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THE ~RNATIONALRECOGNmON OF A UNILATERAL SECESSIONOF QUEBEC: The Case of France and the United States
Jonathan Paquin
Graduate PFogiam in Political Science
Submitted in partial fullillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario. September, 1999. National Library Bibiiotheque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services senrices bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON KtA ON4 OitawaON K1AW Canada Canada
The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant a la National Lfifary of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.
The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othedse de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisati011, This thesis explores the possible international recognition of a unilateral secession of Quebec by France and the United States. In the event where the federal govenunent of Canada would refuse to recopïze a winning referendum on sovereîgnty or to negotiate the secession of Quebec, the Quebec govenuncnt would certainly be forced to issue a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), in an attempt to make Quebec intemationdy recognized as a country. The issue then becomes purely political, rather than legai. The success or the failure of a UDI depends rnainly on the reaction of France and the United States. This thesis argues that although a strong iink of fiendship exists between France and Quebec, it is unlikely that France would recognize a Quebec UDI. As for the United States, the author Merdemonstrates that for strategic and, most importantly, economic considerations, it is unlikely that the US. would recognize a unilateral secession of Quebec. The methodological approach used in this thesis incorporates. among other things, case studies. Although it is true that each case is unique, these case studies provide relevant information leading to the conclusion of this research. Finaliy, the author examines the issue of a hypothetical secession of Quebec through a realist theory of secession. Considerations such as national interests and power are taken into account. Since the basic principle of international recognition is essentially political, realpolitik rather than law and moral rights guides this research. This thesis is dedicated to my parents. Claude and hcef'e Puquin, for ail the interest they have show in what 1am doing. and for their constant encouragement.
Avec toute mon Mection et ma gratitude. Acknowledgements are for me a very fun thing to write. They allow me to put aside the inteiiectuai ngour necessary for the Wfiting of this thesis by giving me the chance to thank aii the people who were then for me during this "obstacle race".
First and foremost, I would me to thank my advisor, Professor Robert Young, who is the initial reason for starting rny adventure in London. Man of sound advice and, what's more, Que%écophiCe, Professor Young assisted me during my research, and ofien shared with me his opinions regarding the political future of Quebec. He also taught me one of the most important qualities of political science... doubt. Professeur Young je vous suis redevable de tout cela et d'encore plus. .. je vous suis également redevable d'une ouverture sur de nouveaux horizons. Avec tout mon respecr et mon admiration je vous remercie.
1 would also Wre to thank Winnie King, Dave MacDonald, Jeff MacLeod and George Wootten, as weii as a special thank you to Chris Dwomüuewicz and Michael Southern for having given me assistance to correct mistakes of aii kinds during the writing of this thesis. Without them, this thesis wodd probably have been written in French.
Moreover, I wouid iike to give my regards to Chris Dwomikiewicz, Winnie King, Michael Southem and George Wootten for their fnendship, and Manuela Oiivo for her kllidness, her friendship and her good food. And, I cannot forget Professor Martin Westmacott for his kindness and his help. Thauks to ali of you for having made my Me so enjoyable at Western.
Finaliy and most importantly, 1 would like to thank my parents. Plus précisément, j'aimerais remercier mon père pour sa générosité et suHout su complicité ainsi que ma mère pour son écoute, su compréhension et ses bons petits plats.
Jonathan Paquin London, Ontario August, 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Certificate of Examination Abstract AcknowIedgements Table of Contents List of Figures
CHAPTER ONE - Theories of Secession Liberal Theories of Secession A Realist Theory of Secession neInternai Merits of Secessionist Claims The Factors of Disruption . Buchheit's Calcuhtiun of Legitimacy The Statist Calculation of Legitimacy
CHAPTER TWO - The Leveis ofhternational Recognition Express Recognition Implied Recognition De facto and de jure Recognition
CHAPTER THREE - The Seeession of Quebec: An Anaiyücd Background The 1980 Referendum on Sovereignty4ssociation From the Patriation to the Chat1ottetown Accord The 1995 Referendum on Sovereignty-Partnership The Supreme Court Reference Case on Quebec Secession Why is the Study of the Quebec UDI Crucial? CHAPTER FOUR - The French Recognition of P Quebec UDI ?: Deconstructing the "Grand Game" of Mr Parizeau Franco-Québécoises Relations The "Grand Game" of Premier Parizeau The European Common Foreign Poiicy The German Unilateral Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia Why a German Unilateral Recognition? The Cost of the Unilateml Recognition The French Recognition of a Quebec UDI: An Unlikely Prospect The French National Interefis Conclusions on Parïzau's "Grand Game"
CEAPTER FIVE - American Recognition of a Uniiaterai Secession of Quebec? The Stnrcti~~and Mechanisms of the U.S. Recognition Power U.S. Recogniîion Power: A Historical Reminder The Sole EiecurrYe Agreement The U.S. Practice Regarding UDI: The Recognition of Bangladesh The U.S. Reaction towardr the Bangladesh UDX The U.S. Practice Regarding UDI: The Recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina me US.Reaction towards Sloveniù and Croatia U. UDI Case Studies: Observations and Discussion The American Perception of Quebec in the 1990's The U.S. National Interests mid the 1995 Quebec Referendum American National hterests and Quebec UDI: The Unlikely U.S. Recognition of Quebec The Sofl Lake The Nard Line A Quebec UDI and the Monroe Doctrine
CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY VITA LIST OF FIGURES
Page
The Calculation of Legitimacy ...... 16
The Statis t Calcutation of Legitimacy ...... -21
Levels of International Recognition ...... 29 Introduction
Recognition is a matter of power adrealplitik rather than iaw.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether France and the United States would recognize a unilaterai secession of Quebec. Although several sovereignists in
Quebec assume that France would quickly recognize Quebec. foliowing a unilateral declaration of independence VI), this prospect appears onlikely. hdeed, as this thesis will demonstrate. because France is a member of the European Union (EU), it must take into account the general interest of the EU, which does not lie in the recognition of a Quebec UDI. Moreover. considering the number of separatist movements in Europe. the recognition of a unilateral secession of Quebec by France could be extremely damaging to French national interests as well as the EU interests. This thesis wiii also show that the United States would be the most important actor, and probably the fkst country to react towards a Quebec UDr. It will be demonstrated that, because the United States national interests lie in a stable and united Canada, it is also unWrely that it wodd recognize a unilaterd secession of Quebec-
Right fiom the outset, it is important to mention that the centrai question of this thesis is very hypothetical. Indeed, then may not be mother referendum on Quebec sovereignty, and support for its independence may eventuaily decrease. Furthemore, the challenge of this thesis is relatively high as it attempts a "second generation" speculation. Indeed. this thesis attexnpts to predict what would happen afier a majority of Quebecers wodd vote to secede, and after Quebec secedes uniiateraily from Canada. Despite the
Robert A- Young, me Secexsian of Quebec and the Future of Cbuuiu, McGiil-Qutcn's University Press, zd. Ed., 1998, p. 105. speculative nature of this thesis, the unilateral secession of Quebec deserves to be carefully studied since it today remains a likely prospecI
The re-election of the Parti Que~cois(fQ) on November 30, 1998 has maintained the possibiiity of Quebec's secession hmCanada During the 1998 Quebec election, Premier Lucien Bouchard mentioned that a thUd referendwn on Quebec sovereignty was a iikely prospect if the PQ was elected. Tt is therefore possible that, within few years, Quebecers could decide to leave the Canadian federation, and attempt to build a sovereign Quebec. However, if it is possible for Quebec to leave the Canadian federation, it is also possible that the Canadian federal govenunent could refuse to recognize its secession- This could occur for different reasons, such as the preservation of the Canadian national intemts or the illegitimacy of the Quebec secession. As will be shown in chapter three, the federd government might not have recognized the 1995
Quebec referendum results, if a simple majority of Quebecers had voted to secede. In 1995, the federal government's position was that a simple majority in favour of secession wouid not provide enough legitimacy to the Quebec government to separate. Moreover,
Ottawa judged that the referendum question was not clear and, because of that, put into doubt the legitimacy of the entire referendum process. Therefore, in the event of another referendum on Quebec sovereignty, it is probable that the federal govenunent would raise the same kind of questions and, as a resuit, rnay refuse to recognize the independence of Quebec. In those cïrcumstances, the Quebec government would have several options. One would be to issue a unilateral declaration of independence, in an attempt to make Quebec recognize UiternationaUy. The issue then would be essentialiy politicai, rather then legd. The success of the UDI strategy would exclusively depend on the political reaction of foreign countries such as France and the United States. A unilateral declaration of independence would also be an alternative if, afier a successful referendum on sovereignty, negotiations on secession between Quebec and the rest of Canada would break down- For instance, such event could occur if disagreement arose conceniing the sharing of the Canadian debt. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the federd govemment would recognize the independence of Quebec, In sum, following a yes majority vote for sovereignty, it is probable that Quebec would have to dedare its independence unilaterdiy. Consequently. the international recognition of Quebec would becorne an extremely cniciaI issue.
The choice of France and the United States, as subject of snidy, is not arbitrary and is based on a certain number of considerations. France was maidy chosen because of the cultural and Iinguistic Iinks that unite France and Quebec. As we will see in the fourth chapter, strong franco-québécoisesrelations have existed between both States for almost forty years. Moreover, France is the only country to be sympathetic to Quebec sovereignist option, and severai French Presidents have implicitly recognized. over years, the legitimacy of the Quebec secessionist claim. The choice of the United States is different The United States was chosen for geopoiitical and economic reasons. With the exception of Canada, the United States is the only other country with which Quebec shares a border. Moreover. considering that the United States is arguably the most powerfd country in the world. its position in the event of the unilateral secession of
Quebec would ceaainly be crucial for detennining the fume of an independent Quebec.
The international recognition of a hypothetical Quebec UDI will be analysed through the lens of a realist theory of secession. This realist theory will provide a base to examine the Quebec case. Considering that the basic principle of recognition is political, our study will focus on national interests and on realpolitik considerations rather than on nghts and law. It is through the pnsm of such realist considerations that the present thesis will be articulateci.
Chanter Breakdowi The thesis is divided in five chapters. The objective of the ktchapter is to present iiberal and realist theory, which embody different perceptions of the legitimacy of secession. The chapter will demonstrate bat the realist theory of secession is are relevant for the aims of this snidy, therefore, it acts as a guide to explore the possible reactions of France and the United States, within the hypothesis of Quebec unilatadly seceding from Canada, Foilowing the detailed study of a realist theory of secession, the di&rent levch of international recognition wÏli be examined in the second chapter. This short chapterdl present the different means used by countries to recognize the independence of seadkg
States. As it will show, recognitions are not dways granted by officiai and piiblic statements. Several levels of "implied" recognition can be employed by staas to maximize their national interests, without king obliged to make forma1 cornmi-.
The study of these different levels of recognition is extremely relevant for the purpo~cof this thesis since these levels could possibly be used by France and the United ws towards a Quebec UDL In fact, the choice to employ these "levels" would depend &y on the circumstances of a unilateral secession of Quekc. Afier having elaborated these theories with respect to secession and recognitb. the purpose of the thud chapter wiil be to present events surrounding the issue of the secession of Quebec. This chapter WU provide an aoaiytical summary of the poliPirrl context in Quebec since the fïrst election of the Parti Quebecois in 1976. It WU,amoog other things, compare the 1980 Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association to the kt referendum in 1995 on sovereignty-pamership. By comparing these two referenda, cbis chapter wili demonstrate why the study of a hypothetical Quebec UDL is now cd.
This chapter wiU also examine the Supreme Court Reference Case conceming the rigbt of
Quebec to secede unilaterally fmm Canada In sum, this ove~ewof the political CO- in Quebec will provide a soiid background regarding the question of Quebec secession The fouah chapter will focus on France. It will speculate on whether Frrre would recognize a unilateral secession of Quebec. %y examining the European CO- foreign policy, and by presenting the case of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia S Germany in 1991, this chapter wiU give reasons why it is unlikefy that France would recognize a Quebec UDI. It will also show that the United States would certainly be the most important actor in a post-UDI era, and that the U.S. reaction wouid be crucial and detemiining for the hiture of Quebec as a sovereign country.
The fifth and Iast chapter of this thesis wuconcentrate on the United States. This voluminous chapter wül examine different aspects of the Amencan policy in maner of recognition. It wiU notably study the stnicture and the mechanisms of the US- recognition power and wiiI present two cases of daterd dechration of independence (Bangladesh and Slovenia-Croatia) that were recognized by Washington since the Second
World War. Altbough each case is unique, these case snidies will provide some indications concerning the US. behaviour toward UDI cases. Moreover, by presenting the Amencan attitude towards Quebec, and the U.S. national intensts regitrding the issue of a Quebec UDI, this chapter WU argue that it is improbable that the United States would recognize a unilateral secession of Quebec. The thesis will hally concfude that, although a Quebec UDI has iittie chances to be internationally recognized by France and the U.S., the cïrcumstances of a Quebec
UDI, and the international conjuncture with which Quebec would have to deal in a pst- UDI era, are unpredictable. Therefore, despite arguments put forward in this thesis, it is always possible that France and the United States would recognize a unilatemi secession of Quebec- Theories of Secession
Perhaps the only ceriuiir fesson ro be derïved fiom a stdy of State pracrice with rcfrence to secessionijr self-determination is thar, given the present absence of my thdisputable rufe of ihtemational faw, a Stcue's response to a parricular sirwtiorr will most ofin be detemined solely by ifs own po fitical huerem-
- Lee C- BUCHHEIT
Secession can be an inherent phenomenon of the nation-state principle. It is the political expression of a group that wants to separate geographicaily and politicaiIy fiom a state on the basis of, among others, a sense of collectivity and its own identity.
Secession aiso represents a political rnovement that has direct eEects on the international political dynamic, since it is an important cause of the appearance and the disappearance of States. At the thethese lines are written, several groups across the world, are qing to achieve secession. Such movements exist, for instance, in Kosovo (Yugoslavia), in the Basque Country (Spain), in Scotland (United Kingdom), and in Quebec (Canada). In short, secession is a widespread phenomenon that can potentiaiiy modify international geopolitics. For this reason, it is important to consider the implications of secession. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical basis to help better understand the dserent considerations of secession that must be taken into account when it is time to establish whether or not a secessionist claim is legitimate.
1 Lee C. Buchhcit, Secessini :27ce LcgiiuMey of Serf-Defennhtion. Yak University Rtss. 1978. p. 105. By looking at two theories of secession, both Liberal-Moraiist and Realist theory. we wiii 2 determine when a secessionist claim tends to be recognized.
In order to explain the different perspectives taken by these two "schools of thought" over questions of secession, the liberal-moralist theory will be presented through Men Buchanan and David Miller's thought. As for the realist schwl, Lee C.
Buchheit's theory of secession wiii be examined. It is important to mention here that Buchanan and Miller's liberal theories will be only brïefly presented, since the emphasis will be put on the reaiîst perspective of Buchheit Indeed, as we will see, Buchheit's realist theory appean to be more complete than liberal theories. Finaüy, the reaüst theory of Buchheit will be adapted to our study, by king transposed fiom an international to a national perspective. Thus, this theory will act as a guide to explore. in the foilowing chapters, how France and the United States would react toward Quebec in the event it seceded fiom Canada.
In his book entitied Secession: The Morality of Politicai ~ivorce,~Men
Buchanan focuses on conditions under which secession caa be morally justified. By basing the right to secede on morai considerations, Buchanan tries to neutraiize the indefinite secession process that could potentiaiiy occur if a right to secede would be acknowledged for every secessionist group. According to him. four arguments can morally jus- a right to secede. The first argument is called the '~Discrimhatory
Liberal and &t thwrics rcgarding the issue of the secession of Quekc have a different approach- For liberal-moralists, the secession of Quebec is, arnong othcr things, a problem of the principlc of majority nile. According to tibtrals, considering the majority as the suprcme authority in democracy would lead to the alicnation of individual rïghts. nie Reallst perspective is diffcrent Rtalists study the issue of the secession of Quebec by taking into consideration the costs of the secession, the national interests involved in the secession, and the pcrïod of transition towards secession- For more on the liberai perspective, sec: Jean-Pierre Derriennic, N&d&e et Démocratie: RyZcxio~sur les ~I~ICSWIISdes indépendanttstes qu4bicois. Boréal, 1995, 144 pages. For more on the realist perspective, sct: Gordon Gibson, PhB: The Future of the Rest of Canadir, The Frascr Institutc. 1994.217 pages- See Allen Buchanan, SCCCJS~KThe Moralfy of Pofitical Divorce fmu. Fon Svmr to Lith-ià and Quebec. Westview Press, 1991,174 pages. Redistrïbution."4 This happens when a group of people within a state becomes victim of discrimination. For instance, in the case where social programs would k offer to the whole population of a country, except to a dennite group for ethnic considerations. Such a discrimination violates basic human nghts of individuals Living within the discriminated group. This discrimination, usuaily based on a collective difference, also has the effect of violating the equality of opprtunity among the members of a state. Buchanan believes, in this circumstance, that a discriminated group has the mord right to oppose political authority thereby justïfjhg secession. The second argument appears when a group, that was unjustly incorporateci within a larger union, wants to secede nom this union. It is what Buchanan cas 'SRectifying Past I.njustices".s The logic of this argument is that the secession of an unjustly integrated group constitutes the mord reappropriation by the legitimate owner of a temtory. In other words, a goup has the nght to reclaim what was unjustly taken by an illegitimate political authority. Another argument that legitimates secession is the "Self-Defense" argument.6 This argument can be used by a group that wants to protect itself hmaggrrssion which may jeopardize its existence. For instance, in reaction to a genocide. Finally, the last case for secession presented by Buchanan is the '6Cultural ~rese~ation".7However, before acimow1edging a right to secede that would protect a minority cultwe, seved conditions have to be satisfied. For instance, some alternatives to secession, such as autoaomy and veto right, have to be seen as insufficient or inadequate enough to preserve the threatened cultural identity. Moreover, a muiority culaire must demonstrate a minimum standard of justice and must not try to secede in an attempt to establish a country that would go against Liberal pnnciples. In sum, these four arguments constitute the ground of Buchanan's theory for a Iùnited right to secede.
ïbid.. p. 38. 5 ïbid., p. 67. 6 ïbid.. p. 64. 7 Ibid., p. 52 David MiUer also elabrates merennt moral factors wbich can validate secessionist clairns8 According to him, secession is legitirnate if a secessionist group has a national identity that cannot be protected or expressed by the state.9 This argument is basicaliy the same as the "Cultural Presemation" of Akn Buchanan. Second. Miller believes that to have a legitimate claim, a secessionist group must not include minorities that have radically incompatible identities with that of the new state.1° As he mentions, that 'kould simply reproduce a multinational arrangement on a smaiier scale-"11 Third, Miller States that some moral considerations must k given to minorities that would be left in the fomer country afier secession. A secession case that wouid have the effect to ostracize minorities of the former country, because of their smd number of people, would not be legitimate.12 Moreover, Miller points out that to gain in legitimacy, a ciaimant must be able to secm itself temtoriaiiy without radically weakening the parent state.13 Finally, a seoedllig group must not contain the entk supply of an important naturai resource that would threaten the weifare of the former state.14 This short presentation of liberai theories was intended to provide a generai idea of some of the most important moral considerations of secession. As we can see, these theories study secession mainly hugh the lem of morality and rights. In fact, Buchanan and Miller taise relevant points coaceming circumstances within which secession can be morally justifieci, but they do not consider some other important considerations such as. for instance, the political aspect of secession and its effect on international politics. For this nason, the reaiist theory of Lee C. Buchheit appears to be more pertinent for the purpose of the present wodc. In addition to iaclucuig general
Sce David Miller, On N&~fity* Oxford*Clarendon Ress, 1995.210 pages. Ibid., p. 113. Io Ibid. 11 Ibid. l2 Ibid.. p. 114. l3Ibid., p. 11% l4 Ibid. considerations of fiberal theorïes, Bucàheit's theory takes into account various elements that surround the phenornenon of secession. His theory analyses secession through a
realpolitik perspective which takes into consideration international politics. The next part will present, in detaii. this realist theory of secession.
A Realist Theorv of Secession
Lee C. Buchheit States. in Secession: Ine Legitiinucy af~e~~etermination~that the international community is presently incapable of distinguishing legitimate fiom iilegitirnate secessionist claims. This incapability stems fiom the fact that there are no standards of legitimacy through which it is possible to calculate the depe of legitimacy
smunding different secessionist cIaims. According to him, this lack of ngour in the analysis of the legitimacy of secession cm be a potential threat to the international world order. Indeed, the recognition of a secession claim. resulting hma decision nom a country or hmthe entire international cornmunity, can have incalculable consequences
at the internati&al lcvel. As a result, Buchheit believes that a secessionist demand can be considered legitimate if moral considerations are respecte& but also if the world harmony is increased by the recognition of the secessionist daim in question. The main purpose of Buchheit is. therefore, to mate a fkamework, or a method. to maxiroizP world harmony by calculating the legitimacy of secession. Once elaborated. this framework will aliow the international community to ascertain the legitimacy of secessionist claims to preserve the world order. In an attempt to elaborate his fiamework, Buchheit isolates different elements, or factors, that the international community should consider relevant in the evaluation of the legitimacy of secessionist claims. These factors are separateci in two areas of concem. The fhtana is called 'The Intemal Merits of the
ls Sce Lee C. Buchhat, SCCCS~~~-.The Legitimocy of Serf-Detcnninarion. Yak University Rcss, 1978. 260 pages. Claim" which =fers to the Memit internai features of seceding groups.16 These "merits" are, in fact, very similar to the moral considerations contained in liberal theones.
The second area is caiied the 'Disruption Factor". which is the degree of disruption caused by a secession to the international order as well as to the nmaining state.17 First, we wiil present elements which must be included in the 'Interna1 Merits of the Claims'.
The Infernal Merits of Secesssionist Clrrim Buchheit establishes several moral considerations which. taken together, constitute intemal merits. The ktfactor bat must be considered is whether the claimant, which is the definite group that wants to secede, is a self'. By "self', which refers to self-determination, Buchheit means a group of people relatively distinct (by history, cul=, laaguage etc.) hmthe other citizens of a state, that is capable of an independent existence. Cowquently, the clairnant must be able to dernonstrate. among other thhgs, its econom. viability and must have political structures. Second, the clairnant must occupy a dennite temtory to have a legitimate claim. In other words, the more the territory is definite and distinct, the more the legitimacy of the claim increases. Third, the claimant group must have a cohesive population in an attempt to avoid the indennite divisibility of its temtory. A group that has a very homogeneous population with regard to language. religion, and cultum for instance, has a greater chance to stay united after the secession, and therefore, has a more legitimate claim. This argument is quite similar to one of Miller's arguments, as we have seen eulier. Finaliy, a minimum standard of viabiiity must k maintained within the seceding group after secession. As Buchheit mentions: "the international community might reasonably seek to prevent a group hmcomrnitting social suicidd9.18 A claimant group that caa demonstrate that its l6 See Ibid-, p. 228. l7 Sec Ibid.. p. 23 1. l8Ibid., p. 231. standard of viability WU,at least, remain the same after the secession. can see the legitimacy of its clah increase.
These factors that measure internai ments of secessionkt daims constitute the first pillar of Buchheit's method to calculate the legitimacy of secession. However, it is important to mention that other elements couid certainiy be included in Buchheit's list of "interna1 merits". In fact. factors listed above only give an idea of the merits of secession. The respect of minority rights and of a democratic process of secession could be other elements to be included in merits of the claim. So far, it is tme that the realist theory of Buchheit is very sirnilar to liberal theories. However, as we will see, by combining the internai merits with the dismptive factors of secession. we obtain a practical and realist theory.
The Factors of Dismption Even though a claimant groÙp may meet mord cnteria enumerated above, it is far fiom certain that the international community WUrecognize the legitimacy of a daim if the secession of that group does &t promote the international harmony. This is a very realist consideration. The first element that must be taken into account in the "Disruption
Factor", is which one of the status quo or the secession best serves international hamony? Stated differently, which one wouid be the most disruptive on the international order. Lee Buchheit points out that there are two kinds of disruption resulting ftom secession. The fkst khd concems the micropoliticai level, that is to Say, the effect of secession on the rernaining state and on States indirectly affected by the secession. The amount of disruption at the micropolitical level will fluctuate according to a certain number of factors. For example, the economic importance of a seceding group must be taken into account. If a seceding province constitutes the economic center of a sovereign state, the amount of disruption will increase. If the saeding province does not threaten the economic viability of a country, the degree of disruption wu be low. Moreover, the amount of disruption would be high if the secession of a province imperiled the secunty of the remaining state. For instance, if the secession of a province increased the chance that the remaining state be anacked by a neighbouring state. the degree of disruption would obviously be high. The geographical aspect can also be an important factor regarding disruption. If the secession of a province bappens to separate the remaining state into two parts and, therefore, break the temtorial cohesion of a country, the amount of dismption wiiI be high. However, if the secession does not chaiienge the territorial cohesion of a state, the disruption will be lowered. Anothcr factor of disruption, following a secession, would be the jeopardization of the remaining state's access to trade and commercial routes. For instance, if by seceding, a province blocks the state's access to an ocean or a sea, the de- of disruption would increase. This would refer, in fact, to miiitary and economic considerations. The second kind of disruption intemenes at the macmpoliticai level and occurs when secession affects the international order. Lee Buchheit points out that the viability of a seceding entity, once secession is achieved, is crucial for the maintenance of international stability and harmony. Therefore, a seceding entity that cannot maintah an independent existence following its secession, is Unwrely to be recognized by the international community. A seceding province that would requKe an international subsidy to survive would have the effect to increase the degree of international dismption. Another factor of possible dismption raised by Buchheit, is the treatment of minorities within the seceding entity. The attention that authonties of a seceding entity wouid pay to the question of humao rights must be seriously taken into account. A seceding group that does not respect minority rights and international nomis conceming this matter, would be potentiaily disruptive and would threaten international harmony, once becoming a country. Buchheit raises one more factor that can chaiienge the maanpolitical order. As shown above, îhis factor also preoccupied liberal theorists of secession. The recognition of a secessionist claim. that would possibly start a wave of secessionist movements in different aceas of the world, is not desirable because it opens the door to future international dismptions. This is what Buchheit caiis the
'Cdem~nstratîoneffect".lg As a dt,a secessionist daim that would risk to generate such an effect. reduces its chances to be recognized. Buchheit does not Say, however, under which circumstances the "demonstration e&ct" would be srnail or big. We can assume that the demonstration effect would be smaii if a secessionist group would be recognized afier having satisfied several conditions of moral and reaïist nature. That couid have the effect to discourage secessionist groups that are not really legitimate. As we can see, this second piïlar of Buchheit's framework look at several extemalities of secession in very realistic terms. Once the elements included in both "Intemal Merits of the Claim" and in
"Disruption Factor" are dennite. dl the pieces of Buchheit's hework are in place to calculate, from a realpolitik point of view, the legitimacy of secessionist claims. As such, the following part of the chapter wiM aim to explain Buchheit's operative hework. Before proceaihg fwthtr, it is important, however, to mention that ail these factors enumerated by Buchheit do not necessatily constitute conditions that each secessionist claim must reach. In fact, the importance of each factor can Vary from one case to another, since the evaluation of the legitimacy of each case depends on politicai circumstances. Moreover, it is possible, on the other han4 that other cnteria could be added to Buchheit's ftamework of legïtimacy, as mentioned earlïer. In fact, what is important here, is to understand the logic of Buchheit's analysis.
Buchheit's Calculation of Legitimucy The decision making process conceniing the legitimacy of different cases of secession, consists of the interaction between the internai merits of a secessionist claim and the wïii of the international community to preserve the world order. In O* words, the degree of legitimacy that a claim WUattain resuit kmthe bdancing of the me& of the claims agairist the dismptive effects that secession can have on the international harmony.20 By proposing such a method of "balancing caicuiation". Buchheit avoids creating a universal standard of legitimacy that would be applied in the same way to all cases of secession. By balancing these two hds of factors depending of the circumstances of the secession, we obtain the most rational solution for each secessionist claim. We also obtain a predictive thwry bughwhich States decide whether or not to recognize secessionist claims. in an attempt to clarify his theory, Buchheit uses a graphical representation to demonstrate the calculation of seassionkt legitjmacy resulting fiom the balancing of both factors. Based on this grapbic, we WU now attempt to calculate the degree of legitimacy of two hypotheticai secessionist daims. The Calculation of Leeitimacv
excellent
Interna1 Merits of the Claim
X low -even -high Disruption Factor
Source: Lee C. Buchhcit, Sec&n,* liu Lcgirr'inacy of Serf-Detennuiotüm,Yak University Press, 1978, p. 249.
