 their masters coincide with those of the Philippine state, they act as proxies to 46 the government.

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1 Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the conflict between the groups – 2 particularly between the Christians and the Muslims - was encouraged as a tool 3 of a colonial rule: first by the Spanish, then by the US. Therefore we could 4 argue that a violent conflict - or even better: a religious conflict – is one of the 5 „leftovers‟ of the colonial era2. Before the 1970s, there was peaceful 6 coexistence between the non-Islamized (Christians and the Lumads) and the 7 Islamized natives. Proof to that is when Emilio Aguinaldo (the first de facto 8 President of the First Philippine Republic in 1898), he invited the Moros in 9 Philippine South to join the Federation, that was short-lived due to the 10 infamous "Treaty of Paris" in December 10, 1898. A sort of addendum is that 11 the minoritized population in Philippine South felt that the state becomes a 12 "surrogate" of the majority population (of Christians in the Northern part) 13 being used to reinforced neo-colonial policies institutionalized by the Spanish, 14 then by the Americans. Hence, the Mindanao conflict is also considered as a 15 resource-based conflict among ethnic groups (non-Muslims and Muslim 16 groups)3. 17 In the narratives of individuals4, particularly in the narratives of the 18 representatives of the Moro population, the fact that the Moro population 19 resisted to the Spanish colonial rule for almost 400 years (1521-1898) is an 20 important historical marker. It is repeated in almost every narrative about the 21 desired political and cultural autonomy of the Mindanao region. The fact that 22 the catholic part of the population was exploited by the Spanish colonial forces 23 and consecutively by the American is also often mentioned. The manipulation 24 practices of the Moro population by the US colonial regime is rarely 25 mentioned, on the other hand, the independent Philippine state is now accused 26 of being „neo -colonialized‟ by the contemporary US. 27 28 29 Big capital in Mindanao 30 31 There is a curse which lies upon Mindanao, as in other places of the world 32 in which the abundant natural resources couples with hierarchical, violent 33 societies and extreme poverty: everyone wants his share of the riches and this 34 is goes usually with ruthlessness and tremendous violence upon the population. 35 Behind the existing historical grievances that motivate armed movements 36 and beside the occasional outbursts of violence as forms of struggle for natural 37 or political resources, lies the ever-present main-initiator: big capital. 38 Mindanao is a playground for various capital and geo-political interests‟ 39 between foreign and local elites. Conveniently, the already-existing 40 paramilitary units or purposefully created units are the pawns which are moved 41 - often by the use of ideology which plays the crucial role in the grassroots - in 42 order to generate big capital for the account of the elites. If lucky, skillful and

2The Philippines has been under Spanish, US, an Japanese colonial rule. 3I would like to thank Mlle Yasmira Moner from Mindanao State University for pointing me this out. 4Fieldwork done during summer 2013

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1 violent enough, some paramilitary-leaders can benefit from their role, and 2 become, at their turn, a new elite in a society shaped by the old-new big capital. 3 While, others, smart in sensing the social changes continue to ride the „wave‟ 4 when their ascendance is enabled, ensuring themselves and for their progeny a 5 secure position in high layer of the social strata. 6 For the purposes of this paper, I will mention several of the big 7 international actors which are present in Mindanao. They are the sources of big 8 capital interests and they couple their political goals with a matching ideology. 9 All are motivated by the natural and human resources of Mindanao. This brief 10 sketch will enable the reader to get an idea about the main big-capital players 11 who all have interest in either stepping in for good in Mindanao or in creating a 12 form of a stronghold on this island to which the paramilitary formations and 13 the insurgencies are a convenient tool. 14 Let‟s start with Malaysia. The Sturm und Drang relationship between the 15 two neighboring countries is probably best known in the example of the 16 Sultanate of Sabah. In short, both Malaysia and the Philippines are claiming 17 ownership of Sabah, which is at the island of Borneo (which itself is divided 18 between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Sultanate of Brunei). The Sultanate of 19 Sulu obtained Sabah from the Sultanate of Brunei as a gift for helping put 20 down a rebellion. It leased Sabah to the British North Borneo Co. in 1878, but 21 Sabah became part of Malaysia when it gained independence in 1963. While 22 Sabah became part of Malaysia in 1963, Kuala Lumpur pays an annual rent of 23 5,300 ringgit (aprox. US$1,600) to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu. Both 24 Malaysia and the Philippines claim right on Sabah. 25 Additionally, Malaysia played a crucial role of one of the international 26 mediators in the peace-negotiation process between the MILF and MNLF and 27 the Philippine government. What is problematic is the conflict of interest that 28 Malaysia has as a mediator. Primarily, MILF is backed in trough unofficial 29 channel from Malaysia. For instance, members of the MILF received military 30 training in Sabah5. Secondly, a Malaysian national oil company, Petronas 31 started during the 90‟s an exploration of a marshland area (Liguasan Marsh) in 32 Mindanao, rich in supply of natural gas6. The PNOC (Philippine National Oil 33 Company) and Petronas suspended operations in the Liguasan Marsh area due 34 to threats from the MILF and extortion by local mayors and political warlords. 35 From the time it stopped the exploration, the collected data from the 36 marshlands had already placed Mindanao‟s untapped mineral wealth worth 37 between $840 billion and $1 trillion7. Among Mindanao‟s minerals that could 38 be found, explored and transformed to money include gold, copper, nickel, 39 manganese, chromite, silver, lead, zinc, and iron ore. In an interesting turn of 40 events, MILF has now allotted 75% shares of Liguasan Marsh estimated to be 41 worth US$500 billion of oil and gas deposits in to Petronas Malaysia, 42 20% to unknown interests (presumably Philippine government cronies) and 5%

5https://larouchepub.com/other/1995/2241_philippines_terror.html 6https://therhsssnews.wordpress.com/2012/01/31/philippines-discover-deposits-of-oil-and-gas- in-mindanao 7idem

