Improving Intelligence and Counterterrorism Capabilities

“As the threats change and terrorists adapt their tactics to the hardened targets in New York City, the NYPD cannot rest. It is essential that raw information be gathered faster and analyzed more rigorously. Intelligence, in turn, must be shared readily, and acted upon diligently.”

Since September 11, 2001, the NYPD has Deputy Commissioner Miller’s first objective built a set of counterterrorism and intelligence has been to solidify the recent gains that have re- capabilities unequaled by municipal law enforce- sulted from what the Department calls its “collab- ment agencies anywhere in the world. The suc- orative reset” with local, state, federal, and inter- cessful and safe completion of the events around national partners. Closely partnering with other the 2014 Super Bowl with New York as the key agencies that share the NYPD’s responsibility in venue was a blueprint for collaboration for a com- the fields of intelligence and counterterrorism is plex, drawn-out, two-state, multi-agency coun- the most powerful force multiplier the NYPD can terterrorism mission. The 2014 United Nations bring to bear in keeping New York safe. General Assembly, attended by the largest number of high-threat foreign dignitaries in the orga- “The Intelligence and Counterterrorism Bureaus nization’s history, stands as another testament are working closely with the Community Affairs to the NYPD’s counterterrorism capabilities and Bureau and the Deputy Commissioner for Collabo- the Department’s ability to work closely with its federal partners. The next General Assembly will rative Policing to engage with community leaders pose an even greater challenge in September 2015 in a transparent and constructive discussion about because, in addition to numerous world leaders, the NYPD’s counterterrorism mission and how that Pope Francis will be attendance and addressing mission will be accomplished.” the General Assembly.

The “collaborative reset,” also requires adjust- ments in the field of community relations. Success As the threats change and terrorists adapt in protecting New York should not be achieved at their tactics to the hardened targets in New York the cost of alienating communities of law abiding City, the NYPD cannot rest. It is essential that New Yorkers. The Intelligence Bureau is work- raw information be gathered faster and analyzed ing closely with the Community Affairs Bureau more rigorously. Intelligence, in turn, must be and the Deputy Commissioner for Collaborative shared readily, and acted upon diligently. To fos- Policing to engage with community leaders in a ter fuller cooperation and information sharing be- transparent and constructive discussion about the tween the Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bu- NYPD’s counterterrorism mission and how that reaus, both bureaus have both been placed under mission will be accomplished. a single deputy commissioner, John Miller—former Bureau Chief of the LAPD’s Counterterror- ism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau, terrorism expert, and former Associate Deputy Director at the Directorate of National Intelligence. THE CRITICAL RESPONSE COMMAND

“Closely partnering with other agencies that share In light of emerging threat patterns, and the NYPD’s responsibility in the fields of intelligence particularly the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in and counterterrorism is the most powerful force January 2015, the NYPD is establishing a Critical Response Command within the Counterterrorism multiplier the NYPD can bring to bear in keeping Bureau. This new command represents a major New York safe.” shift in the NYPD’s counterterrorism profile.

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES 1 For the past ten years, NYPD has staffed • Portable Radiological Detection and Ra- what were called critical response vehicles (CRVs) diological and Nuclear Awareness with personnel and cars drawn each day from the precinct commands, with most precincts pro- • Biological and Chemical Weapons viding one car and two officers to CRV. These ve- Awareness hicles were available to respond to any terrorist or active shooter crisis in the city and to deter • Vehicle and Subway Checkpoints terrorist attacks with high visibility patrols and • Special Weapons and Long Guns inspections. The CRV model brought with it two significant challenges: the daily drain on precinct • Port Awareness – an understanding of resources which left many precincts one car short how weapons might be disguised and smug- on the morning and evening shifts and the fact the gled through the New York City region ports officers assigned to CRV did not come specially and of vulnerabilities of port facilities to ter- trained nor specially equipped for their counter- rorist attack terrorism role. The Critical Response Command will give the “Given that New York City, and especially Manhattan, city a cadre of hand-selected, well-trained and remains a primary terrorist target, the NYPD is estab- well-equipped police personnel poised to respond lishing a Critical Response Command of specially swiftly and with sufficient expertise and force to trained and equipped officers who will provide an counter the most highly organized and heavily immediate and effective response to active shooter armed attack. and other terrorist attacks in the city.”