First, it is important to understand the different elements that appear on this graphic. The 'Pisruption Factor" is reprcsented by the x axis. As it can be seen on the graphic, there an thne degrtes of disruption: Iow, even. and high. A high degret of disruption means that the dimptive effects of a secession exceeds the disruption produced by the status quo (the cumnt dismption). whiie a iow kvei means that a future secession would be less disruptive than the cumnt dimption. Finally. the level of disruption would be "evcn" if the status quo as weli as the recognition of a secessionist group wodd create the same Ievel of disruption. The "temal Merits of the Clah'' are represented by the y axïs. These merits wiii be represented as poor, fair. or excellent, depending on the judgment of the international community. The dotted line ab, that appears on the graphic, relata to the funetion that is used to ascertain whether or not a secessionist claim is legitimate, and cornes about only after balancing the factors represented by the x and y axis. In fact, the ïine ab establishes the final judgment of the international comunity towards a secessionist claim, The area located above the ab Iine constitutes the field of legitimate claim. wbile the area below the Iuie represents the illegitimate field. The line Ob does not necessariiy-have to be drawn at 4S0 degrees, as it is represented on the graphic. In fact, the line ab can osciilate depending on the international community's concem. For instance, durhg the Cold War era, it is highly probable to speculate that the international community has attached more importance to the "Disxuption Factor" than it does now, in an attempt to preserve the bipolar world harmony. As a result, during that period, the lùie ab was probably drawn closer to the y axis, perhaps around 60" degrees. Now, that the inner workings of graphic have been explained, we wiil proceed in demonstrating how Buchheit's theory operates in practice, by using hypothetical secessionist claims. For the purpose of this exercise, we will presume that, in our first example, group C wants to secede hmState D. In this instance. let's assume that group C is able to demonstrate that it is a "self". Indeed, the group occupies a definite province. has a cohesive population, and gives a good treatment to its minonties. Moreover, its economic viability assures its future independent existence. As a result, it is obvious that the degree of the interna1 merits of grwp C's claim will be, at least, between "fair" and "exceiient9*. In addition, for this fht example. we will presume that group C does not thrtaten the economic viability of state D. dow not jeopiadize its territorial cohesion. nor does it block access to its facilities for extemal trade- As a result, the amount of disruption towards the world order and towards the remaining state will be relatively low. Consequently, the claim for secession by group C wili be legitimate according to Buchheit's calculation of legitimacy. On the graphic, the legitimacy of group C's claim is represented by the point marked (i) which is above the line ab. However, if the level of internai merits of the claim remains the same. the degree of legitimacy of group C's claim can change drasticdiy if the level of international dismption is modifie6 hdeed. for the second example. we will pmsurne that group C constitutes the economic center of state D and, therefore, its secession would jeopardize the economic viability of state D. In addition. the secession of group C wouid geopphically spiit state D into two parts. The degree of disruption would, therefore, increase fiom "low" to somewhere around "high".
As a result, its secessionist daim would become illegitimate. On the graphic, this situation is represented by the point marked (ii), locateà below the line ab. which indicates the result of pupC's clah according to Buchbeit's calculation of legitimacy. To surn up, the theory of Lee Buchhtit is reaiïst and very rational. For Buchheit, a secessionist claim is legitimate if it does not threaten the international order, and if merits of the daim arr rclatively high according to some moral and practical considerations. It is the combination of both elements that determinate the legitimacy of a claim. In addition, the so-calIed 'disruptive factors' are fundamental in Buchheit's framework. Indeed' as it bas been seen in the example above. a secessionist claim can be considered iliegitimatt if these factors are too high. regardless of whatever the 'Merhi of the Claim" may be. In liberal theorks, disruption factors seem not to be important since the question is not even raiscd Fiaily, the only important elements taken into consideration by Buchheit lie in bis graphic. The balancing of both the x and y axis permit the maintenance of world hannony by measuring, rationally, the legitimacy of secessionist claims. Therefore. the philosophical question of a moral right to secede is iirelevant for Buchheit. ki other words, Buchheit's theory nfea to intemal mer& and extemal order. That is why the calculation of legitimacy is unique for each case of secession. The Statist Cakulation of Ledti~nacy Lee Buchheit elaborates his reali*sttheory hma global perspective. that is to say, fkom the point of view of the international community seen as a unique actor. However. within the context of this thesis, we have to aâopt a statist perspective. since our purpose is to speculate on whether France and the United States would mcognize a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec. As a consequence, Buchheit's realist theory of secession has to be transposed hm an international to a national point of view. Therefore, his theov wili now be reviewed hma statist perspective. Even though the point of view will change, the logic of Buchheit's caicdation of legïtimacy wïil remain the same. In a statist perspective, elements containeci in the 'Interna1 Merits of the Claim"
WU remain the same as in the global perspective. Considerations such as economic viability, definite temtory and cohesive population are. indeed, factors that can infiuence whether a secessionist claim wili bi recognizcd by a state. From a statist approach, these moral and practical considerations elaborated by Buchheit constitute the fmt pillar of the statist caiculation of the legitirnacy of secessionist claims. However. the second piiiar of the theory, the "Dismption Factor". will clearly differ hmthe international community perspective. Instead of king analysed through the wiii to preserve the international order, the "Dismption Factor", will be calculated from the national interests of a state. In other words, at some point, a state wili have to answer which one of the status quo or the secession in question best serves its national interests? The "Dismption Factor" will be
"low" if the recognition of a secessionist claim would be less costly than the status quo on the national intmsts of a country. It wiii be, however, "high" if recognition would damage national interests more than the staais quo. Finally the level of dismption WUbe considered as "even" if the recognition of the secession and the status quo will have the same effect on national interests. The baiancing of the intemal me& of a secessionist clah with national interests constitue the "Statist Cal~ulation'~of the legitimacy of secessionist claims. Not only wiil this calculation Vary hm one case of secession to another, but the result of this calculation will aiso Vary fkom state to state. A secessionist claim can be seen, by a state. as king legitimate, while another state caa see the same claim as being Uegitimate. In fact, it depends on the national interests of a state combined with the way it sees intemal merits of secessionist claims. To better understand the "Statist CaIculation'* based on Buchheit's reaiist theory, we wili try to calculate the legitimacy of a hypothetical claim of secession. In this example, we will assume that group A wants to secede fiom state B. and that state C, which is a neighbor state, has to decide whcther the secession of group A is legitimate. First, group A has a cohesive population that lives on a dennite temtory. However, the group is not economicaily viable, and its secession would geographically spiit state B into two parts. Therefore, for state C, the "Intemal Merits of the Claim" of group A would be relatively ''poor" conside~gthe economical and geographical position of group A. As for the "Disruption Factor". we cm presume that it would be '%igh". Indeed, the secession of group A would create geopolitical instability that could damage State C.
Group A's secession would also change the political dynamic in this ana of the world, and state C would have to modify its foreign policy to deal with a new country. Furthermore, because of the weak economic viability of group A, state C would potentiaiiy have to provide economic subsidies to the new state in order to limit economical instability. Finally, state C would have to take into account its relations with state B (the predecessor state) before talong any action with regards to gmup A. If States B and C do not get almg weli and maintain bad relations, it could be in the national interests of state C to recognize group A. However, and this is what we will assume here, if state B and C always had very good relations, then it nadprobably not be in state Cs national interests to rccognize group A's secession, because that would compromise its relations with state B. In this example. the level of dimption would certainiy be "high". By using the statist calculation of legitimacy (represented by the graphic below). we can see that there are gdchances that the secession of group A would be seen as illegitimate by state C. On the graphie, this situation is represented by the point marked (i). The intemal merits of group A would pmbably be not convincing enough and. as a resdt, its secession would blybe unfavorable to state Csnational interests.
The Statist Calculation of Leeitimacv
Intemal MerÏîs of the fair Claim
The Cost of Recognition on National fnterests
There is one 1st factor that we must include when calculating the legitimacy of this hypothetical claim. The inclination of the dotteci iine ab has a direct effect on the "statist dculation" of the Iegitimacy of group A's claim. For instance, a state can see its national interests as king the most important fmor that detedes whether a secessionist clah is Iegiimate. Therefore. the Iine ob would move closer to the y axis perhaps arwnd 60" or 65" de-. However, for the same case of secession. another state could see moral considerations as being very important. The line ab would therefore be around 45" degrtes, as it appears on the graphic, and may even fabelow 45" degrees. UsuaiIy. the line ab wiil oscillate according to international circumstances and the perceived national interests of the state making the calculation. Indeed, the way a state positions the line ub today can k far different from the way it was positioned, for instance, during the Cold War. The "Statist Calculation" of the legitimacy of secessionkt claims, based on Buchheit's realist theory, will be the prism through whkh the present thesis wiU analyse whether France and the United States would recognize a unilateral secession of Quebec.
As it has been said in the beginaing of this chapter. this calculation of legitimacy WU act as a guide in our snidy. ûnce the 'calcuiation proass' of the legitimacy of secessionist claims is presented, we have to make a second theoretical step by presenting the different meam used by States to recognize the secession of definite gmups. As the next chapter wiil illustrate, there are different levels of international recognition in international law. These levels do not have the same intensity and the same meaning, which is why it is important to understand what tbey imply. In the case of a unilateral secession by Quebec, the knowledge of these levels of recognition could be a deciding factor for the hture of Quebec as a sovereign state. Cha~ter2
Levels of International Recognition
An entity whkh othenviie firlfiii the factual requirements of tewitory, poputarion mrd stable govemment will faif to quaifi as u srare in the absence of recognition of this status &y the Inteman'onal community.
The purpose of this short chapter is to introduce the different levels of international recognition of secession studied in international law. The knowledge of these different levels of recognition is essential since it ailows one to interpret the meaning of govenimental intentions and political actions towards a new independent state. These levels of recognition will be presented through the study of "express" and "implied" recognitions, which are the two major categones of international recognition.
Finaily. we will establish the clifferences between what we cdde facto and de jure recognition of independent States.
An "express rezognition" is a formai announcement made by a govemment to extend recognition to a new state. It is expressed in a public statement sent to a recognized state, or cm be expressed by a diplomatic note alone sent to a new state.2 Put another way, an express recognition is the announcement of an unequivocal intention to extend international recognition.3 For instance, as we wiU see in chapter five, the United
D. W. Greig, Inte~iomlknv. Second Edition, London, Buücrwocths, 1976, p. 122. 2 Ibid., p. 120. 3 Oppenheim's IncclllOtiOml hv,9. Edition, Sir Robert Jennings and Sir mur Watts (Ed.). Vol. 1. p. 169. States recognized the independence of Bangladesh, in 1972. when the U.S. Secretary of
State announced the White House's decision in a press statement? Following this public announcement, President Nixon sent a diplomatic note to the Prime Minister of Bangladesh to inforrn him of the US. recognition? In pracnce. however, recognition of states is not always issued by public and officiai statements; in some circumstances. recognition can be implied.
Between an "express" recognition and a rehisal to recognize secession, there exists a range of political actions that imply recognition. An implied recognition "'takes place through acts which, aithough not referring expressly to recognition, leave no doubt as to the intention to gnint iK6 Implied recognition can be accomplished in dinerent ways, and it is important to underline that the intensity of the recognition can change depending on the mariner chosen. These levels of implied recognition can be very useful politically when, for instance. a country is somewhat in favour of the independence of a new state but tries at the same time to protect its national interests and to maintain good relations with its neighbours. Because implied recognitions can play a crucial role in the recognition of states and governments, we will now try to define the different forms of impiied recognition by understanding their political and diplomatic meaning. and by dividing them according to their intensity. The most significant political action in the matter of implied recognition is probably the conclusion of a bilateral treaty between the recogniWng and unrezognized states, such as a treaty of commerce for instance, which clearly regulates the reIations
Sc= Facts on Filr. Weiciy World News Digest, '%dia, Palcisran & Bangla Dah", Vol. 32. No. 1640, April2-8,1972, p. 244. Raaiesh Chand Gupta, US. Policy TOWQ~&India d P&M, Delhi, B. R. Publïshing Corporation, 1977. p. 102- Ibid, between the two states.' As an example, in 1929, a United States Court of Appeals stated that the signing of a treaty with an unrrcognized goverrunent or state implied recognition.* This judgment came after a U.S. Representative in Chha entered into a treaty of commerce with the new natiooalirt government. The signing of a treaty with an unrecognized state is extremely significant because it involves a dtten agreement. The second most important level of recognition is probably the fod establishment of diplomatic relations between recogniang and unrecognized states. This level is less significant than the conclusion of a bilateral treaty on trade, because diplomatic relations are a very flexible practice that is not exclusively reserved to sovereign states. For example, diplomatic relations have existed between France and Quebec for decades. In 1977, a few months after the election of the Parti QueWcois, Premier René Lévesque was received in Paris iike a head of stateg Nevertheless, Quebec remains a province within Canada. Therefore, in this case, the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between France and Quebec, folIowing the secession of Quebec, would risk creating an ambiguous situation regarding whether this political action would imply the recognition of an independent Quebec. The third most significmt level of recognition is the "accepted authorization permitting the performance of consular fuactions to a representative of an unrecognized state".lo A country that would implicitly dow an unrecognized state to open consulates on its territory, or to transform its representative offices in consulates, would cleariy imply the recognition of that state, However, in some rare circumstances, the establishment of a consulate does not necessarily imply recognition. For instance, the United Kingdom has a consul in Taiwan but it does not recognize the Taiwanese
OppenhcUnnsIntemional Lw,9.Edition. Su Robert Je~ingsand Sir Anhur Watts m.). Vol. 1. p. 174. * D. W. Greig. ImemmionaiLmv, op cir. p. 121. Jean -François Li,Duns L'oeil & L'aigle. Bor&i Edition. 1990. p. 35657. Maicolrn N. Shaw,International 4*Edioon, Cambridge University Reos. 1997, p. 31 1. governmentil Therefore, logically, a country that wouid aUow a new state to open
consulates on its tem-tory would not necessarily recognize its independence. The fourth level of implied recognition is the act of sponsoring the admission of
an unrecognized state to membership of a statehood organization such as the United ~ations.1~In fact, the sponsoring of an unrecognized state can be based on informal relations and does not necessarily involve a wrïtten agreement between sponsor and sponsored States. For this reason, this level of recognition seems to be less detennining than previous levels. The fifth level of recognition consists of a message of congratulations being sent to a new state foliowing a yes majority vote for sovereignty.13 This Ievel is certainiy one of the least signifi~cantand one of the most implicit because it implies no real obligations fiom the recognùing state. In fact, such a message of congratulations means, in other words, to note a political fact. After sending a message of congratulations, it would be
very easy for a recognizing state to kaintain that the message sent was, in fact, only as a fnendship gesture to an unrecognized state. Finally, the Iast level of impiied recognition is expressed by the recognition of a new state's temtonal cl&-l4 In the case of a dispute between a seceding state and a
remauiing state over a terxitory, such as for instance the sauggle between Pakistan and
India over Kashmir, the seceding state would be irnplicitly recognized by a third party; paaicularly if this party ~cognizesthe legitimacy of the seceduig group over the territory in question. This is the least significant level of implied recognition because it only consists in an opinion expressed by a state. It is simply a sort of moral weight that gives more legitimacy to a seceding state. The recognition of a new state. based on this implied level of recognition, wouid therefore be very implicit.
-- -- Il hid. l2 Oppcnheirn#s Intcrnationa[ knv, op. cir .p. 175. l3 Maicolm N. Shaw, op. d..p. 310. l4 Oppenhcim's IntcllZOtiOiicrl Lmv,op. cit p. 175. These sut levels of irnpiied recognition constitute, as we can see. a range of possibilities between the refusai to recognize a state and the 'kxpress" declaration of recognition. These levels also show that international recognition can ofien be an exercise of deduction that nonetheless cm be exmmely important in detemiining the future of a new state. Before concluding, it is important to mention that both "express" and "implied" recognition can take two fomis. It can be either de facto or de jure. The next part wiIl brkfiy analyse these two forms of recognition.
De Facto and de Jure Recodtion A de facto recognition is usualiy granted when a recognizing state has some doubt as to the viability of a new state or a new government.15 It involves a kind of "wait and see" type of attitude corn the recognizing state, which may, in fact, be haitaot to grant full diplomatic recognition to a new state or govemment. De facto recognition can also be used to show one country's disapproval towards the development of a new state or the formation of a new régime. For instance, the United hgdom recognized de facto the
Soviet government in 1921 and extended de jure recognition only tbree years later in
1924.16 The & facto recognition was made because the British govemment had some doubt as to the viability of the Soviet govenunent, but also to protest against cornmunism. l7 A de jure recognition is usuaily granted when the recognizing state acknowledges that a new state or govemment is pemmnent and fîrxnly rooted and when the doubt conceming the viability of this state or government is overcome.18 Usually, a state WU grant a de jure recognition before estabhhing diplomatic relations with a new state. In other words, de jure recognition cm k seen as a legal recognition as oppose to factual in l5 Malcolm N. Shaw, op. ci+. p. 308. l6 D. W. Grcig, Intema~i'onalLw, op. ci&. p. 129. l7 Ibid. Makolm N. Shaw,op. cir.. p. 308. the case of de facto recognition- As MalcoIm N. Shaw states, by using these two forms of recognition (defacto and de jure) "a recognizing state could act in accordance with political reality and its own interests".lg Indeed, a state can play with both forms of recognition to expresses its opinion and its intention regarding the formation of a new state. To sum up, the highest level of recognition is the express recognition which is made publicly by the government of a recognizing state, or which is sent in a message to the govemment of the recognized state- Below this level, there are the different 1eveIs of implied recognition that have been presented above. Moreover, express and implied recognition can take the forrn of de facto or de jure recognition. For instance, a country can announce publicly that it recognizes de facto a new state. In this situation, we have an "express" announcement of a de facto recognition. As we wiU see in chapter four, Germany recognized expressively and de facto the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl issued a public statement in which he made an official recognition by mentionîng, however, that Germany wouid exchange ambassadors with both states only when the other members of the European Community would also recognize their independence. The German recognition involved therefore a "wait and see" type of attitude. Moreover, a country can also sign a bilaterai treaty with a new state that implied a de jure recognition. Within this example, the "implied" recognition would be one of de jure. Usuaily, a country that signs a treaty with a new state will have littie doubt as to the viability of the new state- Therefore, most of the time, the implied recognition that is extncated fiom the signing of a treaty will be de jure. In fact, the levels of international recognition can be represented by the foilowing fim. In this figure, square 1 will represent the most significant level of recognition, whiie square IV will represent the less sisnificant. Levels of International Recoenition
1 PubÜcStatement Bilateral Treaty De (will to establish Permitting Jure diplornatic relations) Diplomatic Note pedormance of (official Icttcr) consu1a.r functions Establishment of formal diplornatic relations IV Public Statement Establishment of (implying no informai diplornatic dipiornatic relations) relations Spmsoring an De unrecognized state's Faeu admission to an international organiza tion Message of Congratulations Recognition of an wuecognized state's territorial ciah
This short chapter has exploreci the different levels of international recognition, and has showed that the two categories of recognition (express and implied) can take the form of de facto or de jure recognition. In fact, we can Say that "express" and c'implied'' are the way chosen to grant recognition, while &facto and de jure are the meaning of the recognition. The conclusion of this second chapter also means the conclusion of the theoretical analysis upon which the study of the possible international recognition of an independent Quebac WU be bdt. Before speculating on whether France and the United States would recognize a Quebec UN, the next chapter wiU provide an anaiytical background on the past Quebec mferenda on secession and on the debate surrounding, for more than thirty years now, the question of the Quebec sovereignty. The Secession of Quebec: An Analytical Background
Let us keep the fuith. the next tirne wifI be thi rightone! And the na tinte couid corne sooner than we thuik
- Lucien BOUCHARD, the referendun aight, October 30, 1995.'
The objective of this chapter is to give an overview of the period fkom 1976 to 1998, in regard the question of Quebec secession. It will demonstrate the reason why the international recognition of a Quebec UDI is now a very critical and important issue. This chapter wili fkt present elements surrounding the 1980 Quebec referendum on sovereignty-association, and wiii analyse its political rneaning and implications. In addition. some of the most important consequences of this referendum wiil also be briefly reviewed. Second, we wïU focus on the 1995 referendum on sovereignty, in order to demonstrate how the implications of this second referendum were far different fkom the implications of the first one. Following the analysis of both referenda, we wiil then examine the judgement of the Sup~meCourt of Canada concemiog the Quebec Reference Case, which came in reaction to the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty. We wiU concentrate more prezisely on the conclusions of the Supreme Court regarding a unilateral secession of Quebec hm Canada. Finally, we wiU demonstrate that the election of the Parti Québécois on November 30, 1998, makes the holding of another
Free translation. Lucien Bouchard narcd: "Gardons espoir, gardons l'espoir car la prochaine fois sera la bonne! Et elie pourrait venir, cette prochaine fois, efle pourrait venir plus rapidement qu'on le pense." See Memoire du procureur général du Canada, Devant lu Cour Suprême du Corioda, No-25506, September 30, 1996, p. 13. referendum on sovereignty very likeIy, and therefore, keeps the issue of the Quebec UDI relevant.
The 1980 Referendum on Sovereimtp-Association On November 15, 1976, the Parti Quebécois was elected with 41 per cent of the
popular vote? It was the fmt time in Quebec history that a sovereignist party was elected. The main objective of the PQ was to achieve sovereignty-association with Canada- Sovereignty-association consisted in the political sovereignty of Quebec with an economic association with English Cana&, including a common currency. As Michael Keating States, sovereignty-association's objective is to "leave the economic union intact,
while making Quebec into a sovereign state"? During the election campaign, the PQ,
and its leader René Lévesque, stated that sovereignty-association would have to be approved by referendum? and Lévesque promised to hold such a referendum before the
end of the PQ mandate? As a consequence, since voting for the Parti Queoécois did not necessarily mean voting for sovereignty, many Quebecers who opposed the sovereignty option voted for the PQP Therefore, even though the PQ won the 1976 election with 7 1
seats out of 110,' the sovereignty-association option did not necessariiy rdy a majority
of Quebecers -8
Robert Bothwell. Ormdrr and Quebec: One Country, Two Histories, Vancouver. UBC Rss. 1995. p. 155. Michael Kea~g.NrrtrOns agaùrst the Sme: The Ncw Politics of N01ionuhn in Quebec, Gztdonb and Scotland. Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 78. Kenneth McRobats. Misconcciving Cdï7w Strugglefor Nationai Uaity, Oxford University Rea. 1997, p. 148. Jacques-Yvan Morin and José Woehriïng, Demain, le Qutfbcc-..Les Éditions du Septentrion, 1994, p. 51. Kenneth McRobcrts points out: "Sweys found that a nvmber of PQ voters eitha did not support sovercignty-association or did not understand how grcat a chance it would be", See Kenneth McRoberts. op. cit., p. 148. Robert Bothwell. op. ci?., p. 155. Denis Moaiàr, "Deur discours pour k choix d'un pays". in Qudbcc: Un Pays Incertain, QuébcJAmdrique, 1980, p. 89. It is in ihi-s poIiticai context that the PQ bdt its referendum strategy. First, the sovereignist government chose to hold the referendum at the end of its mandate in order, among other things. to have enough time to convince a majority of Quebecers that sovereignty-association was the best option for the future of Quebec. Second, the PQ decided to restnct the object of the referendum to a mandate to negotiate sovereignty- association with the rest of Canada.9 On December 20, 1979, the referendum question on sovereignty-association was made public. The fodation of the question was, in fact, the "fruitvrof a progressive and strategic approach adopted by the PQ du~gits mandate. Here is the question:
The Government of Que-c has made public its proposai to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada, based on the equality of nations; this agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, levy its taxes and establish relations abroad - in other words, sovereignty - and at the same tirne, to maintain with Canada an econornic association including a comrnon currency; no change in political status resulting fiom these negotiatiom wiii be eff'ted without approval by the people th;ough another referendum; on these te=, do you give the Govemment of Que- the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and ~anada?lo
As we can see, the Quebec government asked Quebecers for a mandate to negotiate an agreement with Canada on sovereignty-association. A "yes" majonty vote in the referendum would have only given to the govemment the legitimacy ro negotiate a new agreement with Canada, but not the nght to prodaim sovereignty. Indeed, the decisive vote regarding whether Quebec should become a sovereign state, based on a new agreement reached with English Canada, would have been the objective of a second referendum. As a consequcnce, the strategy, and the logic, of sovereignty-association remained withthe Canadian constitutional fiamework. Aner a wlliniag referendum, the fmt step was to reach an agreement with English Canada on a constitutional transition of
9 Ibid. Edward McWhinmy, OlMdo adthe Comtiinrton 1979-1982: Patriation and the Charter of Rights. University of Toronto Rcss, 1982, pp. 29-30, Quebec towards sovereignty. The next step was to ask Quebecers to rat@ the agreement
in a second referendum. Finaily, foliowing the approval of the deai by Quebecers. the Canadian constitution would have been amended to aUow Quebec to becorne a sovereign
state. That was, at lem, the strategy and the wiii of the PQ govemment. As René Uvesque stated in Lu Presse, one yea.before the elaboration of the referendum question, "sovereignty and association wili have to be achieved concmntiy and without break-up, once Quebecers have given us, by referendum, the mandate to negotiate it".I1 In sum, the strategy of the PQ was to progressîvely rralize a c~nsti~onalsecession of Quebec, based on a new agreement with Canada The unilateral secession of Quebec and international recognition were, therefore, not an issue in 1980. On May 20, 1980, a ciear majority of Quebecers refused to give the PQ the mandate to engage negotiations with English Canada From those who exercised their right to vote, 59.56 per cent voted for the No option, while 40.44 per cent voted for the yes.12
From the Patriation to the Charlottetown Accord During the 1980 referendum campaign, the Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre
Elliott Trudeau, promised that, after a No vote in the referendum, his govemment would make substantial change in the Canadian Constitution in order to acco~~l~~lodate ~uebecers.13 Rime Minister Trudeau did not specify. however, what kind of constitutional changes he was committed to make. His position was clanfied, in October 1980, when his govenment submited the project to patrïate the Canadian Constitution from the Parliament of Westminster in England.14 The objective of pacriation, among
Frce translation. Renit Lévesque stated: "La souvaaineté a l'association devmnt donc se réaliser sans rupture et concurrcment, après que les Québécois nous en auront donnt5 le mandat par voie de référendum*'. See Denis Monih, Les Enjeudu Ré$irendm, Éditions QuébdAmérique, 1979, p. 121. l2 Jacques-Yvan MOMand José Wahrling. op. cit., p. 51. l3 Edward McWhïnney. op. cit-, p. 40. l4 Jacques-Yvan Morin and José Woehrling, op ci+, p. 52. Note that und Aprii 1982, the Condian Constitution was in London and codd oniy be amendcd by the Parliament of Westminster, other things, was to mod* the Canadian Constitution of 1867 by including an amending formula and a charter of rights and fkeedoms.1s However, those ConstitutionaI modifications Ied to some disagreement with the majority of the Canadian provinces. Quebec opposed the version of the Charter of Rights, elaborated by the Federai govemment, becausc it threatened, in some points, Quebec Linguistic laws.16 Moreover, with seven other provinces, Quebec wanted the constitutional right to withdraw (opt out) kom ail the federal programs with fulI financial compensation, while Ottawa agreed to give such a nght only in the matter of education and other cultural fields.17 Nevertheless, on November 5, 1981, an agreement was fmdy reached between the federal govenunent and nine of the ten Canadian provinces. For reasons stU debated today, the PQ government, which was re-etected in 1981 despite its referendum defeat in
1980, did not take part in the final agreement, and refuseci
Progressive Conservative Party won the federal e~ection-~lA year later, in Quebec, the
l5 For more on this, see Kmaeth McRobcrts. op. cit.. p. 161. l6 Ibid-, p. 162. l7 Jacques-Yvan MoMand José WoehrIing, op. eit-, p. 53. l8 Ibid. l9 Sec for instance: Picm Fournier, Autopsie du Lac MeeA VU! Éditeur, 1990. p. 21. 2o Note that sincc 1982, PU Quebec govcmments rchlscd to sign the Constitution Act of 1982 Despite this, the Constitution is implcmented on the Quebec t~rritory- 21 ROMBothwell, op. cit.. p. Xnr. Parti QueMcois lost the provincial election and Robert Bourassa's Liberal Party took office.= These political changes were seen in Quebec and in Canada, as an opportunity "to repair the damage of 1982 and b~gQuebec back into the Canadian family."23 In
1987, a constitutional agreement was reached between the federal govemment and the provinces (including Quebec). This agreement was known as the Meech Lake Accord, and included five minimal conditions imposed by Bourassa's govemment for Quebec to sign the Constitution Act of 1982- One of these conditions was the constitutional recognition that Quebec was a "distinct society9'.24
This agreement's purpose was to bring Quebec back within the Canadian constitutional hework. It had, however. the effect of making worse the constitutional crisis. Indeed, in June 1990, the Meech Lake Accord failed to be adopted because it did not get the consent of ail provincial Legislative Assemblies (Manitoba and Newfoundland's Assemblies did not ratify the agreement). The rejection of this constitutional agreement, which had been ratifïed by the Quebec National Assembly, humiliated many Quebecen. A few weeks after the failure of the accord, the support for
Quebec sovereignty reached 64 per cent among the Quebec population,= unprecedented in Quebec history. In reaction to this constitutionai failwe, the Quebec govemment created two special cornmittees on the political and constitutional future of Quebec. One cornmittee's purpose was to snidy questions surrounding Quebec sovereignty, while the other
22 Jacques-Yvan Morin and José Wahrling. op- ci&, p. 59. Note that the Quebec Liberal Party is a nationalist party that wants Quebec to rcmain in the Canadian fedcration- 23 Kenneth McRokm, op. cit.. p. 203. z4 Here are the five conditions imposed by the Quebec government: 1) the recognition of Quebec as a distinct socicty; 2) more power for provincial govenunents in matter of immmmiption;3) the constitutional right for Quebec to appoint thr# of the nine judgcs of the Suprcme Court of Canada; 4) a limitation of the federal spending power in the ficld of exclusive provincial jinisdictions; and, 5) îhe recognition of a veto right for Quebec rtgarding federal institution reforms and on the ctcation of new provinces, See Gouvernement du Canada, Gu& de l'accord consthrionel du lac Meech, August 1987.2 1 pages, 25 Kenneth McRoberts, op. cir. p. 204. evaluated the possibilities of a new constitutional arrangement with This political exercise fiaaily Ied to a new constitutional agreement with English Canada, adopted in August 1992, by the federaI governmenf the ten provinces and the two temtones. This agreement was known as the Chadottetown ~ccord.2~By signing this accord, Quebec Remier Robert Bourassa decided to commit his govemment to the path of constitutional reconciliation with Canada iostead of the path of sovereignty for Quebec. However, in October 1992, the Charlottetown Accord was rejected by the majority of the Canadian population in a referendum-28 The faiiure of this agreement brought, one more time, anger and disillusion among Quebecers. In sum, since the patriation of the Constitution in 1982, Canada rnissed two chances to put an end to the constitutional crisis by bringing Quebec back into the
"Canadian family". The rejcaion of the Charlottetown Accord, in 1992. marked the beginning of a new era where the sovereignty option was at the center of the political debate in Quebec.