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1 shares to MILF8. Considering that funds which were supporting the MILF 2 during the years of insurgency were channeled through Malaysia, this country 3 was in position to dictate terms to the MILF. When it comes to the resources 4 from the marshlands, MILF seems to play the role of the proxy of Malaysia. 5 Secondly, we have the USA‟s interests in the region. Beside the strategic 6 position of the Philippine islands in this part of world, the Philippines islands 7 make them a convenient pied-a-terre for the US military bases. The Americans 8 too are aware about the abundance of the natural resources of Mindanao. Based 9 on the US intelligence assessment which was leaked through Wikileaks, “the 10 Philippines may have untapped minerals worth between US$840 billion to 11 US$1 trillion” in Mindanao9. The US intelligence assessment was included in 12 the 2006 "unclassified/for official use only" cable from the US embassy in 13 released online by -based Andrew Macgregor 14 Marshall and can be seen at the site of Wikileaks10. From this assessment, we 15 can learn that the US government has long funding intelligence gathering 16 operations just to keep an eye over the untouched treasures of Mindanao. The 17 American assessment too identifies the Liguasan Marsh as resource-potential. 18 Besides being controlled by the MILF, the marshland is in an area where the 19 warring political dynasties are situated who also have claims of ownership for 20 this land. Among the claimers are the dynasties of Candao, Mangundadatu, 21 Ampatuan and Pendatun clans. In parallel MILF claims a communal, Muslim 22 (ummah) legacy of this land. 23 Being aware that a long-lasting conflict between the Philippine 24 government and the MILF could prevent any exploitation of the Mindanaoan 25 resources, the US jumped in as one of the acting peace-brokers. 26 Unofficially some American military presence in the armed conflicts of the 27 island indicates that the US government is willing to back-up its intention with 28 manu militari if needed. For instance, after the clash, a local 29 farmer confirmed to the Philippine press that a "blue-eyed" American soldier 30 was among the casualties. The U.S. embassy denied any involvement in the 31 clash. This incident is just one of several in Mindanao that happened the past 32 two decades, which indicates that the economic interest are in some form 33 backed-up with armed units. 34 And then we have China. China is active on the paramilitary-scene of the 35 Philippines since the creation of the New People's Army (NPA) which is the 36 armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). NPA is 37 ideologically orientated as Marxist-Leninist. Similarly to the MILF, the NPA 38 has a long history of four decades of armed clashes with the Philippine 39 government forces. They finance themselves trough „revolutionary taxes‟, by 40 taxing locals, communities and businesses. It is estimated that NPA 41 collects two billion pesos each year from "revolutionary taxes" that are usually

8https://www.pesoreserve.com/2011/08/wikileaks-us-says-island-mindanao-has-1.html 9https://www.pesoreserve.com/2011/08/wikileaks-us-says-island-mindanao-has-1.html 10http://newsflash.org/2004/02/be/be004421.htm

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1 2% of any business project in the region. In December 2016, it was estimated 2 that NPA counted 3,800 fighters with more than 4,500 firearms11. 3 At the beginning NPA was heavily supported by Maoist China: with 4 weapons, training and funding. However, once China established diplomatic 5 relations with the Philippines, although the basic ideological sympathy 6 remained, an unhinged supply of weapons, ammunition and funds became 7 difficult. 8 Considering that China has interest in maintaining its military presence in the 9 South Chinese Sea, while having in mind that China claims its rights on the 10 Spratly islands12, China uses its ideological influence and its assistance to help 11 the NPA with the goal to create leverage on the Philippines. 12 China also fosters smuggling of precious metals from the Philippines. 13 With its occupation of the Scarborough Shoal (what China calls “Huanyin 14 Island”), smuggling precious metals from the Philippines to a China base has 15 become more opportune especially after the island was transformed into a four 16 story fortress13. China also occupied in 1996 the Mischief Reef, located just 75 17 miles from Palawan. 18 China has a history of mining in the Philippines. The Chinese mining- 19 companies started pouring into the Philippines during the presidency of Gloria 20 Macapagal-Arroyo. 26 Chinese corporations registered in the Philippines to 21 mine for gold, iron ore, nickel, copper, manganese, lead, zinc, chromate and 22 cobalt. They operate in 16 provinces in the Philippines: Cagayan, Benguet, 23 Zambales, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Palawan, Leyte, Eastern Samar, 24 Bohol, , Misamis Oriental, Davao Oriental, Surigao del Norte, Sultan 25 Kudarat, Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur14. 26 More recently, China further developed its investments in the mining- 27 sector in the Philippines the last decade. According to the investigative 28 journalist‟s reports, China is a pretty „dirty‟ player when it comes to respecting 29 tax-payments or obtaining exploration-permits (Stern 2016). Chinese frontmen 30 also use corruption to bribe local politicians and officials for approvals. The 31 impact on the environment of such mining-explorations is environmentally 32 lethal. Additionaly, China is one of major clients of the Philippines in mining- 33 products. However, according to the legal documentation, China, although not 34 appearing as the top mining-investor in the country, somehow manages to 35 exploit the most the mining-resources. Investigative journalism demonstrates 36 that Chinese mining companies use secret permits and agreements and 37 Philippine subsidiaries to get the goodies. 38 There is no accurate data about how many Chinese mining-companies 39 exists and operate in Mindanao. However, in December 2012, 25 major 40 Chinese mining investments operated in the Philippines (Stern 2016). One can

11https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/new-peoples-army-npa-philippines 12Spartly islands dispute between the Philippines and China, known as the South China Sea dispute 13https://mambulaoansworldwidebuzz.blogspot.com/2012/12/focus-chinas-mining-occupation- of.html 14https://globalnation.inquirer.net/59379/chinas-mining-occupation-of-the-philippines