The attackers in Charlie Hebdo incident were armed with assault rifles and made no immediate REBUILDING COUNTERTERRORISM attempt to escape after the attack on the maga- zine, instead bringing the attack to the respond- In 1980, the NYPD worked with the FBI to ing police officers. The incident made clear, as develop the nation’s first Joint Terrorism Task did the synchronized attacks in Mumbai in 2008, Force (JTTF). In the early 1980s this unit, as well that ordinary police patrols are not equipped or as other FBI sponsored JTTFs around the country trained to counter a well-organized and well- focused primarily on domestic terrorist activity. armed terrorist attack. Given that New York City, This model was largely successful at countering and especially Manhattan, remains a primary terrorist groups involved in bombings like the terrorist target, the NYPD is establishing a Crit- FALN, United Freedom Front and Black Libera- ical Response Command of specially trained and tion Army. By the start of the 1990s, as violent equipped officers who will provide an immediate street crime soared, preventing terrorist activi- and effective response to active shooter and other ty was neither the federal government’s nor the terrorist attacks in the city. NYPD’s primary concern. The long-successful JTTF model faced serious challenges disrupting terrorist plots from a growing number of groups The NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau is cur- overseas, including Al Qaeda. rently engaged in an intensive interview process to select the officers, supervisors and command “By the start of the 1990s, as violent street crime staff for the Critical Response Command. The soared, preventing terrorist activity was neither the new officers will be trained in the full range of federal government’s nor the NYPD’s primary con- counterterrorist expertise, including: cern. The long-successful JTTF model faced serious • Hostile Surveillance, Behavioral Obser- challenges disrupting terrorist plots from a growing vation and Counterterrorist Awareness – the number of groups overseas, including Al Qaeda.” ability to detect the signs of an impending attack and to read the faces and body language The attacks on the World Trade Center and of possible attackers Pentagon on September 11, 2001 shocked New • Homemade Explosives and Advanced York and the world. The terrorist attacks com- Explosive Trace Detection mitted by 19 Al Qaeda operatives killed 2,753 New Yorkers. Among the lost were 343 New York firefighters, 23 New York police officers and 37 of-

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES 2 ficers from the Port Authority Police. It was the Yorkers safe from acts of terrorism deters and in- deadliest incident for firefighters and law enforce- terdicts terrorist operations directed at New York ment officers in United States history. City. Despite multiple attempts, between the joint efforts of the FBI and the NYPD, there has been no successful major terrorist operation in New York since September 11, 2001. The attack on the Twin Towers shook New York City and the NYPD to its core. It became clear that national intelligence agencies had not shared – and acted on – vital information that might have kept New York and the Pentagon out THE CURRENT THREAT PICTURE of harm’s way. After September 11th, under the leadership of Commissioner Raymond Kelly, the The threats facing New York City today are NYPD stood up a local counter terrorist and in- becoming increasingly complex. While the NYPD’s telligence capacity to both identify and counteract federal partners have kept Al Qaeda Central off the threats to New York City. balance since 2001, growing regional instability in the Middle East and Central Asia has creat- “Under the leadership of Commissioner Raymond ed a new set of threats that must be mitigated. Kelly, the NYPD stood up a local counter terrorist Commissioner Bratton recognizes that New York and intelligence capacity to both identify and coun- remains the primary target of globally focused ter- teract the threats to New York City.” rorist networks. The NYPD will continue to draw on its own capabilities and the capabilities of its federal partners to maintain a current and de- The Intelligence Division has been re-desig- tailed assessment of the threats facing New York. nated the Intelligence Bureau in recognition of Currently, the NYPD has identified four classes of the new Bureau’s expanded responsibilities and threats. resources. The intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities housed within this bureau are un- • The first set of threats are posed by Al Qae- equaled in any municipal law enforcement agency da Central. The same network that attacked in the world. New York on 9/11 is still active, dangerous and focused on attacking the American home- “The robust infrastructure the NYPD created to keep land. Al Qaeda’s Senior Leadership (AQSL) continues to hide and plot in the ungoverned New Yorkers safe from acts of terrorism deters and regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. New interdicts terrorist operations directed at New York York City was already attacked by the Al City. Despite multiple attempts, between the joint Qaeda network that had trained, planned and efforts of the FBI and the NYPD, there has been no managed its operatives from this region. successful major terrorist operation in New York • The second set of threats derive from Al since September 11, 2001”. Qaeda’s affiliates and breakaway groups, particularly Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsu- la (or AQAP), the Khorasan Group in Syria, While the Intelligence Bureau collects, ana- and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant lyzes and acts on intelligence at the operational (ISIL). AQAP was specifically designated by level, the Counterterrorism Bureau translates Ayman Zawahiri, the leader of Al Qaeda, as intelligence into training programs, target hard- the Al Qaeda branch assigned to attack the ening programs, and anti-terrorism best practic- U.S. homeland. The recent instability in Ye- es. The Counterterrorism Bureau oversaw the men has allowed AQAP to establish secure development of the Lower Manhattan Security bases of operation in the south and east of the Initiative (LMSI)—now one of the most extensive country. networks of security cameras, radiological detec- tors, and license plate readers in the world. To increase LMSI’s effectiveness, the Counterterror- ism Bureau concentrated all the data generated by this extensive network, as well as information from NYPD’s other databases, into one dashboard called the Domain Awareness System. The robust infrastructure the NYPD created to keep New

