Old Crows Conference
Electronic Warfare: The Forgotten Discipline: An Air Force Perspective
No successful outcome to combat is possible without Theintelligence essentiality and of communications, Electronic Warfare hence as thea fundamental universal definition of Electronicfactor in WarfareConflict thatResolution? defines EW as ‘military action that exploits electromagnetic energy, both actively and passively, to provide situational awareness and create Maj Gen Desoffensive Barker, SM, and MMM, defensive FRAeS, effects. MSETP (SAAF Rtd)
5 November 2019 European Airshow Council European Airshow Council: Jock Maitland RAF Paul Bowen Trophy (Belgium) CV Ceremonial Sword (Athens)
2011 Outstanding contribution to European 2018 Display Pilots Outstanding support to European Display Pilots (Energy losses in downline tumble manoeuvres) SETP European Flight Test Safety Award (Austria) 2018 Royal Aeronautical Society Honorary Fellow (London)
The world’s highest distinction for aerospace achievement awarded for only the most outstanding contributions to the aerospace profession. This honour is conferred on those whose careers, leadership, inspiration and impact marks them out as 2012 among the most eminent, widely Lockheed F-16/F-35 chief test pilot Billie Flynn recognised and influential SETP European Flight Test Safety Award aerospace professionals of their Maj Gen Barker (SAAF rtd).- Prototype Demo. generation. Anatomy of Airshow Accidents 663 pages/Research of 1365 airshow accidents and incidents: Chap 1. History of Airshows. Chap 2. Realities of Airshows. International Council of Airshows Chap 3. Statistical analysis. Chap 4. Airshow accident overview Chap 5. Litigation at Airshows. Chap 6. Pilot Incapacitation. Chap 7. Pilot Psyche.
Des Barker
2019-11-06 3 Recollections from a Test Pilot’s Logbooks
A History of Flight Testing in the South African Air Force
Des Barker African Geography
Portugal = Angola + Mozambique
Germany = South West Africa + Tanzania
Britain = South Africa + Botswana + S Rhodesia +N Rhodesia
• 1946 League of Nations supersession by the United Nations.
• South Africa refused to surrender its earlier mandate and U.N. General Assembly revoked it. 1918 • 1971 - International Court of Justice South West Africa issued "advisory opinion" declaring 5th Province South Africa's continued administration to be illegal. Angolan Border War • Angola vs Portugal gain independence/3- Way Power Sharing: • MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) Marxist organization - Holden Roberto. • FNLA (National From for Liberation of Angola) – Agostino Neto. • UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola) - Jonas Savimbi. • Soviet Union and USA competing ideologies Communism vs Capitalism. • Soviet/Chinese expansion into Africa
• USA training and aid to FNLA and UNITA. • Soviet Union training and aid to MPLA. • Angolan Civil War 11 Nov 1975 to 4 April 2002. • South West People’s Organisation SWAPO (PLAN) United Nations Security Council Resolution 191, 282 & 418
• 191/18 June 1964: vs Republic of South Africa condemned/separate development policy.
