NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 1

Draft version 1.2 02.10.2020, submitted for review in Journal of Experimental Psychology - General. This paper has not been peer reviewed. Please do not copy or cite without author's permission Non-human Superhumans -

Understanding Moral Disapproval of Neurotechnological Enhancement

Mika Koverola*¹, Anton Kunnari², Marianna Drosinou², Jussi Palomäki¹, Ivar R. Hannikainen³, Michaela Jirout Košová4, Robin Kopecký4, Jukka Sundvall¹e & Michael Laakasuo¹e e: equal contributions.

* Corresponding author ¹University of Helsinki, Faculty of Arts, Dep. of Digital Humanities, Cognitive Science ²University of Helsinki, Faculty of Medicine, Dep. of Psychology and Logopedics ³University of Granada, Departamento de Filosofía I 4Charles University (Czechia)

Author Note

This research was supported by the Jane and Aatos Erkko Foundation. We have no conflicts

of interest to disclose. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Mika

Koverola at [email protected]. Data and materials can be accessed at

https://osf.io/5h8a4/?view_only=c6784cd9401d42939d1986863d994e56

Wordcount: 9292

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Abstract

Through five vignette-based experiments, we assessed people’s moral reactions toward various cognition-enhancing brain implants, including their overall approval and perceived fairness, as well as the dehumanization of brain-implanted agents. Across diverse forms of enhancement, memory (Studies 1-4), general intelligence (Study 5A) and emotional stability

(Study 5B), people generally approved of curing ailments, and even of attaining optimal human performance, but expressed greater opposition toward superhuman levels of enhancement. Further analyses of individual differences indicated that the tendency to condemn 'transhumanist' technologies was linked to sexual disgust sensitivity and moralization of the binding foundations—two characteristic correlates of a conservative worldview. In turn, science fiction hobbyism was tied to greater approval of brain implants.

We also examined potential idiosyncrasies associated with our stimulus materials and did not find reliable effects of any secondary factors on moral attitudes. Collectively, our studies reveal certain moral boundaries to neurotechnological enhancement, which are rooted in bioconservative affective and moral dispositions, but are relaxed among science fiction hobbyists.

Keywords: brain implant, cognitive enhancement, dehumanization, sexual disgust, Moral

Foundations Theory

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Non-human Superhumans -

Understanding Moral Disapproval of Neurotechnological Enhancement

The theme of making oneself more intelligent or perceptive is a recurring theme throughout different cultures, from ancient Greek religion (Ahearne-Kroll, 2014), and the

Indian yogic tradition (Aguiar & Borowski, 2013) to Western mysticism (Mathers, 1904).

Perhaps the most famous example of fictional cognitive enhancement in the West is the story of Dr. Faust, who uses black magic to call upon the Devil and trade his soul for knowledge and pleasure (Marlowe, 1604; von Goethe, 1808). In modern times, neurocognitive enhancement has become a fixture of the modern science fiction genre, owing in part to movies like The Matrix and Johnny Mnemonic released in the late 1990s. In this paper, we examine a suite of moral attitudes in relation to neurocognitive enhancement, including judgments of ethical approval and dehumanization, drawing on experimental methods and individual differences approaches.

The current state of enhancement technology falls short of the visionary aspirations of, for instance, downloading kung fu into one’s brain as in The Matrix. However, first generation neural implants have seen moderate success: for instance, cochlear implants enable Deaf people to regain their hearing (Ylikoski & Raivio, 1997) and deep brain stimulating microchips alleviate the symptoms of Parkinson’s disease (Houston et al., 2018). More advanced neural implants that would for instance allow individuals to enhance their memory recall (Hampson et al., 2018) or control robotic limbs (Clites et al., 2018) are being piloted but face several practical challenges. If the neural implants of the Matrix movies ever come to life, it is not likely to happen in the near future.

Although these technological developments remain a fantasy, it seems clear that humanity has long been torn by such a prospect: Though many are fascinated by the idea of NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 4 maximizing the mind's cognitive capacities, there also seems to be a moral apprehension to cognitive enhancement--which shows up already in fiction. Dr. Faust ends up tragically losing all he holds dear, irrevocably corrupts his soul, and is finally carried to Hell by the

Devil after bargaining for more knowledge. Even in the cyberpunk genre, where brain- enhancing implants are an everyday technology, the moral of the story is frequently the same: that too much enhancement leads to mental illness or characters “frying” their brains (for examples, see most characters in Mona Lisa Overdrive by William Gibson, 1988). This echoes concerns voiced by The President’s Council on Bioethics (2003) that enhanced individuals may end up “turning into someone else” or undergo other forms of “soul corruption”. Leon Kass (2002), former chair of the Council, called cognitive enhancement technologies “dehumanizing”.

Empirical evidence on folk dualism (Richert & Harris, 2008; Anglin, 2014) and the concept of personal identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014, 2015; Heiphetz et al., 2018;

Jirout Košová et al., forthcoming) helps to substantiate these ethical concerns: The traits that play a central role in the folk characterization of soul overlap substantially with the traits that constitute the core of the folk concept of personal identity (i.e., the “essential moral self” and the “true self”).

Moral attitudes toward cognitive enhancements have been examined by various philosophers and interdisciplinary research teams (e.g. Fitz et al., 2014; Landy et al., 2017;

Scheske & Schnall, 2012; Hyman, 2011; Bostrom & Roache, 2007). In this literature, four ethical concerns emerge repeatedly: (1) authenticity (i.e., whether the achievements of enhanced individuals can be considered truly theirs), (2) safety (i.e., whether there are considerable negative side-effects of enhancement), (3) fairness (i.e., whether enhancement confers undue advantages to individuals), and (4) social pressure (whether enhancement technologies could become a de facto demand, e.g., in professional contexts). Another NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 5 recurring theme is the distinction between treatment and enhancement (Daniels, 2000; Wolpe,

2002): the general public and bioethicists usually agree that using medical technologies for treatment is acceptable, but using them to gain superhuman abilities is not (Sahakian &

Morein-Zamir, 2011; Persson & Savulescu, 2008; although, for contrasting views see Greely et al., 2008; Gazzaniga, 2005).

Fitz and colleagues (2014) studied public attitudes towards cognitive enhancement and found that each of the four moral concerns listed above mattered. That is, when individuals use enhancement technologies, they are seen as (i) less responsible for their achievements,

(ii) gaining an unfair advantage, (iii) exposed to health risks, and (iv) pressured by their peers to use such technologies. Some of these effects have been conceptually replicated, for instance, in Landy and colleagues' (2017) study. They also found that performance enhancing drugs were more tolerated in academic contexts than in athletic contexts. In a similar vein,

Scheske & Schnall (2012) explored pharmacological cognitive enhancement and found that participants were particularly sensitive to safety and health issues and concerned about possible coercion or social pressure. They also observed what they label as “irrational” concerns, like a preference for certain modes of delivery (pill vs. injection) and for the

“naturalness” of cognitive enhancers.

In our current set of studies, we took a slightly different angle. Our aim was to elucidate the cognitive processes underlying moral attitudes toward emerging technologies by adopting an individual differences approach. We focused on judgments of restoration versus enhancement, as these themes were highlighted by previous research. In addition to probing people's moral judgments of enhancement itself, we examined the potential dehumanizing effects of enhancement.

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Individual differences, science fiction hobbyism and norms as elucidations of moral judgment

Existing evidence in moral psychology has focused on characterizing the factors that universally determine attitudes toward enhancement, and yet anecdotal evidence suggests that enhancement constitutes a divisive issue. As such, we should not expect any moral judgments to be universal a priori, but instead focus attention on factors within those who judge (see

Young & Saxe, 2011 for a brief review on this subject). For instance, ample work in moral psychology has documented a role of disgust in connection to moral judgment (see e.g.

