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Surrender, Occupation, and Private Property In Kobe University Repository : Kernel Surrender, Occupation, and Private Property in International Law (2) : タイトル An Evaluation of Some United States Practices during the Occupation Title of Surrendered Japan 著者 Ando, Nisuke Author(s) 掲載誌・巻号・ページ Kobe University law review,21:9-78 Citation 刊行日 1987 Issue date 資源タイプ Departmental Bulletin Paper / 紀要論文 Resource Type 版区分 publisher Resource Version 権利 Rights DOI JaLCDOI 10.24546/00166920 URL http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/handle_kernel/00166920 PDF issue: 2021-10-06 SURRENDER, OCCUPATION, AND PRIVATE PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2) * An Evaluation of Some United States Practices during the Occupation of Surrendered Japan Nisuke ANDo* CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 2: THE JAPANESE SURRENDER, THE U. S. OCCUPATION MEASURES, AND THEIR IMPACT ON JAPANESE PRIVATE PROPERTY Section 1. The Japanese Surrender: The Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender Section 2. The Initial Objectives and Implementation of the U. S. Occupation Measures Section 3. Some Measures Affecting Private Property of the Japanese i ) The Purge of Militarists and Ultranationalists ii) The Dissolution of Zaibatsu iii) The Land Reform Section 4. The Effects of These Measures and Subsequent Development CHAPTER 3: THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE MEASURES IN QUESTION CHAPTER 4: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE HAGUE REGULATIONS TO A POST-SURRENDER OCCUPATION Section 1. The Hague Regulations and Their Applicability to a Post-Hostilities Occupation i ) The Provisions of the Hague Regulations concerning Private Enemy Property ii) The Applicability of the Hague Regulations to a Post-Hostilities Occupation * Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, Kobe University, Japan; Member, Human Rights Committee (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), 1987-1990. * This thesis was originally submitted to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford, Mas­ sachusetts, U. S. A. ) in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Phi­ losophy. Since its submission some time has passed and the author tried to update materials where available and necessary. The author would like to express his hearty gratitude to Professor Leo Gross of the Fletcher School and the late Professor Richard R. Baxter of the Harvard Law School for their generous counsel in the preparation of the thesis. 10 Section 2. The Axis Surrender and the Ensuing Occupation In Practice i ) Italy ii) The East European States iii) Germany (in the Previous VOLUME) Section 3. The Legal Nature of an Unconditional Surrender Section 4. The Applicability of the Hague Regulations to a Post­ Surrender Occupation i ) Some Qualifications of the Problem ii) Italy and the East European States iii) Germany iv) Tentative Conch\sions CHAPTER 5: THE U. S. PRACTICE IN JAPAN AND INTER", NATIONAL LAW Section 1. The Similarity and Difference between the Japanese and the German Situations i ) The Legal Nature of the Japanese Surrender: The Similarity of the Japanese and the German Situations ii) The Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender as the Allied Commitment regarding Post-Surrender Treatment of Japan: The Difference between the Japanese and the German Situations iii) The Legal Basis and Characteristics of the U. S. Occupation of Japan Section 2. The Applicability of the Hague Regulations to the U·. S. Occupation of Japan Section 3. An Evaluation of the U. S. Practice in Japan i) The U. S. Practice in the Light of the Hague Regulations ii) The U. S. Practice in the Light of the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender iii) The Responsibility of the Occupant and the Japanese Government Section 4. A Settlement of the Problem by the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Remedy for Damages to the Japanese Private Property CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION APPENDIX I. The Potsdam Declaration APPENDIX IT. The Instrument of Surrender of Japan II Section 3. The Legal Nature of an Unconditional Surrender The study in the preceding Section indicated that the term unconditional surrender was not well defined by those who used it. When it was used at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Security Problems, an unconditional surrender was understood to imply an "imposed cessation of hostilities," as opposed to an armistice ~hich was a "negotiated cessation of hostilities." The same Subcommittee considered that an unconditional surrender was an act of a primarily military nature. What the Subcommittee members had in mind was the surrender of many European states to Nazi Germany in 1940.271 Then, at Casabianca, President Roosevelt made public this term, saying that it was the only means to realize