• 418/04 November 1977: Unanimous adoption mandatory arms embargo. • Embargo was tightened and extended by Resolution 591. • Ban had direct impact in following ways: • Last-minute cancellation of the sale of submarines by France. • Purchase of SAAR 4 Class missile boats from Israel. • Inability to purchase modern fighter aircraft to maintain balance of air power vs Cuban MiG-23s. • Termination of United States shipments of enriched uranium fuel for SAFARI-1 research nuclear reactor. RESULT: Growth of modern day multibillion-dollar South African arms industry. Historical EW Achievements Russian/Japanese War/1904. First EW applications - Russians jammed Japanese naval comms signals to correct naval gunfire at Port Arthur. WW1/1915. • Allied + Axis successfully conducted EW - communications jamming. • French and British vs German bombing operations - jammed and spoofed EM signals used by Zeppelins for navigation. WWII/1945. Major breakthrough - Allied + Axis Powers used EW to: • Attack radars. • Comms + Nav systems (Winston Churchill ‘Battle of the Beams’). Vietnam/1970. War in the “Fourth Dimension” – the turning point – doctrine and tactics – Wild Weasel/Prowler SOJ. Gulf War/1991. Every conflict since, military forces proven dominance of the EMSpectrum is crucial for most military operations. Electronic Warfare Angola 1960 - 1988 • Soviet/African expansionism– supported infiltrating liberation movements + Soviet air defence network based on Cold War doctrine and equipment - most comprehensive air defence system outside Cold War: • Early Warning + GCI radars combined with interceptors distributed strategically throughout Angola. • Long range SAMs/100 kms/80 000 ft. • Short range SAMs capable of engaging aircraft flying at low level and high speed. • Tracking, acquisition + missile guidance radars - wide frequency range - difficult to counter all effectively. • 3 different radar guided SAM systems (SA-3, SA-6 and SA-8), • 3 MANPADS (SA-7, SA-14 and SA-16) • 2 Vehicle mounted IR SAM systems (SA-9 and SA-13). • Disputed air space stretched 250 nm into Southern Angola. • Own radars only deployed in secure bases inside Namibia (Ondangwa). • Own radar detection 120 nm@10,000 ft/170 nms@20, 000 ft/200 nms@25,000 ft. • Angolan/Cuban forces full radar coverage from low level upwards over most of the region. • Own fighters only approx 2 mins combat fuel at that range. • Air superiority challenge = Substantial EW capability required - UN arms embargo prevented procurement abroad. Radar Coverage 1988
Barlock (E/F) Early Warning 217 nms at 25,000ft
Flatface (C) Target Acquisition Most sophisticated air defence system 155 nms (SA-3/6) outside of European Cold War
Low Blow (I/D) Fire Control
Sidenet Marconi S and L Band Height Finder Range 150 to 180 nms @ 25,000 ft
Spoonrest Early Warning 135 nms Order of Battle Alo III Gunship MiG-21
Bosbok Puma MiG-23 Cessna 185 Frelon SAM-3 Goa SAM-13 Kudu Gopher
C-130B SAM-6 Gainful + Impala Straightflush
SAM-7 Grail Canberra SAM-9 Strela C-160Z Buccaneer
SAM-8 Gecko Mirage IIICZ SAM-16 RPG-7 Mirage F1CZ/AZ Igla Anti-Aircraft Artillery
ZSU-23-4 Shilka + Gundish
ZSU-57-2
14.7 mm Losses Angola/SWA/Moz/Rhod: 1974 to 1989
22 Losses 12 Damaged 12 Accidents . 1 x Mirage F1AZ – SA-13 . 2 x Mirage F1AZ – SA-3 . 2 x Impala Mk II FIT . 5 x Impala Mk II - SA-7, . 1 x Mirage F1CZ – AA-8 . 1 x Impala Mk II Canopy AAA . 1 x Mirage III – SA-7 . 1 x Mirage F1AZ FIT . 1 x Bosbok – SA-8 . 1 x Impala Mk II – SA-7 . 1 x Puma Mech Fail . 1 x Cessna 185 –SA-7 . 1 x Impala Mk II – SA-9 . 1 x Puma Dust . 3 x RPV – SA-8 . 1 x DC3 – SA-7 . 1 x Puma Trooping . 1 x Kudu Engine . AAA . AAA . 1 x Alo III Wirestrike – 4 x Puma – AAA – 1 x DC4 – Small Arms . 1 x Alo III Engine – 1 x Mirage IIIR2Z – AAA – 1 x Puma – Small Arms . 1 x Alo III Antenna Strike – 1 x Canberra – Small Arms – 3 x Canberra Small Arms – 5 x Alouette – RPG, Small . 1 x C185 Takeoff Arms, Interesting Fact Kosovo 1999 – 38,000 sorties flown 24 March to 10 June (30% strike sorties).
