CTC Sentinel Objective

july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining FEATURE ARTICLE From Al-Qa`ida’s Losses 1 Why Terrorists Quit: By Michael Jacobson Gaining From Al-Qa`ida’s Losses By Michael Jacobson

Reports 4 An Ideological and Operational Threat: Abu Àmr/Shaykh Ìsa By Erich Marquardt & Abdul Hameed Bakier 8 Indonesia’s Approach to Jihadist Deradicalization By Kirsten E. Schulze 10 The High Stakes Battle for the Future of Musa Qala By David C. Isby 13 Al-Qaìda Seeking to Recruit African- American Muslims By Cadets Benjamin Haas & Daniel McGrory 15 Propaganda and Peace Deals: The Taliban’s Information War in Pakistan By Arthur Keller 18 Uncovering Extremist Violence in Morocco Jordanians protest the 2005 Amman hotel bombings, an operation that created divisions among al-Qaìda’s supporters. By Alison Pargeter 21 After Action Report: Nuanced n recent months, there has been the radical group Hizb al-Tahrir3 (also Diplomacy in Zerok, Afghanistan a spate of seemingly good news spelled Hizb-ut-Tahrir) established the By Captain John G. Gibson, U.S. Army in the counter-terrorism arena, Quilliam Foundation, which describes as former terrorist leaders and itself as “Britain’s first Muslim counter- 23 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity Iclerics have renounced their previous extremism think tank.”4 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts beliefs. Former Egyptian Islamic Jihad head Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known While these are clearly positive as Dr. Fadl), whose treatises al-Qaìda developments and may have a real often cited to justify its actions, has impact on preventing the next generation written a new book rejecting al-Qaìda’s from going down the path of extremism, message and tactics.1 Shaykh Salman what effect will these renunciations About the CTC Sentinel bin Fahd al-Awda, an extremist cleric have on al-Qaìda’s current members, The Combating Terrorism Center is an whose incarceration in the 1990s by the and on others who are well on their independent educational and research Saudis reportedly helped inspire Usama way to becoming terrorists? What are institution based in the Department of Social bin Ladin to action, went on television the factors that can turn a would-be Sciences at the United States Military Academy, to decry al-Qaìda’s operations, asking terrorist away from this dangerous West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses Bin Ladin, “How much blood has been path? Do former terrorists’ and the Center’s global network of scholars and spilt? How many innocent people, extremists’ messages carry particular practitioners in order to understand and children, elderly, and women have been weight with this group? Unfortunately, confront contemporary threats posed by killed…in the name of al Qaeda?”2 In the terrorism and other forms of political violence. United Kingdom, former members of 3 Although Hizb al-Tahrir is banned in some countries, it is not banned in the United Kingdom. The views expressed in this report are those of 1 Lawrence Wright, “The Rebellion Within,” New York- 4 Susannah Tarbush, “The Quilliam Foundation,” al- the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, er, June 2, 2008. the Department of the Army, or any other agency Hayat, May 26, 2008. For a detailed analysis of the Quil- of the U.S. Government. 2 Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Unravel- liam Foundation, see James Brandon, “The UK’s Experi- ing,” The New Republic, June 11, 2008. ence in Counter-Radicalization,” CTC Sentinel 1:5 (2008).

1 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 at this point there are too few answers Defections from al-Qaìda have to leave the terrorist or extremist to these important questions. What continued since 9/11. For example, Sajid organization. Not surprisingly, can be examined, however, are cases of Badat, a young Muslim from Gloucester, some have departed after becoming individuals who have decided to quit England, was trained in Afghanistan disillusioned with the group’s tactics involvement in a terrorist organization. and Pakistan to use shoe bombs to and strategy. Former EIJ leader Dr. There are a number of cases of terrorist destroy aircraft. His assignment was to Fadl, Saudi cleric Shaykh al-Awda, and “drop-outs,” and studying their target airliners bound from Europe to the founding members of the Quilliam motivations for turning their backs the United States. While his associate Foundation all seem to fit this profile. on their former compatriots is highly Richard Reid—now better known as useful for creating an effective counter- JI commander Abas began to turn terrorism strategy. “Tactical and operational on his organization and to cooperate with Indonesian counter-terrorism Many Candidates to Study differences with the authorities after JI adopted a Bin Despite al-Qaìda’s reputation for leadership have also Ladin fatwa that called for attacks on ferocity and secrecy and its purported civilians. Abas believed that jihad was esprit de corps, many individuals have played a role in terrorists’ only to be fought on the battlefield in quit the organization, making this a disillusionment.” the defense of Islam. Abas later said productive area of study. In fact, al- that he felt “sinful” after the 2002 Bali Qaìda has seen its share of key members bombings, since he had helped train turn against the group from its earliest the bombers in the attacks.13 AQIM days. These include: “The Shoe Bomber”—attempted to blow commander Hadhifa turned himself in, up an American Airlines flight from according to his family, after reaching - Jamal al-Fadl, a Sudanese national, Paris to Miami, Badat simply bailed on the conclusion that the jihad in Algeria who was one of the first members of the plot, leaving his dismantled bomb in was not legitimate.14 Far more shocking al-Qaìda and was involved in the his parents’ house.9 was the decision of Bin Ladin’s son unsuccessful efforts in the early 1990s to Ùmar to quit al-Qaìda in the wake of procure uranium for the organization;5 Al-Qaìda is hardly alone in suffering 9/11, calling the attacks “craziness” and - Essam al-Ridi, an Egyptian who first from defections. Some of its affiliates saying that “those guys are dummies. traveled to Afghanistan in 1982 to have had important losses as well, They have destroyed everything, and fight the Soviets and later purchased ranging from foot soldiers to key for nothing. What did we get from an airplane in the United States for al- leadership personnel. Al-Qaìda’s September 11?”15 Qaìda;6 Indonesian-based affiliate Jemaah - L’Houssaine Khertchou, a Moroccan Islamiyah (JI) was dealt a blow when A lack of respect for the group’s who joined the organization in 1991 and Nasir Abas—one of JI’s four regional leadership has also been a factor. Former trained to serve as Bin Ladin’s personal commanders—left the organization.10 LIFG head Benotman had real differences pilot.7 Noman Benotman, the former leader of with Bin Ladin over the direction of the al-Qaìda-affiliated Libyan Islamic the global jihadist movement, and he Even in the 9/11 plot—where attention Fighting Group (LIFG), also abandoned claims to have asked the al-Qaìda amir has focused on al-Qaìda’s ability to the terrorist cause, turning not only on to get out of the terrorism business at convince 19 people to kill themselves as the LIFG but on al-Qaìda as well.11 In a 2000 summit, realizing that they part of the attack—Bin Ladin was not June 2008, Abu Hadhifa, a long-time were fighting a losing battle. After 9/11, entirely successful. Two Saudis who veteran of the Algerian jihad, who had Benotman resigned from his position were selected for the plot—Mushabib risen to become the commander of al- in the LIFG, concerned that the United al-Hamlan and Saùd al-Rashid— Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) States would likely respond to the attack decided after leaving the training forces in eastern Algeria, dropped out of by not only targeting al-Qaìda, but his camps in Afghanistan not to participate AQIM and turned himself in to Algerian organization as well.16 in the attacks. In the summer of 2001, authorities.12 al-Qaìda nearly faced an even bigger More tactical and operational differences obstacle when Ziad Jarrah, the pilot Factors Causing Operatives to Quit with the leadership have also played of Flight 93, was deliberating about In these various cases, patterns are a role in terrorists’ disillusionment. whether to withdraw from the operation. evident in why they made the decision For example, Essam al-Ridi said that In an emotional conversation, Ramzi bin during the battles against the Soviets al-Shibh—the Hamburg-based liaison July 2004. in Afghanistan he resented taking between the cell and the al-Qaìda 9 Daniel McGrory and Zahid Hussain, “New Wave battlefield orders from Bin Ladin and leadership—was able to persuade Jarrah of British Terrorists are Taught at Schools, Not in the other leaders who lacked military 8 to stay the course. Mountains,” Times Online, July 14, 2005. 10 Bob Simon, “Switching Sides: Inside the Enemy 13 Simon, “Switching Sides: Inside the Enemy Camp.” 5 U.S.A. v. Usama bin Laden et al., Southern District of Camp,” 60 Minutes, May 6, 2007. 14 “Report: Al-Qaeda Maghreb Commander Turns Self New York, 2001. 11 Bergen and Cruickshank, “The Unraveling.” In.” 6 Ibid. 12 “Report: Al-Qaeda Maghreb Commander Turns 15 Peter Bergen, “War of Error,” The New Republic, Oc- 7 Ibid. Self In,” Middle East Media Research Institute, June 8, tober 22, 2007. 8 9/11 Commission, “9/11 Commission Final Report,” 2008. 16 Bergen and Cruickshank, “The Unraveling.”

2 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 experience. Al-Ridi later testified that the plot when they left Afghanistan and into place in recent years. It is clear the final straw from his perspective returned to their home country of Saudi from a preliminary review of individuals was a battle in which many jihadists Arabia. After getting his U.S. visa, al- who have quit or defected that there died—in his view due to the leadership’s Hamlan contacted his family despite are many different factors at play— incompetence—but where al-Qaìda clear instructions to the contrary. When ranging from strategic disagreements to declared victory nonetheless.17 For 9/11 he discovered that his mother was ill, financial disputes—that drive seemingly hijacker Jarrah, one of the causes of his he decided not to return to Afghanistan committed terrorists to change course. unhappiness was Muhammad Àtta’s despite repeated pressure from al- This seems to suggest that a “one size fits leadership style, in particular Jarrah’s Qaìda. He subsequently moved back all” approach is likely to produce only feelings that he was excluded from the in with his parents and returned to his marginal results and that more flexible broader decision-making process.18 college studies.22 Badat, the reluctant and tailored programs are necessary. shoe bomber, likewise appears to have While strategic differences appear Figuring out why people have left to be an important factor, more petty “Without knowing why terrorist and extremist organizations grievances have also played a role in can help governments and non- al-Qaìda members deciding to turn people have become governmental entities craft messages their backs on the organization. Issues disillusioned with designed to pull people already engaged relating to money have frequently in terrorism. This is an area in which caused problems, as some terrorists terrorist and extremist Western governments have struggled have viewed inadequate compensation organizations, it is difficult since 9/11, and where a new approach as a sign that they are being treated is needed. As Department of Homeland unfairly. For example, Jamal al-Fadl to determine what type of Security Undersecretary Charles Allen began embezzling funds from al-Qaìda message would be most noted in a May 2008 speech, at this during their years in Sudan based on his point “no Western state has effectively displeasure with his salary—stealing effective and who should countered the al-Qaeda narrative.”24 approximately $100,000 total. When deliver it.” Without knowing why people have Bin Ladin learned of al-Fadl’s actions, become disillusioned with terrorist and he ordered him to repay the money. extremist organizations, it is difficult After repaying about $30,000, al-Fadl to determine what type of message fled, fearing retribution if he did not made the decision to abandon the plot would be most effective and who should return the full amount.19 once he returned to his home country deliver it.25 and resumed contact with his family.23 Khertchou, on the other hand, became A preliminary review reveals some bitter after one of Bin Ladin’s aides Lessons for the Government interesting potential opportunities turned down his request for $500 to Developing a better grasp of this in this area. For example, since cover the costs of his wife’s cesarean phenomenon is critical for the United disagreement with the leaders seems section. His anger level increased when States and its allies’ counter-terrorism to be a major factor for a number of al-Qaìda paid the expenses of a group efforts. Broadly speaking, it will drop-outs, the messages could focus, of Egyptians who were sent to Yemen to be difficult for the United States to in part, on undermining the stature of renew their passports. “If I had a gun,” effectively counter radical ideology the terrorist leadership. This suggests, Khertchou later testified, “I would shoot without understanding all aspects of for example, that perhaps the U.S. [Bin Ladin] at that time.”20 the radicalization cycle—including both effort to discredit former al-Qaìda why and how people are drawn in to in Iraq chief Abu Musàb al-Zarqawi It appears that terrorist cell members terrorist and extremist organizations by publicizing a video demonstrating who maintain contact with friends and why people have walked away. that he was uncomfortable handling a and family outside the organization firearm—and therefore hardly a worthy are more likely to withdraw. Perhaps A comprehensive study exploring the military leader—may have had some in part in recognition of this, Àtta drop-out phenomenon could have great merit.26 In addition, it appears that forbade the 18 hijackers in the United practical benefits for the United States the United States should also try to States from contacting their families to and its allies. Governments could use avoid further enhancing Bin Ladin’s say goodbye. Jarrah’s unwillingness to the knowledge gleaned to shape their stature by continually emphasizing the cut ties with his fiancé in Germany and counter-radicalization programs, which seriousness of the terrorist threat. As his family in Lebanon was one of the are growing in popularity throughout State Department Counter-Terrorism causes of strife in his relationship with the world. Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Coordinator Dell Dailey recently stated, Àtta.21 In fact, potential 9/11 plotters Egypt, Indonesia and Singapore, as al-Rashid and al-Hamlan abandoned well as the United Kingdom and the 24 Charles Allen, speech at The Washington Institute for Netherlands, are among the countries Near East Policy, May 6, 2008. 17 U.S.A. v. Usama bin Laden et al. that have put these types of programs 25 Governments, and particularly the U.S. government, 18 “9/11 Commission Final Report.” are not always the right messenger when it comes to de- 19 U.S.A. v. Usama bin Laden et al. 22 Ibid. livering counter-radicalization messages. 20 Ibid. 23 McGrory and Hussain, “New Wave of British Ter- 26 Again, however, it is not clear whether the U.S. gov- 21 “9/11 Commission Final Report.” rorists are Taught at Schools, Not in the Mountains.” ernment is the best messenger for these efforts.

3 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 one of al-Qaìda’s goals is to “create a Conclusion An Ideological and perception of a worldwide movement There is no obvious silver bullet. Yet, more powerful than it actually is.”27 the stories of the “drop-outs” are of Operational Threat: more than academic interest. Counter- Abu Àmr/ Shaykh Ìsa Since targeting civilians is also a source terrorism officials have spent a great of concern among those who have quit deal of effort trying to understand the By Erich Marquardt and Abdul Hameed Bakier militant groups, focusing on al-Qaìda’s process of radicalization, but strikingly victims—particularly Muslims—also little work has been done on the flip in pakistan’s tribal regions, the appears to be a worthwhile approach. side of the coin: the factors that can Egyptian cleric Abu Àmr Àbd al- The United States has recently started turn a fanatical would-be killer into Hakim is proving to be a significant to focus on this, trying to demonstrate, a somewhat chastened citizen. While threat to Pakistan. Abu Àmr (also as National Counter-Terrorism Center the recent statements of the clerics and known as Abu Àmru) emphasizes Director Michael Leiter has explained, leaders who have rejected al-Qaìda the immediate need to focus attacks and its ideology are certainly promising on the Pakistani government, rather developments, the reality is that counter- than on encouraging supporters to “Figuring out why terrorism authorities do not have a full strictly concentrate operations on individuals have walked grasp on what type of impact these kinds international forces in Afghanistan, or of pronouncements will have. Until all on the “far enemy” abroad. To justify away from terrorist groups aspects of the radicalization cycle are this “near enemy” approach, this may enable governments to better understood, including those who previously obscure Egyptian cleric uses have left the terrorists’ fold, it will be his writings and sermons to convince better predict whether an difficult to develop an effective strategy Pakistani Muslims that the government individual, or even a cell, to defeat the al-Qaìda movement and in Islamabad is apostate, declaring its ideology. its agents kafirs. Although little is is likely to follow through known about Abu Àmr, a few sources with an attack.” Michael Jacobson, a senior fellow in The consistently identify him as an Egyptian Washington Institute’s Stein Program cleric operating out of Pakistan’s tribal on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, areas and identified as “Shaykh Ìsa al- previously served as a Counsel on the 9/11 Masri.” Shaykh Ìsa has been named as that “it is al-Qaeda, and not the West, Commission and on the 9/11 Congressional a close associate of al-Qaìda’s central that is truly at war with Islam” by Joint Inquiry. He is the author of the leadership and, according to Department highlighting the extent to which Institute publication, “The West at War: US of Defense documents, previously had Muslims are victims of the organization’s and European Counterterrorism Efforts, played a role in training jihadists in attacks.28 Post-September 11.” From 2005-2007, he Kabul in “the rules of jihad.”1 served as a senior advisor in the Treasury This type of study could also have a Department’s Office of Terrorism and Although it is not possible to independently number of benefits for law enforcement Financial Intelligence. prove that Shaykh Ìsa and Abu Àmr are and intelligence agencies’ counter- one and the same, a number of journalistic terrorism efforts. Figuring out why accounts have asserted this connection, individuals have walked away from a claim that seems highly likely. The terrorist groups may enable governments majority of the accounts are based on to better predict whether an individual, the writings of Syed Saleem Shahzad, or even a cell, is likely to follow through the Pakistan Bureau Chief of the Hong with an attack. Understanding the Kong-based internet publication Asia dropouts should also make it easier Times Online.2 In a number of his reports, for law enforcement and intelligence Shahzad has made reference to Shaykh to determine which terrorists might be in Germany now commonly referred to as the “Hamburg Ìsa and has stated that he is also known 3 induced to switch sides, and how the cell”—may have been even more vulnerable. Bahaji, the as Abu Àmr Àbd al-Hakim. Although 29 government should proceed. only German citizen in the group, was described by as- there are many similarities between the sociates after 9/11 as insecure, a follower, and not knowl- two identities, Shahzad’s reporting is 27 Press conference on the release of the State Depart- edgeable about Islam, which was not surprising given his the only source that clearly identifies ment’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, April 30, own acknowledgement that he became a “strong Muslim the two names as one and the same. 2008. in a very short period of time.” One observer said that he 28 Michael Leiter, speech at The Washington Institute did not fit in with the rest of the group because he was 1 “Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative for Near East Policy, February 13, 2008; see also Mat- “too German, too pedantic, too Western.” He was also Review Board in the Case of Mouhammad, Maasoum thew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, “Highlighting al Qae- quite weak, both physically and mentally. He left the Abdah,” Department of Defense, September 1, 2005. da’s Bankrupt Ideology,” The Washington Institute for German Army after a brief stint, and in Afghanistan 2 Shahzad has reported from Pakistan’s tribal regions Near East Policy, May 7, 2008. after 9/11 he complained about the physical conditions and has allegedly conducted interviews with senior Tali- 29 The 9/11 plot offers some interesting examples in this and questioned the purpose of the 9/11 attacks. See Cam ban leaders on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan regard. While Ziad Jarrah is the most obvious example of Simpson, Stevenson Swanson and John Crewdson, “9/11 border. someone who might have been willing to turn on his co- Suspect Cut Unlikely Figure in Terror Plot,” Chicago Tri- 3 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Goes Back to Base,” conspirators, Said Bahaji—another member of the group bune, February 23, 2003. Asia Times Online, November 4, 2005.

