ASPECTS OF EXPANSIONISM IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

DURING THE GRANT ADMINISTRATION

A thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. by Barbara Gillian Green Ptge

Preface iii

List of Abbreviations V

Chapter I Introduction 1

Chapter II Fer,onal1t1•• 8

Chapter XII Cube. 31

Chapter IV Santo Domtngo 89

Chapter V Hawaii 136

Chapter VI Samoa 180

Chapter VIX. conclusion 203

Bibliography 212

Photographs P1rson!l!ti1s iii ~Rtll\CIS u.s. Grant is usually ranked ~mong the three o~ four worst Presidents of the United Stat••• For most people this fact seems to~• sufficient proof that nothing worthwhile emerged from the filight years of his administration. I must admit that I shared this general indifference when first allotted this topic; though :C knew.something of the settlement of the

11Alebarna" claims dispute in the Tre•ty of Wa•hington, I was not aware that President Grant had a distinctive foreign policy. But the Grant ere. has proved to be a fascinating period in American diplomatic history and it surprises me that it he.snot r•eeived more attention. I was frequently f•ced with a shortage of secondary material• that was pJrtieularly frustrating in view of the inadequacies of the primary m•terials available to me. Nevertheleas, it was possible to gain Elorne insight into this period, General diplomatic historiee usually pas& over the years 1865 to 1898, as• kind of, flat spot between the surge ot expansionist feeling glorified•• Manifest Destiny, and America's brief venture into imperialism. In fact. this was a transitional period in which a very different social and economic order spelled the end of one kind of expan•ioniam and prepared the way for another. One can stle elements of both types at work in the particular cases that the Grant: Administration had to deal with. My than1¢11 are due to my •upervisor, Professor A.A. Conway, and to Mr. B. Wearing who was temporai::-y aupe~vi•or, both of whom provided conside~able inspira­ tion; to the librarians ot the tJnivtrsi,ty of Canterbury who were endleaaly helpful; to my typiat who worked under the trying conditions of my absenee1 and to my husband without whose encouragement thi• tnight never have been completed. V

LIST or Af!SREVIATIONS

P.R.F.R. - Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Aecomp~nying the Annual Me$ea9e of the President.

J.s.H. - Journal of Southern History.

- Louieiana Historic•l Quarterly.

~ North American Review.

- faaitic Historical Review •

P.S.Q. • Political Science Quarterly 1 CHAPTER I INTROOUC'r::CON The foreign policy ot the United State$• even today, appear• very often to be governed more by idealism than by prlgm•tism or practicality, and this peculiar trend is apparent throughoqt the entire history of American foreign policy, To understand the pressures which could be exerted on the adMiniatr•tion during Grant•s period, it is important to look briefly at the ideas which had become pa.rt of Amfllt'ic:an diplomacy. A result of the War of Independence had beent understandably, a self-conscious rejection of everything European. and more particularly of things British. This independent spirit was to become translated into the idea of two spheres, Americtn and European; and into an avoidance of any alliances with European powers which could involve American co-operation in war. George Washington in his Farewell Address on September 17, 1796 expressed the policies of neutrality and non-entanglement which were to have considerable effect upon the foreign policies of succeeding Presidents, "Europe has a set of ptimary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies. the cause, of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefoEe, it mu•t be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and cQ\liaions of her friendships and her enmities."\ >

(1) Dexter Perkins, H•nds Off: A. History of the Monpoe poatrine," (Boston, 1§41) p.i7 2 Thia separatism increased. The reaction of monarchical Europe to the French Revolution, which seemed to apply the principles embodied in the Americl.ln Constitution, and the late~ disillusioning .developments of the Revolution, made the differences between the United States •nd Europe more apparent. As far as Americans were concerned, thia epi•ode illustrated the advantages of democratic republicanism over the evils of reaction•ry monarchism, and the United States assumed the tasks of a "republiea.n missionu-y" olairnin9, es Henry Clay did in 1818 in his discussion of the Latin­

American States, 0We are their great example. Of us they constantly speak as of brothers having• similar origin. They adopt our principles, copy our institutions ilnd in many instances, employ the very language and sentiments of our revolutionary papers, 0 <2> The United States, it was maintained, was the creator, and protector, of free government in the Western Hemisphere, a mission which was a reflection of the sense of that uniqueness of the country and its institutions. The Monroe Doctrine was both a reinforcement of this belief and an extension.

(2) Perkins. »ands Off. p,17 3 "The American continents by the free and independent condition which they h$ve assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects f?l>future ooloni~ation by any European powers•" This was the first item of the Doctrine, and though it appeared essentially negative, it was, in reality,• nationalistic and aggressive belief which could be, •nd was used to justify consideral)le Ameriaian activity in the area in following year•• Its apparent success owed less to any strength inherent in the idea than to the reluctance of European nations to become further involved in the issues outside their continent during the troublesome years of the first half of the nineteenth century. Just how little it affected American thinking is illustrated by Dexter Perkins when he points out that of all the statements issued on the subject of the future of CUba, not one l:'efer.red to the Doctrine. The re•son was that it was not a new principle; the only thing that was new was its expression in such explicit terms. ln 1819 John Quincy Adams had claimed that the world "must be familiarized with the idee. of con­ sidering our proper dominion to be the continent of North America. F.rom the time when we became an independent people it w~s as much a law of nature that this should become our pretension (4) $8 that the Mi1sisaippi should flow to the eea"

(3) R.A. Billington, a.J. Loewenburg, S.H. Brockunier ( ed), :t'he Mak+ng of Amer:Jrcan Dem9c5acy. ( 2 vols• New York, 9160) Vol.I, p.207, (4) Richard w. Van Alstyne, .Amex-ican Diplomacy in A2~;on1. /} Se;~e, of c,,i §t;Uali,; (New Yol:'lc,1944) P• . 4 This was an expression of national security,· as waa the Monx·oe Doctrine of 1823, yet the ideas· were also closely linked to$ doctrine far less introspective •nd far more deliberately expansionist, which was described in 1845 '.by John o•sullivant editor of the paper TbeDgnos;:ratic

Review, as "Manifest De$tiny0 • Like the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Pe$tiny was an expression of nationalism, but an expression much more excited and dogmatic. It claimed that nothing could hold back the spread of republicanism and the American way of life, and that annexation of territox-y was a natural development ordained by God. It tran$lated old idec:ls of the perfection and superiority of American republicani~m into a mission of territorial expansion. "Let us leave events to take their own c:ourse. The North Americans wi1~ spread out far beyond their present bounds •. hey wi11 encroach again and again upon their neighbours, New territories will be pl•nted, decla~e their independence and be annexedl We have New Mexico and California& We j:!1'.J:l; have Old Mexico and Cuba& .The isthmus cannot arrest 1,111 ... not even the S•int Law.rencel Time has $ll of this in her womb. b oundfed itates will.grow,up where now exists but thirty. et·us not anticipate. The end of all this shall come, and God only can tell what it will be •nd when."(5) M$n1fe$t Destiny sprang from the opening of California the spread of popul~tion west, the aovance of the rail­ road and the telegraph, and the exagget'ated nationalism of a young, wealthy and successful nation, and the

(5) Billington• Loewenburg, Brockunier, The Making of Affie,r;im Dempcracy. P• 284 5 acqui$1tion of land only increased the demand for more. For political aspirants an advant•ge of the faith in this ideal was that it •oon showed itself to be endlessly adaptable. From e:kpanaion within what 1$ now known ae the United States, it epread to include the entire North Ameriean continent, then the Caribbe•n, and then the South American continent~ So~e, no doubt• had even grander vision•• The most influential period• of Manifest Destiny were the decades of the 1840• and 1850•• A• Weinberg points out in his study of the movement,

"political gravitation", and "politic;:al affinity0 , but it was primarily an attitude of these two decades, growing out of the p•rticular political conditions of these years. Like the Monroe 0Qctr1ne it was used as a ju•tification for expansioni•m much later in the century when the political condition• had changed. Neither American nationalism nor the faith irt the American political •Y•tem had gone, but M.nif'est Destiny had been part of a different kind of nationalism .. An aspect of .American nationalism before the Civil War was ita embodiment of the aims of the ruling Southern majority, 6 which included the need for land to sustain its agrarian way ot life a.rtd the ele.ve system upi;m which it waa baaed; on th• other hand, the nationali•m expr$ssed in public policy after the war wa, predominantly that of the North, looking to an induetri~l future, with as11u.red markets, and commercial and nt4!:rca.ntile consolidation • .UndoUbtedly the •£feet of th• belief still lingered in those individual• who had grown up in the 184.0•s and 1eso•s and who were involved in the implementation of foreign policy •fter the eivil war, but it could no longer be ,e.i.d to govern :1n the seine way the policy-mal(ing of foreign affairs. William Seward. Secretary of state under Lincoln e.nd Andrew Johnson, Wal/I the greatest exponent of Manifest Peatit:ly in the early post-war period. ltven he, however, had been forced by the Wat' to tec:ognize that this belief, as a justification for •xpaniionist intention•, no longer filled all requiretnenta. He tool( the initiative in ~oves upon the Danish West Indies and Santo Domingo because of the need for etr•tegic bases in the Caribbean to protect the southern United Stateua, reason$ which he acknowledged,. Indeed, he discova,red in the course of the•e opetations en anti~e:xpansioniet swing in the country, eau$ed by a wea.rinesa of war and a pre­ occupation with recon,truetion and the eno~mous war debt. Manifest Destiny, or at l•ast the agg~essive and warlike Manifest Destiny of e$.rlie~ yee,.rs, appealed to fewer. 7 "Let it rather be our province to act as peaee... maker and gradually pave the way for more l.ibera.l forms of Go;,re,rnment ••• Thit is a more enviable and d••irable position than that of the conqueror of nat:ionet" advised the Charleatort s;ou.riar in 186s,<7> o.nd John A. Log•n of Illinois in Cong.ress ridiculed expansionist projects by suggesting fac;etioualy that S..ward be authorized to negotiate "for the purchase of empires, kingdoms; rebellion1, wars, volcanoes, icebergs, snow and rain storms, earthqua~e,, or submerged and \mdiscovered i1land•• u(8 When u.s. Grant beeam• Pre•ident th.ii concern with the healing of thf!!! sear• of t:he rebellion was still apparent .. His imperialistic: ideal• were to be met by a nation divided on the ia•ue of ter~itorial expansion; some denied any need for furthex- acquisition of land, others believed, with the ~resident, in the arguments of the past century, and et:ill others looked to a new future to provide answers and just1tieatione.

( 7) Donald Marquand Dozer, "Anti...-txpansionism During the Johnson Administrationt 11 f.H.R., Vol, XIV,(1945) (8) <;on~respio,n4l Globe, 40 Congress, 2nd setssion, p.1 21 8 CHAPTER II PERSONALITIES

According to the Constitution of the United States, foreign affairs are the responsibility of the President.

Aiding him, usually, is the Secretary of State, whose power and authority depends solely on how much is delegated by the President, and who requires the absolute trust of the

President to manoeuvre at all. The most powerful Congres­ sional agent of foreign affairs is the Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a man who can effect or kill advocated policy by the power he wields. Fre­ quently it is at this point that policy dies. During the administration of U.S. Grant, the men who filled these offices were vastly different in temperament and political experience, which had interesting effects upon the running of foreign policy.

The most important figure was President Grant himself.

Of him it has been said,

"No-one had ever entered the White House with so little experience concerning matters of state, indeed with so little education of whatever variety fitting him for high public office, except Zachary Taylor, who in a similar manner, owed his political elevation to military service. But the gratitude of the country for what as a soldier Grant had been the instrument was great, and his very detachment from poJitics had filled right-thinking citizens with hope that his administration woylj be distinguished by honesty and commonsense." 1

(1) E.P.Oberholtzer,History of the United States since the Civil War(S vols, New York,1922),Vol.II,p.213. See also W.B.Hesseltine,Ulysses s. Grant, Politician (New York,1957); L.Lewis,Captain Sam Grant(Boston, 1950);Allan Nevins,Hamilton Fish: The Inner Histor of the Grant Administration New York,1936 ;W.A.Thayer, From Tanyard to White House(London,1892);H.B.Adams, "The Session",North American Review,Vol.CXI(July,1870) 9 Hope for something new was the keynote of the American attitude to Grant. "Grant•• sagacity and force of eh•racter having sufficed to win the war, they must now suffice to make him a powerful President - so men ergued.n(2) These arguntents were based on nothing but his military achievements, tor he was ill~equipped for the tasks confronting him. Born into• frontier family which placed great emphasis on materi•l achievement, Grant had been a failure in every venture he undertook before the Civil War, Educated at W•st Po'int, he had not been a notable suecess as a ;oldier either in peace­ time or in the Mexic•n War, and his post-war attempts at business and at farming ended in nee..r--bankruptcy. Xndeed, the Civil War:- aaved Grant and his family from financial disaster, and was• turning=point in his hitherto undistinguished career• As• military commander he displayed unexpected strengths and talents that eventually carried him to the command of all the armies of the Union. By the end of hostilities Grant was firmly estal:>lished as the architect of the Northern victory; even as the war ended, it was elear that he could; if he chose, be a candidate for the Presidency in 1868, with a good chance of election.

(2) Nevins, Illh, p.107. For an opposing view, see Gideon w"e!Tes, The Di§fX of Gideon Welles (3 vols. New York, 1960), Vol.III, passim. 10 Grant himself appeared to scorn the prospect of political power. In the past he had shown little interest in politics and had allegedly exercised his right to vote only once in his life, when he had voted Democratic. He had also made a number of statements against the participation of military men in political affairs. Yet military heroes before him had gained the Presidency through public gratitude, and Grant cannot have been unaware of its attractions. Certainly his friends, especially Adam Badeau and John Rawlins, were aware of his potential as a candidate, and as early as mid-1866 were beginning to work to seat him in· the White House. For some time Grant remained silent and apparently uncommitted, serving the Johnson Administration in various capacities, advising Southern deputations to follow Johnson and avoiding any personal conflict with the President, even to the extent of accompanying Johnson on his 1866 election campaign. There were signs, however, that he was being advised to be more careful, and he broke his close association with the President by resigning from the Secretaryship of War soon after having been appointed, claiming, in deference to Congress, that acceptance was unconstitutional, a decision that may not have been his alone. His resignation was obviously the moment he made his political choice, or it was made for him. Certainly it was a necessary step 11 to preserve his wide appeal as a potential candidate. In the growing conflict between Johnson and Congress, the Re.dice.ls·were winning some important successes over the executive. It must have been obvious th•t the Radical Republican& were far stronger than the Moderate1.;. If Grant cut himself off f.t·om them, his only alternative would have been to stand ae the Democratic candidate, which was an unlikely c:hoice since the Democratic party had been dealt a severe blow by the Rebellion and by Reconstruction, and Grant himself was the symbol of the Northern victory. Just who was responsible for his decision is, del.)atable. Undoubtedly he had some political ambitions; Gideon Welles recorded in his diary that Grant gave the impression that he felt certain of success and did not displty any opposition to the idea of standing for office,.< 3> However, it is doubtful that Grant had the political acumen to have found his way unaided through the confusion of post-war politics. Much of his success must be attributed to Badeau, Rawlins and Radical leaders such as Benjamin Sutler and Nathaniel P. Banks, who appealed to Grant and who found it easy t~ manipulate him. It may be true that he was led into office by such men, but it is equally true that he put up little

(3) Welles, Q¼!£¥• Vol. III, P.183 12 resistance. The majority of Republicans welcomed him;( 4) some, notably Charles Sumner, had reservations about nominating Grant as party representative when his party convictions were anything but strong(S), but they must have had considerable confidence in his chances of success. The power of his attraction as a candidate disguised some fundamental flaws. Neither his upbringing nor his education prepared him for political power. He was retiring to the point of apparent shyness, honest to the point of naivete, blunt and unsubtle. There seemed to be "an absence of vanity, of ambition, of pride in his

success, of selfishness. 11 <6> Conscious of his intellectual inferiority, he kept his opinions to himself and in any company which awed him, he would remain silent to such a degree that he was con­ sidered by some to be stupid.(?) His lack of legal training and his ignorance of constitutional law were added handicaps. In Januaryf 1867, Welles wrote "••• General Grant will very likely be the next President of the United States. I do not think he intends to disregard the Constitution but he has no reverence for it~ he has no political principles, no intelligent ideas of constitutional government ••• 11 C8T

(4) Hesseltine,Grant.pp.120-131; E.L.Pierce,Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner.(London,1878-93) 4 Vols. Vol.IV,pp.358-60 (5) Pierce,Sumner,Vol.IV,p.358,note 1 ( 6) Adam Badeau,Grant in Peace. From Appomattox to Mount MacGregor,CHartford,Connecticut,1887),p.13 ( 7) Nevins,!1!.h,,pp.132-3 (8) Welles,Diary,Vol.III,p.15 13 In December, 1868, he expanded this further. "He can no more foreshadow, or anticipate, or design a course of political action, than he can make a speech to a popular audience ••• of the structure of the government, and a proper administration of its affairs, he is singularly and wonderfully ignorant••• and has really no idea that the Constitution is any more restreiot upon him as President than as Genera1. 11 (9J Although Welles was an acrid and antipathetic observer, these opinions were probably close to the truth. Grant had accepted the Presidency, as others had before him, as a reward for services rendered to the Republic. At the time, his only success in a lifetime had been military and the only control and leadership he understood were those of the army. A contemporary wrote: "His own idea of his duties as President was always openly and consistently expressed, and may perhaps be best described as that of the commander of an army in time of peace. He was to watch over the faithful administration of the government; ••• and as it was the duty of every military commander to obey the civil authority without question, so it was the duty of the President to follow without hesitation the wishes of the people as expressed by Congress••• (He) assumed at the outset that it was not his duty to ste~r1) that his were only duties of discipline~'( 1u It is probably true that he saw himself as a figurehead, but one, nevertheless, with considerable authority. If it came to a difference between himself and Congress, he felt, despite his attitude to Congress, that his should be the last word, for the good of the country.

( 9 ) Ibid , p • 48 3 (10) Adams, "The Session", N.A.R.,pp.33-34 14 The times, and even the kind of role Grant envisaged for himself, demanded a strong President and a political wisdom which he did not possess. A power he needed most was the ability to deal with Congress, for it became obvious as his Presidency continued, that he had no understanding of authority as a force constitu­ tionally distributed among the three bodies of government - the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary; nor did he appear to realize that ultimate responsibility was his, and he frequently blamed Congress, or individuals, for the failure of his plans. Casehardened by straightforward military strategy, he failed in two important ways to cope with Congress - he was neither strong, nor diplomatic, All his life he had had an almost superstitious regard for the power of Congress, wh:i.ch he saw as invested not so much in a constitution­ ally well-organized and authoritarian body, as in a romantic c:onglomeration of representatives of "the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over whom he preside(d) 11 <11>. Yet at the same time, when Congress disagreed with him he saw it then as a collection of individuals personally opposed to his authority, seldom considering that perhaps a large section of the country too did not endorse his actions. This ambivalent

(11) U.S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of u.s. Grant(2 vols. London, 1886) Vol,If,~.510. Xt is interesting to note that Grant used 'feeling" and "judgment" as if the entire c:ountry thought only one way. He had little concept of Congressional opposition. 15 attitude illustrated his lack of understanding both of his role and of Congress, and hinted at his failure to recognize that Congress needed to be controlled and led as well as heeded. Congress, on the other hand, certainly understood and took advantage of this weakness. Many difficulties he did, of course, inherit. Congress, under Johnson, had won a considerable victory in its fight for ultimate authority and was still attempting to maintain the measure of power it had wrested from the Executive. It was hardly to be expected that Congress would stand aside and let the new President exercise his constitutional right to control foreign policy unchallenged, but Grant's limited understanding of diplomacy and his imperialistic ideals were a positive encouragement to Congressional interference and obstruc­ tionism. While it must be accepted that his problems with Congress were not all of his own making, his tactlessness and political ignorance did nothing to placate his opponents. His relationships with Congress should have been cushioned by his Cabinet ; as Adams wrote in 1870: "Knowledge somewhere, either in himself, or in his servants is essential even to an American President••• and thus, though it was a matter of comparatively little importance that the President's personal notions of civil gove~nment were crude••• it was of the highest possible consequence that his advisors should be able to supply the knowledge t~,y he could not have been expected to possess."

(12) Adams, "The Session",N.A.R.,p.34 16 Grant's Cabinet, however,. was not impressive and his choices only served to emphasize his political uncer­ tainty. The hopes for a strong Presidency that many entertained were dealt a severe blow by this Cabinet;(l3 ) most of its members were army friends or those who had rendered some party service, and Grant seemed to avoid any who, as experienced politicians, could have helped him deal with a recalcitrant Congress. Hesseltine maintains that in his choice of Cabinet members Grant was ruled by two considerations. Quoting Badeau and

Rawlins as authorities, he claims that Grant's first desire was that he should not feel obligated to politicians, and the second was to have no Cabinet member overshadow him. (l4 ) Welles, on the other hand, (15) believed Grant was aiming at a rejection of all parties. Both these interpretations have weaknesses. Hesseltine takes no note of the fact that the President remained loyal to, and influenced by, men such as Hamilton Fish, who was widely regarded as the only man of ability in the Government, or of the fact that Grant not infrequently relied upon the opinions of men of acknowledged political shrewdness, such as Butler. Welles was assuming political acumen in Grant, a quality he had earlier . ( 16) categorically denied him. It was political ignorance

(13) Nevins,Fish,pp.107-8; Hesseltine,Grant,pp.137-9 (14) Hesseltine,Grant,p.139 (15) Welles,Diary,Vol.III,p.545 (16) Ibid,p.483 17 which dictated Grant•s choices. There was certainly no cohesion in the Cabinet and within a few days there were changes. He was forced to give in to Congressional insistence that Stewart, as one actively engaged in commerce, could not be allowed to accept the Secretary­ ship of the Treasury.(t?) Then it was discovered that Washburne had been made Secretary of State as a gesture to an old friend, and he resigned within a few days. At least two men - Jacob Cox, Secretary of the Interiort and Rawlins, Secretary of War - had been soldiers with Grant, and Stewart and Adolphe Borie, Secretary of the Navy, had contributed to the party funds. "No statesman and patriot with right intentions would have selected it (the Cabinet) or any other of untried men for such positions." wrote Welles. There were two important areas where lack of contact between Grant and his Cabinent members and advisors was seriously to affect the efficiency of the administration.

(17) Hesseltine, Grant, p.147 (18) Welles, Diary, Vol.III, pp.544-5 (19) Pierce, Sumner, Vol.IV,pp.373-4; Hesseltine, Grant, p.149. Hesseltine describe Dent as aide-de-camp, not Secretary. 18 Firstly, few of th(~ administration• s officers understood him. He was difficult to reach, and .if criticized would become stubbornly quiet. No-one was sure how he would deal with the issues of the day, and during his Presidency this uncertainty increased. Even Badeau and Rawlins who claimed to be able to manage and control him, which to some degree they could, acknowledged that they did not know why he succeeded but believed in him because he did.( 20) More importantly, Grant aggravated this by refusing to take anyone into his confidence. He was nervous of discussion and uncertain of delegated authority, and trusted only those he had known for some time. Rawlins and Badeau could influence his thinking, but Rawlins died soon after the beginning of Grant's first term, and Badeau was never a trustworthy or dislnterested advisor. Cabinet members, however, were seldom informed of Grant's ideas until the moment they were expected to endorse them. Each man ran his depart­ ment with little interference from Grant; there was thus little Presidential leadership or discipline, and no apparent policy. This led to frequent differences of opinion and embarrassment, though Grant was fortunate that his Cabinet was loyal. Nevins, and Cox, considered that Grant's aversion to discussing ideas and policies was one of the more severe handicaps upon the efficient

(20) Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams - An Autobiography. (Boston, 1961),pp.264-5 19 running of the administration.< 21 > By not turning to his Cabinet members for aid but remaining secretive, he lessened their usefulness, deprived himself of their advice and counsel, weakened the chances for success of numerous measures, and left himself to flounder alone in the responsibility of government. Possibly the most successful individual in the Cabinet was the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish. Just why Grant picked this man for this most important role was not obvious; the two men had been friends for some

time, <22 > and recent hospitality to Grant may have kept him in eye, but Fish had been out of active politics since 1857. The choice was certainly a surprise to American political observers, but it proved to be a wise one, and he was to become the most highly regarded official of Grant's two administrations. Hamilton Fish was a man of upper class New York background. Well-educated, reserved, cosmopolitan and sophisticated, Fish had grown up in a home in which intellectual and political discussion was encouraged.< 23 > When he himself entered politics in the early 1840s, he was an established lawyer, well entrenched in the upper echelons of society, with an influential wife and a growing family. His education, his profession and his

(21) Nevins, Fish,pp,..132-3; J.D.Cox, "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General," Atlantic Monthly, August 1895, p.173. (22) Nevins, F[sh, p.105 (23) Nevins, f sh, pp.8-12 20 wealth linked him with what was loosely called the "vested interests" of the city and like many of his group he chose to enter politics in the service of the

Whigs.< 24 > His father, a staunch Whig and active in politics, no doubt influenced his decision.

In the 1840's the Whig Party of New York was developing as a defence against the onslaught of the Loco-Foco Democrats. These radical voices demanded the destruction of established incorporations to end the chance of America's becoming a land of "inert security for the wealthy11 .< 25 > The Whig Party manifesto appealed generally to the secure and the professional, men who had much to lose by the upsetting of established patterns of society. Usually pacific and conservatively. traditional, the Whigs thus appealed to Fish, whose conservatism, ingrained in his background and way of life, was an important factor in his attitude to politics and political responsibility.< 26 ) He served in Congress, unspectacularly, from 1842 to 1845 as a Member of the House of Representatives, and between 1845 and 1851, when he was elected to the Senate, he served as Lieutenant-Governor, then as Governor of New York. His one term in the Senate was capably but not outstandingly fulfilled< 27 > and in 1857, cut off

(24) Ibid, Chap.1 (25) Ibid, p.23 (26) Ibid, Chap.II (27) Ibid, Chap.III; Pierce, Sumner, :rv, p .. 375 21 from many contemporaries by his deep conservatism and abhorrence of radical commitm•nt, he found he could not compete with the candidates of the new, vociferous Republican party •nd lost his seat. In the Senate he had been respected enough to be given committee service, the most important for his future role being his election to the Foreign Relations Committee. But he kept himself out qf all great con• troversies, being so accommodating that he was virtually negative. Although an early apostle of abolition he found even this ideal distasteful as soon as it departed from what he considered rational and balanced debate, and became a political weapon of the radicals. As the warmth of ~rgument increased so his ardour lessened. "The reopening of the ale.very e.gitation, and the proposed negation of a solemn compact between conflicting sections and opinions is in every point of view, to be greatly deplored••• with all th• Northern sentiment on the subject of slavery strongly and even actively operating on my mind and my conduct as a private citizen, I have ever refused to obtrude my sentiments or to express my opinions $0 as to offend those ~~~f;~~~ta;t!~~P~~~!1i~~;0 ~h~{ !~1~~ri ~~~~p~ • .,< 29 > His concern was not to compromise his pacifism by taking aides. The expansionist mood of the late t840s and of the 1850s a.lso disenchanted himi; he 1Saw only its dangers to the Union. His reticence about discussing either slavery or expansionism and his complete withdrawal from

(28) Nevins, Fiph, p.52 22 the heat of politieal life rendered him, if not~ oddity, at l•aat r•thar unintereeting to observera. The only i••u•• which •••mad to rous• him to any extremes ot feeling w•t• the fate of the Union, and ot the party. Hie concern tor pa~ty unity ~•Y help to explain hi• political diffidenc•• •nd hi• r•l•tionahip with Grant. Alway• a 1taunch party man he •how•d that this loyalty came, and waa to coma, ~•tore many personal friend1hip1 and beliefs. Hence, the tempe~ing ot hi• anti-alavery inatincta by• recognition ~f the unfortunately de1true­ tive emotionaliam ot the period wa• part of hie tear for the future of the party. As Northern and Southern difference• became ao much greater than their area• of agreement Fi1h bemoaned their effect upon the Union, and •poke againat the agitator• who, whether of the No~th or the South, "will .ta±•• the f•ll spirit of diacord, and let loo•• wild paaeion• and 1ectional differences which may rend in sunder the (2g) bonda which have hitherto made us one ne.tion. •• The 1pl1ntertng of the Whig party he found profoundly disquieting,••• symbol yet again of the greater disharmony of the country, and the rather melo­ dramatic union of the New York Whig• and Republican• did nothing to•••• hi• feara.< 3o) Although Republieaniam wa• ab1ox-bing mueh that wae Whiggiah, Fiah bowed to the

(29) Nevins, F!!b, p.52 (30) Xl:.lid, p.55 23 change with reluctance. He had hoped for something based on "broader and more catholic grounds", and was die,a.tisfied with t:tu, sectional quality of the newly developing party.< 31 > The intolerant •ntagonism towards anything Southern which w•• part of the Republican out­ look worried him, and he joined t:he party only after lengthy hesitation, probably l)eeause, as one deeply !nterestt1d in politic•, he felt a need or duty to follow some party. Hia concern and sense may be obvious today; it was then politically unwise for it cost him advance­ ment.<32> And although he spoke pUblicly in favour of the Repul:>licans,< 33 > he refused the chance of another term as Senator and le:tt, in 1857, for a tour of Europe, thus avoiding involvement in the important years from 1857 to 1859. The war left him as out of touch with Northern aec:t:lonali1m as ever, and he prepared to interest himself solely in busine•s and municipal matters. He was still interested in politd.. ee and once the war deetroyed many of the more obvious Northern grievances against the South he felt he could commit hirnselt with mo.rt enthusiasm to the Republican party. The usurpation of party leadership by the Radie•l wing; however, probably encouraged his decision to •void active politics. He was, at 60, more than a little surprised to find himself

(31.) Ibid,p.56; Pierce, S\J!l)Qe,[.IV,p,376 (32) Pierce, sumner,:tv,p.376 (33) Nevins, tisb,P•62 24 Grant's next choice for Secretary of State, and he was very loath to take up the position.< 34 ) He finally accepted "becauae the rea..sons presented seemed·•• to affect high interests, 0 <35 > but it ha.d taken considerable pleading by. Grant and diplomatic argument on: the part of B8.bc:ock.< 3G> The general reaction of the public to his appointment was favourable, many probably regarding this choice the best of a predominantly mediocre selection for Cabinet. Certainly Fish wae in the happy position of having antagonized neither one political aide nor the other. There is no evidence of any enemies in Congress; no-one $poke against his inclusion in the Cabinet. Sumner was well-disposed towards hint, and even Welles noted• °Fish is a New Yorker of medium talents, a man of wealth, of some expe.rience and fair accomplishments, e. moderate Republican, an old Whig• not an extreme man, will be rightly disposed •nd be likely to do tolerably well, if things move rightly, put without energy or force to corre~t ireeidential errors or to resent wrong. 11 l37) No-one, it seemed, expected great things of him yet he was to be a very successful Secretary of State. He came to the office with very little enthusiasm. He w•s not sure that he was fitted for this task, and

(34) N•vins,Fish,pp~112-3; Pierce, Sumner,IV,pp.374-80 (35) Pierce,sumne,.rv,p.379 (36) Hesseltine,Gra~t,p~147 (37) Welles,Diary,f I,p.551 25 did not intend to remain for more than a few months.< 3a> He had no formal diplomatic training nor even a thorough g~asp ot the issues of foreign affairs. The sum total of his E1xperi,imc:e had been two years Sen.ate Committee service whi<::h had included a tact-finding mission to Cuba. He had had an extended period in Europe and during the war he had served as a Northern negotiator with the South for the exchange of prisoners. It was a flimsy b•sis for the eight years of concentrated diplomacy he wa, to be called upon to undertake. More­ over, though strongly anti-e,cpansionist by nature and polities, he was to become the diplomatic instrument of an expansionist era. However. his strengths were his loyalty, his commonsense; and his awareness of political responsibility. He did not have the •ggx-essive self... a,sertion of Seward, but was prepared to counter Grant•s frequently ignor•nt dogmatism with hi$ own caution and mode~ation, especially where ~dmini•trative unity was in the bal•nce. Armed with this, and a certain ahrewd­ ness, he wa:e to prove himself the most ccmsi!tently successful member of the Cabinet, The office of Secretary of State is at the best of times difficult, for foreign affairs is the department Of the exeeut1ve, and the Seetetary can work in only as