Schaich Borg et al., 2008; Haidt et al., 1997), and individual differences in disgust sensitivity are associated with self-placement on the liberal-conservative ideological continuum (Inbar et al., 2012). There is also evidence that sexual disgust specifically (see Tybur et al., 2009) predicts disapproval of transhumanist technologies like mind uploading (Laakasuo et al.,

2018; Laakasuo et al., 2020). Why individual differences in disgust proneness would be associated with moral evaluations of situations that are not themselves disgust-evoking (see also Laakasuo et al., 2017) is still poorly understood; but such empirical connections may ultimately help develop a more cohesive theory of moral cognition.

In addition to dispositional affect, it is important to examine individual differences in moral preferences and their role in judgments of novel situations such as cognitive enhancement. The Moral Foundations Theory (MFT, see Graham et al., 2009, 2011) proposes a set of different foundations for moral judgment, with the importance of each foundation varying from person to person. The moral foundations can be roughly grouped into two categories: individualizing (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity) and binding (ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity) moral values. Political liberals tend to emphasize the individualizing moral foundations, while conservatives demonstrate concern for all five moral foundations (see e.g. Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Waytz et al., 2019). These values NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 7 also predict performance on behavioral measures of prosociality (e.g., individualizing moral values are linked to prosociality in economic games; see Clark et al., 2017). It is not yet clear where cognitive enhancement would land in terms of moral foundations. As mentioned earlier, people express concerns about fairness when it comes to a technology that can concentrate privilege among people with access to enhancement technologies, suggesting that condemnation of cognitive enhancement would arise among people who prioritize individualizing values. On the other hand, enhancement technologies may be seen primarily as violations of bodily purity, or as deviation from ingroup norms, which would make them a concern for those who prioritize binding values. Furthermore, previous research has shown that the individual levels of 'science fiction hobbyism' are associated with moral approval of mind upload technologies, even after controlling for the effects of moral foundations

(Laakasuo et al., 2018). It therefore stands to reason that science fiction hobbyists could also hold more favorable attitudes toward brain implants. So, we included a measure of science fiction hobbyism in our studies.

Finally, we wished to examine the effect of descriptive norms (i.e., regarding the frequency or prevalence of target behaviors) on people’s personal willingness to use enhancement technologies (see Köbis et al., 2015; Reno et al., 1993). In addition to injunctive norms, norms about what should be done or avoided “because people think it is right/wrong”, descriptive norms (about what people typically do or avoid doing) are also known to affect people's behavior. For instance, sometimes people might behave in ways they themselves consider immoral if they view the immoral behaviour as sufficiently common—i.e., as a descriptive norm (see Köbis et al., 2015; Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014). Our approach was to ask people to estimate the frequency or prevalence of enhancement technology use (once the technology is available) and examine whether these descriptive norm judgments help to predict people's stated willingness to use the corresponding enhancement technologies. NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 8

Common moral concerns, such as the fairness or safety of enhancement, could potentially be implicated in situations in which enhancement technologies are considered normative in the descriptive, but not the injunctive, sense. For example, enhancement may be considered unsafe, unfair or dangerous, but still yield rewards that drive a majority to adopt it nonetheless. Inquiring into both descriptive and injunctive (i.e., moral foundations) norms may shed light on the interplay between these beliefs in shaping first-person behavior.

Dehumanization of technology users

A stream of moral psychological research (e.g. Ward et al., 2013; Gray et al., 2012;

Schein & Gray, 2018) suggests that anthropomorphism, mind perception and dehumanization are important building blocks of moral cognitive processes. This raises a subsidiary question:

Do people tend to dehumanize cognitively-enhanced agents? In addition to how people might morally judge acts of cognitive enhancement, we were interested in exploring whether enhancement would affect the perception of humanity in cognitively-enhanced persons.

Dehumanization refers to “perceiving a group or person as lacking humanness”, whereas the related concept of infrahumanization refers to the less dramatic situation of “perceiving an out-group as lacking uniquely human attributes relative to an in-group” (as defined by

Haslam & Loughnan, 2014 pp. 401). The theory of infrahumanization, as developed by

Leyens et al. (2000), differs from earlier theories of dehumanization in that it claims humanity of outgroups may be undermined in subtler ways than through outright denial. For the purposes of our studies, we are interested in this mild form of dehumanization of individuals who, though perhaps not part of a concrete outgroup, engage in acts that may lower their perceived “humanity”.

Theories of dehumanization and infrahumanization state that denials of humanity are based on a general human tendency toward categorical and essentialist thinking. In this way NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 9 of thinking, e.g. humans and non-human animals form two non-overlapping categories and each has some sort of deeper essence which cannot be altered (see Smith, 2014 for a review and criticism of the connection between essentialist thinking and dehumanization). Both theoretical approaches propose two sets of traits that are important in judgments of humanness: traits that form a basis for humanity but may be shared by other animals, and traits that are only found in humans and thus differentiate humans from other animals.

Generally speaking, the traits that differentiate humans from other animals tend to be more complex, and acquired in later stages of cognitive development: e.g., social emotions, self- control, and intelligence. The distinctions made by both theories are similar to the categories of experience and agency, or even simply emotion and cognition, as the two basic elements that make us human (Waytz & Norton, 2014; see also Haslam & Loughnan, 2014).

Why should cognitive enhancement reduce the perceived humanness of those who would decide to enhance their capacities? After all, it seems that the traits people consider most uniquely human are exactly the kinds of traits people typically want to enhance, and dehumanizing enhancement users would consist of actively denying that they have these uniquely human traits. People express more willingness to enhance traits such as concentration, mathematical abilities or rote memory - in themselves (Riis et al., 2008) or their children (Wagner et al., 2018) - than traits such as empathy, which are considered core parts of the self. It thus seems that if people were to enhance something about their cognitive- emotional capabilities, it would be exactly the traits considered more “uniquely human”

(more closely connected to the core of personal identity; see e.g. Nichols & Bruno, 2010;

Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). However, people may perceive a trade-off when it comes to enhancement. Castelo et al. (2019) found that people rated a hypothetical user of cognitive enhancement as more “robot-like” if the user enhanced their cognitive capacities above the normal human baseline than if they were restoring capacities lost due to illness. That is, it NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 10 seems that an increase in a person’s cognitive capacities may come at the cost of others perceiving that person as having lost some of their emotional capacities. While memory, attention or intelligence may not be considered as core parts of the self, altering them to above the human baseline may lead in a less typical kind of dehumanization, where the emotional side of humanity is questioned.

Current studies

We investigated people's reactions to cognitive enhancement from three angles: moral approval, perceived unfairness, and dehumanization using the contrastive vignettes method.

We expanded on previous studies in this area by contrasting how people feel about cognitive enhancement technologies when they are used for treatment, versus for surpassing normal human trait levels. Previous studies have focused on situational variations and have aimed at understanding whether individuals would wish to take enhancements for themselves

(e.g. Riis et al., 2008) or whether people are approving of enhancements given to others

(Wagner et al., 2018). We focused on the latter: moral perception and cognition in situations perceived from the third person perspective.

At the beginning of this set of studies we did not have precise a priori hypotheses. We did however expect to find differences between judgments of enhancement and treatment.

Recently, the Pew Research Center published findings on people’s preferences for transhumanist technologies, or human enhancement (2016). According to these results, people generally think positively about futuristic technology used to mitigate the adverse effects of age or illness, and negatively about the technology if it is used to enable superhuman abilities. In a similar vein, our first four studies focused on using brain implants for memory enhancement. In these studies, we compared three levels of enhancement: NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 11 alleviating an ailment, attaining optimal human level, and attaining superhuman enhancement. Study 5 conceptually replicated the main results in related brain enhancements.