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Additionally, Ayman al-Zawahiri has Fadl). In 1992, at the start of the Afghan expressed surprise over the sudden made mention of both names. In his civil war, Abu Àmr moved back to appearance of the officially-sanctioned 188-page book The Exoneration,4 which was Yemen and taught private religious site, and they were unaware of the released March 2, 2008, al-Zawahiri said classes. Once the Taliban began taking identity of “Àbd al-Hakim Hassan,” that “Abd al-Hakim Hassan” is one of control of Afghanistan in 1995, Abu which was considered especially the most trusted Salafi-jihadi shaykhs. Àmr returned to the country and has surprising since so many jihadist texts He provided details on the shaykh’s allegedly remained in the region ever were attributed to him. The failure background—including his knowledge since. Once back in Afghanistan, Abu to link this identity with the alias of of Islam, his role in jihad and the fact “Shaykh Ìsa” explains why, if these that he was arrested and tortured in “His e-book is a key text are the same individual, he was able Egypt—and then recommended al- to operate largely off the radar for so Qaìda’s followers to visit the shaykh’s that is used to convince long.10 website.5 In a February 2008 posting Pakistanis to conduct of a eulogy for the slain jihadist Abu Even though kanzhassan.com has since Ahmad al-Suri, al-Zawahiri said that attacks against the been shut down and is no longer available al-Suri was a perseverant student in the government.” on the web, writings attributed to Abu Sharià college in Afghanistan where Àmr can be found on various jihadist “Shaykh Ìsa” taught.6 websites, such as muslm.net, hanien.inf and el-ekhlaas.net. Abu Àmr’s Salafi- In light of claims that Abu Àmr is Àmr allegedly set up the religious jihadi literature remains popular among Shaykh Ìsa, it is useful to analyze the school Markaz Salah al-Din li’l-da`wa (Salah jihadist forum members, especially due activities of both aliases. al-Din Center for Preaching) and to al-Zawahiri affirmation of his work. supervised the publication of the Maàlim Abu Àmr’s Biography and Writings al-Jihad (Signposts of Jihad) magazine.8 Abu Àmr’s Ideological and Religious Views According to a detailed, undated posting In his various texts, Abu Àmr places on the tawhede.com forum, Shaykh Àbd Abu Àmr has published a number importance on attacking the “near al-Hakim Hassan Abu Àmr was born in of writings, including “The Religious enemy”—such as Pakistan, and other Egypt in 1959 and received an unofficial Verdict on Reporting on the Mujahidin “apostate” Muslim governments— religious education from Egyptian to Infidel Governments,” “The Warning before the “far enemy.” The debate is shaykhs such as Muhammad Ùmar on Supporting Infidels,” “The Lebanese far from academic, as Tehrik-i-Taliban, Ilyas. He would later study religious War and the Walk on Thorns” and his led by Baitullah Mehsud, has launched jurisprudence and the hadith with 118-page e-book titled al-Idah Wa’l-Tibyan a terrorist-insurgent campaign against mainstream Salafist shaykhs at Egypt’s fi anna al-Tawaghit wa Jushahum Kuffar àla al- the Pakistani government and military, al-Azhar University. Abu Àmr joined Ta’yin (The Clarification and Explanation leading to hundreds of deaths. Analyst the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization Designating the Tyrant Rulers and Brian Glyn Williams, who has studied the and agitated against the Egyptian their Armies as Infidels). His e-book role that Arabs play in this insurgency, government until he was jailed after is a key text that is used to convince has “found considerable evidence that the assassination of Egyptian President Pakistanis to conduct attacks against Arab ‘jihad-entrepreneurs’ such as Abu Anwar al-Sadat.7 Once released, Abu the government. On one site where the Àmr have played a significant role in Àmr pursued further studies in e-book is available, a counter alleges providing the legitimacy and inspiration business management. After completing that the document was downloaded for Mehsud to attack the Pakistani that education, he traveled between more than 20,000 times. government.”11 Indeed, in Abu Àmr’s Saudi Arabia and Yemen, preaching document “Are Jihadi Operations in the his literature to shaykhs until 1985. At In October 2006, the al-Fajr Media Infidel’s Country Better than in Muslim that point, he moved to Afghanistan Center announced the launch of the Countries Taken Over by Infidels?” he to participate in, and preach about the website kanzhassan.com, which was argues that legality of, jihad. During his time in identified as the site of “Shaykh Àbd Afghanistan, Abu Àmr was influenced al-Hakim Hassan (Abu Àmr).”9 The jihad against the enemy to liberate by Àbdullah Àzzam and Àbd al- website contained links to a number a country that was previously ruled Qadir Àbd al-Àziz (also known as Dr. of takfiri/Salafi-jihadi documents by Islam but is now occupied, such attributed to the shaykh. The doctrines as Afghanistan, is more binding 4 The full title of the book is A Treatise Exonerating the promoted by the shaykh on the website than conducting jihad in the enemy’s Nation of the Pen and the Sword from the Blemish of the Ac- were clearly geared toward encouraging country that hasn’t been conquered by 12 cusation of Weakness and Fatigue. and justifying attacks against the “near Muslims yet, such as America. 5 This website is now defunct, but was located at www. enemy.” At the time, users discussing kanzhassan.com. kanzhassan.com on the al-Hisba forum 10 Indeed, if this is the case, it is likely he is attempt- 6 One site where the eulogy appears is www.mnbr2.net, ing to keep the connection between the two identities with a post date of February 23, 2008. 8 “The Shaykhs Mentioned by al-Zawahiri in the Exon- concealed. 7 Although this biography of Abu Àmr claims he was eration,” www.muslm.net, date unknown. 11 Personal interview, Brian Glyn Williams, counter- jailed after the assassination of al-Sadat, the date pro- 9 “Kanzhassan.com: Site of Cleric Abdel Hakim Hassan terrorism analyst, July 16, 2008. vided is 1980. This is clearly a mistake, as al-Sadat was (Abu Amrw),” Society for Internet Research, www.sofir. 12 Àbd al-Hakim Hassan Abu Àmr, “Are Jihadi Op- assassinated on October 6, 1981. org. erations in the Infidel’s Country Better than in Muslim

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Abu Àmr and similar individuals said, every Muslim, regardless of Guantanamo Bay, a number of detainees are problematic for the Pakistani his nationality, be it Egyptian or were accused of partaking in training government because they utilize their Sudanese, has to fight the infidels, from “Sheikh Issa while residing at the religious credentials to “subvert” what the Americans, English and Syrian guesthouse in Kabul,” located were once internationally-focused Europeans, civilians or military, in in the al-Qaìda enclave area of Wazir jihadists—those intent on attacking any spot in the world we find them Akhbar Khan.20 These documents international troops in Afghanistan, at. The religious proofs of this duty identify Shaykh Ìsa as “an Egyptian, Indian forces over Kashmir or Western are abundant in Islam and even the was an amir in the Egyptian Jihad and other targets abroad. Abu Àmr’s foreigners themselves know them.15 Organization [Egyptian Islamic Jihad] literature, for example, attempts to and was the chief mufti of al Qaida.”21 convince Pakistani jihadists who were Concerning the Shià, Abu Àmr’s previously focused elsewhere that the views are rigid; he considers them primary “infidel force” is the Pakistani “rejectionists” (rawafid) and infidels, “One explanation why government itself. Whereas some calling them “illegitimate children who Shaykh Ìsa was able to jihadists recognize that it is counter- should be looted and killed.” Abu Àmr productive to launch attacks on Pakistan believes that the Shià “constantly try increase his stature in since that is where they seek shelter to undermine” the Sunnis and have Pakistan could be due to after engaging Afghan and international “animosity for Muslims and Islam.” forces in Afghanistan, Abu Àmr He thinks that the Shià of Iran, Iraq the Pakistani government’s represents an uncompromising view that and Syria who have supported Hassan increased pressure on jihadists are increasingly following, as Nasrallah of Hizb Allah are concocting seen in the rising attacks in Pakistan.13 a conspiracy with the secret blessing of Islamists within its One example demonstrates Abu Àmr’s the United States to strike at the Salafi- borders.” role in local violence in Pakistan. A jihadi mainstream since they are the group of jihadists addressed a question only ones that shoulder the burden of to Abu Àmr, stating that they do not battle against the enemies of Islam.16 consider many members of the Pakistani Abu Àmr forbids any Muslim from Among those detainees who received Army as “infidels because they are supporting the “rejectionist” Hizb training from Shaykh Ìsa are Abd al- ignorant of the truth,” explaining that Allah, arguing that it is not obligatory Hadio Omar Mahmoud Faraj, Ali Husein “some prominent Pakistani scholars to support “just anyone” who resists Muhammad Shaaban, and Maasoum issued fatawa declaring them only sinners “the Jews.”17 Abdah Mouhammad. According to one and not infidels.” Abu Àmr responded to summary of evidence case, the question by arguing that, according to Shaykh Ìsa’s Activities in Afghanistan and the Sharià and sunna, those who support Pakistan reporting indicates that Sheik infidels in any manner are infidels One of the earliest reports of a “Shaykh Issa would provide a two-week themselves. “It is blasphemy to fight or Ìsa” operating with the al-Qaìda training school at his residence convey intelligence on the mujahidin to leadership came during an October 2001 in Kabul for Syrians and other infidels and polytheists,” he declared.14 report for CBS 60 Minutes, when the Arabs who trained at the Usama late journalist George Crile interviewed Bin Laden camps. He would teach Nevertheless, Abu Àmr still encourages a Shaykh Ìsa, who described himself the rules of jihad, that Americans Muslims to agitate against the “far enemy.” as Usama bin Ladin’s spiritual were non-believers, and it was He argues that the current war is of advisor.18 During the interview, Ìsa justified to kill them.22 “different types such as military, economic, provided details about Bin Ladin’s daily cultural and social,” and that all Muslims routine.19 In documents from the fall It appears that Shaykh Ìsa relocated of 2005, released by the Department of to Pakistan and, according to the must do what they can. The battle Defense and containing the summary of journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad, became is not just Afghanistan. We find the evidence for enemy combatants held at active in Waziristan around 2003, enemy everywhere and the nature eventually settling in Mir Ali, North of the war is different today. As we 15 Àbd al-Hakim Hassan Abu Àmr, “How a Country Waziristan where he preached radical, 23 Judged an Infidel Home or a Home of Islam,” www.al- takfiri views. Pakistani press reports Countries Taken Over by Infidels?” www.almaqreze.net, maqreze.net, date unknown. The suggestion of fighting date unknown. the enemy across the world and in many different man- 20 “Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administra- 13 For example, see the recent July 6 suicide attack ners is similar to the jihadist strategist Abu Musàb al- tive Review Board in the Case of Shaaban, Ali Husein against Pakistani security forces in Islamabad, which Suri’s doctrines. Muhammad,” Department of Defense, September 8, left 15 people dead. See “Pakistani Police Hunt for Clues 16 Àbd al-Hakim Hassan Abu Àmr, “The Lebanese 2005. after Red Mosque Bomb,” Agence France-Presse, July 7, War and the Walk on Thorns,” www.almaqreze.net, Au- 21 “Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administra- 2008; Mubashir Zaidi and Laura King, “Suicide Strike gust 10, 2005. tive Review Board in the Case of Mouhammad, Maa- Targets Pakistan Police,” Chicago Tribune, July 7, 2008. 17 Ibid. soum Abdah.” 14 Àbd al-Hakim Hassan Abu Àmr, “The Clarifica- 18 George Crile, “60 Minutes II: Hunt For Bin Laden,” 22 “Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administra- tion and Explanation Designating the Tyrant Rulers and 60 Minutes, October 3, 2001. It is not clear whether this tive Review Board in the Case of Shaaban, Ali Husein their Armies as Infidels,” www.almaqreze.net, date un- is the same “Shaykh Essa,” although it is likely. Muhammad.” known. 19 Ibid. 23 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Aims at Pakistan’s

6 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 further state that Shaykh Ìsa managed al-Qaeda, which took advantage Conclusion to influence the views of two prominent of the leadership and ideological Although it is not possible with the Taliban commanders, Sadiq Noor and vacuum to make its mark. Shaykh current literature to prove that Abu Abdul Khaliq Haqqani, in addition to Ìsa is an example.27 Àmr Àbd al-Hakim is indeed Shaykh Baitullah Mehsud’s faction and the Ìsa, the biographies and beliefs of Uzbek faction led by Tahir Yuldash of The July 2007 siege of the radical Lal both men reveal many similarities. the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad has Regardless, the literature of Abu Àmr All of these leaders and factions have also proven to be a contributing factor is especially popular among jihadists, shared the belief that the Pakistani for why jihadists are turning their and his words are being used to convince government should be combated, and attention to the Pakistani government. Pakistan’s militants that the “defense Shaykh Ìsa’s religious guidance likely Shaykh Ìsa’s past involvement with of Islam” should begin at home. Abu helps to religiously ground their tactical Ayman al-Zawahiri and the al-Qaìda Àmr’s various texts are dangerous objectives.24 leadership, in addition to his “near for the current Pakistani government, enemy” rhetoric against “apostate” and if concrete evidence32 surfaces that In August 2004, the Pakistani Muslim governments, makes him an Abu Àmr is indeed the Egyptian cleric government accused Shaykh Ìsa of ideal leader to influence jihadists. operating out of the tribal regions known planning a major attack on a number Furthermore, on a more fundamental as Shaykh Ìsa,33 it will mean that this of high level targets to coincide with level, South Asian Muslims tend to two-fold ideological and operational Pakistan’s independence day. The be deferential to Arab Muslims due to threat has operated for too long off the accusations arose after authorities the importance of the Arabic language public radar. arrested five al-Qaìda-linked operatives in the divinity of the Qur’an and in who were planning suicide attacks on hadith studies, and this may have Erich Marquardt is the editor-in-chief of the presidential office, prime minister’s contributed to his popularity.28 the CTC Sentinel. Prior to his work at house, U.S. Embassy in Islamabad and CTC, Mr. Marquardt was the head of Global the General Headquarters of the Chief Today, Shaykh Ìsa is still largely Terrorism Analysis at The Jamestown of Army Staff House in Rawalpindi.25 operating off the radar, with some Foundation, where he was the editor of Pakistan’s information minister and reports stating that he is either the twin counter-terrorism publications, interior minister claimed that the foiled injured, dead or has left the region. Terrorism Monitor and Terrorism plot was planned by “Shaykh Ìsa Shahzad, for example, claimed in Focus. He is based in Washington. and Qari Ismaìl,” both identified as July 2007 that Shaykh Ìsa suffered Egyptian.26 a stroke and was “bedridden and Abdul Hameed Bakier is the former seriously ill.”29 Shahzad also claimed head of crisis management and terrorist One explanation why Shaykh Ìsa has that Ìsa was the target of a bomb negotiations in Jordan’s Counter- been able to increase his stature in attack—allegedly from a CIA-operated Terrorism Unit of the General Intelligence Pakistan could be due to the Pakistani Predator drone—on December 28, Department. At the GID, he also worked government’s increased pressure on 2007 and was wounded;30 a number on international counter-terrorism issues. Islamists within its borders. Shahzad, of other reports have repeated this Currently, he is active in monitoring writing in August 2006, argued that claim, yet they are all based upon jihadist internet traffic for counter- Shahzad’s account. Additionally, a terrorism analysis groups. the Pakistani military operations in Pakistani security source recently the tribal areas of South and North revealed that although Shaykh Ìsa Waziristan from 2003 to 2005 operated out of North Waziristan to root out al-Qaeda fugitives… until recently, rumors now place the gave rise to the takfiri faction in jihadist leader in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan.31 Heart,” Asia Times Online, January 1, 2008. 24 Of course, loyalties can change, and if the Pakistani government were to reduce its operations against Tali- ban militants in the tribal areas, it is possible that these militants would turn their attention back toward outside 27 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah Look arenas of jihad. to Make Up,” Asia Times Online, August 25, 2006. 25 K J M Varma, “Pakistan Foils Major Al Qaeda Plot,” 28 Personal interview, Christopher Heffelfinger, coun- 32 For example, a statement by either identities declaring Rediff India Abroad, August 22, 2004. Among the weap- ter-terrorism analyst, July 7, 2008. ownership of the multiple aliases would suffice. ons confiscated included grenades, various explosives, 29 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Pakistan in the Grip of a Big 33 It is likely that Abu Àmr uses the “Shaykh Ìsa” alias rockets and rocket launchers and detonators. Squeeze,” Asia Times Online, July 24, 2007. in order to maintain his security. Unlike already estab- 26 Qari Ismaìl, for example, would also later be accused 30 It should be noted that both the alleged CIA operation lished ideologues such as Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abu Àmr of receiving $6,500 from Baitullah Mehsud to organize and the assertion that Shaykh Ìsa is ill are based upon has not featured in enough press reports to warrant a what became the successful assassination of former one account and cannot be confirmed. public admission of his multiple aliases. Furthermore, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was killed on De- 31 This information is derived from an interview, not until recently at least, he appears to have been active in cember 27, 2007. See Carlotta Gall, “Pakistani Police Ac- conducted by the authors, of a Pakistani security officer Waziristan preaching his ideology, which would explain cuse Militant in Bhutto Death,” New York Times, March who wished to remain anonymous. The interview was why he would want to remain more anonymous than 2, 2008. conducted in the summer of 2008. other high-profile al-Qaìda-affiliated leaders.