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1 only speculate that this number is way higher, because a legal „whole‟ in the 2 local legislation: in the Philippines foreign-owned companies may be granted 3 mineral processing permits, mineral exploration permits, as well as financial 4 technical assistance agreements (FTAA). However, only Filipino individuals or 5 corporations can obtain mineral contracts to be able to conduct full mining 6 operations. Mineral production sharing agreements (MPSA), on the other hand, 7 are only given to firms that are 60% owned by Filipinos (Stern 2016). Hence, 8 financing a local datu enables a mining-exploitation that goes under the radar 9 of the government. 10 Interestingly, as other capital-ventures the mining-exploitations, the 11 (Chinese) mining companies also have a right to private security forces. Hence 12 under the pretext of arming companies‟ security forces and under the pretext of 13 needing explosives which are abundantly used in the mining industry, (foreign) 14 weapons are shipped to Mindanao. 15 In 2014 NPA rebels in Mindanao started showing off their AK-47s at 16 about the same time that some 1,000 of these assault rifles were bought by a 17 businessman based in the region15. According to the local press, the rifles were 18 purportedly bought for security forces in the mining-sector. The broker even 19 obtained a clearance and license from the Philippines Firearms and Explosive 20 Office. Apparently the rifles were a Chinese variant of the well-known model. 21 The Philippine authorities suspected that these AK-47 came from China. 22 Last, but not least, there is another big international player sustaining the 23 culture of paramilitary units in Mindanao: wahhabism. In the recent years, 24 has become a new battleground, a new „frontier‟ of jihadi 25 groups such as Isis and Al-Qaeda. Paramilitary groups inspired and funded by 26 Saudi and Qatari wahhabism sprout in Indonesia, Malaysia and the 27 Philippines16. Wahhabit-money and ideology influenced young Southeast 28 Asian men to partake in the Syrian conflict. The flow of funds and men also 29 created war-returnees, who once backed in Asia, instigated new branches of 30 ISIS & Al-Qaeda. Through the channel of war-returnees and mostly young 31 indoctrinated scholars, Saudi and Qatari money launched new paramilitary- 32 movements in Mindanao to which Aby-Sayyaf was one precursor. The 33 Marawi-battle was another example. The ultimate goal of Wahhabism is one 34 global Islamic community with one doctrine, Wahhabism, ruled by one 35 Khalifah (Alvi 2014). Over the last few decades, has spent more 36 than US$100 billion exporting Wahhabism to all corners of the globe17. 37 Thousands of mosques, seminaries, universities, schools and community 38 centers have been built, while thousands of , teachers and activists have 39 been educated, trained and shipped across the world along with Wahhabi- 40 approved textbooks and other literature. Naturally Saudi Arabia and Qatar 41 invest also legally in the Philippines, mainly in the agricultural sector. 42

15https://www.rappler.com/nation/60279-ak47-communist-rebels 16https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/wahhabism-in-southeast-asia 17https://www.ucanews.com/news/the-wahhabi-threat-to-southeast-asia/73276

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1 2 Let the Blood Flow - Big Capital needs it 3 4 In order to illustrate how big capital generates paramilitary violence in 5 Mindanao, I suggest discussing three separate cases of armed clashes. They all 6 illustrate the intrinsic relation of big capital and armed violence on this island. 7 They offer example of how paramilitary units sustain the existing order. These 8 cases also provide insight into how the paramilitary units challenge the existing 9 social order and demonstrate how the existing order is maintained. What these 10 incidents all have in common is that they strongly resonated on the 11 international media-scene, they have been abundantly reported on and were 12 analyzed from various angles - hence the motive to elaborate on them. 13 14 15 One 16 17 In November 2009 in the province of in Mindanao, a convoy 18 of cars containing 58 passengers, soon to be victims, was stopped by 100 19 armed men. The cars and the passengers were abducted and shot. Five of the 20 female victims were raped before they were killed. All of the abducted women 21 were shot in genitals and later beheaded. The cars and the bodies were buried 22 in pit which was dug previously with an excavator. The cars in the convoy 23 were containing Mindanaoan , friends and family-members of 24 , at the time the vice mayor of the city of . The 25 convoy goal was to file a certificate of candidacy for Mangudadatu for the 26 forthcoming Maguindanao gubernatorial election. Mangudadatu challenged the 27 mayor of the municipality of , Andal Ampatuan Jr., the son of the 28 incumbent Maguindanao governor Andal Ampatuan Sr. 29 After the killing, which was later known as the „‟ 30 and became the biggest killing of journalists in the world, all proof pointed 31 toward the Ampatuan clan. The Ampatuan clan is one of the leading Muslim 32 political clans in Mindanao. The excavators belonged to the Ampatuans. 33 Andal Ampatuan Sr., the patriarch of the Ampatuan clan was also the 34 founder of this political dynasty as it is in its present state. He went from being 35 a commander of a paramilitary unit to vice mayor and then mayor of Maganoy 36 (now ), a municipality in Maguindanao. Ampatuan Sr. knew how 37 to pick sides, he sided with the anti-Marcos insurgency and when the Marcos 38 regimes was overthrown, two years after the 1986 “” 39 which drove Marcos from power, Ampatuan, Sr. was reelected mayor of 40 Maganoy. It was an election plagued by violence: opponents of the political 41 rise of Andal Amaptuan sr. were killed in the process. Starting from the second 42 half of the 1980s the Ampatuans gained commercial power by using threats 43 and unlawful force to acquire land. The people whose lands were seized had 44 two choices: either to allow the Ampatuans to buy the land or to get a bullet. 45 As the years went by, crimes such as killings, land-appropriation and 46 extortion committed by the clan continued - their political influence grew.