We also aimed to see whether cultural influences such as science fiction literacy (see

Laakasuo et al., 2018) affect moral judgments of these technologies. Furthermore, since implanting microchips in human brains is a de facto body envelope violation (see Rozin et al., 1999), it stands to reason they might evoke pathogen disgust reactions (Tybur et al.,

2009). Previous research regarding disgust reactions towards chemically induced cognitive enhancement has been inconclusive regarding this issue (see Landy et al., 2017; Riis et al.,

2008; Scheske & Schnall, 2012).

In Study 1 we tested our dependent variables and materials. In Study 2, we tested whether presenting the brain implant technology as either an experimental or as an established procedure would impact moral attitudes (in order to also assess the perceived level of “soft” peer pressure). In Studies 3 and 4 we wanted to investigate whether the method by which enhancement is administered affects judgment and, in Studies 5A and 5B, whether the patterns we found for memory enhancement (in Studies 1 to 4) would emerge for other kinds of cognitive enhancement.

After reporting our experimental results, we present a series of covariate analyses (in the aggregate for all studies), investigating the role of moral foundations and science fiction hobbyism in moral judgment, perceived unfairness and dehumanization.

General Methods

Participants & Design

In each study, participants were randomized into one of the experimental conditions with an equal probability for each. The experimental design was 1×3 in Study 1 and 2×3 in Studies

2-5. Studies 1 and 2 were online studies (156 Finnish participants recruited from online NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 12

forums and 435 MTurk crowdworkers, respectively) and studies 3-5 were lab studies (198,

213 and 263 participants). Details in Table 1. Full recruitment and process descriptions in

Appendix E.

Table 1.

Participants in Studies 1-5.

Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5

Participants (N) 156 435 198 213 263

Male 78 156 76 93 114

Female 67 273 122 120 149

Mean age 33.06 33.40 29.51 32.68 30.15

SDage 12.16 9.95 9.43 12.00 9.93

% with at least a bachelor’s degree 30% 58% 58% 66% 63%

Level of income (see note) 76% 75% 90% 83% 89%

Note. Participants in Studies 5A and 5B were the same. Level of income = % participants with

average or lower income subjectively compared to the general population. Genders do not always NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 13 sum to the total N because some participants did not indicate that their gender was either male or female.

Procedures

Participants first answered the covariate questionnaires, then read a randomized experimental vignette and answered our dependent variables, and finally provided demographic information.

Materials

Stimuli

Study 1 had three variations of a vignette taking place in the year 2050. The vignettes described a scenario where memory-improving brain implants are everyday procedures used to treat various illnesses. An office worker named Alex is about to retire and is given the opportunity to have an implant operation. Depending on experimental condition, the operation would either cure his early stage dementia (alleviating an ailment), restore his memory capacity to the level of his youth (optimal human level), or give him the ability to perfectly remember everything he has read, heard or otherwise experienced (superhuman enhancement). After discussing the treatment with a doctor, Alex decides to sign onto the waiting list for the procedure. The outcome of the implant operation was not described.

Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the three vignettes: alleviation, optimization or superhuman enhancement.

In Studies 2-4, the vignettes were modified to include another factor besides the level of enhancement (descriptions provided in the sections for each study). See Appendix D for examples of vignettes. Study 5 is described below. NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 14

Dependent Variables

All items were anchored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). See Appendices

A, B and C for full lists of items and further details and Table 2 for Cronbach’s alphas.

Moral Approval. Our dependent variable was the average score across 14 items measuring participant's moral approval of the decision to start using an enhancement technology

(example items: “Having the operation is the proper thing to do”, “It should be illegal to have operations such as this” [reverse coded]). Higher scores indicate greater moral approval.

Perceived Unfairness. Our secondary dependent variable was the average score of four items assessing the perceived unfairness of gaining an advantage by means of enhancement

(example items: “For someone in work life the advantage provided by the microchip would be unfair”, “I think everyone should have the chance of having a similar operation” [reverse- coded]). Higher scores indicate greater perceived unfairness.1

Dehumanization. In Study 1, we measured the dehumanization of the vignette’s main character, Alex, using a single Likert item:”In my opinion, Alex is not completely human after the operation”. From Study 2 onwards, we included a 9-item exploratory dehumanization scale we developed. Example items: “After the operation, Alex can still feel emotions” (reverse coded), “After the operation, I wouldn’t shake Alex’s hand”. Higher scores indicate more dehumanization. The items were modeled after the recommendations of

Haslam (2006) and Haslam et al. (2012) but adapted to our context.

1 One item was removed from the scale for Studies 5A and 5B, because it concerned whether users of enhancement technology should be disqualified from competitive memory sport events. As such, the item was unrelated to the subject of. Studies 5A and 5B (IQ and mood, respectively). NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 15

Table 2.

Cronbach’s alphas for the dependent variables across studies.

Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study5A Study5B

Dependent Variable

Moral Approval .91 .91 .91 .92 .92 .93

Perceived Unfairness .68 .71 .66 .72 .69 .68

Dehumanization N/A 0.92 .89 .88 .90 .90

Note. All DVs measured on a Likert scale from 1 to 7. Moral approval: 14 items, perceived

unfairness: 4 items, dehumanization: 9 items. Dehumanization in Study 1 was measured

using a single-item measure, so alpha cannot be calculated. Studies 5A and 5B had the same

sample of participants.

Data Analysis

Experimental analysis

We ran one-way ANOVAs (Study 1) and full factorial two-way ANOVAs (Studies 2-5) to

check whether participants' mean answers on each DV (moral approval, perceived unfairness

and dehumanization) differed significantly across conditions. Where there was an effect, we

used contrast analyses to assess the significance and direction of pairwise differences

between conditions. For Studies 5A and 5B, we also conducted a linear mixed model analysis

comparing the results of the two experiments, since the same set of participants participated

in both versions of the study. We ran this analysis for each of the three dependent variables

separately. These models did not include any interaction terms for the within-subjects factor, NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 16 as participants were randomized into the between-subjects conditions independently for both studies. See Table 3 for statistics and Figures 1 and 2 for the estimated marginal means of

Studies 1-4, Figure 3 for Studies 5A and 5B.

Covariate analyses

First, to assess whether a covariate predicted our dependent variables in general, we analysed the connection between covariates and dependent variables by collapsing the secondary factors and running one-way ANCOVAs (Study 1) and full factorial two-way

ANCOVAs (Studies 2-5). Next, we ran full factorial ANCOVA models and report the slope of each covariate for each DV separately. We included the main effects of our manipulation and of the covariate, as well as the manipulation×covariate interaction in the model.

Analyses of Norms

To examine whether beliefs about others’ willingness to use an enhancement technology affect one’s own willingness, we employed logistic regression models. We regressed the participants’ own willingness to take the implant on the experimental factors and participants’ belief about how many others would take the implant.

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Figure 1. Means of moral approval and perceived unfairness in all conditions in Studies 1-4. Items in both measures were on a scale from 1 to 7. Error bars indicate 95% Confidence Interval. NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 18

Figure 2. Standardized means (z-scores) for dehumanization in all conditions in Studies 1-4. Error bars indicate 95% Confidence Interval.