The 1995 Referendum on Sovereimtv-Partnershi~ The failure of two constitutionai agreements and the desire for change in Quebec der eight years of the Liberal Party's govenunent, led to the eIection of the Parti Quebécois in September 1994.29 In some aspects, this election looked iike the 1976 election. Indeed, as in 1976, the PQ promised a referendum on sovereignty. This the
26 Ibid.. p. 206. 27 Hac are Mme of the dispositions included in the Charlottetown Accord: Quebec was rccognizcd as a distinct society; Quebec had a constitutionai right to appoint three of the nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada; the guarantee that Qucbcc rcprescntation in the House ofCornons would be, at least, of 25 per cent; more power in matter of unmigraiion; a veto right rcgardiig ztforms of fedcral institutions and on the creation of new provinces; and, a limitation of the federal spending power in the field of exclusive provincial jurisdictions. See Gouvernement du Canada, Rapport du consensus sur la Co~t~titution, Chartottetown, August 28, 1992,25 pages- ** Jacques-Yvan Morin and hsé Wocbrhg, op. cit.. p. 84. 29 The PQ won 44-7pcr cent of the popular vote and 77 of the 125 scats in the Nationai Asscmbly. Sa Kenneth McRobcrts, op. cit., p- 223. however, the strategy and the politicai implications of the refêrendum were far different than in 1980- The new Remier of Quebec, Jacques Parizeau, was detedned to avoid
what he considered the mistakes of the htreferendum. Right nom the outset, Premier
Parizeau was -y resolved to hold a referendum within the fmt year of the PQ's mandate, instead of at the end of the term.30 Second, Premier Parizeau did not conceive economic collaboration with Canada as a condition to achieve Quebec sovereignty.31 Only few weeks after its election, the PQ unveiled its referendum strategy. On December 6. 1994, Jacques Parizeau introduced, in the National Assembly, an act which
stated: "Quebec is a sovereign counay".32 act entitled: An Act respecting the sovereignty of Que%ec, stipulated, among other- things, that in a sovereign Quebec. the currency would remain the Canadian dollar, and that Quebec would have the authorization to conclude an economic association with Canada, The Act also fixed the arrangements for the clrafting of a Quebec constitution, and included a short referendum
question: "Are you in favor of the Àct passed by the National Assembly declaring the sovereignty of Quebec? Yes or No". In fact, a "yes" rnajority vote would have had the effect to make the Act the fïrst law of a sovereign Quebec. However, the Act stipulated
that on& sections 2, 3 and 15 would corne into effect immediately after a winning referendum. Those sections concerned the negotiation of an economic association with Canada, the drafting of a Quebec constitution, and the sharing of Canadia. goods and debts with the federd government. As for the other sections, they wouid become effective one year after a winning refereadum on sovereignty By the introduction of this Act, the referendum strategy of the PQ was clearly announced. The PQ centered its option on sovereignty raîher than on an association with the rest of Canada. In fact, accordhg to the Act, Quebec wouid become a sovereign
30 Ibid.. p. 233. 31 Ibid. 32 Le Devoir. "L'avant-projet de loi sur la souveraineté du Qutbcc". Decembcr 7. 1994. country one year after a winning referendum, regardless of the result of negotiations with
Canada The politicai sfrategy of the PQ was far different than during the kt referendum. In 1980, Evque's govemment asked for a mandate to negotiate sovereignty-association with Canada. The economic association was seen as a condition to achieve sovereignty, and a second referendum was planned to decide whether to secede, in light of negotiations with Canada But, a second referendum was not part of the political strategy of the PQ in 1995, and economic association with Canada was not a condition to achieve sovereignty but rather a favorable oppominity for a sovereign Quebec-
A few months after the introduction of the act, the PQ's suategy was modified. In order to increase its chances to win a referendum on sovereignty, the PQ concluded an agreement with the Bloc QueWcois (l3~3~and the Action Démocratique du Québec in au attempt to form a coalition of sovereignist parties. The agrrement was ratifTed by Premier Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard (BQ), and Mario Dumont (ADQ) on June 12, 1995,35 and had for result to modify the Act introduced in December 1994 by Premier Parizeau. The June 12 agreement stipulated that a referendum on sovereignty would be held in the au- of 1995, and that the refereodum question would include a formal proposal of economic and politicai partnership with Canada? In fact, the signing of the
33 The Bloc Qu6bcMis (BQ) is a ftderal pwcommittcd to Qudxc sovmignty. 'Ihis party was created in 1990 by former conscrvative dcputies in reaction to the failurc of the Meech Lake Accord, In 1993, the BQ became the official opposition in the House of Commons- In 1995, the BQ leader was Lucien Bouchard, 34 The Action Démocratique du Québec (ADQ) is a Quebec provincial party tbu was crearcd in 1992 by former Liberai Party rnembers, The ADQ was formai in rcaction to the Bourassa's govemment refusai to adopt a constitutional position that promottd a sfrong decentrabation of the Canadian foderation. In 1995, the ADQ leader was Mario Dumont. 35 L'entente tripartite du 12 juin, Guy LachapeNe, Pian P. Tmmblay and John E. Trent, L'impact rt$éreWre, Qu*, RCSSCSde I'Université du Qu-, 1995, pp. 4054. 36 nie economic and politid parmaship was promotcd by the Bloc Québécois and the Action démocratique du Québec. nie incIusion of the partnc~shipproposal into the referendum question was a condition for the BQ and the ADQ CO coordibate th& efforts with the PQ. agreement was. for the PQ, a strategic move. since it provided the fidl support of the BQ and the ADQ members, who were considered as sofier nationali~ts.3~ This politicai virage led to the introduction, in September 1995, of the Bill 1 entitied: An Act respecting thefurure of ~uébec?8which would come into force der a '%s" majorïty in the autumn referendum. The bill declared: 'We the people of QuCbec, through our National Assembly proclaûn: Que* is a sovereign country". The bill also mentioned that the proclamation of sovereignty would have to be preceded by "a formal
offer of ecoaornic and political parmership with Canada", and fixed the referendum date
to be October 30, 1995. Moreover, article 26 of the bill included a one-year penod to negotiate an economic and political association with Canada, and stipulated that the proclamation of sovereignty had to be made after successfd or nuitless negotiations with
Canada As Robert Young points out :'nie actual substance of the biU closely followed the fiamework of the 12 June agreement".39 In fact, the biU respected the political logic
of the Act introduced by Premier ~&au in December 1994, and foiîowed the political
strategy of the 12 lune agreement signed by the PQ, the BQ and the ADQ- The referendum question was also unveiled and adopted by the National Assembly in September 1995 (the initial question. included in the Act of December 1994, was abandoned when the 12 June agreement was reached by the three sovereignist parties). The new question cleariy demonstrated the compromise between the three political parties and the strategic move made by the PQ. Here is the question:
Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereig, afkr having made a formal offer to Canada for a new Economic and Political Partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the future of Que- and of the agreement signed on June 12,1995? YES or NO*
37 Robert A. Young. 'Ibc Secession of Quckc and the Future of Canada, Mdiiii-Queen's University Rcss. 2"6.Ed., 1998, p. 272. 38 National Asstrnbly. An Act respccriurg the future of Quibec. BiU 1. Fit Session. Thirty-Fifih Legislanue, Qu6bec OffIcial Publishcr. 1995. 39 ~otxrtA. Young, op. cit, p. 2n. 40 Ibid.. p. 278. As we can see, even by including an economic and political partnership in the question,
the PQ's referendum logic did not change. As Kenneth McRoberts pointed out: "the
question made the proposal of partnership a condition for Quebec sovereignty but did not
require that the proposal be a~cepred-"~~In other words, after a winning referendum,
Quebec would becorne sovereign (in the short or medium tem) whatever happened to the
political and economic partnership included in the referendum question.
On October 30, 1995, the majority of Quebecers rejected the sovereignty option.
This the, however, the sovereignists lost by a small margin. Indeed, 49.4 per cent voted
for the Yes, and 50.58 per cent voted for the No-The referendum result lwked, in fact,
like a defeat for the federal government. In contrast with the 1980 referendum, Ottawa
was this time reaIly concerneci about the possibIe break-up of Canada and was detemiined
to do something to prevent it.
The Su~remeCourt Reference Case on Ouebec Secession
One of the actions taken by the federai govemment, foilowing the close result of
the 1995 referendum, was to ask the Supreme Court of Canada whether Quebec has the
nght to secede unilaterally from Canada. On September 26, 1996, the Minister of Justice
and attorney general of Canada, Mr. Man Rock, subrnitted the questions to the nuie judges of the Supreme Court of Canada:
1. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislaiure or govemment of Quebec effact secession of Quebec hmCanada unilaterdy?
41 Kenneth McRokrts. op. cit.. p. 226. 42 Kenneth McRokrts, op. cir. p. 230. The -out for the refcrcndum wuexacmely high. 9352 percent of eligible votcrs. Sec RohA. Young, op. ci&. p- 289- 2. Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or govemment of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec hmCanada unilaterally? In this regard, is thex a right to seE4eterminaüon under international law that wddgive the National Assembly, IegisIature or govemment of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
3. In the event of a codïct between domestic and international Iaw on the nght of the National AssembIy, legislature or govemment of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec fiom Canada uniiaterally, which wouid take precedence in Canada93 In a letter sent to the Quebec Minister of Justice, Man Rock justified the Supreme Court reference by saying that, although the Quebec govenunent believes that the Quebec secession process could be based on international law, the federal govemment thinks the opposite, that international law does not give to Quebec the right to secede unüaterally. Rock also added that the federal govemment had the duty to clam what Canadian domestic law and international law dictate about this crucial issue-44 Furthemore, in the House of Commons on September 26, 1996, ALlan Rock stated: "They [sovereignists] clah to be entitled to make a unilaterd declaration of independence to create a separate state of Quebec. In our view, that position is contmy to Canadian law, unsupported in international law and deeply threatening to the orderly govemance of our nati~n."~S In reaction to this legal strategy taken by the federal government, the Quebec govemment strongly protested against it, and attacked the legitimacy of the whole process. The PQ's govemment stated that Quebec secession was a political issue rather than a legal issue. Remier Lucien Bouchard declared: "There is only one tribunal to settle Quebec's political friture and that's the Quebec peop1e."~6 As
43 Govcrnwnt of Canada, Starement by the Honourabfe AIhn Rock conccrning a Refërence ro rhe Supreme Court of Cd,House of Commons, Ottawa, Septcmber 26, 1996, p. 8. 44 Mémoire du imcurcur gén6ral du Canada, DCVM~IP Cour Suprême du &maah. NO. 25506, Scptcmkr 30, 1996, p- 18- 45 Govertment of Canada Statemmt by the Honourabfe AfhRock concemihg o Rcfrence to the Supreme Court of ç=anada, House of Commons,Ottawa, Scptcmber 26,1996. p. 2. 46 Robert A. Young. op. ci&. p. 360. See also Jacques Brassard, DCchrcuian drc Mininrc délégué aux A.Faies intergouvemtmenrcrles cdiènnes à l'occasion de iàjk des dencesdons l'@aire du renvoi devant la Cour suprême, Friday, Fcbruary 20, 1998. a consequence. the Quebec govemment decided to ignore any niling of the Supreme Court regarding the Quebec secession-4' On August 20. 1998. the Supreme Court of Canada finaUy pronounced its judgement entitied: Re$ierence re Secession of ~uebec.48 We wiU highlight, here. oniy the most important elements included in the judgement. RegmIding the hrst question formulated by the Canadian attorney generai. the Supreme Court stated that the National Assembly. the legislature or govemment of Quebec cannot, in accordance with the Canadian constitution. secede unilaterally hm Canada (para 104). The Court mentioned. among other things, chat the constitution '%ouchsafesorder and stability" and that a unilateral declaration of secession would thmaten these principles. Therefore. a secession that would not be achieved within the existing constitutional framework would not be considered legal according to Canadian constitutional law. However. the Court stated that if a clear majority of Quebecers expressed a desire to leave the federation by answericg a clear quenion on secession. this would give a democratic legitimacy to the initiative that the rest of Canada would have to recognize.49 According to the Court, a winning referendum on sovereignty based on a clear majority and a clear question "wouid confer legitimacy on the efforts of the govenimnt of Quebec to initiate the Constitution's amendment process in order to secede by constitutional means" (para. 87). The Court continued by stating that, in those circumstances, aü parties to Confèderation would have a reciprocal obligation to negotiate constitutionai changes (pam 88). The Supreme Coun also declared, on paragraph 103 of the judgement, that foliowing a yes majority vote for secession, the secession of Quebec "would be more likely to be recognized" by the international community. if the federai govemment or other provincial governments
47 ïbid.. p. 361. 48 Supreme Court of Canada. Rrfcence rc Scccssion of Quebec, August 20. 1998. The full text of the judgement can be found at: http~/~~w.&oi~umontrtal.caldocl~~~-~~den/p~b/1998/v0luhW1998~~~2~0217.hÉml[July 23, 19991. 49 hid. refùsed to negotiate or were king intransigent with the Quebec govenunent dunng constitutional negotiations. Conversely. the Quebec secessionkt claim would be weakened if the Quebec govenunent refused to negotiate according to Canadian constitutionai p~cipfesor negotiated in '%ad faiW with Engiish Canada. As for the second question negarding international law and selfdetemination, the Supreme Cou ruled that international law contains an implicit right of unilateral secession only in exceptionai ~Ïrcumstanceswhere peoples cannot exercise their nght of selfaetennination because they are oppressed or colonized (para. 112). The Court stated. however, that this is not the case of the Quebec people, since Quebecers are neither victim of oppression nor colonized, and "'occupy prominent positions within the government of Canada" (paras. 135-36). Accordingly. the Quebec people, the National Assembly. the legislature or goveniment of Quebec does not possess a nght to secede unilaterally ftom Canada under international law (para. 138). Indeed in cases where peoples are not oppressed, such as Quebecers, the Court stated that international law expects that "the rîght to seIf-determination will be exercised by peoples with the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently wiîh the maintenance of the temtorial integrity of those states" (para. 122). Findy. the Supreme Court did not have to answer the third question since there was no conflict between Canadian Constitutional Iaw and international law on the nght of Quebec to secede unüaterally fiom Canada The content of the Supreme Cour&judgement was favourably received by the Quebec government, although it repeated that the judgement was not legithate. In Quebec, political elite focussed on the fact that the federal government would have the "obligation to negotiatc" with Quebec after a winning referendum.50 However. it never mentioned the fact that such negotiations would be obligatory only after a clear majorïty vote for secession and a clear referendum question. Premier Lucien Bouchard stated that
Sec for example, Jacques-Yvan Morin. 'The sécession Itgitim et réaiïsable... en théorie". Le Devoir. August 3 1, 1998- the judgernent reinforced the sovereignty option because the feded govemment wodd be forced to negotiate after a winning referendum on sovereignty. Bouchard pointed out that Quebecers who were afiaid to vote for sovereignty in 1995. because of the intransigeace of the federal govemment regarding negotiations, are now relieved51 The judgement also raid several political questions. The former Premier of Quebec, Jacques Parizeau, certainly raised one of the most important questions by asking: what if the federal govemment wouid refuse to negotiate or if negotiations wouid fail?s2 The
Court aiiudes to this possibility but does not directly answer the question. SeveraI other political questions were left without answer. As Robert Young observes: "the Court preserved a large political arena for debate.53 For instance, what constitutes a clear majority and a clear question? Who would be involvexi in negotiation~?~~Such questions WU have to be debated in the political arena
Whv is the studv of the Ouebec UI~Icmcial ? What would have happened if the majority of Quebecen had voted 'ies" in the
1995 referendum? As it was stipulated in the referendum question, the govemment of Quebec would first offer to negotiate an economic and political partnership with English
Canada, in order to preserve certain Iuiks between the two political entities. Facing these events. the federal govenunent could have reacted in two difEerent ways. Fit, Ottawa could have recognized the referendum rdtand negotiate with the PQ govemment the secession of Quebec. This is what we caii comtitutionaI secession. After having negotiated the sharing of the Canadian debt and other important issues. the secession of Quebec would have occurred afker some amendments were made to the Canadian
Mario Cloutïer, "La souveraineté est renforcée, croit Bouchard", Le Devoir, August 22,1998. 52 Jacques Parizcau, "Et si la n6gocïations échouaient?", Le Devoir, Sepremba 4.1998. 53 Robert A. Young. "A Most Politic Judgements', ConszîNtiOna Quebec govenunent would have had several options. One would have baen to declare a unilateral declaration of independence. A WDIwould have been considered by the federd govenunent as being illegal in accordance with Canadian constitutional law. This is what we cduncomtitruri~l secession. A UDI wodd have declared Quebec law as the oniy Iaw that prevds on Quebec temtory,s and implicitiy declared illegal the irnplementation of Canadian law in Quebec. As Robert Young mentions: 'Since the Constitution Acts would not have ken amended, Canada's constitution would conflict with the assembly's declaration, and by so dedaring independence Quebec wouid 'step outside' the existing constitutional order"? A Quebec UDI would, therefore, create strong and serious political outcornes, and Quebec wodd have no other choice than tuming itseif towards the international community, in order to be recognized as a sovereign country. In September 1995, a few weeks before the referendum, the Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chrétien, implied that his govemment would not recognize the result of a referendum won by a simple majority. CMtien stated: 'Tn a countcy like ours to recognize that at one time a deof majority plus one could break up the country would be irresponsible on my part."58 On the other hand, the Quebec govemment insisted that 50 per cent + 1 vote was a democratic principle and, therefore, that a simple majority was enough to proclaim sovereigntyo In the 1995 referendum, 2,362,648 Quebecers voted - - - 55 For more on constitutional reccssions seRobert A. Ywng, ibid., p. 101. 56 Ibid, 57 Ibid. 5* Ibid.. p. 308. 59 For the PQ's position on the &moaotic aspect of the rcfmndum, see Bernard Landry, 'Tourner le dos aux principes d6mocratiques", Le Devoir, August 14,1997. for the No option, while 2,308,360 voted for the ~es.aWhat would have happened if the result had been reversed? Would Prime Minister ChreCtienhave maintained his decision not to recognïze a simple majonty, and therefore, not to negotiate with Quebec? If he had maintained his position. the PQ govemment was ready to declare a UDI and to ask for international recognition. This possibïiity was clearly anticipated by Parbau's government. More than a year aftcr the 1995 referendum on sovereignty, Jacques Parizeau, then fonner Premier of Quebec, wrote in Le Devoir: '2 don't undentand people who are scared of words. A Quebec unilaterai declaration of sovereignty was an integral part of the bill and of the agreement of 12 June, in case of the failure of partneahip A similar statement was made, in Jmuary 1996, by Lucien Bouchard. who had just become Premier of Quebec. He stated: By proposing a formal offer of partnership to Canada and a one-year period to negotiate, we clearly assert that our fïrst choice is to reach a negotiated resolution on the entire set of issues that interest us :common economic space, shani>g assets and the debt, joint institutions for partnership management. (...) However, if Canada refuses our extended hand, if Canada wants to impose on us vetos, and keep us in the federation agahst our will, we wilI withdraw by proclaming sovereignty.62 In light of this information, and considering the logic of the 1995 referendum question, a Quebec UDI would have ken very Lücely after a simple majonty vote for sovereignty. Robert A. Young, op. cit.. p. 289. 61 Fra translation. Jacques Parizeau mentioned: "Je ne compmids pas ceux que les mots em-ent. Une déclaration unilatérale de souveraineté du Québec faisait partic intigrantc de la loi et de l'entente du 12 juin, advenant un échec des négociations de partenariat.'' See Jacques Parizeau, ''Déclaration de la souveraulcd: Les explications de Parizeau", Lc Devoir. May 9,1997- 62 Frce translation. Lucien Bouchard mentioned: "En pmposant au Canada une offk formelle de partenariat et une période d'un an pour négocier les amngemcnts nécaak, nous affirmons clairement que no= premier choix est une rhlution n€gocibe de I'cnsemblc des questions qui nous intéressent: espace économique commun, partage des resp0asabilitr.squant à la date et aux actifs, organismes conjoints de gestion de nom partenariat (...) Nous ajoutons cependant que si le Canada rcjettc nom main tendue, si le Canada veut nous imposer des vetos, nous retenir dans la f6d6ration con= nom gré, nous allons nous en As a result, the international recognition of a Quebec UDI wodd have been very important and even crucial for the future of Quebec as a sovereign country. The efection of the Parti Que'bécois on November 30, 1998, maintained the importance of the issue of the seccssion of Quebec, and the possibility of a Quebec ~~1.63During the election campaign, Remier Lucien Bouchard mentioned that, if the PQ was elected, he would commit his govermnent towards a referendum on sovereignty. Bouchard added, however, that a derendm wodd be caUed only if the so-caiied "winning conditions" are gathered. Those winning conditions, although not cleariy defined, consist in the creation of a political momentum that would permit his govermnent to achieve sovereignty. For instance, a zero deficit was seen by Bouchard's govemment as one of the winning conditions.) It is therefore expected that the PQ wiU hold a thùd referendum on sovereignty within few years, and maybe even in few months. If this did happen, the judgement of the Supreme Court would cenainly be at the center of the debate, especially the question regarding what constitutes a clear referendum question and a clear majority vote for secession. Depending on which party is in power in Ottawa at the tirne, a simple majority vote for sovereignty with a similar referendum question to the one of 1995 could be Sn, by the federal govemment, as king unclear and illegitimate. In those cùcumstances, the federal government codd refuse to recognize the result of the referendum anci refuse to negotiate the secession of Quebec- As a consequence, the altemaiive of a dateral declaration of independence would be extrernely relevant. Although this scenario is hypothetical, and it is not assured that a third referendum on sovereignty WU be held a Quebec UDI remains a prospect to be retirer en proclamant la souvcrained.** See BedLandry, 'Tomet le dos aux principes démocratiques", Le Devoir, August 14,1997. considered. This is why the international recognition of a Quebec UDI has to be seriously studied, and this is precisely the main purpose of foilowing chapters. The next chapter will focus on the case of France and wili uy to demonsîrate whether France would recognize a unilateral secession of Quebec- 63 On Novembcr 30, 1998, the Psni QutWcois won 75 soo out of 1s. with 43 pcr cent of the popular vote. See Richard MacIrit, "PQlagged in getting out vote, poiisters saym',TheG&be and Mail, Decembcr 2, 1998- The French Recognition of a Quebec UDI ? : Deconstructing the "Grand Game" of Mr Parizeau Mr Parüearc does not have to use France as lever to mobiiïze the Unired States. ney WUbe the firsr to remOCt Michel VENNE~ This chapter WU examine the question of the French recognition of a Quebec unilateral declaration of independence. The case of Frauce has been chosen. as explained in the general introduction, because of the cultural. linguistic and political links that unite Quebec and France, and the obvious bond of niendship that has been forged between both states over years. Moreover, France was chosen because it has ken, for more than thirty years now. the only country sympathetic to Quebec's secessionist claim. However, despite the positive condition offimco-québécoises relations. it will be demonstrated that it is unlikely that France would play a role of leadership or a strategic function in the event of a Quebec UDI, despite what Quebec Remier Jacques Parizeau was expecting in 1995, when he elabrateci bis diplornatic "Grand Game". By presenting the provisions of the European foreign policy included in the Maastricht treaty, and by studying the case of the Ge- unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Cmatia in 1991, we will see that, at the dawn of the twenty-nrSt century, the costs of a quick and unilateral recognition of Quebec to French national interests would be higher than the benefits. This chapter wili also conclude that, since it is udikely that France wouid fulfil a leadership function by 1 Free îranslation. Michel Venne wrote: "M. Panztsu n'a pas besoin de jouer la France comme levier pour que Les États-unis se mobilisent. Ceux-ci seront les premiers P réagir. See Michel VCMC, "Diplomatit de qu€teux", Le Devoir, Octoùer 2,1997- engaging the process of the international recognition of Quebec. our study must rather be concentrated on the United States, since the U.S. position towards Quebec. in a post- referendum accession to sovereignty. would be the most crucial. Franco-Oue3écoises Relations During the 1995 Quebec referendum campaign on sovereignty, Premier Jacques Parizeau found a great deal of hope in France. Premier Parizeau was convinced that, in the event of a Quebec unilateral declaration of independence. France would support and recognize Quebec. This conviction arose hma particular link of franco-québécoise fkiendship that has existed for more than th* years. This Iink was developed during the 1960's. when Quebec society went through a period of rapid modemkation, the so-caïled "quiet revolution". It was during this period of excitement that the French President. Charles de Gauiie, yelied his famous "Vive le Québec libre!" in Montreal duhg an official visit in 19672 Those four words pronouncecl by Charles de Gaulle made him one of the most crucial actors in the evolution of the sovereignist movement in Queùec.3 Regardless of the political reasoning that motivated his statement, General de Gaulle. and France by extension. were seen by Quebec nationaiïsts and sovereignists as allie and France was seen as the country that best undefstood the Quebec situation. For historie. culturai and linguistic reasons. France has been sympathetic to the Quebec secessionist daim since the 19609s, to the great displeasure of the Canadian govemment Since de Gaulle's "Vive le Québec libre!", franco-québécoises relations have been consolidateci and sustained, and Que& goveniwnts have always found an Scr Luc Bernier. De Pda WashUrgton: La poIit@uc intenuuionaIe du Quib~c~Rtsscs de l'Université du Qudbtc, 1996. p, 54-55. Charlcs de GauUcs ais0 suad during his vis& to Quebec in 1967: 'Wt am wim- hem. as in many regions of the world, to the advent of a people which. in al1 fields, wants to determine itself and take in hand its destiny. Who could k amad or alarmed at such a movmicnt, which is in keeping with the modern conditions of the balance in our world, and with the spmt of our tirne". Frct translation. For the original quotation. sec Jacques Parizeau. Pour wr Qu4bec Souverain, VLB éditeur*p- 308. "ear" in Paris. For instance, in 1977, ten years after the visit of de Gaulle to Quebec, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing also demonstrateci his fiiendship and his solidarity to Quebec so~ereig~sts.During the fmt official visit to France of Premier René Lkvesque. President Giscard d'Estaing declareci: 'mat you expect fkom France, [...], is its understanding, its confidence, and its support. You can be sure that they wii1 not be lacking dong the road that you decide to choose."4 This statement became the traditional position of '4non-indifference but non-interference" regarding the Quebec issue, which has been adopted, since then. by French leaders. Moreover, even President Franfois Mitterrand, who opposed Charles de Gaulle's vision and policies in many areas, has voiced kuid words for Quebec. In a visit to Quebec in 1987, Mitterrand stated: '1 pronounce the word Quebec with love. 1pronounce it with respect. 1pronounce it with hope."S Finally, in 1995, Jacques Chirac went fartber than every French Leaders before regarding the Quebec issue. A few rnonths before the 1995 Quebec refenndum on soverèignty. Jacques Chirac, the future President of France, who was in the middle of a French presidential campaign declad In the event that a referendum response is positive, where Quebec sovereignty would be decided, it would seem to us that francophone nations -because it is a problem with a strong hcophone dimension - and in particular France should immediately k at Quebec's side and support and recogaite this new situation.6 Free translation. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing statcd: "Ce que vous attendez de la France. [..-1, c'est sa compréhension, sa confiance et son appui. Vous pouvez compter qu'ils ne vous manqueront pas le long de la route que vous déciderez de suivre." Quoted in Louise Beaudoin and Jacques Vallée, "La reconnaissance internationale d'un Québec souverain", Alain-G. Gagnon and François Rocher (cd,), Répliques audétracteurs de la souvercrUIctédu QuCbec, VLB éditeur, 1992, p. 197. 5 Frce translation. François Miücrrand staicd: "Je prononce cc mot Québec avcc amour. Je k prononce avec respect. Je le prononce avcc espoir-" Quotcd in Jean-François Li*. Le Tiicheur :Ruben Bourussa et les Québécois, Monuéai: Boréal. 1994, p. 184- 6 Sec RhCal SCguin. "French leaders givc lifi to Parizeui", î7ic Gbbe Md Mail, Janu.ry 27. 