(38) Ne.vina.Fi1h 1p.11s. Grant •ugg••ted that he stay until the end of the Congressional $eesion, $nd Fi•h suggested Edwards Pierrepont as successor, 26 much room•• the President allows him.< 39 > Although, as in Fish's case, the Secretary may gain the Freaident•a confidence to such a degr~• that the latter will gr•nt virtual autonomy of action, this is not a constitutional requirement on the part of the President, who ma.y interfere as much •11 he lites or thinks necessary. Even Fish, whom Grant believed indiapensable, and to whom he gave consider«tble authority, had to contend with Granti$ frequent interference and secretiveness. When wor~ing ,smoothly• the fre,sident... secret;ary relationship is one of partnership, but a p•rtnership whert • good deal of care must be displayed by the Secret•rY, firstly not to give the impression that he controls the Pre~ident, and secondly not to become a mere figureh•ad. Becau1e of the importance and frequent d•lice.cy of thi• office, it hau of'ten been considered that the Secretary should be ab.eve the run... ot•the... mill tri1c1ls and pettiness of politic•• but thil!I has t!Seldoro been practic­ able. The result is that the Secr•tary remain• i!hackled by any Congresa~onal •ntipathy, whether on the grounds of personality or ot principle. H$nty Adams lamented the relationship of Secretary and Congress. "The Secretary of .. Ste.te has always stood as much alone as the nistorian,.· Required to look fa.r ahead and round him, he measures forces unknown to party managers. and has found Congress more or les~ hostile ever since Congress first sat, The Secretary of State

(39) For this paragraph see L.H. Chamberlain and R.c. Snyder- Americ&n. Foreign Policy(New York,1948) 27 •xiets only to recognize the existence of a world which Congress would rather ignore; of oblig•tions Which Congress repudiates whenever it c:an; of b•rg•ins which Congress di1truats •nd tries. to tux-n to its advantage or to reject. Since the first day the Senate exiated it bas always intrigued against the Sec.1:'$t•ry of State whenever the S•cretary has been obliged to ~xtend his function• beyond the a:c.,poi. ntment of Consuls in Senlt:ol!'s' ••u:vioe. ''' 7J.0) It was this which Fish was to find so difficult. Half­ way between a Congress and a President virtually •tone another•s throats, he had no real power to wield in order to maintain a balance or to keep the machinety of forei9n policy working smoothly. Unal:>le by the con$titution to deal with Congress personally, either to lead or to explain his attitudes, his measures were transl'l\itted by the Prttsidfmt: to a body antipathetic to the Executive. Xn these years of Executive-legislature conflict, the position of Secretary of State• tot•lly dependent upon the President for authority, and requiring the support of Congreas to achiev~ anything at all, was frustrating •nd difficult. Fish's closest contacts with Cong.teas werEt th.,::ough the foreign relations committees of '.both ttous•s; but these contacts with the moet vital legislative bodies handling :foreign policy we.re indirect and impersonal,· and the tenor of Congressional antagoni$m towards the Executive and the latter's so-called encroachment upon their powers made 28 peaceful relations almost impossible. The more influential of the two committees was that in the Senate, because of that body's constitutional right to a part in the conduct of foreign affairs. The Chairman when the Administration took office was Charles Sumner, Senator from Massachusetts. Charles Sumner came to the Senate in 1851 after his brilliant speechest particularly those against slavery, brought him to the public eye. He was an effective Senator, erratic in ability but enthusiastic and emotional in an age which paid much attention to such attributes. He gained more esteem than he warranted after the Preston Brooks attack in 1858 which made him a martyr in the cause of abolition and spread his fame internationally. Upon his return to his seat after a lengthy convalescence he was regarded as the Senate's spiritual leader, and his power grew accordingly. In March, 1861, Sumner was made Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, possibly the para­ mount post in the Senate. Taking into account his political experience, his standing among his colleagues and his reputation in foreign political circles, his effect should have been one of considerable value, but its usefulness to the Grant Administration was blunted by growing personal faults which lessened his judgment. By 1868 he was querulous, vain and troublesome, until even those who revered him found him trying. He 29 was no longer the fiery visionary of the 1850a. With abolition achieved, Sumner was like a crusa.de.r without a crusade. He eould not find the same glory in Recon­ struction, or economice, or the other realities of post~ war politic$ and without his great cause he was too often reduced to personal spites, E:ven his oratoric•l fire was beginning to dim, and Pierce, a rnost aympathetic observer, acknowledged the.t Sumner•s speeches were oc::easion•lly rambling end heavy.< 41 > Yet despite these failings, he remained the most influential single individual in the Senate, if not in Congress. Squally important, he eould still sway public:: opinion and publication of his speeches could afftct the political thinking of many people who regarded him as the leader of the Senate. At Grant's $lection it did not appear that there was likely to be any antagonism between the President and the Chairman, although Sumner did not view the incoming President: with any enthusiasm., The two had little in col'l'll'l\on. But it was galling for a man of Sumner•s education, expetiencze and a,ophistication to be governed by one who increasingly revealed an alarming lack of political skill. swnner also doubted Grant's political convictions, tor he was a very determined Republican and found Grant's late ~onversion to the P~rty disturbing.< 42 >

(41) Pierce, sumner,Vol.IV,p.264 (42) Pierce, SUmner,Vol.lV,p.358 30 There h•ve been other more selfish motives aasigned to Sumner, non~ of which can be conclusively proven.< 43 > The only one which iasupportable ;Ls that he desired the office of Secretary of State and was annoyed by his · . . . . . · (44) failure to receive it.. Whatever the reasons, Sur11ner undoubtedly harboured a lat£tnt distrust of Grant. This revealed it,elf fully in the Santo Domingo debates where the Chairman led a personal attack on the President which eventually res\llted in his own downf•ll. He was replaced as Chairm•n of the Foreign Rela,tions Conunittee by Simon Cameron, a rnan of dubious honesty but one dedicated to doing the Parµy•s bidding. Under his less inspiring but more acceptsl>le leadership, the Foreign Relation• Committee became mo~$ of an Administra­ tion rn•chine,.

(43) See Pier.ce1 op.cit.,Vol.IV,pp.371-73; Hesseltine, Gpant,p,136,n.29 (44) Pierce. op.cit •• Vol.IV,pp.171 (note).371 30b.

ULLYSSES S. GRANT

CHARLf;S SUMNER HAMILTON F'ISH 31 CHAPTER IIX Xn October, 1868, revolution broke out in CUba. It cannot h•ve been unexpected, for numeroue attempts had been made by Cube.n rt.dicals to induce the Spanish to gra.nt certain reforms, sueh as the right to repre­ ••ntation in the Sp•ni•h Cortes, the rela~ation of tariffs, and the abolition of •lavery. The moat recent application for these reforms had been in 1865, when the Cuban Reform Party submitted a petition to the Spanieh government, which wa11 at that time encouragingly Liberal. It appeared to many Cuban• that their hopes would at last be fulfilled, despite the efforts of the

Spanish Cuban °Moderadc>s 0 to blacken such moves with the brand of 0 revolutionaty0 ,(i) and on July 9, 1.866, the

Cortes pa.s11ed 11A Law for the suppression and Punishment of the Slave Trade0 , which marked a beginning. The Cuban hopes, however, began to dwindle when, in August, 1866, the Liberal party tell to the Moderadoa who, linked by financial •nd economic ties to the slaveowners of Duba and Puerto Rico, oppoaed the growing reformist ,entiment. The f11.te of the convention which had been suggested as a method of investigating the Cuban demands seemed to be in the balance but the new government decided to proceed. This liberal gesture was rendered worthless by the naming of an additional twenty-one commissioners

('1) Philips. Fone,;, A Histo,ry of Cµ};?a and !tf :Relati.ons with the United Stat~• (2 Vols. ~ew York,1963), Vo1.II,pp.1sf... 9,· X:ti.rreferenc;:es hereafter are to Vol. II. 32 representing the Spanish government, who were thus placed in the mJjority. While the Cuban represent•tives in Spain extolled their ease, the ai1:.ua.tion in Cuba deteriorated, with sporadic outbneak:s of violence and the development of• Republican Society of Cuba which, eneour~ged by th~ Union victory in th• United St11.tes and by the revolution­ ary successes in Mexico and Santo Domingo, called for "liberty for all the inhabitant! of Cuba and Puerto

Rico, without di•tinetion of rae• and colour0 .< 2> It w•• a hopeful cry and it w•• a sign th•t mere compromises were unlikely to be acceptable, The fall of the Spanish Monarchy in S•ptembelr, 1868, albeit to a liberal provisional 9overnment, did not change the situation. The provisional government m•de various promiees and decrees, which included universal male suffrage, and freedom of religion, of association and of the press, but the Cubans had lost faith tn Spanish reform movements. The royalists wete firmly entrenched in Cuban politics and the f•ct that their leaders had fallen in Spa.in did not affect their continuing autho.rity. Decrees were made hundreds of miles away by governments which could not retain power long enough to enforce these decrees were not likely to touch the Cuban situation. This, plus the fact that Puerto Rico had not w•ited for Cuban

·------( 2 ) Fon er, Cu)?a !,nd u. S • , p. 164 33 support before declaring itself an independent republic, encouraged the increased acti~ity of Cuban revolutionary meetings. When the revolt planned for Christmas Eve was uncovered,_ the leaders chose to begin it immediately rather than face the consequences of disloyalty.

Although the revolt proclaimed its intention to free the slaves, it was not primarily a revolution of the lower classes. Rather, it was one organized by the educated Cuban bourgeoisie and landowners who were protesting against the competition of Spaniards on the island. Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, one of the leaders, was a lawyer and landowner, and the officers of the

Cuban Junta in New York, Morales Lemus, Alfaro, Jose

Mora, Goicuria and Basora were all men of ability and

~ducation. The Declaration itself indicated the middle class nature of the revolution. Its main complaints were those of economic strangulation caused by inhibitive duties, the inability of Cubans to gain positions in the government of their own country, the prohibition of meetings and gatherings, and the denial of political education, all of which reflected the frustration engendered by the collapse of the reform movement. Only in the last short paragraph did the subject of the abolition of slavery appear. It was first and foremost a revolution of thwarted office-holders, planters and merchants, and only secondly a movement for abolition. 34 Whe news of the outbre~Jc of open violence reached a-.vana some weeks latei;:-, where it was regarded as inconsequential, .•• juet a 0 handful of deluded, badly •rmed fellow1°.< 3) With only 147 volunte$rs, the revolutionary armoury c::on1iated of 45. fowling pieeea, 4 rifle••• few pistols, a numb~r of machetes, and very little aminunition•( 4) The organization was limited to the eastern se~tion ot the island and the Spaniards were convinced that it could be contained there. Yet $S the revolutionary fotee engaged the Spaniards in battle, it became apparent that this was a misplaced confidence. Month by month the army gr$W in nUmb$rS from 147 to 9,700 by the end of October and to at least 1.s,000 by the end of the year, 1hey remained ill-equipped but by December they had taken over the city of Bayamo, had cut internal communications and had defeated numbers of Spanish detachments turned out hurriedly to meet the surpriee a.ttac.k. The Spanish responded remarkably quickly once the magnitude of i:h$•rebellion was clear. A recruitment programme was set into motion, and 90,000 Remingtons were purchased from the United States. On the island began th• organization of the "Voluntaries", Spanish Cubans bitterly opposed to the demands of the native Cubans and vicious in their defence of the way of life

(3) Foner,Cupa !Jld ij·s.,p.174 (4) Foner,CUba and.S.,p.174; Nevins,Fish,p.179 ' ~ 35 they knew and eontrolled.< 5> The reaction in the United Stat•s was one of wide­ spread sympathy with the .rebels, a reaction which beccune ffiOte vocal as the rebels began to suffer before the

9.rowing Spanish resist$nce• Many :felt that the American p•a1r obliged them to 90 to t.he aid of those struggling to free themeelves fx-om the tyra.nny of £uropeah imperialism .. ( S) '?'he rebels themselves awaited the results of the 18'8 United States •leetions with interestf for they believed that should Grant be elected to the Presidency one of his first acts would be "to liquidate Spanish domination in the island of Cuba, le•ding eventually to its annexation to the United States",< 7> a view which had tna.ny adherents in the United States where there had long been an interest in the annexation of Cuba. As the largest isl•nd int.he We•t Indies, situated at the mouth o,f the Gulf of Mexico and only one hundred and thirty miles-· from Florida, CUba had naturally e.ttracted Atnerican attention, though the concern was decidedly more offensive than defensive. According to Weinburg, (S) this interest was evident from:.the 1820's

(5)

( 6) 1868 ( 7) (8) 36 when the theory of the sea as one of the most complete of boundaries began to break down before the new ideals of expansionism. To the exponents of expansionist theories Cuba and Puerto Rico became simply extensions of national territory which it was natural but imperative to acquire. One of the leaders of this attitude was John Quincy Adams who wrote in the 1820s: "These islands, from their local positions, are natural appendages to the North American continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of tran­ scendent importance to the political and commercial interests of our Union. It is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. 11 (9) This awareness of Cuba steadily became more acute and the years leading up to the outbreak of the Civil War saw numerous attempts to bring Cuba within the Union. As the Union extended and consolidated along the

Gulf of Mexico the policies and politics of Cuba became correspondingly more .important to the United States. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was the first concrete sign of this awareness of the Caribbean and of Cuba in particular. However, the case of Cuba illustrated one of the weaknesses of the Doctrine, for it apparently did not intend to allow Cuba to throw off Spanish rule if

(9) Ibid,p.67; Langley,Cuban Policy of u.s.,pp.11-12 37 this could give rise to a Negro Republic. The spectre of a black republic impressed itself upon American thought in the 1840s and 1850s(iO) when the interest in Cuba was at its height, endorsed by the fear of the South that it would be surrounded by slave-free states. The resultant vigorous efforts of Southern politicians to encourage the acquisition of Cuba were defensive measures, given added impetus by the pressure of Britain upon Spain to declare Cuba slave-free. In 1848 the Polk Administration, alarmed by this British activity, offered to buy the island for $100,000,000, which it felt sure Spain would accept. The reaction was antagonistic, to the surprise of Polk who had failed to consider Spanish pride, a failure on the part of Americans which was to continue throughout later negotiations. Conditions likely to encourage intervention were always present as the political situation in Cuba was, at best, unsteady, and revolt continually threatened to break out. However, this gained little sympathy or support from official American sources, which were instead bent on maintaining the authority of the Spanish until they could be either bought out or removed by force, leaving the United States to establish a Cuban

(10) Gavin B. Henderson, "Southern Designs on Cuba, 1854- 1857"• J.S.H. Vol.V,1939; A.C.Wilgus,"Official Manifest Destiny Sentiment Concerning Hispanic America",L.H.Q.,Vol.,XV,1932; Langley,Cuban Policy of u.s.,pp.7-8; Pierce,sumner,Vol.III,pp.567-8 38 government more suitable to American policies. Under the Whig government of Zachary Taylor the interest in Cuba shown by the Democrats was not sustained; internal power struggles dominated politics.< 11 > This lack of official concern did not deter several filibustering attempts which, organized and often led by Narcisco Lopez, a Cuban expatriate, and encouraged by the Cuban Junta in New York, sailed frequently for Cuba from 1849 until 1851 when Lopez was caught by the Spaniards and executea.<12 > The romantic interest engendered by Lopez and by his "martyrdom" made filibustering an appealing exercise for the more active of idealists or arms­ runners, and during the next decades it became an adventure openly supported by many in the United States and covertly encouraged by officialdom because of the refusal to enforce its prevention. Official interest in Cuba continued more positively with the return to power of the Democrats under Franklin Pierce in 1852. His determination to acquire Cuba was apparent early in his presidency. Britain and France, anticipating this, attempted to induce the United States to co-operate in a tripartite convention in which all three would individually and collectively renounce any

(11)Pierce,Sumner,Vol.III,p.255 (12)Langley,Cuban Policy of u.s.,pp.27-33; Foner,Cuba and u.s.,pp.90-93 39 aggressive intentions towards Cuba.< 13 > This was avoided, for it would have crippled the United States• expansionist hopes. Two years later the most determined attempt to date to acquire Cuba was made by American ministers in Europe - Pierre Soule in Spain, John Mason in France and James Buchanan in Great Britain - who met in October, 1854, to discuss the problem. The result was the Ostend Manifesto which, although not specifically ordered by the Pierce government, was justifiably regarded as being symbolic of the administration's intentions. It declared that the acquisition of Cuba by the United States was a foregone conclusion, that nothing could prevent it, and that any attempt by European powers to do so would be regarded as unwarranted interference. It caused a vehemGnt reaction in Europe and it was quickly disowned by Pierce.

(13) Langley,op.cit,pp.35-36; Foner,op.cit,p.94; Van Alstyne, American Diplomacy in Actiop,pp.537-538 (14) Henderson,"Southern Designs on Cuba",pp.373-5 40 minister in Washington, was convinced that such was the determination of the whole country upon the annexation of the island that the United States must ultimately succeed, and he encouraged the view that Britain and Europe should resign themselves to the fact, <15 > but opinion was not as unanimous as Napier supposed, In 1858 there was another effort to buy Cuba which did get as far as a favourable report from the Foreign Relations Committee but, when presented to the Senate, it was taken up by the Republicans to be talked to extinction in the cause of abolitionism. The next session of Congress was hopelessly divided, and the measure came to nothing. Then the Civil War attracted attention elsewhere and Cuba was ignored until 1865. During the presidency of Andrew Johnson, Secretary of State Seward expanded American interests both north and south, but he did not see Cuba as one of the West Indian bases he valued so highly. His vision of empire included the island but like many others he believed that it would fall naturally into American hands.< 16) The outbreak of open violence in Cuba forced the United States to consider more carefully its relationships with the island. Filibustering seemed to be committing the government to a policy it could never afford to maintain;

( 15) Henderson, "Southern Designs on Cuba" ,PP• 383-4 (16) Frederic Bancroft, "Seward's Ideas of Territorial Expansion",N.A.R.,Vol.CLXVII,pp.85-6 41 on the other hand, many Americans felt sincerely that their country had a moral obligation to support the Cuban rebels. So, too, did many of the rebels. The New York Times on March 11, 1869, recorded that "some••• Cubans declare their belief that as soon as General Grant is inaugurated he will recognize the belligerent rights of the Revolutionary Government in Cuba"• The stand taken by Grant would be important. The situation at Grant's inauguration was highly emotional. Since the news of the revolt had reached the United States in late 1868, scarcely a day went by without some mer1tion of the Cuban fight for independence i n some .na t iona. 1 newspaper. (l?) Amer i cans were s t·irre d by the apparent similarities of the Cuban struggle to their own experience. Anti-monarchical feeling was, if anything. stronger following the vindication of republicanism in the Civil War. Resentment of Spanish imperial presence on the very border of the United States ran high. The fact that Spain was chronically weak, poverty-stricken and governed by a provisional military government which was attacked on all sides by monarchists,

liberals and republicans 1 made this seem a good time to wrest Cuba from its control.

·(17) e.g. New York Times, New York T;ibune, Boston Daily Globe 42 Taking advantage of, and encouraging, this wave of fellow-feeling was the New York Cuban Junta, the head­ quarters of a number of similar organizations all over the country, most of which were run by Cuban refugees. The New York Junta was not a new body, but the renewed revolt in Cuba increased its activity, which, as more refugees flooded into the United States, became wide­ spread and highly organized. Their work involved training recruits to be returned to Cuba, maintaining an inflammatory newspaper in New York, organizing mass meetings and rallies, and undertaking anything that would raise money for their cause. One of the largest rallies in the early months of Grant's Administration was on March 25 in New York, and speakers included Mayor Hall and Henry Ward Beecher.CiS} Money poured in from all quarters, women gave up their jewellry and organized women's rallies< 19 > and the call for intervention increased. Congressmen were approached by representa­ tives of the Junta, and letters pleading for recognition of Cuban belligerency were sent to the President and the Secretary of State. Resolutions to this effect were submitted in Congress( 20) and though they failed to pass, the movement was not discouraged. Grant himself was warmly sympathetic to the cause

(18) New York Times, March 26, 1869. (19) New York Times, March 6 7 22, 1869. (20} Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 1 sess-,pp.59,86,276 43 of Cuban freedom. Like many other Americans he was affected by the humanitarian and political arguments, but a more important influence upon his thinking was

John H~ Rawlins, the Secretary of War. Not only was he

a widely respected member of the Cabinet,{21 ) but he was one of Grant's trusted friends.< 22 > Able and frequently

tactful, he was also fiercely enthusiastic about Cuban independence, and exhorted Grant to take some action.

The President's faith in his dying ftiena< 23 > was consJ.d~rable and Fish was well aware of the danger he presented. Rawlins• motives, however, were suspect. Although he was genuinely affected by the straits of the Cuban rebels, there later appeared proof of his having subscribed generously to the notorious Cuban bonds. These bonds, which aroused a cry of corruption from

Congress in 1870, were issued by the Junta in order to gain money and were redeemable upon the success of the revolt, encouraged as this would be, it was hoped, by American aid. No mention was made of these bonds until well after Rawlins• death, when $28,000 worth were found among the securities of the impoverished general. <24 >

(21) He was spoken of by the Washington press as the ablest statesman in the Cabinet. The New York Tribune on March 12, 1869, described him as an "aggressive spirit", wanting to achieve hopes of "an ocean-bound republic"• (22) Rawlins and Grant served together during the Civil War. (23) Rawlins died on September 6, 1869, of tuberculosis. (24) To be fair to Rawlins, Fish had known of the bonds earlier (Nevins,Fish,App.III,p.921) but did not say anything, probably because he did not at that time consider that owning them was a sign of corruption. 44 This pro-Cuban influence upon Grant was not limited to Rawlins alone. Many national newspapers demanded commitment to the cause of Cuban republicanism< 25 > and so did numerous members of Congress, notably John Sherman in the Senate, and N.P. Banks and B.F. Butler in the House. <26 ) Grant was inclined to listen to these advocates in the belief that th_ey represented the true tenor of public opinion. Fish, on the other hand, was aware of the dangers to the United States inherent in a recognition of belligerency, and was concerned with the effect of pro­ Cuban arguments on the President. Like many, he believed in Cuba's rights to freedom and abolition and he sympathized with the struggles against the cruelty of Cuban slavery, but he was unconvinced by the constant emotionalism of the arguments and he did not feel that the United States was morally obliged to give aid. He felt that American interests would be best served by a policy of tact and moderation to minimize the chances of entanglement in war.< 27 > He believed that while the

(25) New York Times, New York Tribune, New York Evening ~' New York Herald, the Sun, the Nation, Boston Daily Globe, to name a few. (26) Banks had long been an expansionist, and had become one of the most impassioned defenders of the Cuban rebels. Ben Butler, always adaptable to any situa­ tion, developed into a staunch supporter of Grant. AlthouQh it appeared that his sympathies were honestly with tne Cuban cause, he was reno~ned as a schemer and as an unreliable ally. But hj was qood-humoured and appealed to Grant, wnom he ca oled and flattered. Nevins, _FishJ.pp.184,585. Also George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Sevent~ Years.(2 vols, New York, 1903),Vol.I,pp.221-25,3 9-32. (27) Nevins, Fish,p.180; Foner, Cuba and U.S.,pp.201-2 45 provisional government lasted in Spain there was a chance for the success of republicanism, which he hoped would lead inevitably to the independence and emancipa­ tion the Cubans demanded. <23 ) The encouragement or recognition of the rebels could only harm this latent movement. Fish was also aware of the possible repercussions of recognition on the pending "Alabama" negotiations, where a similar denial of belligerent rights was at the heart of the American case. Britain had extended belligerent rights to the Confederacy when the latter had had a capital, a working administrative system, a navy and a successful army, none of which the Cuban rebels possessed. To recognize the Cuban rebels would be to provide the British with ammunition.< 29 > Decision-making was complicated by the unreliability of the news, for contradictory reports came out of Cuba daily. As the early months of 1869 passed the news became only more garbled, and it was difficult to discern fact from propaganda. <3o) Every Cuban report was followed by denials from Spanish authorities. Under

(28) Nevins, op.cit.,p.181 (29) Foner, Cuba and U.S.,pp.203-4; Nevins, Fish,p.181 (30) Nevins, Fish,pp.180-2. An example of this was the report from William Newton Adams, lately consul at Santiago, asserting that the rebel government was "simply a few men under a tree". The Cuban Junta strenuously denied this but could provide no corroborative evidence. 46 these conditions any American action on behalf of the rebels would have been diplomatic folly. Fish's stand was a difficult one to maintain and it became more so as the policy he had decided upon was constantly being undermined. The Cabinet allowed Fish for the moment to continue along his cautious path. Rawlins was continually aggressive but Grant was undecided and endorsed Fish's suggestion that the only American action should be a naval enquiry into the real situation in Cuba.< 31> The Cubans, the Spanish and the American press were not so willing to temporise. Fish refused to recognize the Cubans but they came to the State Department anyway, with heated arguments about Spanish tyranny, and about what Cespedes termed "the duty imposed upon (the United States) by the political principles it proclaims and diffuses to take the leadership in this (fight) 11 <32 > The Secretary's reply was cold; Lemus, the Junta leader, was told that any letters should be directed to the State Department, and that no audiences would be permitted: "Whatever might be our sympathies with a people, wherever, in any part of the world, struggling for more liberal government, we should not depart from our duty to other friendly governments, nor be in hast~ to prematurely recognize a revolutionary move- ment until it had manifested a capacity of ( 3 ) self-sustenance and of some degree of stability." 3

(31) Nevins, Fish,p.182 (32) Foner, Cuba and u.s.,pp.199-200 (33) Foner, Cuba and u.s.,p.201 47 The Spanish were treated with similar coolness. The Spanish Minister, Don Mauricio Lopez Roberts denied reports of cruelty and demanded constantly that something be done about American filibustering excur­ sions to the island~< 34 > Both sides pressed for action. Meanwhile the pressure from the country itself increased, and there was a limited but persistent demand for annexation. On March 18, the New York Tribune wrote: "General Grant is aware of the importance of an early acquisition of Cuba and any other territory that is contiguous to the United States," hinting that the only thing that stopped him taking over the island was the fact that Congress had not yet given its permission. The New York Times gave considerable space to reports of Spanish violence and the treatment of prisoners,< 35 > and to the prayer meetings and rallies held to encourage the Cuban cause.< 3G) Late in March came the news that the Provisional Government in Spain had decided upon the restitution of a monarchy, and though a week later it was reported that this would be a constitutional monarchy it disillusioned those in the United States who had hoped for a republic,

(34) Nevins, Fish,p.183 (35) New York Times, March 19,20,21,22;April 9,12,16. (36) New York Times, March 20,21,22,23,25,26. 48 and encouraged the House of Representatives to pass on

April 9 an aggressively worded call for a recognition of the Cuban republic.< 37 >

The public indignation was constantly inflamed by reports of Spanish outrages against American individuals and shipping. Commercial vessels had been seized both inside and outside Cuban waters and their crews treated as pirates, <39 ) and Americans resident on the island (39) had had their persons and property threatened.

These reports not only excited the American intervention­ ists, but increased Rawlins• effect upon Grant, who detested cruelty.

Any remonstrances against the Spanish, however, were greeted with their outcries against filibusterers.

These expeditions were leaving American ports with considerable regularity, aided and abetted by the Junta, and the government took some time to deal with them.

The Spanish legation, on the other hand, had a very efficient detective force maintaining a watch at major ports, and their reports sent a furious Lopez Roberts to Fish with complaints and long lists of suspect (40) vessels. Although federal attorneys in all ports were told to maintain a watch, the situation did not

(37) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 2 sess.,p,276. It passed by 98 to 25. (38} Nevins,Fish,p.187; New York Times,March 16,27,28. (39) New YorkTimes, March 20,31; April 2,3. (40) Nevins,~,p.185 49 improve. Too often the officials were in sympathy with the filibusterers,. Arrests were made as precautions tightened, but evidence was difficult to find and on at least one occasion the friends of one accused fili- b us t erer overcame po li ce and rescued. him,. ( 4 i) Gra d ua 11 y the American Government made a more concerted effort to prevent expeditions leaving, but it was almost a year before filibustering was under control.

Naval vessels were moved into the area both to protect American shipping and to prevent American fili­ busterers from reaching Cuba,. This movement not only reflected the tension but increased it. The orders to resist the seizure of American vessels unless actually landing contraband could be widely and aggressively interpreted, and the appearance of more American gun­ boats in the Caribbea~ promoted both Spanish belligerence and the possibility of a clash.< 42 >

Fish saw now that he was obliged to take some action.

He could no longer afford to remain silent, but he could no more afford to consider recognition. The alternative he chose was one which did not commit the United States either way but which ultimately led it to assume a more aggressive pose than originally planned. That was the offer to arrange a peace between Spain and Cuba.

(41) Ibid,pp.185-7 (42) Nevins,Fish,p.190 50 The opportunity to put this into effect came in June, 1869, when a possible agent was chosen. This was Pauls. Forbes, a shrewd businessman who had spent much of his life in international circles and spoke French and Spanish fluently. He worked mainly in Europe and while there in 1868 and early 1869 heard confidentially that General Prim, head of the Provisional Government, was prepared to sell Cuba. After journeying to Madrid to discuss this rumour with Prim and discovering that it was true, he hastened to Washington. His eagerness undoubtedly reflected the fact that he owned Spanish bonds and represented international interests with money invested in Spain, <43 > but the possibility of buying Cuba or of being financially responsible for the island certainly appealed to the Grant Administration. Forbes had brought with him a report from Prim, which Fish and Grant read in secret on June 2. It acknowledged the monetary stagnation and the desperate straits of the economy of Spain, but pointed out that national honour was involved as well. Consequently, the report claimed, any sum decided upon would have to take into consideration the fact that Spanish blood had been spent in defence of its empire, and Spain would have to agree with the proposal before it could be regarded as official. To this Forbes had agreed and he

(43} Nevins,Fish,p.191-2; Foner, Cuba and u.s.,p.206; Pierce,Suiiiri'er,Vol.IV,p.410 51 suggested that the United States should either guarantee payment by Cuba or buy the island herself. Prim preferred the former, demanding only that Spain be allowed to put down the rebellion and that, "the object of the sale being to extricate Spain from her financial difficulties, the sum must be sufficient for that (44) purpose".

Taking advantage of this report, Fish pencilled a note for the Cabinet and presented it two days later.

"United States offers mediation on the basis I Of the independence of Cuba. II Cuba to pay to Spain$- as indemnity for loss of revenue, etc., etc., for the public property of Spain the Islands - forts, arsenals, public lands etc. III Emancipation of the slaves to be decreed. IV An armistice pending the negotiations. Cuba to issue bonds for$- bearing-% interest, payable within 20 years. The United States, if assent of Congress be obtained, to guarantee these bonds, principal and interest, and the customs duties (export and import0 pf Cuba to be pledged as security. A sufficient sum annually to be paid into a trust for a sinking fund to pay the principal at the end of 20 years, besides paying the annual interest. Discriminating· duties, prejudicial to American productions, to be abolished. All other duties (export or import) to remain unchanged unles$ with the consent of the United States. ,r\45)

It seemed to be a perfect solution and opened the way for future extensions of American authority which might

(44) Nevins,Fish,p.193 (45) Nevins,Fish,p.193 52 be .felt necessary an the island. The Cabinet was relieved and enthusiastic, except for Rawlins who believed the measure did not go far enough. The Cubans, when approached, approved the plan and agreed with Fish on a sum of $100,000,'JOO. After plans were drawn up in secrecy, and after everyone whose support was thought (46} necessary had been approached, Forbes was appointed special agent on June 26. He left for Madrid on July 1.