Table 3. Main ANOVA results from Studies 1-5 NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 19 STUDY 1 Level of Enhancement

(memory chip) F(2, 153)

2 DV F ƞp p

Moral Approval 8.94 0.105 < .001

Perceived Unfairness 11.88 0.134 <.001

Dehumanization 9.79 0.063 .007

STUDY 2 Level of Enhancement Experimental/Established Interaction

(memory chip) F(2, 429) F(1, 429) F(2, 429)

2 2 2 DV F ƞp p F ƞp p F ƞp p

Moral Approval 21.87 .092 < .001 0.74 .002 .389 1.99 .008 .137

Perceived Unfairness 11.85 .051 < .001 0.36 .001 .546 4.55 .015 .011

Dehumanization 8.37 .038 < .001 0.43 .001 .508 1.12 .005 .324

STUDY 3 Level of Enhancement Surgery/Nano-robots Interaction

(memory chip) F(2, 192) F(1, 192) F(2, 192)

2 2 2 DV F ƞp p F ƞp p F ƞp p

Moral Approval 8.39 .080 < .001 1.79 .009 .182 0.23 .002 .789

Perceived Unfairness 10.34 .097 < .001 0.48 .003 .486 1.03 .011 .355

Dehumanization 4.07 .041 .018 0.14 .001 .701 1.64 .017 .196

STUDY 4 Level of Enhancement Surgery/Drug Interaction

(memory chip) F(2, 207) F(1, 207) F(2, 207)

2 2 2 DV F ƞp p F ƞp p F ƞp p

Moral Approval 19.74 .165 < .001 0.90 .003 .341 1.00 0.01 .367

Perceived Unfairness 28.72 .213 < .001 5.13 .025 .024 0.10 .001 .902

Dehumanization 14.27 .116 < .001 5.46 .026 .020 0.17 .002 .838

STUDY 5A Level of Enhancement Experimental/Established Interaction

(IQ chip) F(2, 246) F(1, 246) F(2, 246) NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 20

2 2 2 DV F ƞp p F ƞp p F ƞp p

Moral Approval 3.71 .029 .025 1.779 .006 .183 2.32 .018 .099

Perceived Unfairness 4.31 .032 .014 2.694 .010 .102 0.18 .001 .833

Dehumanization 5.69 .045 .003 0.001 .000 .973 0.02 .000 .978

STUDY 5B Level of Enhancement Experimental/Established Interaction

(mood chip) F(2, 246) F(1, 246) F(2, 246)

2 2 2 DV F ƞp p F ƞp p F ƞp p

Moral Approval 17.76 .129 < .001 0.57 .002 .448 0.44 .004 .638

Perceived Unfairness 19.87 .144 < .001 4.25 0.02 .040 0.02 .000 .979

Dehumanization 13.73 .104 < .001 0.88 .003 .348 0.55 .004 .576

Note. Significant p-values shaded. Studies 5A and 5B had the same sample of participants. see Figures 1 and 2 for means and 95% CIs for cell values. The level of enhancement ma- nipulation had three levels in each study: alleviating an ailment, “optimal” performance, and superhuman performance.

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Study 1

In this first study we aimed to test our experimental paradigm, vignettes and dependent measures. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions in a 1×3 (Level: Alleviation,

Optimization, Superhuman) between-subjects design and read about a person undergoing brain surgery for cognitive enhancement. We then assessed participants' moral attitudes, perceptions of unfairness and attitudes of dehumanization toward the enhanced agent. See

General Methods and Appendices A-E for details.

Results and discussion of Study 1

Level of enhancement had a significant effect on each of the measures, with significantly lower approval, higher perceived unfairness, and higher dehumanization in the superhuman enhancement condition compared to both of the other conditions. Results of Study 1 suggest that, in the context of brain implants, the level of enhancement matters. Namely, fixing existing issues or regaining optimal “normal” human performance in memory functioning were considered generally acceptable, fair and not dehumanizing. Planned contrast analysis indicates that superhuman memory enhancement, compared to both alleviation and optimal level, is perceived as less acceptable and more unfair (moral approval: B = -0.61, 95% CI = [-

0.92, -0.30], t(153) = -3.888, p < .001; perceived unfairness: B = 0.99, 95% CI = [0.584,

1.40], t(153) = 4.808, p < .001). Furthermore, users of superhuman enhancement were dehumanized relative to alleviated and optimized users (B = 0.43, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.75], t(153) = 2.640, p = .009).

Study 2

Emerging technologies may be viewed negatively merely by virtue of being new and NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 22 unfamiliar (Inbar et al., in press). In Study 2, we adapted the vignettes in Study 1 to vary levels of familiarity. We tested whether presenting the brain implant technology as either an experimental or an established procedure would affect how it is viewed – also relating to the perceptions of how risk-free these technologies are. Thus, we sought to replicate our results from Study 1, and also to evaluate whether moral disapproval and dehumanization are rooted in neophobia. Participants were assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (familiarity: experimental vs established) ×3 (enhancement: alleviating, optimal, superhuman) between- subjects design and read about a person undergoing brain surgery for cognitive enhancement.

We then assessed participants' moral attitudes, perceptions of unfairness and attitudes of dehumanization toward the enhanced agent as in Study 1. See General Methods and

Appendices A-E for details.

Results and discussion of Study 2

Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1. Moral attitudes varied across levels of enhancement: i.e., superhuman enhancement was viewed as less acceptable (B = -0.613, 95%

CI = [-0.82, -0.40], t(429) = -5.701, p < .001), more unfair (see below) and more dehumanizing (B = 0.373, 95% CI = [0.176, 0.57], t(429) = p < .001) than the other two types of enhancement (See Table 3 for full statistics). Meanwhile, there were no main effects of familiarity on any of our measures. An enhancement-by-familiarity interaction effect arose for perceived unfairness: Specifically, in the experimental technology condition all treatments were seen as comparably fair/unfair (superhuman vs. rest: B = 0.32, 95% CI = [-0.04, 0.69], t(429) = 1.726, p = .085; alleviating vs. optimal: B = 0.09, 95% CI = [-0.52, 0.33], t(429) = -

0.439, p =.660), whereas in the established technology condition there was a statistically significant linear trend where the superhuman level was perceived as most unfair

(superhuman vs. rest: B = 0.93, 95% CI = [0.55, 1.31], t(429) = 4.847, p < .001; alleviating NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 23 vs. optimal: B = 0.52, 95% CI = [0.09, 0.95], t(429) = 2.402, p = .016). Thus, while unfairness was greatest for superhuman enhancement using established technologies, no such effects of degree of enhancement arose for users of experimental technologies.

For moral approval and dehumanization, we did not find any effect of familiarity of technology (see Figures 1 and 2). Taken together, the results could imply that incurring the heightened risk of using experimental technologies balances out the unfairness (though not the immorality or dehumanization) of gaining superhuman abilities.

Study 3

Previous studies have shown that invasive events such as surgery (a “body envelope violation”) cause a stronger disgust reaction than non-invasive events (Rozin et al., 1999;

Haidt et al., 1994), which could shape our results. –So, in Study 3, we examine whether the body-envelope violation aspect of enhancement promotes moral condemnation and dehumanization. To this end, we contrasted different methods of administration: receiving surgery vs. ingesting nano-robots. Thus, in the control condition, users ingested nano-robots and these nano-robots then enhanced the user's memory. In a 2 (administration: surgery vs nano-robots) × 3 (enhancement: alleviating, optimal, superhuman) between-subjects design, participants were assigned to one of six conditions. In each condition, participants read about a person undergoing brain surgery or ingesting nano-robots for cognitive enhancement, and then assessed the morality and fairness of undergoing such enhancement, as well as the user's dehumanization. See General Methods and Appendices A-E for details.

Results and discussion of Study 3

Again, level of enhancement had a significant effect on each of our measures, with superhuman enhancement viewed as less acceptable, more unfair, and more dehumanizing NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 24 than alleviation and optimization (moral approval: B = -0.64, 95% CI = [-0.95, -0.32], t(192)

= -3.950, p < .001; perceived unfairness: B = 0.88, 95% CI = [0.50, 1.26], t(192) = 4.521, p

< .001; dehumanization: B = 0.43, 95% CI = [0.13, 0.73], t(192) = 2.846, p = .004), replicating the main findings of Studies 1 and 2. However, we found no effects of the method of administration on any of our measures (i.e., no main effects or administration×level interactions), indicating that our subjects did not perceive a moral distinction between cognitive enhancement via surgery and via nano-robots (See Figure 1 for moral approval and perceived unfairness and Figure 2 for dehumanization).