1995. The position of Jacques Chirac was howcver changed once he bccame the President of France in May of 1995, hdd, his govcniment retumed to the "non-indincrena but non-intcrfercnce" traditional position by rtassuring the Canadian govanment that France would not get involved in the issue of Quebec sovereignty. See Jeff Sallot, 'French ministÉr rassures Canada about roIe in Quebec issue", Tlie GIobc ond Mail, June 17, 1995. Those statements made by French Presidents over the years show that the Quebec issue has aiways been highly regarded by French authorities. Since the 1960's. the tight Quebec-France relations tunieci out to be an extraordinary chance for Quebec sovereignists to promote the independence of Quebec and to gain support in Paris. It is also important to mention that no other countries have ever officiaily recognized the legitimacy of Quebec aspirations for sovereignty. In light of this information we can now understand why, at the eve of the Quebec referendum on sovereignty, Premier Parizeau was confident that France would move toward the recognition of Quebec in the eventuality of a refiisal by Onawa to tecognize a 'yes" majority vote for sovereignty. The %rand Game" of Premier Parizeau It is on the ground of the strongfranco-québécois link of fnendship described above that Premier Parizeau set up in 1995. in anticipation of the referendum. his so- caïïed "Grand Game". This diplornatic game was a political strategy whose purpose was to make a Quebec UDI quickIy recognizcd by France and by other bcophone countries. in order to press Washington to recognize the independence of ~uebec.7 The ultimate goal of this domino strategy, as Premier Parizeau expected, was to eventuaiiy see France pressure Washington to move towards the recognition of a Quebec UDI. This "Grand Game". which was made public only a year abr the 1995 referendum, had been conceived because Parizeau was convinced that the United States would never recognite a Quebec UDI. Premier Parizeau wrote: "...Americans [...] will not be inclined to recognize a Quebec which declares itself sovereign, unless they cannot do otherwise. The only way to incite the United States to accept Quebec's new status is to make sure that France recognizes Quebec as a country in a very short time."8 In fact, Parizeau The "Grand Gim" of Rcmin Puitcau is explaincd in: Jacques Parizcau. op. cir, pp. 284-86. 8 FE aans1ation. Puizeui wrote: '... Les Américains CI.] ne saont pas caciins reconnaître un Qutkc qui se déclart souverain, à moins vraiment qu'ils ne puissent faire autrement. La seule façon d'inciter les targeted the United States primarily because of its importance in sustaining and expending the economy of a sovereign Quebec. The United States was the most important market of Quebec goods.9 and without its recognition, the Quebec economy would have been amputateci. In the beginning of the 1990'~~Lwise Beaudoin, now minister of Quebec international relations under Lucien Bouchard's govement, and Jacques Vallée, gave a foretaste of the ""Grand Gasne" by formulahg a toned down version of it They hypothesized that, ia a situation where Canada would not recognize a Quebec declaration of independence, France could recognke Quebec, or at least, would establish unoffcial diplornatic relations with a sovereign Quebec to pressure the United States and other members of the international community to intervene.10 Beaudoin and Vallée justified their argument by pointing out: France, histoncal leader of the fraacophone world and permanent member of the Security Council. is the one state which, more than any other, wiii have the 1egitim;iCy and the necessary weight to engage, at the nght moment, the process of the international recognition of Quebec, and to help it to become progressively irreversible. 11 As one cm see then, Premier Parizeau, as weli as other sovereignists, were hoping that France would eventually play a strategic hction. From the perspective of the Quebec national interests, France was seen as a simple tml, while the U.S. was seen as the indispensable partner of a sovereign Quebec. In an article published in 1995, Gordon Mace, Louis Bdlanger, and Ivan Bernier, gave a good explanation of the long term logic of the sovereignist strategy towards France. They wrote: "[Quebec] hoped to secure États-~nis1 accepter k nouveau statut du Québec est de fsut en sorte que la France k reconnaisse comme pays dans des délais très brefs." See ibid-, p-285. Scr Ibid., p. 286. Louise Beaudoin and Jacques Vail&, op cit.. p. 197. Fret Translation. Beaudoin and Vallée wmtc: "'La France, ider historique du monde frncophonc et membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité, M l'État qui. plus qu'aucun autre. aura la ltgitimité et le poids n&esairc pour enclencher, le moment venu, le processus même de la reconnaissance internationale du Québec et I'aidcr &devenirpco&rcssivernent idversiblel" Sec Ibid., p. 198. quick support hmthe French which would set off a more or less long. but irreversible, pmess of growing international recognition."l2 Wecan be sceptical as to the reaiïsm of i?remier Parizeau "Grand Game". Indeed, this politicai strategy was based on a rather unrealistic original prem-se, which pretended that France would inevitably recognize a Quebec UDI in the foilowing days, or weeks, of the Quebec proclamation of independence. Even if France rnaintained close relations with Quebec, and recognized the legitimacy of the Quebec sovereignist option, it is less Wrely that France would be the fmt state to move towards recognition, and therefore, it is even less Wrely that France wodd succeed in administering pressure on Washington. In a brilliant leading article written for the daiiy te Devoir, Michel Verne wrote: "cAlthough France's inchation towards Quebec is reai, there is a iine to cross betwee!n the expression of fkiendship and the international recognition of a sovereign state."l3 In fact, as it will be seen, it is the whole political considerations constituting this 'line to cross" that &es the "Grand Game" of Mr Parizeau rather unrealistic. For decades, France bas maintainecl very close political and economic relations with other European States withui the European Community C) Those relations have been iatensified and institutionalized even more in the beginning of the 1990's. by the signing of the Maastricht treaty. which created, in Novernber 1993, the European Union (EU).14 The Maastricht treaty included, in its Title V, a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) which had the effect of urguig EU members, including France, to harmonize their foreign policy initiatives with other members of the European Union. As a result, even if France would be tempted to recognize a Quebac UDI, which is fat from evident, the costs of l2 Gordon Me,Laik BLIanda and Ivan Bernier, "Canadian Foreign Policy and Quebec", MaxweU A. Camcron and Maureen Appel Molot (cd.), CModa Among Nrrtions 1995: Democracy und Foreign Policy, Carleton University Press, 1995, p. 13 1. l3 Frce translation. Michel Venne wmtc: "Bien que la sympathie de la France envers le Québec soit réelle, il y a une marge 2t franchir entre I'exprcssion de l'amitié et la reconnaissance internationale d'un nouvel État souverain." See Vennc, "Diplomatiede quêwi', Le Devoir, Octokr 2,1997. l4 See Eumpan Union, Politùpe irrung2rc et de sé'curiri commme, p. 1. Available nt: http~/~~~.e~~0peuin1/poYcf~nfo~frhtm[August 4,19991, betraying common foreign poIicy initiatives would certainly be higher than the benefits of the recognition of a Quebec UDI on French national interests. As a resuIt, it is unlikely that France would be the hrst state to recognk the secession of Quebec, and even less iikely that France would pressure Washington to recognize Quebec. In other words, we can assume that the 'CGrandGame" of Mr Parizeau would have very litde chances to succced- To demonstrate this argument, we will first move on and examine the provisions of the European cornmon foreign policy. The Euroman Common Foreign Policv The provisions of the common foreign poiicy are outlined. as mentioned before, in Titie V of the Maastricht treaty which is untitled: Provisions on a Conunon Foreign and Securïîy policy (CFSP).~~This document has been signed by the EC members in Maastricht on February 7. 1992, and was implemented in November 1993. Those provisions established intergovernrnental procedures that coordinate the national foreign policy of the European Cornmunity member States. Fim, article 1.2 (1) of the document stipulates that EU members must consult one another within the Europeaa Council on any rnatters of foreign poiicy that give nse to a general interest.16 Therefore, right fkom the beginning, we must know if a Quebec unilateral dechration of independence would be an issue of generai in- In an article pubiished in 1998. Philip H. Gordon, specialist on the European Union, analysed the iimits of the Ewopean foreign policy. He stated: "States only pool or delegate their sovenignty in particuiar functional areas if the IS nie Europcan Union. Titlc V: Provisions on a Common Foreign and Ssurity Policy. pp. 1-5. The full tcxt can be found at: http~/~~~.empaeuint/abc/obj/trea~es/edentr2f~han[August 8. 19991. l6 nie Eumpan Council is bascd on the intergovanmntnl coopntion kt- the rnembers (now fiftecn) of the Europcan Union. The Council is formed by the foreign ministcrs of cach EU mcmbcr, and has the executive power to make decisions aftcr the European Commission had submi- its rccommendations. 'Ibe hpeanCouncii ahdetermines the political objectives that the Europcan Union has to mut. See CounciI of the European Union, Generol Infonnrztion. Available at: hap~iue.eu.intle~tOfdfiamel.hm [August 9, 19991. perceived benefits of doing so outweigh the costs."" Considering the fact that nearly aii EU members have minonties of their own, the non-concertation on the Quebec issue, and the unilateral recognition of Quebec by some EU members, could encourage mer secessionist movements in Europe. Therefore, we cm maintain that the benefits for EU counaies to delegate a part of their sovereignty on this matter would certaidy outweigh the costs. As a result, since the iutemationaï recognition of a Quebec UDI would have direct consequences on niles of the international system, and would thereby threaten security and stability in Europe by encouraging secessionist movements, we can argue that a Quebec UDI would be a matter of general interest. Therefore, France would have to respect the general interest for the good of the Eutopean Union. For Rasons just explained, the Empean Council would certainly elabmate a common position in the event of a unilaterai secession of Quebec, and this position wodd be elaborated in accordance with the article J.2 (2) of the documentl8 Furthermore, common positions and actions have to be taken unaaimously within the European Council as article J.8 (2) points out.19 Once implemented common positions and actions cm be modified only by another decision of the Council, also taken unanimously.*0 TitIe V of the Maastricht treaty also provides a measure regarding urgent situations. Article 1.3 (6) stipulates that in a matter of urgency "arising from changes in the situation", and in the case of the failure of a new Council decision, EU members can take measuns which wili respect the general objectives of the joint position and action of - .- - - Philip H. Gordon. "The Limils of Europe's Common Foreign and Sccurity Policyw.in Andrcw Moravcsik (ed,), CentralLzarion or Fragmcntrrtibn?, A Council on Foreign Relations Book. 1998. p. 181- l8 The article J.2 (2) stip~IatLf:"Whcncvu it dcems it necsacy, the Council didl define a cornmon position." 19 Not ail dccisions have to be tsLcn uawimoudy. J.3 (2) stipulaies that some common decisions have to be taken by qualified majonty, likc for instance, the procedural questions. Morcovcr, whcn the Council adopts a joint action, the article J.3 (2) stipulates tliat the Council can dcfine ''those mattcrs on which dtcisions rn to bc taken by a qualincd majority." 20 ÉTic RcmPdc. "Les dispositions du Traité de Maastricht-poiitique étrangères et sécurité commune de l'Union curopécae". Etudes inîe~w~~~Ies,VOL23, No. 2. June 1992. p. 383. the EU.21 Therefore in the hypothesis where the situation would change following a Quebec UDI, and in the case of an imperative need caused by the absence of a new Council decision regarding this issue, one or some EU members could decide to take new measures respecting the initiai Council decision. in order to address the changes. Moreover, in order to facilitaie the decision making process of the European Council, a Political Cornmittee leaded by Political Directors is provided for by the article J.8 (5) of the treaty. In the case of a Quebec unilateral secession, this committee would follow the evolution of the situation and wodd make recommendations to the EU Council, in order to "contribute to the definition of poiicies" regarding the Quebec issue? As we can see, since 1992 the Ewopean Union has established mechanisms to deal with international issues. Because of the consequences that could result nom having Quebec's UDI recognized by one EU member, the Empan Union wodd certainly do di it could to adopt a common foreign policy, and a consemative one, in order to avoid the expansion of secessionist movements in Europe. For instance, the European Union could pronounce itself in favor of the maintenance of the temtoriai integrity of Canada, or it could declare that the Quebec issue is a Canadian internai affair that has to be settled by Canadians.. It is importaut to mention, however, that even though Title V of the Maastricht treaty concerning the comrnon foreign policy strongly encourages EU memben to cooperate, it is not a consaaining document. Since EU members are sovereign countries, 21 The article I.3 (6) stipulaus. "in cases of Unpcrative ndarising frwi changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the gencral objectives of the joint action- The MemkState conccmed shall infom the Council immediately of any such measures." * The Political Commiaa is ''the Member States mentfaum for holding consultuions and hannonizing positions in matters conarning political CO-option"with respect, among others, to foreign policy. Sec Jaap W. de Zwann, Tlic Pernuurcnt Representatïves Lommitree: Its Role in European Union Dccrsian-Muking. Amsterdam, TMC Asser Instituut - The Hague, p. 176. they have the option of establishing their own pmrogatives in matters of foreign policy. The question is therefort to know at what cost a EU member, such as France, would risk breakhg off as a common foreign policy member by recognizing unilaterdiy the secession of a state. In order to demonstrate the consequences and the political costs of not respecthg a Empan common position in a matter of foreign policy, the next part wiii study the case of the Gcxman unilateral recognition of the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. This unilateral recognition by Gennany was made a few months before the signing of the Maastricht treaty. At this the, the European Community members were subject to the provisions of the Single European Act which had been signed in 1986. This Act was a sort of embryo of the common foreign policy initiative implernented in 1993. It included, among other things, a consultation process to elaborate common positions on international issues, as weil as a Political Cornmittee which pnpared Ministers' discussions within the Ewopean Council.25 This Single Act was Iess restrictive, and the langiiage used was much more flexible, than the CFSP included in the Maastricht treaty. Therefore, when it recognized Slovenia and Croatia, the German govemment was not formaiiy restricted by the provisions of the Maastricht treaty concerning foreign policy, but was stili aware of the consequences of its action on European supranational integraion. The German Unilateral Recomition of Slovenia and Croatia On June 25, 1991, the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia fonndy declared their independence and sovereignty.26 The two npublics chose to secede 24 Bulletin of the Europcan Communities, Single Evropeun Act, Ewopcan Communitics. Svppicrncnts 1986, pp- 5-26. 25 See Ibid.. pp. 1&19. 26 Ham Stark, "Diinanccs fhco-allemande sur fond de gumc setbo-cIoatt.*, Polit@ue Cttungire. Vol. 57, No. 2, Summu 1992. p. 340. Note that on Deceniber 23, 1990, die Slovenian govcmment hdd a refercndum on savericignty, and 94.6 per cent of those who voted agreed to de- The refmndum question was: Do you want Slovenia to bamme an autonomous and independent statc? See Ktesing's, Record of World Events. Vol. 36, No. 12, décembre 1990. p. 37924, and Florence Hamann,'Ta Slovenie udaterally nom Yugoslavia in order to force the Yugoslav federal govemment to transfomi the federation into a confederation-27 In reaction io those events, the units of the Yugoslav federal anny, stationed in Slovenia. intervened to protect the intemational borders of Yugoslavia This intemention marked the beginning of the Yugoslav civil war. Until the beginnïng of the civil war, the Gennan govemment was, dong with the eleven other members of the Empan Community, in favour of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.28 However, facing the evolution of the Yugoslav situation, the Gennan position graduidiy changeci. The Gemüui government was particularly concemeci about the situation in Yugoslavia and more precisely in Slovenia and Croatia with whom it had built up extensive trade ties.29 On July 4. 1991. Germany proposed, for the fîrst the. extending unilateral recognition to Slovenia and Croatia. During a meeting of the Empean Communîty corncil of foreign ministers. the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, stated that his govemment would move towards recognition if Belgrade continueci to use force against the right of self- detemination of the two Republics? The Geman proposition was, however, rejected by other members of the EC, and particuiarly by France which was strongly opposed to se prononce pour l'ind6pcndanct**,Le Monk. December 25, 1990. Note aIso that on May 19, 1991, the Croatian govcmmcnt held a rcfetcndum on sovcreignty, and 92 pcr cent of those who expdthcir right to vote votcd for sovercignty. See Milan Aiidrcjevich, 'The Croatian and Slovenian Declaration of Indcpcndcnce", RFE-RL Research hsb'tutc, Report on Emem Europe, Vol. 2, No. 29, July 19, 1991, p- 37. 27 Slovcne Rcndent, Milan Kucan. mentioned: 'We dlfm aegotiation [wïth the ftdd govmmcnt], but in orda that real negotirnationstake place. wc have opteci for independence." See Chuck Sudctic, 'Two Yugoslav States vote independence to press dtmands", The Ncw York îXmes, Junc 26,1991. 28 The Eumpcan Cornmunity consisted in 1991 of twelve membcr spccs: Portugal. Spain, France, hland. the United Kingdom, Netherlaads, Bclgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Gmnany, Italy, and Gr-. See Philippe Batbout, (cd,), TIic European Union HCULdbOOk, Fimoy Dearbom Publishers, London, 1996. pp- 293-301. 29 Sabrina Petra Rame&,"Yugoslav and the Two Gennanys". Dirk Verfieyen and Chri-stian Soe (cd.), The Gennans adth& ffeighbors,Wcstvitvicw Rtss, 1993, p. 327. 30 bid. it.31 France was convinceci that the Yugoslav question had to be resolved by Yugoslavia without any extemai intexvention. The French government also advocated the territorial intefity of Yugoslavia, because it permitted stability in this area of the wodd that has traditionaüy been unstable.32 This position was also shared by other EC memkrs, with the common position being, therefore, to not ncognize Slovenia and Croatia outside the Yugoslav fiamework. It is also important to mention that the European Community was reluctant to recognize both Yugoslav Republics because they thought that this recognition would establish a precedent for ail the secessionist groups in Eastern Europe.33 On July 12, 1991, Geman Chancellor Helmut Kohl received, in Bonn, Croat President Franjo Tudjman, in order to show that Germany was concerned about the fate of the Croats. In reaction to this action, France quickly reacted by expressing its discontent towards Germany, fearing a German unilateral recognition of Croatia.î4 Despite the reception in Bonn of the Croat President, Chancellor Kohl chose to stand by the importance of European concerktion on a common approach regarding the Yugoslav issue. Late in July 1991, Helmut Kohl even issued a joint statement with French President François Mitteniand declaring that it was "tm early**to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.35 Kohl's govemment also declared that by threatening to recognize the two Yugoslav Republics uniiaterally, Germany had not taken into consideration enough political and diplornatic consequences for itself and the Euopean Commuaity.36 Despite the Kohl-Mitterrand statement regarding the Yugoslav issue, the Gennan government intensively kgan, at the end of July, to pressure other EC members in order to obtain a 31 Anuradha M. Chenoy, 'The Eumpun Union and the Brrrhip of Yugoslavia**,lntelll~~ional Stdics. Vot. 33, No, 4, Octobcr-Deccmbcr 19%. p. 445. 32 HDas Stark, op. tir., pp. 339-340. 33 Richard F. Iglar. vïhe Constitutionai Crisis in Yugoslavia and the htcmationd Law of Self- Determination: Slavenia's and Croatia's Rigbt to Secede", Boston College Ikte17~~11ionalad Comparative Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 1992, p- 213. 34 Hanns W. Maull. "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis*',Surwivai, Vol. 37. NO.4. Wïntcr 1995-96. p. 102. 35 Sabrina Pepn Ramct, op. cir.. p. 329. 36 H.nc Stark, op. cit, p. 343. See air0 H.nns W. Maull. op. cit-*p. 103. general consensus on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia The Gempressure had the effect, however, of exacerbating tensions witbin the European Community and During the month of November 1991, violence in Croatia increased and claimed several victims. The Yugoslav govemment contiaued to use force against secessionist republics and was resolved to protect îts territorial integrïty. In reaction to this, German foreip minister Genscher aonounced that if the EC membea would not rapidly accept a common resolution on the recognition of both Republics, Gemany would act uniIateraIIy by recognizing Slovenia and ~roatia.38 At the end of November, the fim signs of an imminent recognition of the two Republics by Germany appeared, when the German govemment clearly expressed its will to recognize Slovene and Croat secession '%efore In the first days of December, Slovene President Milan Kucan and Croat President Franjo Tudjman were received in BOM by German Chancellor Helmut KohI. Both secessionist leaders received the assurance that Gemany wodd recognize Slovenia and Croatia before December 25, 199 1 On December 9 and 10 of 1991, an important event occumd. Memben of the European Community met in Maastricht and agreed (Gemany included) to create a common foreign and security policy that would iatensify cooperation among EC rnember~.~~Despite this agreement to reinforce concertation, the Gemm govemment maintained its cornmitment towards Slovenia and Croatia and was hnnly resolved to recognize their independence. As a consequence, the EC foreign ministers decided to meet in Brussels on DeCernber 16, 1991, in an attempt to fmd a compromise with 37 Hanns W. Maull, Ibid. 38 Sabrina Petra Runet, op. cit., p. 330. 39 Patrick Moore and Duncan M. Pary. The New Europe's Humpty Dumpty on the International Stage*: in RFE-RL Rescarch institute, Report on EPrrent Europe, Vol. 2, No, 51/52, December 20, 1991, p. 35- 40 Faczs on File, Weekiy World News Digest, "EC to Rcrognize Bteakaway Yugoslav Republics". Vol. 5 1. No. 2665, DeCernber 19,1991. 41 nedcommist. "EC and Yugorlrvia :Countdown to recognition", Detcmbcr 21 - Jpauary 3, 1992, p. 57. Germany that wouId preserve the common position regarding the Yugoslav issue. On the eve of the European Councii meeting, the Political Directors hm the EC foreign ministries met in Brussels. The meeting of the EC Political Cornmittee had the objective of studying the possible recognition of the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hexzegovina and ~acedonia.42 The meeting of the EC Foreign &airs ministers on December 16 showed that severai States were mady to recognke Slovenia and Croatia in order to maintain European cohesion on the issue. During the initial vote on the idea of recognition, eight members out of twelve voted in favour of the recognition. and four membea voted againstm43 France and Spain, for instance, opposed the idea of recognition since they had secessionkt movements inside their own boundaries.4 Foliowing the vote, German foreign minister Ham-Dietrich Genxher stated that EC forcign ministen wouid remain at the bargainhg table as long as a unanimous support for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was not reached.45 The meeting, which lasted for more than ten hours, tumed into a quarrel, and a rupture between various EC members was barely avoided.46 Finaliy, after several negotiations, the European Council agreed to recognize both Slovenia and Croatia47 The fmt objective of the agreement was to maintain a common position towards the threat of a Ge- unilaterai recognition of the two Republics. The EC foreign ministers announceci on December 17, 1991, that the European Community wouid officially recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 42 Le Mon& "Les Douze et la reconnaissance der Républiques yougoslaves", January 16, 1992. 43 Alex N. Dragnich. Yugoslavia'z Disluegrution unà the Stnrggie for Tnrth. Columbia University Rcss, New York, 1995, p- 73. 44 Patrick Moore and Duncan M. Perry, op. ci&. p. 35. 45 Alcx N. Dragnich, op. fit., p. 73. 46 Michael Welsh, Europe Unired? fnl Europe011 Llni4n and the Rmeat/mni Fedcraiism, Great Britain, MacMillan Prtss Ltd, 1996, p. 122. See also Hans Stark, op. ci&, p. 345. 47 Kc+sing'r Record of World Events, Vol. 37. No. 12, Decembet 1991. p. 38685. 1992. This delay of recognition had the purpose of allowing the United Nations to put an end to the Yugoslav civil war. The agreement reached between EL members also included a "doctrine of recognition"?* This doctrine, which was elaborated by France, was based on some critena that constituted guideiines for the recognition of Yugoslav and Soviet Rep~blics.~g Furthemore, EC members appointed the Badinter Special Study Commission to insure that the five criteria of the guideluies would be respected by the Republics that wished to be recognized by the Empean Community. including Slovenia and ~roatia? The EC agreement of Decemk 16 was approved by the Gennan foreign minister even though Germany could not give the assurance that it would renounce the unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia The European Community remained, therefore, under the threat of a separate recognition of the two Yugoslav Republics by ~ermany-~~ Despite aU the efforts of the European Community to maintain a comrnon position vis-à- vis the Yugoslav issue, and despite the assurance that Slovenia and Croatia would be recognized by mid-January 1992, Germany unilaterally mcognized Slovenia and Croatia. On December 17, only a few hours aftcr the EC meeting in Bmssels, Helmut Kohl officialiy annorinced that the two Republics wouid be recognized %fore Chnstrnas" as 48 Hans Sm, op. cir.. p. 345. 49 The Docmne of Recognition included five criterio: 1) Rcspcct for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Final Act of Helsinki, and the Charter of Paris with regard to the mie of law, dcmocracy and human rights; 2) guarantecs for the rights of minoritics and for the rights of ethnic and national groups; 3) ricspcct for the inviolability of al1 fiontiers whïch can only be changd by peaceful means and by coaimon agreement; 4) acccptance of disarmament and nuclcar non-prolifcratïon: and, 5) commitmcnt to settle by agreement al1 questions conceming state succession and regional disputes- See European Community, Dechraiion on the Guidclhes on the Recognitton of New Statcs in WernEurope anci in the Soviet Unwn, 3 1, International Lcgal Material (I.L.M.), [Deccmbcr 16, 19911, 1992, p. 1487- 50 The Badinter Commission was an Arbitrary Commission on the Yugosiav P- Conference created by the Extraodinary Ministerial Meeting of the European Politicai Coopcration in Brussels on August 27, 199 1. See Hubert Bamclmans, "States Succession in international Law: Remarks on Reccnt Theory and State Raxis". Boston University International Lmv JOUIMI,Vol- 15, No. 1, Spring 1997, p. 76. See ais0 Michael Welsh, op. cit., p. 122- Philippe Lemailie, 'Zcs Douze se prononceront dans un mois sur la reconnaissance des Rdpubligucs yougoslaves", Le Monde, December 18.1991. had knpromised to Slovene and Croat leaders a few weeks befores2 The Gerxnan foreign minister also pointed out that Gemrany would recognize both republics regardless of what the conclusions of the Badinter Commission might be.53 By referring back to Lee Buchheit's realkt theory of secession, we can see that the German government did not take into consideration the European Community's criteria that focused on the intemal merits of Slovenia and Croatia's claim. In fact, as will be demomtrated later, Gennany recognïzed both republics mainly because this served its own national interests. On December 23, 1991, Gemiany officially recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatias4 German President Richard von Weiaaceker expressly recopized their independence in a letter sent to SIovene and Croat govemments.55 Nevertheless, the Gemian govenunent announcecl that diplornatic relations would be extended to both states ody when the European Community recognized them in January 1992. By addressing these letters (which were symbolic of an express recognition) to the Slovene and Croat govenunents, the Geman President recognized de fmthe independence of Slovenia and Croatia Moreover, Germany decided to recognize both Republics despite the pressure made by the Secretary General of the United Nations, by the President of the United States, and by severai European leaders, io not grant a separate recognitions6 On January 15, 1992, the Arbitrary Commission headed by Robert Badinter concluded that Slovenia met the criteria of the doctrine of recognition, but that Croatia did not respect ail the conditions.57 Regardless of those conclusions, the European Community, in order to respect the common position adopted in December, officialiy 52 John Tagliabue, "Kohl to compromise on Yogorlavia*', 27re New York TicsvDccernbcr 18.1991. 53 Hanns W. MauU. op. ck. p. 104. 54 Hans Stark. op. cit.. p. 339. s5 Io0 M-y. The Times. Deccmbcr24.1991. 56 Keering's. Record of WoriàEvcnts. Vol. 37. No. 12, Dsemba 1991. p. 38684. 57 ne Ec0nomi;st. "Yugoslavii: Wrcckognition*'.Jmuary 18,1992, p. 49. recognized, on January 15, the independence of Slovenia and croatiaS8 France, however, decided to wait untiï Croatia provided better conditions to its minorities before sendîng an Ambassador in Zagrebo The events surroundhg the Gemiao recognition of Slovenia and Croatia raise some important questions that will be relevant for the case of France and a Quebec unilateral declaration of independence. Fit, why did Gerrnany unilaterally recognïze the independence of the two Yugoslav republics? Second, what were the consequences for Gennany of such a unilateral act? The two questions fomulated above diredy refer to the "costs and benefits calcuiation" of this unilateral recognition for Germany's national interestS. Why a Genan Unilateral Recognition? Right hmthe outset, it is important to mention that Germany had saong cultural and ethnic links with both Slove~iiaand ~roatiflThis factor, wwhh hardly can be quantifieci, has to be taken into account, not as the direct cause of the German recognition, but rather as a factor which heightened German awareness about the Slovene and Croat daims. Moreover, Gemiany had stmng investments in those two Republics, particuiady in Slovenia For instance, fiom January 1989 to May 1991, which was the month before the Slovene dedaration of independence, Germany had been by fai the biggest investor in Slovenia During this period of tirne, Germany invested 227.9 U.S. million dollars, while the second biggest investor, Austria, was far behind with 158.1 &on US. in investment.61 As for France, which was one of the strongest opponents 58 Kecsing's. Record of WorId Evcnts* Vol. 38. No. 1. January 1992. p. 38703. s9 Ibid. Michad Wclsh. op. cit., p. lu. Matija Rojoç, "Foreign DUcct Invcsîmeat L the Newly-Independent Rcpublic of Slovcniol Expericnccs and Policy Options," Patrick AmAmsien,Matija Rojec and Marjan Svctlicic (cd.), Foreign Investment in Central and ~emEurope, SL Martin's Rcs, 1993, p. 139. Note bat statistics of Gmnan invcstments in Croatia for the period of 1991-92 do not seem available, pmbably because of the civil war. However, in 1993, WC know that Gcnnany was the most important investor in Croatia with 44-7 million dollars US., to the recognition of the two Yugoslav Republics. it only invested 21.5 mülion dollars in Slovenia during this period that is to Say Iess than the Ausaalian investments. Therefore, the fact that the Yugosiav government used force against Siovenia and Croatia from June 1991 was seen as a direct threat to German foreign investments. Germany thought that by rrcognizing Slovenia and Croatia, the Yugoslav government would be politicaiiy isolated.62 which would have the effect of discouraging Belgrade in its aggressions against the Slovenes and Croats. However. the other members of the European Community did not share this point of view, and believed that the recognition would only intensify the Yugoslav civil war. Moreover, following the Slovene and Croat unilateral dedaration of independence, a strong pro-independentist lobby in Gennany, representing some 70,000 immigrant workers (Gastarbeiter) who came in majority hm Slovenia and Croatia, became very active in pressing the Ge- govemment to extend recognition to both ~epublics.63 As Stephen Kiazer hmthe New York Times points out: There are about 700,000Yugoslav wodim in Germany, most of them Croats. Many have deep roots in Germany. and an estimated 200,000 are votuig citizens. They have been highly active in demanding that the Bonn govemment recognize ~roatia*'~ We also have to point out that the majority of German political parties were in favour of a rapid Slovene and Croat recognition. The opposition Social Democratic Party pressed the Gennan govemment for a quick recognition, and cnticized Helmut Kohl for -- -- ~hilethe second biggest investor, Italy, only invested 11-6 million dolIars, France is not even Iistcd in the ten most important invcstors in Cmatia bctwtcn 1993 and 1996. See Croatian Investmcnt Promotion Agcncy, Direct Foreign lnvesmrent in Crootia. 