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Georgian Nationalism: A Deeper Historical Focus

By: Joshua Hodil

The hills of Georgia are covered by the night; Ahead Aragva runs through stone, My feeling's sad and light; my sorrow is bright; My sorrow is full of you alone, Of you, of only you... My everlasting gloom Meets neither troubles nor resistance. Again inflames and loves my poor heart, for whom Without love, 'tis no existence.

—On the Hills of Georgia, Alexander Pushkin1

1 Alexander Pushkin, “On the Hills of Georgia,” trans. Yevgeney Bonver (1995), ed. Dmitry Karshtedt (1996), http://www.poetryloverspage.com/poets/pushkin/hills_of_georgia.html. Hodil 2

Contents

Introduction: Georgia’s Recent Situation and its Historical Foundations

Historiography

Chapter 1: The Georgian Nation in a State Reunited

Chapter 2: Defending Georgia in Defense of the Empire

Chapter 3: Salvation from Internal Implosion

Chapter 4: An Administrative Path towards Georgian Advancement

Conclusion: Nationalism, an Ever-changing Challenge

Bibliography

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Georgia’s Recent Situation and its Historical Foundations

“They don’t recognise our borders, they don’t recognise our government, they don’t recognise the ceasefire. The Russians have just deployed missiles 40 km away, enough to destroy this place 20 times over. This is not just a performance, it’s a big issue.” —Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia2

On August 7th 2008 the worst fears of the Georgian nation came true. An armed conflict began with their superpower neighbor to the north, Russia. Focused on the region of South

Ossetia, this miniature war raged for 11 days, a truly David versus Goliath effort as Russia imposed its will on the much smaller Georgia. In that fateful time, surely every former Soviet

Republic saw in this small Caucasian state’s struggle the possibility of a Russian military incursion on their soil. The worst nightmare of countries from Estonia to Ukraine to Tajikistan unfolded before their very eyes: military invasion if subservience to Moscow was not maintained. Russia already forced its will on these former Soviet republics by cutting off gas supplies or demanding unfair trade agreements; however, an actual threat to physical sovereignty, which Georgians see this incident as, seemed an impossibility. Yet, harkening back to the old days when Soviet tanks rolled into Prague or Budapest to maintain Moscow’s power, the breach of Georgia’s borders made this threat all too real.

What brought this war down upon the Caucasus? Not disregarding Ossetian national interests, which certainly played a major role in the strife, one will note that Russia’s wish to maintain historical hegemony in the region conflicts with Georgia’s strong national identity.

This national spirit took affront to Russia’s economic and political coercion since the fall of the

Soviet Union, straining against these thralls and reaching out towards the West and

2 “Mikheil Saakashvili: ‘The land they took is rocky. Its only use is for attacking us,’” The Independent, February 15, 2011, accessed March 3, 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/mikheil-saakashvili-the-land- they-took-is-rocky-its-only-use-is-for-attacking-us-2215085.html. Hodil 4 realignment away from Moscow. Here the question becomes more difficult: how did Georgia, which lived under Russian rule for nearly 200 years, develop such a strong national character? It could be argued that Georgia’s nationalism took shape at the fall of the Russian Empire and would have flowered into an independent state if it weren’t for the rise of the USSR. It would logically follow, then, that the recent episode of violence between these two nations is a backlash against a continuation of Soviet oppression that kept Georgian nationalism in check.

President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia echoes this sentiment, stating “this Empire-something we thought was a corpse-has started to revitalize, because it was not completely buried and it is now trying to seize through ugly forms those parts that used to be the Soviet Union previously.”3 While this is certainly a valid argument, well founded in the events and circumstances of the Soviet period, it ignores a deeper history that precedes Lenin and the

Russian Revolutions of 1917.

A century before the Bolsheviks seized control of power and formed the Soviet Union, the birth of Georgian nationalism took place under the reign of the tsars. The Russian Empire, its military actions and political agents all played a role in the creation of this concept of a

Georgian nation. Without understanding the historical processes and circumstances that brought this about, one cannot truly understand the conflicts today. Of course, this raises a perfectly logical question: what role could the Russian Empire have possibly played in the birth of Georgian nationalism? After all, the goal of the tsars was to ensure imperial power and

3 “Saakashvili: Soviet Era is Over in Georgia,” Civil Georgia, May 6, 2010, accessed March 20, 2011, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22269. Hodil 5 therefore disallow any fractious national movement that threatened cohesion between the

Russian center and its periphery.

Before answering this perfectly valid inquiry, one must gain a sense of the term nationalism. Benedict Anderson states that nationalism and all of its corresponding vocabulary

“have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyse.”4 National communities, either real, or (as Anderson posits) imagined, however, require defining guidelines, such as language, kinship, or tradition. Though certainly not the only facet of his study, the concept of equating nation, state, and people, Eric Hobsbawm postulates, “undoubtedly linked nation to territory.”5

Therefore, returning to the above question, one must reply that several factors coalesced during the early and mid-19th century that helped birth Georgian nationalism, not the least among them being the physical unification of the disparate Georgian lands. Prior to Russian annexation, Georgia was divided into various petty kingdoms, some self-governing and others under the sway of the Persian or Ottoman Empires. Though nationalism is a complex idea requiring many preconditions, one of the most important elements is the gathering of all the lands of a nation of people into one country. This does not preclude the possibility of nationalism preceding geographical unity, such as in the case of Germany, where strong national sentiment led to the amalgamation of the German states. The drawing of ethnic and physical boundaries along the same lines, however, is supposed to create a state with a uniform identity and in this manner, one can argue, the modern Georgian nation came into being.

Though not theoretically perfect due to the large numbers of less numerous peoples (Abkhaz,

4 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 3. http://quod.lib.umich.edu.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed December 25, 2010). 5 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 19. http://quod.lib.umich.edu.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed January 2, 2011). Hodil 6

Ossetians, etc.), it included, “the Russian state was able in the first decades of the nineteenth century to ‘gather’ the Georgian lands and establish over them a single political authority.”6

While its chief purpose in obtaining Georgian territory, lying both in the Caucasus and

Transcaucasia beyond them, was not the promotion of that region’s nationalism, the fact remains that, without the Russian army, the modern state of Georgia would not exist. It is important to stress that the acquisition of Georgia was by no means a singular event that simultaneously placed all Georgians under St. Petersburg’s rule. After the annexation of all

Transcaucasia, however, the Russian administration divided the region into distinct units for the sake of streamlining bureaucracy. This included one centered on Georgian lands with Tbilisi as its capital. This was the first building block of Georgian nationalism. With the majority of its people united in one territory, Georgia was primed to create an independent identity.

Almost in concert with this process of unifying the Georgians in one state, the Russian

Empire undertook the arduous task of defending its new subjects from powerful foreign foes in the form of the Ottoman and Persian Empires. Through much of their history, the various

Georgian kingdoms faced external domination from their neighbors to the south. From the

Byzantines to the string of Muslim empires that succeeded them, pressure remained constant on Georgian rulers to defend their own rule from such invaders. In fact, the weight of foreign invasion was so great that Georgia was bound to bow before it. The Persians and Ottomans divided up Georgia, ruling some of its lands directly, while allowing others to maintain some autonomy in return for sworn fealty.7 With the introduction of the Russian military into the

6 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 64. 7 Ibid, 55. Hodil 7 region in the 18th and 19th centuries, these Muslim empires no longer commanded the loyalty of Georgia. Viewing the Ottomans as political and economic enemies and with a stated goal of saving the region from “Asian barbarism,” Russian rulers from Catherine the Great onwards sent ever increasing numbers of Russian troops to the Caucasus.8 Thus St. Petersburg gradually wrested supremacy in the region from the Muslim empires to the south and Georgia found a new, if no less manipulative protector.

Though it may seem easy to blame foreign enemies for the initial division of the medieval Georgian kingdom, they were not alone in keeping Georgia divided. Before the introduction of Russian administration, the Georgian kingdoms were firmly controlled by their relatively large nobility. These noble families ruled with absolute authority on their own lands and often extended their reach to police and judicial power, keeping Georgia in a semi-feudal political state.9 The largest families dominated politics, church life, and the economy, never thinking to use their power to further their nation, but rather to extend their dominance. With the institution of Russian rule, the Georgian nobles were forced to conform to the Russian standard for its nobility. They could no longer rule their petty kingdoms and estates with absolute power, because such singular authority was reserved for the tsar and wielded by his political representatives throughout the empire. The imperial administrators now ruled Georgia and the oppressive manner in which the Georgian nobles lorded over their subjects, lands, and church undermined the authority of these administrators. Though Russian standards of free society were still comparatively low, this opened up Georgian society, freeing the lower nobility, the clergy, and the merchants from the thrall of the highest ranking families. The

8 Michael Rywkin, Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917, (London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1988), 153. 9 Suny, Georgian Nation, 65. Hodil 8

Russians also instilled in the Georgians the concept of “Europe” by introducing European social advancements such as emancipation and constructing schools, theaters, and other institutions along Russian lines, which had in turn been adopted from the West. This came as no surprise, given the fact that Russia needed local alliances to maintain its power in the region. If the

Georgians could be considered “European” and their nobility co-opted seamlessly into Russian high society, Russia could gain a powerful regional ally which it could play off of its more unruly subjects in the Caucasus. While this argument opens up an array of questions regarding Russia’s

Orientalist sentiments, the fact remains that “the annexation manifesto of 1801…promised the

Georgian nobility that it would receive the same status as Russian nobles.”10 The side effects of this Europeanization of Georgia and its people included the introduction of western ideas and concepts, such as modern nationalism, via the imperial academies. Educated Georgians, such as

Ilia Chavchavadze, could now think of themselves in the terms of the European nation-state, albeit under Russian dominion.11 The question then becomes whether or not the mere introduction of this abstract idea of nationalism was enough to spur the Georgians to action.

Perhaps the most successful method for the abovementioned reining in and

Europeanization of the Georgian nobility entailed employing them in the new Russian administration. While many in the Russian administration viewed this as ludicrous and possibly dangerous, given prior rebellious confrontations with semi-autonomous subject nations (like the Polish), the concept of utilizing Georgians to govern their own lands quickly became popular

10 Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, trans. Alfred Clayton (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 176. 11 Ilia Chavchavadze, Ilia Chavchavadze Works, Trans. by Marjory and Oliver Wardrops (Tbilisi: Ganatleba Publishers: 1987), 5, http://www.nplg.gov.ge/dlibrary/collect/0001/000099/Ilia%20works.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011), 13. Hodil 9 with some of the more successful plenipotentiaries of the region.12 In the earlier stages of

Russia’s conquest of Georgia, the administration of the region remained strictly in the hands of the military, leading to authoritarian governance. This was, of course, predictable given the unstable situation in the Caucasus in the first 30 years of its occupation by Russian troops. For it was precisely that, an occupation, due to the military threats that limited the administration.