7 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8

Indonesia’s Approach to can change the jihadist assumption that works for or with the government. They government officials are by definition are the enemy and all products from Jihadist Deradicalization anti-Islamic.3 The thinking behind that government are haram.”5 The police the first premise, as explained by the believed that if they could overcome By Kirsten E. Schulze head of the counter-terrorism desk this distrust and could get the prisoners in the Ministry for Political, Legal to accept police assistance, then other following the october 2002 Bali and Security Affairs, police General deeply-held jihadist tenets would also bombings by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Ansyaad Mbai, is that the often- be questioned. an experimental deradicalization peddled line of moderates having to program was established by the head engage radicals is misconceived. While At the heart of changing the image of the of the Indonesian police’s Bomb Task moderate Muslims may have a role to police is what Mbai calls “soft power,” Force, Suryadharma. The program play in counter-radicalization, there is which amounts to money and in-kind has been active for five years now and no place for them in deradicalization. aid.6 During the last five years, the focuses primarily on jihadist prisoners. “In the mind of the radicals, all ulama police have assisted the families of the While it is too early to pronounce the have already failed because they failed jihadists in the program. This assistance program a success, and despite some has ranged from paying school fees notable weaknesses in the areas of “While moderate Muslims to ensure that children remain in rehabilitation and prison corruption education; providing the wives with as well as ideological limitations, its may have a role to play money to feed and clothe the family; holistic outreach beyond the prisoners in counter-radicalization, allowing greater family access to the to their families and community without prisoners, even providing plane tickets stigmatizing them is an approach worth there is no place for them for family members; allowing prisoner emulating. in deradicalization.” weddings; assuring that prisoners are treated well; and providing medical Program Details care. At the same time, the police have There are approximately 170 jihadist mixed with the prisoners, engaging prisoners in Indonesian jails who can to establish an Islamic state,” Ansyaad in religious discussion, praying and be divided into three categories: Afghan Mbai explained. “Their credibility is breaking the Ramadan fast together. veterans, JI members, and individuals nothing with the militants.”4 What is Upon release, the prisoners are provided from smaller organizations who were needed, therefore, is a reformed radical with identity cards and papers as well involved in the Ambon and Poso with different views, in this case on as start-up money.7 conflicts such as Mujahidin KOMPAK, suicide bombings, to talk to the other Laskar Jundullah and Ring Banten. radicals. The division within JI over the use of Of these, presently two dozen Afghan suicide bombings created a starting alumni, who are also members of JI, as The second premise taps into one of the point for finding militant jihadists well as many other JI prisoners and a most deep-seated jihadist beliefs dating who would cooperate with the police. few Mujahidin KOMPAK are involved back to the Darul Islam (DI) rebellions The police focused on recruiting those in the deradicalization program. The of 1948-1965. It was these rebellions into their deradicalization program two dozen Afghan alumni are mainly that pitted nationalist republican ideals former prisoners, and they have against those of an Islamic state, or Negara 5 Personal interview, Nasir Abas, deputy head of Man- received the most systematic attention. Islam Indonesia (NII), and the violence tiqi III and former JI trainer in Mindanao, Jakarta, Sep- This is partially the result of the key experienced by the DI fighters as the tember 13, 2007. “deradicalizers” Nasir Abas and Ali state crushed the rebellions left lasting 6 Personal interview, Ansyaad Mbai, head of counter- Imron coming from this pool and thus distrust and hatred of government terrorism, Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and their initial “targets” became others from institutions and officials. As JI is deeply Security Affairs, Jakarta, September 12, 2007. the same circle. The program, however, rooted in NII culture, it is not surprising 7 A similar approach is also being pursued by the Saudi has been broadened since, with “Abas that it sees the Indonesian government government. The Saudi deradicalization program pays going around prisons across Indonesia, “as kafir, starting with everyone who “attention given to a prisoner’s social needs. The Psy- handing out money with the promise of chological and Social Subcommittee evaluates each par- more perks for more cooperation.”1 similarly focus on embracing the families of the jihad- ticipant to determine how best the Advisory Commit- ists so as not to create the next generation of alienated tee can assist them and their family. For instance, once The program aims at neutralizing the Muslims. In Singapore, however, the religious counsel- a breadwinner is incarcerated, the committee provides ideological foundations of militant Islam ing is being conducted by ulama with “solid credentials,” the family with an alternate salary. Other needs, includ- and is based on two key premises: the meaning ulama who have studied at Egypt’s al-Azhar or ing children’s schooling and family healthcare, are also first is the belief that radicals will only at one of the Saudi universities. As in Indonesia, both provided. This is intended to offset further radicalization listen to other radicals; the second is the Singapore and Malaysia see their deradicalization pro- brought on by the detention of family members...The belief that through kindness,2 the police grams as successful. government further recognizes that if they fail to do this, 3 International Crisis Group, “Deradicalisation and In- then it is possible that extremist elements will move in to 1 Personal interview, Sidney Jones, International Crisis donesian Prisons,” November 19, 2007, p. 13. provide this support.” For more information on this pro- Group, June 25, 2008. 4 Personal interview, Ansyaad Mbai, head of counter- gram, see Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation 2 A similar deradicalization program to that in Indonesia terrorism, Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” Terrorism Monitor is also being pioneered in Singapore and Malaysia, which Security Affairs, Jakarta, July 24-25, 2006. 5:16 (2007).

8 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 who disagreed with terrorism and this.”11 Abas concludes that the struggle moderate jihadists in segregated saw bombings against civilians as a for an Islamic state is driven by politics prisons. Prison corruption has allowed deviation from jihad, which they defined and power, not by religion, and that for the proliferation of mobile phones in purely defensive terms.8 This was a “true ulama don’t want an Islamic state. and laptops among jihadists who have common view among JI trainers such as The ulama historically have been used by been involved in the planning of further Nasir Abas, deputy head of Mantiqi III, governments. So they should stay away operations as well as the translation who ran training camps in Mindanao. from worldly affairs.”12 of Arab jihadist literature and its According to Abas, the split within JI dissemination. The prison system has emerged following Usama bin Ladin’s Program Weaknesses 1998 fatwa, which was taken up by al- Abas’ and Imron’s success in changing “The value of the program Qa`ida’s Southeast Asia operative and the jihadist mindset has been limited. It JI military commander, Hanbali. Abas has been embraced primarily by Afghan lies in the insight that said that “a debate opened up between veterans, and in many cases those who the police have obtained those who wanted to stick with the old have become part of the program are values and those who wanted to take the those who were opposed to violence into the complexities of war to the civilians.”9 in the first place. For instance, Bali JI from talking to jihadist bombers Imam Samudra and Amrozi Abas and Imron would approach new were not interested when they were prisoners, allowing it to JI prisoners and try to challenge their approached. fine-tune its operations.” beliefs. Abas focused on two key issues that he wanted to deradicalize in the The program also reveals five other jihadist mindset: the killing of civilians, weaknesses. First, while the idea that and the “need” for an Islamic state. only radicals have the credibility to been undermining the deradicalization With respect to the killing of civilians, challenge other radicals makes sense, program to such an extent that the Abas asserts that JI’s struggle has it has a limited shelf-life as any radical Indonesian police are doing “their been corrupted by bombings against who is cooperating with the police will best to keep top terrorists at police civilians.10 On the question of an eventually become discredited. Second, headquarters, out of the normal prison Islamic state, Abas is trying to show the the ideological deradicalization itself is system, because the chances of militants that true ulama do not want an limited. While the killing of civilians by backsliding are so high.”13 Islamic state: “The Islamic state is not suicide bombings is being challenged, connected with religion. The Prophet the jihadist violence perpetrated in the A Success Overall Muhammad never established a state. Ambon and Poso conflicts has been Despite these weaknesses, the program He struggled to make the people better condoned. Third, there is no structured, has been hailed as a clear success story by thought-out, or even government- the Indonesian police. In the Indonesian funded rehabilitation program to deal counter-terrorism context, with the “Abas focused on two key with the jihadist prisoners who are military sidelined and the national issues that he wanted to released from jail. Many of them have intelligence agency (Badan Intelijen few skills, no work, little money and Negara) having little if any grasp of the deradicalize in the jihadist few opportunities outside their familiar situation, it certainly is. Mbai claims mindset: the killing of circles. That means effectively that they that the information that led to the return into the jihadist community to arrest of JI military commander Abu civilians, and the ‘need’ for which they are often tied by marriage Dujana in 2005 came from this program, an Islamic state.” links and are re-exposed to militant and that as a result JI’s military capacity ideas. Fourth, the lack of official budget has been reduced and there were no for this program does not only raise major bombings in 2006 and 2007.14 accountability problems, but if, as a This, however, is almost certainly not persons. So why are we now struggling result of financial difficulties, the police true as the arrest of Abu Dujana was for an Islamic state?” He draws upon fail to deliver on promises for assistance the result of Poso police operations his own experience in Afghanistan after release, these JI members will look that drew upon straightforward police and points to the collapse into fitna elsewhere, most likely within jihadist interrogation work following the following the Soviet-Mujahidin war: circles; moreover, disillusioned ex- capture of Wiwin Kalahe and Sarwo Edi “Afghanistan became an Islamic state prisoners will not be as interested in Nugroho. Moreover, while the arrest of in 1992 under the mujahidin and what sharing information with the police. Abu Dujana and his network weakened happened was civil war. The Taliban Fifth, the Indonesian prison system JI’s military capacity, this was probably fought an Islamic state in order to set and prison corruption are undermining not the only factor for the absence of up their own Islamic government. I saw the deradicalization program. Jihadist major bombings.15 prisoners have been able to spread their ideas to non-jihadists in integrated 13 International Crisis Group, “Deradicalisation and In- 8 Personal interview, Ansyaad Mbai, September 12, prisons and have been able to radicalize donesian Prisons,” p. 16. 2007. 14 Personal interview, Ansyaad Mbai, September 12, 9 Personal interview, Nasir Abas, September 13, 2007. 11 Ibid. 2007. 10 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 15 Personal correspondence, Sidney Jones, International

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Instead, the value of the program lies The High Stakes Battle for district. This created the standard in the insight that the police have of small landlords farming small, obtained into the complexities of JI the Future of Musa Qala well-irrigated holdings. While tribal from talking to jihadist prisoners, structure, economy and population alike allowing it to fine-tune its operations. By David C. Isby have been badly damaged by decades of Also, irrespective of whether anyone warfare, Musa Qala has a situation that absorbs the religious counseling, the since its reoccupation by NATO and is more likely to yield internal stability deradicalization program has created a Afghan forces in December 2007, the by building on what is left of traditional link between the police and JI prisoners remote Musa Qala district of northern Afghanistan. and ex-prisoners through which the Helmand Province in Afghanistan police receives a steady stream of has become important to the future Before the well-publicized October 2006 information about “who is doing what.” course of the insurgency but also to the “truce” that Alizai leaders concluded Most importantly, its value lies in the future of a Pashtun tribe (the Alizai), with the Taliban, Musa Qala had holistic approach of reaching out not a republic (the Islamic Republic of experienced a broad range of approaches only to the prisoners but also their Afghanistan) and even a kingdom (the to countering the insurgency. In addition families and their communities without United Kingdom). The changes that to their dissatisfaction with British stigmatizing them, while at the same take place at Musa Qala will influence operations in 2006, local inhabitants time conducting more conventional the future of all of them. Failure has the claimed that Kabul had not supported counter-terrorism operations. That has potential to be a harbinger of potential them, shown by previous Afghan been the real success, and that is the ultimate failure for the Alizais, Kabul National Army (ANA) units operating area that other countries contemplating and London alike; each needs to succeed in their area before that had been deradicalization programs should at Musa Qala. commanded by Dari-speaking officers study. who often made a point of pretending The Alizai Heartland not to speak Pashtu, and with Dari- Dr. Kirsten E. Schulze is senior lecturer in The importance of Musa Qala to the speaking soldiers who really did not International History at the London School Alizai is not surprising. It is their tribal know any other language, plus an of Economics. She has written extensively heartland. In southern Afghanistan, Afghan National Police (ANP) presence about Indonesia, in particular the conflicts local politics are tribal politics. In the that was active only in extracting in Aceh and Ambon, militant Islamists, 1970s—the last time such data could resources from the population. Militias and security sector reform. Her recent be collected—the Musa Qala district loyal to then-Helmand Governor Sher publications include “From the Battlefield had approximately 30,000 people in Mohammed Akhundzada also had to the Negotiating Table: GAM and the around 70 villages, 93% of them Alizais poor relations with the Alizai jirga and Indonesian Government, 1999-2005” from all six of the major clans, Khalozai much of the local population. This force (Asian Security, July 2007) and The (Khan Khel), Habibzai, Hasanzai, became less effective after their patron 1 Radicalisation of Islam in Post-Suharto Shekhzai, Pirzai and Adozai. The lost power in 2006, leaving the British Indonesia in Stig Jarle Hansen (ed), On Alizai themselves are a sub-tribe of to inherit a security vacuum that had the Borders of Civilisation (forthcoming the Noorzai, one of the Panjpai (“five been filled by the Taliban. Only the local in 2008). brothers”) tribes that makes up part of arbaki (tribal militia), with personally the Durrani Pashtuns. owned weapons, was regarded well.2 The arbaki had helped turn back the While firmly part of the tribal politics initial Taliban attempt to establish a of southern Afghanistan, those of Musa presence in 2004. Qala differed from those in Kandahar Province or even elsewhere in Helmand By December 2006, relations between Province. Musa Qala is dominated by the Taliban and Alizai leaders had a single tribal identity, differing from soured.3 The Taliban, according to most other districts in the region, Afghan press reports, were not Alizai including those in southern Helmand. but were mostly foreign nationals who While Kandahar Province tends to be fled to Baghran district when Musa Qala dominated by a relatively few large was reoccupied.4 The Taliban have made landowners, Musa Qala has traditionally sure that the local inhabitants of Musa had many smaller landowners, making Qala are aware that, while pre-2001 they use of the extensive irrigation from reserved their more repressive policies the Musa Qala river. In the 1970s, for Dari-speaking urban populations the district had approximately 2,300 landlords each with an average of 17 2 This information was drawn from a source that was in acres of cultivated land, with 60 canals Helmand Province during this period. irrigating more than a quarter of the 3 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Co- 1 Pre-war information is drawn from Ludwig W. Ad- lumbia University Press, 2008), pp. 50, 211. amec, Historical and Political Gazeteer of Afghanistan, Kan- 4 “Terrorist Bases Should Be Eliminated,” Anis [Kabul], Crisis Group, June 21, 2008. dahar and South-Central Afghanistan 5 (1980). January 12, 2008.