1993-1996- Available at: httpJ/~~~.hapu.ttl.hr/ditCct~inv.htm[August 12,19993- 62 Foctr on File, Weekly Worid News Digest, "EC to Recognize Bmknway Yugoslav Republics", Vol. 51. No. 2665, Decemixr 19,1991. 63 Ham Stark, op. fit.. p. 341. See rlso Sabrha Pctra Ramct, op. cit. p. 327. Stephcn Kinzcr, "Slovcnia and Cmatia Get Bonn's Nod", ïhc New York Times* DeCernber 24,1991. moving too slowly towards recognition-6s This was aiso true of Foreign minister Genscher's Free Democratic Party* which overwhelmingly supported Slovene and Croat re~ognition.~6Even Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democratic Union loudly endoned the right of Slovenia and Croatia for selfdetermination and pressured the German government to extend re~ognition.6~In addition, Gennan public opinion was also in favour of recognition. Germans demanded that their government talce concrete actions and recognize Slovenia and ~roatia.68 In sum, neady all German political forces supported the recognition of Slovene and Croat independence, and were not redy preoccupied by German commitments within the European Communïty. The German government was thetefore in the middle of a dilemma: please the European Community by not recognizing unilaterally Slovenia and Croatia in order to respect the European position, or please domestic opinion with a quick recognition of Slovene and Croat independence, with or without other EC members. On December 23, 1991, Helmut Kohl's government decided to please Gennany. This decision was the result of a political calculation where the costs and benefits of a unilateral action were weighed. In fact, if Chancellor Kohl had postponed Slovene and Croat recognition to January 15, he could have alienated an important part of the German electorate, including hundred of thousands of Gastarbeiters born in Slovenia and Croatia. Indeed, considering that Helmut Kohl made an official promise to extend recognition to bot.states 'before Christmas", and that public opinion supported a prompt recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the postponement of Gemmn recognition could have been extremely costly politically for Kohl's govemment. Therefore, for Helmut Kohl, this unilateral action was beneficial hma domestic point of view as weli as for relations 65 John Tagliabue, "Kohl to Compromise on Yugoslavio**.The New York 77kes. DeeMber 18. 1991. See also Miron Rezun, Europe and War Ur the i9aikan.s: Towrds a New Yugodav Idcnrity. Editions: Racgcr, London, 1995, p. 149. Sec aiso Sabrina Petra Ramct, op. cir., p. 330. 66 Sabnna Petra Rarnct, Ibid. 67 Ibid., p. 327 and 330. The Economi;st. DeCernber 21.1991 - January 3.1992, pp. 10-1 1. with Slovenia and Croatia. However, as the next part will show, the cost of the Gennan unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia has been very high. The Cos?of the Unilarrml Recognition As the Secretary General of the Study Cornmittee on Gerrnan-French relations, Hans Stark, points out, France reacted strongly to the German unilateral action. nie French govenunent mentioned the "renirn of the Gennan question", which refemd to the aggressive behaviour of Gemiany during the 1930's-69 FoIlowing the German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, French-German relations came wiuiin a haïr's breadth of breaking off. Moxeover, since the Second World War, Germany has rarely been as isolated.70 In fact, the German behaviour created strong reactions on the part of the international community, and several criticisms were formulated against the action of the Gemian govemmnt-71 The unilateral recognition of the secession of Slovenia and Croatia by Germany has been intkrpreted by the international community and by the European Community as a sign of the return of Gemÿui hegemony. We have to remember here that Germany was reunified for barely two years when the Gennan govemment recognized Slovenia and Croatia, and therefore, this action was seen as an attempt to rebuild the German sphere of influence in Centrai Europe. Those reactions of the members of the European Community created a reaï trauma within German diploma~y.~Serbia also nacted funously towards Gennany by accusing Bonn of trying to dominate Europe. The Yugoslav leaders even mentioned that Helmut Kohl's govemment trieci to create a Tourth ~eich"? 69 Ham Stark, op. cit.. p. 339. Ibid. 71 Hanns W.Maull. op cir., p. laS. 72 Ibid. 73 Sephen Kinnr, The New York Timcs,December 24.1991. However, despite all those criticisms, the action taken by the Gemian govemment did not prevent the European Community members, including Gemiany, fiom signing in February 1992, the ‘Ravisions on a Cornmon Foreign and Security Policy" included in the Maastricht aeaty. In fact. the agreement reached between the EC members on December 10, 1991, on the creation of the CFSP did, to a certain extent, save French- Ge- relations and favoured reconciliation. Indeed, for practical reasons, EC members quickly forgave Kohl's govemment in order to ensure the signing of the provisions of the Maastricht treaty. In sum, this episode of European poiitics had proven to be a half-victory for Germany. Although the German govemwnt succeeded in modifying the EC common position regardiag Yugoslavia, and succeeded in pushing the Euzopean Community towards recogniùng the independence of Slovenia and Croatia much earlier than they wanted, the German unilateral action had the consequence of raising suspicions towards a Gemiany ayiag to dominate Europe. Most importantly, Germany, which was one of the principal architects of European inkgration, was diplomatically isolateci and found itself alone in a crucial moment for the European unincation. This case study provides a very good example regarding the consequences of not respecting a European common position. It also gives good indications of the kinds of consequences that France would saer if it eventualiy recognued unilaterally a Quebec UDI. In light of this information, we WUnow speculate on whether France would recognize the secession of Quebec. and we will do so notably by applying the conclusions of the Ge- case. The French Remmition of a Ouebec UDI :An Unlikelv h.osmt Right hmthe outset, it is relevant to point out that it is extrernely uniikely that a unilateral secession of Quebec from the Canadian federation would create a civil war like the one in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990's. Thercfore. the argument that a Quebec recognition wouid put an end to a civil war is not relevant. However, what must be taken into consideration, as the example of Gennany shows, is the different kind of links that exist betwan Quebec and France, and the role played by the different actors which exist on the French national scene, such as opposition parties and interest groups. In the weof Germany, the investments made in Slovenia and Cmatia, and the pressure that the different political actors made on Helmut Kohl's govenunent are, without any doubt, the motive that pressed Bonn to recognize both Yugoslav Republics. We now have to see whether, in the case of France, those factors would play a determining role in the decision making process conceming the recognition of the independence of Quebec. First, the Iinks that exist between France and Quebec are different fiom those existing between Germany and the two Yugoslav Republics. In both cases, it is mie that cultural and ethnic Iùiks are similar, but economic linLs were much smnger between Gennany and Slovenia-Croatia than they are between Quebec and France. For instance, in 1997, Quebec was only the 44thmost important economic partner of France, while it occupied the 37th rank in 1992.74 From an economic point of view, the importance of Quebec for French national interests has decreased since the beginning of the 1990's. (Similarly, in 1997, France was the fourth most important economic partner of Quebec, after the United States, Canada and Great Britain. However, in 1998, France was surpassed by Germany and dropped to the nfth rank just before lapan?) In fact, when we look at economic statistics, we can see that the iinks between France and Quebec are minor, cornparmi, for instance, to US-Quebec economic relations. Indeed, more than 80 per cent of Quebec exports are now destined for Amencan markets, and close to 45 per 74 Gouvernement du QuCbcc, Ministère de I'industrïe et du commerce. Dkctïon de I'analyse de la conjoncture industrielle, Service des données internationales, 1' trimestre 1999. Note that the expression "economic parmer" =fers to the whole econornic transactions made with a state, such as imports, exports, and invcstmcnts. 75 Ibid. cent of Quebec imports are hmthe US? Momver, the American investments in Quebec are much more important than French investments? That &es the United States the most important economic partnec of Quebec and that is, in part, why Premier Jacques Parizeau elaborated his "Grand Game" in 1995 in order to force Washington to recognize Quebec. Therefore. in the case of the secession of Quebec, the U.S. would be much more concerned than France for its economic interests, Second, the number of Quebecers Iiving in France cannot be compared to the hundred of thousands of SIovenes and Croats who iîved in Gemiany when the secession of Slovenia and Croatia occurred It is therefore unIike1y that a pmindependentist lobby. such as the one in Germany in 1991. would be created in order to press the French govemment to quickly extend recognition to Quebec. As for the opposition parties, it is very hard to predict the influence that they would exerrise on the French govemment, since the circumstances of a hypothetical Quebec UDI are unknown. It is also hard to predict the attitude that those parties would adopt. According to Louise Beaudoin, the Quebec minister of international relations, there is now a consensus between French political parties on the issue of the Quebec independence. Minister Beaudoin believes that left wing parties, such as the Parri Socialiste (PS), as well as right wing parties. such as the Rassemblement Pour la République @PR), would support and quickly recognize a Quebec unilaterai dedaration of independence? In fkt, as we have seen in the first part 76 Earl H-Fry, The Econornic Cos& of Quebec's Sepadon Wi11 Be Steep: Rrcponw". The Amen'cm Review of Canadimi Stuài~s.Volume 26, No, 4. Winter 1996. p. 621, Note that only 1.7 pcr cent of Quebec exporrs were desâned for France in 1997. See bid. 77 Severai Amcrican companies ïnvest in Quebcc. For instance, Mcrck Frossr indmore than 325 millions (Can.) sincc 1993, and Pm& Whitney invested more dikn 400 miIlions oniy in 1997. French companies made smalln investmcnts in Quebec. The most ùnporuint French invesunent notcd by "Investissement-Qutkc" in 1997-98 was the invesaent of 147 million dollars by Carrorwnu. As for the other invesanents. tbey wcrc les important, such as the investement of 19 millions by Danone, and 21 millions by AlccuelI Even the German invtsmrents in Quebec sams more important than the French investments. For instance, in 1998-99. the drug Company Hocciut Marion Roussel Chdà investcd 20'7 million dollars, and the multinanond Osram-Sylvanüz invfsted 47 million dollars- See Investissement- Qu-, Multinationak au Québec. Available athttp:www,investqucbec.com [August 10, 19991. 78 interview with Louise Beaudoin, Ministère des Relations Internationales du Québcc (MRI), Qutk City, May 24, 1999- Ministcr Beaudoin statcd during this interview: "Les partis politiques [fiançais] ont of the present chapter, it is true that Fiench Midents hmdifferent poütical parties have been sympathetic to the Quebec sovereignist option and have recognizeà, generally speaking, the "intemal ments" of the Quebec claim. However, that does not mean that if those politid parties were in the opposition (or in govemment) in the eventuality of a Quebec secession. they wodd necessarily support the recognition of Quebec. Their position would certainiy k detcrmincd by the circumstances of the Quebec secession, by French public opinion and, above aü. by the French national inteztsts. Fiially, and most importantly, the %visions on a common foreign and Security policy9'(CFSP) included in the Maastricht treaty constitute. for almost six years now, the official position on EU foreign poiicy. The mechanisms of the CFSP are now mnning well and are more restrictive than the European Sulgle Act, which was in force wben Germany recognued Slovenia aad Croatia In fact, it is very possible that, in practice, the CFSP is now more restrictive and consaaining than it was in tended to be in the document signed in 1992. The will of EU members to generaiiy reinforce their supranational inteption certainly makes sense gîven that common foreign policy is a field where cooperation is essential. Therefore, foliowing a Quebec UDI, it is extremely probable that the pressure made by EU members on the French govemment would be much stronger than in the case of Gennany in 1991. Furthermore, the consequeaces that a French unilateral recognition of Quebec would have on France would iikely be more serious that in the case of Germany. Since the Gennan tudateral action in 1991, the new states have joined the European Union. In January 1995, Ausiria, Finland, and Sweden, bec- EU members.79 As a consequence, if France were to unilaterally recognize Quebec, it would be isolateci hmfourteen other members rather than fiom eleven. In kt, as the number of suites within the EU grows, the pater the Wreiihood -- comme ddpassé les cIivages partisaris et donc il y a un cspèce de consensus [sur la souveraineté du Qudbec] qui s'est int6gré en qucIque sorte dans la politique ht&ieurefrançaise.** 79 Src Philippe Bprbaa (cd.), Ine Europ~~l~Union Hhk,Fimoy Dcarbom Publisha* London. 1996, p. 300. that a country would expose itself to numerous and unpredictable consequences by deviahg hma common policy position. The French National fitetests What wouid be the national interests for France in recognizing the unilateral secession of Quebec? In reality, they are not that numerous. A common Ianguage and a similar culture are generally the two most comrnon components raised. But are those factors really national interests? In fact, it would be surprishg that France wouid act independently and thwart a EU common position because of a similar culture and a common language with Quebec, despite what some Péquistes believe.80 We must Say. however. that the French behaviour would depend strongly on the poiitical conjuncnire. As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, the benefits of a unilateral recognition of Quebec for the French national interests must be greater than the losses and damages. After what was shown above, it is more likely that the cos& for France would exceed the benefits. Therefore, to assure that the "costs-benefits" equation would be positive, it is very probable that France wouid play the card of European cooperation in order to avoid being on the hnthe, and to play a strategic function foliowing a Quebec UDI. Moreover, as the example of Germany has shown, France is very reluctant to recognize secessionist claims since it has its own internai separatist movements, notably in Conica and in ~rittany."This is one reason why the French government demonstrated conservatism towards Slovene and Croat secessionist claims. In fact, a French recognition of the secession of Quebec would create a politicai contradiction, which would potentially revive secessionist movements in France. In addition, afier having put *O Inte~cwwith Louise Beaudoin. Ministère des Relations Internationaies du Québec (MRi), Quebec City, May 24, 1999. Accordhg to Quebec minister Louise Beaudoin, the recognition of Quebec by France wouId be extrcmety bencficai for the Frtnch national interests and the costs of such a recognition would be non-existent for Fiance- " This argument rcgarding French separatist movemnis was ahput foward by Sdphane Dion. Prtsident of the Queen's tivy Council for Canada and ministtr of Intergovcmmcntal Aff'. Sec Interview with Stéphant Dion, nie University of Wcsttni Ontario, London. April23.1999. pressure on Germany to delay its recognition of the two Yugoslav repubiics in 1991. Fmce would find it hard to justiQ a quidc and unilaterai recognition of Quebec before the European ~ouncil.~2Furthemore, as Robert Young points out: ''France] has a large stake in Canada; and if Canada fragmented, the power of the United States couid increase in absolute ternis, a prospect that French govemments have not recently tented to welcome."*3 The fragmentation of Canada would indeed have the effect of decreasing the relative power of the French. which would be the worst scenario for France fiom a national interests perspective. Those arguments gïve even more weight to the hypothesis that, in order to serve its national interests, France would probably not recognize a Quebec UDI and would refiise to be the '~Iocomotive"that would drive other countrïes to recognize the independence of Quebec. Conclusions on Parizean's 66GrandGame" We cm conclude hmthis shidy that the European political reality, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, would probably prevent France hm"crossing the line" between the expression of niendship towards Quebec and the rapid and formal recognition of a Quebec üDI. Therefore, the "Grand Game" of Premier Parizeau is unWrely and unnalistic. However. since the circumstances and the conjuncture of a Quebec UDI are unknown, it is always possible that France could decide to unilaterally recognîze Quebec, despite the anticipated consequences of such an action. As we saw in the second chapter, there are different levels of implied cognition that can be used to recognize a state. France could make, for instance, a & jure recognition by signing a bilateral treaty with Quebec or, a de facto recognition by sending a message of congratulations to the Quebec government. However. those possibilities remai0 unlilccly. Chances are that Fmce 82 Gordon Mace, LwisBLlanger ami Ivan Bernier. op. cir, p. 131. 83 Young, Robert A, lk Seccsswn of Quebec iad the Fun European Union would probably let the United States dethe first move regarding the i~sue.8~From a geopoliticd and economic point of view, and considering the fac~that the United States is the only supeipower, the U.S. would be the logicai leader ta set the tone in a Quebec pst-UDI em In sum, a quick unilaterd recognition of Quekc by France appears to be unlikely. In addition, it is also unlikely that the Euopean Union would extend recognition to Quebec after a UDI. It is useless to push faither the logic of Premier Parizeau's "Grand Game" since the initial premise is not redistic. However, the= is something very important that the stategic game of Mr Parizeau shows. The "Grand Game" had. as its ha1 objective, to pressure the United States to recognize the secession of Quebec. Again, France was seen by PQ strategists as a strategic tool, or as a lever, to put pressure 84 Gordon Mace. Louis BClanga and Ivan Bernier*op. cit. p. 132. on Washington. This strategy shows that MerPeau awarded a paRicuIa importance for Washington aftcr a UDE, and the= is no doubt that for PQ strategists the United States remains the most important player to consider. However, since it is uniikely that France would play a strategic fiinction after a Quebec secession, we must put aside this "Grand Gam" and nim our eyes directly towards the United States, in order to speculate about whcther it would rrcognhe a Quebec UDI. The next chapter will therefore study carefiilly the possible reaction of the United States towards a unilateral secession of Quebec by looking, principally, at the American practice regarding recognition and at U.S. perceptions of Quekc. American Recognition of a Unilateral Secession of Quebec ? When it's rime to defend its nurional uirerestir, the Unired Srares ii a poker pZayer. no? a chess player. - Charles DORANI Before the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec, in 1992, Joseph T. Jockel, director of the Canadian Studies Program at St- Lawrence University, suggested that Washington had never fordated a policy regarding the possible sovereignty of Quebec. He added that, "in an attempt to anticipate what kind of relations would exist between the United States and a sovereign Quebec, we have to extrapolate nom cunent U.S. inte-ts, practices. perceptions and appmaches"? This is also me for the issue of a Quebec Unilateral Declaration of Independence. The U.S. does not have a policy as to what it would do if Quebec unilateraily secedes nom Canada3 Thenfore, in order to predict whether the United States would recognize the unilaterd secession of Quebec, which is the objective of this chapter, we have to extrapolate fiom the U.S. mtio~linterests in Quebec, from the Amcrican practice regarding UDI, and hmits perception of Quebec. This chapter wiil focus on four main themes. The first pari wilI review the structure and mechanisms of U.S. foreign policy regarding recognition of States. This wiil provide the theoretical basis of the U.S. power Inte~ewwith Charles Dorari, Jobas Hopkins University, Wasùiagton D.C.. May 13.1999. Free translation. Joseph T. Jockcl mentioned: 'Washington n'a jamais fonnui6 de politique en pr6vision d'une Cvennielle souveraineté du Québec. Pour prévoir les rdations entre Ics États-unis et un Qu* souverain, il faut donc extrapoler partir des intérêts, des perceptions, des pratiques et des approches actuelles des États-unis. See Joseph T. JockeI, 'Déclaration d'ouverture: Exposé sur les relations internationales*', Commission d'&de des ~rcestwtzsMirentes à l'accession du Qugbec à la souveraineté, Vol. 1, p- 649. 3 Interview with Joseph T. lockei. University of Toronto, Tomnto, May 10.1999. of recognition, and a brief histoncal overview will pment its evolution, in an attempt to facilitate the understanding of its cumnt practice. The second theme will concentrate on case studies where the United States has recognized daterai declamions of independence- These cases will provide a better understanding of U.S. practice concerning recognition. and wili draw conclusions on the U.S. practice regardhg UDI that wül provide a foundation for specuiating on the possible recognition of a Quebec secession by the United States. Third, a bnef summary of the U.S. perception of Quebec during the 1990's will be prcsented FinaIly, in light of the information collected. and by taking into account the American national interests, this chapter wÏIi specdate on whether the U.S. would recognize a Quebec UDI, The Structure and Mechanisms of tbe U.S. Reconnition Power Studying the possible recognition of Quebec secession without knowing the mechanisms of the US. foreign policy concerning recognition would be a superflous exercise. For this reason, the first part of the paper will provide a detailed study of the structure of the U.S. power of recognition. The Constitution of the United States does not explicitly mention the power of recognition. However, Article II of the Constitution provides enough information to establish the mechanism of this power. Section 2 of the Article 11 States that the President: sbdi have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties. pmvided two thirds of the Senators pnsent concur; and he shaii nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shaiI appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and ~onsuls.~ - - - Louis He&, Foreign Affairs und the US Connihtüm, Clarendon Press. Sccond Edition. 1996. p. 560. Technically, thïs provision means that the Resident has the power and the rrsponsibiIity to take the initiative concerning treaties with foreign nations5 However, the Senate has the constitutional right to advise the PRsident during treaty negotiations and the ratification of treaties requins the agreement of the Senate, which imply the consent of two thirds of the Senators. Section 2 dso stipulates that the President has the authority to nominate Ambassadors. As for thek appointment, however, the President and the Senate act jointly since the Senate has the right to advise the President and must give its consent to presidential nominations. Moreover, the Constitution provides in the Article II, section 3, that the President "shd receive Ambassadors and other public ~inisters."6Under this provision, it is clear that the President has the entire authority to receive envoys. In fact, the President has the power to act alone in this matter and the Congress dws not have the authonty to decide whether au Ambassador, or another pubfic Minister, should be received by the United States. Sections 2 and 3 of Article II of the Ammcan Constitution have been iaterpreted as an impiied power of recognition that is exercised by the executive branch of the U.S. govemment. Indeed, accordhg to the Constitution, the Resident cm appoint (with the consent of the Senate) and receive ambassadors. These nghts give to the President the power to recognize govermnents and States. The reception of an Ambassador constitutes "a forma1 recognition of the sovereignty of the suite or governent represented."7 The President also has the power to not recognize a foreign entity by refi~singto receive its Ambassador. Moreover, the President has the authority to establish relations with foreign countries by sendiag Ambassadors andior by concluding treaties with them. However, Clarence A. Berdrbl, '"The Power of Recognition". in: Grccn Haywood Hackworth, Digest of Inre~ionufLow, Vol. 1, Chap. 1-V. Govcmmcnt h-nting Onict, Washington, 1940, p- 522- Louis Henkïn. op. cit.. p. 561. David Gray Adler. "Ibe Rtsident's Recognition Powef', David Gray Adler and Larry N. George (cd.). The Constiturion and the Conducf of the Amencan Foreign Poliq. University of Kansas, 1996, p. 133. such political actions reqmfie, as has been noted, the consent of the Senate. Fmally. the President has the power to terminate relations with foreign governments by expehg a foreign Ambassador or by withdrawing a U.S. Ambassador fiom another counuy.8 It is important to mention here that ail these rights listed above are not mentioned in the US. Constitution, but are an interpretation of Article IL. sections 2 and 3, of the Constitution. As Donald Pau1 Bakker mentions. the US. power of recognition is "the resuit of a development in practice under the Constitution.'* The evolution of the United States practice regarding the recognition power did not foilow a single course. In fact, debates between the Congress and the Presidency over this implied power have been numerous since the adoption of the Amencan Constitution. If it is clear today that the official recognition of foreign States and govenunents is an exclusive authority of the Resident, it was not as ciear during the nineteenth century where the Congress claimed, on several occasions, the power of recognition. A brief reminder of some key events surrounding the evolution of the U.S. recognition power wiii allow a better understanding of its current practice. US-Recognition Power A Historical Reminder The United States used its power of recognition in 1793, when it recognized the govemment of the French ~epublic.~~This recognition put into practice, for the fust tirne, the U.S. mechanisms of recognition. In May 1793, President George Washington received Mr. Genet, the minister of the French Republic. l1 This reception marked the officiai recognition by the United States of the new French govenunent However, some years later, in 18 17, the exclusive recognition power of the U.S. President was questioned * Louis Henkin, op- cir., p. 38. Donald Paul Bakker, ''Congress and the Powa to RccognkC. Andmv W. Cordier (cd.). C~Iumbïà Essays in Inre-ml AR&=, The Dean's Papcrs, Vol- 3, Columbia University Press, 1968, p- 403. l0 Clarence A. Berdahi, op. cir, p. 521. 11 Ibid. by President James Monroe. At this tirne, several South Amencan colonies had declared their independence and were asking for recognition. President Monroe, in a note sent to his Cabinet, wrote: 'Withe sending, or receiving a minister, to a new state under such circumstances be considered an acknowledgment of its independence ?'12 By asking such a question, the President thnw back into question the meaning of the Rcsidential right to receive Ambassadors. In fact, this doubt expressed by President Monroe had the effect of encouragïng the Congress to daim authority in matter of recognition. As a result, in 1818, the Congress had its first discussion on the right of recognition. Senator Henry Clay made a claim to the Congressional power of recognition based on the grounds of the Congressionai authority to "regdate Commerce with foreign Nations" stipulated in the Article 1, section 8, of the Constitution.13 In his motion, Clay stated: This House has the incontestable rïght to mognize a foreign nation in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Suppose, for example, we passed an act regulating commerce between the United States and Buenos Ayres. The existence of the nation would be thereby recognized as we could not regdate trade with a nation which did aot exist? This motion failed, however, because it was perceived by Congress as an act of usurpation and as an invasion of the Executive authority. The debate surrounding the U.S. recognition power was once more debated by the Congress in 1836, when Texas. a new independent Republic and former Spanish colony, asked for recognition. Henry Clay, then Chaimian of the Senate Cornmittee on Foreign Relations, presented a report which asserted that the Constitution provided four ways to recognhe foreign States and govemrnents. His report stated that recognition could be provided: "1) by treaty; 2) by the passage of a law regulating commercial intercourse; 3) by sendhg a diplornatic agent; l2 Ibid.. p. 526. l3 Louis Henkin. op. ci!.. p. 557. l4 Donald Paul Bakkcr. op. ci?., p. 417. 