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1 They have committed the past four decades at least 200 killings. Human Right 2 Watch collected 56 different cases of killing between the period of 1988 and 3 2009 (before the Maguindanao massacre) committed by either by one of the 4 Ampatuans or by their men. The Ampatuans were never prosecuted for the 5 killings and extortions. Their private army was made from policemen, 6 CAFGUs, and those men who lived on „their‟ land, the region under their 7 governance and who were more or less forcibly „drafted‟, often wearing (& 8 shooting) guns for the clan, usually to be paid with a sack of rice. 9 The Maguindanao massacre was just a tragedy in waiting but it was too 10 much, even for the Philippine circumstances. The arrests that followed the 11 November 2009 Maguindanao massacre appear to have weakened, but didn‟t 12 eliminate the Ampatuan power in Mindanao. As a result of the May 2010 13 elections, 8 of the 34 mayors in Maguindanao carry the Ampatuan name; while 14 others are related to Ampatuan, Sr. 15 Now, long before the Maguindanao massacre, the documents leaked by 16 Wikileaks, dated February 2006 and prior in which the Mindanaoan 17 marshlands are particularly discussed, describe the tensions between local clans 18 about the property of Liguasan. Among the claimers (see supra) were and still 19 are the clans of Mangundadatu and Ampatuan. The political challenge was just 20 a pretext to the massacre. The ownership of the Liguasan Marshland is worth a 21 lot of money - enough to wipe off from the face of the earth anyone who could 22 challenge in the future the Ampatuans legitimacy to this ownership. The risk 23 was worth taking. 24 The Ampatuan clan has controlled who lives and who dies in the 25 Maguindanao province for four decades. The rise was enabled due to the 26 willingness of the clan leader to exchange violence for political interests. The 27 clan and its paramilitary unit („private army‟) made of from 2000 to 5000 28 armed men, with an arsenal of 5000 guns (at the time of the Maguindanao 29 massacre) has served the interests of the government of Manila. These forces 30 and social capital were used first to help pull down the Marcos dictatorship, 31 and later by assuring presidential candidate-votes in the province - particularly 32 for the presidency of . During her presidency, the 33 Ampatuans were popularly referred to as her „monsters‟…. The local 34 population often saw the men of Ampatuan as the prolongation of the 35 Philippine government and the army. They came handy in dealing with the 36 insurgency movements in Mindanao (MILF and NPA): the Ampatuan‟s private 37 army played the role of the proxy of Manila. The Ampatuan men were armed 38 by the Philippine army. Although Muslims, the Ampatuans have been loyal 39 allies to Manila against the Moro insurgency (MILF). Analyzing the list of 40 their victims provided by the HRW, it becomes evident that they systematically 41 „removed‟ all individuals suspected being an actor or sympathizer of the Moro 42 insurgency. Nec plus ultra: it was their interests to eliminate any possible 43 „rising-star‟ of the insurgency, a future warlord or a paramilitary leader, who, 44 as once Andal Sr. did, would rise and establish a new political clan in the 45 region.

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1 At least 198 suspects, including Andal Ampatuan Jr. and Andal Ampatuan 2 Sr. and several other members of the Ampatuan clan, were charged with 3 after the Maguindanao massacre. Andal Sr. died at the age of 75 before 4 his trial. 5 The Mangudadatus have become the big players in the region, although the 6 Ampatuans are still strongly present. The Liguasan marshland future remains 7 uncertain. 8 9 10 Two 11 12 In September 2015 the Philippine media reported a clash in Surigao del 13 Sur region in Mindanao between the anti-communist paramilitary unit called 14 Magahat Bagani and the communist-Maoist NPA. The Magahat Bagani was a 15 security threat in this province of Mindanao for a while. Magahat Bagani was 16 the same armed forced that killed a Lumad school director and a couple of 17 Lumad residents in the same region previously. The Lumad in question belong 18 to the Manobo ethnic minority of Mindanao. 19 The three individuals which were executed by the Magahat Bagani at the 20 beginning of September and started the series of armed clashes was Emerico 21 Samarca, the executive director of the Alternative Learning Center for 22 Agricultural and Livelihood Development (Alcadev). Samarca was found dead 23 inside a classroom. He had a stab wound and his throat was slit open. The two 24 others were Dionel Campos and his cousin Aurelio Sinzo, and they were killed 25 in front of the villagers. Campos was a community leader and the chairperson 26 of the indigenous people group Maluhutayong Pakigbisog Alansa sa 27 Sumusunod (Mapasu), which is known for its firm position on the protection of 28 ancestral lands and its campaign against human rights violations targeting 29 indigenous people. 30 The Magahat-Bagani also burned down the building of a community 31 cooperative not far from the school compound. Due to these incidents and the 32 others that followed soon some 3,000 Lumads were displaced, fleeing from the 33 Magahat Bagani. 34 The Lumads in Mindanao originally are the un-Islamized and un- 35 Christianized ethnic groups of the island. The Lumads became politically 36 organized during the Marcos-regime, as a response to the . They 37 lost a part of their ancestral lands due to the incapacity to adhere to the modern 38 land tenure system. In their efforts to protect their lands and their community, 39 some of the Lumad communities have become a stronghold to the NPA which 40 become widespread, and sometimes welcomed, particularly because of its 41 communist-Maoist ideology. NPA systematically recruit its armed forces from 42 the Lumad communities. In that sense the Lumads of Mindanao found 43 themselves in the crossfire between the Philippine army and the NPA. As 44 members of indigenous nations, representative of Lumads of Mindanao have 45 turned to UN for protection, but without major success.