The main goals of the governor general were to protect the Georgian Military Highway, safeguard his troops, and secure the border against Persian or Turkish incursions. To achieve these things, local leaders were forced into peace with Russia, those that refused made to capitulate, and any revolt “ruthlessly crushed.”13 Naturally, under such circumstances the local populace lost most, if not all, say in the administration of their lands. The need to maintain order and security, however, did not necessitate the oppressive reigns of some of the Russian military leaders. Men such as Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich (1827-31) and Evgenii Aleksandrovich

Golovin (1838-42), sought only to integrate Georgia and the other Transcaucasian states as quickly as possible into the central Russian administration.14 Using methods of russification, these men refused to work within the local framework, instead imposing an imperial dominance that was altogether foreign. Given the widespread unpopularity of forcing the

Russian language on Georgians in an official capacity, the loss of the Georgian Orthodox

Church’s autocephalous existence, and other processes of required assimilation, such leaders

12 Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 247. The Congress Kingdom of Poland rebelled against Russian rule from 1830- 31. 13 Nicholas K. Gvosdev, Imperial Policies and Perspectives towards Georgia, 1760-1819 (Wiltshire: Antony Rowe Ltd, 2000), 105-106. 14 Suny, Georgian Nation, 72. The years in parentheses here (and elsewhere) following the names of particular Caucasian leaders refer to the timespans of their control over the region. Hodil 10 were met with discontent and even hostility. Indeed many uprisings resulted from the failing of

Russian generals to understand and cope with local conditions, such as in Guria in 1841.15

Some Russian military governors found success in Georgia, however, upon the realization that only pragmatic policies would garner support in the Caucasus. While certainly not the first (or the last) such general, from 1816-1827 Aleksei Ermolov perhaps best set this path for future Russian governors. According to his own account, upon his arrival in Tbilisi he busied himself with righting past governmental abuses and reforming the administration.16 His efforts to cooperate with locals created a “balance between customary patterns of life and the requirements of Russian imperial uniformity,” endearing him to the Georgian populace.17

Though direct employment of locals by him was limited due to the military nature of his administration, Ermolov opened up relations with the Georgians and other indigenous peoples, paving the way for their future compatriots to gain access to the administration of their country. His success did not go unnoticed, as one of the most dynamic figures in Georgian history followed in his example by instituting pragmatic policies. This was none other than the first Russian Viceroy of Transcaucasia, Prince Michael Semyonovich Vorontsov (1844-54).

Vorontsov, like Ermolov a hero of the Napoleonic wars, assumed his role as plenipotentiary in

Transcaucasia in 1844 and quickly built on the practical foundations of Ermolov and another like-minded general, Pavel Dmitriyevich Tsitsianov. It was under Tsitsianov that Vorontsov received his first taste of Caucasian and Georgian life, serving as a young officer under the

15 Ibid, 73. Guria is a region of Western Georgia. 16 Alexey Yermolov, The Czar’s General: The Memoirs of a Russian General in the Napoleonic Wars, trans. Alexander Mikaberidze (Bodmin: Ravenhall Books, 2005), 221. 17 Suny, Georgian Nation, 69. Hodil 11 former’s reign in that region.18 Keeping in mind the successful models of governing used before him, Vorontsov readily employed Georgian nobles and locals, seeing in them not subjects to be forcibly russified, but rather resources to be used. Vorontsov disliked “superficial imposition of

Russian-looking forms” which brought only disunity to a land which he sought to govern effectively.19 By enlisting the aid of Georgians, he could more easily work within local politics and smooth the way for Russian rule.

For the Georgians, this access to the administration opened up the realm of modern political leadership to them. With representation in commissions and courts, they could begin to work for the betterment of their country within the framework of Russian rule. This gradually morphed into a form of nationalism in which Georgians could lobby for the rights of their nation without directly rebelling against St. Petersburg. Of course, one cannot look at Ermolov and Vorontsov and label them active agents of Georgian nationalism. They were loyal servants to the tsar and their chief goal was the effective establishment of Russian rule in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Though the opportunities they provided to Georgians in their respective administrations helped open the path to the birth of Georgian nationalism, they in no way intended to plant the sentiments of eventual self-autonomy. This development was simply a byproduct of their pragmatic policies and practical actions. Regardless, the opportunity of

Georgian participation in government and the relatively open-minded environment they provided allowed for the embryonic stages of national sentiment to take shape.

18 Anthony L.H. Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov: Viceroy to the Tsar (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 15-16. 19 Ibid, 157. Hodil 12

Thus this logical progression from physically unifying Georgia, to protecting it from external threats, to Europeanizing its nobility, to opening administrative opportunities to the locals illustrates how the Russian Empire aided in the birth of Georgian nationalism. While

Russia never intended to undermine its own authority, one can see in each of these circumstances how imperial actions and actors inadvertently set the stage for Georgia to realize its national potential. A detailed exploration of these conditions will reveal how this foundation of the Georgian nation-state influenced later nationalist efforts, revolutionary movements, and the creation of the Georgian state as it exists today.

Historiography

“In the half century from the Russian annexation of eastern Georgia (Kartli-Kakheti) to the outbreak of the Crimean War, Transcaucasian society was irreversibly transformed. The effects of the Georgian metamorphosis were as fundamental and profound as those of the contemporary political and industrial revolutions in Western Europe.” —The Making of the Georgian Nation, Ronald Grigor Suny20

The general historiography concerning the Russian Empire’s relations with Georgia is relatively young. Though Russian and Georgian language studies on this region are more thorough, material discussing Georgia in English is sparse when compared with the broad spread of material available for its neighbor, Russia. A comprehensive text on Georgian history was not available in English until W.E.D. Allen’s A History of the Georgian People in 1932.21

Thirty years passed before David Marshall Lang took up the study in depth again, publishing

20 Suny, Georgian Nation, 63. 21 W.E.D. Allen, A History of the Georgian People: From the Beginning Down to the Conquest in the Nineteenth Century (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & co., ltd., 1932). Hodil 13 several works on Georgian history from the late 1950s until the 1970s.22 Ronald Grigor Suny released the most recent encompassing text with regards to this scholarship in the form of The

Making of the Georgian Nation in 1988 and again in 1994.23 Despite the exhaustive work these three men have accomplished in their studies, the amount of material available discussing

Georgian history, including the 19th century on which this study focuses, is relatively slim. Still, they provide evidence of Russian influence in the inception of nationalism in Georgia, particularly Suny in his exploration of the imperial period. The most current developments in the field are comparative studies, exploring Georgia mainly through either the Orientalist school of thought (prevalent in St. Petersburg in imperial times) or the military struggle with the mountain people (gortsi), such as the famed rebel Shamil.

Thus on one hand today’s scholarship deals with the intellectual representations of the

Caucasian peoples, including their usefulness to the empire, and on the other the strategic and cultural causes and outcomes of the prolonged struggle for supremacy in the Caucasus. It is through these lenses that the scholar, wishing to incorporate the prevailing strains of research, must look for evidence regarding Russia’s hand in the creation of Georgian nationalism. Edward

Said described Russian Orientalism in a secondary nature, compared to the British, French, and

American colonial powers. However, his definition of orientalism as a “way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience”24 still holds true for the tsarist empire. Indeed this concept is readily found in Schimmelpennink van der Oye’s Russian Orientalism, which deals with the creation of this school of thought,

22 David Marshall Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658-1832 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957); A Modern History of Georgia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962); The Georgians (New York: Praeger, 1966). 23 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). 24 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 1. Hodil 14 supported and molded by the government, and the general attitudes of Russians towards the border peoples of the empire. It follows the ever deepening division in society between East and West, showing how Russians “became conscious of Asia as a separate continent when they began to regard themselves as European under Peter the Great.”25 The question of where the mental divide between Asia and Europe was placed on the physical landscape of Russia greatly affected the perception of the empire’s minority peoples, including the Georgians. Austin

Jersild, in his Orientalism and Empire, explores the Russian bid for military supremacy in the region and its attempt at melding the Caucasus with the rest of the empire. Jersild sides with neither the positive views held by 19th century Russian scholars of imperial expansion nor the decidedly negative ones held by Soviet and other 20th century Russianists of what they deemed ravenous conquest. He explores the complexity of inter-ethnic relations which “frequently blurred the boundaries between foreign and domestic policy.”26 Within such relations, the

Georgian nation was born and nurtured. Both of these works, though not specifically focusing on the creation of Georgian nationalism, give insight into the governmental processes that took place in 19th century St. Petersburg with regards to the Caucasus.

Beyond these more abstract works, several pieces have been written on specific historical figures involved in the Russian Empire’s affairs with Georgia. Anthony Rhinelander provides a detailed portrait of Michael Vorontsov, the first viceroy of Transcaucasia, in Viceroy to the Tsar.27 By delving into Vorontsov’s personal correspondence he uncovers the manner in which this remarkable general managed his administration and gained favor with the local

25 David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the Emigration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 224. 26 Austin Jersild, Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the Georgian Frontier, 1845-1917 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 7. 27 Anthony L.H. Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov: Viceroy to the Tsar. Hodil 15

Georgians. Coupled with General Alexei Ermolov’s memoirs in the Alexander Mikaberidze translated work entitled The Czar’s General, one begins to understand how those leaders who cooperated with the Georgians, rather than attempting to russify them, found success.28 From the Georgian perspective, the personal memoirs of Ilia Chavchavadze provide invaluable insight on how his country’s nobles worked within the imperial framework to create a sense of

Georgian nationalism.29 These specific instances of Russian administrative savvy and cunning

Georgian leadership are put into perspective by Dubrovnin’s massive 19th century tome entitled

The History of the Russians War and Power in the Caucasus, which covers the broader history of the region under Russian rule.30

Perhaps the most invaluable resource when studying any aspect of Georgian history is

Suny’s The Making of the Georgian Nation, a rare direct analysis of the creation of the Georgian nationalist movement. It gives a complete historical overview of this nation, including a detailed section regarding Russian rule. In this work, Suny broaches the idea of imperial Russia aiding in the formation of Georgian nationalism, noting the unification of the Georgian kingdoms and the

Europeanization of the Georgian nobles due to Russian conquest. These ideas serve as springboards for researching the topic of modern Georgia’s birth and the role Russia played in it. Indeed, when combining these various historiographical strands, it becomes readily apparent that the land of the tsars played an integral part in the rise of Georgian nationalism. By applying these sources to the aforementioned progression of events, Russia’s capacity as the facilitator

28 Alexey Yermolov, The Czar’s General: The Memoirs of a Russian General in the Napoleonic Wars, trans. Alexander Mikaberidze. 29 Ilia Chavchavadze, Ilia Chavchavadze Works, Trans. by Marjory and Oliver Wardrops. 30 Nikolai Dubrovnin, Istoriia Voiny I Vladychestva Russkikh Na Kavkaze: Tom 1-4 (Saint Petersburg: 1871). Hodil 16 of this nationalistic birth becomes clear, beginning with the reunification of Georgian lands into one consolidated state.

The Georgian Nation in a State Reunited

“It towered so vast above petty human creation, so elemental in a man-made world, that even if all the men who had lived in all the past millennia had opened their arms as wide as they could and carried everything they had ever created or intended to create and piled it all up in massive heaps, they could never have raised a mountain ridge as fantastic as the Caucasus.” —August 1914, Alexander Solzhenitsyn31

Lying in and around these majestic mountains, Georgia today, with the exception of Ossetia and Abkhazia, possesses clearly defined borders, demarcating the extent of its sovereignty.

