Aspects of Expansionism in United States Foreign Policy During The

ASPECTS OF EXPANSIONISM IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE GRANT ADMINISTRATION A thesis presented for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. by Barbara Gillian Green Ptge Preface iii List of Abbreviations V Chapter I Introduction 1 Chapter II Fer,onal1t1•• 8 Chapter XII Cube. 31 Chapter IV Santo Domtngo 89 Chapter V Hawaii 136 Chapter VI Samoa 180 Chapter VIX. conclusion 203 Bibliography 212 Photographs P1rson!l!ti1s iii ~Rtll\CIS u.s. Grant is usually ranked ~mong the three o~ four worst Presidents of the United Stat••• For most people this fact seems to~• sufficient proof that nothing worthwhile emerged from the filight years of his administration. I must admit that I shared this general indifference when first allotted this topic; though :C knew.something of the settlement of the 11Alebarna" claims dispute in the Tre•ty of Wa•hington, I was not aware that President Grant had a distinctive foreign policy. But the Grant ere. has proved to be a fascinating period in American diplomatic history and it surprises me that it he.snot r•eeived more attention. I was frequently f•ced with a shortage of secondary material• that was pJrtieularly frustrating in view of the inadequacies of the primary m•terials available to me. Nevertheleas, it was possible to gain Elorne insight into this period, General diplomatic historiee usually pas& over the years 1865 to 1898, as• kind of, flat spot between the surge ot expansionist feeling glorified•• Manifest Destiny, and America's brief venture into imperialism. In fact. this was a transitional period in which a very different social and economic order spelled the end of one kind of expan•ioniam and prepared the way for another. One can stle elements of both types at work in the particular cases that the Grant: Administration had to deal with. My than1¢11 are due to my •upervisor, Professor A.A. Conway, and to Mr. B. Wearing who was temporai::-y aupe~vi•or, both of whom provided conside~able inspira tion; to the librarians ot the tJnivtrsi,ty of Canterbury who were endleaaly helpful; to my typiat who worked under the trying conditions of my absenee1 and to my husband without whose encouragement thi• tnight never have been completed. V LIST or Af!SREVIATIONS P.R.F.R. - Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Aecomp~nying the Annual Me$ea9e of the President. J.s.H. - Journal of Southern History. - Louieiana Historic•l Quarterly. ~ North American Review. - faaitic Historical Review • P.S.Q. • Political Science Quarterly 1 CHAPTER I INTROOUC'r::CON The foreign policy ot the United State$• even today, appear• very often to be governed more by idealism than by prlgm•tism or practicality, and this peculiar trend is apparent throughoqt the entire history of American foreign policy, To understand the pressures which could be exerted on the adMiniatr•tion during Grant•s period, it is important to look briefly at the ideas which had become pa.rt of Amfllt'ic:an diplomacy. A result of the War of Independence had beent understandably, a self-conscious rejection of everything European. and more particularly of things British. This independent spirit was to become translated into the idea of two spheres, Americtn and European; and into an avoidance of any alliances with European powers which could involve American co-operation in war. George Washington in his Farewell Address on September 17, 1796 expressed the policies of neutrality and non-entanglement which were to have considerable effect upon the foreign policies of succeeding Presidents, "Europe has a set of ptimary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies. the cause, of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefoEe, it mu•t be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and cQ\liaions of her friendships and her enmities."\ > (1) Dexter Perkins, H•nds Off: A. History of the Monpoe poatrine," (Boston, 1§41) p.i7 2 Thia separatism increased. The reaction of monarchical Europe to the French Revolution, which seemed to apply the principles embodied in the Americl.ln Constitution, and the late~ disillusioning .developments of the Revolution, made the differences between the United States •nd Europe more apparent. As far as Americans were concerned, thia epi•ode illustrated the advantages of democratic republicanism over the evils of reaction•ry monarchism, and the United States assumed the tasks of a "republiea.n missionu-y" olairnin9, es Henry Clay did in 1818 in his discussion of the Latin American States, 0We are their great example. Of us they constantly speak as of