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1 The NPA is collecting its „revolutionary taxes‟ partially from the Lumad 2 community members. The taxes are to be paid by the sympathizers and by 3 those who are not. Caught in the middle, the Lumad communities are often 4 accused by the Philippine government that they are „influenced‟ and „led‟ by 5 the NPA. 6 Magahat Bagani, the main actor of this example, seems to be a 7 purposefully created paramilitary unit. At the funeral of two of the three 8 massacre victims in September 2015, three military and paramilitary personnel 9 were apprehended by Lumad marshals. They were caught taking photos and 10 videos of Lumad leaders and supporters as thousands prepare to bury the 11 victims. The witnesses identified one of them as a member of Magahat Bagani. 12 Later as a response, the Philippine army issued a statement that the military 13 caught during the funeral were actually within their mission. No statement 14 about the member of Magahat Bagani, caught along with the military personal 15 was issued. It wouldn‟t be the first time that the Philippine army uses 16 paramilitary proxies to deal with its opponents. Hence, the creation of a new, 17 disposable „monster‟, such as the Magahat Bagani is plausible. 18 Two years after the killing of the Lumad representatives, Duterte declared 19 that the NPA should figure as a terrorist organization (November 2017). The 20 international reaction was immediate and loud: the Lumad representatives of 21 the Philippines, present of the international scene, accused Duterte of trying to 22 annihilate the indigenous rights, by outlawing their representatives as 23 „communist terrorist‟. They claimed that Lumads stand between Duterte and 24 his goal of industrial priorities in the region. Duterte and his regime were 25 accused of indigenous human rights abuses. Several NGO leaders - among 26 them Lumad individuals too- were placed on a list of 600 so-called terrorists as 27 part of a petition filed in court seeking to declare the Communist Party and its 28 armed wing as terrorist organizations. Indisputably the Philippines figure on 29 the top a list of Global Witness, a non-profit organization which monitors the 30 killings worldwide of people fighting to protect their land and ecosystems from 31 destructive industries. However, as always in the case of Mindanao, an 32 interesting turn of events demonstrates that nothing is simple on this island as it 33 seems. 34 In spring 2019, the Duterte administration presented evidence to the 35 that some of the received EU funds actually end up in the 36 pockets of the communist insurgency in the Philippines. 37 The EUs ambassador in the Philippines admitted that two million of euros 38 were to be released to a local NGO, called Rural Missionaries of the 39 Philippines, a group that the Philippine officials have accused of being a legal 40 front of communist insurgency. Evidence was provided to the EU according to 41 which the European funds were granted to a certain group which was acting as 42 legal front of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed 43 wing, the New People‟s Army (NPA). The EU conducted an audit. It has to be 44 said, that the EU classified the NPA as a „terrorist group‟ since 2005. Damage- 45 control ensued by the EU.

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1 Similarly, the Belgian government too was finger pointed. They funded the 2 CPP-NPA through various NGOs in the Philippines which acted as legal fronts 3 to the communist insurgency. Three Belgian organizations were identified 4 (Solidagro, Viva Salud and Kiyo) as funders of the „reds‟. Many local NGOs, 5 financed by the upper three Belgian organizations, received Belgian/EU money 6 and acted as cover to the communist paramilitaries: among them the upper 7 mentioned Alliance of Concerned Teachers Alternative Learning Center for 8 Agricultural and Livelihood Development (Alcadev). It was with them that 9 Magahat Bagani was used to deal with. 10 Considering the complexity of the Mindanaoan case, one has to ask the 11 eternal question quid bono - who benefits. Indisputably the European 12 intelligence agencies is far from being perfectly functional, however it seems 13 unlikely that the Belgian government and the EU were unaware where does the 14 Belgian/European taxpayers money go. The EU has economic interests in 15 Mindanao, and since the Duterte‟s presidency the ties between (mainly) 16 western European countries and the Philippines are pretty tense. The Duterte‟s 17 regime is incessantly criticized and labeled as „populist‟ (even „right-wing‟). 18 Duterte‟s name is eternally linked in the western media with his „war against 19 drugs‟ (Oplan Tokhang) which can be resumed as extrajudicial killings of all 20 individuals who are (presumably) tied with drug-abuse and trade. 21 Although it is highly unlikely that the EU would be willing (and able) to 22 directly fund an insurgency movement to destabilize a regime - even if it is 23 tyrannical – the financial support of an (unofficial) strategy to discredit as 24 much as possible a (uncooperative) administration - is not unimaginable. 25 On the other hand, there is a third party which benefits not matter how the 26 wind blows. China continues to supply weapons trough unofficial channels to 27 the NPA. The brand new AK-47 which were seized after the conflict between 28 the NPA and Magahat Bagani and in other circumstances are of Chinese 29 origins. The environment-protection oriented Lumad grassroots‟ NGOs are 30 directly directed against the Chinese mining-activities. They represent a more 31 or less serious obstacle in quiet extraction of precious materials from the 32 beautiful mountains of Mindanao. However if the ecologically oriented NGOs 33 would be discredited in some manner - as for instance linked with an armed 34 insurgency -this would at least for a time enable undisturbed mining-activities 35 in the province. China is the biggest beneficiary in both versions of events: 36 with one stroke the NPA is funded and ideologically motivated (kept prepared 37 if needed for some future use). NPA is one of the oldest insurgency movements 38 in the Philippines and is still one of the key armed players in Mindanao. In a 39 clash state v.s. insurgency movements, historically speaking, insurgencies are 40 often successful, hence China‟s interest to keep them financed and armed. With 41 the same stroke the ties between the Lumad and the NPA makes it easy to 42 discredit the ecologically oriented Lumad-movements. 43 As in a mirror-image, the same goes for the Philippine government. 44 Manila just had to lie back and wait for the actors to discredit themselves and 45 reap the benefits. 46