These very borders are at the center of the current political strife between Georgia and its behemoth northern neighbor, Russia, leaving the former to claim grievance for the violation of its dominion. Such an incursion is an affront to the Georgian nation, threatening its stability and very existence. Yet, how Georgia came by such national borders sheds an interesting new light on the 2008 South Ossetia War. It is true that the exact politics that provided for partial South

Ossetian autonomy and divided the ethnic majority of Georgians of this region from their homeland occurred during the Soviet era.32 The creation of the modern Georgian state, however, dates further back to imperial times and Russia’s first struggle to gain the Caucasus.

Only through the force and cunning of the tsars and their administrators was the medieval

Georgian kingdom forged anew into the nation-state as it exists today. Benedict Anderson describes in his Imagined Communities how European powers employed cartography of newly

31 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, August 1914, trans. Michael Glenny (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), 1. 32 Jonathan Wheatley, “Managing Ethnic Diversity in Georgia: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,” Central Asian Survey 28, no. 2 (June 2009): 121, http://web.ebscohost.com.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed April 5, 2011). Hodil 17 conquered lands to justify the extension of their rule which they inherited (by force or not) from previous local dynasties.33 He continues by delineating how such a geographical representation became a powerful symbol of nationalism for subject areas. In the 18th century the Russian Empire, no exception to the European model, saw the creation of maps by men such as J.N. Deslisle that defined the Caucasus, in which it would be so intimately involved.34

For the Russians this was meant to facilitate incorporation, but for the Georgians such physical interpretations eventually gave them the boundaries of their modern nation-state.

Centuries before the advent of Russian soldiers and administration, the Georgian nation formed into a state in the manner of a feudal kingdom. Prior to this, the region was caught between Rome and the Sassanid Persian Empire, trapping the disjointed principalities of what would become Georgia in the border politics of both realms which sought to expand their ascendency into the Caucasus. Thus Western Georgia (Lazica) and Eastern Georgia (the kingdom of Kartli-Iberia) came under the respective sways of the Romans and Persians, with the former a province of the empire since the conquest of Pompey and the latter a vassal state to the Persian Great King in Ctesiphon.35 It is interesting to note that, almost presaging the 18th century request for Russian protection against Ottoman and Muslim Persian incursions, these petty kingdoms called upon the aid of the heir of Rome, the Byzantine Empire, to secure themselves against the Zoroastrian Sassanians of old. Though the inception and expansion of

Islam brought a new political actor onto the regional scene (the Arabs), the dynamic in the

33 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 175. 34 W.E.D. Allen, “Two Georgian Maps of the First Half of the Eighteenth Century,” Imago Mundi: The International Journal for the History of Cartography 10 (1953): 99, http://www.jstor.org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed December 25, 2010). 35 Suny, Georgian Nation, 23-24. Hodil 18

Caucasus remained the same: the small kingdoms in what is now known as Georgia remained divided and heavily influenced by their larger neighbors. The continuance of this disunity was halted, however, by the rise to power of David of Tao, who combined the crowns of Abkhazeti

(Western Georgia), Kartli-Iberia, and Tao under his rule. Though the Byzantines still largely influenced the politics of the region, Suny notes that, “for the first time since the coming of the

Romans the two principal parts of Georgia were united,” under the rule of David’s heir, Bagrat

III.36

While modern Georgian nationalists would point to this era as a foundation for their nation-state, they must reckon with the fact that the united Georgian kingdom was a tenuous and fleeting entity, surviving ever at the whim of greater forces and often rocked by power struggles within its own borders. Though medieval Georgian power did not peak until the reigns of David II the Rebuilder (1089-1125) and Queen Tamar (1184-1213), it was clear that, given the immense power wielded by the nobility and the ever increasing external pressures, this kingdom in the mountains could not be maintained in a unified whole. “The Mongols put an end to the Golden Age” of Georgia and, over the course of the late middle ages, the power of the Georgian king disintegrated.37 The state fell once again into a rabble of various petty dynasties which looked to foreign support for protection. After centuries more of Muslim subjugation at the hands of a succession of Islamic empires, some of the Georgian noble families began to seek aid elsewhere, looking north to the Christian empire of Russia, which itself was blossoming under the influence of the West and enlightenment. In 1783 King Erekle II

36 Ibid, 32 37 Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 172. Hodil 19 of Kakheti and Kartli (Eastern Georgia) placed himself under the protection of Russia, then ruled by Catherine II the Great. Though little actual protection was afforded to Erekle, the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Georgia led the empire “to a much greater degree of involvement in the affairs of the southern Caucasus.”38 From this point onward, the tsar in St.

Petersburg looked to Georgia with ever increasing interest in the greater game of imperial politics with the Ottomans. Though Catherine failed to obtain lasting power in the region, her political legacy, which saw Georgia as the key to power in the Caucasus, laid the groundwork for those that followed her on the Russian throne.39

The aforementioned failure to actually support Erekle II comes as an extension of the previous era’s politics in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Russia, not unlike the Byzantines and the Persians before them, wished to control the region in order to vie with neighboring empires. The simple fact that Russian troops entered this arena was enough to satisfy the end of proving Russia’s status as a political player in the area and the actual protection of the

Georgians was not a necessity. Regardless of this notion, “Erekle nonetheless maintained that only the Christian Russian Empire could offer his kingdom a secure future” and continued to lobby for support from St. Petersburg.40 Catherine’s descendants took her weak incursion into the Caucasus to a new level, however, wishing to solidify hegemony in the region as a means of obtaining actual political power. With the Caucasus secured (and Georgia as its leading province and capital), Russia could drive ever further against its perennial foes, the Ottoman and the

Persian Empires. In the process the Russians established a unified and stable Georgia, bringing

38 Rywkin, Russian Colonial Expansion, 159. 39 Ibid, 168. 40 Stephen F. Jones, “Russian Imperial Administration and the Georgian Nobility: The Georgian Conspiracy of 1832,” The Slavonic and East European Review 65, no. 1 (January, 1987): 54, http://www.jstor.org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed December 25, 2010). Hodil 20 all of the various lands that the medieval kingdom once possessed under a single ruler again.

This, however, was not a singular process; it required many decades to establish and faced constant counter incursions from the Muslim empires and raids from the ever daring mountain peoples of the Caucasus. The first tsar to truly undertake the process of incorporating Georgia into the Russian Empire was none other than Catherine’s son, Paul I, who, though ruling for only a short time, confirmed the status of the Georgians as protected by the Russians. Upon the request of King Giorgi, Paul stated “the lands of the Georgian tsardom were accepted as direct subjects of the imperial All-Russian throne.”41 Though it would be his son, Alexander I, who began the incorporation of the Georgians in earnest, Paul’s declaration marked the beginning of

Russia’s assimilation of that country.

Alexander I, famous for his victory over Napoleon, undertook yet another formidable task in his attempts to bring Georgia into the Russian fold. Though on paper his imperial army was far superior to any indigenous resistance, the tsar’s forces faced a daunting task in uniting the disparate lands of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia, Georgia among them. Even disregarding the possibly even more challenging and simultaneous goals of incorporating the Armenians and

Azerbaijanis to the south or the multifarious Muslim tribes high in the mountains and along the

Caspian coast, unifying the Georgians into a single administrative unit proved quite difficult.

Many looked to religion to bridge the gap between new master and subject as “Eastern

Orthodoxy obviously created some natural affinities between Russia and Georgia.42 Despite this land being an Orthodox bastion, which one might think would facilitate a smooth introduction into the imperial administrative system, the various generals and political leaders charged with

41 As quoted in Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 174. 42 Jersild, Orientalism and Empire, 8. Hodil 21 the task of bringing Georgia into the Russian fold expended great efforts before achieving success.

The first step was the military occupation of the region, securing Georgia and the surrounding lands as an outpost for further advances. Key to Russia’s mastery of the Caucasus was the “defense and maintenance of the Georgian Military Highway.”43 This vital lifeline through the treacherous mountains ensured the supply and upkeep of the troops stationed beyond in Transcaucasia and Georgia proper. Though the empire intended these military purposes to subjugate the Georgians, the road provided the first symbol of unity. Life in the region centered on this artery of trade and travel, providing the inhabitants a common bond.

From this beginning thread, the modern nation of Georgia was sewn anew by one of

Russia’s most compelling leaders in the Caucasus: General Pavel Dmitriyevich Tsitsianov (1802-

1806). Of Georgian heritage himself, Tsitsianov favored the land of his forefathers as the focal point for Russia’s involvement in the Caucasus. As Rywkin asserted “he wanted to regather the

Georgian Principalities and restore his ancestral homeland to its dimensions at the height of its medieval strength.”44 He aggressively pursued the expansion of Russian power in the region, not only subduing vast swaths of Armenia and Iranian Azerbaijan, but also forcing the vassalage of the stubborn King Solomon II of Imretia. This was the last hold-out of the major Georgian petty kingdoms which would be directly incorporated in 1810. Though his primary goal was the successful military occupation of the Caucasus, “neither distance nor difficulty of relations” he believed should keep him from providing administration to the people who now entrusted their

43 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians: A History (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 237. 44 Rywkin, Russian Colonial Expansion, 172. Hodil 22 fate in Russia.45 This relatively conciliatory attitude fostered an amicable relationship in which both master and subordinate could benefit. Tsitsianov encouraged the Georgians to join the state service and showed interest in Georgian culture, thus gaining their respect.46 Of course, despite all of these appeasing actions towards the Georgians, he remained staunchly loyal to the tsar and was unwilling to threaten Russian rule. In response to Dagestani attempts to appeal to his heritage, Tsitsianov replied “you truly believe that I am Georgian and that you can write to me this way? I was born in Russia, there I grew up, and I have a Russian soul.”47 Thus, one can see that, while Tsitsianov maintained comparatively good relations with his subjects, when stability and order came into question, he took necessary measures to safeguard imperial control, exiling many Georgians and restricting local access to administration.48 Though some of his successors to power preferred to alienate Georgians from the rule of their country, leaders such as Ermolov and Vorontsov revived this tradition of cooperation between imperial

Russian plenipotentiaries and those they ruled.

For the sake of Georgian nationalism, an important milestone had been reached. In the first decades of the 19th century, Russian expansion into the Caucasus and Transcaucasia brought all of the various Georgian lands under one government. Though this government was that of the tsar in St. Petersburg, for the first time in centuries the Georgians were a united people. As in all of the following advances on the road to Georgian nationalism, one can see that in this instance the Russian Empire did not intend to foster what could possibly have been a seditious movement. Its goal was only to further the reach of Russian power and the

45 Nikolai Dubrovnin, Istoriia Voiny Na Kavkaze: Tom 4, 7. 46 Suny, Georgian Nation, 68. 47 As quoted in Gvosdev, Imperial Policies and Perspectives, 103. 48 Ibid, 84. Hodil 23 protection of lands that had been gained for the realm. Without the advent of Russian intervention, however, the consolidation of Georgia into a single whole would not have occurred. Indeed, as Stephen F. Jones puts it “Russian conquest not only united a previously divided Georgian territory, but reactivated a sense of Georgian identity.”49

From this point, further obstacles impeded the advancement of nationalism, including the still powerful Georgian nobility (who desired all power to remain locally in their hands) and a lack of access to administrative positions. However the most pressing impediment was

Georgia’s very survival, now that it had finally gained unification. The Ottomans and Persians still threatened to the south and these perennial foes of Georgian unity desired to regain the

Caucasus for themselves. To the end of protection, however, this small subject state, consolidated by imperial forces, could look to its master for protection. Russia’s military strength would keep the Muslim empires to the south at bay.