700 SAMs launched – only 2 aircraft lost but no pilots. Battle Damage
8 June 1980 Mirage F1AZ – SAM 3 Capt I.C. Du Plessis Ruacana 21 May 1983: C47 SAM-7 Ondangwa
27 August 1981 Mirage IIICZ – SAM 7 Capt R. Keet Ongiva Ops Protea SAAF EW Assets 1975 - 1990
44 Sqn EW DC-4
VHF Rx Comms/Passive
VHF Directional Plotting Canberra Cenotaph 0.5 Mhz – 2 Ghz
CRWS First SAAF Sqn EW Suite 2 – 18 GHz a. CRWS b. Cenotaph Electronic surveillance Information analysis – manually. c. Chaff/Flare
Cenotaph Antenna 12 Sqn/CSIR RWR 3 Development
Spoonrest Radar
Dennis Milton & Bob Collins RWR 3 The display had 8 lamps to indicate Developmental Trials the direction of the radar detected
Two large omni-directional antennas were fitted in the existing wooden section of the Canberra’s tail. The Chaff Debacle
Military Airspace
Conformal Chaff Dispensers
168 Chaff Cartridges Standoff Jammer
Controllers CRWS + SOJ First SAAF Tactical EW Course 12 Squadron EW Patch
A ‘tactical EW course’ focussing was on the operational application of the on board EW equipment
Lecturers: Ad Sparius (University of Pretoria), Mossie Basson (SAAF) Gerrie Radloff. (SAAF) Lessons Learned: Doctrine & Tactics . Joint operations – inter service co-operation!!!! . Integrated, real time command and control – Computerised JAMPOT – force multiplication = 4 waves/day vs 2. . Intelligence – Photo, Visual, Electronic – JARIC – EW/Comint DC-4 – Canberra EW suite 0.5 Mhz to 18 Ghz. – Bosbok, UAVs, Impala, Canberra, Mirage IIIRZ, Buccaneer.
. Active and passive EW - chaff, flare, jammers, RWR. – Bikini Active Jamming Pods. – Radar Warning Receivers. – Missile launch warning. Bosbok IR Suppression – IR signature damping of exhausts on Choppers and Fixed Wing propeller aircraft to reduce SAM IR threat. Exhaust blanking
. Training of all personnel, discipline, professionalism, courage, bravery and skill. . Aggressive engagement and the use of smart tactics, initiative and technology. Engine hot spot blanking Divine Intervention: MiG 23 vs C-130 3 April 1986 Fighter Meet: 4 May 2019: • Eduard - Cuban MiG-23 pilot assigned to shoot down SAAF C130's SARH R-24R lock-on after launch capability - range on night resupply mission to UNITA, approximately 300 nms inside 50 km/height 82,000 ft) Angola. IR R-24T. Minimum range 500 m (1,600 ft) for rear- quarter engagement/vs aircraft maneuvering at up • Cuban Intelligence wise to low-level ingress supply drops at midnight to 7g. along the eastern Angolan border – parachute clothes. • Trap set by mobile radar into the area – intelligence/28 Sqn unaware. • MiG-23 armed with two missiles, one R-24R radar guided and one R-24T IR. • Crossed the cutline on routine 800 ft agl drop. • MiG-23 launched radar missile within parameters -15 kilometres - missile rogue, impact the ground. NO visual contact with C-130s. • Radar contact with C-130’s lost by Cuban mission control/RTB, mission control restablished contact with C130s egressing to the East.
• M1.3 interception 1.3 at about 3,000 metres, launched missile that Laubsher Reid passed between two engines on left wing of C-130. Barker
• PROXIMITY FUSE FAILED TO DETONATE THE Gagiano MISSILE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Eduard Piercy • Marc Binoux reported this huge flash that passed them, thinking it was a SAM 2 but of course, at 800 ft agl, it was highly unlikely. 60 Sqn Tanker/EW Strike Force
ELINT Receiver EW 60 Sqn Boeing 707
VHF Whip Ant COMINT + JAM
Comms Ant
SAAF EW Operators
UHF Blade Ant Jammer underfuselage for COMINT + JAM EW C-47 TP
ELINT Spinning DF Ant ELINT Ant
COMINT Ant Mirage F1AZ Passive Countermeasures
•Underwing Station #0 Chaff & Flare
Aida Ranging Radar Ventral Fin Flare Dispensers Laser Ranger Electronic Warfare: Active & Passive
•Underwing Station #0 Chaff & Flare
“Bikini” Pod ACS CARWS “Bikini” Pod ACS
Ventral Fin Chaff/Flare installation 1976: Mirage F1AZ
RIMS
Compact Radar Radar & Missile Warning System Launch Warning Controller Indicator
Bikini ACS Pod Cheetah D Technologies: Project Brahman
Flight Refuelling Radar Probe Ranging Canard
Chin Station Head Up Display
Chaff & Multi Flares Function Display Typical A/G Configuration: HOTAS 2 x V3B 4 x Mk 81/82 2 x RPK Fuel Drop Tanks MFCD/Tactical Situation Display
EW Suite: active and passive
Pulse Doppler radar/Digital FCR A/A + A/G Search, Search & Track While Scan modes Look down/shoot down
Short Range IR V3S – Snake + BVR missiles V4 LOAL/LOBL V4 Air-to-Air Missile
“Bishop” Cheetah C #344 TFDC Problem Definition (Operational) . Air Warfare Colleges Students at Staff, Chiefs of Staff Operations, and Squadron Commanders, all address modern conflict strategies from the perspective that all modern conflicts will have as fundamental, the capability to conduct Electronic Warfare in its various subdivisions and portfolios of – Electronic Attack (EA), – Electronic Protection (EP) and – Electronic Support (ES).