4) by the executive receiving and accrediting a diplornatic representative".l5 For the first and the third method proposed the Congress and the Resident had to act jointly. As for the second method, the Congress acted alone because the regdation of commerce was its exclusive author@. Finaiiy, the last method was left to the Presidential discretion since the President had the power to receive Ambassadors. In brief, the Senate was involved in the fust three ways proposed by the report. However, as we cm see, without any cooperation with the Executive branch, the Senate was not comptent to formally recognize any States or goveniments. Based on this report, which demonstrates a certain authority of the Congress in matters of recognition, the Senate adopted a unanimous resolution to recognize Texas and declare, in March 1837, that Texas shouid be recognized as a.independent country. l6 It is interesthg to underline here that President Andrew Jackson did not see the Conpsional resolution as interference in the Executive power of recognition. In fact, like President Monroe, Andrew Jackson questioned the meaning of his power regarding recognition. At the end of the nineteenth cenniry, the inteqretation of the U.S. Constitution concerning the implied power of recognition took another direction. The Congressional debate over the recognition authonty was raised in 1897 in connection with the Cuban struggle for independence.17 This the, the Senate Cornmittee on Foreign Relations came to a different conclusion regardhg the authority of the Congress for recognition. The Cornmittee stated that "the recognition of independence or beiiigerency of a foreign power, technically speaking, is distinctiy a cliplamatic matter".ls The report of the Cornmittee also stated that "the executive branch is the sole mouthpiece of the nation in communication with foreign sovereignties... [and] therefore, a Congressional recognition l5 David Gray Adkr. op. ci*.. p. 151. l6 Clarence A. ~mia~.op. cit.. p. 533. l7 Donald Paul Bakkn. op. cù.. p. 43 1. l8 Clarence A. Berdahi, op. cil.. p. 536. of belligerency or independence would be a ndlity".l9 This conclusion went againsi the Congressional claim for a power of recognition promoted on severai occasions during the nineteenth centiuy. In facf this position of the Senate was the last important transformation of the interpretation of the power of recognition. This position put an end to the debate between the legislative and the executive branches of the US. government. Moreover, this position of the Senate was cohedby judicid decisions. For instance, following the recognition of the Soviet Union by President Roosevelt in 1933, the Supreme Court of the United States stated that the recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were clearly the cornpetence of the ~resident.2~In sum, the Senate position elaborated at the end of the nineteenth cenhuy concerning the recognition power, and the judicial decisions like the one regarding the recognition of the USSR have definitively established the U.S. practice conceming the implied power of recognition. As David Gray Adler points out: 'cpresidents in this century, unlike those in the nineteenth, have seîzed the reception clause as a discretionary means by which they could direct the course of the Arnerican foreign p~licy."~* This brief reminder of the evolution of the power of recognition showed that several debates within the Senate and betwan the President and the Congress marked the development of the practice of the recognition power. It is clear now that the decision to recognize foreign States or govenunents is an exclusive prerogative of the President. The Congress ody has a secondary role in the process of recognition. In fact, the Congress is involved in the process only if the recognition entails a treaty or the senduig of a diplomatic representative. Moreover, the congressional authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations cannot be used as a tool to fodyrecognize a foreign country. As Louis Henkin mentions: "Congress does not speak or receive coxnmuxücation on behaif of l9 Ibid. 20 Louis Henkin, op. cit, p. 220. 21 David Gray Adler, op. cit., p. 133. the United States, or negotiate wiîh forrign governmenB... [therefore] Congress cannot itself recognize foreign states or goveniments-"u Furthemore, despite the fact that treaties concluded by the Resident have to be ratified by two-thIr& of the Senate, the Congress does not have the auîhority to break relations with foreign states nor to terminate treaties-a Once the Senate has approved a treaty or a diplornatic nomination, the President is fkee to reguiate foreign relations and to tenninate treaties. However, despite the predominant role of the President in matter of recognition, the Senate always has the possibility to refiise to ratify treaties or to appoint Ambassadors. In a case where the Senate would do so, the Presidential recognition of a govemment or a state wodd only be theoretical and reduced to a simple mord weight. Therefore, in order to reduce their dependency on Congress for treaty issues, U.S. Presidents have developed, over years, the b'soleexecutive agreement" practice to avoid the Senate approval of treaties. It is important, now, to defhe what are these agreements and how the President can use such a political rdease for questions of recognition. The Sole Execrrtive Agreement These agreements are made in accordance with the Constitutional authority of the President, and, as Glenn P. Hastedt states. do "not require the consent of the Senate before comuig into f0rce."2~ Furthennore, executive agreements can be signed by the President but can also be made by U.S. Ambassadors, Secretaries of State or by other U.S. Officiais, since there is no constitutional requùement concerning how they should be made. Since George Washington, Amencan Presidents have made thousands of executive agreements. Between 1946 and 1977, Presidents signed more than 7200 executive 22 Louis Henkin. op. ci*.. p. 88. 23 Ibid. 24 Glenn P. Hurcd~Amcn'cm Foreign Poficyr Pas& Prcscnt, Fufurc, Renticc-Hall. Third Edition. 1997, p. 159. agreements. compared to 451 treatîes? Moreover, the U.S. Resident is not constrained by the Constitution regarding such agreements since the Constitution does not distinguish between executive agreements and treaties. Over years, the Supreme Court of the United States confirmed the autbority of the President to maice sole executive agreements and niled that they have the same legal force as treaties. Consider the example of the recognition of the Soviet Union by President Roosevelt in 1933. In a letter sent to the Soviet govemment, Roosevelt wrote: 7 should be glad to receive any representative you may designate to explore with me personaily all questions outstanding between our countries."27 Foiiowing this presidential invitation, Moscow sent a representatïve to Washington. The meeting between Roosevelt and the Soviet envoy. Mr. Litvinov, marked the Amencan recognition of the Soviet government?s The Congress was not involved in this political action since the agreement was concluded in accordance with the sole executive agreement power of the President. In refemce to this case, the Supreme Court of the United States found, in 1937, that executive agreements were, definitively, within the competence of the President and confimed that such agreements did not require the consent and the advice of the Senate. The Supreme Court aiso stated in regard to this case: The recognition. establishment of dipiornatic relations, the assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were aii parts of one transaction. resulting in an international compact between the two govemments. That the negotiatiom, acceptance of the assignment and agreements and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted.29 27 Lana Shehbaum, US Presidential Recognilwr of Foreign Govcmmcnts adNew States, Master of Arts thesis, Department of Political Science, nie University of Wcstcni Ontario, London, Ontario, Iuly 1989, p- 62. 28 Louis Henkia. op. cit.. p. 220. z9 Md. In brief, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the exclusive responsibility of the President (D recognize states and govemments. Furthemore, it acknowledged that the estabIishmcd of diplornatic relations could be concluded as executive agreements and, theref- without the involvement of the Senate- Facing the problem of the presidential executive agreements, the Congress ha been unable to define or to Limit their reach. For this nason, as Louis He& points "Congress sought to discourage Residentiai abuse by assuring that Congress is informd of all sole [executive] agreement concl~ded.'~30By the "Case-ZabIocki Act" of 1972, tk Congress requïred that each executive agreement concluded by the President k transmitted to Congress for study. In fact, under this act, the President is required ID submit to Congress all international agreements, other than treaties. within 60 days afk their signing?l The agreements are then subject to scrutiny by the Congress. To sum up, the Resident of the United States has the authority to formaiiy recognize foreign states and governments in accordance to bis power to receivc Ambassadors and other Representatives. He ais0 has the opportuaity to use executi~ agreements to establish diplornatic relations with foreign nations in order to avoid Senatorial consent for treaties. He findy has the power to regdate relations with foreip states and to terminate treaties. As for the Congnss, it has the Constitutional nght oD advise the President during treaty negotiations and two-thirds of the Senators mm approve treaties. Midentid nominations (Ambassadors and other public Ministers) also have to be approved by the Senate. Finaily, the congressional authonty to regulate commerce with foreign states cannot be used as a congressional tool to recognize states and govemments since Congnss cannot speak on behalf of the United States on tk international scene. - -- 30 Ibid., p. 224. 31 Ibid.. p. SOI. Aithough U.S. Residents have the Constitutional power to use executive agreements, they may think twice before using it. Indeed, the conclusion of a presidentiai agreement with a foreign nation that would not take into account the opinion of the Congress could be costiy politicaUy. The political interdependence that exists between the executive and the legislative branches of the American govenunent can be a factor of dissuasion for not usîng such executive agreements for questions of recognition without the tacit approvd of the Congress. In fact, it is a question of costs and benefits calculation. If the use by the President of such a constitutiond prerogative risks to compromise his good relations with Congress, and with the Senate in particular, it is unlikely that the President wouid ignore Congress and sign an international agreement that would substitute for a treaty. The snidy of U.S. mechanisms regarding recognition provides a clear picture of the political dynamic between the Pnsident and the Congress for such matters. It &O gives a clear idea of the different possibilities that wouid be offered to the American govemment facing the secession of Quebec. In order to assimilate the theoretical base examined above, it is important now to shift fiom theory to practice by looking at how the U.S govemment deals with cases of secession. Two cases of secession will be investigated here. The fmt case concems the U.S. recognition of the independence of Bangladesh in 1972. This case study was chosen because it is a rare example of where the United States ncognized a unilaterai declaration of independence, while the preàecessor state (Pakistan) opposed the independence. The second case study is the US. recognition of the independence of Siovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1992. This case, was chosen for two main reasons. Fust, it is relatively recent and WU permit an examination of how the cumnt U.S. practice of recognition works. Second, as in the case of Bangladesh, the independence of these three republics constituted a unilaterai declaration of independence from the Yugoslav Federation, that was recognized by the United States, despite the opposition of the predecessor state (Yugoslavia).3* In fact, the secession of Bangladesh, and of the three former Yugoslav RepubIics, constiaite the only two cases, since 1945, where new states have ken intemationaily recognized (in a nonsolonial context) after a unilateral declaration of independence, against the wiU of the predecessor state.33 These cases wiii illustrate the U.S. process of recognition, and wiU reveal the evolution of the US. practice from the 1970's to the 1990's- FinaUy, these case studies will give some indication of how the United States wodd react towards a Quebec The recognition of Bangladesh and of the three YugosIav Republics wîIl be studied through five major criteria These cnteria are: 1) the Iegitimacy of the independence (the percentage of the population that agreed to secede); 2) the period of time between the unilateral declaration of independence and the recognition by the United States; 3) the relation between the U.S. Congress and the Presidency over the issue; 4) the criteria imposed by the US. govenunent as conditions of recognition (if there are criteria); 5) the U.S. interests towards these secessionist States. The U.S. Practice Renardinn UDI :The Recodtion of Bangladesh Pakistan was fonned fiom the partition of India in 1947. This partition was based on the fine that separated Hiadu and Muslim religions.~The result of this separation created a geographicdy divideci Pakistan (West and East Pakistan) whïch was separated by India 32 At the tirne of the U.S. recognition. Yugoslavia was constihited, in f~ by Scrbia and Monttncgro. Despite this, the Yugoslav goverurnent was defining itself as the rcprescntative of the predcccssor state. 33 JansCrawford wrïtes that the secession of Bangisdah was the only succcssfbl w of UDI. As for Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hcrtcgovina, Crawford writcs that thcü recognition was due to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. h fact, we can certainly argue that the UDI of the thrce Yugoslav Republics was also successful, since a Yugoslav predecessor statt (fonned by Scrbia and Montenegm) opposeci theu secession. See lames Crawford, ''State Ractice and International Law in Relation CO Unilateral Secession", Procureurs du Procu~curgénéral du Canada, Devant la Cour Supréme drr Canaab: Supplément au dossier rapport d'experts, Ho- 25506, Fcbruary 19,1997. pp. 40-1. Note that the independence of Eriîrca in 1993 was not a case of UDI since Ethiopia (the prcdecessor state), accepteci the Eniman secession. Sec Ibid., p. 30. 34 Lee C Buchheit, Secession: 27w Legin'- of Seif-Dcunnhation, Yak University Press, 1978, p. 199- In 1970, the first del~ocraticelection was held in Pakistan since its partition from India During thïs election, the leader of the East Pakistan nationalist organization cded Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, promoted political autonorny for East Pakistan (Bangladesh) by proposhg a program based on six points35 The election took place in December 7, 1970, and Mujibur Rahman's party won 167 out of the East Pakistan's 169 seats, while the leader of the Pakistan's People's Party. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, won 81 of the West Pakistan's 143 scats? With this victory, Sheikh Mujib had the mandate to negotiate, with other parties, a decentralued federation. However, in Western Pakistan, ALi Bhutto was a strong defender of a centrai govemment and opposed the "Six Points" of Sheikh Mujib, which caused tension between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. On February 15, Ali Bhutto announced that his party wouid boycott the National Assembly if no compromise were reacbed with the Awami League on its political vision. The tuming point of the Cnsis came when Pakistani President Yahya Khan decided, on March 1, to postpone the fïrst National Assembly meeting because of the political deadlock between Sheikh Mujb and Bhutto.37 At the end of March, aher several meetings between the two Pakistani leaders, no compromise had been reached. As a consequence, to protest against the political deadlock, Mujibur Rahman declared a generai srrike across East Pakistan. In teaction to Sheikh Mujib's appeal to civil disorder, and facing the radicalization of the automonous movement (including the growing of secessionist claims in East Pakistan), President Khan sent, on March 25, the West Pakistani armed forces into East Pakistan to restore order and eliminate the secessionîst 35 W- Norman Brown, The United Stotes and India, Pakirran. t3ang&iicsh, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 213-14. in summary, the "Six Points" demandeci: 1) the cstabiïshment of a federal govcrnmcnt; 2) the ftdd government would have powcr for questions of forcign affairs, defcnse and currtncy; 3) two separate currencics for East and West Palastan; 4) fiscal policy would be ttic prerogative of the fedmting units; 5) fcderatl-ng statcs would have the powcr on forcign trade; 6) fcdcrating statcs would have the right to keep paamilitary forces- 36 Dan Haendel, nil Proces of PMrizy FonnuImiotr US For* Policy ii the Indo-Poki;rtani Wor of 1971, Wtstview Press, 1977, p. 80. 37 Ibid., p. 83. movernedg This intewention was marked by aaocities (hundreds of thousands of East Pakistanis were küled and 10 million refugees fied into India between March and November 19713.39 Hours after the beginning of the military intervention, Mujibur Rahman declared, on Mach 26, 1971, the independence and the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Bangladesh40 This unilateral dedaration of independence was proclaimed without any public consultation beforehand. A few hours after the proclamation, Mujibur Rahman was arrested by West Pakistani rnilitary forcesi" FoUowing his capture, a provisional government of Bangiadesh (in exile in India) formed by elected members of the National Assembly was constituted. This government confmed on April 10, 1971, that the UDI pmIaimed by Sheikh Mujib was a legitimate declaration in accordance with the Bangladesh right of se~-determiination.~2Fiaiiy, on April 17, the Democratic Republic of Bangladesh was formdy proclaimed by the provisional govenunent-43 The US.Reaction towurds the Bangladesh UDI The fint U.S. reaction came fiom a State Department spokesman on March 26, 197 1. The spokesman stated that "thc United States was watching the developments with anxiety?4 The White House took a neuaal and very cautious attitude towards the Pakistan-Bangladesh crisis. For years, the U.S. had maintained a "policy of fnendship" 38 Lee C. Buehhei~op. CU,p- 206. 39 Sec Ibid., p. 207. Sec ais0 MdoMLs On File, "Fighting Heats up in Pakistan; Indian Ttoops Aiding Bengalis*',Vol. 2, No-2% Novemvcr 16-30, 1971, p- 1468- 40 Editon'ats On File. "Civil War in East Pakktan as Province Seeh Autonomy", Vol. 2, No. 6. March 16- 31, 1971, p. 364- Sce dso Fam on File, "Rebels Declare Independent Republic", Vol. m,No. 1587, March 25-31,1971. p. î21. 41 Lee C. Buchheiî, op. cit. p. 2û6. 42 Ibid., p. 207. 43 Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan. tncguiec of Bangiadesh Md the Rob of Awami kague, Vhs Publisbing House Pvt Ltd, 1982, p. 1%- 44 Ibid.. p. 241. it was concemed by the people's srnering and the Iost of Iife in East Pakistan. However, at the same time, the White House was directiy and indirectly sending amis to West ~akistan.50Senator Edward Kennedy, chainnan of the Senate subcommi~eeon refugees, and a strong opponent of Nixon's neutral and quiet policy towards Pakistan. cleariy exposed Nixon's contradiction. He stated: 'lthink the American people are distressed and perplexed that on one hand we ship supplies to the govemment of West Pakistan which are used for military suppression in East Pakîstan. This mates refugees for which, on the other hand we are providing resources to help."Sl In the summer of 197 1, the US. intention towards the Pakistani crisis became clearer. Washington seemed to want a quick political senlement of the codlict as weli as the preservation of the territorial integrity of ~akistaa.~2In November 1971, tensions between India and Pakistan increased. Since the beginning of the Palristan's civil war, India had dowed the Bangladeshi resistance to use its temtory for offensive and defensive strategies against the Pakistani forces. As months passed, the resistance was supported by hdia and fiontier violations between India and Pakistan became fiequent On December 3, Pakistan and India began a war when each declared that the other attacked its temtory.53 For Washington, this Indo-Pakistan wa.was the worst possible scenario. The White House feared that the Soviet Union and China wouid becorne involved in the issue. It is important to note that one of the most important consequences of the Indo-Pakistan war was the recognition of the Bangiadesh UDI by Maon December 6, 1971.54 The war, which lasted for 13 days, was won by the Indian anny. On December 16, the Pakistani 50 Ibid., p. î32. Ibid.. p. 233. 52 Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan. op. cir. p. 243. 53 W. Norman Brown. op. ci&, p. 224. 54 Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyui. op. cit.. p. 258. forces in Bangladesh surrendered? The end of the war signifieci that Bangladesh was free and de facto independent. On January 8.1972, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was released hmdetention in West Pakistan. Som after Sheikh Mujibur came back to Bangladesh to becorne the Prime Minister, several countries began to recogaize the secession of ~ang1adesh.sFacing the recognition of Bangladesh by the international community, the new President of Pakistan. Zulfikar ALi Bhutto, announced on January 13, 1972, that the Pakistani govenunent would break diplornatic relations with any countries that would recognize ~an~ladesh.~~ That was the ultimate attempt made by the predecessor state to block the secession process of Bangladesh. The return of Sheikh Mujibur to Bangladesh and the recognition of the Bangladeshi state by several countries led to a debate in the United States conceming whether Washington should recognize Bangladesh. The US. Congnss urged the Nixon administration to recognize the fact that Bangladesh was an independent state. Senator Stuarî Symington said that he would see no objection to recognizing ~angladesh.58Some others, like Senator Adlai Stevenson, declared that the U.S. should recognize Bangladesh and give economic assistance.~9Senator Edward Kennedy gave a strong support for recognition when he visited Bangladesh on February 14, 1972. Before thousands of students at Dacca U~versity,Kennedy declared: "Even though the United States 55 Shri Ram Shama, op. cit.. p. 140. Facts on File. Weekly Worid News Digest, "Sheü; Mujibur FMReturns to Bangla Desh As Leadcc Rutes Out Tics With West Pakistan", Vol. 32, No, 1628, January 9-15, 1972, p. 13. Hcre are some of the countries that rccognized Bangladesh: Eastern Gcrmany (Jan. 11); Soviet Union (Jan- 24); Austraiia and New Zealand (Jan- 31); Unitcd Kingdom, Western Germany, Austria and Sweden (Feb* 4); Ireland and Belgium (Fcb. 11); France and Italy (Feb. 12); and Canada (Feb. 14). See: Keesing's, Wcckly Diary of World Evcnts, Volume No. 18,1971-1972, Fcbruary 19-26,1972, p. 251 13. 57 Four on Füc. Wcekiy Worid News Digest, "Piasiani-Bangla Dcsh Dispute", Vol. 32, No. 1629. January 16-22,1972, p. 28. 58 Ramcsh Chand Gupta, US. Poiicy Towards Indirr Md Pukbtm. Delhi. BRRiblishing Corporation. 1977, p. 101. 59 Ibid. govemment does not recognize you, the people of the world do recognk y~u-"~He also said, during his visit, that the US. recognition was "Woverdue"P1 Not only the Congress made pressure on the White House, but labor unions also got involved in the issue. The Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor and Congress for Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) reiterated a few tiws its demaad for recognition. nie Executive Comcil said: "Our govemment should Iose no Mertime in extending recognition [...] to Bangla Desh Govemment which is far more representative than the regime in Hanoi, Peking and MOSCOW.''~~ Moreover, some newspapers Ue the New York Times were in favor of the U.S. recognition of ~angladesh.63In sum, strong domestic pressure was placed on the Nixon administration to extend recognition to Bangladesh- On February 9, 1972, the White House, which had been quiet on the issue of Bangladesh recognition since the beginaing of the crisis in M& 1971, spoke about a possible recognition of Bangladesh. Hemi Kissinger, the President's national security adviser, stated that the U.S. diplomatic recognition of Bangladesh was 'iinder active cons ide ration".^ In addition to intemal pressure for recognition, Washington had to deal with the fact that the Soviet Union had recognized Bangladesh on Ianuary 24.65 On that date, the USSR became the first great power to recognize this new statem66Following the Soviet recognition, several American newspapers wrote that the recognition by Moscow 60 Facrs on File, Weekiy World News Digest, "Pakistani-Bangla Desh Dispute". Vol. 32, No. 1633, February 13-19,1972,p. 104. 61 Ibid. 62 RC ~upta,op. cit.. p. 102. 63 bid. 64 Facts on FiLe, Wcckiy World News Digest, "Rcsident Nuon's Sea of propaganda in Bangladesh.68 The White House had therefore two possibilities. First, to maintain its poïicy of non-recogni*tion of Bangladesh while knowing that other countries, including the Soviet Union, made unavoidable its independence. Second, to recognize the Bangladesh UDI in an attempt to fight agaùist the Soviet influence in this new State. On Am 4, 1972, the United States decided to recognize the independence of Bangladesh- Announcing the decision Ïn a press statement, US. Secretary of State, William P. Rogers said: "we look forward to good relations with this new country- I want to reaffirm our intention to develop fiiendly relations and be helpfbl as Bangla Desh faces its immense task of relief and reconstmction."69 In a letter sent to Prime Minister S heikh Mujibur Rahman, President Nixon stated: 1 wish to infonn that the United States Goveniment has recognized the people's Republic of Bangla Desh and that we would Wre to estabiish diplornatic relations at the Embassy level with your govemment.70 The U.S. State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, said that the White House delayed the recognition of Bangiadesh because it was waiting for the withdrawal of Indian military forces fiom Bangladesh and "was concemed about the general stability of the regi~n".~~In fact, other considerations were certainly involved in the American decision to recognize Bangladesh. As we already mentioned. hard intemal pressures for recognition were made on the White House by the USCongress, labor unions and by newspapers. Moreover, at the international level, the Bangladesh issue was inherent to 67 See for instance: Editoriuk on Fiie, "Destret News**.Vol. 3. No. 3. February 1-15. 1972. p. 136. 68 Sydney H. Schankrg, "Campaign by Soviet Wons Bengali Fricnds''. The New York Tïmcs, Apnl 6. 1972. 69 Facts on Fiie. Weekly World News Digest. "India, Pakistan & Bangla Dcsh", Vol. 32. No. 1640. April 2-8, 1972, p. 244. Ramesh Chand Gupta, U.S. Policy Towczrds In& Md Pakisrun, Delhi. BKPublishiag Corporation. 1977. p. 102. 71 Facts on File. Wetkly World News Digest, %dia, Pakistan & Bangla Dcsh': Vol. 32, No. 1640, Apnl 2-8, 1972, p- 244. the Cold War dynamic. In fact, it became an issue where vat powers were trying to include Bangladesh in their own sphere of influence. Therefore, it is very Wrely that the Soviet recognition of Bangladesh in Ianuary 1972, pushed even more the U.S. poiicy towards the recognition. As for Pakistan. it recognized Bangladesh oniy on Febmq 2, 1974. almost two years after the U.S. recognition.72 Now. before elaborating on conclusions as to whether the United States wodd recognize a Quebec UDI we will look at our second case study. which is the Amencan recognition of Slovenia. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovia This second case will aiiow us to examine if there are some recurrent elements in the US-attitude towards unilateral declarations of independence. By comparîng these two cases of US. recognition, we will formulate empincal generalizations that will enlighten the possibiiïties that the United States wouId recognize a Quebec UDI. The U.S. Practice Renardinn UDI : The Recomition of Slovenia. Croatia and Bosnh-Hemovina On December 23, 1990, the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia held a referendum on sovereignty. The referendum question was clear. Do you want Slovenia to become an autonomous and independent state?73 From the 93.5% of Slovenes who voted. 94.6% agreed to separate hmYugos~avia.~~ The government of Slovenia had, thecefore. the support of an overwhelming majonty of Slovenes and the intemal legitimacy to do independence. FolIowing this. the Slovene governwnt gave a period of six months to the federal government, in Belgrade. to renew the Yugoslav union on the basis of a confederation. As for the Republic of Cmatia, a referendum on sovereignty was heId on 72 James Crawford, "State Ractice and htcniaaonai faw in Relation to Unilateral Sccession", Rocureurs du Rocureur g6nérai du Canada, Devunt 10 COUI Suprême du CMada- Srrpplément au dossier rapport d'experts, No. 25506. Februq 19,1997. p. 21. 73 Fiorcnce Hamnann. "Lo SLov6nie se prononce pour Pindependance'*, Le Monde, Thusday. Dcîcmbcr 25,1990. 74 Keesing's. Record of World Events, Vol. 36, No. 12. Durmkr 1990. p. 37924. May 19, 199 1. and the referendum question was similar to the one asked in Slovenia five months earlier.75 However, the tumout was Iower than in Slovenia with oniy 708,and 92% of the voters pronounced in favour of the independence of Croatid6 Despite the clear result of Croat and Slovene referendums, the United States remained opposed to the secession of the two Republics and "firmly committed to the territorial integrity of ~ugoslavia"." At this the, the U.S. government had direct interests in this area of the world and these interests transcended the question of the YugosIav federation. In fact, the Bush administration feared that the breakup of Yugoslavia would redefine the geopoliticd map of Europe.78 The lack of enthusiasm of the Bush administration towards Croat and Slovene separatism can. then, be explahed by the U.S. will to maintain stability in Eastern Europe. As mentioned in chapter four. despite the Cmaî and Slovene ultimatum sent to the federal govemment, Belgrade refuseci to redefine the basis of the Yugoslav Union by creating a Codederation. As a result, on Jme 25, 1991, six months after the SIovene referendum on independence, the two republics fodydeclared their independence and their sovereignty.79 which had the effect of starting a bloody civil war in Yugoslavia, which quickiy spread across the federation, The U.S. Reaction towardr Slovenia and CroatÏu U. The US. policy towards the Yugoslav confiict evolved slowly. Two days before the Croat and Slovene independence, the United States rnaintained its position conceming 75 Milan Andrejevich, "Ihe Cfoatl-an aad Slovcnian DcclLUation of Indcpndenn*',RFE-RL R-ch Institute, Repoa on Emem Europe, Vol, 2. No. 29. July 19, 1991, p. 37. 76 Ibid. 77 Morton H-Halpcrin, David J. Scheffer and Patrick L. Small. Serf-Derte-nation in the New Wd Order, 1992, p. 33. 78 Le Mode, 'Washington reconnaîî la SlovCaie, h Crdea la Bosnk-HerrCgovinc*'.Thuday Apd 9, 1992. 79 Ham Stark. ''Dissonances bco-allemande sur fond de gume dm-croatc**,Politique étrmgère. Vol. 57, No. 2, Summer 1992. p. 340. the integrïty of Yugoslavia, when the U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, stated that the United States wodd not ~cognizeSlovenia and Croatia outside the YugosIav ~ederation.*O On Jdy 3, 199 1. James Baker signaied that the United States would accept any new political configuration of the Yugoslav Union, but would not grant recognition to any Yugosiav Republic as Iong as the civil war continued.S1 Before the Conference on SecUnty and Cooperation in Ewpe (CSCE), in September 1991, Secretary Baker indicated the US. policy on the recognition of States. This policy constituted. implicitly, the U.S. guidefiaes for the recognition of Yugoslav Republic. James Baker stated that the recognition was to be accorded in the Iight of five principles. These principles were as follows: 1) determining the fuNe of the country peacefuiiy and democratically; 2) respect for internai and extemai borders; 3) support for democracy and the rule of law, by promoting the democratic process; 4) safeguarding human rights, including quai mentof minorities; and, 5) respect for international law and obligations, especidy the Helsinki'Fiaal Act and the Charter of Paris.82 By developing this guideline, the UnM States asserted, once again, that without peace and democracy in Yugoslavia, no recognition of independence wouid be granteci. Until December 1991, the U.S. policy towards Slovenia and Croatia was coordinated with the policy of the Empean Comrnunity (EC). However, on December 16, 1991, as we have seen in chapter four. the twelve members of EC reached an agreement that stipulated that Slovenia and Croatia wouid be formaily recognized by the Milan Andnjevich. Patrick M- and Duncan M. Peny, Troatia and Slovenia Mare th& Independence" RFE-RL Research Institutc, Repon on Earrern Europe, VOL2, No. 28, July 12, 199 1, p. 25- * Morton H. Halpain. David I. Scheffa and Patricia L. SmPII. op. cir.. p 35. buis Henkin, Richard Crawfard Pu@. Oscar Schachta and Haus Srnit, ImetlIOtiO~fImv, ihud Edition, West Pubiishing Co., 1993, p- 250. nie Helsinki Final Act was signcd in 1978 by membcrs of the Commission on Sccurity and Cooperation in Eurape (CSCE). 