Defending Georgia in Defense of the Empire

“Tired of his crown and troubled sore, To Russia gave his kingdom o’er. God’s blessing fell on Georgia then: She bloomed and glowed in every glen; Safe in her garden’s kindly shade, By friendly bayonets round arrayed, Of no near enemy afraid.” —Mtsyri, Michael Lermontov50

Having fought a prolonged conflict to advance the borders of the empire, the Russian military at long last won territorial supremacy over the lands of which Georgia consisted. This

49 Jones, “Russian Imperial Administration,” 57. 50 Michael Lermontov, “Mtsyri,” The American Slavic and East European Review 4, no. ½ (August 1945): 93, http://www.jstor.org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed January 16, 2011). Hodil 24 victory, however, did not end war in the region or guarantee that these newly gained possessions were safe, either from foreign incursions, or domestic rebellion. Indeed, as Rywkin stated “Russia had gradually become committed to a course of expansion in the Caucasus from which it could not back down without tarnishing the empire’s dignity.”51 For Georgia, this meant that its recently unified status remained in grave danger of collapsing again into various minor principalities should Russia fail to defend them. History in the region shows that, despite being unified before, Georgia could never hold on to her consolidated sovereignty for long.

Even the reign of Queen Tamar, when “the Georgian medieval monarchy reached its apogee” according to Suny, allowed for only a relatively short period of expansion and unification, until the Mongols tore the Georgian Kingdom asunder once more.52 Therefore two unrelated needs united in the common desire to defend this region: the maintenance of Russian hegemony and the desire of Georgian nobles, beginning to develop a sense of Georgian-ness under the umbrella of the empire, to maintain the geographic continuity of their nation.

Though multifarious threats loomed in the mid-19th century to challenge the hard fought Russian dominance in Georgia, the greatest by far were the rival empire of the Ottoman

Turks and the guerrilla warfare of the mountain tribes.53 Some will argue that the guerilla war with the mountain peoples dealt more with the Northern Caucasus and not Georgia; however,

51 Rywkin, Russian Colonial Expansion, 185. 52 Suny, Georgian Nation, 39. 53 Certainly the Persian Empire as well still played a significant role in the politics and military struggles of the region and greatly influenced the princes and leaders of Eastern Georgia, but for the sake of limiting the scope of the question, focusing on the two aforementioned threats to Georgia’s burgeoning sense of nationalism will prove both advantageous and effective. The argument here is that Persia’s role was similar to that of the Ottomans, a major imperial challenger for supremacy in the Caucasus overall and Georgia specifically, and that both instances are not required to prove the desired point. The choice of the Turkish example comes down to the greater contact between Russia and the Ottoman Empire during this time period (1800-1860) in the conflict over Georgia. The Safavid Persians threatened Russian interests more in the Eastern Caucasus and Azerbaijan. Hodil 25 the threat it made to Russia’s ability to provide supplies and aid to its forces on the frontline in

Georgia certainly influenced not only how that Transcaucasian state was defended, but also the

Russian Empire’s military strategy in the region as a whole.

Like Russia, the Ottoman Empire coveted Georgia as a key vassal state in a strategic location for the advancement of trade and the projection of power. Turkish dominion prior to

Russian rule was reflected on by the Georgian noble and poet Davit Guramishvili, who wrote

“Woe is the day! The Ottomans shed much innocent blood, wherever they met a workman or a simple peasant, they cut off their heads.”54 The ferocity of the Turks to regain this coveted territory was not in doubt and, therefore, it came as no surprise when these two long standing rivals expanded the front of their previous wars into Transcaucasia. The concept of the modern

Georgian nation-state came into being under these turbulent conditions, united only to be thrust into a war that dated back to the times of Ivan the Terrible. It was only able to survive this crucible through the intervention of Russian military might that, for purposes of its own, fended off the Turkish armies. The main focus here will be on the Caucasian front of the

Crimean War (1853-1856), allowing one to see how a fully incorporated Georgia was defended by the Russian Empire from the designs of the Ottomans. This specific front differed little from the many previous conflicts between these two historical entities in the region. The Caucasus and the lands beyond were the arena and hegemony the prize.

Continued Ottoman interest in Georgia even after its incorporation into the Russian

Empire came as no surprise. During its own expansion in the 16th and 17th centuries, this great

Muslim empire had subjugated the western Georgian principalities which were strategically

54 As quoted by Donald Rayfield, The Literature of Georgia: A History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 122. Hodil 26 located just to the northeast of the Ottoman heartland, Anatolia. Whether or not the Sultan in

Istanbul wished to create a buffer between his empire and that of the rival Safavids or intended to push further eastward, it remains clear that many of the key Georgian principalities under

Ottoman sway were to be fully assimilated into the empire. While some remained loosely ruled vassal states, particularly the mountainous regions of western Georgia, several Georgian kingdoms were formally organized into sancaks (Ottoman administrative units) and attached to the province of Erzurum in modern eastern Turkey.55 Therefore it is understandable that, after lengthy rule, these regions were viewed by the Ottomans as integral parts of the empire. The eventual conquest and incorporation of Georgia, including the formerly Ottoman sphere of influence, by Russia was viewed as a direct violation of its sovereignty. By the mid-19th century the balance of power between these rival empires had swung in the favor of Russia, leaving

Ottoman hopes to regain Georgia lands through its own might slim. Therefore, when the opportunity arose to join with Britain and France to fight the Russians, the goal of reclaiming what was, in their minds, rightfully theirs, certainly helped sway the Ottomans to join in the

Crimean War. Apart from the main theater from which this conflict took its name, the Ottoman

Turks massed troops in Eastern Anatolia and launched an attack on Russian Georgia. The goal was to recover control of Transcaucasia “with Tiflis, the Georgian Capital, being the major trophy.”56 The attitude of Turkey’s rightful claim to Georgia was also adopted by her newfound allies in Western Europe. The British Lord Clarendon, while listing a preferred reorganization of

Europe following a Russian defeat included “Turkey being indemnified by the Crimea, the

55 Kemal H. Karpat and Robert W. Zens, Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political Changes (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 22. 56 Winfried Baumgart, The Crimean War, 1853-1856 (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1999), 180. Hodil 27

Eastern Shores of the Black Sea and Georgia.”57 The stage was set both physically and morally for an attempt to retake Georgia for the Sultan.

In previous centuries, even a united Georgian front could not withstand similar onslaughts of Ottoman armies and submitted to the rule of the Sultan. By the onset of the

Caucasian front of the Crimean War, however, the united Georgia could count on the protection of its new master, the Russian Empire. Whether an extension of the near continual warfare with the Turks since Peter the Great’s time or, as Baumgart views it, “an important element in the so-called ‘Great Game for Asia’” between Britain and Russia, Tsar Nicholas I refused to relinquish Georgia without a fight.58 Thus this second theater of the Crimean War commenced. Initially outnumbered, the Russian forces in the Caucasus faced a steep test in repelling Ottoman incursion, as had the Georgians for centuries in such conflicts. The difference, however, came in the form of Russian reinforcements, able to swell the ranks of the

Caucasian defenders. In the spring of 1854 the Russian army in the Caucasus totaled 160,000 men.59 Never before could Georgia rely on such a mass influx of soldiers to aid in her defense.

Though the commitment of so many troops (which were sorely needed elsewhere as well) to this particular front may have helped the allied forces defeat the Russian Empire in the Crimea and the war overall, Transcaucasia and Georgia were relatively secure during the conflict.

The Georgians themselves “rallied to the Russian banner,” fighting in the imperial army as soldiers and officers.60 This provided a new source of national pride. Not only did Russia stave off the shattering of Georgian unity under Ottoman rule, it gave an outlet for the

57 Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale (Hanover: The University Press of New England, 1985), 108-109. 58 Baumgart, The Crimean War, 177. 59 Ibid, 181. 60 Suny, Georgian Nation, 75. Hodil 28

Georgian people to fight in a successful defense of their country. While some disgruntled nobles defected to the enemy ranks, such as in the case of the Abkhazian leadership during the

Turkish general Omer pasha’s landing in Sukhumi in 1855, scores more served in the Russian army in the defense of their country.61 This effort transformed from regular service in the army to self-organized resistance. When Russian troops were forced to strategically withdraw from the front, Georgians organized partisan warfare that kept the Turks at bay.62 “In response to the looting, murder, and enslavement of the population,” Curtiss states that Georgians created militia units and “gave valiant support” to the Russian army.63 Here one can see that, despite the brunt of the protection of Transcaucasia being taken on by the imperial army, local initiative played a crucial role in staving off the Ottoman invasion. Emboldened by the support of Russian troops, Georgians achieved what they failed so many times to attain throughout their history: an effective resistance against Muslim invasion from the south. While it must be stated again that the Russian Empire fought off the bulk of the Ottoman attack and that attempted defense would have failed without such support from the Russian center, Georgian resistance in

Transcaucasia allowed the tsar to maintain control of this region, despite losing the Crimean

War.64

Russian defense of Georgian unity, however, was not limited to traditional warfare against perennial foes. The constant guerilla warfare of the various mountain tribes of the

Caucasus proved almost as detrimental to national unity as conventional warfare with the

Ottomans. This danger was embodied in the person of Shamil, third Imam of the Caucasian

61 John Shelton Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), 412-13. 62 Suny, Georgian Nation, 75. 63 Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War, 413-14. 64 Suny, Georgian Nation, 75. Hodil 29

Imamate, who had for years proved quite elusive to imperial forces.65 This bellicose region threatened the stability of Russian imperial power in Transcaucasia by endangering vital supply and communications routes across the Caucasus and distracting the army from the Turkish front, most notably during the Crimean War.

The threat of Shamil and the other Muslims of the Caucasus materialized during the

Russian Empire’s expansion into the region. Along with its soldiers Russia also brought its orthodox Christianity. Sergei Uvarov first momentously stated that Russia was based on the principles of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality,” meaning that the survival of the empire was at least in part determined by the promotion of the Russian Orthodox Church.66 For the

Georgians, this meant the subservience of their own Georgian Orthodox Church to the Russian

Church in 1811. Though the Georgians resented this move, their negative reaction could not compare to the resistance offered by the Muslim gortsi of the Caucasus. Caught on what Jersild refers to as “one of the fault lines of Christianity and Islam,” these mountain dwellers were subjected to Russian orientalism common in the 19th century and portrayed as savage fanatics.67 Having converted to the religion of the prophet Muhammad during the long occupation of the Caucasus by various Islamic empires, these peoples fought against Russian rule, which was heavily influenced by its Orthodox Church. What would be known as the

Caucasian War, which dragged on for most of the first half of the 19th century, was partially in response to this perceived threat by the Caucasian Muslims. Jersild describes how, even in the later period of this conflict, Aleksandr Baryatinsky, Viceroy of the Caucasus from 1856-62,

65 Baumgart, The Crimean War, 177. 66 Cynthia H. Whittaker, “The Ideology of Sergei Uvarov: An Interpretive Essay,” The Russian Review 37, no. 2 (April 1978): 172, http://www.jstor.org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed April 5, 2011). 67 Jersild, Orientalism and Empire, 148. Hodil 30 doubted the hold of Orthodoxy and Russian rule in this region. Due to their religious beliefs, these various mountain peoples lay outside of Russian influence “as if the Caucasus did not belong to a Christian state,” leaving the Georgian Military Road in grave danger.68 Georgian unity, now dependent on supplies and troops from the Russian center, was in danger of dissolution if this route through the Caucasus was cut off by the rebellious Muslim gortsi.