10 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 and treated their presumed supporters in The Musa Qala Taliban were not Abdul Salaam is a charismatic and the south better,5 this time there would destroyed in battle, but moved largely controversial figure. He is using his be no mercy shown to “collaborators.” to adjacent districts in 2007. Helmand tribal and religious connections to This included executing, along with member of parliament Nasima Niazi has talk with authority figures to help alleged criminals, several “spies,” which claimed that the Taliban remain active consolidate the government position in included Afghans who had taken part in in Musa Qala despite the reoccupation.10 Musa Qala. Abdul Salaam’s major theme work-for-food programs.6 Security outside the district center is to portray the Taliban as outsiders, remains uncertain. reflecting that many of them are either The Alizai are also hoping to get more foreigners or Afghans from other areas from the new security situation. They By strengthening the Alizai connection and tribes. Western press reports have have requested that Kabul make Musa with a district chief with tribal legitimacy criticized him extensively. To British Qala a separate province.7 This proposal who can point out that the Taliban are Lieutenant-Colonel Ed Freely, “He has been supported by current and largely foreigners, Kabul may be looking former Helmand provincial governors. to get the population of Musa Qala to This would provide opportunities for resist or at least limit cooperation with “The loyalty of the Alizai patronage and give them a legally- the largely cross-border insurgency and may be a significant recognized base that competing tribal narcotics. Currently, while Musa Qala is groups in the south would be unlikely growing a significant poppy crop, Kabul indicator of the overall to match. is not aiming to eradicate it (unlike in situation in the south.” Greshk, Nawa, Marja and Nade-e Ali Kabul’s Challenge districts and the capital Lashkar Gah Kabul’s challenge is to prove that its in Helmand Province).11 This reflects policies are relevant to the future of Kabul’s concerns that an eradication appears less interested in governing his Musa Qala and its people in a way it was campaign would undercut the counter- people than reinforcing his own personal unable to do in 2001-2006. For example, insurgency effort. position of power.”14 To the Kabul- according to one press report, after appointed chief of police of Helmand recapturing Musa Qala the government The most obvious change is the Province, Brigadier Mohammad announced that more than $60 million appointment of Mullah Abdul Salaam, Hussain Andiwal, he is a “war criminal” would be spent on “reconstruction and an Alizai of the Pirzai clan, as district involved in the slaughter of prisoners welfare services in the provinces in an chief. He was the former Taliban district and a “leading heroin producer.”15 effort to encourage the people to stop chief of Kajaki and acting governor of supporting the Taleban and cultivating neighboring Uruzgon Province prior Great British Setbacks poppy.”8 Other press reports provided to 2001, the highest-ranking former The military operations in Musa Qala details: “a contract has been signed with Taliban official serving under the since the reoccupation have been private companies to build two schools current government. Abdul Salaam has carried out by a broad range of Afghan and a religious school…at a cost of been allowed to keep his own personal and coalition military forces. U.S. 6,394,700 dollars. Canada will provide militia of some 300 men, who function Marines have been playing a major the funds.”9 The press reports have not, as successors to the arbaki. This sets an role in recent operations in Helmand however, identified whether a funding important example to those opposing Province. Yet, Helmand remains a stream has been identified to operate Kabul that they can be reintegrated into British area of operations, and the role these schools and the degree of local Afghanistan’s political process. To the of Musa Qala in the 2006 fighting—plus involvement with this development; insurgents, he is a major target. Current their withdrawal and the subsequent both have frequently been absent from Taliban propaganda stresses the use of truce with the Taliban—make success such efforts in the south. fear to dissuade cooperation with Kabul in 2008 an important objective. and its coalition allies,12 and if Abdul Both reconstruction and recreating Salaam can cooperate so overtly and The British 2006 campaign in southern security in Musa Qala will be difficult. survive or even thrive, this will look less Afghanistan has already become part of persuasive. He was the target of cross- military history—marked by a popular 5 For more information on the Taliban’s weak en- border suicide bombers in January and 2007 exhibition at the National Army 13 forcement of haircuts and schools in Musa Qala from gunmen in February. Museum in London—but the results of 2006-07, see Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, that fighting have not helped the United pp. 72, 104. 10 Ehsanollah Daulat Moradi, “Karzai’s Confrontation Kingdom’s image as NATO’s foremost 6 Personal interview, Afghan source, 2008. See also with Britain over Administration of Helmand,” Hasht-e practitioner of counter-insurgency and “Taleban Hang Afghan Teenager for ‘Spying,’” Pajhwok Sobh, January 27, 2008. stability operations, employing tactics Afghan News, January 18, 2008. 11 Dad Nurani, “How Drugs Will be Dealt With in Hel- refined since Malaya in conflicts 7 “Musa Qala Should Be Upgraded to Province,” Hasht-e mand Province,” Arman-e Melli [Kabul], February 27, Sobh [Kabul], February 17, 2008. 2008. ary 1, 2008. Report on National TV Afghanistan, Febru- 8 Mohammad Amin Mirzad, “The Taleban Still Rule 12 On Taliban themes, see Thomas H. Johnson, “The Tal- ary 13, 2008. Helmand Province,” The Daily Afghanistan [Kabul], Janu- iban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night 14 Jerome Starkey, “Former Warlord Blames UK for ary 26, 2008, p. 4. Letters),” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18:2 (2007). Breakdown in Security,” Independent, June 9, 2008. 9 Larghunpal, “Candle of Education is Relit in Musa 13 Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Ex-Taliban Commander 15 Stephen Grey, “Understanding the Taliban,” New Qala,” Hewad [Kabul], February 6, 2008. Lectures Mullah Omar About Koran,” RFE/RL, Febru- Statesman, April 24, 2008.

11 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 worldwide. Rather, the image was of military successes despite a lack of model for Afghanistan as a whole; it will besieged “platoon house” outposts resources. Otherwise, it will reinforce certainly be watched by Hamid Karzai’s under Taliban attack and of too few the perception that all the United critics in Kabul and from the Northern deployed forces being desperately Kingdom is capable of is to “scale back Alliance that are concerned Karzai has under-resourced.16 British forces in reconstruction objectives in order to end been appeasing the Taliban and aiming Afghanistan lack an ability to fund the fighting, declare victory, and leave.”21 to secure Pashtun loyalty. It also could quick response development programs suggest a greater role for local leaders in a way comparable to the United The Future in Kabul’s appointment of district chiefs States,17 and, according to the Economist, Alizais, Kabul and London alike have in the future, a change from the current “a growing number of British officers a lot more at stake in Musa Qala than insistence on centralization. Previous grudgingly recognize that America simply influencing the future of a remote unmet aid commitments in Musa is learning the lessons of irregular town and its surrounding district. Each Qala have made the local inhabitants warfare, drawn mainly from British is looking at a potentially best possible distrustful.23 colonial experience, better than the case to show that they can make a modern British Army.”18 positive contribution to Afghanistan’s For the United Kingdom, it is a future. If any of them fail, it raises the chance to show that the second largest Since the initial withdrawal from question, where can they succeed? coalition member in terms of troops in Musa Qala in 2006, the British image Afghanistan can demonstrate results for military capability in general and For the Alizais, the current situation is on the ground commensurate with their counter-insurgency competence in a chance to do things again their way status in bilateral and multilateral particular has suffered a number of under a fusion of tribal and federal security relationships. As British policy setbacks, by no means all in Afghanistan. government (rather than tribal and is to channel aid through Kabul where The success of Iraqi forces in Basra in Taliban) leadership. If the Alizais in feasible, this provides an opportunity 2008 was widely seen as them doing a Musa Qala, who have the advantage for aid to be directed in Musa Qala in job that the British had left unfinished of a cohesive population, defensible order to show a long-term commitment for political reasons. Britain’s relations territory, and a leader appointed by at preventing the Taliban from returning with Kabul have suffered a number of Kabul to rally the population cannot to burn schools and kill Afghans. If the setbacks, from the removal of diplomats succeed, then it is questionable which United Kingdom fails in Musa Qala, its following direct negotiations (bypassing of the tribes that populate southern relations with coalition partners and Kabul) with the Taliban at Musa Qala in Afghanistan will be successful in Afghans alike is likely to be harmed, 2006 to Kabul’s rejection of Lord Paddy countering the insurgency. The loyalty and it may have a further impact on its Ashdown to be the new UN envoy of the Alizai may be a significant international standing. in Afghanistan.19 British differences indicator of the overall situation in the with the government in Kabul have south. The tribe still reveres the memory David C. Isby is a Washington-based increased, and Britain has become the of Aktur Khan, an Alizai who led the consultant on national security issues. focus of much of the frustration with uprising against Shah Sujha, though a He is a frequent visitor to the region. He coalition efforts.20 Durrani, in 1840, after he appeared to has written four books on Afghanistan, be too close to the British. Abdul Salaam including the forthcoming Afghanistan: A success in Musa Qala will have the is already on record saying that he is Vortex of Terrorism (New York: Pegasus, potential to assure Kabul that Britain contending with large unmet desires by 2009). His articles have appeared in can still deliver results and that his tribal supporters and that neither Terrorism Monitor, National Interest Helmand Province will not end up like the provincial government, Kabul nor Online, Washington Times, Jane’s Basra. It will also demonstrate that Britain—due to tribal rivalry, lack of Defense Weekly, Jane’s Intelligence the United Kingdom can still produce resources, corruption or distrust—are Review and other publications. He has meeting these needs, hurting his claim appeared as a commentator on regional 22 16 Extensive UK press coverage included Tim Albone, to legitimacy. issues on CNN, Fox News, Voice of America, “Pathfinders on a Four-Day Mission Fight off Eight- PBS NewsHour and other programs. He has Week Taleban Siege,” The Times, September 27, 2006. For Kabul, it is an opportunity to show testified as an independent expert before This article was critical of the ANP role. that it is relevant in creating a better congressional committees. 17 “A War of Money as Well as Bullets,” Economist, May future for all of the country, even those 22, 2008. areas where the Taliban and narcotics are 18 Ibid. most entrenched. Unless Kabul can show 19 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, pp. 211-12, that it will not once again be subjected suggests that the United States and Kabul took action to to a deal made without its participation end the British-engineered truce. that allows the Taliban back, many in 20 Examples include “Coldness in Relations - Everything the area will be reluctant to support the Started as a Result of Musa Qala,” The Daily Afghanistan, government. The role of former Taliban January 28, 2008; “Lack of Coordination in the War on in Musa Qala will have importance as a Terror will Result in Failure,” The Daily Afghanistan, February 2, 2008; “Kandahar Awaits Helmand’s Fate?” 21 Richard Weitz, “NATO Allies Experience Battle Fa- Rah-e Nejat [Kabul], February 21, 2008; “Prince Harry tigue,” www.eurasianet.org, May 19, 2008. Returns to London,” The Kabul Times, March 3, 2008. 22 Grey, Understanding the Taliban. 23 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, p. 197

12 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8

Al-Qaìda Seeking to During the interview, al-Zawahiri and a potential leader of African- discusses, quotes and even displays Americans, similar to Malcolm X. Recruit African-American video clips of Malcolm X. He reaches Muslims out to African-American Muslims in the Al-Zawahiri proceeds to introduce a United States, presumably because he variant of the Salafi-jihadi doctrine By Cadets Benjamin Haas and Daniel McGrory interprets this community’s activist past of takfir into the African-American as a potential avenue for future activism discourse. By making reference to does al-qaìda still operate primarily and radicalization. Al-Zawahiri praises former Secretary of State Colin Powell as a hierarchical organization, or is it Malcolm X and, at one point, specifically and Secretary of State Condoleezza fundamentally a worldwide brand-name highlights his radical activism: Rice as “house slaves” who help keep for the global Salafi-jihadi movement? down “field slaves,” he is drawing a This question is the subject of an ongoing Would that those who insist on parallel to “apostate” Muslim leaders debate in terrorism studies. A specific peaceful resistance had heard who keep down pious Muslims within subcomponent of this larger debate is what was said by the struggler their states. Ideally, al-Zawahiri would the issue of organizational growth: is and martyr (as we see him) al-Hajj like to implant sentiments within the al-Qaìda growing in the United States Malik al-Shabaaz, or Malcolm X African-American community similar and elsewhere due to recruitment or to (may Allah have mercy on him): to those that are integral to al-Qaìda’s radicalization? Many argue that there “Anytime you beg another man are deliberate efforts by al-Qaìda’s to set you free, you will never be “He is cleverly interlacing high command to recruit operatives free. Freedom is something you among the U.S. population, while others have to do for yourself…The price the narrative of the global claim that due to the decentralized of freedom is death.”1 jihad with the domestic nature of al-Qaìda, expansion has its roots in homegrown sentiments While Malcolm X and the Nation of context of oppressed and action. Analytical effort is better Islam did not advocate violence as a African-Americans in an spent, however, at the nexus of these means of achieving their goals, al- two static paradigms, as expansion is Zawahiri interprets their story as an attempt to conflate both neither exclusively a top-down nor example of radical activism into which ideologies.” bottom-up process. One dynamic of al- he can tap. Qai`da’s recruitment activities is the high command’s recognition of extant or Al-Zawahiri seeks to further manipulate potential radicalization patterns among the sentiments of the African-American fundamental ideology. He is cleverly social movements and its opportunistic community by highlighting the interlacing the narrative of the global capitalization on these observations. alleged oppression and subsequent jihad with the domestic context of When al-Qaìda recognizes the prospect disenfranchisement under which it oppressed African-Americans in an of domestic radicalization in the United lives. To make his point, al-Zawahiri attempt to conflate both ideologies. States, it amplifies that prospect from shows another clip of Malcolm X, who Al-Zawahiri is co-opting the persona its media platform. states, of Malcolm X to identify himself and al-Qaìda as proponents of African- Al-Qaìda second-in-command Ayman No, I’m not American. I’m one of American Muslims. He adopts the same al-Zawahiri’s video release in May the 22 million black people who are tone as Malcolm X, identifying problems 2007 makes it clear that the al-Qaìda the victims of Americanism, one African-Americans have historically leadership is targeting African- of the 22 million black people who faced in the United States. While American Muslims as a potential source are the victims of democracy…I Malcolm X does not specifically offer a of membership, or at least as a fifth see America through the eyes of a solution in the video, al-Zawahiri does. column in its operations against the victim.2 He tells African-American Muslims United States. While this recruitment that with Allah’s help they can rise effort can be viewed as a top-down Al-Zawahiri immediately follows this up to free themselves from the “most phenomenon, it is more accurately clip by arguing that the United States powerful tyrannical force in the history perceived as an attempt by al-Qaìda “will throw you into the street without of mankind.”4 While it is unclear to capitalize on domestic potentialities. mercy like an old shoe.”3 He supports whether he is seeking recruits for al- This opportunistic methodology for his point by citing the example of Qa’ida specifically, he is undoubtedly expansion reinforces the idea that al- homeless, wounded veterans who are haranguing the domestic, African- Qaìda is pragmatic, adaptive, and less victims of the “capitalist Crusade.” American Muslim community to join in ideologically bound than some would be By using such rhetoric, al-Zawahiri is the fight against the West. led to believe. trying to identify himself to the African- American community as a fellow victim Although African-Americans have Propaganda Attempts attracted the most focus from al- The transcript of the May 2007 interview 1 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Interview with Shaykh Ayman Zawahiri’s recruitment efforts, al- of Ayman al-Zawahiri demonstrates al-Zawahiri,” al-Sahab, May 5, 2007. Qaìda is attempting to reach out al-Qaìda’s perception of trends in the 2 Ibid. African-American Muslim community. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

13 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 to multiple racial groups. In a post- Furthermore, in January 2008 a jihadist States and abroad.”9 In addition to May 5, 2007 web posting by Abu in al-Hisba posted a diatribe that did not these groups, radical trends within the Dujana al-Khurasani, one of the elite mention Malcolm X, but rather focused African-American Muslim community writers for al-Qaìda’s secure al-Hisba on racial tension in the context of the are highlighted in a Pew Research website, al-Khurasani courts not only upcoming presidential election. He Center study: only 36% of native-born African-Americans, but also Native indicated that the Democratic contest African-American Muslims expressed Americans, Vietnamese, Aboriginals, between Senators Hillary Clinton and a very unfavorable view of al-Qaìda, Japanese, North Koreans, Venezuelans, Barrack Obama has reinvigorated racial while other native-born Muslims did Panamanians, Colombians, and conflict in the United States and predicts poor immigrants to join in the fight that this tension will escalate into the “While al-Qaìda has been against their “oppressor,” the United ultimate “collapse” of the country.6 States. Al-Qaìda is looking to all able to take advantage these groups of people, whom they Groups Possibly Receptive to the Message of grassroots sentiments consider to be disenfranchised by the While it may seem speculative to assert United States, as potential followers that al-Zawahiri has taken note of certain among Muslims in the of its cause. Having seen numerous radicalized groups of African-American United Kingdom, it is examples of radicalization within the Muslims, it is safe conjecture that they disenfranchised and poorly integrated have not gone unnoticed due to the entirely possible that Pakistani population in the United publicity they have received. Domestic African-American Kingdom, al-Qaìda understands that and largely homegrown radical Islamist it is a worthwhile strategy to target groups within the United States, such as Muslims, and American disenfranchised communities for Jamaàt al-Fuqara’ (JF), Jamiàt al-Islam Muslims in general, simply recruitment with deliberate propaganda al-Sahih (JIS), and the radicalization campaigns. efforts of Warith Deen Umar in the New have no inclination toward York State prison system have attracted Salafi-jihadi actions.” After the al-Zawahiri interview, a fairly widespread media attention across the sizeable amount of Malcolm X chatter world. Accepting that al-Qaìda is a surfaced in jihadist internet forums. “thinking” organization, members of For example, the story and image of the high command have likely noticed so at a rate of 69% and foreign-born Malcolm X has been invoked several these radical cells and view them as a Muslims at a rate of 63%.10 It is safe times in the al-Ekhlaas forum. Many potential source for recruitment in the to assume that al-Zawahiri is aware of the postings praise him as a martyr United States. of such activities and sentiments on and offer biographical information. American soil and considers them as More importantly, one can find links to The four members of JIS who converted, factors when pondering how to augment a fascinating video entitled “Malcolm radicalized and plotted attacks from al-Qaìda’s global movement with X: Prince of Islam.” Preceding the within prison walls in Sacramento American recruits and incite violence biographical video on Malcolm X is a were arrested in 2005 for their “roles in the United States. music video, “By Any Means Necessary,” in a terrorist plot to attack U.S. by “Sheikh Terra,” who also produced military facilities, Israeli government Evidence of Grassroots Recruitment? “Dirty Kuffar” in 2004. The music facilities and Jewish synagogues in Despite the recent appearance of video makes direct appeals to African- the Los Angeles area.”7 Three out of Malcolm X in al-Qaìda media and American sentiments by specifically the four members of this group, to racially charged chatter in jihadist web presenting a rap song and showing include its leader and founder, Kevin forums, there does not appear to be images of Malcolm X, men clad in KKK James (Shaykh Shahab Murshid), are any noticeable grassroots movement robes and the lynchings of African- African-American Muslims. A militant from the African-American Muslim Americans. Calling the “Army of Allah” strand of activism within the broader community. This lack of a grassroots to “fight oppression,” the music video African-American Muslim community response may signify that this particular further promotes militant activity by is further evidenced by JF. This group, propaganda tactic with this particular displaying video clips of Improvised allegedly founded by Shaykh Mubarak community is ineffective or based on Explosive Device attacks on U.S. forces Àli Gilani and “comprised mostly of miscalculation. While al-Qaìda has in Iraq and training exercises of what one African-American Muslim converts,”8 been able to take advantage of grassroots would assume to be jihadist militants.5 is credited with conducting “militant sentiments among Muslims in the Again, Salafi-jihadis are attempting to and criminal activities in the United United Kingdom, it is entirely possible interlace issues which matter to them that African-American Muslims, and with those that evoke emotions from American Muslims in general, simply African-Americans. 6 OSC, “Iraq: Jihadist Website Interprets Clinton, have no inclination toward Salafi- Obama Contest in Racial Light,” 2008. jihadi actions. Al-Qaìda’s willingness 7 “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to to reach out to such communities Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities, Other Targets,” 5 “Malcolm X: Prince of Islam,” Green72 Media, avail- Department of Justice, August 31, 2005. 9 Ibid. able at www.video.google.com/videoplay?docid=486832 8 Chris Zambelis, “Radical Trends in African-American 10 “Muslim Americans,” Pew Research Center, May 22, 7196210505055. Islam,” Terrorism Monitor 4:16 (2006). 2007.