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1 Three 2 3 The Marawi-crisis, often called as the Battle of Marawi was a mini-war 4 which lasted five months in 2017 in Mindanao. In was the longest urban battle 5 in the modern history of the Philippines and the first serious armed clash for 6 the Duterte administration. 7 The city of Marawi was under siege by the Philippine government security 8 forces (the army and special police forces). The city was taken hostage by at 9 least three different paramilitary-units: Aby Sayyaf, the Maute-group and 10 Ansar Khalifa Philippines; although according to the press-releases, individual 11 members of the MILF who joined one of these units participated as well. Some 12 of them, wearing MILF uniforms were among the casualties. 13 The mini-war resulted in 978 killed militants (13 foreigners; unofficially 14 from Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia), 168 killed government 15 forces and 87 dead civilians (40 due to illness). Most of the city was destroyed 16 and damaged beyond repair and at some point 300 000 civilians were 17 evacuated. 18 The city of Marawi before the siege was an important Muslim religious 19 and cultural center of Mindanao. Foremost it is cultural and social center of the 20 Maranao/Maranaw (Muslim) ethnic group of Mindanao and an important hub 21 of the region. 22 According to the Philippine government, the Marawi-crisis began during 23 an offensive in Marawi to capture , the leader of the ISIL- 24 affiliated Abu Sayyaf group. However, citizens reported months before the 25 actual battle that various armed groups, with ISIS-insignias were seen in the 26 city. For months the members of various Islamist paramilitary units have been 27 plaguing the (Christian minority) citizens of the city. Marawi - being an urban 28 Moro-center, and as one of the MILF-strongholds, got used to the sight of 29 armed Muslim paramilitary unit-members marching up and down in the city. 30 They belonged to the urban scenography. When the Islamists paramilitary unit- 31 members started slowly pouring into the city no greater public attention was 32 given to them. 33 The Maute-group (founded by two brothers with the same family-name) 34 was most made of former members of the MILF. Additionally some of the 35 members, the leaders included had afinal kinship-ties with members, 36 particularly leaders of the MILF. The Maute-group split from MILF in 2013. 37 By 2013 they were associated with Jemaah Islamiya and in 2015, along with 38 another Philippine Islamist paramilitary formation, the Ansar Khalifa 39 Philippines (also from Mindanao), they pledged allegiance to the . 40 Before the Marawi-battle, they had several activities in Mindanao: they 41 abducted six and beheaded two sawmill workers in and were behind the 42 2016 bombing (in which 14 people died and 70 were injured). 43 The Maute-group is affiliated with another, older Islamist paramilitary 44 formation, the Abu Sayyaf, a militant jihadi formation. The Abu Sayyaf is a 45 breakaway group of the MNLF (N.B. MILF stems also from MNLF). This

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1 formation is behind some of the worst terrorist attacks in the Philippines since 2 the 2000‟s. 3 In spring 2017 the Philippine military and police conducted joint zoning in 4 Marawi to validate the information that suspicious personalities (the Maute 5 brothers) in the city when they spotted Insilon Hapilon. An operation was 6 launched to capture these men, which turned into siege. During the siege MILF 7 leaders volunteered (a weak after the first clash) to meditate between the 8 Philippine government and the leaders of the Maute- and the Aby Sayyaf 9 Islamists. MILF also facilitated ceasefire and offered humanitarian assistance 10 to the civilians‟ trapped in the city under siege. As the siege kept going, some 11 local warlords/community leaders or datu-s realized that the time had come to 12 pick sides. Several datu-s played a crucial role in negotiating in on-to-one 13 negotiations with the leaders of the Islamists leaders to release hostage and in 14 saving trapped Christian civilians. 15 The warlord-datu-s who actively took part in negotiating directly with the 16 Islamists during the siege are members of the lustrous local political clans. 17 Among the clan-members which took part are the Alonto18 and the Lucman 18 clan. Considering that the province of „belongs‟ to them it was 19 natural order of things in Mindanaoan circumstances. During the clash (June 20 2017), the Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre II claimed that the clan members 21 of Alonto-Lucman met with several Philippine lawmakers and members of the 22 Duterte-opposition prior to the siege with a goal to discuss the destabilization 23 of the Duterte administration. Later the Justice Secretary denied his statement 24 and stated that he was misquoted. 25 The Alonto-Lucman clans are one of the oldest politically active clans in 26 Mindanao. In the 1934 Constitutional Convention that framed the 1935 27 Philippine Constitution (used as the fundamental law of the Commonwealth 28 and 1946 Republic of the Philippines), several elected Muslim Constitutional 29 delegates, led by Alauya Alonto, the first Muslim senator, called upon their 30 fellow delegates not only to cease from calling Muslims as Moros but also to 31 accept Muslims as part of the Filipino nation (Buendia 2005:113). Another 32 Alonto, was a member of the House of Representatives, proclaimed before the 33 First National Muslim Convention in 1955: “We need a thorough spiritual 34 rejuvenation ... If we are good Muslims, we are automatically good citizens." 35 (Buendia 2005:114) While another Lucman formed the Bangsa Moro 36 Liberation Organisation (BMLO) in 1971 (Buendia 2005:114). 37 One of the members of the Aloncto-Lucman clans, I will refer to as NAL, 38 a former deputy governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, 39 directly took part in negotiating with the Islamist unit-leaders during the siege 40 of Marawi. Fluent in five languages (Tagalog, Maranao, , French and 41 English) well educated – partially in US -, he served in his youth as a 42 diplomatic representative, a writer, a playboy but foremost a warlord. In a 43 loose friendly conversation, NAL explained to us that he “inherited 1000 men