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES 3 “AQAP was specifically designated by Ayman Zawa- “To ensure a relevant and thorough understanding of hiri, the leader of Al Qaeda, as the Al Qaeda branch the shifting threat picture, the NYPD must work with assigned to attack the U.S. homeland. The recent its state and federal partners to coordinate resourc- instability in Yemen has allowed AQAP to establish es, share intelligence, and exchange analyses. The secure bases of operation in the south and east of Intelligence and Counterterrorism Bureaus’ staffing, the country.” structure and analytics provide the NYPD with a unique capability to quickly gather raw information • The third class of threat comes from and translate analysis into action.” the so-called “Lone Wolf” who may follow the doctrine or narrative of Al Qaeda, and decide to act alone on U.S. soil. Many of these of- Under Commissioner Bratton, the Intelli- fenders, such as Army Major Nidal Hassan, gence and Counterterrorism Bureaus have con- who carried out the Fort Hood attack, have tinued to improve intelligence gathering, analysis been inspired by Al Qaeda videos and the dissemination and quick response capabilities. preaching of spokesman like Anwar al-Au- In addition, the Department is reviewing and re- laqi. structuring its existing criminal intelligence col- lection and dissemination programs to make them “While ISIL lacks Al Qaeda’s built-in external opera- more effective. tions planning or “cells” of trained attackers, it has developed a complex network of tools that use online platforms for radicalization, recruitment and calls for As terrorist tactics strive to adapt to the NYPD’s countermeasures and to its federal part- attacks in the United States.” ner’s capabilities, a continued and expanded collaboration between NYPD and its federal partners • Syrian Civil War has also caused greater will keep the Department one step ahead of terror- instability in Iraq. A former Al Qaeda affili- ist operations. ate, ISIL, took advantage of this instability and used armed detachments to take and “The Intelligence and Counterterrorism Bureaus hold large swaths or territory in Syria and will facilitate a greater and more diverse group of Iraq. While ISIL lacks Al Qaeda’s built-in national and international relationships by hosting external operations planning or “cells” of informative, educational and professional develop- trained attackers, it has developed a complex network of tools that use online platforms for ment trainings with the NYPD’s state, federal and radicalization, recruitment and calls for at- international partners.” tacks in the United States. The NYPD is taking the opportunity to reset its collaborative relationships with local, state, and federal partners. The Intelligence and Coun- “COLLABORATIVE RESET”: terterrorism Bureaus recognize that expanding STRENGTHENING LAWFUL AND the amount of intelligence and analysis shared between the NYPD and its partners will greatly RESPECTFUL INTELLIGENCE increase both the Department’s and its partners’ understanding of the threats we face together. To OPERATIONS affirm and solidify this reset, the Intelligence and Counterterrorism Bureaus will facilitate a greater Just as terrorists rely on networks, public and more diverse group of national and interna- safety professions must maintain a cooperative tional relationships by hosting informative, edu- network among all the agencies – local, state, and cational and professional development trainings federal – charged with countering the terrorist with the NYPD’s state, federal and international threat. To ensure a relevant and thorough under- partners. The NYPD and its partners will share standing of the shifting threat picture, the NYPD their expertise, test their best practices and eval- must work with its state and federal partners to uate their lawful uses of technology through these coordinate resources, share intelligence and ex- expanded training opportunities and exercises. change analyses. The Intelligence and Counter- terrorism Bureaus’ staffing, structure and ana- “We will be working with community leaders to lytics provide the NYPD with a unique capability ensure that those who live in, work in and visit New to quickly gather raw information and translate analysis into action.