On the same day, the new United States Minister left to take up his post in Madrid. Daniel Sickles was a strange choice and one in which Fish concurred only after considerable hesitation.< 47 ) He was a man of (48) dubious character. He had been involved in a larceny scandal, censured by the New York State Assembly for immoral conduct, and had killed a man in a duel.

He had blundered his way through the Civil War, been part of the anti-Johnson campaign and had lost money heavily by gambling. His choice as Minister was apparently recognition of the part he had played as a campaign speaker for Grant, for he had little if any diplomatic training, and had indeed been very vocal in his endorsement of the Ostend Manifesto.< 49 > His

(46) Ibid,pp.193-4. These were Lopez Roberts, Thornton, the British Ambassador, and Lord Clarendon, British Foreign Secretary. (47) Nevins, op.cit.,p.189 (48) The Sprinqfield Republican called him "an unprincipled adventurer whose appointment is a disgrace, and will prove a calamity to the country". The Senate was also hesitant; though appointed in 1869, he was not con­ firmed in office until March 1870. (49) Nevins,lli,h,p.189 53 instructions were extremely full and were concerned with the organization of a conference between Spain, the United States, and Cuba. His bargaining power was increased by the addition of a supplementary note which stated: "(You) may add, in a case of a protracted discussion, on the prospect of a refusal by Spain to accept the proposed offer by the United States, that an early recognition of belligerent rights is the logical deduction from the present proposal, and will prob-ably be deemed a necessity by the United States, unless the condition of the parties to the (SO) contest shall have changed very materially." Despite this threatening tone, Fish himself encouraged the negotiations by taking preventive measures against filibustering which intercepted one of the largest expeditions to date.(Si) All seemed to be progressing very well. From the time that Forbes arrived in Spain, however, the situation began to deteriorate. He arrived on July 14, a week before Sickles, and, beginning the negoti.ations with Prim, quickly assumed a position of authority he did not want to give up. On July 16, he cabled that Prim now wanted $150,000,000 but would include Puerto Rico. Forbes felt sure that Prim would accept a lower sum and added, "Chief wishes to treat solely himself through me~'( 52 ) On July 20, in an explanatory letter to Fish, Forbes repeated this claim and continued:

(50) Nevins,Fish,p.197 (51) This was the "Catherine Whiting" expedition on June 26-27. The vessel was captiured just outside New York harbour .. (52) Nevins,op.cit.,p.199 54 "Mr. Sickles has not yet arrived. He seems unable to move quickly but meanwhile Cuba bleeds••• If diplomacy is slow humanity will not wait, the magnetic wires will do their duty, annihilating time and space - and those who tarry must find when too late that they come only to reap bfs3jn honors and harvest garnered fields." The observations he made upon the attitudes of the Spanish officials were encouraging, and Fish felt con­ fident that the negotiations would soon be terminated. Sickles, however, found on his arrivat that this optimistic state of affairs was illusory. The Spanish officials had not made any decisions, and in fact Sickles experienced some hostility. Forbes was undermining the United States Minist·er and calling for more authority,< 54 ) while Sickles was overcome by cables from Fish, pressing for results.(SS) The Spanish, it appeared, were stalling for time while Prim looked for someone to take over the government, and both he and Silvela, the Minister of State, acknowledged later that the Spanish people could neverhave been convinced of the ( 5 6) need to give up Cuba. Fish and the Administration became increasingly

(53) Nevins,fifil!.,p.231 (54) Ibid,p.232. (55) Sickles later claimed that it was this pressure from Fish on Spain that defeated mediation as Prim wanted time to prepare public opinion. J.M.Callahan, Cuba and International Relations. (London,1899),p.377 (56) Cnllahan, Cuba and International Relations,pp.382-3 55 disillusioned, and the delicate balance between war and peace in the negotiations with Spain was not helped by a revival of interventionist demands. The New York Times, which in April had been strongly opposed to any talk of annexing Cuba, was by May and June enthusiastic­ ally reporting annexationist meetings and by June 26 was actively supporting it.< 57 > Grant, impressed by these views and by Rawlins• continual pressure for intervention, discussed the problem with Sumner. The Chairman advised (58) him against any aggressive move, · but by August Grant was convinced that he should issue the proclamation of recognition of belligerency which he had drawn up secretly with Rawlins in mid-July. Fish, fearful that he would not be able to stave off this step for much longer, cabled Sickles to hurry the negotiations. On August 14 Grant wrote to Fish that he intended issuing the proclamation "if General Sickles had not received an entirely satisfactory reply to his proposition to mediate between Spain and the Cubans". ( 5 9 ) It appeared that Fish's policy had failed, but on the same day, August 14, a cable arrived from Sickles.

(57) According to Callahan, op.cit.,p.381, even the European press was content to see Cuba fall to the United States. (58) Pierce,Sumner,Vol.IV,p.409 {59) Nevins,Fish,p.239. Grant sent this proclamation to Fish in order to get the State Department seal. Fish delayed sealing it in the hope that Sickles would succeed in gaining some concessions from the Spanish. The proclamation was later locked away. 56 Spain had accepted mediation with a proviso. Prim•s

modifications of the original American plan were

embodied in four propositions. Firstly, the insurgents

were to lay down their arms; secondly, Spain would

grant a full and complete amnesty; thirdly, the people of Cuba were to vote by universal suffrage on the subject

of independence, and finally, if the majority chose

independence and if the Cortes granted it, Cuba was to pay a satisfactory sum, guaranteed by the United States.( 50)

From this point, mediation was doomed to failure.

Fish refused to accede to the first and third

propositions on the grounds that they were impracticable.

On August 16 he instructed Sickles to negotiate on terms which in effect ignored the Spanish proposals. Prim, however, refused to accept the propositions of the

original American document and though the discussions

continued, it was obvious that a deadlock had been reached.

Fish, like many others, failed to understand the

pride of the Spanish. Prim had claimed that only if the

financial offer was high enough to cover the Spanish

investment in men and money would Spain sell Cuba, but

this was more than a matter of pecuniary need; it con­ cerned Spanish honour. To lose Cuba was to lose self­

esteem. The conditions which Prim imposed upon the

negotiations were impractical if their success was

earnestly wanted. However, it is probable that he was

(60) Nevins,Fish,p.239; Callahan,Cuba and International Relations,p.380 57 still undecided about what the Spanish reaction would be; by delaying he hoped he could prepare Spain and still retain American interest, thus avoiding a recognition of belligerency.( 6i)

Meanwhile the chances of successful mediation faded even more as the Cubans refused to accept the Spanish terms and as the American press printed further articles on violence in Cuba.< 52 > In the Cabinet, however, Fish had achieved some degree of success. He managed to defeat Rawlins in an impassioned debate on Cuban independence, and Grant had agreed to withhold recognition for the time being, and to extend mediation until October

1 • Fi s h was re1 ieve,. d (G3 ) especia' 11 y wenh th e pressure for intervention in Cabinet was lifted by the death of . (64) Rawlins on September 6, and Sickles had sent encouraging reports to the effect that many in the Spanish

Cabinet were "apparently in earnest for a complete accord with the United States". <55 > Both men were being overly optimistic. Spain had no intention of agreeing to the

American proposals, and any slight hope for a fruitful continuation of the negotiations was finally destroyed in mid-September. A garbled version of the American

(61) Foner,Cuba and u.s.,p.208 (62) Ibid,p.209; Nevins,Fish,p.243; Callahan,Cuba and International Relations,pp.383-4 (63) Nevins,Fish,p.244 (64) Ibid,p.247 (65) Foner,Cuba and u.s.,p.210 58 plans was released to the Spanish press apparently by Bicerra, acting Minister of State.< 66) The result was an immediate and bitter denunciation of the United States and of its interference in Spanish colonial policy. Mediation was over. The next few months were taken up by th~ Dominican situation and Grant's attention was diverted from Cuba. The press, however, remained interested in Cuba,and the New York Times still discussed the possibility of annexation.CG?) The pro-Cuban rallies continued, especially after United States released some gunboats built for Spain. The opening of Congress in December increased the pressure. Grant's December 5 Annual Message to Congress pacified no-one. After an initial struggle with the President, who included on his own volition a number of passages from a departmental report on Cuba which Fish had not intended for publication, the Secretary managed to restrain the message to sentiments of sympathy. It pointed out that "The contest has at no time assumed the conditions which amount to a war in the sense of international law or which would show the existence of a de facto political organization of the insurgents sufficient to justify a recognition of belligerency. 11 (681 The message also included a paragraph which has been

(66) Callahan,Cuba and International Relations,p.385,note (67) New York Times, September 6,7, 1870 (68) J.D.Richardson,Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington,1897)Vol.VII,p.31. All references are to Vol.VII unless otherwise stated. 59 interpreted as Grant's extension of the Monroe Doctrine;(Gg) like the Doctrine it attacked European influence in the area but did not preclude American acquisition of territories as dependencies.(?O) Combined with a paragraph to the effect that "the principle is maintained

••• , that this nation is its own judge when to accord the rights of belligerency",< 71 > the message appeared less as a statement of American policy than as a rather negative attempt to cajole and pacify the extremists expected to control the discussions on Cuba.

On December 10, the opposition in the House began the debates on Cuba. A letter from the Government of

South Carolina "transmitting a copy of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the State relative to the recognition of the republic of Cuba by the United (72) States Government" was presented to the House, and on Deccrriber 13 Ward of New York presented a petition signed by over 70,000 citizens of the state calling for the recognition of Cuba and of the "independence of her sons from the tyranny of foreign yoke which for more than a year they have maintained unaided by the triumph of their arms 11 .< 73 ) Fitch of Nevada took the floor on December 10 to deliver a long, emotional speech on Cuba,

(69) Walter La Feber,~ New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898(New York,1963),p.37 (70) Richardson,op.cit.,p.32 ( 71) Ibid (72) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 2 sess.,p.64 ( 73) Ibid, p • 100 60 which contained an attack on the President for his stand and exhorted the Congress to action. This, he felt, would force the Administration to recognize the island's independence.

"(But) possibly we should have more than this. Perhaps we should possess by the generous suffrages of a people whom we had helped to liberty, the right of ownership of that tongue in the Gulf of Mexico which can dictate commercial.laws to the Caribbean Sea - the right to flaunt a banner of thirty­ eight stars in the face of the eqµator, and to count among the brightest of the constellation the planet which symbolise the island States. 11 (74)

The speech aroused a stirring ~ound of applause which had to be quietened by the Speaker.

From January to late February 1870 scarcely a day passed without some reference to the situation in Cuba~

Resolutions for recognition were regularly passed to the

Foreign Relations Committees in both Houses. The New

York Times on January 29 and :eebruary 4 ran articles on the strength of the rebel government which claimed that all requirements in international law were fulfilled.

The arguments were remarkably restrained and illustrated the urgency felt in Congress. There were frequent references to international law and lengthy quotations ( 75) from law books in attempts to define warfare, and several speeches in both Houses won applause from the

(74) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 2 sess.,p.192. (75) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 2 sess.,pp.192,1206,1265,1266 61 floor and the galleries. The Legislature was pressuring the Administration and with effect, for Fish began looking for ways to quieten the opposition to his policy.

He had continued his attempts to gain something from

Spain, but the failure of mediation and the evasiveness of the Spanish response to American overtures had frus­ trated him and angered the country. The Secretary had warned Spain repeatedly that the United States Adminis­ tration could not long hold off the public demand for recognition, but meanwhile he made efforts to restrain this demand.

On January 7 the New York Herald published an article by the Washington correspondent, T.M. Connery.

It claimed that the rebellion was on its last legs and that the Cuban Junta was a mismanaged failure. The

President and the Secretary of ~tate, it declared, had been willing to recognize the rebels but "disaster after disaster followed (for the rebels) and the President was reluctantly compelled to withhold his signature from the . ( 76) Proclamation". Now the rebellion was over, it would not be needed. The article claimed that all this was beyond question; that the information had been furnished by "a high official". That official was Fish, who hoped to induce many interventionists to think again. But the effect on public opinion was minimal, and the clamour continued through March and April.

( 7 6) Fon er, Cuba and U.S. , p. 214 62 What was needed, as Fish was aware, was some force to back the American demands, and on May 28, in despera­ tion at the situation, he approached the British Minister, Thornton, on the possibility of Britain•s siding with the United States in warning Spain that intervention in Cuba was imminent unless the war was ended. Thornton shrewdly pointed out that such threats were useless unless action was intended. Fish then suggested that Britain and the United States should (77) declare that action would be seriously considered. Nothing illustrates more aptly both Fish's concern and the weakness of his position. When Congress reopened the debate in June, this position became critical. He realized that the demands of the country could not be disregarded much longer. Not even accusations of bribery with Cuban bonds could dampen the determination of the interventionists.< 7s) Attacks on Fish had increased and it was apparent that his resignation would be necessary if he failed to halt this trend. The agitation in favour of passing yet another resolution was so intense that Fish felt that its continuation could only mean war. The only way possible to prevent the success of the Congressional moves was a firm Administration stand. The Secretary thus wrote for Grant a decisive message

(77) N£vins,Fish,p.347 (78) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 2 sess.,pp.4224-4331. 63 on the Cuban situation which would point out the dangers of recognition and indicate the President•s confidence in the State Department. The Cabinet's attitude was mixed, <79 ) but Grant was in favour of the message; he was still concerned with Santo Domingo and had for some time been allowing Fish to cope with the Cuban situation.

The next day, apparently on the advice of George

Boutwell, Secretary of the Treasury, ~ho favoured action in Cuba, Grant changed his mind. He suggested instead that the message be sent to the Senate as a departmental report, with the addition of a Presidential endorsement.

Fish pointed out that the paper would immediately lose any effect, but he could not get Grant to accept the original. Two days later, on June 2, he went to the

White House and told the President bluntly that either the report went to Congress as a Presidential message or he would resign.(SO) He refused any longer to bear the brunt of the attacks against the Administration's foreign policy while the President regarded the issues with indifference and undermined the Secretary's authority.

Grant was impressed by Fish's annoyance and cancelled a trip to Annapolis in order to read the report again.

He kept it for eight days during which Fish heard nothing. On June 10 Ben Butler and Representative Orth ------•------·--~---·---·----·----- (79) Nevins,Fish,p.354 (80) Nevins,Fish,p.355 64 of Indiana called at the State Department to warn the

.Secretary that a vote on Cuba could be .expected within the next few days an

It had the desired effect, and caused a sensation. at the same time. Acknowledging that the future might brin

Congress was amazed and on June 14 the debates began again. John Farnsworth of Illinois defended the message.

He claimed that aid to Cul.>a could only lead to war with

Spain and consequently to the destruction of American . (83) r:(-.,publican.'Lsm. In the evening session Thomas Swann

(81) Nevins,Fish,pp.356-7 (82) Richardson,Messages and Papers,pp.64-9 (83) Conq. Globe, 41. Cong., 3 sess. ,p.4436-7 65 of Maryland resumed the attack on the Administration, calling upon the United States to recognize its position as upholder of the rights of man, and went on more aggressively to voice the feelings of many interventionists: "I would permit no interference with the great mission upon which we have entered. If Cuba, under the guardianship of Spain, stands in the way the consequences will be with herself. If she persists in the oppression of her people, in the violation of the rights of American citizenship, in the disregard of the common laws of humanity, she must be taught the example which this nation holds out to her ••• Her soil will be invaded in the interests of freedom, and the American flag will float over her in SP.ite of the combined powers of the world. 11 (8~) There were assaults en the President's honesty and his republicanism, and there were attacks on his advisors.CBS) Fernando Wood of New York reasserted the country's republicanism amid a lengthy applause. "All feel and know that sooner or later·our political system must spread round the whole of the Gulf, and Cuba must then be under our protection, if not eventually incorporated into our system. This is no question of greed or of domination, but simply of population and of geography. 11 (86) The message did, however, have equally staunch supporters. Butler argued against intervention, with the emphasis of his speech being on the rumour of bribery attached to the Cuban bonds.CB?) Orth maintained that

(84) Ibid,p.4440 (85) Ibid,pp.4446-8 (86) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 2 sess.,p.4481 (87) Ibid,p.4483 66 the United States was not responsible for any action in Cuba and there was no need to force a war with Spain just because a few Americans had been killed. In opposition to the arguments of the interventionists he believed that hasty recognition would retard the inevitable gravitation of Cuba to the United States,(BB) a belief which was supported by Jacob Ambler of Ohio and Charles Willard of Vermont.(sg) The debate centred on the House as Logan's resolution for recognition was pending there. On June 16 the vote went against the resolution by 100 to 70, the only concession to interventionists being a call for a protest against the brutality of the rebellion. Fish had won. Many agreed it was an Administration triumph(gQ) and it certainly gave an appearance of unity and strength which previously had been lacking. Its effects were considerable. The attention paid to Cuba in Congress slackened and the remaining resolutions for recognition received scant consideration. The episode seemed to indicate that Congress had been seeking in the Cuban debates less an endorsement of their views than leadership. Relations with Spain were more peaceful for the next few months and there was a return to the diplomatic attempts to gain a settlement of American claims against Spain for damage to American property in Cuba. These

(88) Ibid,App.,pp.504-6 (89) Ibid,App.,pp.507,536-8 (90) Nevins,Fish,p.362 67 were delicate and frequently infuriating negotiations but Fish was restrained. His success in reaching at last the point where a commission was accepted was due less, however, to his diplomatic skills than to a sudden desire of the Spanish to conciliate American opinion. In 1870 the obvious Spanish weakness was aggravated by two events, one internal, one external. Having decided that a monarchy was to be the political organization of Spain, the Cortes was finding it difficult to find a candidate for the throne. The uncertainty t~is imposed weakened the Provisional Government and left it more than usually open to attack from the Carlists, the Army and the Republicans, who were all vying for .pow-~r in the interim. The search for a candidate had helped to precipitate a conflict between France and Prussia, which deprived Spain of one of her European supporters, and forced Britain to divert her attention from the specific Spanish problems to the general European situation. By mid-1870, therefore, Spain was without allies, and attempts were made to conciliate the United States. In May a lukewarm gesture towards abolition was made in a resolution presented to the Cortes, "The Preparatory Law for the Abolition of Slavery in the Spanish Antilles". So few were its concessions that it appeared to be aimed 68 at delaying American action.< 91 > No abolition policy was likely to succeed until the Spanish government was strong enough to withstand the demands of Spanish and Cuban slaveowners, plantation runners and businessmen. Prim was aware of this, but he was biding for time until the new regime was installed, and warded off American demands by agreeing to Fish's suggestion of a court of

arbitration, then adapting its terms of reference. <92 >

On November 16, Amadeus, Duke of Aosta, was elected King of Spain,< 93 > his regime to take effect on January 1, 1871. Until that time Spanish officials could afford to dally, as their responsibility would cease with the change of administration. Fish continued to instruct Sickles to negotiate for the commission, though his patience was running out.

(91) Foner,Cuba and u.s.,pp.220-21. The law provided that all children of slave mother were "free but held in patronage" until 18. 1'he master, or "patron" could utilise their free labour until they were 18, then pay them half pay of Whites. All slaves born between September 18, 1868-, and the passage of the bill (July 4, 1870) could purchase their freedom for $50, which would mean that they would have to spend most of their working lives in servitude anyway. The only slaves freed immediately were those over 60, who now, after a lifetime of work, had to support themselves in their old age. Punishments, for example, whips, chains, manacles etc., remained. (92) P.R.F.R. (1871-2),pp.697,698,698-9,707,729,732,735, 740,741,742,743-4,744-5,746-7,750,762-3,763-4,765- 8, 791. (93) P.R.F.R. (1871-2),p.730. Sickles to Fish, November 19, 18 70. 69 Prim was not able to override the powerful interests in Spain which were determined to hold on to Cuba, though he was still considering selling the island to the Cubans. In November he sent agents secretly to the Cuban Junta in New York and to the rebels with plans for selling Cuba for $200,000,--000, the sum to be guaranteed by the United States.< 94 > Such an arrangement would also help Spain to pay the reparations demanded by the United States. This scheme collapsed with the death of

Prim on December 30, 1870, from injuries received in an (95) assassination attempt three days earlier. The situation appeared to have deteriorated again, but on January 26, 1871, Minister of State Martos agreed to concede to the demand for an arbitration commission. Whether the new regime had intended submitting to American demands before coming to power never became obvious but in December a situation developed which may have influenced the decision. On Dc~cernber 5, 1870, Grant presented to Congress his second Annual Message. The section on Cuba did not add much to the special message of June 13, but it included a hope that arbitration would solve the difficulties between Spain and the United States, and added

(94) Nevins,fish,pp.617-18 (95) Ibid,p.618,note 7; P.R.F.R. (1871-2),p.350. Sickles to Fish, December 28, 1870; p.351. Sickles to Fish, December 31, 1870. 70 "Should the pending negotiations, unfortunately and unexpectedly, be without result, it will then become my duty to communicate that fact to Congress, and invite its action on the subject. 11 (96)

The international press seemed sceptical about the reality of this threat; most said they would wait and see.C 97 ) Spanish papers were considerably more decisive.

One, El Imparcial, believed the whole statement to be an elaborate political trick to retain the favourable opinion of an influential section of Congress, <99 ) but others, La Igualdad, La Epoca, La Discussion, and El

Universal, felt, in varying degrees of anxiety that the

President's statement signified a dangerous period for Spain if the threat was carried out.< 99 )

Though some accommodation had been reached with

Spain, the situation in Cuba did not improve. Reports of murder, plunder and barbarity reached Washington ( 100) almost daily. Although Congress was comparatively quiet on the subject of recognition, the Administration's concern with Spain did not cease, for Fish took it upon himself to propose that the Spanish end slavery in their

Latin-American colonies.

(96) Richardson,Messa es and Papers,p.98 (97) P.R.F.R. (1871-2 5,pp.736-7 (98) P.R.F.R. (1871-2),p.738 (99) P.R.F.R. (1871-2),pp.738-9 ( 100) New York Times, January and February, 1871 71 The Secretary of State hoped that, by precipitating abolition in the Spanish colonies, he would be bringing about a cessation of the war in Cuba, and his beliefs were shared by many fellow-Americans. The intolerance in his instructions to Sickles was surprising in a man so avowedly peaceful, but it was only a reflection of the period. The faith of Americans in their way of life, endorsed as it seemed to be by the success of federal Republicanism in the Civil War, was vociferous, and the fact that their own emancipation of slaves had been belated did not prevent many from crusading this ideal aggressively. Since 1869 Fish had regularly urged abolition upon the Spanish government, and had discussed the problem at length with Lopez Roberts.< 101> By 1870 these suggestions had developed into demands, and on December 21, Sickles, acting on Fish's orders, wrote to Sagasta, the Colonial Minister, a report on the American attitude to Cuban slavery. This message included a veiled threat. "These sentiments••• coilncide with the conviction more than once frankly declared to the Government of His Highness the Regent that the policy of political and administra­ tive reform in Cuba is best calculated to restore peace to that island••• among the considerations which have most contributed to restrain the manifestations of sympathy felt in the United States for those••• struggling in Cuba for self-government, has been the confident expectation••• that•••

(101) Nevins, fJsQ,pp.344-5. 72 institutions in harmony with the Spanish constitution of 1869 would be extended to the Spanish Antilles. 11 (102) From this period there was an increase in the number of such statements, and a corresponding increase in the sharpness of tone.< 1o3 ) The Spaniards received such demands sporadically throughout 1871 but, as the larger part of American interest was taken up by the Geneva Arbitration on the

"Alabama" claims, the Cuban situation did not attract considerable attention again until late in 1871 when one of the first diplomatic messages to be sent was a ( 104) discussion on emancipation. Meanwhile the political situation in Spain had declined once more. The machinery of government was barely working, governments rose and fell, and revolt was more common than peace. Carlists, Republicans and Liberals continued to attack the monarchy, and Sickles reported that sessions of the Spanish Cortes were frequently cancelled because of the uneasy situation. Taking advantage of these disturbances within the mother country, the Spanish Cubans kept up a vocal representation in the Cortes and used the press to encourage the defeat of any measures for abolition.ClOS)

( 102) P.R.F.R. (1871-2),pp.746-7. Sickles to Sagasta, December 21, 1870. ( 103) It is interesting that this increase in official pressure upon Spain on the sub1ect of emancipation should have come so quickly after the announcement of the pending establishment of a monarchy. ( 104) P.R.F.R. (1872-3),p.550. Sickles to Fish, November 20, 1871. ( 105) P.R.F.R. (1871-2),pp.759-60,762-3; (1872-3),pp.552-3 73 "It is at least certain (wrote Sickles) that a league of Madrid and provincial journals has been formed with the avowed object of opposing the "filibusterers and internationalists", and it is believed that the real business of this association is to maintain slavery in the Antilleij at all hazards and whatever the cost,. 11 (106) The attempts by the United States to force emancipation upon the Spanish strengthened the opposition, which saw these attempts as unwarranted outside interference in domestic affairs. A writer in El Emigrado maintained that the aims of the United States were purely covetous

and that they expected Cuba to fall into their hands. Independence would mean that the United States would bleed both Spain and Cuba. "Let Cuba be independent tomorrow, and in a short time the fable of the wolf and the lamb would, at our expense, be re-enacted, for our beloved island would be found disturbing the waters of the Gulf which bathes the feet of the American Union. In order to be Cuba, Cuba cannot be independent."(107) Martos was reported to have said "if we lose Cuba by mismanagement and by alienating the affections of the loyal inhabitants, we should be looked upon as traitors; if the United States choose to deprive us of our colony, we may have to yield in the end to superior force, but we shall have preserved our national dignity" 11 (108) War was to be preferred to an enforced emancipation"

( 106) P.R.F.R. (1872-3),pp.589-90. Sickles to Fish, November 20, 1872. ( 10 7) Callahan, Cuba and International Relations,pp.400-1 ( 108) Nevins,lli,h,p.619 74 As the relations between Spain and the United States declined once more it became obvious that not only Fish, but the American Minister to Spain, Daniel Sickles, was aggravating the situation. Admiral Polo de Bernabe, the capable new Spanish Minister to Washington, informed Fish that Sickles was involved in deals and intrigues with the renascent Republicans in Spain and that his behaviour was proving a political embarrassment.Ci09 ) It was evident from Sickles' despatches to Fish that his sympathies lay with the Republicans and their attempts to gain power, and he became increasingly tactless during 1873 and 1874 as this involvement deepened.< 110 > The American Minister returned to Madrid in June 1872, after leave in the United States, carrying with him orders to close the Legation if American demands were not met. The pressure from the United States for emancipation continued, <111> and Spain retaliated with protests against filibustering. At the same time American hopes for success rose with the accession to power of Ruiz Zorrilla, a Radical who favoured the Republicans. Zorrilla•s premiership saved Sickles from recall. He had antagonized Sagasta, who had demanded his removal, but

(109) Ibid,p.620; Callahan,Cuba and International Relations, p.406. Sickles later admitted this involvement, though his interpretation of events did not correspond to that of Admiral Polo. (110) Nevins,Fish,p.621 (111) P.R.F.R:-r:f872-3),pp.564,566,566-7,576-7,580-4, 591-2,592-3; (1873-4),pp.825-7,835-6,843. 75 Zorrilla asked that he remain.< 112 >

Americans were soon disappointed by Zorilla.

Although he had long attacked the efforts of political opponents to gain peace and stability, he soon found that the conditions of Spain, especially its economic exhaustion, and the power of the vested interests, precluded radical

reform. He reported that he would not grant reforms in Cuba until the revolutionaries laid down their arms, <113 > and the Spanish Minister in London claimed that Zorrilla believed this was being delayed only because American interference was keeping the revolt alive. Fish was

indignant at this accusation.

"I think this government has done all a government can be called upon to do in such circumstances; that for nearly.four years we have abstained from recognizing belligerency; we have exerted the inherent power of a government to arrest expeditions and seize vessels, (and) have broken up the Junta ••• I state that••• unless Spain is more successful in subduing the insurrection than she has been ••• I cannot say that we may not be QbliQed to adopt a different line of policy. 11 l114 J

He immediately instructed Sickles to press the demand for abolition, <115 > and on October 24 warned Polo that recog­ nition of belligerency was imminent.<116)

(112) Sagasta fell from power in June and Marshal Serrano took over the government. He was forced to resign within seven days. P.R.F.R. (1872-3),pp.553-5,559-60. (113) Nevins,~,p.623 (114) Ibid,p.624 ( 115) Ibicl. (116) Ibid,p.625 76 On October 29 he sent to Sickles a most outspoken document, so unguarded in tone that Sickles decided it was wiser to present only a precis of it. In it, Fish claimed that the abolition laws which Spain had passed "partly at our insistence", remained unexecuted, and declared that although the United States abided by the general rule which required a notion to avoid interference in the domestic policies of other nations, "circumstances warrant partial exceptions to this rule. Governments (he continued) cannot resist a conviction so general and so righteous as that which condemns as a crime the tolerance of human slavery, nor can governments be in fault in raising their voice against the further tolerance of so grievous a blot upon humanity ••• A nation gives justification to resistance while wrongs remain unredressed." After informing Sickles that he was to present this for­ midable despatch in such a way as to make it clear that the United States was in earnest, he finished with the threat that if redress was not forthcoming "Spain must. not be surprised to find••• a marked change in the feeling and temper of the people and the government of the United States." Fish had hoped that this would prompt some action but nothing happened, chiefly because Spanish officials feared a political upheaval. Some reforms had been mooted earlier in the month but they had led to a

(117) P.R.F.R. (1872-3),pp.580-4, Fish to Sickles, October 9, 1872. 77 conservative revolt, and the Spanish government thus suppressed Fish's despatch in the interests of peace.

As it was, the Secretary of State was not prepared to go to the lengths of recognition or war. Threats had been made before and never carried out. "No. 270", as this despatch became known, was as empty as others.

Its failure forced Fish to think again about the policy he was pursuing. Threats of recognition had achieved nothing, but now he was committed to some action.

He chose high discriminatory duties against all slave­ owning countries, notably Cuba, Puerto Rica and Brazil.

The Cabinet endorsed the idea on November 21. Admiral

Polo was advised of the situation and he immediately cabled -l:o Spain for a rapid answer; the President's

Annual Message to Congress would incorporate the decision, and the message was to be delivered on December 2.