Native Georgian support for the Russian struggle against Shamil was evidenced by the mobilization of the Kakhetians, part of the Georgian populace. In 1854 they took up arms to fight off the Imam when imperial troops were forced to retreat from battle.69 Only through massive Russian military intervention and decades of warfare, however, were the Caucasus and the Georgian Military Highway secured against the Muslim tribes.70 Georgians alone could not have prevented the closure of that vital lifeline and would have quite easily fallen into disunity were they separated from Russian support. With imperial victory over the Islamic Caucasian rebels, however, the foundations of Georgian nationalism survived and continued to grow.

This broad threat, spanning nearly half a century, is best viewed, perhaps, once again in the microcosm of the Crimean War. Never was the threat of Islamic mountain tribes greater than during this most terrible conflict. With Russia embroiled in perilous battle along the southern Transcaucasian front, the rebels led by Shamil stood ready to aid their Muslim brethren and disrupt the movement of imperial troops. Twice the Imam struck out for Tiflis

(mid 1853 and July 1854), with the intent of meeting up with Turkish forces, only to be repelled both times. Baumgart argues that Shamil’s maneuvers, though annoying, were of little strategic

68 Ibid, 43. 69 Baumgart, The Crimean War, 178-79. 70 Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 179. Hodil 31

“importance.”71 The inability of initial Russian counteractions to drive off the invaders and the requirement of reinforcements, however, indicates the hard-pressed situation the imperial

Russian army found itself in. Well-armed and supplied from abroad, Shamil and his men placed

Russian superiority in the Caucasus and the maintenance of Georgian unity in dire straits.

Luckily for the foundations of the Georgian national movement, “the Russians had veteran troops of great skill and courage, and with powerful artillery and excellent leadership they were superior to the foe.”72 It is true that native forces, comprised of Georgian peasants, helped in the repulsion. Without the advantage of imperial Russian troops capable of fighting both the

Turks and the Muslim rebels simultaneously, however, Georgia would have been overwhelmed and the brief emergence of the prerequisite elements of nationalism quashed.

Though the Russian Empire lost the Crimean War, and with it much prestige, through skillful arms and maneuvering it managed to maintain Georgian unity under the protection of the tsar in St. Petersburg during and after the first half of the 19th century. Where Georgians for many centuries had failed to preserve a consolidated state in the face of invasion by the Muslim empires to the south, Russians prevailed, most notably in repelling the Turkish armies of the

Ottoman Empire during the Caucasian front of the Crimean War. Similarly, the empire checked the advance of the Muslim mountain peoples and kept them from destabilizing the tenuous unity that it had forged among the formerly disparate Georgian principalities. Though it fought this two-front war for the sake of upholding imperial sovereignty, Russia managed to inadvertently save the burgeoning roots of Georgian nationalism in the process.

71 Baumgart, The Crimean War, 179. 72 Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War, 415. Hodil 32

Perhaps just as impressive as the external salvation of the modern Georgian state was the internal reform that truly allowed nationalist sentiments to blossom. During the years preceding the Crimean War, the imperial Russian administration in Transcaucasia succeeded not only in molding itself to the unique situation of that region, but also in reforming the

Georgian nobility to better serve the tsar’s purposes. The former success entailed the adoption of Georgian traditions, practices, and civil servants into the regional administration, allowing them to flower into nationalist convictions. The latter involved the bringing to heel of the

Georgian nobles who, since the 16th century, had sown seeds of disunity in Georgia for the sake of their own desires and private property.73 Properly shaped and controlled by their Russian overlords, the Georgian nobility was to become a constructive force for the molding of the

Georgian nation.

Salvation from Internal Implosion

“In the case of the Georgians the social elite was the nobility, which was numerous and hierarchically structured. Its upper echelons possessed far-reaching privileges and power.” —The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, Andreas Kappeler74

As Russia expanded, the tsar and his administration came into contact with many peoples and myriad systems of local rule, particularly in Asia. From the gortsi of the Caucasus to the Buriats in Siberia and other various native populations, imperial rule was forced to reckon with political systems that often clashed with the government in St. Petersburg. Kappeler states that “Russia adopted from the west a eurocentric feeling of superiority towards Asia,” with religious belief the most definite line of separation between the local populations and their

73 Suny, Georgian Nation, 46-47. 74 Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 172. Hodil 33 conquerors.75 The process of combating this difference and adapting these new subjects to

Russian rule and its Western administrative system proved difficult. Few could have predicted, however, that one of the more difficult feats accomplished by the Russian Empire was the transformation of the Georgian nobility into loyal subjects capable of aiding in the rule of their united country. Suny is correct to hesitate in grouping these nobles with the feudal aristocracies of medieval Western Europe, given the inaccuracy of translating concepts from one territory to another.76 It has become commonplace, however, to classify the system of rule prevalent in

Georgia directly prior to and during the transition to Russian incorporation as feudalism. Having such a system of government, and thus being fewer steps removed from the system of imperial government implemented by Russia than the aforementioned Caucasian and Siberian peoples, one would think that converting the Georgian nobles would have been comparatively easy.

Precisely because of this feudal state of affairs, however, the adaptation of this particular nobility proved quite difficult. Not only did this seemingly all-powerful aristocracy hinder the establishment of Russian rule, it threatened the unification of Georgia and thus the fledgling concept of nationalism as well.

In his survey of Russian ascendancy in the Caucasus, Dubrovnin described the Georgians during the takeover and occupation of their country by the empire as being ruled by the heads of families in the absence of a single king.77 Though lesser kingdoms and principalities claimed to rule over the fractured medieval Georgian state, the landed nobility controlled true power.

Members of this gentry treated their own estates as sovereign realms in which their power

75 Ibid, 168. 76 Suny, Georgian Nation, 42. 77 Nikolai Dubrovnin, Istoriia Voiny Na Kavkaze: Tom 2, 179. Hodil 34 knew no limits. Unlike in Western European states, such as England or France, where nobles indeed enjoyed far-ranging powers but still swore fealty to the king above them, Suny notes that from 1500-1800 Georgia transformed into a system of tavadoba, or “the rule of princes.”78

This circumstance saw the sovereigns of Georgia slowly bleed away their power in the forms of land and privilege to the aristocracy until little command could be wielded over it. As Dubrovnin reports, the power of the king eroded so much that he could not exert the full force of the law without being confirmed by the agreement of his nobles.79 The inability to control the nobility and the decline in the centralized power of kings led to a failure in military might and aided the advances of the Ottomans, Persians, and later the Russians. Combining these external threats with the domestic greediness of the aristocracy led to the fracturing of the medieval Georgian kingdom and, consequently, a division of the Georgian nation. Suny states that “the original tribal-dynastic aspects of the Georgian noble system reemerged in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,” underscoring how individual noble estates had become the main social unit, fragmenting national identity.80 In retrospect the Georgian nobility understood the detrimental effect they had on the cohesion of medieval Georgian identity. This sentiment is perhaps best displayed by the poet David Guramishvili (1705-1792), a noble in the suite of the exiled king

Vakhtang VI, who wrote these lines in the poem “Woes of Georgia:”

“But soon at home domestic broils, Quarrels and feuds arose like mists. Brothers with brothers grappled. Thus Did trifles cause mighty contests.

And as a cock that flies upon

78 Suny, Georgian Nation, 42. 79 Nikolai Dubrovnin, Istoriia Voiny Na Kavkaze: Tom 2, 180. 80 Suny, Georgian Nation, 47. Hodil 35

Another cock, they turned to fight, Strutted and glared and frowning sprang On each other, and then in spite, With unsheathed swords, they savagely Dealt blows that fell to left and right. Thus Georgia weakened and soon felt, The sting of Turkey’s, Leki’s bite.”81

Thus the Russian Empire, upon its entry into the Transcaucasian arena and absorbing of

Georgia, found the small state divided and in the hands of an aristocracy unwilling to give up its powers. With hopes of expanding ever southward and the perennial Ottoman and Persian foes looking for any slip to regain ascendancy in the region, the Russian administration could little afford the threat of a fractious Georgian nobility. The first attempt at submitting these nobles to Russian rule was to confirm their equal status to Russian nobles. Stipulated in the initial annexation of Georgia in 1801, the process proved difficult and, as Kappeler notes, “dragged on for decades,”82 with Russia hesitating to elevate all of Georgia’s relatively large aristocracy. The end goal of making these Georgians a uniform segment of the Russian nobility and subject to the tsar’s command seemed a somewhat hopeful desire that could not be achieved by the will of his government in the imperial capital.

Therefore, the position of governor-general was created in order to enforce Russian dominance over the noble Georgians. Pavel Tsitsianov, given such control of Russia’s

Transcaucasian forces in 1802, first tried to bring the local nobles to heel and “prevent

Georgians from influencing authorities in the capital [Tiflis],” a task that proved difficult due to

81 Anthology of Georgian Poetry, trans. Venera Urushadze (Tbilisi: State Publishing House, 1958), 22, accessed March 21, 2011, http://issuu.com/timjkercher/docs/anthology_of_georgian_poetry. 82 Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 176. Hodil 36 the already large number of the aristocracy in the city.83 One can see the struggle between an attempt of consolidating Russian central power around the Georgian capital and the Georgian nobles who sought to maintain their individual local authorities throughout the country. In order to prevent this, Suny states “the consistent aim of the Russian government in the first half of the nineteenth century [became] to wear away at the peculiarities of the Georgian seigneurial system; that is, to reduce the independent powers of the local nobility, serfdom, and bureaucracy.”84 Tsitsianov’s response to continued noble control focused on the limiting of

Georgian positions in his administration and the deportation of many members of the aristocracy to Russia.85 At first glance this seems detrimental to building Georgian nationalism, which indeed took a hit with the loss of locals’ participation in the government. The same policy also appeared to undermine the aforementioned administrative inclusion of Georgians that

Tsitsianov had called for. Unfortunately, political reality forced Tsitsianov to abandon his initial desires “to uphold native customs and traditions” and employ locals in the government.86 The predicament of both integrating and controlling these native elites led the governor-general and many of his successors, as Suny states, “to alienate a significant number of Georgian nobles and draw others into service of the tsar.”87 Such limitation on the inclusion of Georgians in their own rule, however, would be rectified by some of those who followed Tsitsianov’s reign. In terms of developing the national movement, the removal of divisive elements of the Georgian aristocracy, who at the cost of national unity sought only to maintain their power, was achieved.