14 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 within the United States with no strong Propaganda and Peace which morphs into a computer graphic history of Salafist-inspired activism of a box of laundry detergent. The box is indicates that al-Qaìda’s strategy for Deals: The Taliban’s easily recognizable as the most popular expansion or incitement is based more Information War in brand in Pakistan. On this soap box, so on pragmatism than ideological Pakistan however, are words in English and Urdu imperatives. for “Pak Force” or “Pak Foj” (common By Arthur Keller shorthand for the Pakistani Army) with Al-Zawahiri’s May 2007 interview a logo saying “Pervez” (a logo which demonstrates that al-Qaìda’s approach in early 2008, the United States later turns into “Bush”). The voiceover to expansion in the United States is announced that it would invest $400 of the pseudo-commercial exclaims: one that seeks to take advantage of million to train and equip Pakistan’s perceived bottom-up trends within the Frontier Corps (FC) to combat the Slaves (infidels) you can buy the African-American Muslim community. Pakistani Taliban and slow cross- Pakistan Army for 25 rupees a In essence, al-Qaìda high command border attacks into Afghanistan. box! For cleaning all Muslims! is using an opportunistic strategy. At U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in the They are the best in destruction. least in regard to recruitment within Pakistan-Afghanistan border region Just say their name and ask for it. the United States, al-Qaìda hopes to rely on Pakistani troops, such as those Look at the pictures and buy it. find success at the nexus of opportunity from the under-equipped FC, to control They are smarter than the devil. in which bottom-up radical sentiments the border in the violent Federally will be receptive to its top-down efforts Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).1 The voiceover terminates with a to appeal to possible recruits. This Most FC units—such as the Tochi sinister chuckle. Yet, “Clean Army” is methodology, which focuses neither Scouts—are composed of indigenous only warming up. Next, it laments that solely on hierarchical efforts from Pashtun levies. the United States broke the promises it the top nor homegrown interest from made to Pakistan for a better life for its the grassroots, reflects immensely on Unfortunately, Pakistani soldiers are citizens: al-Qaìda’s pragmatic and adaptive being actively targeted by the Pakistani nature. Indeed, since al-Qaìda cannot Taliban’s propaganda efforts, often with Now all of those four years have merely rely only on recruitment or disturbing effectiveness. To realistically passed but none of the promises radicalization independently, it is understand U.S. options in Pakistan, have been fulfilled...Economics endeavoring to exploit the communities one must understand the impact of the and life in Pakistan speaks for in which the two phenomena meet. Taliban’s propaganda and intimidation itself, which needs no proof: Gas tactics in FATA, and why these tactics which was 30 rupees in 2001 per Benjamin Haas and Daniel McGrory are have caused the Pakistani government liter is now 70 rupees because of members of the classes of 2009 and 2010 to resort to ineffective “peace deals” friendship with Bush. Sugar which at the United States Military Academy, with Taliban-affiliated fighters. These was 20 rupees per kilo is now 35 respectively. CDT Haas is majoring realities mean that U.S. assistance to rupees a kilo. There are a lot of in international relations and CDT Pakistan’s FC is unlikely to curtail the other examples. Even ignorant McGrory is majoring in economics with a Taliban’s increasing influence. people can see the difference minor in terrorism studies. They recently between then and now. interned with the Combating Terrorism The Taliban’s Message Center supporting the Federal Bureau of Amat studios is the Pakistani Taliban’s The video finishes with a snuff- Investigation. production studio. It churns out a film ending. The viewer sees clips of 3 steady stream of propaganda aimed Pakistani General Khattak, leader at the local Pashtun populace and the of the 2005 army campaign in South Pakistani armed forces. Amat’s videos, Waziristan. Then comes shaky low- generally in Pashtu or Urdu, seem to light footage dated January 7, 2006. be intended for domestic consumption, The location is Mir Ali, a small city although senior Taliban members have in North Waziristan. Cries of “Allahu said they will soon be appearing on Akhbar” (God is Great) ring out to “You Tube.” One Amat video, “Clean Army,” hit the market in 2006.2 The 3 Khattak was in charge of the Pakistani Army raids video starts with a clip of Pakistani into South Waziristan in 2005, raids renowned for the President Pervez Musharraf addressing amount of ill will they generated in the local Pashtun assembled Pakistani Army officers, populace because of the popular perception that the Pak- istani Army used their helicopter gunships and artillery indiscriminately, causing many civilian casualties. Khat- 1 Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan’s Frontier tak was also prominent in calling for a peace deal with Corps,” Terrorism Monitor 5:6 (2007). local militants after the Waziristan offensive, a deal that 2 “Clean Army” is an untitled Amat studios video des- is now widely acknowledged to have created a safe haven ignated “Clean Army” because of the accusations of eth- for the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaìda. Khattak is cur- nic cleansing against the Pakistani Army. The video was rently in charge of the efforts, funded with U.S. dollars, to transcribed by the author in May 2006. improve the Frontier Corps.

15 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 the accompaniment of gunfire: the al-Qaìda, specifically playing on letters,” crude notices posted in public Pakistani Taliban are attacking a Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code, and the places or nailed to buildings threatening Tochi Scouts checkpoint. The video duty of Pashtuns to provide milmasthia, death for those who cross the Taliban.7 jumps to the aftermath, in which the which loosely translates as “hospitality,” The Pakistani Taliban also make prolific checkpoint has been overrun and close- to al-Qaìda guests.5 Another Amat use of night letters to warn off maliks up shots of corpses with the Tochi video, “Snake,” reinforces the evil of the who might be inclined to cooperate Scouts’ uniforms are clearly visible. United States and its allies. The opening with the Pakistani government against The Taliban videographer zooms to a scene is a rattlesnake morphing into the Taliban. Maliks who have failed to nauseating view of one of the Scout’s President Bush.6 The video displays heed the threatening letters have been corpses, his head smashed open and his houses in Waziristan demolished by the summarily executed by the Taliban. brain clearly visible, as is the nametag 2005 Pakistani Army offensive. One on the uniform: “Tahir Iqbal.” In the Added to the assaults on the maliks is eerie light from fires of the burning the regular killing of ordinary Pashtun camp, surrounded by charred and “To many Muslims in the tribesmen by the Taliban. These killings bloody Tochi Scout corpses, one of the Pakistani military, the dual are generally motivated by revenge or Pakistani Taliban, spectrally lit with money, but the targets are left dead by the green glow of low-light cameras, threat of brutal death and the side of the road with “American Spy” delivers a monologue aimed directly at hellfire earned by siding pinned to their jacket. The dead men every Pakistani Army or FC soldier that rarely had any connection to the United sees the video: with ‘infidels’ against the States, but their corpses nevertheless umma has a dispiriting are chillingly effective psychological We want the “Pak Force” to warfare. understand their goals and not to effect, and nowhere more give in to the Jews and Bush and so than in FATA. ” Despite many outlandish claims and go to hell for their doings. Listen inconsistencies in Amat videos, the and understand the meaning of paucity of contradictory information belief, being clean, and jihad in the flowing into FATA as well as the way of Allah. Think about your life voiceover states that the demolished complete dominance of the Taliban’s after death. Army mothers, sisters, house belonged to a widowed mother of message means that the Taliban’s fathers, brothers, and family: four. Another clip shows an interview twisted version of events is often the make your children understand. of a young boy who explains that he has only one heard.8 How seriously is the You are a mother or father of the been orphaned and wants to become a Pakistani Taliban about spreading its army, you have wished that your jihadist. Passionate appeals for local propaganda? Tehrik-i-Taliban chief son sacrifice themselves for their tribesmen to take up arms against the Baitullah Mehsud recently announced country, and be successful. But Pakistani government are a constant a major propaganda push and stated, today your sons have joined the theme in “Snake.” The Taliban’s “The media war is the real war.”9 infidels and the American flag and propaganda in FATA also extends Furthermore, Pakistani authorities have they are fighting with mujahidin beyond videos. Dozens of unregulated shown little ability to curtail this media and ruining the life and afterlife, or “black” low wattage radio stations war. For example, the “Clean Army” and will go to hell. Would you spew extremist propaganda in almost video included the name, location in like this to happen to your loved every valley of FATA. the Wana bazaar, and phone number of ones? the video distributor. The distributor In conjunction with these propaganda obviously has no fear of Pakistan Army Labeling a box of soap “Pak Army” vehicles, the Taliban have made a soldiers even though his wares openly and saying that the army is “cleansing” practice of attacking alternate sources advocate their death. brother Muslims is a simple but of information, such as newsstands. devastating accusation in a Muslim To further control the information Are the Taliban’s Tactics Successful? country. To many Muslims in the environment, Pakistani journalists Overall, the Taliban’s tactics are Pakistani military, the dual threat of in FATA have been assassinated for working. The average FC soldier, having brutal death and hellfire earned by writing articles of which the Taliban seen videos of fellow soldiers brutally siding with “infidels” against the umma did not approve. There has also been has a dispiriting effect, and nowhere a campaign of intimidation aimed at 7 Declan Walsh, “Night Letters from Taliban Threaten more so than in FATA. the local Pashtun tribal leaders, who Afghan Democracy,” Guardian, September 19, 2004. are called maliks. In Afghanistan, the 8 Just a few of those claims include that the United States Other Amat videos cleverly exploit local Taliban have long employed “night has 10,000 troops in Pakistan, that Musharraf has 4 customs. One video, “Ansar,” goes into given the CIA 74 bases in Pakistan, that the U.S. battle details on the duty of Pashtuns to shelter 5 “Pashtun Tribes Live by Their Own Set of Rules,” Pa- against Islamic extremism is actually a systematic effort shtunFoundation.org, date unknown. by Christendom to destroy Islam worldwide and con- 4 “Ansar” is an untitled Amat studios video designated 6 “Snake” is an untitled Amat studios video designated tains the clear implication that the West wants to enslave “Ansar” because of the discussions of the need to harbor “Snake” because of the opening sequences showing film Muslims lands. al-Qaìda. The video was transcribed by the author in of a rattlesnake. The video was transcribed by the author 9 Iqbal Khattak, “Media War is Real War: Mehsud,” May 2006. in May 2006. Daily Times, May 27, 2008.

16 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 killed, becomes ever more unwilling to U.S. Assistance Unlikely to Make Impact In some cases, the various Pakistan- oppose the Taliban. The malaise injected Although the United States declared it Taliban peace agreements now under into Pakistan’s military has long since will invest $400 million to train and negotiation do not rely on either the spread from the paramilitary FC units equip FC troops to combat the Pakistani risk averse regular army or the even such as the Tochi Scouts into Pakistan’s Taliban and slow cross-border attacks more timid FC for enforcement, but regular army. In 2007, India’s security into Afghanistan, even in the best of on the local police force in FATA, the and intelligence establishment noted that circumstances it would be hard to get FC Khasadars, who are even more poorly Pakistani Army troops in FATA have troops to actively engage the Taliban; in trained and equipped than the FC. A “unprecedented levels of desertions, fact, many of the FC troops are related provision of one of the latest peace plans to Taliban members.12 After factoring is that an expanded force of Khasadars in the FC’s demoralization, it becomes will fill the security gap left by the “The average FC soldier, evident that no amount of training and withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from having seen videos of equipment will likely be able to overcome FATA. The Khasadars will allegedly the pull of local ties, when combined accomplish this extremely difficult task fellow soldiers brutally with the fear and guilt engendered by with the benefit of training, funded by killed, becomes ever more the Taliban’s intimidation tactics and the United States.15 propaganda. Marksmanship classes or unwilling to oppose the Kevlar vests will not change the social The fact of the matter is that the peace Taliban.” realities on the ground, or the near total deals are being signed because the information dominance of the Taliban Pakistani government knows that its in FATA. The likelihood of a return on demoralized soldiers and police have the $400 million investment is low.13 little will to fight, and believe face- suicides, and discharge applications.” saving but impotent peace deals are the In the space of just five days in October The Taliban’s morale-destroying only alternative to publicly admitting 2007, the Pakistani Army allegedly propaganda also has important the truth: the Army, the FC and the suffered 150 desertions.10 implications for the various peace deals Khasadars are incapable of handling the being negotiated with Pakistani Taliban Taliban. Regardless of the reassurances Even stronger evidence of disaffection in FATA. These deals are “bait and was the 2007 surrender of 250 Pakistani switch” scams. For example, the North soldiers to a few dozen militants in Waziristan Accord of 2006 required the “Any U.S. plan to combat South Waziristan without a single shot Pakistani Army to be withdrawn from Islamist extremism that being fired. In January 2008, an entire many areas, to be replaced by expanded checkpoint of 40 soldiers surrendered FC units. Another recent example is the relies on effective ground their post to Taliban militants, again 2008 peace deal with Taliban leader action from the Pakistani without a single shot fired.11 Apathy Baitullah Mehsud (a deal that came even and risk aversion are pervasive in the after Mehsud was accused of arranging Army, the FC, or the Pakistani military. the assassination of former Prime Khasadars will fail.” Minister Benazir Bhutto). The deal The Taliban are not universally withdraws regular army troops from welcomed in FATA and their brutal the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan tactics have excited considerable and instead gives the FC “freedom of the United States may receive from resentment among many Pashtun movement.” Missing was any mention of General Khattak or Army Chief of Staff tribesman. Unfortunately, that how the FC will enforce the provisions Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, pervasive morale resentment does not mean the Taliban’s of the agreement.14 Reliance on FC units problems mean that no elements of the grip on power is weakening. The usual for “enforcement” is one big reason all Pakistani military will slug it out with avenue for Pashtun tribesmen living in agreements with the Taliban are dead the Taliban in ground combat, with the FATA to deal with physical threats is letters. exception of very limited engagements, the formation of a lashkar, an informal such as clearing the Lal Masjid (Red tribal army. The assassination campaign Mosque) in Islamabad in 2007, or the against maliks suggests that a lashkar to (now-curtailed) operations in Swat oppose the Taliban probably will never 12 “US to Spend Over $400m to Enhance the FC,” The this year. Pakistan’s recent “offensive” be formed; many of the maliks who could News, March 3, 2008. against militants in the Peshawar area, lead such a lashkar are dead, others are 13 The United States has tried training Pakistani soldiers for example, grounded to an ineffectual cowed into inaction by the body count. before, to hunt al-Qa`ida in Afghanistan. The unit never halt in early July 2008 before significant saw action, but became an informal guard for President numbers of militants were ever even 16 Nawaz Sharif and later dissolved, never having gone engaged. after a single al-Qa`ida member. See Steve Coll, Ghost 10 Rajat Pandit, “Multiple Conflicts Bleed Pak Army,” Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Times of India, October 31, 2007. Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New 15 “23,000 Levies Being Trained to Help Counter Ter- 11 Bill Roggio, “Pakistan Troops Abandon Second Fort York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 445. rorism,” Daily Times, May 27, 2008. in South Waziristan,” The Long War Journal, January 14 Ismail Khan, “Peace Accord Finalized with Mehsuds,” 16 Riaz Khan, “Pakistan Halts Assault on Militants,” As- 17, 2008. Dawn, April 22, 2008. sociated Press, July 5, 2008.