This pattern of results provides initial evidence that opposition to cognitive enhancement is not driven primarily by opposition to body envelope violation. However, it is also possible that ingestion (i.e., of nano-robots) and body envelope violations elicit comparable disgust reactions (see Rozin et al., 1999), and belong to a more general class of disgust elicitors which inspire the moralization of enhancement.

Study 4

The evidence in Study 3 indicated that surgery and ingestion do not differ in a morally relevant sense. For instance, subjects may perceive both behaviors to constitute “body envelope violations” in a broader sense (Rozin et al., 1999). Thus, in Study 4, we contrasted surgically implanted microchips with traditional pharmacological intervention. Participants were assigned to one of six conditions in a 2×3 between-subjects design, and read about a person undergoing cognitive enhancement, and evaluated their behavior as in previous studies. See General Methods and Appendices A-E for details.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 25

Results and discussion of Study 4

We replicated the variation across levels of enhancement once again: Superhuman enhancement was viewed as less acceptable, more unfair, and more dehumanizing than the other two levels of enhancement (moral approval: B = -0.96, 95% CI = [-1.26, -0.66], t(207)

= -6.281, p < .001; perceived unfairness: B = 1.47, 95% CI = [1.08, 1.85], t(207) = 7.452, p

< .001; dehumanization: B = 0.73, 95% CI = [0.46, 1.01], t(207) = 5.316, p < .001).

This time, however, we also found main effects on method of administration (i.e., on perceived unfairness and dehumanization, but not on moral approval): specifically, traditional pharmacological interventions were seen as more fair and less dehumanizing than novel interventions. No corresponding effect arose for moral approval (See Figure 1 for moral approval and perceived unfairness and Figure 2 for dehumanization).

This implies that some of people's moral disapproval of brain implants is driven by negative attitudes toward the method of administration. In Study 3, we observed that receiving surgery and ingesting nano-robots were seen as comparably immoral methods of cognitive enhancement. In contrast, in Study 4, receiving comparable enhancement through a conventional method (i.e., medication) garnered more favorable attitudes. This effect of method of administration arose only for while perceived unfairness and dehumanization, hinting at a difference between our dependent variables: Moral approval may be influenced solely by the outcome of the enhancement (i.e., exceeding optimal human abilities or not) while perceived unfairness and dehumanization are also partly driven by the method by which enhancement is administered.

Studies 5 A and B: General Intelligence and Emotional Stability

Inspired by Strohminger and Nichols' (2014) concept of the Essential Moral Self, we wanted to check whether the same kind of patterns found for memory enhancement in Studies NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 26

1 to 4 would hold for other core components of personal identity, such as emotional stability

(“mood”) and general intelligence (“IQ”). In addition, we wanted to re-run the level of familiarity manipulation from Study 2 to see if the familiarity of the technology may have an effect depending on what part of human cognition is altered, since the results of implant vs. traditional medication in Study 4 could be interpreted as an effect of familiarity. In studies 5A and 5B, participants read two short futuristic stories in a randomized order about a person diagnosed with A) slow cognitive processes and B) recurring periods of anxiety getting a neural implant to help with his symptoms. We maintained the level of enhancement manipulation from Studies 1-4 (A: level of a typical, adequately performing adult / level of a typical, well performing adult / super-human level, B: mitigate anxieties / return the function of the emotional system to the level of a healthy adult / give complete control over one's emotional state).

We also included the level of familiarity manipulation from Study 2. Thus, Study 5 was a

3 between- (level: alleviation, optimization, superhuman) × 2 between- 2 (familiarity: experimental vs established) × 2 within- (domain: IQ, mood) subjects design. Below we report the domain for each level of domain separately: i.e., intelligence as Study 5A, and mood as Study 5B. See General Methods and Appendices A-E for details.

Results of Studies 5A and 5B

5A General Intelligence

Level of enhancement again exerted a significant effect on each of our measures, with the greatest opposition arising toward superhuman enhancement (moral approval: B = -0.46, 95%

CI = [-0.81, -0.11], t(246) = -2.588, p = .010; perceived unfairness: B = 0.62, 95% CI =

[0.20, 1.04], t(246) = 2.919, p < .001; dehumanization: B = 0.44, 95% CI = [0.17, 0.70], t(246) = 3.241, p < .001). There were no main effects of level of familiarity, or interactions NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 27 between level of familiarity and level of enhancement (See Figure 3). However, a contrast analysis revealed that the main effect of level of enhancement on moral approval was driven by the superhuman cell in the experimental technology condition (superhuman vs. the rest, experimental technology: B = -0.81, 95% CI = [-1.31, -0.31], t(246) = -3.211, p = .001; superhuman vs. the rest, established technology: B = -0.11, 95% CI = [-0.60, 0.38], t(246) = -

0.443, p = .658).

5B Emotional Stability

Level of enhancement again had a significant effect on each of our measures. As with memory and intelligence, superhuman mood enhancements were viewed as less acceptable, more unfair, and more dehumanizing than either alleviation or optimization (moral approval:

B = -0.97, 95% CI = [-1.30, -0.65], t(246) = -5.960, p < .001; perceived unfairness: B = 1.18,

95% CI = [0.81, 1.54], t(246) = 6.305, p < .001; dehumanization: B = 0.66, 95% CI = [0.41,

0.91], t(246) = 5.229, p < .001). We also found a main effect of level of familiarity on perceived unfairness, indicating that an established treatment was seen as more fair (See

Figure 3). There were no main effects of level of familiarity on moral approval or dehumanization, nor any two-way interactions for any DVs.

Comparing 5A and 5B

We also ran a two repeated measures ANOVAs for each of our DVs to compare between the results of 5A and 5B; in the first model we just entered the DVs and the dilemma type as the within subjects factor into the model; there was a statistically significant main effect of

Chip type on Moral Acceptance (Higher acceptance of Mood Chips: B = 0.48, F(1,503) = NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 28

34.89, p <.001) and on Perceived Unfairness (IQ chips more unfair: B = 1.23, F(1,503) =

145,05, p <.001). No difference was observed for the Dehumanization.

We then ran a repeated measures ANOVA where we nested the factorial structure of the experiment inside the Chip type. The results indicate that there was a statistically significant interaction effect in the Mood Chip ( F(2, 241)= 4.04, p = .01) condition for Moral

Acceptance, but not for the IQ chip ( F(2, 241)= 0.75, p= 0.47). Contrast analysis indicated that the interaction effect was driven by the Superhuman condition, where experimental mood chip was less accepted than an established one (B = 0.55, F(1,241) = 4.48, p = .03).

With respect to the Perceived Unfairness; there was a main effect of level of Experimentality of the technology in IQ Chip experiment ( F(1,241) = 6.10, B = 0.49, p = .01). No other effects were found.

Discussion of Study 5

The robust effect of level of memory enhancement seen in Studies 1-4 generalized to further core aspects of cognition: specifically, general intelligence and emotional stability.

That is, achieving superhuman emotional stability or intelligence levels elicited greater moral disapproval, and was considered less fair and more dehumanizing, than either alleviating impairments or optimizing those psychological facets within the normal human range (See

Figure 3).