On November 24, Martos pointed out to Sickles that reforms for the colonies were being considered and that (118) American hostility could be embarrassing. By

December 2, the Spanish Ministry had decided to give in, and to avoid parliamentary complications it declared by executive decree that civil and military authority in

Puerto Rico would henceforth be separate, and that a bill for the emancipation of slaves would be submitted to the

(118) P.R.F.R. (1873-4),pp.825-7. Sickles tq Fish, November 24-, 1872. 78

Cortes.< 119 > It would apply, however, only to Puerto Rico which was peaceful and wealthy. Cuba was not included. Fish had won a small victory but had not achieved his aim of freeing Cuba from some of its Spanish ties. Slavery continued, American property was still embargoed, Spanish Cubans exacted heavy port duties, and Americans complained that the State Department was doing nothing. Newspapers took up this attack, <120 > and once again Fish found himself the scapegoat. To protect himself he published the correspondence with Sickles, including'No. 270". This relieved the pressure in the United States, but only increased the discontent in Spain. Many Spaniards were convinced the liberal reforms had been issued only because of American pressures, and the reaction against this affront to Spanish pride led to the downfall of the Zorrilla regime. In Cuba there was considerable resentment against the negative policy of the American Government.< 121) In the United States, feeling gradually hardened against Spain. Calls for a stronger line resumed and on December 9, 1872 Representative Blair presented a

(119) P.R.F.R. (1873-4),pp.835-6. Sickles to Fish, December 16, 1872. A bill for the emancipation of Puerto Rican slaves was submitted to the Cortes within three weeks. It passed in March, 1874. (120) New York Herald, New York Tribune, the Sun and the Nation Nevins,Fish,p.631 - (121) Nevins,Fish,pp.632-3; Foner,Cuba and u.s.,pp.242-3 79 resolution calling for the annexation of Cuba.<122 > Fish was concerned that he was losing control in the face of this growing feeling and he approached Grant with a suggestion that the President should encourage influential Congressmen to forestall any Congressional attempts to bombard the Administration again with resolutions for action.( 123 ) In early February came signs of an easing of the situation. On January 30, Sickles had written to Fish to warn of an imminent change of executive. On February 11, Fish received a telegram from the Minister to say: "At half past four this afternoon the two Houses unite under presidency of Rivero and decxare themselves in the exercise of sovereign powers. Martos, in name of Cabinet, presents resignation of Ministers. Cort~s accepts -\inanimously abdication of King. 11 ~124} Later in the evening of the same day Sickles telegrammed:

"At 9 o'clock Cortes adopt republican form c125 ) of government- 259 affirmative, 32 negative." The reaction in the United States was one of delight. Congress passed congratulatory resolutions, forgetting any claims for recognition of Cuban belligerency.<126) A republic was something for which Americans had long hoped, and the Administration had no desire to destroy

(122) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong.,3 sess.,p.76 (123) Nevins,Fish,p.633 (124) P.R.F.R:-IT873-4},p.888. Sickles to Fish, February 11 1873. (125) P.R.F.R. (1873-4}lp.888. Sickles to Fish, February 11, 1873 (evening) ( 126) Cong. Globe, 42 Cong.,1 sess.,p.1345 (Senate); p.1980 (House) 80 it by undue pressure. The Foreign Relations papers show a decrease in the number and arrogance of demands from the United States as from this time. The republic was quickly recognized and Sickles who, unknown to Fish, had been actively involved in the plans for a republic, was showered with honours. The official and public reaction in the United States suggested that the republicanism of Spain, and not Cuban reform, had been the issue at stake. So complete was the acceptance and support in the United States for the Spanish republic that not even the "Virginius" case aroused a great debate in Congress. This dealt with the capture by Spanish officials of an American-manned vessel which was chased into Cuban waters. Attempts by the American consul in Jamaica to help the men were blocked by the Cuban officials and, without trial or counsel, a large number of the crew and some (127) passengers were summarily ex~cuted. Fish submitted a protest, and the diplomatic warfare began all over again. It was predominantly a diplomatic collision and displayed little of the emotional involvement of previous crises. There was a considerable number of indignant meetings and an increase in the discussions of the possible annexation of Cuba, but an economic depression and an awareness that the "Virginius 11 had long been a filibusterer

(127) Nevins,Fish,pp.667-694; Foner,Cuba and u.s.,pp. 244-47; Callahan,Cuba and International Relations, pp.406-13; Rudolph de Cordova, "The 'Virginius' Incident and Cuba", Nineteenth Century,Vol.LX,1906. 81 kept feelings at a lower leve1.< 129 > The question of reparations became a matter of defining responsibility, and centred around whether or not the ship was an American vessel. When Spain agreed to reparations and

Fish recognized the dubious legality of the ship's ownership the disagreement came quickly to an end.

The "Virginius" affair was hailed in the United

States as a victory for Fish, <129 > and indeed he had carried out the negotiations ably and calmly, though some peremptory demands had been issued before he was fully conscious of the invalidity of the ship's papers.

The episode revealed a unity of Administration force behind Fish and he was able to cope with the situation without interruption and interference. It also led to

Sickles' downfall. The Minister's aggressive stands came close to upsetting the delicate balance between peace and war, and Fish was forced to take the move which should have been made earlier. He demanded Sickles' resignation, and ordered the ne0otiations to be conducted in Washington where he knew he_ could reach~ satisfactory agreement with Admiral Polo.

These relatively calm relations continued throughout the short life of the Spanish republic and the fate of

(128) Foner,Cuba and U.S. p.245; Callahan Cuba and International Relat!ons,p.409. Sickies pressed for annexation at this point, claiming that Europe would not be opposea but would see it as a justi­ fiable step. Callahan, op.cit,,p.410 (129) Nevins,Fish,pp.691-92 82 Cuba was regarded as less pressing. Indeed, as one Cuban historian noted, "Fish adopted the attitude that the Republic of Spain should triumph, and for this it was necessary to condemn the Republic of Cuba to death. 11 <13o> The Secretary of State avoided any opportunity to pressure Spain, In -:l.874, for example, Colombia attempted to revive an earlier project to gain a Pan-American agreement to demand Cuban independence. Fish had r·efused earlier on the grounds of diplomatic procedure, and refused again. "The measure would have been much acceptable to us whatever might be the probability of its success, if, before the Circular had been issued (to other Central American nations), we had been consulted as to our disposition to accept the function of an arbiter. 11 (131) The Latin-Americans considered this attitude cynical, a judgment which seemed justified when his orders to Caleb Cushing, Sickles' successor, became generally known. Caleb Cushing took over the embassy to Madrid in February, 1874, and was to be one of the best United States Ministers of the period. On February 6, 1874, he received his instructions from Fish. These summarised

Fish•s view of United States policy.

"The desire of independence on the part of the Cubans is a natural and legitimate aspira­ tion of theirs, because they are Americans. And while such independence is the manifest exigency of the political interests of the

(130) Foner,Cuba and u.s.,p.251 (131) Foner,Cuba and u.s.,p.250 83 Cubans themselves, it is equally so that of the rest of America, including the United States ••• the President does not meditate or desire the annexation of Cuba to the United States, but its elevation into an independent republic of freemen, in harmony with ourselv~s and with the other republics of America."(132) When this correspondence was published later in the year Latin-American states were considerably annoyed by this assertion and accused the United States of hypocrisy. "If anything (adds Foner) this (period) in American diplomatic history proved that the government of the United States_ still clung to the traditional policy of opposing the independence.of Cuba, and was still waiting for the laws of 11 politic2.l g.ravitationll to c133 ) bring the island within the American Union." Meanwhile the demands for American action resumed within the United States. Fish claimed the instigator was the Cuban Junta and "the wonderfully persuasive influence of Cuban bonds scattered broadcast among the noble army of newspaper reporters."(134) Grant's enthusiasm was fired once more. He brought the topic of a Cuban policy before the Cabinet on October 26, and Fish noted in his diary later that the President was threatening to recognize Cuban independence. ( 1·35 ) Congress was likely to acquiesce, especially as the Cuban Junta had $20,000,000 worth·of bonds to issue among

(132) P.R.F.R. (1874-5),p.550. Fish to Cushing, February 6, 1874. (133) Foner,Cuba and u.s.,p.251 (134) Nevins,~,p.874 (135) Ibid,pp.874-5 84 Congressmen. A more telling argument influencing Congressional opinion was the collapse of the Spanish republic and the proclamation on December 29, 1874, of a monarchy under Alfonso XII, the son of ex-Queen Isabella. <136) The pressure against Spain began in earnest again. Fish drafted a strongly worded message against a recognition of belligerency or independence, which succeeded in forestalling many of the resolutions expected on the issue of the Cuban rebellion.< 137> However, it did not long satisfy public opinion and, in November, Fish sent to Cushing Instruction No. 266 which "consti­ tutes one of the most curious episodes in ~American) (138) diplomatic history." It embodied a decision to intervene, something which the Secretary had avoided for a long time, on the grounds that the situation had dragged on for too long. The fear that such action would result in war was circumvented by an application to European governments, particularly that of Britain, for joint action. The reaction from all quarters was far from what Fish had expected. Firstlyt before receiving notification of this despatch, Spain affected its impact by promising in . (139) specific terms to redress various grievances. The

(136) Callahan,Cuba and International Relations,p.415 (137) ~ong. Globe, 43 Cong., 1 sess.,pp.62,206,3109,3203 {138) Nevins,Fish,p.878 (139) Nevins,Fish,pp.879-81 85 Secretary was "disappointed"; apparently he wanted action, and he did not consider that the Spanish gesture changed the situation.< 14o)

Cushin~ did not like No. 266, which he felt was unnecessarily aggressive, and delayed presenting it to the Spanish ministry until he had further instructions.

He believed that if Britain supported the United States,

Spain would capitulate in sullen despair, but that if no

European power took action, Spain would be likely to attempt a last desperate war which many Spaniards would encourage as a remedy for domestic disturbances.< 141> A few days later, on November 26, he pointed out that

Spain was not the only country with faulty institutions; the United States could not prevent "corruption, public and private, financial frauds, a mercenary press, and the subordination of principle (including the highest (142) interests of the country) to demagogy.'' Fish was so concerned by this reaction that, though he directed

Cushing and Robert Schenck in London to present the instructions, he conceded that it ·"was not intended as minatory in any sense, but in the spirit of friendship. 11 <143 >

This was a radical change of emphasis, but one which

(140) Ibid,p.881. (141) Callahan,Cuba and International Relations,p.422 (142) Nevins,Fish,p.882 (143) Ibid 86 events proved timely, for the reaction of the European powers was anything but encouraging. Italy informed the United States that her relations with Spain were

"delicate", France could not consent to any support for the Carlists which such a move would imply, and Britain offered her services as mediator but refused to put any pressure on Spain. Only Russia made any attempt to comply with the su9gestions.c 144 )

Within the United States, opposition was just as widespread. Fish was attacked as having violated the

Monroe Doctrine and the non-alignment ideal, which he strenuously denied. On December 30, 1875, he explained to the Italian Minister

••• "that we desired the restoration of peace and good government, that we had no selfish or a~gressive policy, did not invite or seek any forcible intervention by other governments, but simply asked an expression of their opinion as to the reasonabtI~~js of our attitude and demands on Spain." ·

The wording of Instruction No. 266 did not completely support this assertion, for there he stated that the

President "feels that the time is at hand when it may be tlrn duty of other governments to intervene", and the directions to Schenck had suggested that if Britain exerted her influence "to induce a settlement", a. faster settlement might result.

(144) Ibid; Callahan,Cuba and International Relations, pp.422-3; Foner,Cuba and u.s.,p.257 (145) Nevins,!i§.h,p.883 87 But later he felt it necessary to defend his action. He maintained that the Monroe Doctrine did not mean complete isolation from Europe and that, since Cuba was still a Spanish colony, the call for European action was within the confines of the Monroe Doctrine. There was a precedent, he pointed out, in the American suggestion that Russia mediate between Spain and the South American governments in 1824, only a year after the Doctrine had been advanced.(i4G) His.defensive stand suggested that he was aware of the dubious constitutional legality of his moves. Even more interesting was the fact that this came so soon after the refusal of the Latin-American proposal. This had included the proviso that the basis of this pressure on Spain should be the independence of Cuba and the abolition of slavery. Fish's scheme had not laid down any such conditions. The chances of a united front in Latin-America had been extremely good; the hopes for European action had not been investigated and were in fact unjustified. The policy of the Grant Administration towards Cuba was radically different from that demanded by much of the country and with which many members of the Cabinet

sympathised. These attitudes were held in check by the commonsense and determination of Fish who feared the

(146) Callahan~Cuba and International Relations,p.429 88 eventuality of war with Spain. Yet even he displayed some representative qualities in his arrogant republicanism and his failure to understand or to accept

Spain's pride in her nation and her empire. Cuba occupied a place in the history of American foreign policy that was deep-seated and there was a continual consciousness of the island's importance to the United

States. Added to this was the aggressivP expression of newly acquired abolition and proven republicanism. The idealism of expansionism tended to clash with practical diplomacy and brought .l?ish' s policy, pacific at head:, close to failure. 89 CHAPTER IV SANTO DOMINGO In the early months of the new Presidency, Grant showed no sign of the expansionism which was to characterize his foreign policy. At the early Cabinet meetings Grant's attitude was cautious. He avoided any commitment on the Cuban question, and turned down the Raasloff treaty for the purchase of the Danish West Indies, Cl) which meant that it was defeated easily by an unenthusiastic Senate.< 2 > However, by the end of 1869 certain newspapers were speculating with considerable interest on the possibility of annexing Santo Domingo,< 3 > and within a few months the Administration was deep in negotiations with this very possibility in mind. These negotiations were to be the cause of much ill-feeling in government circles, and the furore they created cam.e close to destroying both the Administration and the party. Yet what Grant a.ttempt~d was nothing new; he was expanding an interest displayed by others, particularly Seward.

(1) This treaty, so-called after the Danish Minister to Washington, General Raasloff, was one with Denmark for the sale of the island of St. Thomas in the Danish West Indies for $7,500,000. It was never a popular move, but the chances of its success declined still further after an earthquake and trobical cyclone devastated the islands early in 1868. (2) Nevins,fi§.!l,pp.126-7; D.M.Dozer, "Anti-Expansionism during the Johnson Administration",P.H.R. Vol.XIV (1945) (3) For example, New York Times, New York Herald, Boston Daily Globe; Nevins,Fish,p.310 90 Seward was conscious of the need for strategically­ positioned American bases in the region which could be used both to extend American commerical and political interests and to keep to a minimum European interference in the Western Hemisphere. Americans generally had reasons for interest. Trade with the whole region was lucrative, and it was natural for merchants to fear competition. The world wide emphasis upon shipping lerit force to renewed demands for a link across the central American isthmus, and the continually mooted suggestions fc:or a canal kept attention focussed on the area. In many Congressional debates upon Caribbean developments, there was noticeable concern for American interests in the region in the face of the proposed canal.( 4 ) Seward•s main concern• however, remained the question of bases, and the two pos•sibilities he considered were the Danish West Indtes and Santo Domingo. The island of Santo Domingo was the second largest in the Caribbean, and was divided into two small republics, Haiti and Santo Domingo, which had been independent since 1844. The Dominican Republic was larger than Haiti but had a smaller population, and was constantly subject to Haitian raids. Potentially Santo Domingo was a country of great wealth, with reserves of

(4) Mary w. Williams,Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy. (New York, 1965); G.c. Van Deusen,William Henry Seward (New York, 1967),pp.517-8. · 91 gold, silver, iron, copper and tin, and a plantation system of agriculture which was readily adaptable to coffee, sugar, cotton or tobacco. The failure of the republic to exp~nd economically after its independence was not therefore due to a poverty of materials, but to continual civil war; indeed, so continual were the conflicts that they were almost a way of life. They were the result of constant competition for authority between aspiring politicians,mainly Pedro Santana, Buenaventura Baez, and later Jose Maria Cabral. Dominican government was thus a creaking machine which threatened to collapse at any moment. In such a defenceless state it attracted the attention of various powers, especially Britain and France who had commercial interests in the republic. Their respective policies from the l840s seemed to be aimed at discouraging the other from taking control.CS) The United States inevitably reacted to the appear­ ance of European powers in the Caribbean, and in 1846 investigated the possibilities of using Samana Bay as a naval base, but the Mexican War diverted American atten­ tion. In 1850, after another Haitian invasion, there was a tentative suggestion from a portion of the Dominican population that the United States should be offered the

(5) R.W. Logan, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (London, 1968) ,pp. 34-5. 92 republic, but President Baez was not prepared to give up his power. It is doubtful, in any case, whether the Whig administration would have been in favour of the proposition. In fact, little attention was paid to the republic during Taylor•s Presidency, and a British suggestion that the United States join with Britain and France to guarantee Dominican independence was rejected on the grounds that this was a denial of the policies laid out ih the Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine.( 6) Franklin Pierce, whose Presidency began in 1852, was, on the other hand, extremely interested in the Caribbean, and may have seen Santo Domingo as a step in his attempts to annex Cuba.(?) He acted by sending an agent in 1854 to enquire into the republic's potential­ ities; the agent was William L. Cazneau, apparently a strong supporter of American political and economic penetration into the Caribbean.CB) That he was sent as a special agent indicated that the Administration's interest was deeper than mere curiosity, for he was ordered to report on aspects of governmental organization and on commercial prospects. His report was enthusiastic and he returned to the island with Captain George B. McClellan in July 1854 to negotiate a treaty which included, among commercial and mercantile considerations,

( 6) Logan,Haiti and the Dominican Republic,pp.36-7; Van Alstyne,American Diplomacy in Action,p.543 ( 7) Van Alstyne,op.cit.,p.544 (8) Nevins,Fish,p.252 93 a clause allowing for the use of Samana Bay as a coaling station.Cg) The Dominican President by 1854, however, was Santana, who was not enthusiastic about this arrange­ ment in the face of British and French antagonism, and he burdened the treaty with so many amendments and provisos that the American government lost interest.(lO) Cazneau decided to settle in the rept.tPlic, and bought a plantation. In 1859 he became the partner of Joseph Warren Fabens, another of Pierce's special agents, in a scheme to gain a land grant from Santana in return for a loan and the promise to encourage American emigration and American investment.Cii) An opportunity arose in 1862 when Congress discussed the appropriation of funds for the colonization of former slaves;< 12 > Cazneau and Fabens, with others, took advantage of the mood of the moment, and floated the "American West India Company" which invested only $4000 but published an elaborate prospectus claiming they had acquired magnifi­ cent tracts of land valued at over $2,000,ooo.< 13 > Gullible speculators paid out, and even more gullible settlers left for their new paradise. Most died and the

(9) Nevins,Fish,p.252 ( 10) Ibid; Logan,Haiti and the Dominican Republic,p.38; Van Alstyne,American Diplomacy in Action,p.544 (11) Sumner Welles, Naboth•s Vineyard - The Dominican Re~ublic 1 1844-1924.(2 Vols.New York,1928),Vol.II, p. ~2. All future references are to Vol.II. (12) Nevins,Fish,p.253 (13) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.313 94 scheme collapsed, though its promoters apparently gained (14) handsomely. The two men, "full of schemes, and of money, and devoid of scruples", <15 > organized other such projects with varying success, and waited for future opportunities. ''I am awe-struck with the brilliant . ( 16) prospects 11 , wrote Fabens to Cazneau at one time.

They were obviously nothing but adventurers, yet they were to be trusted by both Seward and Grant.

Seward was interested in a West Indian naval base, but was undecided whether to favour Samana Bay or St. (17) Thomas. Although action did not come until 1866, it is apparent from a reference in Gideon Welles' diary{lB) that Seward was interested in Santo Domingo in 1864, for he was considering giving aid to the Dominican rebels in their fight against the Spanish.< 19 > At the same time he was disturbed by continuing British and French activity around the islana,< 2o> and sent the

(14) Ibid,pp.314-5 (15) Nevins,~,p.254 (16) Ibid,p.254 (17) Welles,Naboth•s Vineyard,p.316 (18) G.Welles, Diary,Vol.I,p.519 (19) In 1860 bankruptcy and political chaos forced the Dominicans to offer the republic to the Spanish. The offer was accepted, and the United States was too concerned with the Civil War to object. Within a few years, however,the Dominicans realized their error and fought to regain their independence. In 1865, after a half-hearted attempt to hold back the rebellion, the Spanish gave in. (20) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.316 95 British a terse reminder to keep out.< 21 > In January

1866, with the excuse of a recuperative trip, he sailed for the Caribbean with his son Frederick, assistant Secretary of State, and arrived in Santo Domingo on January 15, where Cazneau took over the job of showing them around the republic. The official paper reported that Seward's visit to the President was one restricted to an open exchange of opinions, adding that: "the details of this interview provided the most satisfactory preliminaries for negotiations tending towards a frank under­ standing between the United States and the Dominican Republic. 11 (22) Because of the pressure of work, Seward did not bring this matter before the Cabinet until December, <23 > and Welles recorded the event with disapproval: "First••• (the area) is very sickly; second••• it lies off the direct route to Aspinwall, - the bay itself being thirty miles deep; third, but few inhabitants and no markets; fourth, the condition of the Treasury. 11 ' 24 ) Seward continued to work strenuously for his scheme by 0aining the support of Congressional leaders, notably ~haddeus Stevens, William P. f'essenden and James Grimes; Welles, however, felt that Seward's object all along was merely to get on good terms with these men, and to

(21) Van Deusen,Seward,p.529 (22) Welles,!:Jaboth's Vineyar..3.,p.317 (23) G. Welles,Diary,Vol.II,p.631 (24) Ibid 96 gain a spectacular diversion of attention from internal discontents.< 25 > There was, as far as he could see, no object "naval or commercial" in getting Samana.( 2G)

Seward had merd:.:Loned political reasons, which Welles could not fathom; there was a suggestion that these could allude to the "Negro problem", but whether or not this meant a scheme of emigration was not explained.< 27>

At all events the Dominicans proved to be harder bargainers than anticipated, for the Dominican Cabinet was divided on the idea of alienating land to the United

States. Cabral, currently in power, procrastinated, adapting and amending the American proposals and, though negotiations continued, Welles felt that by February

1867 the episode could be considered a failure.< 23 >

Congressional opposition too was growing. Disheartened,

Seward ordered the negotiations terminated.< 29 >

In 1867, however, the political situation in Santo

Domingo changed again. Cabral 1 s declining power was further undermined when the rebellious Baez reached an accommodation with the new Haitian President, Salnave.

To bolster his authority Cabral offered the lease of

Samana Bay to the United States. Seward was sceptical about the offer and was annoyed by the inconsistent attitude of the Dominican leaders, but negotiations were

(25) Ibid,p.643 Ibid G.Welles,Diary,Vol.II,p.643 1~1! Ibid, vo1.1:u;p.l1Q (29) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.332. 97 reopened, despite his pessimism.< 3o) Cabral, however, had delayed too long; his position was hopeless, and on January 21, 1868, he capitulated to Baez.< 3t)

The seesDw of Dominican politics steadied for a while, but Baez was as much as in need of aid as had been Cabral. The agreement with Haiti was not likely to remain in effect for long, <32 > the economy was in ruins, and Baez was without fun.ds. He turned to Cabral' s method, and offered to the United States the Samana peninsula and bay for $1,000,000 in gold, and $1,000,000 worth of armaments, attempting to browbeat Seward by hintin0 that the offer would be made to England, France or Spain in the event of the United States turning it , ( 3 3) aown. The situation was complicated by the continual interference of Pabens and Cazneau. By 1868 they held vast land and mineral concessions which promised consid­ erable returns on investments should the republic, or the peninsula, much of which they owned, become American property. In the fever of speculation, they had involved Spofford, Tileston and Company (a New York bankinQ house), . (34) various merchants and a steamship line, and conse- quently a considGrable core of wealthy investors was

(30) Welles,Naboth•s Vineyard,p.338 (31) Ibid,p.339 (32) The rebellion against him began almost as soon as he took office, and there were tentative advances to Salnave by the rebels. (33) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.348 (34) Nevins,Fish,pp.255-6 98 vitally interested in the fa,te of the proposal. <35 > Fabens, with his confidence and his polished and suave Boston manners, came to Washinqton in January 1869, ( 36) prepared to lchby in Congress.

Dy this time, however, tolerance of the project in

Congress had long since d8partcd. The time lag had given opposition the chance to become organized and considerably more vocal. The hostility was personal as well as political, aimed at Johnson and his secretive

Secretary of State and the proposition was doomed. Two quick attempts were made to rally Congressional support. N.P. Banks on January 12 introduced in the House a joint resolution aimed at extending a protectorate over Haiti and Santo Domingo. This was tabled by a vote of 126 to

36. <37 ) On FeJnuary 1, .S.P. Orth proposed the annexation of Santo Domingo. After some reaction aguinst the way it was being pushed upon them, the Representatives tabled this also, 110 to 63.< 39 > This concerted indifference killed the scheme. The Dominican leaders could only hope that the coming change of Presidency would yield better results.

(35) It is surprising that men of such dubious character should attract the investors they did. Seward continued to deal with them despite repeated, warnings from Smith, Commercial Agent in Santo Domingo, and otherl.~epresentati ves in the Caribbean. Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.349. ( 3 G) Welles,Diary,Vol.III,p.517; Picrce,Sumner,Vol.IV,p.428 (37) Conqressional Globe, 40 Congress, 3 session,pp.317,333 (38) Ibid,p. 769 99 When Grant took over the Presidency the Dominican question was thus still fresh in public minds. There was a body of opinion in favour of annexation; indeed, there was more -i.ntcres t in annexation than in a protect­ orate, as the reaction to the resolutions revealed some saw annexation as more profitable; others saw it as a pos.itivc stepping stone to Cuba. <39 ) Nevins records a number of examples of favourable opinion - there was mention of "new and great results" that it would yield, (40) and of its strategic value. But there was also strong opposition to the idea, notably from the World, the Tribune, and the Nation in New York. Their main contention was that the whole project contained an clement of chicanery,- and that the move to annex the republic was "a large speculation in real estate and coloniu.l debts". ( 4 i) Fabens and Cazneau continued to rally support for annexation. Pabens, in Washington, had gained the sympathetic attention of Banks, who had agreed, among other things, to speak at a Dominican meeting to be held in New York in May. <42 ) Fabens also maintained and extended links with American financiers, speculators and compan i es area1 d y in-eres. t t e d in. ~an., t o Domingo. . ( 43 )

(39) Nevins ,~,p. 259; New York Times ,September to December, 18G9 ( 40) Nevins,Fish,p.259 (41) Ibid,p.256 (42) Ibid,p.261; Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.357; Pierce, Sumner,Vol.IV,p.428 (43) Nevins,.E.!..§h,p.256 100 Cazneau remained in Santo Domingo, sustaining Dominican determination. His wife, all this time, was publishing in the New York Herald picturesque and enthusiastic ( LUI.) articles on the republic. -~ In April, Pabens made his first direct approach to the Administration. On the first of the month he wrote a highly coloured report on the resources of Santo Domingo, extolling its virtues as a commercially strategic acquisition, and sent the report to the State

Department. A few days later on April 5 he called to see Fish, who greeted him coldly, and presented to the Secretary a memo which he claimed he had been instructed to present as the confidential agent of Santo Domingo. "The Dominican Government is disposed to enter fully into tho American Union as a free and sovereign state, and is prepared to assert that the question when submitted to the people will be approved with enthusiasm. Neverthe­ less, it cannot take the initiative. It appears most suitable that the United States Congress, advised of thP- true situation of the Dominican Republic, should accept thec 4s) Dominican Republic as one of its states." This was mentioned to the Cabinet, and passed over with very little interest.C 4 G) Though Fabens bombarded Grant with letters and visits, the President did not seem particularly interested.

(44) Nevins,~,p.256 (45) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,pp.365-66; Nevins,Fish, pp.128,216. Welles claims the date was March 9, but as Fish was not yet Secretary of State by that date, Nevins' date of April 5 is more likely. (46) Nevins,op.cit.,p.216 101 Meanwhile, within Santo Domingo, the economic situation declined still further. Desperate for money, so much so that he could not wait for the campaign in the United States to bear fruit, Baez turned to a London financial house, Hartmont and Company, for a loan. This was beset with difficulties from the beginning. Edward H. Hartmont was a man with a criminal record, and a reputation among financial circles in London that made it surprising that he was still working in the financial world. The loan he engineered was so ringed around with amendments and commissions that, of an agreement for f.757,000, the Dominican Government seemed destined to gain only about £320,000.< 47 ) An intriguing aspect of this deal was the fact that Fabens was appointed Hartmont•s agent in Washington, and the New York agents of the firm associated with Hartmont were Spofford, Tileston and (48) Company. In Washington, Fabens and his associates were beginning to have some effect upon Grant. Their concen­ tration upon the President and his closest advisors was shrewd; they had quickly discovered that he was easily influenced. As early as April 22, 1869, Fabens reported to Cazneau that Grant seemed "very favorably disposed" and that Porter, Rawlins, Logan, Banks and Fish would

(47) Nevins,Fish.p.261 (48) Ibid 102 all co-operate in the arrangements for either the lease of Samana Bay or the annexation of the republic.< 49 ) That much of this was the exaggeration of an entrepreneur was obvious by his inclusion of Fish, who was always far from enthusiastic about the scheme. There may have been an element of truth in his references to the other men; Rawlins especially was a believer in Manifest Destiny, and his influence upon Grant was very powerful.(SO) Congressional opinion at this time towards the measure was not so much antipathetic as uninterested, as it had been at the end of Johnson's term. Orth's speech of April 5, 1869, encouraging annexation, had met with little response.(Si) On May 17, Thornton, the British ambassador, wrote to the British Foreign Office in reply to a query about American designs upon Santo Domingo that in his opinion nothing at all was intended, especially "without first consulting the feeling of Congress upon the subject - a step which could not be taken without giving publicity to such a subject. 11 <52 > On that same day, however, Grant was asking the Navy Department for a warship to be sent to Dominican waters to enquire into the commerce, finances and political condition of the . (53) republ 1.c.

(49) Nevins,Fish,pp.262-3 (50) Ibid,p.263 (51) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 1 sess.,pp.523-27 (52) Nevins,Fish,p.262 (53) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.371 103 The President was impressed by the desperate situation of Santo Domingo, and he came to the belief that only annexation and its benefits could save the republic. This, like most of the arguments he used and expanded in his messages to Congress,< 54 ) was a reiteration of ideas presented to him by advocates of annexation. It was apparent that what was most responsible for his interest was the influence of individuals, such as Rawlins, Banks and Fabens. It seems reasonable to discount as rationalization Grant•s later claim that he sought in annexation an end to racial disorder, and looked forward to the establishment of an independent black state peopled by Negro emigrants from the United States.< 55 ) Once he had decided to act Grant was determined upon annexation; he certainly became deeply involved in the negotiations. He sent Commander Selfridge in the "Nipsic" on a naval investigation, a common method of probing for information which should have sufficed, but before Selfridge's return Grant went ahead, without advising Congress or Cabinet, with alternative arrange­ ments - the sending of a special agent, a move prompted by new developments.

(54) J.D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Vol.VII,pp.61-2,96-112. All references are to Vol. VII unless otherwise stated. (55) Grant, Memoirs, Vol.II,p.550 104 During June and July 1869 the State Department was under increased pressure from Santo Domingo where the economic situation had deteriorated further, leading the Baez Government to encourage Fabens to push the scheme with more vigour.(SG) The position was further compli­ cated by rumours that Salnave in Haiti had considered ceding some Haitian territory to the United States if a naval station was all the United States wanted. Without an American commitment, the Dominicans felt the republic would collapse. Fabens went to Fish, pleading for action and secrecy, intimating that some other, but unspecified, power wou ld b e approac h e d if·· . th e nego: t ia. t ions' co 11 apse· d • ( 5 7) In his meeting with Fish on June 9, ostensibly to discuss the so-called depradations of a rebel vessel, the -.~'Telegrafo", against American shipping, Fabens in desper­ ation suggested that he should act as the American agent, despite the fact that he was already the representative of Santo Domingo. (SB) Early in July, Spofford, Tileston and Company suggested to the State Department that someone should be sent secretly to the Republic to acquire a better understanding of the situation.< 59 ) Implicit in

(56) Welles,Naboth's V.i.neyard,p .. 367 (57) Ibid,p.368 (58) Ibid,p .. 369. It is interesting that the company which complained about these "depradations" and called for action against them was Spofford, Tileston and Company. See Nevins,Fish,p.265 (59) Nevins,Fish,p.264 - 105 this appeal was the view that affairs in Santo Domingo warranted more than a naval commission. Fish was ( 60) annoyed by the suggestion and concerned about ignoring Congress, but Grant was convinced that a special agent was necessary.