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Since 2005, the only consistent and Uncovering Extremist The Emergence of Militancy tangible benefit to the United States This new wave of militancy has not for “engagement” with the Pakistani Violence in Morocco materialized from thin air and has been military has been the occasional brewing within the kingdom for many authorization to target militant By Alison Pargeter years. Indeed, in spite of the general compounds inside Pakistan with assumption that the Moroccan state airstrikes, an authorization which does long hailed as a bastion of stability only woke up to the domestic threat not require the demoralized Pakistani in a region prone to radicalism, today after the Casablanca bombings of May military to put any of its soldiers at Morocco is struggling hard to deal with 2003, in fact the realization that it risk.17 Any U.S. plan to combat Islamist the problem of Islamist militancy. The had a problem came after 9/11. This extremism that relies on effective ground newspapers are filled with stories of realization coincided with the new king action from the Pakistani Army, the FC, arrests of terrorist suspects and of court coming to power in 1999, a development or the Khasadars will fail. Until that cases in which sentences are being that heralded a major security review basic truth is recognized, U.S. efforts handed out to those accused of recruiting within the kingdom. It was then that to combat militant Islamists in FATA for Iraq, plotting to launch attacks in Morocco began wondering about the will continue to flounder, and money Morocco and abroad, or of being part various Islamist currents active in its will continue to be spent on training of militant currents such as “Salafiyah- midst. and equipping Pakistani troops while Jihadiya.” In June 2008, for example, 29 getting very little in return. individuals from the “Tetouan cell” were Yet, in spite of this recognition, the convicted of belonging to a terrorist regime appears to be in a state of denial Indeed, the Taliban’s propaganda group and of recruiting for Iraq, and in about the nature of this radicalism. tactics, followed up with its campaign of July 2008 35 people were arrested in a Not only is it keen to hype links with fear, are making it increasingly unlikely number of cities accused of recruiting international terrorism, blaming al- that Pakistan, despite support from for al-Qa`ida groups in Algeria and Qa`ida for the Casablanca bombings and the United States, will be able to resist Iraq. As such, Morocco would appear to the emergence of other militant cells, the Taliban’s growing strength and be a hotbed of militancy and terrorism. it is still insisting that this new breed spreading influence in the near future. of radicalism has been imported from For a kingdom that has long prided abroad and is alien to the country’s long Arthur Keller is a former case officer with itself on the success of its containment tradition of tolerance and moderation. the Central Intelligence Agency’s Counter- strategy toward its Islamist opposition, Much of the blame is being pinned on Proliferation Division, where he worked not to mention the fact that the king’s Saudi Arabia and more specifically on on both nuclear and “delivery systems” special role as “Emir al-Mumineen” Wahhabism. The former Moroccan proliferation, as well as on counter- (Commander of the Faithful) has minister of habous (religious affairs), Dr. terrorism issues. Mr. Keller served as an inferred an almost unquestionable Abdelkebir Alaoui M’daghri, recently inspector in the Iraq Survey Group in religious legitimacy upon the monarchy, asserted that the former Interior 2003 and 2004 and in Pakistan’s tribal the extent of the militancy that is now Ministry chief, Driss Basri, who was areas in early 2006. Since leaving the being uncovered has come as a real ousted shortly after King Mohammed CIA, he has been published in the New shock and has left the regime grappling came to the throne, had sponsored the York Times, Washington Post and for solutions. It is responding with a Wahhabist movement provided commentary to CNN and WBEZ multipronged strategy, on the one hand (NPR Chicago) on intelligence matters. trying to bolster Morocco’s traditional for specific geopolitical reasons… He recently finished writing Hollow Maliki school of Islam and the various and also for personal reasons Strength, a novel about the CIA, the Sufi tariqas that have been part of the connected to the intimate relations Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and country’s complex Islamic identity for that existed between [Moroccan Iran’s nuclear program. He can be reached generations, while on the other hand and Saudi] officials. This is the via e-mail at [email protected]. employing a zero tolerance strategy reason why Wahhabism was of preemptive arrests to the extent sponsored in our country in every that, according to one high-ranking part of the state.2 Moroccan official, around 4,500 militants have been arrested since the It is true that the militancy evident 1 Casablanca attacks of 2003 alone. Yet, today has been inspired by a range of this approach looks unlikely to stem outside influences that are far removed the appetite for radical rejectionist from the Maliki school. Yet, while ideologies within the kingdom, and these external factors are important, all the indications are that militancy one cannot discount the role that the will continue to be a problem for the Moroccan state has played in fostering foreseeable future. 17 As in Swat earlier this year, the Pakistani military has the local conditions in which such demonstrated that they will use artillery and Cobra heli- ideologies have been able to flourish. copter gunships to target militants, but for any purposes These conditions have arisen in part requiring “boots on the ground,” such as active patrol- ling, border control and raids, the Pakistani military has 1 Personal interview, senior Moroccan official, Rabat, 2 Abdelkebir Alaoui M’daghri, Al-Houkuma al-Multahiya been highly ineffective. April 2008. (Rabat: Dar al-Amman, 2006).

18 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 from Morocco’s Cold War alliances that Hassan Kettani, were ultimately to have bid to impose their rigid ideology upon placed it in the pro-Western camp of a strong influence in fostering support their own communities. The most famous conservative monarchies. This meant for a rejectionist ideology that dared example is Yousef Fikri, who killed his that it not only gave its blessing to to challenge the king’s religious and uncle for “un-Islamic” behavior, but his those volunteers who wanted to go to political legitimacy. As such, Morocco was not an isolated case. The cell led by fight jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and cannot argue that this new militancy has Abdelwahab al-Reba’ah in Meknes, for other battlefields, but more importantly simply been imported from the outside. example, was recently accused of killing it permitted them to return. Although a number of people they considered due primarily to the limited number of The Militants kafirs because they did not wear Afghan Moroccans who went to Afghanistan in Morocco has also fostered certain socio- clothes, had married through official the 1980s, these volunteers were not economic conditions that have proven channels and because they prayed in able to form a group that could seriously ripe for radicalism. Although one cannot public mosques.4 challenge the monarchy. These veterans make the direct link between poverty were, however, able to spread their and radicalization, these ideologies have These bands of young militants ideology and influence within the generally follow a similar pattern. They kingdom with relative ease. Indeed, it “The Moroccan regime has have tended to come from the same was only after the attacks of 9/11 that neighborhood, were often childhood the Moroccan state began to seek out always relied upon and friends and in many cases comprised such individuals. taken refuge in Islam as siblings or members of the same family. Their education levels have for the most Furthermore, the Moroccan regime has a means of countering its part been low, and they have tended to always relied upon and taken refuge opponents.” drift from job to job as street hawkers or in Islam as a means of countering its petty traders hardly scratching a living. opponents. The ruling elite, for example, It is through militant Islam that these bolstered the Islamist movement during individuals seem to have discovered a the 1970s and 1980s to try to weaken certainly been able to thrive in Morocco’s form of salvation and self-esteem. the leftists. It encouraged the Islamists slums and shantytowns that were left to to dominate university campuses and fester for years without any attention It was just such a group that carried abolished a number of university from the authorities. According to out the Casablanca bombings in May courses in the humanities, such as figures published in 2007, 4.5 million 2003. Similarly, the cell that appeared philosophy, that were deemed to be the Moroccans live in indecent housing and in the spring of 2007, which included bastion of the left-wing, replacing them there are more than 1,000 shantytowns 23-year-old Abdelfattah Raydi, who with courses in Islamic studies. Such in 70 cities, as well as more than 1,250 blew himself up in a cyber café in actions may have served to weaken “arbitrary neighborhoods.”3 These Casablanca to avoid being captured by the left, but they also helped foster a slums are generally home to Moroccans the police, had a similar profile. Raydi society in which religion came to play who migrated from impoverished rural lived with his mother and six siblings an increasingly important role in the areas into the margins of the cities. It in a tiny dilapidated room in the Dour public space. would seem that unlike the rural areas Sekila shantytown. He and his brother, themselves, where the population is still who was also part of the cell, both sold The monarchy has also played one steeped in local traditions of Islam that orange juice for a living. Raydi had Islamist current off against another, are locked into old patronage systems, already spent time in prison for his thereby strengthening the king’s position these shantytowns have provided a alleged linkage to the 2003 bombers as “Commander of the Faithful.” During particular mentality that is open to before being released under an amnesty the 1980s and 1990s, for example, it more militant ideologies, so much so in 2005. According to an individual employed a strategy of countering its that it is a common joke at the moment who knew him, Raydi was “fragile, and indigenous Islamist opposition, such in Morocco to talk about these shanty suffered from periodic bouts of epilepsy as the banned but highly popular al- neighborhoods as being the Kandahar and complained of being harassed Adl wal-Ihsan movement, by promoting of their respective cities. by the police even after his release the Wahhabist trend. It encouraged from prison.”5 Indeed, the fragile Moroccan imams to study at Saudi Indeed, it was these shantytowns that and inexperienced nature of these universities and gave them pride of were the domain of radical preachers individuals is reflected in the fact that place when they returned to the country. such as Mohamed Fizazi during the their attacks have for the most part been Traditional religious scholars who had 1990s and that became a natural seemingly amateur or botched affairs, been trained at the Dar al-Hadith al- recruiting ground for those seeking to from the Casablanca bombings, where Hassania, the main school in Morocco bring others to the cause of jihad. It was some of the bombers got lost and blew for graduating imams in the Maliki out of these places that small groups themselves up at the wrong target, to tradition, were often passed over when of militants who created their own Raydi exploding himself in a cyber café, it came to appointing teachers in Islamic fiefdoms came to emerge, meting out studies in favor of those who had been punishments and even murders in the 4 “Morocco: The Investigative Judge Listens to al-Shatbi, trained in Saudi Arabia. Some of these One of the Nine Escapees from al-Kenitra Prison,” al- Saudi trained individuals, such as the 3 “The Triangle of Fear in Morocco,” www.moheet.com, Sharq al-Awsat, May 10, 2008. radical preachers Mohamed Fizazi or November 26, 2007. 5 “Le Retour de la Peur,” Telquel, March 17-23, 2007.

19 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 to Hicham Doukali blowing himself up employment. The vast majority of those sacrilegious. It is true that these types with a gas cylinder in Meknes in 2007 who have been convicted have been of initiatives may enable the state to and only managing to injure himself. accused of being part of “Salafiyah- gain greater control over mosques and Indeed, none of these suicide bombers Jihadiya.” More than anything, however, public religious spaces, yet the official left notes or videos, reflecting perhaps this appears to be a label put upon these religious discourse will struggle hard their limited capacity and how they militants reflecting the fact that they do to compete with the satellite channels appear to be acting out of desperation not belong to any particular formalized such as Iqraa that have become hugely as much as anything else. group. As such, “Salafiyah-Jihadiya” popular in the shantytowns where, in would seem to be a label invented by spite of the poverty, satellite dishes Solutions? the Moroccan authorities to describe still dominate the neighborhoods and In their bid to eliminate this militancy, an ideological current. As the wife of seem to provide the main source of the Moroccan authorities have adopted one Moroccan convicted on terrorism entertainment. a strategy of conducting mass arrests by charges explained, “We are so badly picking up anyone who appears to have educated we couldn’t imagine even Moreover, all the underlying conditions Salafist tendencies. Many of the families coming up with such a term.”9 that fuel support for militancy are still of those who have been convicted have very much present. In spite of some complained that their loved ones were Although this heavy-handed approach half-hearted development attempts, might resolve the immediate threat, the poverty, lack of education, sense “It is through militant it is unlikely to stem the support for of alienation and social injustice will such militant thinking. If anything, it continue to feed an appetite for a Islam that these individuals is only likely to heighten resentment simplistic rejectionist ideology that seem to have discovered a and to strengthen resolve against the provides answers and a meaning to state. To make matters worse, there life. Of course, one should not overplay form of salvation and self- have been repeated reports of Moroccan the threat in Morocco, as this current esteem.” prisons becoming major radicalization represents a minority of the population centers on account of the large numbers and any major Islamist uprising is of Salafist prisoners being held. unlikely. Yet, it would not be surprising Furthermore, the seemingly exaggerated if more cells appear in the future or if a not involved with any militant group numbers of arrests have given rise to bomb explodes in the heart of a tourist but were simply religiously “committed” the suggestion that Morocco is simply center such as Marrakech. Indeed, as far and were arrested because of those doing the bidding of the United States as militant Islam is concerned, Morocco convictions.6 One young Salafist from in the war on terrorism, especially in can no longer claim to be the exception Tangiers, for example, was reportedly the case of those arrested for recruiting to the rule in North Africa. taken from outside his home and spent for the Iraqi jihad—an act considered by 40 days in secret detention where he many Moroccans as a noble cause and Alison Pargeter is a Senior Research underwent extreme forms of torture religious duty. This, too, is only likely to Associate at the Centre of International as the authorities had considered increase frustration against the state. Studies at the University of Cambridge. him suspicious because he traveled She works on security issues in North twice a week between Tangiers and Similarly, it seems difficult to imagine Africa with a particular focus on Libya Mohamedia.7 He was later released with how the monarchy’s current reliance and also on issues related to political an apology. upon its old strategy of trying to counter Islam in the Middle East and Europe. one religious trend by strengthening She has recently completed a major study The regime is not taking any chances. another will have any real impact amidst of the Muslim Brotherhood and is now The profiles of the majority of those the desperation of the shantytowns. Its working on a project on radicalization in who have been arrested in Morocco recent bid to train women preachers North Africa. Her book, New Frontiers of since the Casablanca bombings of 2003 (known as the mourchidat), for example, Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe, has just are similar to those who have conducted who can perform all the functions of a been published by I.B. Tauris. attacks. For example, in a list of 204 male imam except for leading prayers, prisoners arrested in Casablanca, 30% with the aim that they will go into of those arrested had only attended the community and promote more primary school and 35% had managed traditional Maliki Islam, is unlikely to only the first few years of secondary have any far reaching effect. Similarly, school.8 Most were unemployed or the push to bolster traditional Sufi working as street traders or in temporary tariqas is likely to have limited impact given that such tariqas are viewed even 6 Personal interviews, families of those convicted on ter- by the more moderate Islamist currents rorism charges, Ain Sebha, Casablanca, April 2008. as contravening what they consider to be 7 Personal interview, Mohamed Darif, Moroccan aca- “true Islam” and are regarded by those demic, Casablanca, April 2008. of a more militant nature as completely 8 List of prisoners on terrorism charges collected by Moroccan human rights group and acquired by author 9 Personal interview, wife of terrorism suspect, Ain in 2008. Sebha, Casablanca, April 2008.

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After Action Report: tribe. Two sub-tribes in Zerok make up was also engaged. This time, the enemy the population base of the district. The was able to kill two ANA soldiers and Nuanced Diplomacy in people subsist on farming and small damage several vehicles. Zerok, Afghanistan trade. The district is approximately 33 square miles and sits just 12 miles from I immediately met with the elders, shura By Captain John G. Gibson, U.S. Army the Pakistan border. members, the district governor and the ANP chief at the Zerok District Center. enemy machine gun fire and Rocket Corruption and collusion were the I discussed security, governance and Propelled Grenades (RPGs) slammed into bedrock of Taliban operations focused development in the district. I asked the my convoy as two tracer rounds punched on the destabilization of Zerok district. shura members if they knew anything through the turret of my up armored The first three weeks of my deployment about the enemy forces operating in vehicle. My third firefight in four days consisted of several operations designed the area. The entire room responded and the summer was only starting. It was to simply assess the environment with a resounding “no.” Frustrated by mid-June 2007 in the mountains of the and create relationships with local the response, I reminded the group that sprawling Paktika Province. I quickly district leaders, Afghan National jobs and economic development were realized that the enemy knew my name, Police, elders and shura members. impossible without security. number of vehicles, departure times and Counter-insurgency doctrine states plans; I had just left a meeting with its that creating separation between the I moved my entire convoy element back informants, the Zerok tribal shura. down the route to Forward Operating “The members of the shura Base Orgun. My battalion was planning I was a company commander responsible a major operation in the Zerok area for Sar Hawzeh, Naka and Zerok districts began to claim allegiance and we were to start preparations and in northern Paktika Province. Zerok to the government rehearsals during the next few days. district is part of the Zadran tribal arc. The We departed Zerok COP under cover Zadran tribes span from the mountains of and provide names of of darkness. Five miles south of my Pakistan’s Waziristan tribal areas to the contractors. The contracts outpost we were hit again. My convoy Afghan cities of Khost and Ghazni. The stayed the night at the location of the Zadran claim, as one of their own, the began, and for the first time firefight. We spent the next 24 hours pro-Taliban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. in a year attacks stopped.” combing the area, talking to Afghans After six years of progress in Afghanistan, and searching for intelligence. A tip Zerok district remained a haven for came from an unexpected source. foreign fighters, Taliban, Haqqani One of my paratroopers received a tip network fighters and corrupt government enemy and the people is the first step from a police officer at the Zerok COP. officials. In May 2007, however, the 10th of transforming the environment. I Sharing a coveted American cigarette, Mountain Division created a series of spent the month of May and the first the policeman told us that the Taliban small combat outposts near and along the two weeks of June 2007 attempting to were in the district center and knew Afghan-Pakistan border, and I inherited create separation by using a technique the exact moment our patrol departed a combat outpost called Zerok COP. called Key Leader Engagement (KLE), or the COP for FOB Orgun. It turned out The outpost housed a small number of Village Engagement (VE). My company that enemy forces were operating in the paratroopers and a large mortar tube. It completed a series of patrols focused on district center that shared a wall with was co-located with an Afghan National meeting as many Afghans as possible in my combat outpost. This, of course, Army (ANA) contingent and shared a wall the neighboring district of Naka. caused me to suspect that many of my with the Zerok District Center. I was able Afghan leaders were enemy or openly to quickly interact with the tribal leaders I had one platoon at the Zerok COP supporting them. (the shura) and the district governor. and planned to re-enforce the outpost Upon the departure of my counterpart, with my headquarters, another platoon Taking a Hard Line: No Development the Zerok COP was ready for operations. and several jingle trucks.1 On June 13, My district was rife with enemy Zerok district would become the setting however, one of my platoons responded corruption and active collusion. I had for a lesson in corruption, violence and to an attack along the only useable two shura members and a district governor hope. road leading to the Zerok COP. Enemy that began meeting with me in secret. fighters engaged a combat engineer One of my platoon leaders confirmed Identify the Problem route assessment patrol with machine that the police chief actually allowed the Zerok district sits as the most northern gun, RPG and AK-74 fire. My platoon Taliban to climb into the towers of the district in Paktika Province. Paktika responded and was also engaged in a district center to survey our activities. comprises 18 districts that create a firefight with the same insurgents. The The district governor was disillusioned border province in the southeast of following day, my headquarters, several with the provincial government by a Afghanistan. The capital is the city of jingle trucks, an ANA platoon and a personality conflict with the provincial Sharona. Nine districts form eastern U.S. platoon moved up the same route to governor. He was also ineffective due Paktika, the Area of Operation Eagle. re-enforce the Zerok COP. That convoy to the elders and members of the shura Zerok district consists of two main being a de facto Taliban organization. unpaved roads, 9,000-11,000 foot 1 “Jingle trucks” are local flat-bed vehicles that are used Only two individuals in Zerok pursued mountains, and people from the Zadran for transport purposes. me to talk seriously about the problems