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 29

Figure 3. Means of moral approval, perceived unfairness and dehumanization in all conditions in Studies 5A (IQ) and 5B (mood). Items in all measures were on a scale from 1 to 7. Moral approval and perceived unfairness reported as estimated marginal means; dehumanization reported as standardized means (z-scores). Error bars indicate 95% Confidence Interval.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 30

Cultural and individual differences: The roles of ideology and science fiction exposure

Based on previous studies in which the binding moral foundations have been associated with aversion towards new technologies (e.g. Laakasuo, et al., 2018; Koverola, et al., 2020), we expected that the MFQ binding factor would be associated with disapproval of this technology generally. Given the empirical links between moralization of the binding foundations and individual differences in disgust sensitivity (Rozin et al., 1999), plays a role and included the Three Domains of Disgust Scale. In turn, we expected cultural influences and, in particular, exposure to the idea of neural implants and cognitive enhancement to reduce moral opposition: as a proxy, we hypothesized that science fiction enthusiasts would be display more favorable attitudes toward enhancement. See Table 3 for Cronbach’s alphas.

Covariates

Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). MFQ was originally developed to measure individual differences in intuitive ethics based on five basic pillars of moral foundations

(Graham et al, 2011). However, recent studies suggest the five-factor scale structure is relatively inconsistent and unreliable, and instead propose dividing the MFQ into two factors: individualizing (care/harm + fairness/cheating) and binding (loyalty/betrayal + authority/subversion + sanctity/degradation) (Graham et al., 2012).

Science Fiction Hobbyism Scale. This scale consists of 12 items measuring cultural exposure to science fiction themes, both consumption of science fiction in various forms and involvement in science fiction fandom. Example items: “I consider myself a major consumer of science fiction”, “I think science fiction is an interesting topic”. All items were anchored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with responses averaged to produce a score indicating interest in and exposure to science fiction. For more details see (Laakasuo et al., NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 31

2018). See Appendix F for a full list of items.

Three Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS). TDDS was developed by Tybur and colleagues (2009)

and draws on evolutionary theory. The scale has 21 items and three subscales (i.e., moral,

sexual and pathogen disgust sensitivity; with 7 items each), though our focus in this paper is

on the sexual disgust sensitivity subscale.

Table 4.

Cronbach’s alphas for the covariates across studies.

Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5

Covariate

MFQ .76 .81 .72 .70 .73

Individualizing

MFQ Binding .85 .89 .86 .86 .84

Sci-Fi Hobbyism .89 .91 .89 .91 .89

Sexual Disgust NA .90 .78 .79 .79

Note. Studies 5A and 5B had the same sample of participants.

Covariate Analyses.

First, we analysed the association between levels of enhancement and covariates to detect

the presence of main effects (i.e., collapsing across any secondary factors like method of

enhancement or familiarity of technology). As shown in Table 4, both the MFQ binding

factor and sexual disgust consistently predicted moral disapproval and higher NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 32 dehumanization. Additionally, science fiction hobbyism predicted higher moral approval in most studies. Importantly, we saw no sign reversals in the association between the covariates and the DVs. See Appendix G for full statistics.

Table 5.

Number of studies where a covariate had a statistically significant correlation with a DV

Covariates Moral Acceptance Unfairness Dehumanization

Binding ------+ + + + + + + +

Individualizing + + - -

Sexual Disgust - - - - - + + + + + +

SciFi Hobbyism + + + + - - - -

Note. + indicates a positive correlation, - a negative one. Binding, individualizing and SFH were measured in 6 studies, sexual disgust in 5.

Next, we ran full factorial ANCOVA models with each covariate for each DV separately.

We included the main effects on our manipulation and for the covariate and their interaction in the model. Below we summarize our main findings verbally; see Appendix H for full statistics.

People whose moral preferences leaned more towards the binding orientation found the superhuman scenario less acceptable, more dehumanizing, and often but not always more unfair. Those leaning toward the individualizing orientation occasionally found the superhuman condition less acceptable and more unfair, but never more dehumanizing. The results are in line with our predictions: those who prioritize binding values see superhuman enhancement as generally worrisome, tending to dehumanize enhancement users, whereas NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 33 those who prioritize individualizing values demonstrate concerns about unfairness.

Also as predicted, science fiction hobbyism was positively associated with approval and perceived fairness, but was unrelated to dehumanization. Critically, science fiction hobbyists were also less likely to morally distinguish treatment from enhancement, since SFH was positively associated with approval of superhuman levels of enhancement specifically. Thus, the results stemming from SFH reveal a robust effect of cultural conditioning on acceptance of brain implants and/or cognitive enhancement: Exposure to these themes and ideas (via science fiction) is associated with greater receptivity toward future developments in enhancement technology. These findings also suggest the possibility of variation across countries and age groups, though cross-cultural replications of this finding are needed to draw any firm conclusions.

Sexual disgust sensitivity was associated with disapproval in almost every experimental condition. Regardless of the level of enhancement, those higher in disgust sensitivity consistently saw enhancement as more immoral, unfair and dehumanizing. These results highlight the role of negative affect in opposing to enhancement technologies and may point toward a biological basis for people's rejection of brain implant technology.

In summary, the MFQ binding factor and sexual disgust sensitivity predicted overall negative views of cognitive enhancement, particularly in the superhuman condition. Science fiction hobbyism was linked to favourable views in all conditions. The MFQ individualizing factor seems to be a more mixed case: predicting approval of treatment conditions while also supporting concerns about unfairness. As cognitive enhancement draws different reactions from those who prioritize binding orientation in their moral cognition and those who prioritize individualizing orientation, it seems possible that these technologies will become a future battleground in the so-called “culture wars” between liberals and conservatives

(Graham et al., 2009). NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 34

Descriptive Norms

Descriptive norms refer to the perception of what is, or, in other words, perceptions about how people do in fact behave. In studies 4, 5A and 5B, we included a measure of descriptive norms: Participants were asked to estimate the percentage of the population that would want the implant for enhanced memory (Study 4), general intelligence (Study 5a), or emotional stability (Study 5b). In each of these studies, we also asked participants whether they themselves would be willing to get the implant (with a dichotomous yes/no response). To examine whether beliefs about others’ willingness to use enhancement technology underlie one’s own personal willingness, we used logistic regression models. We regressed participants’ own willingness to get the implant on the experimental factors and their estimate of general willingness in the population. In every study, belief in a greater estimates of others' willingness to receive the implant predicted one’s own willingness. See Figure 4.

For memory-enhancing (Study 4) and intelligence-enhancing (Study 5A) implants, neither the level nor the method of enhancement predicted a participant’s own willingness, and there was no interaction between the two. For the mood-enhancing implant (Study 5B), both level of enhancement and familiarity of technology were significant predictors, and their interaction was significant as well. The experimental status of the technology as well as enhancement that went further than alleviating issues in mood made participants less willing to take an implant. Interestingly, the experimental status of technology attenuated the lowered willingness caused by more drastic outcomes. See Appendix I for detailed results. The results indicate that beliefs about others’ willingness to use cognitive enhancement indeed do act as descriptive norms influencing one’s own willingness to receive an implant, thus supporting that the worries described by Fitz et al. (2014) and Scheske & Schnall (2012) are realistic. NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 35

However, given the correlational nature of the link between descriptive norms and personal willingness, we cannot rule out that this positive association is the result of a common cause, for instance.

In sum, in each of the three studies, there was a positive association between a participant’s belief about others' proclivity to receive the implant and their own personal willingness to do so. The experimental factors only had an effect on willingness for the mood implant, which may imply greater wariness when enhancing something that is considered more of a core part of personal identity than memory or IQ – we will cover this in more depth in the general discussion.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 36

Figure 4. Mean willingness to take an implant as a function of how many other people participants thought would also be willing to take the implant. The percentages on the X axis represent the proportion of the population participants thought would take the implant.

Dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. Crosshair indicates the 50% threshold.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 37

Discussion

Through five studies we measured: 1) moral approval, or the general acceptance of the idea of brain-enhancing implants and people getting such implants, 2) perceived unfairness of the enhancement, and 3) dehumanization of persons using brain implants. In our vignettes, the enhancement attained one of three levels: it either a) alleviated an ailment, b) gave optimal human level performance or c) gave superhuman performance. Studies 1 to 4 concerned various forms of memory enhancement, while Studies 5a and 5b described enhancements of general intelligence and emotional stability, respectively.