. Policy statements are integral to most defence force’s statements, but usually not backed up by provision of – budgets, – resources and – force preparation. Operational planners don’t really understand the collateral utility of electronic warfare as a . Reason, - electronic warfare is not ‘hard kill’ - directed energy weapons and lasers provide the means forcapability ‘hard kill’. enhancement and ultimately as a force survival benefactor.
. Increased budgetary constraints - focus on prioritizing ‘hard kill’ resources being available before electronic warfare subsystems
. Military forces embrace cyberspace focus area - develop new weapon systems to operate within these dimensions - unfortunately, African initiatives not embraced Electronic Warfare (EW). Problem Definition . New generation soldiers without exposure to operational reliance on ES.
. Primary focus in training is ability to conduct air combat and interdiction missions. – First priority is survive air combat, – Secondly, to inflict damage through air-to-ground missions – Insufficient emphasis on increasing survivability indices through EW.
. Electronic warfare on its own, will not prevent defeat against an enemy, but without EMS, the reverse is true, own forces may not be able to defend against an aggressive opponent. He who knows the inner thoughts of the adversary, has the strategic, operational and . Integratedtactical advantage application toof electronicdominate warfare the location, assets, timeair, ground and outcome and sea, ofis essentialthe battle. for jointIt is imperativewarfare. for operational planners to have a comprehensive understanding of the . Combat against implicationsan electronically of EWsuperior on a adversary, successful can mission be catastrophic. outcome.
. EW critical to modern operations – rapid revival to catch up with adversary advances.
. Smaller defence forces, EW section manned by dedicated specialists BUT operational planning level, there may not necessarily be EW specialists.
. Operational planning may invite ‘EW Specialist’ to planning team or only after the fact - ‘EW Specialist’ try to fit EW into plan instead of integration from concept design.
. Frustrated Ops Planning Team + EW specialist group - Ops Planning Staff not necessarily understand mutual benefits of EW to attack or defensive plan. Why has EW ‘Lost Its Shine?’