18See Buendia (2005) about the Alonto clan

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1 from his father”19, who are “at his disposal at all time” to fight [for him] if 2 necessary. He made sure to underline that he didn‟t choose to have these men 3 as his subordinates, but it‟s his “obligation to command them”. These men 4 “count on him”. He related an anecdote in which he played a decisive role: a 5 Swiss citizen, an investor present in Mindanao was kidnapped by some armed 6 units (he didn‟t explain which ones)20. He omitted to explain how he was called 7 to intervene in the negotiations with the hostage-takers. When a phone line was 8 established with the hostage-takers e insisted to speak with the hostage. 9 Knowing that the hostage is Swiss and that the line is eavesdropped by the 10 hostage-takers, as soon as he had on line the hostage he asked him in French 11 what is the first thing that he (the hostage) is seeing around him. Before the 12 liaison was interrupted by the hostage-takers who realized that they will not 13 understand the rest of the conversation for the simple reason they didn‟t spoke 14 French, the hostage managed to utter that he sees a lake. This element was 15 enough for NAL to establish the exact location where the hostage was held and 16 the Philippine army was able to locate him and safely recovered his freedom. 17 During the siege it was again a moment for NAL to shine. He took the 18 fleeing Christian civilians in Marawi in his house under his protection and 19 refused to hand them over when the Islamists besieged his house. The story 20 was lavishly covered even by the international news agencies in lengthy 21 reportages about the armed clashes in Marawi. It remains unclear if those 1000 22 men inherited from his father played a crucial role in why the Islamist 23 paramilitary didn‟t insist on him handing out the civilians. The story circulated 24 for weeks in the international media. He became one of the heroes of the mini- 25 war. Months after the siege, with Marawi almost completely destroyed (only 26 70 % of inhabitants returned), the relationship between Christians and Muslims 27 in the region (Iligan city included) shaken by this experience, NAL admitted on 28 his profile that part of the guilt lies on the “hospitality of the Marawi 29 (Muslim) citizens” who accepted and ignored the true nature of the 30 paramilitaries which infiltrated their city and caused its destruction. 31 Flirting with foreign, Saudi (wahhabit) money is no stranger to the 32 community leaders of the city. For instance, foreign money built the beautiful 33 Aga Khan Museum in Marawi and financed Muslim scholars of Marawi City 34 University. The Islamist paramilitary unit leaders who have chosen to settle in 35 Marawi surely didn‟t came empty-handed. It was after the siege that the 36 Philippine military discovered that the Islamic state funded with 1.5 million US 37 dollars the so called „insurgents‟ (aka the Islamists). The media stated that the 38 Iraqi city of Mosul was used as a blueprint to take over Marawi. 39 The Mautes were killed in August and in October 2017 as well as Isnilon 40 Hapilon. However, a new paramilitary group took the vacant position: the 41 successor group has been labeled as the "Turaifie group" a faction which split

19Fieldwork from 2013 20Hostage-taking of foreigners is the favorite pastime and mean of self-financing of the Philippine paramilitaries

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1 from the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) which is itself a 2 breakaway of MILF. 3 Two years exactly after the Marawi-clash, NAL was a Vice gubernatorial 4 candidate in the midterm elections of 2019 in Mindanao. He was not elected. 5 He complained to the local press that the elections were rigged. 6 7 8 Conclusion 9 10 These three briefly described examples all happened in Mindanao in a 11 period less than a decade and they were all acts of extreme violence. What they 12 all do have in common is the instrumentalization of paramilitary units, whether 13 they are employed by the government or by private parties. 14 The example „One‟ demonstrates the upward social mobility that an 15 unhinged violence can ensure in Mindanao. Violence assured the rise of an 16 individual who ensured his place by positioning his kinship and afinal kinship 17 members in such a manner that they guaranteed the social ascendance of the 18 whole clan for the past forty years and probably for the decades to come. Being 19 aware of how the use of violence is a tool of social mobility, the former 20 warlord Ampatuan made sure to eliminate all possible challengers and all risks 21 were just worth taking for that goal. Older, more known Ampatuan family 22 members did fall, however the clan didn‟t and survived the blow which ensued 23 by the national government. After all said and wrote about the Maguindanao 24 massacre, little attention was given to the „spark‟ that potentially caused a 25 massacre of such a great scale: the natural resource-abundant Liguasan 26 Marshlands. The marshlands are the pivotal point on which several 27 international sides and local players are fighting. Political influence breeds 28 capital, hence it is vital who will politically dominate the region with such a 29 treasure. Private armies and insurgencies are those who are going to make 30 things happen. 31 The western media has the distressing habit to simplify circumstances that 32 accompany killings of the NGO-members in Mindanao. The sensationalism- 33 hungry foreign press is always eager to describe violent killing of partisans of 34 some righteous cause which heightens the moral outrage of an eventual reader. 35 However what example „Two‟ demonstrates that no conflict is simple as it 36 seems in Mindanao. Mindanao, due to its natural riches is in a center of several 37 foreign interests which are keen to get their share. Their task is easier because 38 of the political situation in Mindanao, which probably didn‟t know any 39 prolonged peace since centuries. Mindanao is home of two major insurgencies 40 and as the cases demonstrates the field of numerous „small‟ terrorist, 41 paramilitary formations and private armies. They are the convenient device to 42 achieve economic and political interests on a short- or long-term. Not even the 43 ecologically-oriented NGOs are spared from being instrumentalized. From the 44 historical perspective, this case wouldn‟t be the first in which big capital 45 interests, disguised as a NGO, sustain a revolutionary („red‟) insurgency and 46 manipulate humanitarian - in this case, ecological ideology to outsmart the