'I%kact had the purpose to promote the Euraptan Securïty as weU as human rights. Sec Vojtech Mastny, HebWi, Hw~nRights, ruid European Secu~ty,Dukc University Press, Durham, 1986, 389 pages. The Charter of Paris was signal by CSCE membcrs in 1990. The Charter had the objective to reinforce the protection of human rights, democracy, and nile of law in Emp. See Commission on Secwity and Cooperatïon in Europe, Cliarter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 1990. European Cornmunity on January 15, 1992.83 Facing the European Comrnunity's moves towards recognition of the two Republics, the U.S. govemment finnly opposed recognition. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence EagIeburger, stated that the recognition of the two Republics by the Euopean Community would probably exacerbate the war and "aùnost inevitably lead to greater bloodshed".84 When the European Community finaily recognized Croatia and Slovenia on Ianuary 15, 1992, a US. govemment spokesman stated that the United States would recognize the two Republics only when a general settIement of the Yugoslav crisis would be negotiated.85 The recognition by EC of Slovenia and Croatia marked officidy a break with the US. position towards Yugoslavia The diplornatic position of the AmeRcan govemment was then isola~dand more difficuit to justify before the Europeans and before the U.S. Congnss. According to Warren Zimmermann, former U.S. Ambassador in Yugoslavia, once isolated, the U.S. policy of nonrecognition quickly lost effectiveness.86 In January 1992, the Congress of the United States began to criticize publicly the White House position of nonrecognition of the two Republics. On January 23, a resolution of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. introduced by 29 Senators, expressed support for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatiaa' This political action, led by Senator Bob Dole, came officially in reaction to Serbia's brutal war agaïnst Croatia. Moreover. Senators Albert Gore and Claiborne Peil described the US. position towards Yugoslavia as 'Cm~ribundand counterproductive", in a letter sent to other Senators on January 17.88 Despite, these criticisms, the Bush administration maintained 83 KeesUlg % Rccord of World Evcnts. Vol. 37, No. 12Dkembcr 1991, p. 38685. 84 Ibid- 85 Blaine Harden, Wnarmed UN. Officiers Begin Yugoslov Mission; Test for Pace Kecp Looms in Serbian Enclave", The W~siungtonPosî, January 15,1992. 86 Warren Zimm~mm,Ongii of cz C(1t4sttoptre.,Ti Books. 1996, p. 178. 87 Frane V. Golem, "RccognirC Croatia for the Sake of Pcace", TliL W~hUlgtonPost, February 3.1992. 88 Ibid, its position- However, as David Binder, from the New York Times, reported: "the administration took pains to explain its rationale for delaying such acti0n".~9 In the beginning of March 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina foiiowed Croatia and SIovenia by holding a referendum on secession. The referendum result was clear, 99% of the voters voted in favor of independence, and 63% of the eligible voters cast ballots." Following the referendum, the government officidy declared the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina On March 9, a few days after the independence of Bosnia- Henegovina, the White House stated its intention to recognize Croatia and Slovenia, but dso delayed the recognition of other Yugoslav Repubiics. Secretary of State James Baker declared that the time had corne for the European Co~munityand the United States to "work in tandemT*P1Baker also mentioned that this important shift in U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia was the result of the imminent deployment of 14 000 peace- keepers in Croatia, which was an important step towards peace in Yugoslavia?2 Finally, on April7, 1992, President Bush stated: The United States recogaiw Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign and independent states and wilI begin immediate consultations to establish fidl diplornatic relations. The United States accepts the predsis Republic borders as the legitimate international borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. We take this step because we are satisfied that these states meet the requisite criteria for recognition. We acknowledge the peaceful and democratic expression of the wiU of citizens of these states for sovereignty.93 This statement made by the U.S. President constituted an "express" and de jure recognition. Contrary to what the Secretary of State mentioned on March 9, the United States also recognized Bosnia-Hexzegoviaa. This formal recognition by the U.S. 89 David Binder. "'US.Rccognizes 3 Yugoslav RepubIics as Independent*',The New York Tùnes. April 8. 1992. Morton H. HalpCnn. David I. Scheffer and Paaicia L. SmalI. op tir-, p. 35. 91 William Drozdiak, "WS. Set to kcognizt Croatia Slovenia; Baker, EC Officiais Defer Action on 2 Other Yugoslav Rcpublics", The Wrrshington Posr, March 11, 1992. 92 Ibid. 93 WeekZy CompiIation afprendcnrbf Da-nzn, %atcment of United States recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics", Public Papcrs of the mident, VOL 28, (1992) April7.1992, p- 601. government was intended to "b~gUnited States policy into Iine with that of the European Community".94 The European Community recognized Bosnia-Hertegovina on the same day as the United States. However, despite the fact that President Bush stated that the U.S. wodd begin immediate consuitacion to establish diplomatic relations with the three States, the White House waited until August 1992 before extending full diplomatic relations with Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina by exchanging hbassadords Different factors have to be taken into account to understand the shift of the U.S- policy towards Yugoslavia With the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, putting an end to the Cold War, the United States lost their strategic interests in the former buffer zone that was ~ugoslavk.96 Moreovei, by recognizïng Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovha, the White House moved out fiom its political isolation. The recognition gave to the United States the opportunity to, once again, be on the same wavelength as the Ewopean Community conceming the three new counmes, and to continue working in partnership with the EC to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. UDI Case Studies: Obsewstiom and Diion What conclusions can we drawn fiom these two case studies? We will first re- state the five critexia through which the case studies have ken examined: 1) the iegitimacy of the independence; 2) the period of thne between the unilateral declaration of independence and the recognition by the United States; 3) the relation between the U.S. Congress and the Residency over the issue; 4) the criteria imposed by the U.S. 94 David Binder. "US. Rccognias 3 Yugoslav Rcpubiics as Independent", 27ze New York Times, Apd 8. 1992. 95 Morton H. fIaiperin. David J. Scheffer anci Patricia L. Sd.op. cit.. p. 37. 96 Le Monde. 'Washington reconnaîtla SlovCaie, h Croatie a la Bomie-Hdgovind".Thurday Apd 9. 1992. government as conditions of recognition; 5) the US-interests towards these secessionist States. First, it is hard to say if the provisional government of Bangladesh had the politicd legitimacy to secede considering that the Awami League was elected to provide autonomy for East Pakistan. However, because the Pakistani President refused to validate parliamentary elections in March 1971, and considering that the Pakistani army intervened in East Pakîstm to cmsh the secessionist movement, we can maintain that Sheikh Mujibur had the moral right, on behalf of Bangladesh, to proclaim secession.g7 As for the second case study, it seems that the govemment of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had the intemal legitimacy to reaiize independence since in the three cases, the population voted by overwhelming majorities to secede fkom the Yugoslav Federation. Second, the United States recogoized Bangladesh almost thirteen months after the Bangladesh UDI. Therefore, the Ü.s. recognition came very slowly for Bangladesh- Until February 1972, the Nixon administration strongly supported the Pakistani President. The Soviet recognition of Bangladesh on January 24, 1972, and U.S. intemal pressures, as it has been said, certainly had a direct influence on the quick reversa1 of the U.S. policy towards Bangladesh. In the case of Slovenia and Croatia, the United States granted recognition a linle more than nine months after the secession of the two Republics, and one month after the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina- During the fmt eight months of Slovenia and Croatia independence, the United States was fdy opposed to their recognition for questions of stabiiity in Eastern Europe. However, the European Community's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992, certainly accelerated the development of the U.S. position towards Yugoslavia In fact, we can arguably maintain that it is possible that the thret Yugoslav Republics would not have 97 According to Allen Buchanan, a pupthat wants to wcede hma politid union in order to protcct its mcrnbers fkom a military aggrtssion committcd by the authority of this union. represents a clear case wherc a moral rigbt to secede must be acknowledgcd. Sct theory of Ailen Buchanan in chapter one- been recognized by the U.S. in April 1992. if the European Community had not recognized Slovenia and Croatia three monhs before. Third, the Amerïcan Congress played an important role in the US. recognition of Bangladesh. Even though the power of recognition is a presidential prerogative, some members of the Congress, like Senator Edward Kennedy, publicly criticized Nixon's policy in the United States as weil as in Bangladesh when he visited the state. In fxt, severai members of the Congress used their informal power of influence to bring pressure on the White House. As in the case of the three Yugoslav Republics, the U.S- Congress aiso played an important role in the recognition process. Its cnticisms had certainly innuenced the evolution of the White House position regarding Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Henegoviaa. Moreover, the Congress played a detennuiing role when the United States established fidl diplornatic relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia (this is also tme in the case of Bangladesh). Indeed, as the fmt part of the paper on the U.S. power of recognition showed, the Senate had to give its consent for the appointment of U.S. Ambassadon. Unfortmately, because the U.S. recognition of these two UDI case studies were "express" and de jure, they do aot give us the chance to study "implied" and de facto recognitions similar to those presented in the second chapter. Fourth, the United States did not elaborate cnteria of recognition in the case of Bangladesh. It seemed that national intetests were the only considerations involved in the issue. We can arguably defend that the international stability, which implied to maintain the bipolar structure, was the main consideraiion on which the U.S. policy was based. Things were differeat in the case of the three Yugoslav Republics. Indeed, it is important to remind oimelves that the United States has elaborated five critena for recognition. Among others, the U.S. govenunent imposed a peacew settlement of the political crisis and a democratic process. However, it appears that the White House did not follow this guideline to the letter, since it recognized Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina while there was no equal matment of minorities and the fighting was continuhg in these two Republics. In f't, these five criteria, rooted in political ethics, have been over- shadowed by realist considerations, such as the wlll to move out from political isolation, as we saïd earlier. Finally, the Amerïcan interests towards the two case studies have to be taken into account. Washington clearly had a national interest in the integrity of Pakistan. As it has been said, Pakistan was an Amencan aUy in the Sub-Continent Therefore, the appearance of a new state (Bangladesh) in this area of the world was seen as an event that would potentially reduce the political innuence of the U.S. in Aga. However, when it became obvious that the independence of Bangladesh was irreversible, the U.S. policy shifted quickly towards recognition in order to thwart Soviet influence in Bangladesh. In the case of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Henegovina, once again the White House obviously had an intenst in the integrity of Yugoslavia. Indeed, Yugoslavia preserved the geopolitical stability in Eastern Europe. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. interest in Yugoslavia decreased significantiy. However, despite the decreasing of Amencan interests in this area of the worki, the Yugoslav civil war had negative effects on stability in Europe. Therefore. by recognizing the independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Henegoviaa, the U.S. govemment believed that it wodd contribute to the peace process in Yugoslavia. In summation, the U.S. recognition of Bangladesh, Slovenia and Croatia came several months after their unilateral declarations of independence. Bosnia-Herzegovina is. in facf the only exception, shce Washington recognized its independence only a month after its secession. Moreover, in both case studies, the White House recognized secessionist states only after several other codes did recognized them. Shce the United States is arguably the most powemil country in the world, the preservation of the international order, for Washington, is always an extremely important issue. mat cm maybe explain why Washington is dways tardy in recogn-g the independence of states. Moreover, it seems that the importance of moral considerations (minority nghts, democratic process etc.) have gained in importance between the 1970's and the 1990's. However, despite the attention paid to moral principles in our second case study. Amencan national interests remained the p~cipalcomponent of the U.S. policy in matter of recognition, as the case of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina showed. In fact, it appears that, in the 1990's, moral considerations are an important aspect t&atis integrated in the U.S. recognition process. These moral principles can have a direct influence, for instance, on the delay of recognition, but certainly not constitutes the base on which the U.S. govemment decides to recognize States. By using the graphic of the "statist calculation" of the Iegitimacy of secession, we can assert that between the 1970's and the 19901s,the line ab moved closer to the y axis. The '%temal Merits of the Claim'- certainly had more importance in 1992 when the U.S. ncognized the three Yugoslav Republics, than in 1972 when Washington granted recognition to Bangladesh. Finaiiy, it is interesting to notice that mord cnteria of recognition seem to be a general tendency. As we have seen in chapter four, ihe European Union also had developed criteria that Yugoslav and Soviet Republics had to respect before king recognized.98 However, those criteria were not foiiowed Before speculating on the probability that the United States would recognize a Quebec UDI, it is essential to review quickiy the U.S. attitude towards Quebec during the 1990rs. Endeed, in the event of a Quebec UDI, the White House policy towards this case of secession would be greatly innuenced by the American perception of Quebec. The Arnerican Perce~tionof Ouebec in the 1990's In contrast with the 1970's. when several Americans saw Quebec as the 'Cuba of the North' because of the Parti Que'bécois socialist platfonn,99 Quebec is now seen by - - -- 98 Scr Ewopean Commuaity. Dechratïun on the GuidcIiincr on the Recognition of Ncw States in Eàstcrn Europe and in the Soviet Union. 31, International Legal Material (1-LM.), @kcrnbcr16, 19911, 1992, p. 1485. 99 Earl H. Fry, Canaah's Unity CNir. New York The Twentieth Ceniuy Fund Press. 1992, p. 3. the U.S. as a fiee-trader and economic partner wiîh pro-business values. The Nming point Înthe evolution of the American attitude vis-à-vis Quebec is situated at the junction of the 1980's and the 1990s. The change of the US. attitude can be explained economicdly as well as strategicdy. From an economic point of view, Quebec govemments were no longer seen, in the 1990's. as king socialist. Robert Bourassa, Premier of Quebec between 1985 and 1993, was regarded in Washington as a moderate leader of a pro-business Liberal party.100 At the strategic level, the deche of the Soviet Union had the effect to dissipate the threat of the Quebec independence for the US. strategic interesdO1 It is important to remind that, at the end of the 1970's. severai member of the U.S. foreign-policy community feared that a sovereign Quebec, led by the PQ. would withdraw fkom the North American Treaty Orgdation (NATO) and the North Amencan Air Defense Command NOR RAD).^*^ Therefore, the end of the Cold War and the pro-alliance plaaorm of both Quebec Liberal Party and Parti Queoicois dissipated the fear of a possible strategic vacuum in North Amencê Furthemore, the creation of North Arnerican Free Trade Agreement (NAFI'A)~~~in 1992, had the effect of consolidating the U.S. perception of Quebec. Indeed, Quebec appreared to be, during the NAFTA negotiations. a fie-trader and a good economic pariner for the United States. This change in the American perception of Quebec was felt in 1994 when the Parti Québécois won the Quebec election. Unlike the election of the PQ in 1976, the U.S. business community did not react negatively. In an article fkom the Washington Post WTitten ten days before the election of the PQ, Anne Swardson stated: "Perhaps the greater cause for concem is not separatism, but expansionism".l~ This uncertainty loOJean-Fransois Liste. Le Triehem Robcn Bourassa et les QuLbicois, Monnéai: Boréai, 1994. p. 174. lol Jonathan Lemco. Tumil in the Peaceable Kingdom. University of Toronto, 1994. p. 114. 102 Earl H-Fry. op. cit., p. 3. lo3 This track agreement was signal in Dcccmbcr 1992 by the United States, Canada and Mexico. and took effect on January 1' 1994. 104 Anne Swardson. "In Quebec, Wwhg Waii Street; Whow Fiscai Poücy Is Backcd by Financiers Becornes Election Issue", The WmhingtonPost, Septemk 2,1994. reported by the Washington Post was not related to the Quebec sovereignty issue but rather on the choice of the PQ's fiscai policies. As Joseph Jockel pointed out, the evolution of the U.S. perception towards Quebec is the result "of a more sophisticated American understanding -especially in the business world- of Canadian affairs, including development in Quebec". '05 Quebec is now seen by the United States as a good economic partner that would be interested in remaining in NAFTA der a Quebec secession. Moreover, Quebec is now a supporter of NATO and NORAD and is no longer a security threat for the Americans. However, even though the secession of Quebec is now, for the U.S., less threatening than it was in the 1970rs, it appears that, even today, Amencan national interests are better serveci by a united Canada In fact, as Louis Balthazar points out: 'For a great power, the status quo is usuaily the best".Iofj However, in a more specific way, there are new considerations that are, now in the 19901s,under the umbreiia of the U.S- national interests. New economic structures that unite North America (FïA and NAFTA) are elements that can potentially be victim of instability facing the Quebec secession. We can arguably maintain that the redef*g of these trade and economic structures in North America would go against the American national interests. Now, the presentatïon of the Amencan aninide during the 1995 referendum wiil give, among others, a good idea of the principal concems of the United States regarding the issue of the Quebec secession. Moreover, the surnmary wîii present the Clinton administration's position on the Quebec sovereignty. 10s Joseph T. Jockel. "If Canada Breaks Up: Implication for U.S. Policy". Ouiadi "a dicey and difficult prospect".Iog Moreover, two weeks before the referendum, a US. study entitled: The Implications for US. Trade Policy of an Independent Quebec, commissioned by the Center for Strategic and International Snidies (CSIS), showed that a sovereign Quebec would not necessariiy become an automatic member of NAFTA because it would not have automatic rights under this trade agreement109 However, as Joseph Jockel, mention& in the Washington Pua matpossible interests could the United States have in tossing Quebec out of NAFTA? If Quebec were moving decisively toward independence, it would be very much in Our interests to strike a deai with them".Ilo Yet despite this statement, because the Quebec accession to NmAwould likely prove to be a difficult prospect, the United States continued to see the independence of Quebec as a potential element of destabilization in North Amenca. Moreover, the possibility of the fkagmentation of Canada following the secession of Quebec could have resulted in a confusing situation with regards to rrade agreements and the iike. For these reasons. the U.S. govemment favoured the Canadian unity. lo7 Gouvernement du Québec, Secrétariat il Ia mtnic&ion. k Commerce avec un Québec souverah: les hs-unisfavorkent Err contüiuitd, Septernber 1995, p-2- Charles Truehcart, 'W.S. 1s Reluctanily Being Drawn Into SdonDispute in Canada", The Wcrrhington Posf,Octoba 10,1995. James J. Blanchard, Bchind the Embassy Door, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart hc,1998. p. î3S. Charles Truehean "U.S. Is Reluctantly Being Rnwa Into Sscrsion Dispute in CM&, Thc Washington Posr, October 10, 1995. The meanhg of the official position of the Ciinton's administration towards the Quebec issue did not differ significantly from those of the previous US. adminisuations.l~* However, even though the meaning remained the sarne, the position of the Clinton rdminisuation appeared somewhat modified and persistent than traditional U.S. formulations. When President Clinton visited Ottawa in February 1995, five months after the election of the Parti QueWcois, he mentioned his position regardhg the sovereignist debate. In a speech pronounced in the House of Commons on February 23, before among others the Bloc QueWcois deputies who fmed the ofncial opposition at the tirne, Resident Clinton stated: 'In a world darkened by ethnic confiicts that literally tear nations apart, Canada has stood for aiI of us as a mode1 of how people of different cultures can live and work together in peace, prosperity, and respect." He contïnued by adding: "The United States, as many of my predecessors have said, has enjoyed its excellent relationship with a strong and united Canada, but we recognize, G..] that your political future is, of course, entirely for you to decide. That's what democracy is aU about."ll2 In sum, the President mentioned two important thuigs after raising consequences of ethnic nationalism; a direct allusion to the war in former Yugoslavia. First, he stated his preference for a united Canada, and second, he repeated the US. policy of nonintederence towards the intemal affairs of Canada113 However, later on The US. position towards the Quebee sccession con k nimmarizcd in two points: 1) the US. preference for a United Canada. and 2) a policy of noninterference ui the Canadian interna1 affairs- Here are some of the U.S. officiai statements: In Fcbruary 1977, EVesident JiiyCarter declared: The stability there in Canada is of crucial importance to us and the confederation itselfis obviousiy of importance to us". See The New York Timcs, '"Carter Discusscs Future of Quebec; He Mc.Trudeau9*, February 22, 1977. In January 1979, the Carter's Secreîiuy of State, Cyrus Vance mentioned: 'lwantcd to indicate clcarly that we believe it is important that th- be a unitcd Canada but also to make clear that this is an interna1 matter, and we do not intend to inttrferc in the intcmal affairs of Canada See Charles Doran and Brian Job, "American Perceptions of Quebec", Alfred O- Hem, Ir., and MarceI Dantau (d.),Probtms ond Opportuniries Ur US.-Quebec Relruiom, Westview Pm,1984. p. 249. in Aprii 1990, Piesident George Bush stated: "This is aot a point at which the U.S- ought to involve irself in the the intcmal aff'airs of Canada (..J My expcriencc is ta stay out of a matter that's bubbling around up thete in Canada right now. courageously sit on the sidciines". See Jean-François Lisée, The Tnckstcr: Robert Bourassa and Quebecers, Toronto: Jamcs Lorimer & Company, 1994, p. 83. l2 James J. Blanchard, op. d,p. 211. The U.S. poiicy of noninterfcrence in Candian internai affairs hrr been kquently repcaud since 1977. For more information, sec fmtnot~I 11 - dengan official duiner with Prime Minister Jean Chrétien at the Museum of Civilization in Hull. President Ciinton went faaher in his comments by saying: ''let us work together and let us Say long live Canada Vive le CoMdd'.l14 This statement. reminding the Vive le Québec libre( of the former French President Charles de Gaulle, departed from the U.S. policy of noniatederence established by President Clinton only few hours before. This statement was cenainly one of the most explicit ever pronounced by an American president because of the symbolism of VNe le Cd! Two weeks before the referendum on Quebec sovereignty. *th the 'Yes" side gaining support and poUs showing that the federaIists and the sovereignists were relatively equal, the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher made a declaration which, again, went fanher than the traditional formulation. Aftet repeating the usual cautionary statement of noninterference. he mentioned: 'lthink it is probably usehi for me to Say that we have very carefdy cultivated our ties with Canada, [...] and 1 think we shouldn't take for granted that a different kind of organization would obviously have exactiy the same kind of ties7*.1l5 For the hrst thne, a US. official expresseci doubts concerning American relations with Quebec in a pst-sovereignty era. This doubt raised by the Secretary of State was a clear intervention in the Quebec debate and was not indicative of the traditional position of Washington. Finally, on October 25, only five &ys before the referendum, while the Quebec population was split 50-50 on the issue, Resident Clinton decidecl to mention, again. his position on the Quebec question in a news conference. The American President stated: "Wow the people of Quebec will have to cast their votes as their lights guide them. But Canada has been a great partner for the United States. and 1 hope that can continue". ''6 That was the ultimate effort made by Washington in au mptto influence the outcorne. l4 Ibid., p. 217. Robert A. Young. op. ciA. p. 287. l6 James J. Blanchard, op. cù.. p. 248. Between October 18 and Octobtr 25, the United States felt the need to repeat twice its position on the Quebec issue. Incontestably, Washington was very concemed by the possible break up of Canada. In brief. the American officiai position on the Quebec- Canada debate was more explicit and went farther than ever before. and as Joseph Jockel points out, the U.S. position towards Quebec "evolved significantiy during the referendW.117 Even though the U.S. policy remained the same in 1995, the way Washington expressed it has changeci. This cm no doubt be related to the fact that the "Yes" and the "No" sides were almost even in the poils during the two last weeks of the referendum carnpaign, and as such, helps explain the attitude and the persistence of Washington vis-à-vis this CanadIan Ïntemal affair. On October 30, 50.6% of Quebecers voted to remain in Cauada, while 49.4% voted for sovereignty.lls In the contrary to the period that foilowed the 1980 Quebec referendum, Washington did not lose interest in Quebec afier October 1995. With a tight result like this, which did nothing to settle the issue, and a Premier of Quebec who "exhorted sovereignists to prepare for the next encounter", 119 the United States continueci to keep a careN eye on Quebec. As an example, almost a year after the Quebec referendum, the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the U.S. House of Representatives held a one day hearïng on the Quebec situation. This hearing hold on September 25, 1996, was titled: The Issue cf Quebec's sovereignty and its Potential Impact on the United ~tares.l~* It was the first time that the Congress of the United States had taken the time to formdy discuss the issue of ~uebec.121 This example shows that Washington was stiii concemed about the Quebec issue and would probabiy i.n @airs was advocated; and fhally, respect for the Canadian democratic process was continuaily reinforced. Moreover, we can see that the United States continued to believe that, in one way or the other, its interests were being potentiaiiy threatened by the Canadian disunity issue. Consequently, Amencan president Bill Clinton felt the need to elabrate on his public position regardhg the Quebec issue. American National Interests and Ouebec UDI= The Unlikelv U.S. Recomition of Ouebec Conclusions drawn fiom the study of the U.S. power of recognition, and Born the U.S. attitude towards Quebec in the 1990's. give a good indication of the potential U.S. behaviour towards a unilateral secession of Quebec hmCanada. As for the study of the only two cases of UDI that wen recognized by the United States since 1945, they ailow us to formulate empirical generalizations that can be applied to the Quebec case. Now, the inductive approach WUailow us to speculate on the Quebec case by addressing the probability that the United States would recognize a unilateral secession of Quebec. Fht of ail, it is uniike1y that a third Quebec referendum on secession would reach an overwhelming majority in favour of independence, as in Slovenia, Cmatia or Bosnia- Henegovina. When we look at the two Quebec referendums held in 1980 and in 1995, we see that the support for independence has always been below fïfty percent, even by asking ambiguous questions, such as the referendum question of 1995.1* Therefore. if sovereignists win a third referendum on secession, it wiii probably be only by a smaii margin. As a consequence, the Canadian federal govenunent may refuse to recognize the independence of Quebec because of a Iack of legitimacy or, as Louis Bélanger wrote, "to test the solidity of that majority".l~This reaction hmOttawa wouid probably push the Quebec govemment to declare a dateral declaration of independence. Moreover, this wouid certainiy be an important element in the shaping of the US. position towards Quebec. After studying the U.S. attitude towards Quebec in the 1990rs, which showed that Amencan interests clearly lie in a united Canada* we can maintain that if Canada opposes the secession of Quebec, it is unlikely that the United States would go against the wiU of the predecessor state (Canada), by recognizing Quebec. What we also cmnotice, in the case of Quebec, is that the question of secession is formulated in North Arnerica, in the northern border of the United States rather than in Europe or in Asia By reason of proximity, we can assert that the question of stability would be more important in the case of Canada than in the case of Yugoslavia for instance. The instability that the Quebec secession wouid potentially create wouid be a threat to US. economic and political interests. From a political point of view. the secession of Quebec wodd make more difficult the U.S. politicai and diplornatic relations with its northem neighbour. hstead of deaihg with only one govemment, the United States wouid have, then, to deai with two sovereign governments and maybe more, if the secession generates a politicai desintegration of ~anada.1~~As for the economic interests, as we mentioned eariier, the FTA and NAFïA would certainly be important sources of instabiiity. By seceding from Canada, Quebec would no longer be part of these economic agreements and wouid have to apply to become a member. Io addition, as Brower and Smutny mention: "Quebec would not be assured of NAFIA l*3 Louis Bélanger, "nie Unit& States and the Formative Ycars of an Independent Quekc's Foreign Policy", The Amcricm Reviav of CanaduUr Studies, vol. 27, NO. 1, Spring 1997, p.15. 