Iraq/Afghanistan/Libyan/Yugoslavia/Bosnia Conflicts (1990 to 2011) • Strategic - adversary EW threat limited + technologically unsophisticated comms/radars. • Tactical - electronic threats eliminated during opening phase of war by Coalition. • Coalition forces: • Employed EW to defeat remote-controlled IEDs using jammers. • Uninterrupted use navigational GPS + reliance Blue Force Tracker. • Coalition forces unhindered Command and Control. • Focus towards EW faded within NATO? • Policies, plans, doctrine slowly outdated. • EW training throughout NATO lost focus and EW skills atrophied. • Reduced tension between super powers - regression in EW prioritization - focus transferred to Cyber? • Has EW community been sucked into a comfortable region of decreased awareness? • Is Cyberwarfare a threat to EW or part of the total package? • Does this sound familiar to the RSA scenario? My Subjective Opinion/Answer • Cyberwarfare publicly accessible - dragged effort/resources away from traditional EW: • EW viewed as purview of high-end militaries • EW threat faded with the demise of the Soviet Union? Cyber: • Sabotage • Deny access to information • Destroy data • Disrupt crucial infrastructure • Espionage • Steal data. • Manipulate data to change context or perception. • Alternate warfare – hacking international resources viz finances/political. • NATO now reemphasized need against any emerging threat. • Russia and China significantly upgraded capabilities in EMS. • Eastern Ukraine, Russia used sophisticated jamming and interception tactics to undermine comms/surveillance drones. • Proliferation of commercial telecomms accelerated development of numerous capabilities. • Growth of commercial wireless market enabled many countries to operate within EMS. US DOD Prioritisation/Investment US Defense Department to boost investment in EW capabilities as it gears up for great power competition. • Congressional Research Service department seeks $10.2 billion for EMS capabilities in 2020. (U.S. Military Electronic Warfare Investment Funding: Background and Issues for Congress.) • Pentagon to increase: U.S. military must “win the battle for the airwaves.” New • EW projects. 2019 >$700 million more for EW projects than requested.investments in EW capabilities/CONOPS. • EW research DT&E funding 9.7% + procurement funding 7.1%, in 2020 relative to 2019. “It’s more than just a matter of • Boost EW spending by: buying things, but thinking through how we should • $1.48 billion in 2021 (16.3% increase), operate in the EMS as part of • $1.53 billion in 2022 (a 16.9% increase) multi-domain operations as well as the technologies we • $1.41 billion in 2023 (14.8% increase) should invest in.” • Total Defense Department expenditure plan: • $27.8 billion on procurement. • $25.8 billion on RDT&E.
•Gen.Adversaries Joseph investingDunford, heavily chairman in own of EW Joint capabilities, Chiefs of United Staff, States“EW is can’t the riskNo. falling 1 functional behind. area where investments need to be made in the coming years. Being in a position to achieve • China + Russia warfighting strategy, emphasizes ability to operate effectively in EMS. superiority in the electromagnetic spectrum is absolutely critical,” he said. Current EW Capabilities
SANDF has not adapted to the current reality and is mostly still “fighting” the (c)old war. Reasons being the lack of (EW) education and of course funding.
Gripen PS-05 Multi-Function Radar (Search, SAR, Track, Fire Control RWR (Radar ESM, ELINT)/2 - 40 GHz Electronic Protection (Chaff & Flare) EA (Self-protection jammer - 6 - 18 GHz Reconnaissance Pod (Electro-Optic) Targeting Pod (laser) Short range A2A IR missile Networked (Link ZA)
Hawk RWR (Radar ESM) - 2 - 18 GHz Chaff & Flare Networked (Link ZA)
Oryx Weather radar MAW (UV) Chaff & Flare
A109 MAW (UV) 1 a/c only Chaff & Flare
Lynx Ocean Eye Surveillance Radar DF Unit (S&R) - 30 - 525 MHz ELINT (6-18 GHz) Networked (Link ZA)
C-130 Weather radar MAW (UV) Chaff & Flare
Rooivalk RWR 2-18 GHZ/LWR Electronic Battlefield 2019
1. SATCOM 2. Electro Optical 3. Communications 4. Command Guided Missiles. 5. Radars Air/Ground a. Search b. Tracking c. Fire Control
6. Anti-Radiation Missiles 7. IR Missiles 8. Lasers limited. 9. Synthetic Aperture Radar 10. Chaff/Flares/Decoys 11. Jammers a. Active b. Passive 12. Data Links 13. GPS Where Are New Electromagnetic Battlefield Key Focus Areas? F-35 Unprecedented Battlefield Access
• F-35’s advanced stealth/built-in EW capabilities enable unprecedented battlefield access without dedicated EA aircraft. • Locate + track enemy forces • Jam radio frequencies • Disrupt attacks with precision • F"What-35 AESA we've radars/sophisticated done with the 5th EA, Generation including: [aircraft] is the computer takes all those sensory• False inputs, targets fuses it into information. The pilot sees a beautiful God's eye view of • Network what'sattack going on. [...] It's a stunning amount of information." • Advanced—Gen. Mike jamming Hostage, and algorithm Commander,-packed Air data Combat streams Command, U.S. Air Force • Penetrate well-defended targets and suppress enemy radars • AS1-239 system provides fully integrated radar warning, targeting support, self-protection, to detect and defeat surface and airborne threats. • SOJ for other aircraft - providing 10x ERP of any legacy fighter. • Can operate closer to threat (‘stand-in’) - jamming power multiples of any legacy fighter. • Survivability index: • electronic attack • electronic protection • situational awareness • advanced targeting F-35 Lightning Cockpit
BAE Systems Wins Major F-35 Electronic Warfare Upgrade Aug 21, 2019Steve Trimble | Aviation Week & Space Technology
EW multiyear $10 billion makeover of the Lockheed Martin F-35. Lockheed selected BAE Systems to upgrade Block 4 program ASQ- 239 electronic warfare/countermeasures subsystem. Has not yet achieved FOC - how many multi-billion $USD upgrades needed before FOC? Foresighting New Offensive/Defensive capabilities include:
. Multi-Domain Operations
. Hypersonics
. DIRCM ie high power microwaves capable of destroying electronic components.