83 Rywkin, Russian Colonial Expansion, 171. 84 Suny, Georgian Nation, 66. 85 Rywkin, Russian Colonial Expansion, 172. 86 Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov, 14. 87 Suny, Georgian Nation, 68 Hodil 37

The nobility who remained were curbed in other ways through the modification of their rights and powers. As has been noted, prior to Russian rule Georgian nobles enjoyed not only

“nearly unlimited power over their estates and the enserfed peasantry but had long been accustomed to exercising police and judicial power.”88 Such free reign was significantly lessened by the introduction of Russian regulations and the incorporation of Georgia into the imperial administration. Most notably, the control of the highest circles of aristocracy over lower gentry and the Georgian Church was reduced and the dismal existence of Georgian serfs moderately improved. The emancipation of the “vassal gentry,” as Suny calls them, was completed in order to facilitate the introduction of Georgian nobles into the Russian aristocracy.89 As a side effect, the ability of the upper nobility to control the various Georgian regions and influence state authority diminished. Similarly, the release of the clergy from noble bondage also weakened local aristocratic control. A final stroke in weakening the power of the Georgian nobility came about by the forced conforming of serfdom to Russian standards. While Georgian serfdom was previously ambiguous, allowing peasants to “‘volunteer’ for bondage” and for the practice of enserfing freemen, imperial administration demanded nobles prove their ownership of serfs, who in turn could petition for freedom.90 This seriously undermined the authority of Georgian nobles who lost absolute power even over their own estates, let alone the country itself. This served the purposes of the tsar, for the weaker the Georgian nobility were, the more subservient they became to St. Petersburg and Russia’s hold on the region was strengthened.

88 Ibid, 65. 89 Ibid, 67. 90 Ibid, 67. Hodil 38

This process of subjecting the Georgian lords to tsarist command, however, came at a price, for the nobles of that land loathed the loss of their immense powers. The independent kings of Georgia had attempted to curb aristocratic power before the advent of Russian rule, only to be foiled and lose power themselves. Dubrovnin recounts how Erekle II attempted to limit the strength of the nobility and prove his own ascendancy by taking away the lands and inheritance of some powerful princes and giving them to their sons and grandsons, who, in turn, obeyed the king even less.91

The Russian Empire, however, had considerably more power and was more effective in reining in the Georgian nobility, who could not simply ignore the command of the tsar. Many in the local aristocracy who neither joined imperial service nor retired to their estates strove to overthrow Russian rule, leading them to join in the multiple rebellions that took place over the course of the first half of the 19th century.92 Russia capably quashed each of these rebellions with overwhelming military superiority, an advantage that the independent kings of Georgia never enjoyed over their nobles. This series of revolts culminated in the conspiracy of 1832, which, though it never got off the ground, sought the termination of tsarist over-lordship. By that time this sentiment had become unpopular among the Georgian nobility who were then being readily integrated into Russian civil and military service.93 The last threat of the aristocracy to Russian ascendancy never posed a serious problem and was quickly thwarted.

Therefore the unity of the Georgian state was maintained.

91 Nikolai Dubrovnin, Istoriia Voiny Na Kavkaze: Tom 2, 180. 92 Suny, Georgian Nation, 70. 93 Ronald Grigor Suny, “‘The Peasants Have Always Fed Us:’ The Georgian Nobility and the Peasant Emancipation, 1856-1871,” The Russian Review 38, no. 1 (January 1979): 30, http://www.jstor.org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed February 7, 2011). Hodil 39

Like the external threat of the Persians and the Ottomans, imperial Russian administration and force was able to ward off the danger of domestic strife. Unlike the medieval kings of Georgia, the tsar and his representatives in Transcaucasia not only kept the aristocracy at bay, but did so despite the continued threat of war with the Muslim Empires. Of course the task was not simple, even for the relatively well-liked General Ermolov, who stated

“I do not see either gratitude for our rule…or fidelity to the sovereign…except for a small number of nobles serving in the [Imperial] military, others are not guided by such concerns.”94

Many supported the son of King Erekle II, Alexander, in his bid to regain the throne. It was quite possible that his victory would have seen Georgia once again descend into a fractured state.

Regardless, Russia had the numerical advantage to quell any such revolt by the nobles, whether it was in the name of Alexander or simple personal gain. While Georgian kings could rely only on a limited number of loyal nobles to counteract their power hungry neighbors, Russia enjoyed the manpower and material of a massive empire. The once ascendant aristocracy saw its ability to divide Georgia for the sake of increased local power deteriorate at the hands of imperial regulation. Any separatist members of the gentry who sought to restore the unlimited power they wielded before incorporation could not hope to stand against such superiority.

Thus the Russian Empire removed another roadblock on the path to Georgian nationalism. Indeed, in doing so, it ironically transformed this divisive section of society into a loyal nobility. The Georgian aristocracy increasingly joined civil and military service in the name of the tsar and sent their children to the empire’s many academies. It is from this group of gentry that Georgia’s national leaders, such as Ilia Chavchavadze, would arise. Again, the

94 Gvosdev, Imperial Policies and Perspectives, 136. Hodil 40 imperial administration undermined noble authority only to strengthen its own power and ensure the continued security of imperial lands and assets. Indeed some might see these actions as having a negligible (or possibly negative) effect on the formative era of nationalism in

Georgia. They would look at the military occupation of this Transcaucasian state and the deportation and temporary exclusion of its nobles as destabilizing any notion of a nation. Yet the advent of Russian soldiers and their defense of Georgia as a part of the empire were key in progressing the burgeoning national movement. The Georgian nation was united in a single state, protected from external foes, and safe from the most divisive of domestic adversaries.

Beyond this seemingly passive aid, the Russian Empire took a more direct and visible role in the birth of Georgian nationalism as well. By employing them in imperial service, both in the civil administration and the military, Russia allowed the Georgian nobility, united and under prime conditions for national sentiments to develop, the opportunity to direct the fate of their country and people. Suny states that “the Georgian nobility in the mid-1850s was a self- conscious estate with a new sense of purpose,” ready to serve the tsar.95 Continuing a time- honored and pragmatic practice of cooperating with locals to help govern conquered regions, some of the most dynamic Russian figures in Transcaucasian history played their part in inadvertently advancing Georgian nationalism, by affording these nobles the opportunity to influence their state’s governance.96

95 Suny, Georgian Nation, 75. 96 Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 206. Hodil 41

An Administrative Path towards Georgian Advancement

“Vain are all barriers to Russians, In us victory and valor meet, We have our Bagrations, All enemies will be at our feet…etc.”97 —War and Peace, Leo Tolstoy.

As the old Count Rostov exclaimed in Tolstoy’s magnum opus, Georgians, such as the

Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration to whom he refers, represented a vital part of Russian life following their incorporation into the empire. Like most subject peoples, they provided members of their elite to serve in the imperial army, supplying Russia with some of its most celebrated military commanders of the era. In order to more efficiently bring Georgia under the control of St.

Petersburg, however, the Russian Empire required the skills and services of the local elites in the civil administration of Transcaucasia as well. Without the active participation of Georgians, specifically the nobility, Russian rule in Tbilisi would have been greatly handicapped.

The previous chapters discussing the roots of Georgian nationalism display the passive manner in which the Georgians themselves took part in this process. Certainly individuals aided the military occupation as guides or local interpreters, but on the whole the physical unification, military defense, and reining in of the nobles were all imposed upon the Georgians.

It just so happened that the formative stages of national sentiment were a byproduct of these

Russian actions. By joining the imperial administration, however, Georgians (particularly the aforementioned and pacified nobles) began to take a more active part in the development of a sense of nationality. Though Russian generals and governors once again played a vital role in opening up administrative positions to native Georgians, these local officials laid the

97 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 311. Hodil 42 groundwork for the movement in the future. Their accomplishments established the system by which early Georgian nationalism operated, which was within the Russian government, not against it.

The reigning governor-general of Transcaucasia was an all-powerful figure in that region, capable of not only manipulating the administration but also enforcing his will with military might. It stands to reason that, with each new holder of this title came a different style of ruling this often difficult part of the empire, centered in Georgia. Two different policies regarding the use of Georgian locals in the government emerged as the 19th century progressed: one of intolerance towards and exclusion of the native inhabitants and a more open-minded approach that called for the employment of these people to increase administrative effectiveness. This latter policy gave Georgians access to the governance of their land, now united, and inadvertently offered them the opportunity to advance their own state and people within the framework of imperial rule. The first tentative step in the direction of this practice was taken by none other than General Pavel Dmitriyevich Tsitsianov, who, as was previously mentioned, helped physically unify the Georgian State. Georgian by heritage,

Tsitsianov desired to reestablish the glory of medieval Georgia as the crown jewel of Russian

Transcaucasia. Given his lineage, one can consider Tsitsianov a prototype of the incorporated

Georgian who sought advancement for his ancestral homeland within the bounds of imperial rule. He garnered the respect of the locals, including them in state affairs, opening a school in

Tbilisi, and even allowing the children of the Georgian nobility to join the Russian cadet corps.98

Such amiable actions soon faded as the enormity of Tsitsianov’s task in Transcaucasia became

98 Suny, Georgian Nation, 68. Hodil 43 apparent. Hardly secure, the tsar called for him to solidify the Russian position in the region and ensure the cooperation of the local populace, a command in the name of which Tsitsianov felt no qualm in forsaking niceties with the Georgians.99 Thoroughly Russianized (even ‘Tsitsianov’ was derived from the Georgian ‘Tsitsishvili’), his chief goal was the maintenance of imperial power, and he did not hesitate in sacrificing Georgian goodwill or the inclusion of locals in the government in the name of this task. Thus, while Tsitsianov opened a door for Georgians to participate in the rule of their people, he quickly shut it again, due to the military realities of a still insecure domain. The concept of gaining the respect of and employing the locals would not be forgotten, however, by either his successors as governors-general or the Georgians themselves.

Following a succession of even less-accommodating Transcaucasian plenipotentiaries,

Georgia finally received from St. Petersburg a more moderate commander, Aleksei Petrovich

Ermolov. Michael Whittaker describes the reign of Ermolov in the Caucasus as the breeding ground for a new “‘Caucasian’ outlook” that was “out of tune with official policy” and encouraged free thinking and “positive action.”100 This view of administration allowed the new governor-general to analyze the situation in Transcaucasia with fresh thoughts and a mind to shake up and improve the government in Tbilisi. Ermolov stated “I had decided to bring with me a few officials who had proved themselves in service and on whose honesty I could depend,” trying to avoid the corruption prevalent in the administrations of his predecessors.101

This became the standard practice of this vital figure in Georgian history, bringing in talented

99 Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov, 14. 100 Michael Whittlock, “Ermolov-Proconsul of the Caucasus,” Russian Review 18, no.1 (January 1959): 53. http://www.jstor.org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed February 13, 2011). 101 Yermolov, The Czar’s General: The Memoirs of a Russian General in the Napoleonic Wars, trans. Alexander Mikaberidze, 221. Hodil 44 advisors to aid in his rule, despite their backgrounds. This “‘family’ of talented and enlightened assistants” included several Georgians, among them one of the foremost names in Georgian literature, Alexander Chavchavadze.102 Viewed as the father of Georgian romanticism,

Chavchavadze “played a vital role in introducing Russian and European literary themes and forms into Georgian literature” and in his poem “The Caucasus” describes how Georgians

“began once more to hope that enlightenment would enter their land” by means of Russian incorporation.103 Though the occupation of his homeland by Russian troops and officials grew sour to him, Chavchavadze reached prominent position through a long term of imperial service, a status which certainly aided his literary career. Indeed, one may speculate that without the initial patronage of Ermolov, one of Georgia’s greatest national writers, who was essential in the building of Georgian national sentiment, may never have come to prominence.