The agent he chose was an old friend, Benjamin P. Bunt. (Gi) The first intimation the Cabinet had of this action came when, at Bunt's falling ill, Grant chose his secretary, Orville Babcock.< 62 ) The reaction was not at all favourable, especially as it had been agreed in Cabinet

"that a cordially friendly attitude to the actual government in San Domingo, with decided discouragement to all interventiof ) and filibustering, should be the policy." 63

Many felt the sending of a Presidential agent on such a mission would unnecessarily complicate the situation.

However, the Cabinet acquiesced; no-one could think of ( 64) any legal reason why Babcock should not go.

Fish's orders to Babcock were strictly limited, and he was given no diplomatic authority at all, but was

"to endeavour to obtain full and accurate information in regard to the disposition of the Government and people of the Republic toward the United States; the character of the Government, whether it be military or

( 60) J.D. Cox, "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney­ General", Atlantic Monthly, August 1895,p.165 (61) Nevins,Fish,p.264 ( 62) Cox, op.cit.,p.165 (63) Ibid ( 64) For the Cabinet's attitude, see Cox, "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General",p.165 106 civil, whether it be stable or liable to be overthrown••• Generally, any informa­ tion tending to illustrate the condition and resources of that Republic, and the character and influence of those chargetGS) with its destinies, will be agreeable." The Secretary of State had no idea that Grant would augment these instructions by asking Babcock "to consult the Dominican leaders Con the subject of annexation). If he found them favorable, he was to ascertain the terms on which they desired annexation. 11 (66) The President also took control of the arrangements for Babcock's travel and showed a lack of diplomacy and a tactlessness which alarmed the Cabinet. He suggested that the vessel to take Babcock to Santo Domingo should be the "Tybee", one owned and run by Spofford, Tileston and Company, and mentioned that some New York merchants had offered the agent free passage. Fish remonstrated vociferously, and Cox felt that not only did this episode show "that somebody was giving publicity to the mission, but it had greater signifi­ cance in showing that the State Department had no part in its management.nC67J The Cabinet had been led to believe that the negotiations would be secret; that this was not so was obvious from the fact that Babcock was being accompanied by Fabens, Columbus Cole, a noted enthusiast for annexation, and

(65) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.371 (66) Nevins,Fish,p.265,note 4 (67) Cox, "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General", p.166. Grant finally gave in and ordered that the Navy give Babcock transportation. 107 "Judge" O'Sullivan, a concession holder in Santo Domingo and an acquaintance of Grant.< 6S) From his arrival in Santo Domingo Babcock was treated with care and attention. The day after he arrived in Santo Domingo City, accompanied by Fabens and Cole, Babcock spent the evening with Baez, Cazneau and Gautier, Dominican Minister of State, an event which Mrs. Cazneau recorded with enthusiasm for the New York Herald. (Gg) The sending of additional warships to support Babcock's authority and the rumours concerning annexation which were developing in the United States must have warned Fish that something was afoot; yet he did not tackle Grant on the subject until late August at the earliest.(?O) It is possible that, though suspicious, he did not believe Grant foolish enough to attempt such a scheme without approaching either the

Secretary, Cabinet or Congress. He apparently did not gain any illuminating answers from the President, for his astonishment on hearing of Babcock's treaty negotia­ tions was quite genuine. One Cabinet member recalled that Fish had exclaimed: "What do you think! Babcock is back, and has actually brought back a treaty for the cession of San Domingo; yet I pledge you my word he had no more diplomatic authority(th1n any other casual visitor to the island!" 71

( 68) Ibid; Nevins,Fishtp.266 ( 69) Nevins,Fish,pp.76'b-8 Ibid p.267 ~ ~~~ Cox, l1How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General", p.166. 108 The Cabinet was as shocked as Fish, and certainly did not think that: "the President would assume responsibili~y for the illegal act of his messenger. 11 C7 1 Cox claimed that he and Fish decided the proper thing to do was to regard the treaty as null and void, "and insist upon burying the whole in oblivion as a state

secret 11 .c 73 > Nevins, on the other hand, believes that Fish decided instead to treat the protocol as merely a collection of unofficial opinions, giving Grant the opportunity to back out.< 74 ) This was more likely, for Fish was aware that too many people knew of the mission for the treaty to remain a secret for long. The terms of the treaty were straightforward, and probably more in the Dominicans• favour. For the cession of the Republic, minus public lands, Baez was asking $1,500,000, with $100,000 in cash and $50,000 in arms and supplies payable immediately. Should the treaty fail ratification at either end the amount given in cash and materials was to be credited on account for the sale of Samana Bay, which would be sold to the Americans for the sum offered by Seward, namely $2,000,000.< 75 > However, the agreement carried the extraordinary and unconstitutional addendum that the President:

(72) Cox,"How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney-General",p.166 (73) Ibid (74) Nevins,fisl'}.,p.269 (75) For the text of the treaty, see Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,pp.977-82. 109 "should use all his influence with the members of Congress to popularize the idea of annexing the Dominican Republic to the United States and that he would withhold from them all official communication on the subject until)certain of its approval by a majority. 11 C76 Fish, despite his anxiety and annoyance, was calm and non-committal in his dealings with Grant, hoping that the President would recognize the unconstitutionality of the measure and allow it to expire.< 77> Grant, however, was ardent for annexation. He told Fish that Babcock•s action had his approval, and that the Secretary should draft a treaty along the lines suggested. At the next Cabinet meeting Grant, departing from his usual custom of allowing each member to deal with the matters in his own portfolio, brought the subject of the treaty to the attention of the Cabinet.(?S) Casually acknowledging that Babcock's action had been "informal", he called for support to make it legal, by arranging for the treaty to be signed. "This took everybody so completely by surprise that they seemed dumbfounded. After an awkward interval, as nobody else broke the silence, (Cox) said, "But, Mr. President, has it been settled, then, that we want to annex San Domingo?" The direct question evidently embarrassed General Grant. He colored, and smoked hard at his cigar••• As the silence became painful, the President called for another item of ( 7g) business, and left the question unanswered."

(76) Ibid,p.375. (77) Nevins,fi.sh,p.270 ( 78) Cox, "How Judge Hoar ceased to be Attorney-General", p.166. Cox claims that Grant's reason for taking the initiative was that Fish, had he brought up the sub­ ject, would have disclaimed all P.art in the matter, ( ) and ~ould ha~e stated that it hao been utterly illegal. 79 op• C1 t • , p .1. b "/ 110 The Cabinet oviously was not in favour of the scheme.

Further evidence of the attitude of members was found in the final Cabinet meeting to discuss Santo Domingo, on

October 19, 1869, when the treaty draft was considered.

Only one member, John A.J. Creswell, Postmaster General, was definitely in favour; the others were either actively opposed or politely doubtful, and Boutwell was very concerned that Congress had not been approached.(SO)

Grant's reaction to the opinion of his Cabinet was silence; he did not broach the subject again.

Meanwhile encouragement was being given to the supporters of the scheme. Fabens had suggested giving

Babcock a material interest in the Republic, which

Babcock very rightly refused; however, Fabens• correspondence with Fish gives the impression that

Babcock was intimately acquainted with the management of the negotiations.(St) In the Republic, opposition was being stifled. The Baez Government insisted on the recall of the American Commercial Agent, Mr. J. Somers

Smith, who, unwisely as far as his career was concerned, wrote to Fish on September 2 accusing Fabens and Cazneau of being nothing more than speculators "who (would stop) at nothing to bring about their own selfish ends". He believed that the United States should avoid any interference:

(80) Nevins,Fish,p.271 (81) Nevins,Fish,pp.275-6 111 "in the dissensions in this revolutionary country while the permanency of its govern­ ment is precarious. The prisons are filled with political offenders, and several hundred of the most respectable men in this city are in exile. 11 (82) It was a wise observation, but caused a demand from Baez for Smith's recall, with which the State Department had no choice but to comply. His successor was Major Raymond H. Perry, an adventurer with no talent for diplomacy and even less inclination for it.<93 > Babcock returned to the island not long after, with Rufus Ingalls, a friend of Grant and an associate of O'Sullivan and Fabens. Babcock's instructions, besides acknowledging that he would be supported by warships, included an order to keep the object of the visit and the treaty's terms as secret as possible.

(82) Welles,Naboth•s Vineyard,p.375 (83) Nevins,!'lJi!l,p.277 (84) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.377 (85) The text of the convention is found in Ibid,pp.982-4 112 acted in good faith. The Republic was wealthy, it did have potential, it did offer a defensible naval base, and it had pleaded for help. However, if Grant's motives for considering the annexation of Santo Domingo were most plausible, the dogmatism inherent in his attitude led to difficulties. Personally incorrupt,CSG) he was yet incapable of recognizing corruption in others, but this did not excuse his failure to ensure a thorough investigation before carrying on with a project which he must have known was likely to be controversial. The uncertain political stability of Santo Domingo and Baez's obvious plight, plus the numerous though not always specific rumours of speculation, bribery and violence, should have suggested to Grant, as it did later to

Congress, that a careful scrutiny was needed of all aspects of the case. That this was not done provided the opposition with a considerable weapon against the

Administration.

Perhaps some of the pitfalls could have been avoided had Grant not been so secretive. His Secretary of State was not told of the scheme until it was well under way, and, as was obvious from both Fish's diary and Cox's

(86) Charles Sumner, in later debates, accused Grant of being party to the corruption. See Pierce,Sumner, Vol.IV,pp.437-87; Cong.Globe, 41 Cong.,3 sess., pp.227-31. There is no evidence to support such accusations. 113 description of the episode, the Cabinet was equally ill­

informed. Even after it had been told of the annexation

measure and after its members had signified their

disapproval or at best, their lack of interest, Grant

persisted. His secrecy astonished and worried them,

especially as they were expected to maintain this secrecy

and leave public opinion and Congress ignorant of

developments; the latter, particularly, would not be

inclined to take lightly this apparent sign of disregard.

Grant's stand can be interpreted as symbolic of his

definition of his role as President. Convinced that his

programme was essential, commercially, strategically and

politically, he went ahead in military fashion, keeping

the numbers of those in his confidence at a minimum, and

demanding and expecting obedience. It is possible that

his failure to inform Congress until the treaty was drawn

up was an attempt to avoid the development of organized

opposition such as that encountered by Seward, but it

seems more likely that he did not imagine that

Congressional opinion would be vociferously antagonistic.

He felt sure that he represented the people, as the

· election had shown. Furthermore, a number of able,

successful men were advocating the proposition, and at

least some newspapers supported him. He may have felt

that Mrs. Jane Cazneau•s articles, published so regularly, were signs of American and Dominican approval.CS?)

(87) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.370 114 Fish, meanwhile, was in the invidious position of being a Secretary of State in ignorance of a presidential scheme which he was expected to support. From the beginning he had been opposed to the idea of annexation.

He disliked and distrusted Fabens, and was shocked by

Babcock's usurpation of authority. His support for the project was given reluctantly, but unshakeably, as his concern for the Administration was greater than personal considerations. He had remonstrated with Grant, but there was little he could do once the President had assumed control of the situation. The initiative for foreign policy lay with the executive, and the delegation of authority was the President's concern. If he decided to carry on alone, Fish could do nothing to regain control without forcing his own resignation and thereby threatening the already uncertain harmony of the

Administration.

His anxiety over annexation, however, was partly assuaged by the thought that the scheme could not succeed. The Senate would ultimately have control of it, and the chances of the treaty passing were remote, he felt. ( 33 )

On December 5 Congress assembled and the President's

(88) Nevins,Fish,p.313. Nevins believes that Fish left Grant to deal with Santo Domingo because he was concerned about the delicate relations with Spain; he would rather keep Grant's attention away from Cuba. 115 speech on the State of the Union was presented to them.

It mentioned nothing whatsoever about Santo Domingo, though newspapers were discussing rumours that the United States was playing an important role there.

This was only speculation but it kept the issue in the public eye until January 10 when the treaty was finally presented to the Senate for action, the first public announcement of annexation.< 9o)

Between the opening of Congress and its return on

January 10 after the Christmas recess, Grant had not been idle; instead he had begun rallying support for the treaty, and early in January( 9 i) he visited Sumner, for he recognized the Chairman's standing in the Senate, and his appeal to the public. To attempt to sound out

Sumner was shrewd political strategy, but its possible effects were negated by Grant's clumsiness. He arrived unannounced in the middle of a small dinner party Sumner was giving and, without copies of the treaty, of which

Sumner was ignorant, launched into a discussion of the topic. His nervousness and confusion was such that he apparently addressed Sumner as Chairman of the Judiciary

(89) New York Times,November-December 1869,January 1870; Nevins,Fish,p.309. Thornton, the British Ambassador, believed that the United States was playing such a role, and wrote to the British Foreign Office that this movement would not stop with the acquisition of Santo Domingo, but would go on to include Haiti, Cuba and Puerto Rico. Nevins,op cit.,pp.309-10. (90) Richardson,Messages and Papers,p.46 (91) The date is uncertain. 116 Committee! 92rte left the house believing he had the Chairman's wholehearted support, which Sumner later (93) d en ide. Probably it was a straightforward misunderstanding but it was to have a significant effect upon the relationship of the two men and upon the fate of the treaty.< 94 > The treaty was :r.:asscd to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and there it remained for about two months. Meanwhile Grant continued to supply aid to Santo Domingo. Another revolt against the Dominican Government would destroy any chance of the treaty's being ratified, so in answer to various pleas from Baez for aid against encroachments from Haiti, Grant ordered at least two ships into Dominican waters with instructions to protect the Dominican Government against any aggression of the Haitians.< 95 > Not only were these orders to bo communicated to the Baez regime but they were to be made quite clear to Haiti also.C 9G) The constitutional legality of this action was later queried by Congress, and it was certainly politically foolish at a time when (97) the treaty was pending before the Committee.

(92) Pierce,Sumner,Vol.IV,p.453; Nevins,!.!§h,p.311. Grant, foolishly, had paid the first instalment of the lease out of Secret Service funds, thus avoiding Congressional consent. This payment committed the United States to the lease of Samana Bay, and later payments had to be made. Cong.Globe, 41 Cong.,3 sess.,pp.242-3 ~§~~ For Interpretations see Nevins Fish,pp.311-2; Hesseltine,Grant,pp.199-200; Pl"erce,Sumner,Vol.IV,p~453-5 (95) Welles,Naboth 1 s Vineyard,p.383 ( 96) Cong.Globe, 42 Cong., 1 sess.,App.p.54 /0•7' T~~~ nn_Ai-A ~~~-~h_?71-~1a_~?a-q?_A14-h 117 Grant felt that the justification for his move lay in the Dominican plebiscite of February 19, 1870. Reinforced by American strength, Baez announced on February 16 that a vote on annexation would be held three days later.< 9s) Reams of government propaganda emerged, the most interesting aspect of a large propor­ tion of it being its attempt to display the United States as: "a collection of free and independent republics united by a common bond, each state possessing its qwn religion, language, customs, and habits, 11 (99) which suggested that Baez was none too sure of his people's desire to surrender their independence. This opinion is endorsed by the fact that his agents let it be known that any opposition would meet with imprisonment, banishment or death.ClOO) Not unexpectedly the result was overwhelmingly in favour of annexation - 15,169 to 11 was the official total. Fabens explained that the eleven votes were registered only to preserve appearances! 101> Grant was pleased by this vindication of his interest. Fish continued unenthusiastically but loyally to follow the President but it was obvious that he had no faith in the measure and was convinced it would fai1.< 102 > Then

(98) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.384 (99) Ibid,pp.384-6 (100)Ibid (101)Nevins,Fish,p.315 (102)Nevins,Fish,p.314 118 the newspapers learned of the terms of the treaty fcom an undisclosed source, and began a campaign of opposi­ tion.<1o3> They explored the dubious legality of Fabens' and Cazneau•s actions, the wholesale speculation of certain American merchants, the attempts to bribe Babcock, the government support of Baez, the connections between interested parties, and the Davis Hatch case. Hatch was an American citizen, living in Santo Domingo, who had acquired a number of concessions from the govern­ ment. He became aware of the speculatory activities of Fabens and Cazneau and, when his opposition became inconveniently vocal, Baez imprisoned him, ostensibly for subversive action. The American Commercial Agent made a number of attempts to have him freed, without success, and he finally appealed to Babcock who, convinced of Hatch's danger to negotiations, ignored him. Even the State Department showed little interest. <1o4 ) This case was to provide the focal point for an irrelevant but emotional debate in Congress against.annexation. Although some newspapers, such as the New York Times and the New York Herald, ,generally supported the Government, it was apparent that public opinion was predominantly opposed to annexation, or at least indiff­ erent to its so-called advantages. Most people were more concerned with events at home, and some felt that the

(103) Ibid,pp.312-3 (104) Ibid,pp.330-34 119 annexation of Santo Domingo would cause unnecessary lll­ feeling in Danish-American relations, as the treaty for the sale of the nearby Danish West Indies had failed to pass the United States Senate.(iOS) Grant, however, could not be deterred. Badeau attributed his persistence to "the heat of the contest that made him so eager for success at last; for he had the soldier•s instinct, even in civil affairs. When he was once engaged in)battle, he was always anxious to win. 11 (106

Concerned that the Senate would not make a judgment before the expiry date of March 29, Grant sent a message to the Senate on March 14, urging rapid consideration: "The people of San Domingo have already, as far as their action can go, ratified the treaty, and I express the earnest v..rish that you will not permit it to expire by limita­ tion. I also entertain the sincere hope that your action may be favofW~r to the ratification of the treaty." 1 Fish's frustration, for he was not told of this note and interpreted it as a want of confidence in himself, was not eased by Grant's incessant lobbying. For days the President called senators to his room at the Capitol, or to the White House, and preached the advantages of annexation.< 1os) It was not illegal, but it was undignified.

(105) See an article discussed in the New York Times, March 27, 1869. (106) Pierce,Sumner,Vol.IV,p.439 (107) Richardson,Messages and Papers,pp.52-3 (108) Nevins,f.!§h,p.317; Hesseltine,Grant,pp.201-202 120 The message had no visible effect on the progress of the treaty through the Senate, for it passed from committee to executive session where it remained for well over two months~< 1o9 ) The delay caused it to lapse, but as it had not been definitely voted out, Grant was encouraged to negotiate for an extension, hoping that the treaty would meet with more success. During April and May, 1870, the Senate was busy with other matters and the subject of Santo Domingo did not come up for serious discussion until June, although the question of annexation was not ignored. A mass meeting was organized in New York on May 12 in an attempt to rally support for the treaty. One of the more interesting justifications of annexation was voiced at this meeting when one speaker claimed that there was: "a scientific theory that the West Indian Islands were formed out of the wash of the Mississippi Valley, carried by the Gulf Stream and deposited into the reefs of the Bahamas. If this is cor~ect, that soil must have been torn out of the American continent:110 ) ·and why should we not fol low our property'? 11 In the House Benjamin Butler made eight attempts to introduce a joint resolution to annex the republic.< 111> As he continued with these attempts the House appeared to be more bored and amused than antagonistic. Every­ one seemed indifferent.

(109) During the discussion of the treaty, Sumner and Carl Schurz led the attack upon it. See New York Tribune, March 25,26, 1870 (110) H_esseltine,Grant,p.204; New York Tribune,May 13, 1870 (111) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong.,3 sess.,pp.2442,2495,2547,2602, 2660,2861,3386,3976. 121 Indifference was apparently increasing. There was no desire to annex the Republic - it was small, politically uncertain, diseased and not part of the American mainland. Some, like Senator Merrill, queried the claim that such annexation was a manifestation of the Monroe Doctrine, because the Doctrine was essentially defensive, not imperialistic. <112 > Many of the strategic justifications had lost their effect with the failure of the proposals to build a canal across the Central American isthmus. Surveys in recent years told only of disease, engineering difficulties and endless expense.< 113 > Grant, however, was not discouraged and went ahead with the negotiations for an extension of the expiry date of the treaty, which was acquired on May 14. Although he still could not see that the measure was doomed, he had recognized that some compromise was needed.(ii4 ) Fish put forward some suggested changes, which called for the establishment of a protectorate rather than annexation, (115) with control vested in Congress. This, he hoped, would appease Congress and bridge the 9GP between it and the President. His ideas did not appeal to Grant who turned them down, chiefly because he believed they had originated with the opposition.<116) The changes finally made had little

(112) Con~.Globe, 41 Cong.ii sess.,p.527 (113) Nev nslF'ish,p.327; W lliams, Anglo-American Isth""'. mian D plornacy,pp.270-75 . 114~ Nevlns,op.clt.,p.324; Hesseltine,Grant,p.204 ~115 Nevins,op.cit.,p.326 116 Ibid,p.328 122 effect on the tone of the treaty, but only limited the amount of money to be spent in annexation.< 117 > The President's decision was probably influenced by letters from Gautier who claimed that "The desire is great with which this country almost unanimously is burning to see the conclusiQn gf its annexation to the United States. 11 { 118 > Both Gautier and Fabens were urgent in their recommendations for action, with some justification, for the political situation in Santo Domingo was approaching near chaos. The rebels under Cabral were gaining strength, and it was rumoured that the British Vice-Consul had lent them financial aid, which prompted Grant to s.end American vessels to support Baez. ( 119 ) Even more disquieting to the advpcates of annexation was the growing opposition of the American Commercial Agent, Perry. He had become aware of the roles of Fabens and Cazneau in the annexation measure, and had begun asking difficult questions. His remonstrances to the Head of the Dominican Senate against the continuing extension of conce$sions to these two men resulted in his recall. He left in the middle of May as an enemy of annexation, and warned Cazneau:

(117) Hesseltine,Grant,p.204 (118) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.387 (119) Ibid 123

11You may rest assured that inasmuch as it lies within my power I shall do all I can to prevent injury or intrigue against the interests of my government and to defend the name of President Grant, which name I have every reason to fear has already been used by a finaQcial ring for their own selfish ends.n(120)

Grant continued to press for action. On May 31 he issued an unexpected message to the Senate which dwelt upon the merits of annexation, and which was, in effect, a call for party unity as he made his personal concern quite plain. It was also interesting for its expanded appeal to the theories of the Monroe Doctrine:

"The doctrine promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and I now feel it proper to assert the equally important principle that here­ after no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power••• The acquisition of San Domingo is an adherence to the "Monroe Doctrin(;!"" it is a measure of national protection. 11 \121)

When Congress took up the subject again in June, the President's hopes were dealt a blow, for the Senate, led by Thomas Ferry of Michigan, launched into a discussion of the Davis Hatch case, one bound to reflect badly upon the Dominican negotiations. As expected, the debate did not long confine itself to Hatch, but developed into an attack upon the Administration in

(120) Welles,Naboth's Vineyard,p.390; Nevins,~,p.330 (121) Richardson,Messages and Papers,pp.61-2 124 general, and upon Grant in particular. An entire day was spent in general recriminations during which Charles

Sumner figured prominently in the assault upon Babcock and Grant. John Thayer's frequent attempts to introduce reason into the debate were ignored. It became apparent that the investigating committee voted to look into the

Hatch case would be investigating not so much the case as Grant and his failings.< 122 > The unpleasant situation was not improved by the President's continual lobbying, nor by Fish's inopportune offer to Sumner of a post in

E·ng 1 an,d presumabl y i. f h e wou ld d rop h 1.s· oppos1.· t ion,· ( 123 )

That this debate would have an effect upon popular reaction to the treaty was a foregone conclusion. Not only had it uncovered more of the dubious legality of the negotiations, but it also revealed Sumner's opposi­ tion both l.:o the scheme and to the Administration. On

June 30, after two days of debate, the treaty failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority. The fifty-six

Senators voting divided evenly. All the Democrats voted against it, and nineteen Republicans joined them. The remaining Republicans had followed Grant, some because they supported th~ scheme, others, undoubtedly, because he had made it an issue of party loyalty.

(122) Cong.Globe, 41 Cong.,2 sess.,pp.4194-4201 (123) Nevins,~,p.364; Pierce,Sumner,Vol.IV,pp.433-4. This was an action which Fish later regretted deeply. 125 The measure now seemed to be definitely finish8d. Grant expressed his disappointment in a defensible but ill-timed gesture which was to be interpreted as personal spite. The day after the Senate's decision John Lothrop Motley, Minister to England and one of Sumner's admirers, was recalled. This had been pending for some time, for his opposition to Grant and his frequent refusals to take orders from Fish were indefensible in an Administration officer. Only Fish's attempts to avoid too many changes . ( 124) had prevented Motley•s recall earlier. Motley, however, refused to resign and remained in England until a successor, Robert Schenck of Ohio, was found in September. In the intervening months, Sumner, far from being subdued, was more vociferous than ever in his denunciations of Grant, realizin9 that Motley's dismissal was a blow aimed at him.< 125 ) Though justifiable in terms of the administration of foreign affairs, the removal of Motley was certain to damage any further developments in the Santo Domingo case - 11 a blunder"

(124) Badeau,Grant in Peace,pp.205-8,469-70 (125) That this was aimed at Sumner was apparent from a :)letter from George Jones, of the New York Times to Benjamin Moran, Secretary of the American Legation in London: "Grant said he had appointed Motley to please Sumner, since he himself had known nothing of him••• Now he would remove the man to please himself because of the San Domingo business". Moran's diary, August 22, 1870, in Oberholtzer, History of the u.s.~yol.II,p.259 126 and "a fatal blow to the San Domingo scheme" was the view of the Nation.( 126)

On Decembers, 1870, Grant sent to Congress his

Annual Message, which bemoaned the failure of annexation, and put forward his belief that European powers would fill the position vacated by the United States. His interest was obviously undiminished, but, knowing there was no chance of getting annexation by treaty, he suggested that:

"by a joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress the Executive be authorized to appoint a Commission to negotiate a treaty with the authorities of San DomiQgo for the acquisition of that island. 11 (127)

With this the debates began again when, on December 9,

Sumner demanded of the President all the information in his possession relating to annexation. On December 12,

Oliver Morton of Michigan in the Senate and Nathaniel

Banks in the House introduced identical bills calling for the creation of the Commission suggested by the

President. ( 128 ) With these bills the Senate went into

Executive Session and for the week until December 20 nothing was heard but rumours which told mainly of . (129) Sumner's opposition. On December 20, however, on

(126) Oberholtzer,op.cit.,p.243 (127) Richardson,Messaqes and Papers,p.100. This apparently assumed that Haiti too would be annexed, a point which Sumner fixed upon, but it was probably a slip of the tongue on Grant's part. (128) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong.,3 sess.,pp.51,66 (129) Hesseltine,Grant,p.225 127 the floor of the Senate Sumner reopened the campaign ..

The Chairman marshalled all his skills to discredit the President and his policy, and he was supported by a number of influential Senators, particularly Republicans

Carl Schurz of Missouri, Orris Perry of Connecticut,

Justin Morrill of Vermont and James Patterson of New

Hampshire, and Democrats Garrett Davis of Kentucky,

Eugene Casserley of California, Thomas Bayard of Delaware and Allen Thurman of Ohio.Cl30) In the afternoon of

December 20, armed with the information he had demanded, he began the attack, which Schurz picked up and 0xtended.

The debates ranged from objective to viciously personal, from relevant to highly illogical, with the most effective taking place during the two days of Decunber 20 and 21, and the long night session of the 21st. rrhe clim,1x of these two days ca.me with Sumner's famous "Naboth's

Vineyard" speech, which was to be widely discussed by the press then and later.< 131) He labelled the Dominican

Government "a collection of political jockeys" and attacked Baez as a black Iscariot planning only to reap the financial benefits of the sale of the Republic, an underhand plot which was being sustained by the continuing

(130) Three of these men, Schurz, Patterson and Casserley, were also members of the Foreign Relations Committee. (131) For example, an article by B.L. Godkin, Editor of the Nation, "A Senator's Fidelity Vindicated", N.A.R.,Vol.XXVII, 1878. 128 presence of the United States Navy of Dominican Waters. He claimed that annexation would be costly and unproduc­ tive and would lead to the conquest of the entire West Indies. The speech then turned into an attack on Grant. Sumner denounced the President as a constitutional menace, claiming that he was attempting to interfere with the work of the Foreign Relations Committee, and comparep Grant's Administration to the expansionistic presidenci~s of Pierce and Buchanan: "I protest against this resolution as another stage in a drama of blood. I protest against it in the name of Justice, outraged by violence; in the name of Humanity insulted; in the name of the weak trodden down; in the name of Peace imperilled, and in the name of the African race, whose first132 ) effort at independence is rudely assailed." Oliver Morton leapt to Grant's defence, attacking Sumner's speech point by point, continuing with a call for support for the President• s suggestion of a Commission and ended: "The annexation of San Domingo will come. I prophesy here tonight that it will come. It may not come in the time of General Grant, or in my time, but I believe it is destined to come, and with it, too, the annexation of Cuba and Porto Rico. 11 (133) It was, he claimed, the Manifest Destiny of the United States to control the West Indies. James Nye of Nevada continued the defence of Grant, and an assault upon Sumner developed. It became apparent that the heated

(132) For the entire speech, see Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 3 sess.,pp.227-236 (133, Ibid,p.271 129 attacks on Grant had helped rather than hindered his supporters. Opposition amendments to the resolution in an attempt (134) to render it ineffective were regularly defeated. Finally Aaron Cragin of New Hampshire settled the doubts of many senators by proposing an amendment which suggested that a vote in favour of the Commission should not commit a senator to a vote for annexation. This passed, and the

vote on the amended resolution came at about 6 o'ciock on the morning of December 22. It passed by 32 to 9. The House debate was equally acrid, with Fernando Wood of New York leading the opposition. The measure was passed on January 9, after a day of discussion, but the debates continued for another two days.Cl35 ) The Commission sailed on January 17, only twelve days after the House vote; the President had evidently (136) been confident of victory. Fish was pleased with the men chosen by Grant: Ben Wade of Ohio, Andrew D. White, President of Cornell University, and Samuel G. Howe of Massachusetts, a long-standing friend of Sumner. Frederick Douglass was one of the Secretaries, and geologists, geographers, stenographers, newspaper reporters and political observers brought the numbers to (137) twenty-four. The Commission returned in March with

(134) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 3 sess.,pp.252,255,259,260, 261,26S,266,269,270. (135) Ibid,pp.381-416 (136) Hesseltine,Grant,p.227 (137) Ibid,p.228 . 130 a report of no great depth which, to Grant's delight, supported his annexation plans. The return gave Sumner another opportunity to attack the Administration,< 139> but his influence had been diminished by his removal from the Chairmanship. The debates of December 20 and 21 had revealed only too well that Sumner's latent antagonism towards Grant as President had come to a head. His increasingly vituperative denunciations of Grant and his policies had become a rallying point for any disfavour towards the Administration and his influence threatened the stability of both the Republican Party and the Senate. It can be said on his behalf that he was concerned, and probably honestly, about the effects of the annexation of Santo Domingo upon the political future of Haiti. The Negro republic had fired Sumner's imagination, and he believed that the United States had a duty, as a strong power, to foster and protect weaker powers instead of plotting to absorb them. As one of the most incorruptible of Senators he was also incensed by the taint of corruption and influence that had surrounded the negotiations. However, his personal assaults upon Grant forced him into a position which was impossible for the Adminis­ tration to accept. There were many examples of his

(138) For events see A.D. White, Autobiography,(New York, 1905),Chap.XXVII (139) Cong. Globe, 42 Cong.,1 sess.,pp.271-305 131 speaking indiscriminately against the President. In November 1870 he claimed that he had been told: "that the whole coast of the bay of Samana is staked off into lots and marked "Cazneau" and "Bab cock" and "Baez" and that one or two particularly large ones' . are marked "Grant".. II ( 14Q) Such remarks forced even the cautious Fish to write: "Upon a certain class of questions, and whenever his own importance and influence are concerned, Qr upon anything relating to himself or his views past or present or his ambition, he loses the power of logical reasoning, and becomes contradictory and violent. This is mental derangement. 11 (141) It was his vanity which led to this "mental derange­ ment". Seeing himself as a great Congressional leader, as others did, and as a symbol of senatorial authority, he regarded Grant's irregular handling of the episode as a personal affront. His maintenance of senatorial and personal authority had become an obsession. By the time the Santo Domingo Commission returned

Sumner was no longer Chairman. The Republican Party caucus replaced him in March, 1871, with Simon Cameron. In any case, the Commission returned to find that interest in Santo Domingo was dead. Fortunately for Fish's peace of mind, Grant at last recognized the hopelessness of the measure. Of the Cabinet meeting of March 31, 1871, Fish wrote:

(140) Cong.Globe, 41 Cong., 3 sess.,p.245 (141) Nevins,Fish,p.451 132 "President reads draft of proposed message communicating report, to which some amendments and alterations are suggested. In the main it is right; he submits the whole question to Gongress and the people. Asks no action, recounts his action with regard to it, and claims that the report justifies his views and expressions. 11 ('142) The Commission had been only a gesture, and any positive effects it might have had had been limited by· Cragin's amendment. Congress had turned to other matters and the moment for annexation had passed; it was obvious even to Grant. His message to Congress on April 5, 1871, was a recognition of failure - quiet, resigned and dignified:

"No man could hope to perform duties so delicate and responsible as pertain to the Presidential office without sometimes incurring the hostility of those who deem their opinions and wishes treated with insufficient consideration; and he who undertakes to conduct the affairs of a great government as a faithful public servant, if sustained by the approval of his own conscience may rely with confidence upon the candor and intelligence of a free people whose best interests he has striven to subserve, and can bear with P.atience the censure of disappointed men. 11 C1~3)

Fabens continued to badger the Government, but Pish was now in control and he told the Dominican agent quite unequivocally that the matter was finished.< 144> Grant agreed, and Fish wrote in relief that "the troublesome, vexatious and unnecessary question is••• finally got rid of. 11 <145 )

(142) Nevins,~,p.498 (143) Richardson,Messages and Papers,p.131 ( 144) Nevins ,f1:!ll, p. 500 (145) Ibid,p.501 133 Grant alone was responsible for the Administration policy in Santo Domingo, and only he in the Government responded with enthusiasm to the idea of annexation; even his supporters had found justification difficult.