brothers having• similar origin. They adopt our principles, copy our institutions ilnd in many instances, employ the very language and sentiments of our revolutionary papers, 0 <2> The United States, it was maintained, was the creator, and protector, of free government in the Western Hemisphere, a mission which was a reflection of the sense of that uniqueness of the country and its institutions. The Monroe Doctrine was both a reinforcement of this belief and an extension. (2) Perkins. »ands Off. p,17 3 "The American continents by the free and independent condition which they h$ve assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects f?l>future ooloni~ation by any European powers•" This was the first item of the Doctrine, and though it appeared essentially negative, it was, in reality,• nationalistic and aggressive belief which could be, •nd was used to justify consideral)le Ameriaian activity in the area in following year•• Its apparent success owed less to any strength inherent in the idea than to the reluctance of European nations to become further involved in the issues outside their continent during the troublesome years of the first half of the nineteenth century. Just how little it affected American thinking is illustrated by Dexter Perkins when he points out that of all the statements issued on the subject of the future of CUba, not one l:'efer.red to the Doctrine. The re•son was that it was not a new principle; the only thing that was new was its expression in such explicit terms. ln 1819 John Quincy Adams had claimed that the world "must be familiarized with the idee. of con sidering our proper dominion to be the continent of North America. F.rom the time when we became an independent people it w~s as much a law of nature that this should become our pretension (4) $8 that the Mi1sisaippi should flow to the eea" (3) R.A. Billington, a.J. Loewenburg, S.H. Brockunier ( ed), :t'he Mak+ng of Amer:Jrcan Dem9c5acy. ( 2 vols• New York, 9160) Vol.I, p.207, (4) Richard w. Van Alstyne, .Amex-ican Diplomacy in A2~;on1. /} Se;~e, of c,,i §t;Uali,; (New Yol:'lc,1944) P• . 4 This was an expression of national security,· as waa the Monx·oe Doctrine of 1823, yet the ideas· were also closely linked to$ doctrine far less introspective •nd far more deliberately expansionist, which was described in 1845 '.by John o•sullivant editor of the paper TbeDgnos;:ratic Review, as "Manifest De$tiny0 • Like the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Pe$tiny was an expression of nationalism, but an expression much more excited and dogmatic. It claimed that nothing could hold back the spread of republicanism and the American way of life, and that annexation of territox-y was a natural development ordained by God. It tran$lated old idec:ls of the perfection and superiority of American republicani~m into a mission of territorial expansion. "Let us leave events to take their own c:ourse. The North Americans wi1~ spread out far beyond their present bounds •. hey wi11 encroach again and again upon their neighbours, New territories will be pl•nted, decla~e their independence and be annexedl We have New Mexico and California& We j:!1'.J:l; have Old Mexico and Cuba& .The isthmus cannot arrest 1,111 ... not even the S•int Law.rencel Time has $ll of this in her womb. b oundfed itates will.grow,up where now exists but thirty. et·us not anticipate. The end of all this shall come, and God only can tell what it will be •nd when."(5) M$n1fe$t Destiny sprang from the opening of California the spread of popul~tion west, the aovance of the rail road and the telegraph, and the exagget'ated nationalism of a young, wealthy and successful nation, and the (5) Billington• Loewenburg, Brockunier, The Making of Affie,r;im Dempcracy. P• 284 5 acqui$1tion of land only increased the demand for more. For political aspirants an advant•ge of the faith in this ideal was that it •oon showed itself to be endlessly adaptable. From e:kpanaion within what 1$ now known ae the United States, it epread to include the entire North Ameriean continent, then the Caribbe•n, and then the South American continent~ So~e, no doubt• had even grander vision•• The most influential period• of Manifest Destiny were the decades of the 1840• and 1850•• A• Weinberg points out in his study of the movement,<G) the catch words to de1cribe the doctrine changed, and later it was variously called 0 inevitable destinY"t 0 natural growth", "political gravitation", and "politic;:al affinity0 , but it was primarily an attitude of these two decades, growing out of the p•rticular political conditions of these years.

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