Ermolov’s ability to further form Georgian society, however, was not limited to this inner circle of assistants. He also championed the cause of the lower nobility, who, as previously mentioned, had endured centuries of virtual thralldom from the upper aristocracy.

Ermolov “managed to persuade the nobility to agree to the establishment of a lower house” thus giving a far wider spectrum of Georgian society the opportunity to participate in their own government.104 Of course this represents the advancement of a still limited section of society, but any broadening of that group of Georgians capable of influencing the workings of their

102 Whittlock, “Ermolov-Proconsul of the Caucasus,” 55. 103 Harsha Ram and Zaza Shatirishvili, “Romantic Topography and the Dilemma of Empire: The Caucasus in the Dialogue of Georgian and Russian Poetry,” Russian Review 63, no. 1 (January 2004): 3; 9, http://www.jstor.org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu (accessed February 13, 2011). 104 Yermolov, The Czar’s General: The Memoirs of a Russian General in the Napoleonic Wars, trans. Alexander Mikaberidze, 230. Hodil 45 country propelled the cause of Georgian nationalism forward. Though still answerable to the tsarist state, these local administrators and officials gained more power and responsibility.

Perhaps the greatest act of Ermolov towards the growth of Georgian nationalism was the translation of the law code of King Vakhtang VI (ruled Kartli 1716-23) into Russian, thus building “a bridge to his subjects.”105 Though Ermolov most likely commissioned this translation in order to streamline his bureaucracy by making it more compatible with local traditions, it produced a side effect vital to the national cause. The Georgian people were now, though still subject to the overall authority of imperial law, at least partially governed by their own traditions. True, this is not a direct administrative opening for a specific Georgian, but it does represent the promotion of a Georgian ideal into the very framework of the government presiding over that country. If not for Ermolov and his tolerant policies as governor, such an advancement of Georgians and their traditions would not have occurred.

Forced out of his office in 1827, Ermolov retired, leaving all of Transcaucasia and particularly the focal point of Georgia in flux. A succession of less tolerant plenipotentiaries bent on russifying rather than conforming to local tradition took command, removing Georgian language from government affairs and thus limiting access to law and bureaucracy.106 One such measure enacted by Baron Pavel Vasilyevich Hahn, which attacked Georgian serfdom (prior to empire wide emancipation), was so grave a threat to this historic social structure that leading nobles such as Alexander Chavchavadze and Dmitri Orbeliani appealed directly to the central government for relief.107 Though this example highlights a negative point in Russian-Georgian

105 Suny, Georgian Nation, 69. 106 Ibid, 72. 107 Ibid, 73. Hodil 46 relations within the empire, it does show how, having been banded together in service to the tsar, these nobles now strove to maintain a distinctly Georgian identity. True, the institution of serfdom had undergone many changes to fit with the Russian model, but the Georgian nobility was unwilling to give it up completely because of the desires of a Russian commander.108

Luckily for the progress achieved under Ermolov’s reign, a commander with similar thoughts came to power in 1844, giving Georgia perhaps its most influential Russian figurehead of the imperial period.

As Russia slowly incorporated Georgia and the rest of Transcaucasia into the imperial fold, the task at hand for the men leading the region became more difficult and complex.

Nearing the middle of the 19th century and following a series of relatively short reigning governors-general, Tsar Nicholas I, “long frustrated with the Caucasus and the interminable war,” needed someone capable of handling not only the perennial threats of Persia, Ottoman

Turkey, and the quarrelsome mountain tribes, but also the ever more intricate civil administration developing in Tbilisi.109 For this task, he chose a dynamic leader, proven in the crucible of the Napoleonic wars, Mikhail Semyonovich Vorontsov.

Having established himself during a long stint as the governor of the lucrative region of

“New Russia” (modern southern Ukraine, parts of southern Russia, and Bessarabia), Vorontsov was appointed to the newly created post of Viceroy in Transcaucasia in 1844.110 This was a practical choice, not only given his successful and dutiful service, but also due to his prior experience in the region. One will recall that Vorontsov began his military career under the

108 Ibid, 82. 109 Jersild, Orientalism and Empire, 63. 110 Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov, 120; 123. Hodil 47 command of General Pavel Dmitriyevich Tsitsianov in the then recently acquired region of

Georgia.111 Therefore, upon being reposted to this region, Vorontsov already knew the lay of the land and had some grasp of which policies would work and which would not with regards to administration. The question became whether or not he would follow the progressive or repressive policies of his mentor, becoming either another Ermolov and well-received in his governing of the region or just another in a long line of authoritarian governors. The issue of

Georgian nationalism, still in its initial stages, hung in the balance.

Luckily for the locals, Vorontsov followed the former path from the beginning of his reign as viceroy. The very title itself, which per the mandate of the emperor was vested “with unlimited plenary powers,” was the starting point for more regional autonomy and gave a greater chance for building up the national movement away from centralized control.112

Chernyshev, who became one of Vorontsov’s closest political advisors, wrote of the need for such a flexible viceroyship in Transcaucasia, stating the necessity of “an administration wisely adapted to customary laws, to habits, to traditions…an administration that corresponds to the real needs of its inhabitants.”113 This suggests that the situation in the Caucasus and across them required a special form of government, less constricted by rule from St. Petersburg and more local in nature. While Vorontsov still answered to the tsar and remained loyal to the crown, the migration of Transcaucasian affairs out of the imperial capital allowed for a greater growth in the foundations of Georgian nationalism.

111 Suny, Georgian Nation, 73. 112 Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov, 136. 113 As quoted in Ibid, 135. Hodil 48

One of Vorontsov’s greatest contributions towards this end was the toning down of russification, particularly the actions of Pavel Hahn, who had redesigned Transcaucasian administration along centralized lines and sought to “eliminate local divergences.”114 Vorontsov disapproved of such strident russification and desired a more gradual integration of Georgian society, believing that “the attractions and benefits of Russian imperial culture…had rendered most aspects of old, pre-imperial Georgian culture simply irrelevant.”115 With such thoughts in mind, he allowed more locals to join in the state service, serving in courts and various other capacities. By reversing the restrictive policies of Hahn, which limited Georgian access to the government, the viceroy gained great acclaim among his new constituency, engendering in them a new sense of trust that had been lacking in the administrations since Ermolov. Showing how the national movement was revitalized under Vorontsov’s reign, “the Georgian intelligentsia,” Georgian historian Ivane Javakhishvili described “was inspired, and the hope appeared that the cultural-national progress of the Georgian people would be possible and without obstacles under Russian rule.”116 Born to an aristocratic family in the decades directly following Vorontsov’s reign, Javakhishvili himself took advantage of the opportunities afforded to him by the viceroy’s pragmatic rule, attending first the local school in Tbilisi, then graduating from St. Petersburg University, and finally helping found Tbilisi State University.117

The inclusion of more Georgians into the civil administration of their country came about due to an advantageous combination of events during the reign of viceroy Vorontsov. An increasing number of local Transcaucasians were graduating from imperial institutions, capable

114 Suny, Georgian Nation, 72. 115 Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov, 157; 171. 116 As quoted in Suny, Georgian Nation, 73. 117 “History of I. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (TSU),” accessed March 20, 2011, http://www.tsu.edu.ge/en/universityabout/general_info/. Hodil 49 of merging local traditions, culture, and language with Russian bureaucracy; simultaneously, St.

Petersburg experienced a glut of native Russian officials who were unwilling to complete their service in the fringe parts of the empire. This led Vorontsov to suggest a plan of employing local officials in Transcaucasia to the tsar, who in turn expressed “‘pleasure and satisfaction’ at such efforts to cut administrative costs.”118 In this manner an ever increasing number of the lower and middling officials working in the service of the viceroy came from local stock, including many Georgians and, in particular their nobility. Kappeler points out that the preservation of elites was an important precondition for the national movements in Transcaucasia, which certainly pertains to the case of the Georgian nobles who were given ever increasing responsibility and position in Vorontsov’s administration.119

Equally important in increasing local access to government was the incorporation of

Georgian laws in the management of regional affairs. While Ermolov first commissioned the translation of Vakhtang VI’s laws into Russian and their employment in his administration, the interim between his rule and Vorontsov’s saw the rescinding of such local legal tradition under the political program of Hahn’s centralization and russification. In an effort to strengthen the loyalty of his subjects, the viceroy called for a committee composed entirely of Georgians to review Vakhtang’s law code so that it might be resubmitted to the tsar.120 As Vorontsov desired, the committee declared much of the ancestral legal code “irrelevant to present day conditions,” however, the statutes that were approved were included in the imperial law code,

118 Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov, 170. 119 Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 178. 120 Rhinelander, Prince Michael Vorontsov, 171. Hodil 50

“applying uniquely to the Georgian provinces of the empire.”121 Once again, under the rule of a progressive viceroy in Vorontsov, Georgians and their own laws were able to participate in the political process. Such increased say in their governance decreased reliance on central authority and helped preserve traditional civilization, which, as Kappeler again proposes, would inspire

Georgians in the formation of their national movement.122

Perhaps the greatest and most lasting of Viceroy Vorontsov’s reforms, however, was the revamping of the educational system in the Caucasus. This supplied the upper class with greater access to education, providing the Georgian nation with its future leaders. One such man, Ilia

Chavchavadze, would become the head of the national movement after spending his youth in the gimnaziia (secondary school) in Tbilisi and furthering his education at the University in St.

Petersburg, where, as Suny states, he was “fundamentally affected.”123 In his own words,

Chavchavadze describes the four years he spent in Russia as “life’s foundation, life’s head waters, the hair-like bridge thrown across between light and darkness” from which “the tendril of life knots itself into the brain and heart of youth.”124 Having absorbed the benefits of Russian education, he came back to his homeland and began writing poetry and prose extolling the qualities of Georgia. His participation in the imperial educational system gave him the requisite qualifications to join the administration of his country once he returned. There he championed

Georgian culture and traditions despite the rise of reactionary russification later in his life. He criticized the establishment for “wanting to wrap Georgian literature in a dead man’s

121 Ibid, 171. 122 Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 178. 123 Suny, Georgian Nation, 127. 124 Ilia Chavchavadze, Ilia Chavchavadze Works, Trans. by Marjory and Oliver Wardrops, 5. Hodil 51 shroud.”125 Fresh from his imperial education, one can see that Chavchavadze was ready to lead the burgeoning “romantic kind of patriotism,” which aroused interest in Georgian culture and language.126 Here one can see the tendency of such national leaders towards working within the imperial framework to advocate nationalist sentiment. Though, through his newspaper

Iveria, he readily challenged the imposition of Russian culture in place of the native traditions of

Georgia, he maintained his position in the imperial civil service; in this capacity he sought to improve the lives of his countrymen through social programs, such as the Propagation of

Literacy and the Agricultural Bank of Georgia.127 Many later Georgian progressives labeled him as increasingly nostalgic, conservative, and sympathetic to the reactionary policies of late imperial rule; however, his patriotic efforts to elevate the Georgian vernacular language and provide an outlet for Georgian literature in the form of periodicals made him the “most influential Georgian nationalist from the emancipation until the 1905 revolution.”128 A lofty title, only obtained after assiduous study under Russian tutelage and advancement through

Russian administration.