a total elimination of Axis war power. The total elimination of Axis war power presupposed a total military defeat of the Axis states, and probably a complete military defeat was regarded by the President as an essential requirement of an unconditional surrender. When he rejected the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation to issue a statement in clarification of the Casablanca formula, Roosevelt insisted that, in order to attain their war aims, the Allies should be determined to administer a total defeat to Germany as a whole.272 It is doubtful, nonetheless, that Roosevelt used the term in its purely military sense. At Casablanca he also stated that an unconditional surrender meant the destruction of the Axis philosaphy, based on the conquest and subjugation of other peoples. The President knew that such a great task could not be achieved by a military victory alone, however complete it might be.273 How he planned to attain this objective is not exactly known, but in the official communique ().f the Yalta Conference of February 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin stated that: We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished.... It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. Weare determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff ... ; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; ... and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world.274 271. See pp. 46-47, No. 20 of this LA W REVIEW (1986). 272. u. S., Foreign Relations, 1944 Vol. 1, pp. 501-502. 273. Ibid., p. 502. 274. U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 12, p. 214. 12 The question of post-surrender treatment to be accorded to Germany and the Germans is touched upon in this statement. It was precisely because such a question was raised by the term unconditional surrender that German propaganda appealed successfully to the fear of the Germans as to their future in order to stiffen their resistance against the invading Allied forces. Indeed for that reason, the U. S. military staff and the Office of Strategic Service repeatedly requested a clarification of the term. Ironically, it was in this very respect that President Roosevelt was resolved to avoid any commitment. Therefore, it can probably be concluded that, at least in Roosevelt's thinking, a complete military defeat of the enemy and no advance commitment regarding post-hostilities treatment of the enemy, the conditions of which were to be later imposed by the victor, constituted essential characteristics of an unconditional surrender.275 The conditions of post-surrender treatment of the vanquished state would certainly include measures of other than a military nature - that is, those of a political nature. They would involve interests not only of the vanquished but also of the victorious.276 Hence, no more Fourteen Points! But, if Roosevelt was to illustrate his concept of an unconditional surrender, Lee's surrender to Grant was a bad choice. It must be remembered that in March 1865 Lee proposed to Grant to submit the subjects of controversy between the belligerents to a military convention. Upon transmitting this proposal to Washington, Grant received the following instruction from President Lincoln, through Secretary of War Stanton: The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of Lee's army, or solely minor or purely military matters. He instructed me to say that you are not to decide, discuss or confer upon any political question. Such questions the President holds in his own hand and will submit them to no military conferences or conversations. Meantime y.ou are to press to the utmost your military advantage.277 Here, as in the discussion of the Subcommittee on Security Problems, an unconditional surrender was treated as a purely military act, and no political questions were to be involved therein. The French expression for "unconditional surrender" is "la capitulation sans condition" or "la capitulation inconditionnelle,,,278 and this 275. For a psychological background of the term, see A. Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender (n. 181 supra), p. 15f£. The strategic implication of an unconditional surrender is neatly analyzed by P. Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender (n. 181 supra), especially pp. 218-219. 276. U. S., Department of State, Division of Special Research, Chronological, Minutes S-4, Meet­ ing of May 20, 1942, p. 2. 277. John W. Draper, History of the American Civil War (3 vols., New York: Harpers, 1868-1870), Vol. 3, p. 561. 278. Sometimes the word "reddition" is used in the place of "capitulation." See for example, Charles Rousseau, Droit international public (Paris: Sirey, 1953), p. 591. 13 "capitulation inconditionnelle" or unconditional capitulation in the strictly military sense has been an established institution of international law.
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