21 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 facing the people of Zerok district. in districts other than Zerok. near significant population centers, but small districts such as Zerok Two elders became my trusted agents and Small Steps of Progress are not relevant to the provincial or the core of my battalion commander’s We continued to engage the population national government. Nevertheless, security shura initiative. LTC Michael of Zerok in meetings, patrols and the government must focus on remote, R. Fenzel ordered us to develop trusted behind closed doors. My battalion was isolated, under-developed districts. agents that would discuss important able to assist me in removing three Taliban and forces opposed to the issues honestly. Not to be confused corrupt police officials. The provincial Afghan government place critical with intelligence sources, the security government replaced the district importance on the mental and physical shura members talked about politics, governor twice. We talked to the people disposition of districts such as Zerok. personalities, development, governance and continued to spend money in other Remote districts, left unattended, and security. My two security shura men districts. The elders continued to harbor provide the Taliban with sanctuary, began to make secret trips to visit me, the Taliban as attacks persisted and food, men, weapons and fertile ground and over cups of hot chi told me how security waned. The resounding theme for continued opposition to the Afghan to proceed with Zerok. They explained of each weekly meeting was projects. government. Projection of Afghan that the Taliban were directly testing Repeatedly, the shura suggested that security and Afghan governance in the will of my unit and, further, the task projects would benefit the district. I the sanctuary of an insurgent force force. I decided to take a hard line with continued to remind the leaders that will sway the people of Zerok far security was the only requirement. greater than a thousand projects or “Remote districts, left Meanwhile, my other two districts an outpost. I often thought about the flourished with projects. New road challenges of leaders in past conflicts unattended, provide the construction, well construction projects, and kept returning to this quote by T.E. Taliban with sanctuary, and humanitarian and civic assistance Lawrence from The Seven Pillars of Wisdom: missions took place in each district, “[War] upon rebellion was messy and food, men, weapons except Zerok. slow, like eating soup with a knife.” and fertile ground for War in districts such as Zerok is slow In March 2008, I began to plan projects and messy indeed. continued opposition to the for Zerok district as preparation for Afghan government.” improved security. A municipal water CPT John Gibson is an Infantry Officer system for a small village, two new water currently serving with 1-503rd Infantry wells, three mosque refurbishments, a (Airborne), 173rd ABCT. He recently flood abatement wall, a solar light array, completed company command in the Zerok shura. I called a meeting in two school roofs and a food distribution Afghanistan after 13 months deployed in the district center and admonished the were announced to the shura. The support of Operation Enduring Freedom tribal council for not providing security projects represented an employment VIII. CPT John Gibson also served in OIF for the people of Zerok and informed the opportunity for more than 150 Afghans. I and OEF VI. CPT Gibson graduated council that no new economic project The members of the shura began to from the U.S. Military Academy, West would come to Zerok until security claim allegiance to the government Point, in 2000 with a BS in International was established. I told the shura that my and provide names of contractors. The & Strategic History and Latin American forces and the ANA would inform the contracts began, and for the first time Studies. CPT Gibson’s awards include the people of Zerok that the shura decided in a year attacks stopped. The district Combat Infantryman’s badge, the Airborne no projects or humanitarian and civic remained quiet for 47 days. Enemy badge, and the Ranger Tab. assistance should come to the district. activity was reported by locals in the The meeting was terrible and the elders bazaar, Afghan contractors and several were upset. shura members. I was confident that the population was effectively separated The two security shura men were from the enemy. Real transformation surprised at this decision. They later seemed possible for the first time. reported that the shura fully expected me to announce the start of an economic Conclusion initiative. The head of the shura, Haji Zerok District is a microcosm of Tadai, was furious. Haji Tadai’s nephew Afghanistan. Day-to-day life in the area was a Taliban commander in northern has not changed drastically in the last Paktika Province, working for Haqqani. 200 years. The people have vehicles The situation in Zerok was treacherous, and a few telephones, yet farming and and the next 11 months proved family ties rule the day. The situation in difficult and violent. In 13 months, my Zerok is ripe for progress. For example, company fired more than 3,590 120mm compare this small area with the mortar rounds, directed 79 airstrikes, progress of the area surrounding Kabul participated in 21 firefights, received 43 or even the provincial seat, Sharona. enemy rocket and mortar attacks and The government of Afghanistan makes spent more than $2 million on projects improvements and reaches the people

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Recent Highlights in on their positions. The fighters also June 18, 2008 (JORDAN): A Jordanian mined roads leading into the Taliban military court sentenced Ziad Khalaf Terrorist Activity occupied villages, which were seized on Raja al-Karbouly, an Iraqi al-Qaìda June 16. – AFP, June 17 operative, to death for planning terrorist June 16, 2008 (UNITED STATES): attacks on Jordanians in Iraq. According The U.S. government designated June 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Four to an AP report, “The ruling was the the Philippines-based group Rajah British soldiers were killed in an second time the court had sentenced al- Solaiman Movement (RSM) as “specially explosion in Lashkar Gah, Helmand Karbouly to death in the case. Following designated global terrorists.” The Province. The Taliban took credit for the initial verdict in March 2007, a decision will freeze the assets of RSM the operation. – CNN, June 18 Jordanian Appeals Court asked military and its leaders. On June 4, the United judges to retry him to verify his claims Nations had previously declared that June 17, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): The that he suffered a mental illness.” – AP, the RSM was linked to al-Qaìda. Abu Sayyaf Group released well-known June 18 – Bloomberg, June 16 journalist Ces Drilon, her cameraman and a university professor, all of whom June 18, 2008 (THAILAND): A roadside June 16, 2008 (IRAQ): Four bombs had been held hostage since June 8. They bomb ripped through a police vehicle in targeting homes and vehicles of Iraqi were freed on Jolo Island. The hostages Pattani Province, killing a police colonel security force members detonated recounted their experience, saying that and his driver. After the explosion, simultaneously in Mosul, Ninawa the ASG fighters, some of whom were insurgents immediately opened fire, Province. One policeman was killed. as young as 12-years-old, threatened wounding five policemen. – Reuters, June – Reuters, June 16 to behead them. Philippine authorities 19 said that at least $112,700 was paid June 16, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): in ransom in exchange for the release. June 19, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Approximately 500 Taliban fighters – AP, June 18; Reuters, June 20 NATO and Afghan government officials seized control of seven villages in announced that the Taliban have Kandahar Province’s Arghandab June 17, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): A been cleared from the villages they district. It is believed that some of the prominent extremist Jordanian cleric recently seized in Arghandab district fighters were recently freed during the with suspected ties to al-Qaìda was in Kandahar Province. Approximately June 13 Sarposa prison break. Afghan released on bail. The cleric, Abu Qatada, 1,000 NATO and Afghan soldiers were and NATO forces, however, dispute has been labeled Usama bin Ladin’s part of the counter-offensive against the high number of Taliban troops. “spiritual ambassador in Europe,” yet Taliban forces. An Afghan official said – Washington Post, June 17 British courts have ruled that he cannot that 56 Taliban fighters were killed, be deported back to Jordan and therefore many of them foreigners; the actual June 17, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber should be released from detention in death count may be much higher. An on a motorcycle attacked a checkpoint the absence of a conviction or trial. ISAF spokesman said that the joint in Baghdad, killing four anti-al-Qaìda Nevertheless, British judges recognize forces are now in the “closing stage of Sunni fighters. – Bloomberg, June 17 that Abu Qatada is still a security threat the operation.” – AFP, June 18 and have ordered him to a 22-hour per June 17, 2008 (IRAQ): A truck bomb day house arrest. He is prohibited from June 19, 2008 (GERMANY): A German exploded in a bustling market in a using a cell phone or computer and is court sentenced Ibrahim Raschid to predominately Shià area of Baghdad, not allowed to connect to the internet. three years in prison for spreading killing 63 people. The U.S. military – Reuters, June 18 internet links to audio and video believes that the attack was actually messages of al-Qaìda leaders. The carried out by a Shià splinter group led June 18, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): Iraqi refugee was arrested in October by Haydar Mehdi Khadum al-Fawadi Home Secretary Jacqui Smith told 2006. Speaking about the sentencing, (also known as Haydar al-Majidi) in reporters that an appeal would be a prosecutor said, “For the first time, a order to “incite (Shiite) violence against filed against a ruling that prevents German court has appraised the domain Sunnis; that his intent was to disrupt authorities from deporting extremist of Islamist activities on the internet and Sunni resettlement in Hurriyah in order Jordanian cleric Abu Qatada, who was shown that they are punishable under to maintain extortion of real estate freed on bail—albeit on strict house German law.” – AP, June 20 rental income to support his nefarious arrest—on June 17. Smith said, “I am activities.” – Reuters, June 17; AP, June 19 appealing to the House of Lords to June 20, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): reverse the decision that it is not safe A British court ruled that extremist June 17, 2008 (IRAQ): A car bomb to deport [Abu] Qatada and the other Muslim cleric Abu Hamza should be exploded outside the police headquarters Jordanian cases.” – BBC News, June 18 extradited to the United States where he in Ba`quba, Diyala Province, killing one faces terrorism charges. The Egyptian- policeman. – Reuters, June 17 June 18, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): born Abu Hamza had been fighting Afghan and NATO forces launched the U.S. extradition request in British June 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban a major offensive against Taliban courts, but the judges ruled against fighters destroyed bridges in Arghandab positions in Arghandab district in him. At one point the cleric ran the district in anticipation of an Afghan Kandahar Province. – Washington Post, Finsbury Park Mosque in north London. government and NATO military assault June 19 – guardian.co.uk, June 20

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June 20, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber June 22, 2008 (SOMALIA): A video June 23, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A exploded at a checkpoint in Mosul, statement of al-Qaìda operative Abu suicide car bomber attacked an Italian wounding at least five policemen. Yahya al-Libi was posted on Islamist NATO convoy in Shindand district of – CNN, June 20 web forums, in which the leader urges Herat Province, killing five civilians. Islamist fighters in Somalia to fight – Reuters, June 23 June 20, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A a United Nations peacekeeping force suicide bomber detonated his explosives that may soon be deployed there, and to June 23, 2008 (THAILAND): near a NATO convoy in Gereshk district establish an Islamic state in the country. Approximately 200 soldiers and police of Helmand Province. At least five He criticized the June 9 peace deal raided a jungle hideout used by Muslim civilians and one NATO soldier were between Somalia’s Transitional Federal separatist insurgents in Yala Province, killed. – International Herald Tribune, June 20 Government and the opposition Alliance killing six of the fighters. – Reuters, June for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. – AP, 23 June 20, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): June 23 Taliban fighters ambushed U.S.-led June 24, 2008 (IRAQ): U.S.-led coalition coalition forces in Zerok district of June 23, 2008 (SOMALIA): The deputy forces killed al-Qaìda in Iraq’s amir for Paktika Province, near the Pakistani chairman of the Somali opposition Mosul, according to a press statement border. Approximately 55 Taliban group, the Alliance for the Re-Liberation from Multinational Force-Iraq. The fighters were killed in the engagement. of Somalia (ARS), Abdirahman leader’s name was later identified as – Reuters, June 23 Abdishakur, criticized a June 22 Abu Khalaf. – MNFI-Iraq.com, June 24; AP, statement by al-Qaìda operative Abu June 26 June 20, 2008 (SOMALIA): Somali Yahya al-Libi, in which Abu Yahya opposition and military leader Yusuf denounced the June 9 peace deal between June 24, 2008 (IRAQ): A bomb ripped “Indha Ade” Mohamed Siad told a the ARS and Somalia’s Transitional through a Baghdad council meeting, Mogadishu-based radio station that Federal Government. “I do not think we killing 10 people. The dead included he rejects the recent June 9 peace deal are interested in al-Qaida’s statements two U.S. government employees and between Somalia’s Transitional Federal and they have nothing to do with Somali two U.S. soldiers. The U.S. military Government and the opposition Alliance issues,” Abdishakur said. “Al-Qaida blamed “rogue elements” of the Mahdi for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. “I know has not got any base in Somalia and Army. – Reuters, June 24 nothing about that peace deal, therefore they always issue statements against it does not concern us,” he said, adding any peace process. I do not think their June 24, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): that “the fighting will continue until statements are relevant to the Somali Germany announced that it would Somalia is liberated from Ethiopian people.” – Voice of America, June 23 increase the number of its soldiers troops.” – Garowe Online, June 20 available for use in Afghanistan by June 23, 2008 (IRAQ): Two U.S. soldiers 1,000. Once the change takes effect, June 21, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): An were killed in Madain (also known as Germany will have 4,500 soldiers IED killed four soldiers from the U.S.- Salman Pak) in Baghdad Province after a deployed to the country. According led coalition in Kandahar Province. disgruntled local official opened fire on to one press report, however, “Some – Reuters, June 21 them after a municipal council meeting. military experts questioned how much According to one witness, “The attacker help the additional German forces could June 21, 2008 (THAILAND): Suspected came out of his car with an AK-47 rifle provide if they were not permitted Muslim insurgents boarded a train as in his hand and started firing on the to engage in the heaviest fighting.” it passed through Yala Province and American soldiers until he was killed – International Herald Tribune, June 25 proceeded to kill three civilian train by the return fire.” Conflicting accounts employees and one policeman. – AP, June in press reports state that the assailant June 25, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The bodies of 22 was either formerly or currently a 22 members of a pro-government “peace member of the municipal council. – AP, committee,” who had all been killed by June 22, 2008 (IRAQ): A female suicide June 24 Taliban forces loyal to Baitullah Mehsud, bomber detonated her explosives outside were discovered in South Waziristan a government compound in Ba`quba, June 23, 2008 (IRAQ): A roadside bomb Agency. Mehsud’s men captured the Diyala Province. The explosion killed at exploded next to an Awakening Council town on June 23 and rounded up pro- least 15 people. – AP, June 23 patrol in Ba`quba, Diyala Province, government members of the Bhittani killing two of the council members. tribe. The Taliban began withdrawing June 22, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber – AP, June 24 from the town on June 24. According to an targeted a police checkpoint in Mosul, AFP report, “Clashes broke out in Jandola Ninawa Province, leaving 14 people June 23, 2008 (THAILAND): The on Monday [June 23] between followers of wounded. – AP, June 23 State Railway of Thailand suspended pro-government tribal elder, Commander services in Thailand’s three southern- Turkistani, and militants belonging to June 22, 2008 (IRAQ): A mortar attack most provinces of Yala, Pattani and Mehsud’s tribe after rockets were fired at killed 10 members of an Awakening Narathiwat as a result of the June 21 the home of a peace committee member. Council in Udaim, Diyala Province. killings of train employees by suspected Tensions had been high between the - AP, June 23 Muslim separatist insurgents. – Bangkok groups for months.” – Reuters, June 25; Post, June 23 Daily Times, June 25; AFP, June 26