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1 existing political setting. We only have to remember how Wall Street financed 2 the Bolshevik revolution, which went so far that bankers disguised as members 3 of the Red Cross during WWI went to Russia to establish future alliances with 4 the leading revolutionaries (Suton 1974). Capital doesn‟t recognize ideology; it 5 recognizes opportunity and uses all possible means to succeed. 6 Alfred McCoy‟s „Anarchy of the families‟‟ (1993) resumes the basic 7 concept which is held as cornerstone of any political study about the Philippine 8 state: that the family is a special unit of analysis. Most of the political and 9 economic strategies are developed and operationalized within families. There is 10 visible evolution of strategies and tactics as generations‟ progress: most 11 successful families held office through three colonial regimes and five 12 republics. There is clearly a set of specific social practices that enable singular 13 individuals to stand out and embrace roles of participants of the power-game in 14 the society. Example „Three‟ demonstrates this. The oligarchic, cacique 15 families‟ success is based on the skills and abilities of their gifted individuals 16 which occasionally are produced or rise from their ranks. Enrichen with social 17 capital such as foreign education, polyglossia, backed-up with valuable social 18 skills and ramified social network these singular individuals play a crucial role. 19 They are either mediators between their own social strata and the civil society 20 at large, or they portray themselves as organic parts of the civil society which 21 they dominate. They often embrace the role of a „tool‟ of the interest of the 22 state if it coincides with their own interests and goals. With the willingness to 23 use coercion in order to achieve his goals, an enthusiastic and the capable 24 warlord can reach incredible peaks of social hierarchy in a community in which 25 men with weapons have a long tradition of social acceptance and social 26 mobility (Anderson 1988, Kreuzer 2006, Quimpo 2016, Adam & Verbrugge 27 2015, etc). 28 When foreign paramilitaries arrived in Marawi, they were accepted 29 according to the rules of local hospitality-practices and the Islamic ideology of 30 ummah. Openness to create alliances with various armed formations with just 31 common point, Islam, was as an option until a choice had to be made between 32 two allegiances: the one to the Philippine state and a long-term survival of the 33 existing social order and to the other, the ummah. When things turned sour, the 34 local community leaders - as well as MILF, knew when to pick the right side. 35 Not even the 1.5 million US dollars could make a difference. In that sense case 36 „Three‟ is the unsuccessful example of how, in this case foreign capital failed 37 to shift out of balance the usual social order. 38 Belonging to a paramilitary unit or becoming a notorious warlord was and 39 continues to be way of upward social mobility in Mindanao. As in the case of 40 the Maute-brothers, the whole unit of the family supports the individuals in 41 their efforts. It is probably the reason why breakaway formations keep popping 42 out from each other: MNLF gave birth to MILF, while MILF members created 43 the Maute-group and so forth. As soon as one unit is dismantled and it leader(s) 44 are killed, there is always another formation which will take its place because 45 of the hope that eventually a new leader and a new formation will manage to

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1 ensure long-term rule. The question is: who will the new formation serve? One 2 thing remains certain: only big capital will win at the end. 3 4 5 References 6 7 Abuza, Zachary (2003) Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network 8 of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya. Contemporary Southeast Asia,Vol. 25, No. 2 9 (August 2003): 169-199 10 Adam, Jeroen (2016) Genealogies of the colonial present: the rediscovery of the local in 11 conflict management interventions in Mindanao, the Southern Philippines. Conflict, 12 Security & Development, 16:5: 387-404 13 Anderson, Benedict (2008) Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams 14 (Date first published: May 1988). Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières 15 Buendia, Rizal G. (2005) The state‐Moro armed conflict in the Philippines Unresolved 16 national question or question of governance?, Asian Journal of Political Science, 17 13:1: 109-138 18 Chambers, Paul (2012) A Precarious Path: The Evolution of Civil–Military Relations in 19 the Philippines. Asian Security, 8:2: 138-163 20 Cruz de Castro, Renato (2019) The chronic threat of insurgent groups in the Philippines in 21 (eds. Schreer, Benjamin, Tan, Andrew T. H.) Terrorism and Insurgency in Asia. A 22 contemporary examination of terrorist and separatist movements. Routledge: 147- 23 160. 24 Kreuzer, Peter (2005) Political clans and violence in the southern Philippines. Frankfurt 25 am Main, 2005. PRIF Reports 71. 26 Le Billon, Philippe (2001) The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed 27 conflicts. Political Geography. Volume 20, Issue 5, June 2001: 561-584 28 Le Billon, Philippe (2005) Fuelling War. Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts. 29 Routledge 30 Lujala P. The spoils of nature: Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources. 31 Journal of Peace Research. 2010;47(1) : 15-28. 32 McCoy, Alfred W. (2009) An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. 33 University of Wisconsin Press 34 Mendoza, Ronald, Beja, Edsel Jr, Venida, Victor, Yap, David (2013) Political dynasties 35 and poverty: Resolving the \chicken or the egg" question. MPRA Paper No. 48380, 36 posted 17. July 2013 37 Pepinsky, Thomas B (2008) Capital Mobility and Coalitional Politics. Authoritarian 38 Regimes and Economic Adjustment in Southeast Asia. World Politics 60 (April 39 2008) pp. 438–74 40 Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert (2016) Mindanao: Nationalism, and Frustrated Peace. 41 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3(1):. 1–26 42 Quimpo, Nathan (2017) Philippines – Mindanao: Nationalism, Jihadism and Frustrated 43 Peace (on the history of the Moro struggle) (Date first published: 26 January 2016). 44 Europe Solidaire Sans Frontieres 45 Sidel, Thayer John (1989) Beyond Patron-Client Relations: Warlordism and Local Politics 46 in the Philippines. Kasarlinan, 1st quarter 1989:19-30 47 Sutton, Anthony C. (1974) Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution. New Rochelle, New 48 York: Arlington House

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1 Smith, Paul J. (2004) Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational 2 Challenges to States and Regional Stability: Transnational Challenges to States and 3 Regional Stability. Routledge 4 Tan, Andrew T.H. (2009) A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia. 5 Edward Elgar Publishing 6 Teehankee, Julio C. (2007)And the clans play on. Philippine Center for Investigative 7 Journalism. https://old.pcij.org/stories/and-the-clans-play-on/ 8 Teehankee, Julio C. & Thompson, Mark R.(2016) The Vote in the Philippines: Electing A 9 Strongman. Journal of Democracy. October 2016, Volume 27, Issue 4: 126-135 10 Wong Pak Nung (2008) Towards a More Comprehensive Analysis of Warlord Politics: 11 Constitutive Agency, Patron–Client Networks and Robust Action. Asian Journal of 12 Political Science, 16:2: 173-195 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

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