Overall, people were quite accepting of brain implants, but a clear pattern emerged: mitigation of ailments was considered acceptable and fair but enhancement to superhuman levels is questionable: morally disapproved, unfair and dehumanizing. Enhancement to an

“optimal” human level was judged practically identically to alleviation, and differences were clearly driven by the superhuman condition in all studies. This is in line with previous studies

(Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, 2011; Wolpe, 2002; Pew Research Center, 2016; Castelo et al.,

2019; Daniels, 2000; Greely et al., 2008; Hyman, 2011; Scheske & Schnall, 2012) which have also concluded that treatment and enhancement are viewed differently. This effect replicated across all our DVs (moral approval, sense of fairness and dehumanization) and all our studies. The DVs, however, showed differential sensitivity to other (i.e., secondary) manipulations and were aligned in different ways with our individual differences measures that assessed both cultural influences as well as more biological features. These alignments will be discussed in detail below.

In Studies 2 and 5, we tested whether describing the method used for enhancement as experimental or established (i.e. familiarity) would affect opinions. We found clear differences in attitudes as a function of familiarity only on perceived unfairness: experimental NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 38 memory (Study 2) and mood (Study 5B) chips were seen as more fair than established ones.

Familiarity had no effect on moral approval or dehumanization.

Inspired by previous links between a binding foundation orientation, sexual disgust and disapproval of related biotechnologies, we tested whether explicitly invasive enhancement

(body envelope violation) like surgery affected judgment in Studies 3 (nanorobotic pills vs. surgery) and 4 (pharmacological pills vs. surgery). Here we found that only traditional pharmacological (normal pills) intervention differed from novel methods in that they were perceived as less unfair and less dehumanizing (similar to Castelo et al.,, 2019). Given the convergent effect of familiarity on fairness in Study 5, it seems possible that the greater fairness of conventional modes of administration is due in part to their greater familiarity, and strictly to particularities of the method of enhancement (such as whether it constitutes a body envelope violation; see also Scheske & Schnall, 2012; Landy et al., 2017). Furthermore, everybody is familiar with “alleviating ailments” and can imagine what an “optimal human level” of memory, intelligence or emotional stability is, while a “superhuman” ability is by definition outside of human experience, thus not familiar.

Though the statistical power of our studies to detect patterns of moderation (in our covariate analyses) is uncertain, several recurring patterns are worth noting and point toward their robustness. Across five studies, the MFQ binding orientation was consistently associated with disapproval of superhuman enhancement and dehumanization. Furthermore, in four of our studies we found a positive link between sexual disgust and opposition toward brain implants, suggesting a biological basis for such attitudes. Given that sexual disgust and the binding orientation are greatest among religious conservatives (Haidt & Graham, 2007;

Koleva et al., 2012), these results also help to anticipate intergroup disagreement surrounding the permissibility of cognitive enhancement. These findings resonate with recent studies by NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 39

Laakasuo et al. (2017, 2018). Laakasuo and colleagues (2017) find that sexual disgust is associated with deontological (as opposed to utilitarian) preferences in solving moral dilemmas; and (2018) that people who endorse the binding moral foundations and are prone to sexual disgust disapprove of another transhuman technology, that of mind upload (see also

Laakasuo et al., 2020).

Perhaps what is actually 'condemned' in the context of brain implants is the act of instrumentalizing or objectifying the human consciousness; in deontological intuitions, condemnation is often related to objectifying humans or using them as instruments (for similar argument see Laakasuo et al., 2018). Sexual disgust might thus be, in an abstract sense, related to condemnation of brain implant technology, because the mind or “soul” is the

“essence” of what it is to be a person (from a folk psychological perspective). Furthermore, some of the items used in the sexual disgust sub-scale describe acts and deeds that objectify the person filling in the questionnaire (e.g., “Finding out that someone you do not like has sexual fantasies about you”), a cue that is related to deontological cognition and Kant’s categorical imperative. However, there are no similar items in MFQ Binding orientation scale.

Furthermore, we found a consistent effect of science fiction hobbyism predicting approval, less perceived unfairness and dehumanization of brain implant users, implying that cultural factors, such as exposure to the ideas of cognitive enhancement and brain implants through books, films and pop culture reduces condemnation. Indeed, greater science fiction hobbyism was associated with reduced dehumanization of hypothetical users of superhuman enhancement consistently. This implies that familiarity may breed acceptance, in approximately the same way as in previous studies on acceptance of mind upload technologies and sex robots (Laakasuo et al., 2018; Koverola et al., 2020). However, the exact causal route between exposure to science fiction and approval of futuristic technology NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 40 is not obvious from these studies specifically, but they imply that adult developmental processes and cultural learning mechanisms play a role in forming moral judgments regarding new technologies. However, we also do need to ascertain the probability that certain personality types may be more inclined to like both science fiction and transhumanist technologies. On the other hand, consuming science fiction could familiarize people with the idea of human enhancement and/or brain implants, and the familiarization induces a positive attitude towards them. Research on attitude change following accustomization (e.g. robots in elderly care, Stafford et al., 2010) supports the interpretation of cultural influences, while there also appear to be effects of selection, since science fiction hobbyists differ from the general population along certain psychological dimensions (Bainbridge, 1986). As in most

“nature vs. nurture” comparisons, it is likely that both play a role. In other words, cultural influences (familiarization with transhumanist themes) together with biological components

(e.g., related to sexual disgust) seem to jointly determine whether people condemn or approve of cognitive enhancement (see also Tomasello, 2018 for biocultural models of human moral development).

In three of our studies (Studies 4, 5A and 5B), we examined whether our participants themselves would wish to use enhancement technology and why. For memory enhancement

(Study 4), a majority of participants (roughly 75%) stated they would be willing to receive an implant, whereas for intelligence or mood enhancement (Studies 5A and 5B), only a minority

(42% and 40%, respectively) were willing. While there were differences in design and experimental manipulations between these studies, we argue that the most parsimonious explanation for these differences is simply the domain of enhancement. People may be more familiar with issues relating to memory deterioration in old age, and more able to imagine such ailments as an illness or injury separate from one's personality. Intelligence and mood may seem like broader concepts than memory, and they may constitute a more important part NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 41 of one's personality and humanity. As a result, these domains may seem like things that should not be tampered with (see Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). It is important to note, though (also as a suggestion for further studies), that if the memory was introduced as a concrete kind of memory, namely memory connected to interpersonal relationships, people might be more reluctant to tamper with it (see Strohminger & Nichols 2014, p. 162f). The low rates of people willing to take an intelligence or mood enhancement implant are in slight conflict with earlier findings suggesting people are more willing to enhance, e.g., mathematical abilities and concentration rather than, e.g., empathy (see Riis et al., 2008;

Wagner et al., 2018). People may find it more palatable for cognitive enhancement to target specific rather than general cognitive capacities (e.g., mathematical ability instead of intelligence), since these may entail more modest change in an individual's personality and/or self.

Limitations and future directions

Like all behavioral studies, ours suffers from a standard set of limitations in laboratory or

Internet questionnaires. Our respondents were not a random sample representing the general population. Instead, they were likely more curious and open minded than the population average, having volunteered to participate in scientific research. Our participants were also younger than the population average. Survey-based studies utilizing self-report measures are biased by a mixture of positive response biases and demand characteristics. However, these are inherent problems in any research involving volunteers, and not specific to our studies.