1*4 See Charles Dom, "WfiCanada Unravei", Foreign Affiiirs. Vol. 75, No. 5.1996, pp. 97-109. benefits fiom the United States7'.12S ArticIe 2204 (1) of the NAFT'A agreement, stipulates that a country has to negotiate conditions of its accession with the NAIT'A Commission, and that decisions made by the Commission have to be taken by consensus.126 Therefore, the Quebec demand to become member of NAFTA would have to be approved by the United States, by Canada and by Mexico. This impiies that the Amencan Congress wouid have to approve the Quebec application since. according to the US. Constitution, the Senate has the right to advise the President during treaty negotiations and treaties have to be ratified by two thîrds of the Senators. This provision would potentiaIiy make more difficuit the Quebec entry into NAFTA. The issue could lead to an intemal debate in the United States. Since there is no smct party discipline in the U.S. Congress, and each Senator acts according to his own interests, the Quebec integration in NAFTA could be uncertain. Moreover, the politicai tension between Quebec and Ottawa, caused by the unilateral secession of Quebec, couid perhaps harm the reintegration process of Quebec within the FT'A and NAFïA. Since a consensus is neded to enlarge the NAFîA agreement to other countries, Canada could oppose Quebec entry to protest against its unilateral declaration of independence. As Robert Young points out: "Canada has the legal right to veto Quebec's entry to NAFTA".~~~Moreover, even if negotiations occur between Quebec and Canada following Quebec's secession, Young adds that Canadian leaders would 'bot provide any assurances not to use this veto power until negotiations are weil advanced".l** In sum, the secession of Quebec would certauily be a disruptive 125 Charles N. Browa and Abby Cohen Smutny, " The Effen of the Independaicc of Quebec upon Treaties and Agreements with the United States of Amcrica", The Armn'cM Review of CdionStudies, Vol. 27, No- 1, Spring 1997, p. 55. 126 The artide 2204 (1) of the No& Amcrican Free Trad+ Agreement stipulates: "Any country or poup of countries rnay adeto this Agreement subject to such tems and conditions as may be a@ betwttn such country or counmts and the Commission and following approval in accordance with the appiicable legal procedures of each country. Sec Ibid. Robert A. Young. op. tir., p. 174. 128 &id. factar for the U.S. economic interests because of the instability that it would create. For these reasons, the United States would have no interest in seeing Quebec become a sovereign country. This also explains why the American interest is fundamentaliy conservative on this issue. However, if Quebec did secede, how would the United States react? Among the American foreign-policy cornmuni-ty, it seems that there is no clear consensus on what would be the U.S. policy regarding a Quebec UDL Opinions are roughly divided between what we cm cdthe "'sofi line" and the *%hard iineT, even though the gap between these two categories is sometimes thin. Zhe Sofr Lhe According to soft luiers, there are smaU possibilities îhat the United States would decide to recognize a Quebec UDL Such a decision would depend on the circumstances of the UDL and on the events following the Quebec declaration of independence. As Joseph Jockel mentions, the determuiiog question for the US. would be: would more disruption occur by recognizing the secession of Quebec or by denying it?129 According to Jockel. the United States could recognize a Quebec UDI under some very specific circumstances. He points out that if "in one way or the other Quebec is going... leaving Canada, and English Canada is king obstreperous in allowing Quebec to become independent", the U.S. could move towards recognition." Moreover, he adds that if "there is a threatened breakdown in economic relations between Canada and the United States, and within Canada, because of quarrels [between Quebec and Canada]", then the US. could recognize a Quebec ~~1.131Jockel beiieves, however, that these two - 129~ntc~e~with Joseph T. Jockel. University of Toronto. Toronto. May 10.1999. 130 Ibid. 13l Ibid. circumstances are not most Iikely and. in most circumstances, the U.S. interest wodd remain with Canadian federalists. Sofi liners view on this issue is interes~gand credible. En fact, it is not because the U.S. interests are better served by a united Canada that Washington would never consider recognizing Quebec in some specific circumstances. Arnericans are pragrnatic and go where their national interests are. For instance, in the case of the Bangladesh UDI, President Nixon was Myin favor of the Pakistan territorial integrity because the U.S. national interests were better se& in this arta of the world by a united PakÏstan. This U.S. position maintaioed for more than a year following the Bangladesh UDL Nevertheles, the White House recognized Bangladesh ahost thirteen months after its secession fÎom Pakistan. One of the most important reasons that pushed the White House to recognize Bangladesh, was to maintain of the U.S. level of infiuence in this area of the world during the Cold War. In the case of Yugoslavia, it is aiso obvious that US. national interests changed toward; Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Henegovïna a few rnonths after their UDI. Following the secession of the three Yugoslav Republics, the United States wanted to maintain stability in Eastern Europe, by promothg a united Yugoslavia, in order to protect the international order. However, the recognition of the three Yugoslav Republics by the European Union in January 1992, and the U.S. domestic pressure made on the White House, chaaged the U.S. policy regarding the issue. In fact, these two cases show that what is evident and publicly stated by U.S. officids today, can nimed out to be false tomomw. In other words. we should not take U.S. positions for granted since American national interests are always movùig. If Quebec did secede, the U.S. wiii certainly want a quick settlement of the issue, in order to limit the perverse effects of secession on its own national interests. A Iong settiement of the question would certainLy be intolerable to the U.S. government, since it would create a permanent state of instabiiity in North America. In order to avoid getting involved in the intemal affaUs of Canada, the United States would certaïdy favour cooperation between Quebec and canada132 Therefore, according to some soft Liners, it would be in the Amencan interest to use its power of infiuence to pressure Ottawa and Quebec to quickiy settie the question of the Que& secession. Such a policy would alIow the U.S. to maintain good relations with Canada, and at the same time, would help to resolve the instabiüty cnated by the unilaterai independence of Quebec. Here are some alternatives that codd be coasidered by the Amencan govenunent. As in the case of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.S. government could, for instance, create a policy or a guideel regarding Quebec recognition, based on different criteria This prospect is shared, among others, by Charles Doran, director of the Center of Canadian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University, and by Joseph Jockel. According to Doran, a U.S. guideline on recognition could include critena such as a clear majoiity of Quebecers in favour of secession, a peacefbl process. and a clear referendum question. In fact, we can assume that the elaboration of a guideline on recognition would signify that the United States conceives a possible recognition, and the consequence of this action wouid cenainly force the Canadian govemment to sit at the bargainkg table with Quebec. in an attempt to mach a compromise on secession before the U.S. moves closer to the recognition. Furthermore, the White House could initiate a dialogue with the Quebec government on the potential recognition of Quebec, further increasing the pressure on the Canadian government to negotiate with Quebec. This action would be executed by the Executive branch of the U.S. govemment, since the Resident is the only one to enter into communication with foreign nations. The effet of this action wodd be stronger than the creation of a guideluie on recognition. Indeed. a dialogue with the Quebec govemment would constitute "direct contact" between the U.S. goveniment and the Quebec 132 Se= Robert A. Young, op. cit. p. 106. govemment. Therefore, fiom a diplornatic point of view, this action would imply US. recognition of the legitimacy of the govemment of an independent Quebec. Another alternative for the United States, would be to sign a ueaty with Quebec. which wouid take effect, for instance, a few months later. This would make pressure on the Canadian government to initiate, drning this perhd, a dialogue with Quebec to resolve the conflîct concerning secession and to reduce instability. Joseph Jockel believes that this is a possible scenario, even though it is not the likeliesti33 For different reasons, this method of pressure would certaidy be the least favorable for the United States. Firstiy, the U.S. Congress would be involved in the process leading to the implementation of the ueaty. (It is true though that the President wouid have the alternative to conclude an Executive agreement with the Quebec govemment, but that could be costly politicaily if the Congress is strongly opposed to it.) Secondly, as we have seen in the second chapter, the signing of a treaty would constitute an "implied" and de jure recognition of the independence of Quebec, and that wouid risk compromising Canada-U.S. relations. From a "soft hei' point of view, these alternatives could be used by the United States to pressure the Canadian government to sit at the bargaining table with Quebec. In the case of a failure of these alternatives, the United States could. as a last resort, proceed to an express recognition of Quebec. However, these circumstances remain Unwrely because, as mentioned earlier, it wodd be extremely detrimental for the Canada-U.S. relations. In fact, if these aitematives failed, the United States wouid have two possibilities: recognize the sccession of Quebec and thus compromise its relations with English Canada, or not recognize Quebec secession thus perpetuating the politicai and economic instability, and mcertainty. The choice wouid certainly be difficult considering that there are costs and benefits in both cases. At a certain point, foilowing pp - - l33 Interview with Joseph T. l&. University of Toronto. Toronto. May 10, 1999. the Quebec UDI, a "costs-benefits cdculation" on the part of the United States wodd have to be made- The Nard Line The "hard line" is a very interesthg view, but it is not encouragîng for those who would like to see the United States recognizing a Quebec UDI. According to hard liners, the U.S. government would not recognize the secession of Quebec as long as negotiations between Quebec and Canada would not be completed and successful. In other words. as long as Canada would not recognize the independence of Quebec, Washington would consider Quebec as a Canadian province. According to Charles Dom, the White House would not get involved in the Quebec UDI issue because it would be considered as a Canadian interna1 affair.134 Moreover, the hard line view suggests that Washington would not make pressure on the Canadian government to press negotiations between Quebec and Canada because then would be no emergency and no instability following a Quebec UDI. Christopher M. Sands. director of the Canada Project at the Center for Strategic and International Saidies (CSIS), points out that: "a undateral declaration of independence is vety destabiiizing by itseif if you let it take effect".i3s According to hirn, the IJS. govemment would not let a Quebec UDI take effect and would treat a Quebec UDI as a "declaration of intent and as an empty piece of paper".'36 As a consequence. the U.S. would pretend that Quebecers are still Canadians, and the Quebec govemment would continue to receive trade benefits fiom the FïA and NAFTA. In brief, nothing wodd change. As a resuit, the US. government would be ready to wait however long it took for successfùi negotiations between Quebec and Canada before making a move towards recognition. - - 34 In As we cmsee, there are different opinions on what wodd be the American policy towards a Quebec UDI, and there is no general consensus ammg members of the US. foreign-policy community. However, soft and hard liners agree at least on the fact that the U.S. govemment would favor negotiations between Quebec and Canada. There is another dimension that we have to take into account when we speculate on what the U.S. would do facing the secession of Quebec. This dimension concems relations between the United States and other countnes. For instance, how the United States would react if France did recognize a Quebec secession? This leads us to consider the Monroe Doctrine elaborated by U.S. President James Monroe in 1823.~~0This doctrine, that shapes American foreign policy even today, is based on the following prînciple: what happens in the American hemisphere concems Amencans. In other words, European counaies and other countries would not be welcome to get involve in 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 For the original Monroe Doctrine that was containcd in hident Monroe's message of Dccember 2, 1823, sec: Dextcr Perkins, A Hijrary of the Monroe DocrrUie, Littie, Brown and Company, 1963, pp. 391- 93- issues that take place in the Axnerican hemisphere.141 Obviously, this dimension did not exist in the case of Bangladesh and the three Yugoslav Republics. By taking into account the Monroe Doctrine in the case of the Quebec secession, some interesthg questions can be raised: would France be welcome to get involved in the Quebec issue? Would Washington-Pans relations detenorate if France did recogoize a Quebec UDI? A Quebec UDI and the Monroe Docîn'ne There are good chances that the United States wodd be involved in the issue each minute foiiowing a wînning referendum on Quebec secession. The US. government would also pay much attention on what other couoaies would do regarding the secession of Quebec, more panicularly on France and on the European Union. However, it appears that the Monroe Doctrine would not have much weight in the Quebec issue. According to Chris Sands, on the one han& the French govemment wouid not be welcome by getting involved in the issue, but on the other han& the United States would Iet France recognize a Quebec secession. Sands mentions: 'We wouid disagree with the move publicly, and Say so, but othexwise U.S.-France relations would proceed nor~nally".~~~ Joseph Jockel is another academic who believes that the Amencan government would let France recognize Quebec.I43 In fact, the recognition by France seems to be a level of involvement that Washington would tolerate. However, if we take, for instance, a very unlikely scenarïo where France would send troops in Quebec to help local forces to exclude Canadians hmthe Quebec territory, then. such a Ievel of involvement would certainly not be tolerated by Washington. According to Sands "it would be seen by In DES as George F. Bain mentions. îhe Monroe Doctrine wuclabod by President Monme in order to proscribe "Europcan intewcntion in the affaüs of Spanish-AmenencanStates and has bten a clear policy of the United States since then". S#: George F. Bain, United Strrtes Intervention in the Secession of Quebec, March 12,1999. This papa is however unpublishcd. 142 Interview with Christophm Smds. Centcr for Strategic and International Studics, Washington D.C., May 13,1999. 143 Interview with Joseph T. Jockel, University of Toronto, Toronto. May 10. 1999. Washington to be highly counterproductive, and there wodd be a 'big chiII' if not an outright contlict with ParisW.I44 However, as we said, this scenario remains very unlikely, and is closer to a science fiction noveI. Even if the United States would probably let France recognïze Quebec, that would certainly not influence the U.S. position on the matter. Charles Doran and Joseph Jockel believe that the French recognition of Quebec would not have a heavy impact on the U.S. position, and would not press Washington to recognize ~uebec.1~5mese opinions give even more weight to the argument put forward in chapter four, that the "Grand Game" of Mr Parizeau is unrealistic.) In sum, the Monroe Doctrine would probably not be an important element to consider in the relations between the United States and other countries regarding the Quebec issue. Moreover, it is unlikely that the relations between the U.S. and France become "cold" sirnply on the basis ofa recognition of Quebec. Before concluding, it is important to mention that the Congress would certainly play a signincant role in determining the evolution of U.S. policy towards Quebec secession. In the cases of PalUsuin and Yugoslavia, the U.S. Senate promoted and supported the recognition of Bangladesh, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovïna, and criticized the White House's position on the issue. In faft, the rivaùy between the Democrat and Republican political parties certainly explains in part why, in both case stuclies, some members of the Congress strongly criticized the White House's position. In the case of Bangladesh, Resident Nixon was a Republican while Senator Edward Kennedy, one of the most fervent opponents of Nixon's policy towards Bangladesh, was a Democrat. In this case, the political rivalry between the parties was clear. In the case of the secession of the former Yugoslav Republics, Resident Bush, a Republican, was Çnticized by several Democrat members of the Congress Wre, for instance, Senator Albert 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. and sec Intmiew with Charles Dom. Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C.. May 13, 1999. Gore, the cumnt Democrat Vice-President. However, in th.case, some Republicans nom the Congrrss, such as Senator Bob Dole, also disapproved of Bush's policy regardhg Slovenia and Croatia. This second case showed therefore that the rivairy between political parîies is not the only factor that motivated the congressional pressure on the White House. Indeed, the disapproval of a Republican President by Republican Senators demonstrates that the US. Congress has its own interests. In the case of the Yugoslav Republics, it is possible that Senator Dole, who was the Chair of the Senate Foreign An& Comminee, and other Republican members, acted in an attempt to maintain the mdibility and the influence of the Senate in matter of foreign policy. Some other political considerations may have also been involved. For instance, some congressional members mayk have criticized the White House because their own voters supported recognition. in the case of a Quebec UDL, it is therefore probable that rivalry between Amencan political parties as weH & other Congressional interests would animate the U.S. Congress. By looking at the two case studies (Bangladesh and Slovenia-Croatia- Bosnia-Henegovina), it is iikely that the U.S. Congress would try to influence the presidentiai position on Quebec. Since it is probable that the American President would adopt a very conservative position towards a Quebec UDI (as in the case of Bangladesh and the Yugoslav Republics), the Congress could, for instance, urge the Resident to pressure the Canadian govemment to negotiate with Quebec, or even to push the White House towards the recognition of Quebec. That would dl depend on the Congressional interests at that moment, In sum, it is uniikely that the United States would recognize a dateral secession of Quebec. However, if we follow the "sofl-liners" view, it is possible that Washington would put pressure on the Canadian govemment to recognize Quebec or, at least, to establish a dialogue with Quebec sovereignists in order to reduce the instability. Moreover, in some specific circumstances, it is possible that the White House may recognize a Quebec UDI. if its own interests would be better swed by doing so. Ih this case, the White House wouîd quicLly shift its policy. In fact, what would reaily matter would be the Amencan national interests rather than the political coherence towards the Quebec issue. It is a this level that the United States is a "poker player" rather than a "chess player". However, the circumstances that would push Washington to recognize a Quebec UDI remain unIikely. In fact, the US. position regarding Quebec secession wodd be shaped according to two main considerations. First, the importance of maintainhg good relations with Canada, and second, the need to avoid politicd and economic instabilities- Conclusion This thesis has argued that the international recognition of a unilateial secession of Quebec by France and the United States appears unülely. More partîcularly, this thesis has outiined, in chaptcis four and five, the masons why these two countries would be disinclined to recognize a Quebec UDI. As demonstrated in chapter four, despite good franco-québécoises relations. the cost of a French unilateral recognition of Quebec would be for France higher than the benefits. Even if France may tempted to recognize Quebec, the European integration. and the secessionist movements in France as well as in Europe, would probably prevent France from playing a strategic function regarding Quebec in a post-UDI era. As the case study of the German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia demonsoatcs, the consequences of not respecting a European cornmon foreign policy could be detrimental to the national interests of the state that deviateci hmthe common position and on the European Union's interests. Momver, the case study of the German recognition showed that France was reluctant to recognize the two Yugoslav Republics and piaced pressure on Germany in order to maintain the EU common foreign policy of non-recognition of Slovenia and Croatia Therefore, despite what Premier Parizeau believed in 1995, when he set up his diplornatic "Grand Game". it is improbable that France would recognize the unilaterai secession of Quebec, and play a role of "locomotive" by driving the United States and oîher countries towards the recognition of a Quebec UDL The reasons that would probably prevent the United States from recognizing a Quebec UDI are dBerent. The US. national interests Lie in the maintenance of good political and economic relations with a unit4 Canada. For the United States. a united Canada reprrsents the only way to assure stability in the no& of its border. The prospect of a Quebec Tm1 is therefore not in the best interests of the United States. However. if Quebec did secede unilateraily, the key for the United States would certainly be the stabiiïty in the transition towards secession. Successful negotiations between Quebec and Canada would Lùnit the perverse effects of secession, and restrain the costs of secession on American national interests- Indeed, for the United States, a Quebec constitutional secession (with the agmment of the rest of Canada), wodd be the only way to limit political and economic instability. A Quebec UDI wouid however be the worst scenario for the US. since it wouid create an economic and political vacuum to the north of iu border. As a result, in the hypothesis of a Quekc UDI, the United States wodd probably not let the UDI take effect, by not recognizing it. By doing so, the Amerkari govemment would try to protect its national interests by Iimiting instability. In fact, as long as Quebec and Ottawa wodd not have concluded successfid negotiations, we can assume that the United States would probably not recognize a Quebec UDI. However, depending on the circumstances of the Quebec secession, it is possible that the United States would put pressure on the Canadian ftderal govemwnt to recognize Quebec. Such an action on the part of Washington would be motivatecl, once again, by its own interests. The United States could even use the dinérent levels of implied recognition in order to force Quebec and Ottawa to negotiate. Washington couid begin, for instance, direct discussions with Quebec or sign a bilaterd treaty with the Quebec govemment. However. these possibilities are not the most likely. Moreover, as the case studies have shown, the United States was rcluctant to recognize Bangladesh and Slovenia-Croatia, and its position was very consemative. In both cases, the White House was pushed by other countries towards recognition. In the case of Bangladesh. the Soviet recognition had the effect of pressing Wasbington, whiie in the case of Yugoslavia, it is the European Union that put pressure on Washington by recogniziag both Yugoslav Republics. In the case of Quebec, however, who wodd push Washington towards recognition? In contmst to Bangladesh, Slovenia and Croatia, Quebec is in the direct U.S. sphere of influence. From a geopolitical perspective, that malces ail the Merence, and as seen in chapter four, it is unlikely that the European Union wouid press the U.S. to ncognize a unilateral secession of Quebec. In sum as we can see, a U.S. recognition of a Quebec UDI appears uniikely . As shown in chapter tb,the phenornenon of UDI is a relatively new prospect in Quebec. It was in fact seriously anticipaad for the first time in 1995 during the Quebec referendum campaign. In contrast to the mt referendum in 1980 on sovereignty- association, the 1995 referendum could have been a one way ticket towards a unilateral secession of Quebec. In fact, a UDI was included in P~mierParizeau's strategy. The Supreme Court Reference Case on Quebec secession is a clear expression of this new political realify. The legal strategy adopted by the Canadian federal govemment had the effect of recognizing officially the possibüity of a Quebec UDL In the event of another referendum on Quebec sove~ignty,the judgement of the Supreme Court would cenaùlly be a master piece in the political game between Quebec and Ottawa. As we have seen, considerations such as a clear refmndum question, a clear majority of Quebecers in favour of secession, and the "obligation to negotiate" Mth Quebec wodd undoubtedly animate several debates. Chapter one has demonstrated that the reaiist theory of Lee C. Buchheit was much more pertinent for the purpose of this thesis than liberal theories. Buchheit's theory studies secession by taking into account realpolitik faftors as weii as some moral and practical considerations. The cquation of both factors creates a very rational process through which states actualiy go in deciding about recognition. Since the basic principle of recognition is essentially political, Buchheit's theory becomes the adequate lens to study cases of recognition, once adapted to the statist perspective. Chapter two. which pnsented the different levels of international recognition. showed that there are dinerent options avaüable to recognize new states. In fact, public and official statements granting & jure recognition, is only the "tip of the iceberg". DBerent implied leveis of recognition pccsented in this chapter can also be used by states to maximize their national interests, without king obliged to make formal commitments. These levels could be very usefûi for France and the United States in the event of a Quebec UDL They could be used by Paris and Washington as political twls to protect their national htcrests without ncccssarily tuming othcr States agaiast them. However, as demonstrated, the use of these different levels by these two countnes =main unlikely. The statist calcdation of the legitimacy of secessionist claims, grapbidy represented in chapter one, bas been used to p&ct whether France and the United States would recognize a Quebec UDL The ntst comment that we can formulate is that the "cost of recognition on national inttrests" was a more determining factor than the "internat men& of the claim". Indeed, if we look at the Gennan recognition of Slovenia and Cmatia, we can see that the German national interests were the most important factor that pushed Helmut Kohl to recognize the secession of both republics. The German foreign minîster even statcd that Gemiany would recognize both Republics regadess of what would k the conclusions of the Badinter commission concerniag the respect by the Yugoslav Republics of the "doctrine of rtcognition", which was based on ethic and moral considerations. Moreover, even the European Union recognized Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992, despite the fact that Cmatia did not rrspect ail the criteria of the N "doctrine". The European Union was, at that tirne. more pnaccupied by its political cohesion and by the maintenance of the common position adopted in December 1991, than by mord considerations, such as the protection of minonties in Croatia The same comment cmbe made for the case of the United States. As demonstrated in chapter five. what drove the U.S. towards recognition was essentiaily its national interests. The Amencan recognition of Bangladesh UDL, in 1972, is the perfect example. The cost of the Bangladesh recognition on US. intemts was hm fa,the most important factor considered in Washington. In fact, we can assume that the line ab included in the "statist calculaîion" graphic included in chapter one, was probably mund 80" deps, close to the y axis. As for the case of the Amencan recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, it showed that the "intemal men& of the claim" gawd in importance, but were not as important as the "cost of recognition" factor. Even if U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, elaborated a U.S. doctrine of recognition simila. to the one adopted by the EU, Washington made the decision to recognize both repubics in hction of its own national interests. In fact, it is possible that the "intemal merits of the claim" delayed the U.S. recognition. but was certainly not the decisive factor that pushed Washington to recognize or not to recognize Slovenia and Croatia Therefore, between the 1970's and the 1990's. we can maintain that the Iine ab of the "statist calculation" graphic moved towards the x axis, probably around 60° degrees. Ti1 sum, the "cost of recognition on national interests" is the decisive factor that push States to gant recognition. nie main difficulty of this thesis is as foiiows. As stated in the general introduction, the central question of the thesis is very hypothetical. There may not be another referendum on Quebec sovereignty, and support for its independence may eventually de-. As a result, the speculative nature of the work is a high challenge since the aim of the thesis is to study the future rather than the past Moreover, because the circumstances of the Quebec UDI, and the international conjuncture in the event of the secession of Quebec are unknown. it is difncult to predict with precision how France and the United States would react towards Quebec. In fact, there are several variables that we cannot control. For instance, the role aad interests of the French National Assembly towards a Quebec UDI are unpredictable. Furehennore, discussions within the European Council. and the "game of power" played between EU members are unknown. In the case of the United States, it is almost impossible to predict what would be the congressionai position towards a uniiateral secession of Quebec. Inde severai actors. with their own politicai iaterests, wodd take part in the shaping of the congressional position towards a Quebec UDL For these reasons, this thesis does not pretend to Lnow the future. In fact, despite arguments put fornard demonsaating that it is unWEely thaî Paris and Washington would rccognize a Quebec UDI, it is always possible that France and the United States could recognize a unilaterai secession of Quebec. It would ail depend on the circumstances. However, in spite of the constraint of thne and money, the arguments and the concIusions of this thesis seem very realistic, and are based on political facts rather than on generaily accepted ideas. While this thesis has provided the occasion to discuss and to elaborate conclusions on whether France and the United States wouid recognize a Quebec UDI, it also gives nse to some new questions. One of the most important questions concems how Quebec sovereignists codd ameliorate the "me& of Quebec claim" and reduce the "cost of Quebec recognition" on French and American national interests. By idiuencing factors included in the "statist caiculation of legitimacy", the Parti Québécois could increase Quebec's chances of king intemationally recognized. Moreover, another important question is how to avoid a Quebec UDI. Considering the fact that it is unWtely that a unilateral secession of Quekc would be ncognized by France and the United States, a Quebec UDI would cenainly be very damaging for Quebec's national interests. Therefore, a constitutional secession of Quebec appears essential. It would k in bath Quebec and Canada's interests to conclude successfui negotiations on secession since it would avoid a political and economic vacuum. Moreover it would also avoid putthg Quebec's future in the han& of foreign counnies which mainly act according to their own political interests. 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