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June 25, 2008 (YEMEN): Yemeni June 26, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): The June 28, 2008 (SOMALIA): Islamist authorities announced the arrest of head of the Philippines’ armed forces, insurgents took control of the strategic Haytham bin Saad, identified as an General Alexander Yano, told reporters town of Beledweyne, according to the important member of al-Qaìda in that the Abu Sayyaf Group had been town’s residents. Reports said that the Yemen. The arrest, which took place in reduced to “plain bandits” as a result fighters were unopposed since Ethiopian Hadramawt Province, included four of of a “leadership vacuum.” According to and Transitional Federal Government Bin Saad’s bodyguards. – Saba, June 25 Yano, “We still look at them as a loose troops were not present. – AP, June 29 organization with some splinter groups, June 25, 2008 (SAUDI ARABIA): in fact, some of them may be conducting June 29, 2008 (IRAQ): A female The Interior Ministry revealed that their own operations, and now, has suicide bomber attempted to blow up authorities had arrested 701 suspected degenerated into a money-making an Awakening Council headquarters al-Qaìda-linked militants since the group devoid of any ideology or cause.” in Diyala Province, but her explosives beginning of 2008. Out of the 701, – Philippine Inquirer, June 26 detonated prematurely after coming 520 remain in custody, while 181 were under fire by Iraqi guards. One council released due to lack of evidence tying June 26, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Military member was wounded. – AP, June 29 them to the terrorist group. – AP, June 25 officials announced the capture of Jul Akram Hadjail (also known as June 29, 2008 (IRAQ): A truck bomb June 25, 2008 (THAILAND): Five Thai Dodong), an Abu Sayyaf Group fighter detonated in Duluiyah in Salah al-Din Army soldiers were wounded when who had an estimated $3,300 bounty. Province, killing seven policemen and a remotely-detonated bomb exploded According to authorities, the suspect, a member of an Awakening Council. under their vehicle in Yala Province. who was captured near Jolo airport in Due to conflicting reports, it is unclear – TNA, June 25 Sulu Province, may have been involved whether the bomb was remotely in the June 8 kidnapping of ABS-CBN detonated or detonated by a suicide June 25, 2008 (SOMALIA): Nine police correspondent Ces Drilon and her team. bomber. – AP, June 29; Reuters, June 29 officers, including the Daynile district – GMANews.tv, June 27 deputy police commander, were found June 29, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): dead inside a Mogadishu police station. June 28, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi police raided A new report by MI5 warned that al- The al-Shabab insurgent group was a house on the outskirts of Samarra, Qaìda-linked operatives in the United blamed for the killings. – Garowe Online, Salah al-Din Province, and arrested 11 Kingdom may be planning to purchase June 26 suspected al-Qaìda operatives. In the former ambulances and police vehicles house, police discovered the bodies of to utilize them as suicide car bombs. June 26, 2008 (UNITED STATES): A seven Iraqis who had been tortured and According to one press report, “Every U.S. military judge denied a defense killed. – Reuters, June 28 year dozens of police cars, ambulances motion to delay the trial of Salim and fire engines are sold. Some are fully Hamdan, a former driver for Usama bin June 28, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik- marked and can be bought for as little Ladin held at Guantanamo Bay. Pretrial i-Taliban Pakistan leader Baitullah as £1,500.” – The Sunday Times, June 29 hearings will begin on July 14, and the Mehsud suspended peace talks with the trial will start shortly after. – AP, June 27 government “because the government is June 30, 2008 (GLOBAL): The UN constantly using force against us…if the Security Council voted to extend June 26, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber government takes any military action we sanctions against the Taliban and al- targeted a municipal office in Garma in are also ready for martyrdom.” Mehsud Qaìda for 18 months. According to Anbar Province, killing the local mayor had previously announced a unilateral one press report, “The Security Council and at least 14 members of an anti-al- cease-fire in April, and his latest mandate is a measure to prevent funds Qaìda Awakening group. Three U.S. announcement came after Pakistan’s and other financial assets from reaching Marines were also killed. The Islamic military “moved paramilitary troops to al-Qaida and the Taliban or any satellite State of Iraq later claimed credit for the clear the area [outside of Peshawar] of organization with ties to the terrorist operation. – AFP, June 26; Los Angeles Times, militants and establish the writ of the networks.” – UPI, July 1 June 26; AP, June 28 government.” – AFP, June 28 June 30, 2008 (UNITED STATES): The June 26, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): In June 28, 2008 (YEMEN): A Yemeni Pentagon announced that it would seek response to an attack while on patrol, court refused to grant bail to al-Qaìda the death penalty against Abd al-Rahim Afghan and U.S.-led coalition troops operative Jabir al-Banna. He will return al-Nashiri, a Saudi of Yemeni descent killed 32 Taliban fighters in Uruzgan to court on October 11 when the verdict who is charged with “organizing and Province. – Reuters, June 28 on his appeal is ready. – AFP, June 28 directing” the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen. The al-Qaìda operative June 26, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Suspected June 28, 2008 (THAILAND): Rail service is currently being held at Guantanamo Abu Sayyaf Group fighters kidnapped five was restored to Thailand’s three Bay. – AP, June 30 employees of an electronics company on southern-most provinces. Service was Basilan Island in the southern Philippines. suspended on June 23 in response to June 30, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen One of the hostages was released shortly a June 21 insurgent attack on train attacked a checkpoint in Mosul, Ninawa after capture due to his tribal affiliation. personnel. – TNA, June 28 Province, killing two Iraqi soldiers. – AP, June 26 – Reuters, June 30

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June 30, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S.- Qaìda connections and for planning July 5, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi police killed led coalition troops engaged a grouping bomb attacks in the United States and four militants near Tikrit, Salah al- of Taliban militants near the border France. The suspect, identified as “U,” Din Province. Two of the killed were with Pakistan, killing 33 of them with served more than seven years in jail foreigners. – Reuters, July 5 helicopter gunships and fighter jets. The and is now under strict house arrest incident occurred in Khost Province. while he fights deportation procedures. July 5, 2008 (THAILAND): Suspected – AFP, June 30 According to one press report, “U was insurgents shot up a café in Yala arrested at London’s Heathrow airport Province, killing three customers. The July 1, 2008 (NORTH AFRICA): in February 2001 when attempting to fly café was regularly frequented by police According to new statements made to Saudi Arabia on a false passport. The and soldiers. – AP, July 5 by al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb British government calls him a ‘leading (AQIM) leader Abdelmalek Droukdel, organiser and facilitator of terrorist July 6, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide “American interests are legitimate activity aimed mainly at overseas targets,’ bomber targeted a group of policemen in targets” because AQIM “found America with direct links to bin Laden and other Islamabad during a commemoration of building military bases in the south of senior al Qaeda figures.” – Reuters, July 3 the first anniversary of when Pakistani our country [Algeria] and conducting security forces stormed the Lal Masjid military exercises, and plundering our July 3, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): (Red Mosque). The bomber killed 15 oil and planning to get our gas.” – Arab Suspected Taliban gunmen killed eight people, 13 of whom were police. It is Times, June 2 Afghan police officers at a checkpoint unclear who was responsible for the between Zahri and Panjwaii districts in attack. – Financial Times, July 6; AFP, July 6 July 1, 2008 (SPAIN): Authorities Kandahar Province. – CBCNews.ca, July 4 arrested three men of Algerian origin on July 6, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A report suspicion of raising money for al-Qaìda July 3, 2008 (PAKISTAN): The United published in Dawn alleges that Tehrik-i- and other Islamist terrorist groups. The Kingdom announced that it would double Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has established men were arrested in Huelva Province its aid program for Pakistan to help the a Sharià court in Bajaur Agency, “and and in the Basque country. – AP, July 1 country combat extremism in its tribal a large number of people are using them areas on the Afghanistan-Pakistan [TTP] to get disputes resolved, instead July 2, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): border. Assistance—which focuses on of waiting for action by the tribal Small-arms fire brought down a U.S. relieving poverty and improving health administration.” – Dawn, July 6 helicopter in Logar Province. The care and education—will reach $950 damaged helicopter landed safely, and million by 2011. – Bloomberg, July 4 July 6, 2008 (SOMALIA): Osman Ali the personnel were evacuated. Coalition Ahmed, the head of the UN Development forces then destroyed the disabled July 3, 2008 (SAUDI ARABIA): Saudi Program in Mogadishu, was gunned helicopter with precision-guided Arabia’s grand mufti, Shaykh Abdul Aziz down as he left a mosque in the Somali munitions. – Reuters, July 2 Al al-Sheikh, called on Saudi citizens to capital. It is suspected that Islamist take the al-Qaìda threat seriously and fighters were behind the attack. – AFP, July 2, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A to cooperate with the country’s security July 7 suicide car bomber attempted to kill services. “You should be aware that Nimroz Province Governor Ghulam these militants, who claim to work for July 7, 2008 (IRAQ): A female suicide Dastagir Azad, killing three police the cause of Islam and defend Muslims, bomber detonated her explosives at a officers and one civilian during the actually hide their vested interests and market in Ba`quba, Diyala Province, attack. The governor was not wounded. vicious objectives…Aggressions against killing nine people. – Reuters, July 7 – AP, July 2 Muslims and occupation of land… cannot be a justification for explosions, July 7, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A July 2, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): During denouncing other Muslims as infidels suicide car bomber rammed his vehicle a 10-hour clash in Badghis Province, and disobeying the Muslim social into the gates of the Indian Embassy in NATO and Afghan forces killed at least consensus…Obeying the Muslim ruler Kabul, killing at least 58 people. Since 25 Taliban militants. – AFP, July 3 without sedition is as a basic principle the attack, Afghan government officials of Muslims who follow the path of the have implied that Pakistani government July 2, 2008 (MOROCCO): Morocco’s Prophet.” – Arab News, July 4; Reuters, July 3 elements may have been behind the state news agency announced that operation. The Taliban have denied authorities apprehended 35 members July 4, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Gunmen involvement. – Reuters, July 7; AFP, July 8; of a group accused of sending suicide killed Habibullah Sanzenai, a member of AP, July 10 bomb volunteers to al-Qaìda in Iraq Afghanistan’s lower house of parliament and to al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb. for Kandahar, as he returned home in July 7, 2008 (THAILAND): Suspected Additionally, authorities accused the Kandahar Province. – Reuters, July 5 Muslim insurgents opened fire on a group of also planning attacks inside school bus in Pattani Province, killing Morocco. – Reuters, July 2 July 5, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen shot two paramilitary rangers and wounding and killed two off-duty policemen in three students. – AP, July 7 July 3, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): a market in Mosul, Ninawa Province. UK authorities released from prison – Reuters, July 5 July 8, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A an Algerian who is suspected of al- roadside bomb killed an Australian

26 july 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 8 soldier in Uruzgan Province. – Reuters, terror network [al-Qaìda].” –AP, July July 11, 2008 (IRAQ): A roadside bomb July 9 9 wounded six civilians in Mosul, Ninawa Province. – Reuters, July 11 July 8, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A July 9, 2008 (TURKEY): Suspected roadside bomb killed a U.S. soldier in al-Qaìda militants attacked a police July 11, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Maulvi Kunar Province. – Reuters, July 9 guard post outside the U.S. Consulate Omar, a spokesman for Tehrik-i-Taliban in Istanbul, killing three police officers leader Baitullah Mehsud, warned that July 9, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car and losing three of their own. At least the Taliban would begin killing members bomber rammed his vehicle into the two of the attackers were Turkish of the security forces that it is holding convoy of Iraqi General Riyadh Jalal nationals. – AP, July 9 hostage. To prevent the executions, the Tauffiq, the head of security operations militant group is demanding the release in Mosul and Ninawa Province. The July 10, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car of a number of Taliban militants held attack, which occurred in Mosul, killed bomber rammed his vehicle into an in Pakistani jails. The demand comes seven people, although the general was Iraqi Army vehicle in western Baghdad, shortly after a top aide for Mehsud, not harmed. – AFP, July 9 killing two people. – Voice of America, Rafiuddin, was captured by authorities. July 10 – USA Today, July 12 July 9, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban militants attempted to abduct aid July 10, 2008 (IRAQ): Gunmen shot to July 11, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A workers building a well in Faryab death the head of the National Identity new audio statement allegedly from al- Province, yet were driven away by a Department for Ninawa Province. The Qaìda commander Abu Yahya al-Libi group of villagers who used a machine incident occurred in Mosul. – Reuters, was posted on Islamist web forums. In gun and other weapons to kill two of July 10 the statement, Abu Yahya threatens to the Taliban fighters. One of the killed increase attacks on international forces militants was the Taliban-appointed July 10, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): An IED in Afghanistan and says that militants shadow governor for the province. killed two NATO soldiers in Paktika Province. are “determined to turn the upcoming – AP, July 10 – Reuters, July 11 winter to hell for the infidels.” – AP, July 11 July 9, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani July 10, 2008 (TURKEY): Turkish authorities signed a peace deal with authorities detained four people July 11, 2008 (MOROCCO): Abdelhak an 18-member group of tribal elders suspected of involvement in the July 9 Bassou, the head of Morocco’s in Khyber Agency of the Federally attack on the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. Renseignements Generaux domestic Administered Tribal Areas. The tribal Authorities are still investigating intelligence agency, told the AP that leaders had consulted with militant whether al-Qaìda was involved in the Moroccan security forces foiled a leader Mangal Bagh before the deal was operation. – AP, July 10 terrorist plot to attack tourists this signed. – AFP, July 10 summer, and said that it has become July 10, 2008 (MOROCCO): Hicham “near-daily work” to find and dismantle July 9, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Police Doukali, a Moroccan would-be suicide terrorist cells in the kingdom. - AP, July arrested an aide to Tehrik-i-Taliban bomber who attempted to blow up a 11 leader Baitullah Mehsud. The aide, bus filled with U.S., Italian and French known as Rafiuddin, was captured with tourists on August 13, 2007, was July 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A four other associates while traveling in sentenced to life in prison. During the suicide bomber killed two soldiers and South Waziristan Agency. – AP, July 11 botched attack, the bus door was closed a child in Helmand Province. – Reuters, just before he boarded, causing him to July 12 July 9, 2008 (YEMEN): Al-Qaìda’s blow off his own arm. A co-conspirator, wing in Yemen posted a statement on Hassan Azougar, received a 10-year July 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Islamist internet forums calling for the sentence. – news24.com, July 10 Taliban fighters killed two female kidnappings of tourists in the country. police detectives and left their bodies in The purpose of the kidnappings, the July 10, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Abu a graveyard ditch in Ghazni Province. statement read, is to gain leverage Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants released – Reuters, July 13 against the Yemeni government so that from captivity four electric company it releases jailed al-Qaìda-affiliated workers who were kidnapped on July 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A militants. – Reuters, July 9 June 26. Authorities refused to reveal roadside bomb killed three police whether a ransom was paid in exchange officers in Zabul Province. – Reuters, July July 9, 2008 (ISRAEL): Israeli for their release. – AP, July 11 13 authorities arrested two Israeli Bedouin Arabs on accusations that they provided July 11, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi authorities July 12, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Pro- strategic information, such as details on foiled a chlorine bomb attack after seizing Taliban fighters ambushed a convoy of army bases, commercial buildings and a truck filled with chlorine bottles and paramilitary soldiers in Hangu District an airport, to al-Qaìda. According to explosives in Samarra, Salah al-Din of the North-West Frontier Province, an AP report, the allegations marked Province. During the encounter, four killing at least 16 of them. – The Age, July “the first time Israel has accused any militants were killed. – Reuters, July 11 13; Reuters, July 12 citizens of cooperating with the global

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July 13, 2008 (IRAQ): Three policemen operations in Ba`quba, Diyala Province. CTC Sentinel Staff were killed after two roadside bombs – Reuters, July 15 exploded in Falluja, Anbar Province. Editor-in-Chief – Reuters, July 13 July 15, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car Erich Marquardt bomber killed eight people in an attack Senior Editor, CTC July 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): on a police checkpoint in Mosul, Ninawa Nearly 200 Taliban fighters attacked a Province. – Reuters, July 15 Editorial Board remote American-run military outpost GEN(R) John P. Abizaid in Kunar Province, near the border July 15, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Distinguished Chair, CTC with Pakistan. During the engagement, detonated his explosives in a crowded nine U.S. soldiers were killed. The area in Mosul, Ninawa Province, killing COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. insurgents managed to partially breach four people. – Reuters, July 15 Department Head the compound. Taliban casualties were Department of Social Sciences (West Point) high. – New York Times, July 15 July 15, 2008 (THAILAND): Thailand’s cabinet extended emergency rule COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. July 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide in the country’s three southern- Deputy Department Head bomber on a motorcycle detonated his most provinces of Yala, Pattani and Department of Social Sciences (West Point) explosives next to a police patrol in Narathiwat. Emergency rule has been Uruzgan Province, killing 24 people, 19 in place since July 2005 due to ongoing MAJ Reid Sawyer of whom were civilians. – AP, July 13 separatist violence. – AFP, July 15 Director, CTC July 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A Brian Fishman roadside bomb killed six Afghans Senior Associate, CTC working as guards for a Western security firm in Helmand Province. Christopher Heffelfinger – Reuters, July 14 FBI Fellow, CTC July 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban gunmen kidnapped Abdul Contact Wali, a member of parliament, in Logar Combating Terrorism Center Province. – AP, July 13; AFP, July 14 U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall July 13, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide West Point, NY 10996 bomber injured four people at a Shi`a Phone: (202) 425-8578 religious gathering in Dera Ismail Khan Email: [email protected] in the North-West Frontier Province. Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ – AHN, July 13; Daily Times, July 14

* For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 July 14, 2008 (IRAQ): Police killed a suicide bomber as he approached their checkpoint in Mosul, Ninawa Province. support – Reuters, July 14 The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial July 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban supporters, for without their support and fighters killed eight civilian passengers shared vision of the Center products like seized from vehicles in Ghazni Province. the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If A Taliban source told Reuters that the you are interested in learning more about killed civilians were acting as spies for how to support the Combating Terrorism U.S.-led forces. – Reuters, July 15 Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at July 14, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A West Point’s Association of Graduates at roadside bomb killed six civilians in 845-446-1553. Paktika Province. – Reuters, July 15

July 15, 2008 (IRAQ): Two suicide bombers targeted a military recruitment center in Diyala Province. The bombs killed 27 people, 20 of whom were police The views expressed in this report are those of recruits. – Reuters, July 15 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency July 15, 2008 (IRAQ): A U.S. soldier of the U.S. Government. was killed by an explosive device during