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES 4 York feel equally protected and respected by the “First, FIOs will identify the local drivers of violence intelligence gathering methods and counterterrorism and crime; second, FIOs, in coordination with public safety initiatives of the NYPD.” precinct commanding officers and other units, will develop strategies that mitigate or eliminate these The Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bu- drivers; and third, FIOs will have to ask and answer reaus will work with the Community Affairs Bu- questions about the crime trends they discern in reau and the Deputy Commissioner for Collabo- rative Policing to reach out and engage with the their respective commands.” many communities that make up New York. We will be working with community leaders to ensure • The Intelligence Bureau will design a clear that those who live in, work in and visit New York set of priorities and tasks for FIOs. These priori- feel equally protected and respected by the intel- ties and tasks will fall into three categories: first, ligence gathering methods and counterterrorism FIOs will identify the local drivers of violence and public safety initiatives of the NYPD. crime; second, FIOs, in coordination with precinct commanding officers and other units, will develop strategies that mitigate or eliminate these drivers; and third, FIOs will have to ask and answer ques- To further centralize the analysis conducted tions about the crime trends they discern in their by the Counterterrorism and Intelligence Bu- respective commands. Exemplary FIOs currently reaus, Deputy Commissioner Miller instituted perform all of these tasks, but such a system of the Police Commissioner’s Daily Briefing (PCDB). expectations for the FIOs had yet to be institution- The PCDB’s structure and purpose is modeled af- alized. ter the United States President’s Daily Briefing. The PCDB summarizes Field Intelligence Officer • The Intelligence Bureau will develop an inter- activity, city events, dignitary visits, major coun- nally transparent process that highlights enforce- terterrorism events outside of New York City and ment-related queries from all levels of the Depart- insightful analyses relevant to New York City ment and sets clear intelligence requirements for and events of interest. Just as the President’s the FIOs. When the criminal intelligence elements Daily Briefing is not restricted to the Command- of the Intelligence Bureau and patrol commands er-in-Chief only, the PCDB is provided to the high- work closely to develop these queries for the FIOs, est levels of the NYPD command staff, ensuring the answers will help the NYPD explain bor- that the executives leading possible first respond- ough-wide or citywide crime trends and conditions ers are equipped with the latest intelligence and that may have seemed mysterious previously. The have the highest degree of situational awareness. results of this analysis will be shared with patrol commanders and the highest levels of city govern- “To further expand the Intelligence Bureau’s criminal ment and allow for certain types of criminal activ- intelligence capabilities, Deputy Commissioner Miller ity to be accurately categorized and managed as part of wider crime trends. is expanding the successful elements of the Depart- ment’s Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) program.”

To further expand the Intelligence Bureau’s TRANSPARENT AND COMPREHENSIVE criminal intelligence capabilities, Deputy Com- missioner Miller is expanding the successful ele- COUNTERTERRORISM INITIATIVES ments of the Department’s Field Intelligence Of- ficer (FIO) program. Reporting to the Intelligence Bureau, 105 FIOs are assigned to precincts and With the goal of improving both the efficacy other commands across New York City. They and the transparency of the NYPD’s intelligence manage numerous confidential sources of infor- gathering and counterterrorism operations, Dep- mation and conducted over 1,500 controlled buys uty Commissioner Miller is reassessing and re- for guns, narcotics and stolen property in 2014. sourcing numerous programs with the purpose of The Intelligence Bureau intends to create a meth- securing New York for the long term. odology of intelligence gathering and analysis for FIOs that helps them quickly identify pertinent “The deputy commissioner assigned Intelligence Bu- intelligence gaps and fill them. reau personnel to draft an Intelligence Bureau Policy Guidebook (IBPG) that contains more detailed policy guidance relating to Intelligence Bureau policies, and practices.”

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES 5 The deputy commissioner assigned Intelli- of New York, NYPD officers must continue to de- gence Bureau personnel to draft an Intelligence velop and refine a similar skill set with respect to Bureau Policy Guidebook (IBPG) that contains terrorism. To achieve this capability citywide, the more detailed policy guidance relating to Intelli- Counterterrorism Bureau has launched a Coun- gence Bureau policies, and practices. terterrorism Officers Program to train patrol officers to function as counterterrorism officers or • The NYPD is developing an IBPG that is CTOs. The program is developing a cadre of police as transparent about intelligence procedures officers and detectives in each patrol command as practically possible. The Department has who can identify signs of possible terrorist activ- solicited the opinions and thoughts of a num- ity. These trained officers will act as a force mul- ber of New York’s civil rights organizations tiplier and help the NYPD quickly identify events and community leaders during the drafting and behaviors that are indicative of more sinister of the IBPG. activity.