The process of including native Georgians into the administration of Transcaucasia should not be mistaken as a rapid development, but rather as gradual progression. Over the course of the first half of the 19th century, like-minded leaders such as Tsitsianov, Ermolov, and

Vorontsov saw the advantage of employing locals in civil service, given their knowledge of the language, tradition, and culture of the area in question. The goal of these Russian administrators, whose responsibilities encompassed myriad difficulties distinct to the political

125 Rayfield, The Literature of Georgia, 175. 126 Kappeler, A Multiethnic History, 231. 127 Rayfield, The Literature of Georgia, 176; 178. 128 Suny, Georgian Nation, 131. Hodil 52 situation of Transcaucasia, remained simple: the defense of the empire and imperial interests.

On the southern fringe of Russia’s control, the Caucasus and the provinces just beyond them proved difficult to maintain, given the never ending threat from the Persians and the Ottomans to the South and the perennial strife between the colonizing Russians and the Muslim mountaineers. Therefore a successful plenipotentiary in this region, like the three men mentioned above, used any means necessary to accomplish continued imperial ascendancy, including the engaging of locals in the state bureaucracy. Thus, though their desired end was not the advancement of Georgian nationalism, these leaders, by opening up administrative positions to Georgians, solidified the already growing national movement. With roots firmly planted in the form of a unified state (though divided into two Russian provinces after the reforms of Vorontsov), ample defense from both external and internal threats, and local government officials capable of molding the future of their own affairs, the inception of full- blown Georgian nationalism was primed to blossom.

Nationalism, An Ever-changing Challenge “In thy waves in the midst of my land A long history lies buried And pure Georgian blood Has been poured forth on thy banks.

There where thy powerful stream Mingles with the troubled slow Kura There once was spilt Georgian life There thundered the voice of Georgia for for fatherland's sake.” 129 —“O Our Aragva,” Ilia Chavchavadze

Many scholars choose to focus on the negative influence of imperialism on those regions occupied and incorporated by the great European Empires of the 19th and 20th

129 Chavchavadze, Ilia Chavchavadze Works, Trans. by Marjory and Oliver Wardrops, 39. Hodil 53 centuries, and rightfully so. The abuses of colonization, the exploitation of the present day third world, and the destruction of old social structures, all aimed at strengthening the hold of the center over its acquired territories, produced often detrimental effects on those regions that found themselves under imperial rule. As a historian, however, one must look past bias and examine the possibility that imperialism produced positive effects as well. Though it may be difficult to sift through the tragedies brought about by empire building, the elusive benefits of becoming subject to such great powers are well worth searching for.

An excellent example presents itself in the case of Georgian nationalism. Modern partiality leads one to believe that Russian rule of this small Transcaucasian state was detrimental to the formation of the Georgian nation, undermining it from the day Tsar Paul I signed the act of incorporation in 1801. This concept is readily supported by the various conflicts fought by Georgians against Russian central authority throughout the years, from the noble uprising and peasant revolts in the early 19th century, to the battle of the independent

Democratic Republic of Georgia against Soviet annexation, to the recent struggle against the

Russian Federation over South Ossetia. This most recent episode serves as a poignant example of the tumultuous relationship between Moscow and its former dependent and solidifies the notion of Russia perennially eroding Georgia’s independence. Yet, a careful examination of the earliest decades of imperial rule over Georgia provides us with evidence for a different theory: that the foundations of Georgian nationalism were actually laid (if inadvertently) with the help of Russian administration and administrators.

As has been delineated above, a certain progression of events, in which Russians played a pivotal role, paved the road towards a Georgian nation. The first, and perhaps most Hodil 54 basic, step on this path came in the form of the physical unification of Georgia. The various petty domains that had arisen as a result of the fragmentation of the medieval Georgian kingdom remained divided given the political situation prior to Russian annexation. The

Ottoman, Persian, and Russian Empires all vied for the loyalty of these disparate lands which failed to produce a leader dynamic enough to unite them once again into a single kingdom.

Georgia appeared doomed to be forever disunited. Russia, however, with an immense military effort wrested Georgia piecemeal from its southern neighbors during the first half of the 19th century. In this manner it gained a key addition to its empire and control to a timeless trade route from the expanses of Asia. In the process of progressing imperial ambition, though, Russia also managed to unify Georgia, a vital achievement towards the end of building the modern

Georgian nation.

Equally inadvertently, the tsar and his administration in Transcaucasia successfully defended Georgia from enemies, both foreign and domestic. Unlike the weak and poorly supplied minor Georgian kingdoms before imperial rule, Russia had the ability to summon great quantities of both manpower and material in the name of defending its new southern frontier.

Though the Muslim Empires in general, and the Ottomans in particular, proved to be tenacious foes bent on reconquering at least parts of Georgia, the military might wielded by the Russian army won out, even in the face of its greatest challenge during the Crimean War. Thus, Georgia remained defended from external foes. An internal obstacle, however, also met its end at the

Russian resolve to remain in control of this region. The recalcitrant nobility, who played a crucial part in undermining centralized power in medieval Georgia and kept their country divided until the advent of tsarist rule, were brought to heal by Russian administration. Once Hodil 55 again, in the name of defending imperial priorities and sovereignty, Russians inadvertently removed two major obstacles to the formation of Georgian nationalism: predatory empires and divisive aristocracy. In this manner, Georgians, for the most part, passively watched as Russia opened the door for national sentiment to develop.

Finally, Russian administrators also provided a more active opportunity for Georgians to take the reins of their country and shape the policies that ruled it. Under the wise and practical command of men such as Aleksei Ermolov and Michael Vorontsov, imperial administration morphed from what had been a more exclusively Russian affair, with little chance of local participation, to a government open to the inclusion of Georgians. Such governors-general and viceroys gave locals, in the form of their elites, the chance to take part in law-making, judicial procedures, and other various aspects of governing their state. For Ermolov and Vorontsov, employing the Georgians served to pacify a difficult region of the empire, smoothing the process of governance and making the land more prosperous. For Georgians (or at least the nobility), this act meant that their own people now had some control over their unified country and nation, bringing them to the brink of forming the national cause.

So it can be seen that this sequence of events, from unifying Georgia, to defending it from foreign and indigenous threats to consolidation, to providing opportunity for at least some indigenous say in the ruling government, allowed the birth of a form of Georgian nationalism.

Embodied in the example of Ilia Chavchavadze, those Georgians who ascribed to this nationalism sought to progress this still fragile concept by working within the imperial system.

In this way, the Russian Empire served as an unintentional incubator for this movement, affording the Georgians the protection under which they could develop the idea of their nation. Hodil 56

This circumstance, however, did not last, as the rise of radical revolutionaries throughout the late 19th century swept away any hope of such a national path. Several factors weakened this base of nationalism that had developed in the first half of that century, leaving it vulnerable to the firebrands of socialism. These include the decline of the Georgian nobility following the emancipation of their serfs, the rise of a “rapacious” Armenian middle-class that dominated Georgian industry, the increasingly reactionary nature of the government in St.

Petersburg (desirous of re-establishing russification efforts), and the fragmentation of the

Georgian intelligentsia by the 1870s.130 This left Georgian society open to the influence of Marx and his various devotees, who made themselves heard and felt throughout Russia during the waning years of the imperial period. Interestingly, as Jones notes, the Georgian Social

Democrats saw the value of the national identity developed in the late imperial period and championed national rights in their version of socialism.131 As the empire fell in 1917 to the forces of socialism, however, so did hopes for this coupling of socialism and Georgian nationalism. Briefly independent in the form of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War spelled doom for self–determination, and the Caucasian state was forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union.

This outcome begs some interesting questions that are certainly worthy of further research. Despite giving rise to a Georgian intelligentsia aiming for eventual independence, the more liberal policies of men such as Vorontsov, proved to be arguably the best way of controlling Transcaucasia, maintaining relative peace and prosperity. Why, then, did political

130 Suny, Georgian Nation, 115; 139; 140-141; 132. 131 Stephen F. Jones, Socialism in Georgian Colors: The European Road to Social Democracy 1883-1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 29. Hodil 57 ideology regarding the region become more reactionary and move towards greater levels of russification? Though this circumstance alienated border regions across the Russian Empire, a specific study of the Georgian case would be insightful. In comparison with similar studies of other peripheral areas, it might reveal the reasons behind the overall attitude of reaction emanating from St. Petersburg and the tsar. Of course, the personalities of the last Russian sovereigns and their advisors, such as the conservative statesmen (and mentor to Alexander III and Nicholas II) Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev, certainly played an influential role in the policies of the late empire. Particular situations outside of the capital, such as the discontinuation of the relatively liberal policies of Vorontsov in Georgia, however, should be studied further in order to determine their part in the establishment of reactionary politics.

Another intriguing inquiry is how the ideals of Marx and socialism were able to gain such a strong foothold in Georgia. Some of the future Soviet Union’s greatest leaders, such as

Lavrentiy Beria and Joseph Stalin found their beginnings in the socialist movement in this country. Can this border region be used as a microcosm for the rise of socialism in the Russian

Empire on the whole? Did the national tendencies built in the first half of the 19th century play any role in differentiating the Georgian socialist agenda from the international movement? The latter question could prove instrumental in determining why Georgians established an independent democratic republic, rather than willingly joining the Soviet Union after the fall of the Russian Empire.

Indeed, a broader question must be posed: how did the Soviet Union aid in the continuation of Georgian national efforts, if at all? Such a companion piece of research could provide vital insight on how Soviet rule compared to imperial government concerning the Hodil 58 important issues of nationalism and nationality policy. Determining whether the communist regime undermined or advanced (inadvertently or not) Georgian nationalism could provide a vital link between the above study on imperial rule and present day Russian-Georgian relations.

This leads to a final question: if the national movement founded under the rule of the empire proved so weak as to be swept aside by the radicalism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, what, if anything, remains of it today? How has it shaped the Georgian nation in its present form? Most visibly, the foundations of Georgian nationalism birthed in the first decades of its incorporation by Russia can be seen in the borders of Georgia today. The basic area of the

Georgian nation-state, though altered to suit the purposes of communist leaders during Soviet rule, remains the same today. The imperial unification of the disparate kingdoms and domains provided Georgia with its basic outline and gave it a particular and contiguous territory that can be called distinctly Georgian. Perhaps just as important, the Russian Empire educated and gave arena to the voice of Georgian nationalist leaders in the mid-1800s, who revived their medieval culture and created a tradition of questioning central authority, be it the tsar in St. Petersburg or the General Secretary in Moscow. Again, Ilia Chavchavadze serves as a perfect example of a champion of Georgian tradition and literature over the superficial imposition of Russian forms on Georgia.132 He set the stage for his future countrymen to take up vocal opposition to Russian domination, including the current President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, who struggles to this day against increased Russian influence over his country.

Of course, one must advise caution in claiming direct correlation of present Georgian nationalism with the imperial period without heeding the possibility of Soviet influence in

132 Suny, Georgian Nation, 127. Hodil 59 between. Also, a careful study of other former lands of the Russian Empire, such as Ukraine or

Central Asia, could clarify the effect that imperial rule had on the foundation of peripheral national movements and how they manifest in their modern counterparts. Still, without such studies, evidence abounds that some of the core elements of nationalism that endure today found their beginnings under tsarist rule and that Russian administration and administrators played a vital, if unintended, role in the foundation of the national movement in Georgia.

Hodil 60

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