They had marshalled arguments of economic and strategic necessity. Orth, for example, claimed Caribbean control was vital since much of American trade went through the

Gulf of Mexico and the isthmian canal would increase this trade. (i4G) Morton quoted figures of British trade in the area and asserted that Santo Domingo would yield vastly more. (l4 ?) Others talked of controlling great shipping lanes and reaping the benefits. The arguments of the opposition were far more effective, however. It had become apparent that the idea of a canal was, at least for the moment, little more than a dream.

Without it control of the Caribbean was not commercially worthwhile. Other arguments pointed out that the

Dominican national debt was $10,000,000, and as most of the franchises were by this time in English hands, much of the potential wealth would be beyond the reach of . ( 148) Americans. The republic was economically crippled, it was diseased, it was black and it was Spanish-speaking; there were frequent attacks on the "mongrel blood" and . 1149) the ineptitude of Spanish governments.' A further

(146) ~ong. Globe, 41 Cong., 1 sess.,p.524 (147) Ibid; 41 Cong., 3 sess.,p.197 (148) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 3 sess.,p.388 (149) Ibid,pp.194,225,249,386,404~409,412 134 devastating argument was the readily evidenced accusation of corruption. Grant had not improved the situation by his clumsiness, his secrecy and his reprehensible defence of Babcock. ( lSO)

It was Grant's handling of the issue which was at the heart of the opposition for he had threatened the newly won Senatorial dominance and the jealous regard for this dominance was the keynote of the arguments against the annexation scheme. Davisi during the debates of December 20 and 21, put the Senate's case succinctly when he claimed Grant was insulting Congress, and the Senate, by forcing upon it: "a furtive, unconstitutional project••• to be effected without the authority of the Constitution, and perverting and usurping its powers by assuming the prerogative of the treaty-making power. 11 (151) This argument appeared again and again, and was undeniably the Senate's basic stand. It was no longer possible to call for complete party unity, for the division between the Senate and the Executive transcended even this. Fish, in a letter to George Bancroft, Minister to Berlin, on February 9, 1870, summed up the situation:

(150) There was, too, some discussion of the resignation of Judge Hoar, Attorney-General. Grant demanded this in order to replace him with .1\mos T. Akerman, of Georgia, in an attempt to muster Southern votes. See Cox, "How Judge Hoar Ceased to be Attorney­ General", Atlantic Monthly. ( 151) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 3 sess.,p.195 135 "The S.an Domingo treaty, I apprehend, will not be approved. In addition to the doubts honestly entertained by many of the policy of acquiring insular ~ossessions ••• , there is something of jealousy••• operating in certain quarterso The necessities of war developed large powers exercised by both Executive and Legislative branches; the subsequent disagree­ ment between Congress and A. Johnson increased the legislative powers and accustomed those in Congress, and particularly those in the Senate to antagonize every proposition emanating from the Executive ••• The habit of criticism. if not of opposition, became somewhat fixed••• - it is difficult to voluntarily relinquish power. 11 (152)

Confidence in Grant and his Cabinet had been

severely shaken. Fish had threatened more than once to

resign and his disillusion with the running of affairs was apparent to many. The unity of the Republican Party had suffered from the confrontation of Grant and Sumner.

The reaction of the country was shown by the decided

swing to the Democrats in the 1870 elections.

(152) Nevins,Fish,p.313- 136 CHAPTER V HAWAII The policy of the United States towards Hawaii was for most of the nineteenth century undefined, and any action taken was less a matter of government interest than of an unofficial commitment by Americans living on the islands. To understand the force exerted by these individuals during Grant's period, it is necessary to look at the development of the "American frontier" in

Hawaii. The Hawaiian Islands were on the path of vessels bound from the American coast to Canton. The location of the archipelago and the ease with which water, firewood, vegetables, hogs and salt could be purchased there gave the islands a very real importance to all who were engaged in the trade of the North Pacific. To these attractions were added theciJsurances of security of life and property. · These remarks sum up the position Hawaii held. The only sizeable island group in the North Pacific, it is approx­ imately 2000 miles from the west coast of the United States, 5000 miles from South America and about 4000 miles from most of the Asian mainland and Australasia, but its apparent isolation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries only increased its importance as a coaling station and resting place in the long trans-Pacific hauls of the old trading routes. From the time that Cook's voyages, and death, brought

(1)Harold W. Bradley, The American Frontier in Hawaii: the Pioneers 1789-1843. (Stanford, Calif.,1912),p.21 137 the islands into prominence, the traffic through them increased steadily, especially as the fur trade with China flourished. The old route had been to leave China in April, and hug the North Asian and Alaskan coasts to the Canadian west coast. With the advent of the Hawaiian stops a faster trip could be made with fewer provisions. Food was cheap in Hawaii, and the natives, as accomplished seamen, could be hired as pilots or replacements for scurvy-ridden sailors. Until the early nineteenth century, the leaders in this developing enterprise were the English, for they had the obvious advantage of the command of the largest commercial fleet. A small number of Englishmen joined Hawaiian societYt the outstanding examples being Isaac Davis and John Young, who were left on the islands by mistake. So trusted did they become that they ultimately joined the king's haole, or "council", and created a liaison between the "administration" and the growing numbers of Europeans of dubious character. By the turn of the century Americans were appearing in the North Pacific in appreciable numbers. Many Englishmen, forced out of Pacific trade by the monopoly of the East India Company, began using American vessels to ship their goods, but it was not long before American merchants themselves were attracted by the commercial possibilities of the area. As the end of the War of Independence released more American vessels and as the Napoleonic wars forced England to close some of her 138 commitments in the Pacific, the number of Americans in the region increased. The sandalwood trade, which boomed at the beginning of the nineteenth·century, was largely responsible for this growth, for it was almost entirely an American affair. By 1818 between one and two hundred foreigners were living in Hawaii, of which the majority appeared to be Americans,< 2 > and the advent of whaling only carried this development further. The next significant move of foreigners into Hawaii began in the 1820s with the influx of the missionaries, who were to have an enormous impact upon Hawaiian life, far greater than mere numbers suggest. Again, they were predominantly American and, more particularly, New Englanders. Their influence was both good and bad. The most important advance was in education, but the religion and ethics they taught were of a rigid, Calvinistic variety and the effect they had in destroying many social customs and beliefs can be held at least partially responsible for the disruption of native life, and the decline of the native population.< 3 > Politically, their influence was to be vital for the future American commitment in Hawaii. Their hold over certain important Hawaiian chiefs increased steadily, and they exerted considerable pressure in government circles through these men. Their interests were not

{2) Bradley,Affierican Frontier,p.58; T. Morgan, Hawaii: A Centurg of Economic Change 1778-1876. (Cambridge, U.$.,194 ),p.76 (3) Morgan-Hawaii~ Economic Chanae.o.115 139 solely spiritual but material, and they constituted a strong and vocal pro-American, anti-British force in the islands. Foreigners of other nationalities, particularly the British and French, were constantly concerned by the (4) growing political power of the American missionaries. As European authority in the islands stabilised, merchants were encouraged to establish trading houses, and once more Americans dominated this group. So strong was the American commercial commitment that in 1820 the

United States Government felt it warranted an agent, and in September John Coffin Jones was appointed American

Commercial Agent at Honolulu. Six years later a commercial treaty was signed between Hawaii and the

United States, the first treaty undertaken by Hawaii.

Though never ratified by the American Senate, it lent a more formal tone to the commercial relations of the two countries.

Yet, despite the increasing domination of Hawaiian commercial and religious life by Americans, the paramount political power was Britain. Since the late eighteenth century Britain had offered aid and protection, though she had consistently refused to consider the annexation of the islands, and she had become Hawaii's traditional friend. Against this Americans had as yet made little headway. During the 1820s, however, the balance changed.

(4) Ralphs. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom 1778-1854. (Honolulu, 1938),p.196 140

In 1821 Kamehameha II and his favourite wife had died during a trip to England, leaving the king's nine­ year old brother as heir. A regency was established under

Kaahumanu, Kamehameha I 1 s favourite wife, and although she continued to favour the British, she permitted the child to be educated by the American missionaries. The

American influence was further enhanced by the Hawaiian acceptance in 1825 of a new moral and social code drawn up by the missionaries, who saw it strictly enforced when, at Kaahumanu's death in 1832, the heir Kamehameha

III took his throne.

By the late 1830s Americans had become firmly entrenched in Hawaiian society, and had considerable influence over the king and his advisors. As the native population continued to decline, th~y bought up land and established plantations which, in turn, encouraged the development of small industries, such as sugar and cotton mills. This American predominance was not, however, a cohesive phenomenon; merchants and missionaries were frequently in violent disagreement over each other's actions. The missionaries constantly disapproved of the lives of merchants and sailors, and the latter complained that both their social lives and the efficient running of commercial activity were being hindered by the bigotry of their compatriots.

The merchants' distrust of the missionaries and their power was echoed by Britain and France, both of 141 whom had similar misgivings about the constant increase of American mercantile power. Neither was prepared to force its control on the islands, but neither would accept the usurpation of authority by the Americans. The 1840s saw a sudden surge of Br:itish and French activity in the area, including a rise in the volume of their respective trade with the islands. So concerned were the American merchants by this renewal of European interest that they proposed that the Hawaiian government should apply for a recognition of independence from all powers which most threatened the status quo. Britain and France agreed to this suggestion, but the negotiations with the United States were more difficult.

The activities of American citizens in Hawaii had not been sanctioned or encouraged by the United States government; in fact, the United States seemed to have little interest in the islands beyond commerical enter­ prise, and any action by the government up to 1842 had been fostered by Hawaii's American population. Now, in 1842, the United States was being forced to take more notice, and President Tyler, on December 31, issued the first statement of American policy towards Hawaii, after hints that if he did not recognize the islands a British protectorate might be sought.(S) It was an important document, for it resembled in some respects the Monroe

(5) S.ylvester K. Stevens, American Ex}ansion in Hawaii 1842-1898. (New York,1968 reprint ,pp.1-5 142 Doctrine. It declared a national interest in the islands

and their fate, and warned that it would frown upon

attempts by.any foreign power "to take possession of the

islands by conquest, or :for the purpose of colonization".(G)

Despite the fact that this Presidential statement asserted

an American concern for Hawaii, relations with the Islands

might well have gone on as before had it not been for the

seizure of Hawaii by Lord George Paulet in February 1854,

which caused such a reaction in the United States that

the State Department felt constrained to issue a more

definite statement. Legare, the Secretary of State,

warned the British government that the United States was

vitally interested in the fate of Hawaii and that any

attempts at annexation would be regarded as a threat to

Am· eri can securi-y.·t (7) The British government, after

restoring the Hawaiian flag, organized with ~ranee a

joint recognition of Hawaiian independence. Efforts to

include the United States failed, and the American

government was left unfettered in its relations with the

islands.

The next decade was one of increasing Americanization,

culminating in the annexation fever of the middle 1850s.

The missionaries steadily increased their hold over

(6) Stevens, American Exiansion in Hawaii,p.3 (7) Ibid,p.18; Kuykendal , Hawaiian Kingdom,p.200 143.

Hawaiian society a.s more of their numbers came out from the American mission societies; their importana.e in instilling a faith in the American way of life should never be underestimated. Many of them acquired land and a material interest in the future of Hawaii, and gradually the barriers between the commercial and evangelical worlds broke down. Economic life prospered.

The results of the decline of the whaling trade were negated by the "economic revolution" wrought by the opening of California and Oregon, which was to be instru­ mental in tying Hawaii even more tightly within the

American sphere of influence. The Californian gold rush boosted prices of all goods produced in Hawaii, increased exports, and encouraged the spread of the sugar industry. lt was also responsible for an influx of migrants, eager to buy land and pressuring the Hawaiian government for new fiscal codes and increased democratization. This growing awareness of the social and economic dependence of Hawaii upon the United States, and the fear, engendered by the 1849 attempt of the French to seize control of the islands, that this position could be lost, were major causes of the suctaen agitation in the United States for closer ties with Hawaii,

The 1849 debacle had prompted a voluntary cession of the islands to the American Commissioner, (S) which had been immediately rejected by the Whig administration,< 9 >

(8) P.R.F.R.(1894), Hawaii Appendix,pp.13-14 (9) Ibid,pp.99-100 144

and which had not been greeted with approval by many in

Hawaii. Merchants did not want to exchange the low

Hawaiian tariff for an increased American one, and the missionaries believed annexation would destroy native

life completely. In the United States, however, interest in Hawaii was deepened and a noticeable swing towards annexation took place. The Senate, encouraged by the

interest of the Californian representatives, asked the

President for all relevant information on Hawaii, but

'raylor was opposed to any thought of annexation and the requests were denied.(iO)

Annexation fever came closest to success during the

Presidency of Franklin Pierce, who was an enthusiastic advocate of Manifest Destiny. In 1854 interest in taking over the Hawaiian Islands was bolstered by the assertion of David Gregg, the new Minister to Hawaii, that the islands were anxious for union with-the United States.< 11 >

Rumours that Britain and France were considering some action added to the need for speed, and in April 1854 the

Pierce Administration informed Gregg that the sovereignty of Hawaii would be purchased for $100,000.( 12 ) The negotiations were slow, hindered by the king's demands for $300,000 and a guarantee of his current standard of living, but in December 1854 he died. His successor,

Alexander Liholiho, was actively opposed to annexation,

(10) Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., 1 sess.,pp.572,603 (11) Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom,pp.417-22 (12) P.R.F.R. (1894),Haw.App.,pp.121-2 145 both because he led a growing nationalistic movement among native chiefs, and because he feared the reactions of the alarmed British and French. His attitude spelt the end of annexation. In the next few years the United States was too concerned with the problems of imminent civil war to turn to Hawaii, where Americans were now pressing for a reciprocity treaty. But the United States was not interested in this proposal; it was annexation or

nothing, <13 > and the opposition of the Louisiana sugar planters to a purely economic arrangement which could threaten their sugar monopoly further decreased any appeal the measure might have. Expansionist feelings faded as men realized that this was not the time to encourage costly ventures in imperialism. This did not, however, prevent a continuing awareness in the United States of the American position in Hawaii, nor did it diminish the jealous regard for that position. In August 1863, James McBride, United States Commissioner in Honolulu, wrote to Secretary of State Seward, pointing out that British influence there had grown while the Civil War had diverted American attention, and he suggested that the United States should take immediate action. His recommendation was a reciprocity

(13) P.R.F.R. (1894), Haw. App.,pp.14-15 146 (14) treaty. The fear that Britain would usurp the

American position was not without basis. The king was an Anglophile and had given increasing numbers of official posts to Britons, as the decline in the native population meant that there were insufficient native replacements. McBride believed that in the event of the king's death, which appeared imminent, the British would assume control of the government, and he claimed that there was an unpaid British loan which could be used as a justification for annexation. But the danger was (15) exaggerated, and Seward met his suggestions with a firm refusal; however, he was credited as having stated that 11when the Civil War was over, the government would take good care of its interests in the Sandwich Islands."< 15>

After the war, Seward investigated the Hawaiian situation more closely, occasioned by the visit to England in 1865 of Queen Emma,of Hawaii and Bishop Staley.< 17>

He betrayed some concern about the political reasons for

(14) P.R.F.R.(1894),Haw.App.,pp.134-5. McBride to Seward, October 9, 1863. · (15) McBride's dispatches reveal that.he was an advocate of annexation. (16) John Patterson: "United States and Hawaiian Reciprocity, 1867-70 ",P.H. R. Vol. VII, 1938, p.16 (17) Kamehameha V advised Emma to visit the United States in order to show: that your visits (sic) to Europe was not of any political purpose but for private purposes. They (the Americans) are a very sensitive people, your visiting them will disarm all the lies and insinuations directed against our family from what they say of our dislikes of that country. She did so, but cut short her visit on the death of her adoptive mother; Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom 1854-1874(Honolulu,1953),p.202. Hereafter Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.II 147 this trip, and wrote to Charles Adams, Minister in

London, asking for information on the official British attitude. Adams assured him that all was well, but this did not, it seemed, settle Seward's apprehensions, for he eagerly entered into new negotiations for a recipro­ city treaty. He wrote to the new Minister in Honolulu,

Edward McCook, encouraging him to sound out the proper authorities on the subjects of both reciprocity and annexation, and later confessed to McCook that the real in. t en ti on was annexa t'ion. <19 >

Annexation feeling ran high in Hawaii in these months. Sugar planters were suffering from the results of an economic slump caused by the fall in prices at the end of the Civil War. McCook, who was being pressured by the sugar interests, and z.s. Spaulding, Seward's secret agent in the islands, wrote to encourage annexa­ tion, claiming that a revival of the reciprocity treaty was useless and that annexation would be more readily ( 19) accepted. But Seward, regretfully, had been forced to recognize that reciprocity was likely to be more successful in the United States, for public interest seemed, he said, "to be fastened upon the domestic questions which have grown out of the late Civil War. 11 <2o>

( 18) P.R.F.R.(1894),Haw.App.,p.143. Seward to McCook, September 12,1867 (19} Ibid,pp.139i140,144. McCook to Seward, June 7 and Augusts, 1867; reply of Seward to Spaulding's unprinted dispatch, July 5, 1868. (20) P.R.F.R.(1894),Haw,.App.,p.144. Seward to Spaulding July 5, 1868 148

As it was, the reciprocity treaty was not successful.

It was not reported out of the Foreign Relations

Committee for a year and then it was tabled by one of

its opponents. Though resubmitted in January 1869, it was ignored until May 1870 when it met with considerable

indifference, for though it was defeated by only 20 to

19, only half the Senate bothered to vote.

The reasons for its failure were many, but one of

the most widely accepted was that, despite the opposition to annexation at the time, reciprocity would hinder any later attempts at annexation. Another interesting theory was that opposition to the treaty was increased by the belief that it had been engineered by anti-American elements in Hawaii; particularly the British, under the assumption that reciprocity would kill any desire for . (21) annexation on the part of Hawaii.

The anti-British element in these early diplomatic dealings was very strong and appears to have been a far greater impetus to an active American policy towards

Hawaii than economic or even strategic considerations.

Again and again the predominant argument in favour of action had been a desire to stop British authority spreading in the Pacific. This line was cloaked in the language of economic necessity, of political strategy

(21) Patterson, "United States and Hawaiian Reciprocity", pp.18-26. See also Jean I. Brookes, International Rivalry in the Pacific Islands, 1800-1875. (Los Angeles, 1941),pp.269-79. 149

and of Manifest Destiny, but it seemed unlikely in the

1840s and 1850s that an outpost such as Hawaii would be

a strategic necessity or an economically sound proposi-

tion for the United States, or that American commit- ments and investments there were sufficient to warrant

such action. Opinion within the United States had been

rather indifferent until 1853 and even then the enthusiasm had been limited mainly to those from California. The

activists were those Americans in the islands who, by continual pressure upon both the Hawaiian and American

governments, attempted to fore~ a political situation which would support their authority. Citizens of the

United States were in the majority among foreign residents, and had gained positions of considerable. influence; any movement on the part of Britain or France towards increased political interest in the islands upset the delicate balance of power which the Americans had established. With each one of these movements there can be di.stinguished an American reaction aimed at some con­ crete proposal, such as reciprocity or annexation.

The first reactions of the Grant Administration to the treaty of reciprocity still pending before the

Senate were those of indifference. There is no evidence that Grant was even vaguely interested in the islands, and it seems to have been a year before Fish paid more than passing attention to the scheme, and this was not occasioned by a growth of interest in it, but by the 150 constant lobbying of the Hawaiian agent, Elisha Allen. In January 1870 Allen visited Fish in an attempt to urge Administration support of the treaty; the Secretary was cold, and was unwilling to be drawn into further recipro­ city negotiations. For the next two months Allen con­ tinued to communicate with the State Department, much to the annoyance of Fish, who finally dismissed the agent with the argument that the immigration of orientals practised by Hawaii was viewed with strong disfavour in the United States. <22 ) By the end of May, the treaty had failed to pass and Allen had returned to Hawaii. The response there to the failure of the treaty was a violent anti-American swing. It was apparent that the failure was due in part to the feeling that reciprocity would hinder annexation schemes, and the reaction in Hawaii was alarm and indignation. Public meetings were held in opposition to annexation, and the popular Queen Emma exhorted the population never to give up its independence. Even the possibility of reciprocity had lost its appeal, for there was a revulsion against the national dishonour of begging for aid.< 23 ) The Pacific Commercial Advertiser of November 18, 1870, declared:

{22) Stevens; American Expansion.in Hawaii,p.103 (23) Ibid,pp.103-105; Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom 2Vol. II,pp.225-228 151 "Let us depend upon our own resources, and upon the markets of the world, and make the most of opportunities which we ( 24 ) have, and of which no-one can deprive us."

So widespread was the disillusion with the United States that even the commercial interests, who were desperate for aid of some variety, began to search for new markets beyond the United States. Such a development alarmed the new American Minister to Hawaii, Henry A. Peirce.

The appointment of Peirce as Minister was the only action taken by the new administration which seemed favourable to the islands. He had long been associated with Hawaii; in his youth he had taken an active part in the mercantile life of Honolulu and had been one of the founders of the firm of c. Brewer and Company, one (25) of the largest and longest-lived of the early companies.

His understanding of the islands was well-respected, and his sympathies with the needs of their economy made him a strong supporter of closer ties with the United States, his conviction being that annexation was the only way to save the struggling economy from complete ruin. The growing opposition to this, and, indeed, to American influence generally, impressed him so strongly that shortly after his arrival, and less than three months after the failure of reciprocity, he wrote to Fish to report that trade with the British colonies was

(24) Stevens; American Expansion in Hawaii,p.103 (25) Josephine Sullivan, A History of C. Brewer and Co. Ltd.: One Hundred Years in the Hawaiian Islands. (Boston,1926),pp.31-40. 152 developing so rapidly that it posed a significant threat to American interests, and he suggested that some American action was essential.< 26) There was some reason for his alarm. Between 1866 and 1870 plans for transoceanic steamship lines connect­ ing Hawaii with the rest of the Pacific basin came to fruition. Numerous attempts failed but by 1870 various lines were running, the most effective being an Australian Company which gained subsidies from the Australian, New Zealand and Hawaiian governments, and an American line, run by w.H. Webb, the New York ship­ builder, which acquired similar subsidies but which could not encourage American support.< 27 > Though all these ventures collapsed within two years, their growth had seemed an encouragement to Hawaii to seek financial and commercial aid outside the United States. At the same time there had been an increase in trade with Australia and New Zealand, but this had been very slight and had not diminished the trade with the United States. The figures were quoted by annexationists in the United States as evidence of an anti-American move­ ment, but these trade links at no time constituted a threat to American commercial dominance in Hawai1.< 29 >

(26) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.II,pp.227-28; Stevens,American Expansion in Hawaii,pp.109-10 (27) Ibid (28) Morgan,Hawaii: Economic Change,pp.209-11 153 It is possible that this rumour was gauged to appeal to the anti-British instincts of American expansionists in an attempt to revive American interest in Hawaii. Peirce, like many others, was impressed by these apparent signs of British competition, and he continued to press for a commitment on the part of the United States. In September 1870 his arguments were endorsed by a scheme for a reciprocity treaty submitted to Fish and Grant by Zephaniah Spaulding, one-time secret agent to Hawaii during Seward's Secretaryship. At that time he had inclined towards annexation, but since then he had become an associate in a sugar venture on the island of Maui, and he stood to profit more from reciprocity than annexation.< 29 ) The administration made no reply to these letters; indeed it was a long time before any interest was displayed. Only Fish appeared to have changed his atti­ tude, for he began to bring the Hawaiian question before Cabinet. It is not obvious what caused this reversal of opinion but the persistence and urgency of Peirce's suggestions may have been partly r~sponsil:>le. In October

(29) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom 2Vol.II,p.228. Spaulding's case was interesting, for it illustrated the reasons for the differences between annexation and reciprocity. Those in the UniteJ States who favoured closer ties with Hawaii were likely to favour annexation since this would mean free trade between Hawaii and the United States. Hawaiians, or those with a commercial investment in Hawaii's economy, usually favoured reciprocity, which would ensure an expanding but independent economy and better returns for their endeavours. 154 1870 he broached the subject of annexation in Cabinet. Most of its members appeared little impressed, and Grant remarked only that "Sumner had better be consulted whether Annexation is desirable. Let him think that he originates it, and all will be we11. 11 <3o) In December Fish made another attempt to have the subject discussed, encouraged by the enthusiasm of Californian merchants and businessmen for action.< 3t) The reaction was indifference. "No-one responds and the subject is dropped. The indisposition to consider important questions of3the future in the Cabinet is wonderful,"{ 2) . Fish observed. The Administration's ignorance of the potential importance of Hawaii was further illustrated by Grant's suggestion that Peirce be removed in favour of someone looking for political reward. The idea was (33) thwarted by Fish. In 1871, however, there was a glimmer of interest in the reaction to Peirce's dispatch of February 25. In yet another attempt to encourage the Administration to revive the subject of annexation he had written: "That such is to be the political destiny of this archipelago seems to be a foregone conclusion in the opinion of all who have given attention to the subject ••• The . event of the decease of' the pres,ent sovereign

(30) Stevens,American Expansion in Hawaii,p.111 (31) Ibid (32) Ibid ( 33) Ibid 155 of Hawaii, leaving no heirs or successor to the throne••• will produce a crisis in political affairs which•·• will be availed of as a propitious time to inaugurate measures for annexation of the islands to the United States••• as the Manifest will{and choice of the Hawaiian people." 34)

On April 7 Grant forwarded this to the Senate with the comment: "Although I do not deem it advisable to express any opinion or to make any recommendation in regard to the subject at this juncture, the views of the Senate, if it should be deemed proper to express them, would be very acceptable with reference to any future course which)there might be a disposition to adopt. 11 l 3 5 Over a month had passed since Grant had received this dispatch, and there is nothing to show what influenced him in his decision to transmit it to the Senate, but it seems hardly coincidental that he should have developed a sudden interest in Hawaii at the same time that his schemes for Santo Domingo were dealt a final blow.< 3G) Although the Senate did not reply to the message, Grant was not discouraged. A confidential mission was authorized to investigate the commercial and naval facilities of the islands. In 1872 two military agents left to make a careful survey, which was reported on May 8, 1873.< 37 > This favoured the acquisition of Pearl

(34) P.R.F.R.(1894),Haw.App.,pp.16-19. Peirce to Fish, February 25, 1871. (35) Richardson,Messages and Papers,Vol.VII,p.131 (36) Grant's message recognising the defeat of Dominican annexation was delivered on April 5, 1871. (37) P.R.F.R.(1894),Haw.App.,pp.154-B. Report on Pearl Harbour. 156 Harbour, if a naval depot was required, and commented upon the public attitude to closer links with the United States. Only very few wanted annexation, the report pointed out, but it suggested that the United States accept the cession of the harbour ''as an equivalent for free trade. 11 <3a> In Hawaii a new development prompted another call for annexation from Peirce. On the morning of December 11, 1872, Kamehameha V died. He had not appointed a successor and, though in the last hours of his life his ministers had attempted to encourage him to name his choice, he died without having resolved the crisis. There would be an election to name a successor, and a political crisis developed as the contest narrowed to two of the four candidates, William Charles Lunalilo, the late king's cousin, and David Kalakaua, a high chief, (39) who had been educated in Europe. On December 11, Peirce informed Fish of the situation, and anxiously hinted once more at action by the United States. "I have heard influential men speak of annexation to the U. States as being the most preferable measure for the future prosperity and security of these Islands.

( 38) Ibid, p .158 (39) The other candidates were Princess Bernice Pauahi, relation and close friend of the late king and married to an American in the Hawaiian Cabinet, Charles Reed Bishop; and Ruth Keelikolani, said to be the choice of many chieftains "because she would place many of them in presumptive relation to the throne". Queen Emma refused to stand. P.R.F.R.(1873),p.485. Peirce to Fish,December 11,1872 157 But success in that direction they deem impossible of attainment; in view of the results in regard to former proposed purchases by the U. States, of the Island of st. Thomas and that of St. Domingo; as well as the indifference shown by the u. States Government for the acquisition of these Islands. The "Party of Annexa­ tionists" so calledt seems now to have little life - but it would revive with the most overwhelming strength, if any encouragement were given them by authority of the U.S. Government.n(40) This feeling had been growing in Hawaii for some time, partly out of increasing desperation. The sugar industry had not recovered after recession which set in after the temporary boom offered by the American Civil War, but in 1872 the situation was mo.re immediate. The year had been a bad one for sugar planters and the prospects for 1873 did not seem to be good. Labour was difficult to obtain, especially as a reaction developed against Chinese coolies when it was realized that this could have a detrimental effect upon the case for reciprocity. Transport costs increased as a number of the shipping lines with Hawaii went out of business. High tariff walls in the United States upset many planters and even the lower duties of New Zealand and Australia were not encouraging, for it was obvious that these countries could never hope to absorb the amount of sugar exported to the United States should such a trading

!40) Ibid. See also: Merze Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom - A Political History. (New H~ven, 1965),pp.29-31 158 (41) change be necessary. Sugar interests were in desperate need of some aid, and such disillusion had been expressed in the hope that reciprocity would be accept­ able to the United States that men were being driven to suppor t annexa t ion. in' pre f erence t o econom i c ruin.. <42 > The revival of talk of annexation at the time of the election of a new king partly reflected hope for a change of government policy after the anti-American feeling which had been apparent at the end of the previous reign. Planters and merchants tended to support Lunalilo, for he was not actively opposed to closer ties with the United States, and his royal blood appealed to the native population; thus at the election on January 1, 1873 he won by an overwhelming majority.< 43 ) Hopes for annexa­ tion were further enhanced by Lunalilo's announcement a few days later of a Cabinet composed almost entirely of Americans. Encouraged by this, a group of planters, led by one Henry Whitney, placed before the king a memorandum calling for an investigation of American attitudes to reciproci. 't Y• (44)

(41) Tate,The U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom,pp.31-32; Sullivan,c. Brewer & co.,pp.129-31; Stevens,American Expansion in Hawaii,pp.112-13; Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time; A History of the Hawaiian Islands. (New York, 1968),p.191 (42) Stevens,American Expansion in Hawaii,p.113; See also article by Charles Nordhoff in New York Tribune, March 19, 1873. (43) Lunalilo had run a more strenuous campaign than Kalakaua, and was determined to win, even to the extent of overthrowing Kalakaua if the election went that way. Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.II,p.244 (44) Stevens,American Expanslon in Hawaii,p.114 159 Although the agitation for annexation had become very strong, this demand for a renewal of the recipro­ city negotiations wisely recognized two important elements in the Hawaiian attitude towards reciprocity and annexation. Firstly, mast planters would prefer reciprocity to annexation if this was possible, and secondly, the native population was intensely nationalistic and was opposed as strongly as ever to annexation and the loss of independence. The memorandum realized, however, that reciprocity alone was not sufficient to attract the United States, and it suggested that the lease of Pearl Harbour as a naval station be offered.< 45 > This suggestion was presented to Minister

Peirce, who was forced to decline it because he had no instructions from Washington, but it was forwarded to Fish.( 4 G)

Despite the fact that reciprocity was apparently preferred in Hawaii, Peirce continued to press Washington for a consideration of annexation. So enthusiastic was he personally for annexation that he failed to judge accurately the prevailing spirit in Honolulu, and held the king responsible for any opposition to the idea.