. Lasers
. Artificial Intelligence
. Quantum computing
• Drones/Swarming - unmanned systems with EW weapons.
. JUCAV/X-45A
– “Blowfish” encryption algorithms
– “Honey Encryption” + quantum keys Russia Trials New EW Systems: Borisoglebsk-2 EW system
• New EW comprehensive protection/safe ‘vacuum’ space against UAS, airborne radar stations, radio-controlled land mines, cruise missiles (Russian MoD 10 June 2019). • Simultaneous deployment of the Krasukha, Zhitel, and Borisoglebsk ground- based EW systems.
• Each designed to target different elements of the electromagnetic spectrum.
• Conventional air defence engagements simulated: • RB-301B Borisoglebsk-2 system = tracked MT-LB - reconnaissance of ground and airborne radio communications then interference. • Krasukha - vehicles based on Kamaz-6350 truck to jam/suppress airborne radars AND the radio control channels of UAVs. • Krasukha-2 jams airborne warning and control systems (AWACSs) at ranges of up to 250 km + other airborne radars viz radar guided missiles. • Truck-based R-330Zh Zhitel system used to interfere with satellite communications + navigation systems + mobile phones within a 30 km The R-330BMV vehicle radius. is one of the elements of the Borisoglebsk-2 EW system. 6th Generation Fighters: Air Dominance USAF F-X (NGAD) Next Generation Air Dominance What is 6th generation fighter? • Next technological level - 5th-generation fighters viz Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning JSF: UCLASS • stealthy, • high-performance, • multi-role aircraft/high-speed data links to share information from sensors and avionics. • 5th gen fighters entering service Russia, China, and Japan - obsolete? • F-35 still in testing phase, US Pentagon looking at replacement. • France, Germany, Spain - build NGF to replace Eurofighter Typhoon, Panavia Tornado, and Dassault Rafale fighters. • France and Germany surrendered own efforts at building 5th-generation fighter in favour of skipping straight to 6th. • 9 countries working on a 6th-generation fighter either jointly. • USA - US Navy's F/A-XX - replace F/A-18E/F Super Hornet + complement the F-35C. • UCLASS unmanned aircraft + USAF F-X Next Generation Tactical Aircraft. Tempest • July 2018, Britain, shut out of NGF program, pursuing own 6th-generation fighter, Tempest, partnering with Sweden.
• Japan's Mitsubishi F-3, Russia's Sukhoi Okhotnik and Mikoyan MiG-41, and Taiwan's Advanced Defense Fighter. MiG-41 6th Gen Fighter Design Philosophy/2040?
• Several variants - land based, carrier based, VSTOL, multi-role combat. • Aerodynamics - large, flattish delta wing, single seater. • Single engine/advanced super-cruise design - greater emphasis on speed + payload to allow outrunning threats • Long range, less maneuverable - dogfights rare - most attacks over the horizon - ground bases and aircraft carriers need to be farther from the action. • Inflight auto-reconfig maximizing performance at high and low speeds. • Engines generating large amounts of electrical power for energy weapons. • EW Technologies: • Reduced radar profiles/vertical stabilizers and canards removed. • Radar-absorbent materials coatings. • IR obscuring technology to even out its temperature profile. • Advanced sensors counter to stealth technology.