• In order to facilitate a consistent bu- • The training program rotates through reau-wide understanding of the current rule each borough and trains roughly 20 to 30 offi- sets, the IBPG will be designed as a stable, cers across multiple commands in how to rec- but adaptable, document. As the nature of ognize warning signs of terrorist activity. The criminal activity and terrorism alters, guide- borough training sessions last two weeks. lines and procedures in the IBPG can be add- ed, revised or removed. Any future changes to • A select group of officers trained by the Intelligence Bureau policy and protocol will program was recently deployed to the Vet- be made, after appropriate review, directly to erans Day parade, where they provided an the IBPG. enhanced level of security for the event’s par- ticipants and viewers. The CTO program is “To improve the efficiency of the NYPD’s internation- now expanded into the Housing and Transit al intelligence capacity, Deputy Commissioner Miller Bureaus. has undertaken an internal review of the Intelligence “The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative’s (LMSI) Bureau’s overseas offices. The review will determine network of cameras and license plate readers, if the Intelligence Bureau’s resources are in the together with its radiological and chemical sensors, ‘right’ places and asking the ‘right’ questions.” is one of the most extensive IT security networks in To improve the efficiency of the NYPD’s inter- the world. The Counterterrorism Bureau will continue national intelligence capacity, Deputy Commis- to expand the range and capabilities of the LMSI sioner Miller has undertaken an internal review network.” of the Intelligence Bureau’s overseas offices. The review will determine if the Intelligence Bureau’s The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative’s resources are in the ‘right’ places and asking the (LMSI) network of cameras and license plate ‘right’ questions. The internal review will also an- readers, together with its radiological and chem- alyze the degree to which the intelligence shared ical sensors, is one of the most extensive IT secu- by the NYPD’s federal partners fully meets the rity networks in the world. The Counterterrorism Department’s needs. The conclusions of this re- Bureau will continue to expand the range and ca- view will lead to an appropriate resetting of the pabilities of the LMSI network. Intelligence Bureau’s resources.

“The Counterterrorism Bureau has launched a Coun- • The expansion of the LMSI network terterrorism Officers Program to train patrol officers of cameras to include sections of Brooklyn and Queens, and sensors outside of Lower to function as counterterrorism officers or CTOs. The Manhattan, will substantially increase the program is developing a cadre of police officers and Department’s ability to conduct investiga- detectives in each patrol command who can identify tions on high-threat locations and provide signs of possible terrorist activity. These trained enhanced situational awareness to first re- officers will act as a force multiplier.” sponders. • Expanding the network of cameras Just as New York police officers learn to iden- and license plate readers will also provide tify the signs of criminal activity on the streets crime-focused units and the NYPD Real Time Crime Center with an increasingly powerful investigative tool.

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES 6 The Domain Awareness System (DAS) merg- SECURING THE CITY es the various outputs of the LMSI network into one easily accessible dashboard. DAS is also equipped with other features that allow a user “The establishment of a Critical Response Command to query the NYPD Crime Data Warehouse. As will greatly enhance the NYPD’s ability to respond to the LMSI network is expanded, a primary objec- any attack that might occur, but the key to protecting tive of the Director of Planning and Policy in the Counterterrorism Bureau is to give every precinct the city will always be the our ability to detect and commander the additional tools and capabilities derail terrorists before they strike.” provided by DAS. The terrorism threat in New York City re- • Currently, almost every NYPD com- quires continuous vigilance and preparedness. mander has access to DAS Light, i.e., DAS The city remains a target of choice in the minds with just the Crime Data Warehouse capabil- of terrorists worldwide. The continuing threat of ity and without the ability to access cameras Al Qaeda, the emerging threat of ISIL and the and sensors. The Counterterrorism Bureau hard-to-detect threats from lone wolves all rep- has provided a fully operational version of resent challenges to protecting New York from DAS to the 1st Precinct as a pilot project. terrorism. The NYPD Counterterrorism and In- telligence Bureaus are working to counter these • As the Department’s broadband speed multiple threats. The establishment of a Crit- grows, the full DAS system will be offered ical Response Command will greatly enhance to more commands. Access to the full DAS the NYPD’s ability to respond to any attack that will be prioritized in the precinct commands might occur, but the key to protecting the city will deemed to contain the highest value terrorist always be the our ability to detect and derail ter- targets. rorists before they strike. In striving for this goal, the NYPD relies upon the experienced detectives “The deployment of smartphones to 35,000 police and FBI agents of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, officers with access to the DAS system will allow the trained personnel of the Critical Response the department to push any intelligence relating to Command, and our field intelligence officers and terrorism to all police officers immediately, in effect, CTOs stationed in precincts and commands across the city. We also rely upon our partnerships. The making every police officer part of the counterterror- Department is redoubling its efforts to open chan- ism program.” nels of communication with the many New York communities so we can work together to protect The deployment of smartphones to 35,000 the city we call home. police officers with access to the DAS system will allow the department to push any intelligence relating to terrorism to all police officers immediately, in effect, making every police officer part of the counterterrorism program.

IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM CAPABILITIES 7