(45) Ibid; Harold W. Kent, Charles Reed Bishop: Man of Hawaii. (Palo Alto, California, 1965),pp.Gi-2 (46) P.R.F.R.(1894),Haw.App.,p.152. Peirce to Fish, February 10, 1873 160

"The glitter of the crown, love of the power and emoluments of office have too many attractions. But should the great interests of the country, however, demand that annexation should be attempted, the planters, merchants and foreigners generally will induce the people to over­ throw the Government, establish a republic and then ask the U.S. for admittance into the Union. 11 <4 7)

Such was the popular faith in the king, however, that according to Charles Nordhoff, the noted specialist in

Hawaiian affairs, "not even a glimmer of annexation spirit prevailed among the natives. 11 <43 > By late

February, there had been a general acceptance of reciprocity over annexation and Peirce's views were embarrassing its advocates. The Honolulu Chamber of

Commerce ventured the opinion that Peirce would actively (49) oppose any scheme for reciprocity, and on March 15

Fish informed the minister that his ideas were premature and threatened the good relations between Hawaii and the

United States which rested upon the recognition of the islands' independence.(SO) Californian enthusiasts for annexation had met with a similar response, when Fish, while not denying the possibility of annexation in the future, de_clared that "at the moment the Government has no such arriere pensee".(Si)

(47) P.R.F.R.(1894),Haw.App.,pp.152-4. Peirce to Fish, February 17, 1873 (48) New York Tribune, March 11, 1873 (49) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.II,p.251 (50) Ibid; Tate,u.s. and the Hawaiian Kingdom,pp.32-3 (51) New York Herald, January 8,1873, quoted in Tate, op.cit.,p.33 161 On March 25, the Secretary of State sent to Peirce

the first comprehensive statement of the administration's

attitude to Hawaii. He held out little hope for the

success of a reciprocity treaty, though he was unsure how much a cession clause would alter opinion.

"The position of the Sandwich Islands as an outpost fronting and commanding the whole of our possessions on the Pacific Ocean, gives to the future of those islands a peculiar interest to the Government and people of the United States••• The acquisition of territory beyond the sea outside the present confines of the United States meets the opposition of many discreet men who have more or less influence in our Councils • .11

He agreed that many believed in annexation, but maintained that there was insufficient information to create a con­ crete policy and suggested that Peirce

"without committing the Government to any line of policy, (should) not discourage the feeling which may exist in favour of annexa­ tion ••• ; and you will cautiously ••• avail of any opportunity of ascertaining the views of the Hawaiian authorities on this question, and if there be any idea entertained in that direction••• you will endeavor••• to ascertain their views as to the manners, and the terms and aonditions (on which such a project could be executcd). 11 (52)

Encouraged, Peirce transmitted this message to

Bishop, who brought it before the Cabinet where the negotiation of a treaty was discussed. It was finally agreed that the cession of Pearl Bay would be included in the reciprocity offer, though it was an uncertain

(52) P~R.P.R.(1894),Haw.App.,p.19. Fish to Peirce, March 25, 1873. See also E.J. Carpenter, America in Hawaii: A History of United States Influence in the Hawaiian Islands. (Boston, 1899),pp.98-9 162 agreement. The King was rather reluctant, and Bishop himself was unconvinced that this was the best strategy; his wife, Princess Bernice, was strenuously opposed to the idea of alienating land. The treaty was forwarded to Fish by Peirce early in July, and on July 12 the terms were published in the Pacific Commercial Advertiser in Honolulu.< 53 >

There had been considerable feeling against such a (54) scheme before July 1873, but the publication of the terms caused a tide of opposition. Public meetings were held to voice disapproval and an American journalist,

Walter Murray Gibson, started a newspaper, Nuhou, specifically to publish articles which opposed the cession. (SS) Queen Emma wrote

"There is a feeling of bitterness against these rude people who dwell on our land and have high handed ideas of giving away som~­ one else's property as if it was theirs. 11 l56)

Theophillus Davies, acting British Commissioner, believed that this signalled the end of American dominance of

Hawaii.

(53} Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.II,p.255 (54) For example, public speech by Hon. Stephen H. Phillips, March 11, 1873, published in pamphlet form later in the same month. (55) Daws,Shoal of Time,p.192; Kuykendall,op.cit.,p.255; Isabella Bird Bishop, Six Months among the Palm Groves, Coral Reefs and Volcanoes of the Sandwich Islands.(London, 1894),p.242. Her opinion of the Nuhou was that it was "scurrilous and diverting,. and appears "run" with a special object which I have (not yet unravelled) from its pungent but not always intelligible pages." (56) Tate,u.s. and Hawaiian Kingdom,p.32 163

"Within the last six months the United States has lost ground here which it can never regain - that is in the hearts of the people. It is commonly believed that if Great Britain were to ask for Pearl River, or even one of the islandsl the natives would grant it at once. 11 C:i7)

Even Peirce recogni~ed that a swing to Britain was possible, though he claimed that the situation owed much to "emissaries and political demagogues of foreign and native birth" who were "exciting the passions and prejudices of the people, against cession of territory; stirring up strife and enmity between the foreigners . (58) and natives."

The King was deeply concerned by the reaction. He had not been sure that a cession of Pearl Bay was advis­ able and since July had been receiving Joseph Carter, a prominent citizen who was strongly opposed to the cession, and that fact, wrote Charles Bishop,

"strengthens the impression that he is not heartily in favor of reciprocity with any cession of t~rritory, and it accounts for the other fact, that many prominent natives who have usually made the King's wishes (sg) their own••• have spoken against cession."

( 5 7) Tate,Q.~S. and Hawaiian Kingdom,p.32; Kuykendall, Hawaiian Kingdom, Vol.II,p.256 (58) Kuykendall,op.cit.,p.256 (59) Kent,Bishop,p.62 164 A Cabinet meeting was called for November 14, ( 60 ) and

the King withdrew his support £or the treaty .. Fi.sh

received this news calmly:

"It is possible that the 2cr:uisition suggested might in some respects be advan­ tageous to the United States. No encouragement, however, can, under existing circumstances, be given that the propositi9n will be accepted upon the terms proposed. 11 t61)

This did not put an end to the reciprocity movement but it did disillusion many of its enthusiasts. Further political disturbances threatened to break out, and the climax came with the death of the King on February 3,

1874 after little more than a year's reign. His death plunged the kingdom into yet another crisis, for he too died without naming a successor. The three possible candidates were Bernice Pauahi, who refused to stand;

Queen Emma, who had a body of followers sharing her distaste for anything American; and David Kalakaua, whose position had improved since the last elections, partly because he had spent more effort in his campaign, and partly because he was opposed to annexation and the cession of territory. Davies wrote that a deep-seated antagonism existed between Kalakaua and the Americans, and he felt sure that British interests would be safe.< 62 >

(60) The delay since the last Cabinet meeting in July was due to the King's illness and convalescence. (61) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.II,p.255 (62) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.II,p.255 165

This analysis of the situation proved to be

incorrect. No such antagonism 0xistcd and the Americans

were quite ready to support him,. On February 12 he was

elected king after a day of blttnr fighting between his

and Queen Cmma•s supporters which necessitated the call

for troops from both British and American vessels in the

harbour.

Once order was 1~e-es tablished, the interest in

reciprocity began again. 'rhe news of the proposed

cession of Pearl Bay in order to ac0uire reciprocity had

prompted the usual nationalistic, anti-American

correspondence. The Hawaiian Gazette (whose editor was

H,enry Whitney) said on February 25, 18 74

"We have wasted much valuable time .in fruitless endeavours to secure a treaty; let us then in future attend to the development of our productions and 'our commerce on a self-reliant anrl independent basis, leaving the overtures for a treaty to be m~de from the other side of the water. 11 l63)

Just how transi±qry this opinion was became apparent

when, a few weeks later, the same paper responded to a

new memorandum for reciprocity:

"Now appears to be the golden opportunity for Hawaii to make another vi9orous effort to secure the coveted boom••• If, in addition, His Majesty can be induced to head an embassy to Washington, i't might add an eclat which, we are confident, would crown the undertakinq with success. And ~o this proposal -t:he people will say Amen. 11 ( 4 )

(63) Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom: 1874-1898 (Honolulu, 1967),pp.17-18. Hereafter l

risk the failure of the treaty.< 67 > In this he was wrong; cession of Hawaiian territory was something to which Kalakaua was inflexibly opposed. On October 18, Allen and H.. A.P. Carter, the other appointed negotiator, left for Washington with orders to use the uncompleted 1867 trea~y as a model. They were instructed that sugar up to a specified grade must be admitted duty free, and it was suggested that they

(65) Ibid,pp.19-20 (66) P.R.F.R.(1875-6),p.669. Peirce to Fish, August 20,1874 (67) Ibid,p.670. Peirce to Fish, September 10, 1874; P.R.F.R.(1894),Haw.App.,p.163. Peirce to Fish, October 12, 1874. 167 should attempt to get rice and wood included, but any cession of territory was out of the question.(GS) Conditions in the United States were more favour­ able towards a reopening of negotiations, for the general indifference which had dogged earlier attempts had begun to change. The issues in foreign policy which had taken precedence over Hawaiian affairs had been settled - Santo Domingo had long since been dealt with, and an amicable arrangement had recently been reached with Spain. Charles Sumner, who had attacked most of the administration's schemes in foreign affairs, had died in March 1874. Fish had realized the importance of controlling Hawaii for some time but more important concerns and the indifference of the Cabinet had prevented any action.(Gg) By late 1874 the constant reports of Peirce, and the insistent enthusiasm of Californian merchants for a consideration of Hawaiian needs had had some effect upon the Cabinet.(?O) The argument which seemed to be most forceful in bringing about this change was that of the competition of Britain and the British colonies. While the figures

(68) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.III,p.22 (69) Stevens,American Expansion in Hawaii,pp.119-20 (70) Ibid; Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.III,pp.23-4 168 ( 71) quoted by Morgan reveal no substantial change in the trade pattern of Hawaii, they did show a slight increase in the trade with British colonies and this, combined with the rumour that Hawaiian planters were preparing to send the entire 1875-1876 crop to Australia and New Zealand, produced a favourable reaction to the treaty. Another rumour that gained considerable attention was the belief that Julius Vogel, Prime Minister of New Zealind, was about to admit Hawaiian sugar free, and was negotiating for the union of Australasia and Hawaii in a "Polynesian C9mp2.ny 11 under British suzerainty.< 72 > These arguments were seized upon by San Francisco news- papers, whi c h k ep t up a cons t an t campa 1 gn f or ac. t.ion, ( 73) and to their voices were added those of businesses, such as ship-building, which saw considerable profit in closer ties with Hawaii. They were optimistic about the treaty's chances,< 7~) but official circles did not offer the negotiators such hope.

( 71) Morgan,Hawaii: Economic Chg~9£., ~• .. 2 '.1.1 EXPORTS OF SUGAR FRO~ HAWAII. (in million pounds) TO: 1872 1873 1874 1875 U.S.A. 14.41 14.83 18.19 23.76 AUSTR. ,N.Z. 2.57 8.28 6.23 1.22 OTHER .02 .02 .14 .10

See also Chalfont Robinson, A History .of Two Reciprocity Treaties (New Haven, 1904),p.121 (72) Tate,u.s. and Hawaiian Kingdom,p.32; Robinson, op.cit.,pp.120-22 (73) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.III,pp.18-24 (74) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.III,p.24 169 Fish was not encouraging, although his continuing coolness did not give Allen or Carter the impression that he was actively opposed to the treaty.< 75 ) His chief concern was that the "most favoured nation" clause of most international agreements would negate any advantage gained by the United States. On December 24, 1874 the Hawaiian agents pressed Fish for action, but he still seemed loath to act, and promised only considera- tion without commitment. He seemed to be waiting for ( 76) some hint of the Senate's reaction. Judge Al;J..en left Washington to join the King before the next meeting with Fish and Carter continued the negotiations alone. It is evident from both the headway he made with Fish, and the arguments he used against the Secretary's caution, that Carter was a skilful negotiator. Of the December 31 meeting he wrote: "I had previously requested some of our friends to call upon Mr. Fish and he seemed more inclined than I had s~en him before to discuss the Treaty. 11 (77> He had also approached a number of Senators "who encourage,(d) me to believe that the treaty (would) be favorably acted upon and urge(d) an early submisston)after th~ assembling of Congress.'' 78

(75) Stevens,American Expansion in Hawaii,p.121. He believes Fish's coolness was towards Allen whom he had disliked since the 1870 negotiations. (76) Kuykendall,op.cit.,p.24; Robinson,Two Reciprocity Treaties, p·.122 (77) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.III,p.24 (78) Stevens,American E?ffiansion in Hawaii,p.122 170 His pressures had effect, for he was asked by Fish to submit a treaty draft by January 4, 1875. On the following day it was submitted to Grant and the Cabinet, and the general opinion was favourable-. Within the next two weeks, the treaty was discussed item by item. Certain changes were made; coffee was removed from the free list, as were hemp, flax and similar materials in order to avoid possible opposition from textile interests but, apart from these, agreement was reached quickly. The treaty was signed on January 30, and submitted by the President to the Senate on February 1.< 79 > The treaty, as it stood, was merely an agreement for reciprocal trade; any political aspects were not explicit. The Senate, however, wanted more overt acceptance that the American position would not be challenged. Therefore, the addition of Article IV was made. "It is agr.-C:':ed, on the part of His Hawaiian Majesty that so long as this treaty shall remain in force, he will not lease or other­ wise dispose of or create any lien upon any port, harbor or other territory in his dominions, or grant any special privilege or rights of use therein, to any other power, state or government, nor make any treaty by which any other nation shall obtain the same privileg~s ~•• herein se~ured to the United States. 11 (80,

Allen and Carter had expected s.ome additions of a

(79) Richardson,Messa es and Papers,p.318 (80) P.R.F.R.(1875-765 ,pp.XXVII-XX 171 political nature, but undoubtedly they did not antici­ pate the kind of amendment which eventuated. Carter telegrammed resignedly to Allen, "You had better assume we considered the amendment alright (sic) and stand by it with me if you will do so". (8 l) The treaty was reported back to the Senate from the Committee on March 11, 1875. Both Peirce and Allen had appeared before the Committee to plead the treaty's case, maintaining that the failure of this treaty would drive the islands in desperation to Britain. The amended treaty was debated in Executive Session on March 17 and 18.(82 ) Senator Morrill was the chief opponent, denying that there was any commercial value in the treaty, and maintaining that it could only bring the United States into conflict with jealous nations. Another powerful ar0ument put forward by Morrill was that the treaty was merely a "put-up job, in the interests of the planters of the Sandwich Islands, and at the expense of the Government of the United States."(s3> Senators Hamlin of Maine, Kelly _of Oregon and Sargent of California led those in favour, and as the amendments were adopted, one after the other, it became apparent that the treaty would be successful. On March 18, it was put to the vote and passed easily, 51 to 12.

(81) Stevens,Arnerican Expansion in Hawfaii,p.126 (82) Although Executive Session debates are generally secret, the Senate can authorise the publication of certain speeches. This was authorised in this case on March 23,1875. See Cong.Record,44Cong., 1 Sess., (83) ~g£a?i~ts~p-151-62 172 As the measure involved a revocation of revenue legislation, however, the House of Representatives was required to originate an enabling bill to put the treaty into effect. This had to wait until the next session of

Congress, beginning in December 1875. In the meantime, both sides had time to organize, and Judge Allen returned to the United States from Hawaii in the autumn of 1875 (84) to lend support to the treaty's supporters. On

January 6, 1876 Representative Luttrell of California introduced the necessary bill (H.R. No.612), and it was reported to the Committee on Ways and Means where it remained until February 2.11. The Committee reported 6 to

4 in favour of the bill, the minority submitting a report in opposition to the bill at the same time.

The majority report dealt rapidly with the commer­ cial advantages, then proceeded to discuss the points which were the crux of the reciprocity issue - the strategic and political necessities of accepting reciprocity.

"We should consider it as a question comprehending interests beyond the mere free exchange of' ar)ticles enumerated in the schedules." 85

It pointed to the commercial competition of Britain and claimed that it was vital to secure the islands against

(84) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.III,p.28 (85) Congressional Record, 44 Cong., 1 Sess.,p.1421 173 British encroachment. The minority report confined

itself to commercial considerations and had no diffi­ culty in erecting a sound case against reciprocity.

Such an agreement was unnecessary, it claimed, because

American influence in the islands was sufficiently

extensive to ensure the United States of continuing dominance.

"The neutrality of the commercial nations as to these islands, the hospitable entrepot for the Pacific commerce of the world, their healthful civilization and development under the common protection and liberal policy of all, and an open but firm diplomacy, will do more to expand our commerce and secure our peace than the possession of the sovereignty of the islands, and for a much .stronger reason ~?gi)th~ i+lusory provisions of this treaty.

The debates which ensued were concerned mainly with arguments over whether or not the islands were strategi- cally necessary. The Californian representatives, however, introduced a new point of discussion. "It is a Pacific-coast measure," claimed Luttrell, "and we do not want to have you send us home defeated and mortified."(B?) This line of argument gained several supporters, including Money of Mississippi, and Garfield of Ohio who maintained that the ratification would serve to unite the east and west coasts, which was owed to

(86) Cong.Record, 44 Cong.,1 Sess.,p.1422 (87) Stevens,American Expansion in Hawaii,p.136 174 California and to the United States.CBS) Finally the

House voted, and passed the measure 115 to 101; conspicuously most of the opposition was from the mid­

West and South, areas which would not benefit immediately from the treaty.

From the House Bill No. 612 went to Senate on May

15 and was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.

In the weeks while it was discussed the Southern sugar interests began organizing deputations to the Committee, opposing both the pending bill and the treaty. On June

14 Allen wrote anxiously to Fish that the "delegations of the rice and sugar interests are active in their 9 opposition~1~ ~rtd asked for some help to encourage the passage of the bill. On June 20 Fish suggested to Grant that some pressure should be applied; h~ himself approached Senatorial Leaders Conkling of New York,

Cameron of Pennsylvania and Hamlin of Maine and urged haste.ego) It had been the delays in debate and discussion which had helped to kill previous treaties.

Finally, ten days later, the Committee reported favour­ ably on the bill and it was returned to the Senate without amendment. Senator Morrill immediately reopened the opposition and suggested that, as the bill involved

(88) Cong. Record, 44 Cong., 1 Sess.,pp.2273-4 {89) Stevens,American Expansion in Hawaii,p.137 {90) Stevens,American Expansion in Hawaii,p.137 175 a change in tariff regulations, it should go before the Committee on Finance. Cameron, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, argued that this was unnecessary,

but he failed to prevent it,<91 > It was apparent that Morrill was hoping to keep the bill out of open debate long enough for favourable opinion to change. That the Senate was already losing interest was indicated by the small number of Senators debating the bill, and by the struggle that Senator Sargent of California had in forcing the bill out of Committee and

into discussion on the Senate floor.< 92 > The debates, on August 12 and August 14, brought forward no new justifications or attacks, except references to the memoranda from South Carolina, Georgia and Louisiana in opposition to the bill. A clearer sign of the apparent indifference was the final vote on August 14, for, although the bill passed 29 to 12, the numbers were a (93) marked change from the vote for the treaty. The slow progress of the bill through Congress and the developing lack of interest in Washington caused

(91) Cong. Record, 44 Cong., 1 Sess.,p.4261 (92) Cong. Record, 44 Cong., 1 Sess.,pp.4261,4265-6, 5099,5118,5356-7,5432,5462-3 (93) A study of the vote reveals that every opposing vote, except those of Morrill and Booth, an independent from California, was from the South, and only five Democrats voted in favour. Of a Senate of 71, only 41 voted compared with 63 on March 18, 1875. 176 concern in Hawaii where the fate of the treaty was being followed anxiously. The fear that reciprocity might fail yet again led to votes of no confidence in the

Government ~wice during the long summer session of the

Hawaiian Legislature. At least one of them related (94) directly to the question of the treaty. The

Enabling bill was signed by President Grant on August

15, but the news did not reach Hawaii until September

21 with the arrival of the steamer "City of New York".

It was greeted with considerable rejoicing.

"This country has now its way opened to flourish like a green bay tree", wrote Peirce. "Capital and immigration will be attracted to it; and the rich bounties which God and nature have bestowed upon these beautiful islands, will be developed (gs) under a good government and able ministry." ·

The reciprocity had been a Hawaiian Measure from the beginning and it was envisaged wholly as a commercial arrangement. The addition of Article IV was not desired by the Hawaiians but it was recognized that something of the sort was necessary in order to widen the appeal of the Measure in the United States. The native population and a large percentage of the foreign residents were definitely opposed to any limits upon Hawaiian sovereignty and did not intend the treaty to lead to annexation. It was not politically motivated but was a measure to alleviate the desperate plight of the sugar industry,

(94) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.III,pp.37-40 (95) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom,Vol.III,p.40 177 and to give a boost to the economic life of the Islands. Annexation had been considered mainly as an alternative to reciprocity in the attempt to keep the Hawaiian economy alive, and even then was interpreted idealisti­ cally. Many appeared to envisage it as a system where the way of life would remain unchanged but where economic security would be assured.< 96 ) As far as the United States was concerned, most experts in this field are agreed that the political arguments carried more weight than those of commercial gain. It was not difficult for economists to show that the treaty would result in financial loss for the country, and Southern rice and sugar concerns presented convincing cases to prove that reciprocity could only harm their production. The best economic arguments were those which maintained that the treaty would lead to an increase of trade between the two countries and that this trade increase would benefit shipping interests on the Pacific and the bankers, merchants and insurance companies of California. Undoubtedly California was to profit by the treaty• In economic terms the opposition's case was far stronger, but the arguments of strategic and political gain were on the side of the advocates of reciprocity.

(96) See letter of H.A.P. Carter, December 19, 1872, in Sullivan,c. Brewer & co.,pp.131-34, and speech of Hon. Stephen H. Phillips, March 11, 1873 178 Kuykendall maintains that the most effective claim was that of strategic necessity; that, because of their position, control of the Islands was essential to protect the Pacific coast, to promote American domina­ tion of the commerce of the North Pacific, and to encourage American men and money to go out to the

Islands to build up unbreakable economic links with the

United States. <97) Robinson favours the complementary idea that it was antagonism to the encroachment of Great Britain which fostered the acceptance of the treaty.< 9s)

The debates in the Congressional Record reveal a . (99) preponderance of this latter argument, though in most cases it is couched in terms of economic need to disguise the expansionist intentions. The wariness of

British activities in the Pacific had for a long time been part of American policy towards the area, and the advocates of the treaty talked at length on the cordon which Britain was throwing around the United States, from Canada to Fiji and Australasia. The passage of time only endorsed the view that it was, as Senator

Morgan stated before the Fifty-third Congress,

(97) Kuykendall,Hawaiian Kingdom 2Vol.III,p.35 (98) Robinson,Two Reciprocity Treaties,pp.132-4,138 (99) Cong. Record, 44 Cong., 1 Sess.,pp.1419-26,1461-65, 1488-98,1596-1604,2270-81,3027-31,4261-65,5356-7, 5461-63,5485-91,5533-35,5563-72,Appendix pp.151-62 179 "negotiated for the purpose of securing political control of those islands making them industrially and commercially a part of the United States, and preventing any other great power from acquiring a foothold there which might be adverse to the welfare and saf~ty of our Pacific coast in time of war.n{100J

The treaty was a great success for Hawaii; produc­ tion increased remarkably and, from a period of poverty and bankruptcy, Hawaii moved into a period of affluence and prosperity. As a commercial enterprise, the treaty cannot be said to have had the same importance for the United States economy, but as a political move its effects were to be long-lasting.

(100) Robinson,Two Reciprocity Treaties,p.134. See also, R.P. Spaulding, A Bird's-Eye View of the Hawaiian Islands with Some Reflections upon the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, (Cleveland, 1882) 180 CHAPTER VI SAMOA

Like Hawaii in the North, the Samoan Islands occupied a strategic position in the South Pacific and were one of the few sizeable island groups not yet under foreign control. American interest in them had been slight. Individual traders had long recommended a government investigation into the islands• possible attractions, but these were ignored until the 1830s, by which time British missionaries had established some influence. The persistence of these recommendations finally prompted a naval commission in 1839 under

Lieutenant Charles Wilkes. His report on possible harbour sites was especially favourable towards Pago Pago but no subsequent action was taken.Ct)

By the 1870s European influence was well-entrenched due to the activity of the missionaries and an energetic

German trading firm, Godeffroy and Company, which controlled Samoan trade. It was at this time that a number of American enterprises, encouraged by the apparent commercial benefits and by the continuing optimism about the possibility of an Isthmian canal, attempted to acquire a slice of this trade.

(1) Joseph w. Ellison, Opening and Penetration of Foreign Influence in Samoa to 1880. (Corvallis, 1938), pp.24-5 181 One of the first of these enterprises was the

Polynesian Land and Commercial Company, formed in 1868

by San Franciscans James Stewart and James McKee. The

Company was a speculative syndicate which established

claims, often by only a minimal deposit, to over

300,000 acres, <2 ) and it was anxious for American

control of the islands in order to ensure a large

financial return. Another American link was that of

William H. Webb, owner and director of a Pacific Mail

line between San Francisco and New Zealand. He applied

to Congress for a subsidy to enable him to extend this

line, maintaining that it would bring the United States

in closer contact with the important trade centres and

routes in the Pacific. Henry Peirce, Minister to

Hawaii, supported him and wrote to Fish to point out

the great commercial advantages to be gained from such

an arrangement. The bill for the subsidy failed to pass

in the Senate however and Webb turned elsewhere, finally

gaining some financial support from Australia and New Zealand.< 3 >

Once the steamship line was operating Webb was

interested in Pacific ports, and sent Captain E. Wakeman

to the Samoan Islands to report on their commercial value.

(2) G.H. Ryden, The Foreign Policy of th~ United States in Relation to Samoa. (New Haven, 1923),p.44; J.W. Davidson, Samoa Mo Samoa: The Emergence of the Independent State of Western Samoa.(Melbourne, 1967) PP• 46-7 (3) Ryden,Foreign Policy of u.s •••• to Samoa,p.46. Peirce also voiced some interest in the annexation of Samoa by the United States 182 He left Hawaii on July 30, 1871, and submitted his report on September 20. It was highly optimistic, painting the harbours and economic potential in glowing colours.

"I know of no other island with the same form of government, where all the chiefs are willing and desirous of ceding to the Americans, which would in that event be so valuable. From its commanding position in mid-Pacific, with the control of the commerce of all the islands which are contiguous to this point, with Australia and New Zealand at their door to supply with sugar, coffee, etc., no other group affords equal facility for a naval station (and coal depot) with a most brilliant future for a lucrative••••••• commercial enterprise. Of the 150 Europeans, they are all strongly in favor of having ( 4 ) American law established on the islands."

Enthusiastic about the possibility of absolute

American control in Samoa, Webb submitted this report to the Secretary of the Navy, Robeson, who sympathized with his interest and claimed that the Department was aware of Samoa's potential. A hint that New Zealand and Germany were scheming for control of the islands had more effect, however, especially after corroborative evidence was received from the Minister at Honolulu,

Peirce, and from Jonas Coe, the United States Commercial

Agent in Apia. On August 30, 1871 the United States

Minister in Berlin, George Bancroft, was instructed to enquire whether Germany had-any designs on Samoa, to which the German Foreign Office replied it had not.CS)

(4) House Executive Document No. 161,44 Cong.,1 Sess,p.10 (5) Ellison,Opening and Penetration••• of Samoa to 1880, p.40 183 Nevertheless, the Navy Department displayed some anxiety

and the Commander of the United States Pacific Fleet,

Rear-Admiral John A. Winslow, instructed Captain _Richard­

Meade, commander of the "Narrangansett" to survey the harbour of Pago Pago and locate a depot. ( 6 ) Peirce, in

an urgent letter to Meade, wrote:

"It is.of great importance to the future interests of the country, in the South Pacific, and I may say, in this Hemisphere, that you should proceed as soon as possible even before visiting Micronesia, to the Navigators Islands, for the purpose of promoting by all legal and proper means, American interests and enterprisr,, present and contemplated at that group."

Meade apparently shared Peirce's views, for he undertook

the mission with avowed intentions to procure some measure of American control in_ order "to frustrate

foreign influence, which is at present-very active."(S)

The Navy Department made no sign of disapproving of

these less than diplomatic hopes, which were, in fact,

outside his jurisdiction.

Meade left Honolulu on January 28, 1872 and reached

Pago Pago on February 14. In the course of the survey, which took about a month and which included several displays of strength to impress the chiefs with the power and authority of the United States, he took it

(6) Ibid,p.41; Ryden,Foreign Policy of U.S •••• to Samoa,pp.53-4 (7) Ryden,Foreign Policy of the U.S. ••• to Samoa,pp.60-61 (8) Ellison,Opening and Penetration••• of Samoa to 1880,p.40 184 upon himself to conclude a treaty with Mauga, the most powerful chief of Pago Pago. The treaty did not promise American protection but was worded in such a way that this was implied. In return he awarded the

United States

"the exclusive privilege of establishing the said harbor of Pagopago (sic) island of Tutuila, a naval station ••• And I hereby further agree that I will not grant a like privilege to any other foreign power or potentate. 11 (9)

As Mauga was only one of a number of chiefs constantly in conflict for control of Pago Pago, Meade got them to agree to a loose confederation in the hope that peace would preserve the terms of the treaty.( 10) Apparently he promised that the United States would protect them all from foreign interference~ Certainly he left the impression that the United States was politically interested in the islands, for a few weeks after Meade's departure the chiefs petitioned the American government asking that the islands be annexed to the United States.C 1 t)

In the United States the activity in Samoa did not

.go unnoticed. San Franciscan commercial companies were

(9) House Exec. Doc. No. 161, 44 Cong.,1 Sess.,pp.6-7 ( 10) Ibid, P • 65 (11) Ibid,p.4. Ellison,Opening and Penetration of••• Samoa,p.42 maintains that the phraseology of this document makes it almost certain that it was drafted by Americans on the island. Their main concern was the establishment of some law and order to permit the peaceful pursuit of business, a concern shared by most foreign residents. 185 anxious for American political dominance in any part of the Pacific in order to expand their markets, and enthusiastically endorsed the reports from Samoa. In

Congress some members were encouraging a more positive policy in Samoa as a method of advancing American political and economic interests in the Pacific. On

March 7; 1872 Representative Ho~ghton of California submitted a resolution calling for information on:: any proposals to extend an American protectorate over the islands.< 12 > On May 13, Senator Cole of California proposed annexation, to which the Senate did not seem ( 13) opposed. Congressional opinion appeared favourable, and the treaty, accepted by Robeson despite the fact that Meade had had no authority to negotiate it, was recommended to Fish. The Secretary of State sent it to

Gran t f or consi"d erat' ion. <14) 0 n May 22 , th e P res id en t forwarded it to the Senate with a qualified recommendation:

"The advantages of the concession which it proposes are so great, in view of the advantageous position of Tutuila, especially as a coaling station for steamers between San Francisco and Australia, that I should not hesitate to recommend its approval but for the protection on the part of the United

(12) Cong.Globe, 42 Cong.,2 Ses&,Pt 2,pp.1509-10 (13) Ibid, 42 Cong,,2 Sess.,Pt 4,p.3352 (14) Ellison,Opening and Penetration of••• Samoa,p.42; Sylvia Masterman, The Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa, 1845-1884. (London,1934),p.113 186 States, which it seems to imply. With some modification of the obligation of protection which the agreement imports, it is recommended to the)favorable consideration of the Senate. 11 (1:,

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was apparently opposed to the unconstitutional negotiation of the treaty for, despite earlier signs of favour, the treaty never emerged from the Committee.