• Stealth technology - reduced radar profiles - removing vertical stabilizers/canards, • Radar-absorbent materials coatings, 6th Generation Sensors & Armament
• Cockpits - few, physical instruments controls - Instruments - blank plastic surfaces change when pilot puts on helmet. • Surfaces and pilot flight suit covered with displays/controls that change instantly to suit a particular situation. • Operating by voice command, gesture, or a glance. • Pilot's helmet integrated into an array of cameras and sensors as integral part of the aircraft's skin. • Aircraft fuselage effectively invisible from the pilot's point of view - fuselage becomes transparent, so no blind spots. • Multi-spectral and radio-frequency sensors to connect with other aircraft, drones, ships, bases, and satellites – direct, real-time data link - directly wired into everything else. 2040 Battlefield
• Hypersonic missiles • Swarming • DIRCM • Data Fusion Future Active Countermeasures • Lockheed Martin + Boeing + Northrop Grumman, developing laser defense system against approaching AAM. • Self-Protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD) –anti missile active defense laser – auto targeted by high energy laser. • No evasive action by pilot – autonomous - SHiELD neutralise inbound threats. (Jeff Peer – Yom Kippur 1973) • Fitted to larger, less maneuverable AWACS/transport/tankers. • Active Laser: • Damage missile sensors (IR seeker) + navigation system. • Damage missile aerodynamics + missile’s FCS. Su-57 • Laser heat ignition of rocket fuel/explosive material = missile self-destruct in midair. • Russia + China developing long range AAM viz Vympel R-37M and PL-XX. Conclusions . Suffered regressed EW culture – NOT ‘HARD KILL’! – an afterthought!
. EW policies outdated.
. EW funding/budgets inadequate.
. BUT exponential growth of space/cyber technologies rely on EM signals = renewed sense of urgency to rebuild and recapitalize EW capabilities, both offensive and defensive.
. Increasing dependencies of modern military systems upon the EMS, commanders must understand the following: ‘EW has been a sleeping beauty, hidden away and forgotten for a generation.– EME an operationalNow it isenvironment a dragon MUST about support to EMO reawaken, while denying andits use SADC to the adversary. leaders who – continueBattlespace MUSTto ignore be used itsto conduct significance EW to attack do an adversary so at the while Alliance’s protecting own peril.’ forces.
. Essential/critical conduit for EW capabilities to exploit adversary EM signals for situational awareness, indications and warning, and targeting.
. SANDF and SADC nations must re-invest in modern EW capabilities, and build enough capacity in these capabilities to compete with peer competitors.
. Is there updated SANDF EW Doctrine? NATO is presently rewriting EW Doctrine + investigating how to operate in the EMS more effectively.
. Future considerations must examine the modern EW capability and doctrine requirements, along with how the SANDF can best catch up. Thank You!
Cheetah C - V3S TFDC JUCAV
X-45A, developed by DARPA/Boeing Company, is the first unmanned system designed from inception for combat missions. (David McNew/Getty Images)
DARPA Study Forecasts New Encryption Ending Intelligence Surveillance by CHRISS STREET August 20, 2019 Updated: August 20, 2019
DARPA Projects Agency forecasts U.S. intelligence’s communication surveillance capabilities are “Going Dark” as AI + quantum computing move toward true “end to end encryption.”
DARPA and Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism reported smartphones and servers with powerful processors applying and keys limiting FBI and U.S. intelligence community access to communications. Within five years, “Honey Encryption” + quantum keys will end FBI’s surveillance capabilities, <10 years. U.S. national secrets and personal privacy will be substantially enhanced; bad news that state actors, criminals and terrorists will be able to communicate without concerns the U.S. intelligence community is listening and watching. But China’s quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI) effort is suspect.
CIA, NSA and the U.S. military employing the full portfolio of high-tech signals intelligence (SIGINT) tools to hunt down low-tech insurgents and terrorists, neighboring China intelligence services through observation and espionage gained the knowledge to hone an arsenal of highly- competitive “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (AA/AD) SIGINT tools. 2016 Pentagon acknowledged emergence of power threat from China + Russia by launching its Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) that for the first time added cyberspace to land, sea, air and space as one of 5 domains of war.
The new Trump administration moved quickly in 2017 to integrate operations across all five domains and began applying AI applications to military operations by launching the Algorithmic Warfare Task Force—the parent of Project Maven and the predecessor of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center.