The matter did not end there. The treaty had given rise to increased purchases of land by the Polynesian

Land Company and the pressure of the company for annexa­ tion persisted. "Highly respected commerical persons"(iG) continued to exert their influence upon the Administration, and later in 1872 there was sufficient public interest in Samoa for Grant to feel an investigation of the . ( 17) islands was necessary. He decided that an agent should be sent "in the hope that the information collected and reported to Congress would excite the interest of that body in the Samoan Archipelago 11 .< 1s> The agent chosen was Colonel A.Ba Steinberger.

(15) Richardson,Messages and Papers,pp.168-9. See also: w. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle Between President and Senate over the Conduct of Foreign Relations,(Gloucester, 1964) ,p.130 (16) Ellison,Opening and Penetration of ••• Samoa,p.46 (17) See American Samoa: A General Report by the Governor,(Washington,1931),p.6. Here the developing public interest was referred to as "a public call for information". (18) Ellison,Opening and Penetration of ••• Samoa,p.46. Many people believed the mission was to be political. See ibid,p.47; Masterman,Origins of International Rivalry in Samoa,p.119. Certainly it was interesting that a Special Agent should be sent on a fact-finding mission so soon after Meade's survey of Tutuila. A naval investiqation was more usual. 187

Little is known of Steinberger's past, but he seems to have had links with the Polynesian Land

Company and with Webb; it appears that Stewart suggested him to Webb, who agreed and sent the name to

Grant as a recommended choice. <19 > The President then ordered his secretary, Horace Porter, to send this recommendation to Fish:

"Mr. Webb strongly recommends Mr. Steinberger as a competent person to visit the Navigator Islands and report upon their condition ••• Of course, it is not the intention to annex these islands, but if, in your judgment, it would be well to send a commissioner to report upon their condition with a view to sending such information to Congress, you miqht commission Mr. Steinberger for this duty. 11 (20)

Fish hesitated before taking action - his attention was taken in any case by negotiations with Spain and Britain

- and it was not until March 1873 that he undertook to write to Steinberger. On March 29, he gave the agent his instructions which were to investigate:

1. The number of islands, constituting the group, and the extent of each. 2. The number of inhabitants, both aboriginal and from abroad. 3. The nature and quantity of the agricultural and other productibns.~. 4. The harbo~s suitable for vessels engaged in long voyages by sea.

He added:

(19) Masterman, op.cit.,pp.116-7 believes he was a clerk in Stewart's office. Davidson, Samoa Mo Samoa,p.48 considers that he "had contacts with the Polynesian Land Co." and was a "promoter of the trans-Pacific Steamship Company.'' (20) House Exec. Doc. No. 161,44 Cong.,1 Sess.,p.3. Porter to Fish, August 20, 1872. 188 "It is not unlikely that perhaps in the not distant future the interests of the United States may require not only a naval station in the Samoan group, but a harbor where their steam and other vessels may freely and securely frequent. Full and accurate information in regard to the Islands will be necessary to enable th_e Government here to determine as to measures which may be advisable toward obtaining that object."

He further advised Steinberger that he was an informal, not a diplomatic agent, and reminded him of the need to be "reticent". <21> After some trouble in finding trans­ port, Steinberger left on June 29, 1873 and reached Pago

Pago on August 7.

The visit was a great success. Steinberger•s charm and undoubted tact endeared him to the native chiefs and they were encouraged to submit to him the laws they had drawn up for a proposed constitution. <22 > These he modified with the assistance of the American, German and

British consuls and the Catholic and Protestant missionaries. He helped to settle land problems and sat in conference with the great chiefs, displaying a delicacy and understanding of local custom and etiquette that gratified them all. <23 > When he left on October 8 he carried with him many gifts and pleas from the chiefs for annexation and guidance. He left behind a considerable respect for the United States and its agents, and a firm

(21) House Exec. Doc. No. 161,44 Cong.,1 Sess.,pp.5-6. Fish to Steinberger, March 29, 1873. (22) Ibid,pp.58-62. Enclosures F and G. ( 2 3) Ibid, p. 50 189 belief that the mission had been a preliminary step to­

wards a protectorate by the United States Government. <24 >

He had done little to dispel this impression,

despite his orders, and he undoubtedly favoured the idea

himself. On his first visit to Mauga he settled a

dispute with a British vessel in order to get:

"a practical recognition of Commodore Meade's action. Whatever may be the avarice and ignorance of Mauga or his farcical estimate of the importance to himself of Commodore Meade's treaty, yet that treaty and the harbor-regulations, with the intelligent and dignified action of this Officer, gave to the United States a powerful influence, ••• attracted all the natives to us, and compelled upon the part of foreigners a tacit acknow­ ledgement of the priority of Amertca)in its right to treat with the Samoans." 25

In a later speech with Mauga and the chiefs of Pago Pago he said that Meade had made the treaty with them

"believing that at no distant day your harbor would afford a refuge to our vessels, and create such general commerce and commercial relations as would bring••• the Samoan and the American people i?to)close relation and bonds of friendship." 26

Such statements encouraged the belief that a protectorate was imminent; they certainly prompted many letters to the American Government.< 27 > Not only the natives but the white population looked forward eagerly to a protec­ torate. The planters and traders were acutely sensitive to any change in the political system, and wanted a stable government and a recognition of their land

(24) Ellison,Opening and Penetration of ••• Samoa,p.55 (25) House Exec. Doc. No.161,44 Cong.,1 Sess.,p.45 (26) Ibid,p.54 (27) Ibid,pp.53-62. Enclosures A1,B2,C1,D1,E,I1,I2,I3 190 claims. <29 > The missionaries believed that such stability would protect the native population from the foreign assaults upon its culture.< 29 > "Some interven­ tion is necessary to bring (this) unsettled state to an end. Providence seems to show us that the Government of the United States is to take interest", wrote the Catholic bishop, Father Elloy.( 30)

Fish greeted these letters with disfavour, and his acknowledgement of Steinberger's report was short and cold.

"Your letter of this date (March 4, 1874) has been received. In reply, I have to state that your report ••• in regard to your visit to the Samoan group of islands, reached here in due season, and has been read with lively interest. It is replete with novel and valuable information, and shows that you mustc 31 ) have been a diligent and judicious observer."

Steinberger was not disheartened, and continued to advocate a protectorate with himself as governor.

Though he claimed that any act to aid the Samoans would be for him a "labour of love", he also suggested that any moves should be given the force of diplomatic authority to give him, "precedence over the American and other consuls". To his various letters in this vein,

( 28) Davidson,Samoa Mo Samoa,p.47 (29) House Exec. Doc. No.161, 44 Cong.,1 Sess.,pp.62-4 ( 30) Ibid,p.64. Ellison believes that many of the letters praising Steinberger and asking for his return in an official capacity were inspired by Steinberger himself. See Opening and Penetration of••• Samoa,p.55 (31) House Exec. Doc. No.161, 44 Cong.,1 Sess.,p.69. Fish to Steinberger, March 4, 1874 191 Fish apparently made no reply. On April 8 Steinberger wrote:

1(rhe Samoan people) seek American protection ••• After spending some months with these people, it is my judgment that the United States (should) extend a protectorate, appoint a governor and secretary, equipment for, say, one hundred men as(~ ~ative guard ••• and a scientific corps." 2

On April 17, determined to gain some assurances from the

State Department, he submitted to Fish a proposed message to the Samoan chiefs which he desired the Department to endorse. Like his other speeches to Samoans this contained disguised references to the possibility of the

United States extending its "interest", and it was dismissed by Fish.< 33 )

Though Fish was opposed to further commitment, it was apparent that Grant was considerably interested in

Samoa. The harbour especially appealed to him, but the strategic location of the whole group had not escaped him, especially as these arguments were constantly forwarded by San Franciscan merchants. The singular desire of the natives to surrender to American control, as evidenced particularly by the gifts to Grant of the staff, fly-flap and sacred mat, Samoan symbols of power, made the scheme more attractive.< 34 > Pish was more cautious and was concerned by the possible repercussions in Congress of further expansionist ventures.

(32) House Exec. Doc. No. 161,44 Cong.,1 Sess.,pp.71-2 (33) Ibid,pp.74-5 (34) Ellison,Opening and Penetration of ••• Samoa,p.58 192 Steinberger, for his part, was determined to return

to Samoa as he had promised, and was convinced that the

United States Government would accredit him as a

diplomatic agent. In September, before having received

instructions or even notification of any decision by the

State Department, he left for Hamburg to discuss the

future of Samoa with John Godeffroy and Son, the German

trading company .. An agreement between them, which was

later to be brought as evidence of Steinberger's

duplicity, called for Steinberger to encourage business

for the Company in return for the Company's co-operation

with him in his "laudable and humane purpose ••• to

establish a fixed and substantial government upon the

principles of good administration", and for a promise to

use influence to gain the recognition of the Samoan

government by the German Empire. <35 ) The Company was to

have a monopoly of copra and cocoa-nuts in the islands

and was to be permitted to introduce foreign labour.

For this Steinberger was to receive ten per cent of

purchases. Both wanted a stable government and economic

advancement and it was presumed that one would enhance

the other. $13,982 in gold was advanced to Steinberger, which included $8,500 to purchase the "Peerless". The

rest was to be invested in the Company at six per cent

interest.

Upon his return to the United States, Steinberger

(35) House Exec. Doc. No. 44,44 Cong.,2 Sess.,p.129 193 informed the State Department of his negotiations with

Godeffroy but did not tell Fish the precise nature of

the agreement.

"In the interests of the Samoans, I have conferred with the Messrs. Godeffroy, at Hamburg. They are elevated and conscientious people ••• Claims will be subject to legal adjudication. The agents of Messrs. G. (sic) are instructed to this effect, and their inclufence is to be used at once after my arrival to secure the recognitt~g)of the Samoan Government by Germany."

Finally Steinberger•s persistence achieved success;

Grant, although not taking up the suggestion of a pro­ tectorate, appointed Steinberger to Samoa, again as a special agent which still hinted at political interest.

His position this time was anomalous. His orders were

"limited to observing and reporting upon Samoan affairs, and to impressing those in authority there with the lively interest we take in their welfare,"( 37 > but that much he had done earlier. It appeared that Fish was uncertain about what orders to give Steinberger, and his letter of December 11, 1874 expressed admirably the con­ fusion of the American position:

"Its (Samoa's) position ••• in the Pacific is commanding and particularly important to us. It is more than doubtful, however, whether these considerations would be suffi­ cient to satisfy our people that the annexation of these islands to the United States is essential to our safety and pros­ perity. In any event, supposing that the

(36) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,p.132 (37) Ibid,p.77 194 general sentiment should be favorable ••• , I am not aware that it has received such an expression as would require an acknow­ ledgement by the Government and wafrg~t measures on our part accordingly." 3

With these imprecise orders, Steinberger sailed on

February 2, 1875.

His reception in Samoa was jubilant. Elaborate

festivals were planned, and on April 22, 1875 the gifts

from Grant were handed over and the President's message

read. At this gathering or "fono" a satisfactory code

of laws was organized and under Steinberger's hand a

government was established with a constitution of six

articles modelled on that of the United States. The

Legislature was to be composed of two Houses: the

Taimua or House of Nobles, consisting of fifteen high

chiefs chosen by a system resembling election, and

approved by the King; aqd the Faipule or· House of

Representatives elected on the basis of one member for

every 2000 natives. The monarchy was placed on the

peculiar basis of a four year alternation between the

two great houses vying for it. The office of premier was also created, with Steinberger in mind, and in July

1875 he officially accepted the position.

Undoubtedly the system of government was too

sophisticated for a people experiencing centralization

for the first time; nevertheless, it was the best form

(38) House Eocec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,p.76. Fish to Steinberger, December 11, 1874 195 of government Samoa had had up to that time. Although

Steinberger interpreted his role autocractically the natives responded appreciately, <39 > and indeed his inten­ tions for Samoa were probably good; his enthusiasm for the islands and their people was always genuine. It is posstble that he hoped that his action would encourage the American Government to take a more lively interest in Samoa. In his letter on July 4, 1875, advising the

State Department of his acceptance of the office of Premier, he pressed again for closer ties with Samoa. ( 40)

In the United States any interest in Samoa was limited to San Franciscan merchants and other commercial concerns in California who wanted stronger links with possible Pacific Ocean coaling stations. Bills had been introduced in Congress in May and June 1874 to authorize the establishment of naval and coaling stations in the

Samoan Islands, but neither emerged from the Foreign (41) Relations Committee. Undoubtedly some influence was being brought to bear upon the Government in an attempt to gain an American commitment to Samoa but it had no effect, though this may have been caused as much by a preoccupation with other issues as by indifference.

What probably encouraged Steinberger was the fact that the State Department issued no criticism of his

(39) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,pp.61,96 (40) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,p.81 Steinberger to Fish, July 4, 1875 (41) Cong. Record, 43 Cong.,1 Sess.,pp.4238,4450 196 action. Despite Fish's awareness from August 30, 1875< 42 > that the United States agent had accepted the premier­ ship, he did not demand that Steinberger give up his office; nor did he advise the Samoan Government or the foreign consuls that Steinberger's action was not approved by the United States Government. There was no reply to Steinberger•s resignation of his post as special agent and there was no response, either in opposition or approval, to his draft of a treaty of friendship between the United States and Samoa.< 43 > The Government may well have been indifferent but it did not seem to be hostile.

The chances for the success of the new government appeared to be good. On July 16, 1875, it was recognized by King Kalakaua of Hawaii.< 44 ) The natives were undoubtedly pleased with it and its premier, and the foreign consuls and residents seemed to feel that this government could offer peace and stability.< 45 )

Steinberger frequently turned to the missionaries for counsel on matters of government social policies, and consulted the consuls on matters such as harbour duties and pilots. However, this harmony did not last long.

(42) When Steinberger's despatch of July 4 was received. Steinberger resigned his position as special agent in October, 1875 (43) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,pp.3-5 (44) An appeal on October 19 for recognition by the United States drew no response. (45) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,pp.5-6,20, 96. King Malietoa to Grant, October 19, 1875; Taimua to Grant, October 30, 1875; speech of King Malietoa, December 27, 1875 197 Within two months, there were complaints from consuls and commercial interests about taxes on liquor, the strict control of land sales and the slow adjudication of land claims. Griffin, the successor to S.S. Foster, the United States Consul at Apia, wrote to Fish later that the trouble was said by the people

"to have been inspired by British and German commercial interests that have••• long main­ tained a commercial monopoly there to the great detriment••• of Samoan interests and American trade••• During the administration of Colonel Steinberger, a prominent feature of his policy was to aid in subserving the expressed wishes of the natives in diverting the trad~ of the islands••• to the United States. 11 l 4 6)

Steinberger had always been anxious to bring Samoa closer to the United States, and foreign merchants became aware that their acceptance of his law and order meant a gradual monopoly of the trade by the United States. Even the missionaries turned against him. Just why this was so is difficult to understand, but as they claimed they would demand his deportation if he was not acting with the authority of the United States Government, it seems likely that they were concerned for the political stability of the islands if other nations moved in to usurp h is' unau th ori zed posi. t ion.. ( 4 7 ) Mores t range 1 y, the most influential individual in Steinberger's downfall was probably Foster, the United States Consul, who was,

(46) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,pp.156-7. Griffin to Fish, February 2, 1877 (47) Ibid,pp.124-5. Foster to Hunter, October 3, 1875 198 from the beginning, jealous of Steinberger's power, but had not been able to get him removed.

The first attempt to remove him came in December

1875 when a British man-of-war, the "Barracouta", under

Captain C.E. Stevens, arrived in Apia. Foster and

T. Williams, the British Consul, appealed to him for aid, and together they seized the "Peerless",

Steinberger's vessel. This caused considerable dissen­ sion and, though the King stood behind Steinberger in the ensuing attack upon him, the Government began to lose its control of the situation.< 4s) The British and

American consuls beseiged the government with petty but aggressively worded complaints, and though the natives remained loyal to the Government, the foreign population was divided. On January 18, 1876 fifty-four foreigners signed a petition to Stevens, demanding the removal of

Steinberger on the grounds of his "drunkeness, his lying, his debauchery, his disregard for the common decencies of life" and accused him of being "dangerous" (49) and "a despot". 'rhe Americans on the islands, with only a few exceptions, responded with a counter petition, maintaining that under the Government there had been peace and order, justice had improved, roads were built, morality uplifted and native wars prevented.(SO) The

(48) The declining efficiency of the Government at this time endorses the impression that Steinberger's rule verged on dictatorship. (49) House Exec. Doc, No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Ses~,pp.126-7 (50) Ibid,pp.66~7· 199 King protested against the actions of the foreign (51) consuls, and the government on January 20, 1876 sent a plea for support to the United States.< 52 >

No help was forthcoming, and on February 7 King

Malietoa was finally persuaded by Foster, Williams, and

Stevens to agree to the removal of Steinberger.< 53 > On

February 8, the King appeared before the Legislature and issued a statement on Steinberger, claiming he was

"a liar and an imposter" and that he had been "the cause of all the troubles which are called insults offered by our Government to the representatives in Samoa of the British and United States Governments".< 54 ) At a meeting later on the same day, Steinberger was arrested and taken on board the "Barracouta11 .< 55 ) The Taimua and Faipule responded by deposing the king, an act which later led to bloodshed when Stevens, Foster, and Williams tried to reinstate him. The chiefs then wrote to Grant asking for a warship and bemoaning the loss of Steinberger.

"We can never forget our love for Colonel Steinberger. He is as the lamp of Samoa which is now distinguished. He has never said a word in Samoa by which he tried to bring us under the power of the United States. This is true ••• We and the Samoan Government, in our actions during the recent difficulties, have had no wish to join any other nation. Our only wish was to keep fast our friendly relations with your Government. 11 (56)

(51) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,pp.68-9. January 21, 1876 (52) Ibid,p.70. Samoan Government to Grant, January 20,1876. (53) Ibid,p.156. Griffin maintained that the persuasion was drugged wine. (54) Ibid,p.138 (55) Ibid,pp.138-9 ( 56) Ibid.oo.71-2. Taimua to Grant. Mav 1. 1876 200 On March 30, 1876, the "Barracouta" sailed, taking

Steinberger and Jonas Coe, one-time American Consul to

Samoa, who was arrested because Stevens and Foster believed he was blocking their attempts to reinstate

Malietoa. Steinberger made numerous attempts to gain a hearing at the court martial of Stevens in Auckland, New

Zealand, but the transfer of the case to London seemed to mean the end of his hopes.

Public opinion was divided on the issue. R.L. Ogden,

Commercial Agent to Samoa and a prominent San Franciscan merchant, defended Steinberger in a letter to the

President in which he included several articles from

Californian newspapers. These, he claimed, reflected the majority feeling in the state. All called for action against Britain and the reinstatement of Steinberger.< 57 )

The New York Times used the issue as a political weapon to attack Grant and the Administration for ever having sent Steinberger, (SB) but the New York Herald upheld

Steinberger and Grant, and demanded compensation for the attack on the American flag. <59 >

Grant himself was prepared to stand behind

Steinberger, having always supported the agent's conten­ tion that a positive policy towards Samoa was needed, and he OL'd{,red that Steinberger be given all papers he

(57) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,pp.73-79 (58) New York Times, March 25, April 14,May 5, 1876 (59) New York Herald, March 26, 1876 201 required to carry on his case in London. ( 60) Foster was removed from office and a new consul sent, G.W.Griffin, whose orders from the State Department illustrated the new awareness of Samoa.

"You will endeavour as far as possible to repair the harm that has been done by your predecessor, and will do all in your power to cultivate friendly relations with the authorities, assuring them of the interest this Government takes in the welfare of their people, and of the earnest desire of the President to do all in his power to, 61 ) promote the prosperity of the islands."

Griffin was further instructed to investigate the

Steinberger debacle and its effects in Samoa. His report was completely favourable to Steinberger. He noted the strong pro-American feeling engendered by Steinberger•s presence and the unanimity of affection for him. He endorsed the agent's economic policy, and claimed that the natives had observed that:

"under the influence of American commer­ cial intercourse and the friendship and political intimacy of the Government of the United States, the Hawaiian Islands had emerged from a rude and semi-barbarous condition to a civilized, enterprising, ( 62 ) prosperous state among the family of nations."

Like Steinberger, he reinforced the need for closer ties with Samoa for the sake of a commercial and strategic control of the Pacific. He warned that unless something was done soon the monopoly of the Germans would ensure

(60) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,pp.106-7 (61) Ibid,p.153-5 (62) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,pp.156-7. Griffin to Fish, February 2, 1876 202 that no American commercial enterprise could become established, and finished by saying

"I do not hesitate to express my unquali­ fied conviction that any engagement these people may be permitted to enter into w:i..th the United States••• will be faithfully and religiously observea. 11 (63)

The next administration agreed and, bolstered by the

Samoan approach~s to Britain, concluded a treaty of friendship with Samoa on January 17, 1878.

The links with Samoa were new and the American awareness of the islands' strategic and commercial potential was limited. Grant was eager to extend an

American protectorate, and Fish was not opposed to investigating the possibilities, but there was insuffi­ cient public interest to ensure the passage in the

Senate of such a proposal. It is possible that the issue of a Samoan protectorate might have attracted more widespread attention in the United States had it not coincided with the passage of a controversial Hawaiian treaty. The strategic value of Hawaii was more apparent, and there was no American investment in Samoa that justified closer political connections. Undoubtedly the

Steinberger affair had increased the Administration's interest in Samoa; the fact that Grant was forced to follow a policy of non-intervention did not denote indifference. The years 1874 and 1875 had given the

United States a position in Samoan affairs that was to be formalized by the following Administration.

(63) House Exec. Doc. No.44, 44 Cong.,2 Sess.,p.158 203 CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION

The foreign policy of the Grant Administration was not distinguished for broad statements of America's place in the world or for definitions of national purpose. Yet foreign policy issues fell into two distinct categories: matters awaiting settlement after the Civil War, of which the "Alabama" claims case was most important; and the expansion of American influence abroad, both in regions where the United States had long had a role, and into areas far beyond the traditional sphere of influence. The expansionist arm of this policy has been the concern of this thesis.

The Civil War spelled the end of the uncomplicated expansionism glorified as America's "Manifest Destiny".

But as foreign policy under Johnson had been strictly peripheral it was only in the Grant Administration that the passing of the old order was apparent. In many respects foreign policy under Grant was an uncomfortable mixture of old and new. On the one hand the men who made policy and some of the problems facing Grant at his inauguration were survivors of the old order; on the other hand, the complexities of the new American economy and the nature of its infiltration into other regions marked out a distinctly new path. This dichotomy may explain why the Administration did not achieve many of its foreign policy goals, though they pointed the way to what came later. 204

Compared to the territorial concerns of Polk and

Pierce or the strategic interests of Seward, the expansionism of Grant•s period showed little or no singlemindedness of purpose. There were no specific ideals and no acknowledged doctrines of action. Instead the Administration responded randomly and unpredictably to the issues it confronted, and the only thing that united these apparently unrelated episodes was the expansionist mood.

In this expansionism the Administration only reflected the age. Few periods in American history have ever been characterized by such universal growth. The post-Civil War era was one of rapid industrial, commer­ cial and financial development which was to place the

United States among the greatest industrial producers in the world. "There is no other period", writes

Hofstadter, "when politics seems so completely dwarfed by economic changes."(i) This preoccupation with the power of economics led to a gradual change in the justifications for expansion, a change which gives

Grant's period, in retrospect, the appearance of a watershed between the old and the new.

The attitudes which had governed the foreign policies of the pre- Civil War period still lingered during Grant's Presidency, for the men who guided the

(1) Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It. (New York, 1948),p.164 205 Administration were by and large products of that era.

Grant was a crude expansionist, interested in advancing

Republicanism, with little awareness of either the

diplomatic niceties of international relations or the

wider international significance of any move made by

the United States. Fish was cautious and responsible,

but displayed in his Cuban policy an ambivalence of

attitude. He was conscious of the need for peaceful

relations with Spain, yet he was so impressed by the

thought of a Spanish republic that his policy towards

Spain fluctuated according to the fortunes of Spanish

republicanism. Like other members of the Administration he was slow to perceive the potential of Pacific control,

limited as he was by traditional policies.

Congress was still composed largely of political

survivors of the pre- Civil War period, and only

gradually reflected the changing nature of the society

it represented. In the Senate, furthermore, positive

action was too frequently hindered by the conflict between the Executive and the Legislature. The extinc­

tion in the Foreign Relations Committee of the 1872

Meade treaty for harbour privileges at Pago Pago after the Senate had approved earlier resolutions to this

effect illustrated succinctly the jealousy regarding the control of foreign aff~irs which existed between the two arms of government. 206 Furthermore, many well-entrenched arguments for

expansion were displayed, especially in the attitudes

of the press and of public opinion. The most noticeable were those which opposed European and particularly

British influence in any area where it could conflict with American interests. The presence of a monarchical

and imperialistic power on the borders of the United

States had never been acceptable to Americans, and the

surge of republican feeling after the Civil War made

the Spanish presence seem even less tolerable. The

Cuban fight for independence presented another opportunity to vent anti-Spanish sentiment. The tradi­

tional anxiety about British competition was revealed in the Hawaiian situation where the declining economy demanded aid from some power.

There were evidences of a slight but nevertheless acknowledged consciousness of the Monroe Doctrine in the persistent awareness of the importance of the

Caribbean, and in the antagonistic reaction to Fish's appeal for a multilateral assault on Spain's Cuban policy. The more recent beliefs of Manifest Destiny, that nebulous body of expansionist ideas which saw

America's mission in the world as fostering the inevitable spread of republicans, persisted with more effect. But the Civil War had spelled the end of

Manifest Destiny as an immediate issue, and it was a less vital and less realistic movement when it 207 reappeared in the time of General Grant. Consequently

there had to be new justifications for expansion.

Of the four areas of American interest discussed in

this thesis only Cuba fitted completely into the pattern

of Manifest Destiny. This was due largely to the fact

that attention to Cuba was a traditional policy

inherited by the Grant Administration. The reaction to

the stimulus of a fight for independence was to recall

the policies and attitudes of the past and to reassert

the right of the United States to determine the future

of the island. That this previous interest was a justi­

fication in itself seemed acceptable, and the arguments

in Congress centred on little else.

In the relations with Santo Domingo, Hawaii and

Samoa, however, there was a gradual but distinguishable

change in the emphases of the arguments favouring

increased American commitment. The new and increasingly

important element was the economic argument which on one hand acknowledged the insufficiency of the justifications of Manifest Destiny in the conditions of the 1870s, and on the other hand revealed the direction of policy in

the future. "We are rapidly becoming a commercial people", said S.P. Orth as early as 1869, "and we should avail ourselves of all just means which tend to foster and protect our commercial interests. 11 ( 2 ) The branching

(2) Cong. Globe, 41 Cong., 1 Sess.,p.524 208

out into the Pacific especially encouraged the develop­

ment of this commercial line of argument, for there was

no traditional policy towards the area. Indeed, the

debates on Hawaiian reciprocity saw a refutation of

claims that the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny

could be exterided to include the Pacific.{ 3 ) To an

increasingly pragmatic age economic arguments had more

appeal and considerably more relevance.

The change was not as sudden as this would suggest.

Undoubtedly the arguments of Manifest Destiny retained

their appeal for some, but the justifications put

forward by the advocates of foreign expansion began to

mirror the economic advance of the whole country. As

these justifications became more generally accepted, the

application of the beliefs behind Manifest Destiny became

less necessary.

This adaptation of the justifications for territorial

expansion did not extend to the President or the Cabinet,

though economic arguments increasingly found favour in

Congress, or with the public at large, as a method of

promoting expansionist schemes. The division within the

Government and between Government and people was sympto­ matic of deeper divisions and tensions which hung over

from the constit~tional battles of the Johnson adminis­

tration. Because of this disharmony and because of the

(3) Cong. Globe, 44 Cong., 1 Sess.,pp.1497,2273,2275. as examples. 209 President's inability to lead, a power vacuum developed in the field of foreign affairs into which stepped individuals and interest groups who acquired influence and authority out of all prop~rtion to their numbers.

For those with a purpose and a determination to act upon it there were many opportunities in this purposeless period to achieve results. It was thi8 purpose on the part of Steinberger, and the abrogation by the State

Department of responsibility for defining a Samoan policy, that enabled the agent to commit the Government

to a policy it had not anticipatedo

The most important development was not, however,

the influence of separate individuals such as Steinberger,

Fabens and Cazneau but the steady increase of the power of those with commercial purpose and determination.

The economic growth of the post-war period encouraged widespread financial investment in trade and commerce,

shipping, insurance, industry and other aspects of the

economic expansion of the United States. These invest­ ments were not only internal but also extended to enter­ prises outside the borders of the United States. Some of these were purely· speculative as in Santo Domingo, but others were perfectly sound; for example, in areas such as Hawaii where the American atmosphere and apparently strong economy promised good returns.

American political control over such regions was considered desirable, for political stability and 210 economic advance were held to be complementary.

Endorsing and utilising this argument were expatriate

Americans, in whose future the investments had been made and who turned naturally to the United States in times of economic setback to demand aid and support.

The power of this coalition of interests increased as its role in the American economic boom became more assured. Their wealth made them considerably influential; the financial scandals and accusations of large-scale corruption in the Grant period bear witness to that fact.

Their involvement in foreign affairs was not envisaged by these men. It was instead the natural result of their increased wealth and their part in the economic progress. Commerce was expansionist by nature and it advanced a philosophy of growth based on an awareness of commercial and mercantile potential. Their justification for expansion was not one of manifest right but one of commercial need.

Few of them or of their contemporaries were conscious that this change was occurring in the traditional policies of foreign affairs. But it became apparent that the arguments of commercial progress were appealing more and more. Indeed the Hawaiian reciprocity treaty was symbolic of this change when it implied that economic dominance could be equated with political control. It was natursl that goverriment policy should be affected by 211 this developing interpretation of expansionism, for its advocates expected the Administration to support them and to smooth the path to their goals, especially where foreign complj_cations arose. The Grant Administration did not appreciate this challenge and businessmen were forced to take events into their own hands. Future

Administrations, however, reflected more clearly the interests of the business community and acted accordingly.

The culmination of this trend was to be the aggressive imperialism of the 1890s and the Dollar Diplomacy of the early decades of the twentieth century. 212 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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