Regardless of how brain implant technologies actually develop in the future, it is important to understand people’s perceptions and preferences concerning their use. Thus, different descriptions of enhanced capabilities and the methods used to achieve them offer a fruitful line for future research on human perceptions of transhumanist technologies. NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 42

Furthermore, even if these technologies do not become reality within the next 20 years, we feel that the ethics and moral psychology regarding the technologies need to be discussed well in advance, due to their serious implications for human societies. The subject clearly fascinates people: without any concrete results yet or even a proof-of-concept design ready,

Googling Elon Musk’s Neuralink (Pisarchik et al., 2019) gives more than a million results today. But as digital technologies can develop at exponential speeds and given that the first generation of brain implants is already well established (Houston et al., 2018; Ylikoski &

Raivio, 1997), we should be prepared to have a serious ethical discussion about further use of these technologies sooner rather than later.

Here we have mainly concentrated on finding out who will condemn those who enhance their cognitive capabilities and whether different kinds and levels of enhancement elicit different levels of condemnation. Our findings do give some insight into these questions, at least as starting points for future research. Perhaps a more profound question on these topics is “Why?” and that needs to be addressed by a more qualitative research approach. Why indeed is an athlete’s attempt to run ever so slightly faster than her fellows cheered as a noble if futile way of spending one’s youth but someone who attempts to improve their brain beyond nature’s limits is seen as “less acceptable, more unfair, less human”, as our results consistently show?

As our results on the science fiction hobbyism scale indicate, cultural influences play a significant role in attitudes towards transhumanist technologies. This suggests the need for cross-cultural replication, be it in various countries or different cultural settings. Future research should also look into the question of why sexual disgust sensitivity and purity orientation predict negative attitudes towards brain implant technology (and mind upload, see

Laakasuo et al., 2018; 2020). Are these constructs possibly associated with rejecting “human enhancement” technologies in general, and if so, why? The current results, alongside those of NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 43

Laakasuo et al. (2017) linking sexual disgust to deontological moral decisions, might suggest that moral cognition is a product of sexual instead of group selection (see also Miller, 2000,

2007). Jonathan Haidt, the main developer of the Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt &

Graham, 2007; Koleva et al., 2012), has argued on behalf of group-selection models in defense of his model (Wilson, 2002; Haidt, 2007). Including disgust sensitivity measurements in future research on the moral psychology of transhumanist technologies could very well shine some light on evolutionary mechanisms behind moral cognition,

Conclusion

In summary, we showed that moral approval, sense of fairness and dehumanization are relevant in modern day contexts where moral implications of new technologies are being evaluated and that while people generally approve of curing ailments, they are more cautious of unfamiliar levels of enhancement. Furthermore, in five studies, the tendency to condemn transhumanist technologies to factors was associated with disgust sensitivity (the binding orientation of the MFT and sexual disgust). We found that science fiction hobbyism is linked to approval of brain implants. We also examined possible idiosyncrasies associated with our stimulus materials and did not find any reliable additional factors associated with moral cognition (e.g. body-envelope violations & familiarity). Future studies in moral cognition should look more carefully into associations between norms, purity/binding orientation, sexual disgust and science fiction hobbyism and adoption of new technologies.

Understanding moral cognition in this context could be an important issue when it comes to guiding future norm-setting regarding new technologies.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 44

“Whatever is the lot of humankind

I want to taste within my deepest self.

I want to seize the highest and the lowest,

to load its woe and bliss upon my breast,

and thus expand my single self titanically

and in the end go down with all the rest.”

― Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, First Part

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 45

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NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 53

Appendix A. Moral Approval scale items (Studies 1 – 5).

1. Having the operation is the proper thing to do.

2. Having the operation is in Alex’s best interest

3. Having the operation is acceptable.

4. Having the operation is wrong

5. If needed, I would have the same operation as Alex.

6. Most people would do the same in Alex’s situation.

7. If the operation in the story existed in real life, everyone should have the right to it.

8. Having the operation is unethical.

9. Having the operation is inconsiderate.

10. Alex is selfish.

11. Alex is immature.

12. What Alex did is nothing out of the ordinary.

We report the English materials as they were used in the only study run in English, Study 2.

Studies 1, 3, 4, 5A and 5B were run in Finnish. The English materials were translated by the authors from the Finnish originals. The character in the vignette was called Antti in the

Finnish materials; other than this, the materials were the same. NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 54

Appendix B. Perceived Unfairness scale items (Studies 1 – 5).

1. For someone in work life the advantage provided by, the microchip would be unfair.

2. For a student the advantage provided by the microchip would be unfair.

3. I think everyone should have the chance of having a similar operation.

4. After his operation, Alex should be disqualified from competitive memory sport events.

We report the English materials as they were used in the only study run in English, Study 2.

Studies 1, 3, 4, 5A and 5B were run in Finnish. The English materials were translated by the authors from the Finnish originals. The character in the vignette was called Antti in the

Finnish materials; other than this, the materials were the same. NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 55

Appendix C. Dehumanization scale items (Studies 2 – 5).

1. I don’t think Alex can be called fully human after his operation.

2. After the operation, Alex can still feel emotions.

3. After the operation, Alex can still be kind.

4. After the operation, Alex is still capable of being a good partner

5. After the operation, Alex is still capable of friendship.

6. After the operation, I wouldn’t shake Alex’s hand.

7. After the operation, Alex somehow feels dirty to me.

8. After the operation, Alex is less valuable as a human being.

9. After the operation, Alex is still a normal human being.

10. After the operation, Alex should still have the same rights as everyone else.

11. After the operation, Alex is more a machine than a man.

12. After his operation, I don’t think Alex belongs to the same species as I.

(Study 1 used a single item for this measure: “In my opinion, Alex is not completely human after the operation”.)

We report the English materials as they were used in the only study run in English, Study 2.

Studies 1, 3, 4, 5A and 5B were run in Finnish. The English materials were translated by the authors from the Finnish originals. The character in the vignette was called Antti in the

Finnish materials; other than this, the materials were the same.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 56

Appendix D. Vignettes for Studies 2 and 5

Study 2 – memory implant (level of enhancement)(level of familiarity)

(1: perfect memory, 2: level of youth, & 3: early stage dementia fix)(1:established,

2:experimental):

It is the year 2050. Medical science has advanced significantly, and implanting microchips in people’s brains is an everyday procedure. These microchips can be used to treat, for example, depression or Parkinson’s disease, and the results are much better // have so far been much better with fewer side effects than those obtained with traditional long-term medication.

Alex is an office worker soon to retire. Work health services offer him a chance to have an operation, where a microchip would be implanted in his brain to improve his memory func- tions.

The operation would give him the ability to perfectly remember everything he has seen, read, heard or otherwise experienced. // The operation would restore his memory capacity to the level of his youth and prevent any further age-related memory deterioration. // The operation would repair his memory impairments, which are related to an early stage dementia, and pre- vent any further disease progression. After discussing the potential risks with his physician,

Alex signs up for the operation and enters the waitlist.

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Study 5A – general intelligence implant (level of enhancement)(level of familiarity)

( 1: mitigation, 2: normal+ level, & 3: super-human) (1:established, 2:experimental):

It is the year 2035. Medical science has advanced significantly, and for example the neural basis of thought processes is now known. Implanting microchips that improve brain functions is an everyday procedure // is a new and promising procedure. These microchips can be used to treat, for example, depression or Parkinson’s disease, and the results are much better // have so far been much better with fewer side effects than those obtained with traditional long-term medication.

Alex is a 35-year old office worker. He feels that he is not especially intelligent, and tests done by his work health services show that his cognitive functions are significantly slower than normal. His doctor recommends implanting a microchip in his brain that would raise his intelligence to the level of a typical, adequately performing adult // to the level of a typical, well performing adult // to a super-human level.

Alex decides to follow the recommendation of his doctor.

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Study 5B – emotional stability implant (level of enhancement)(level of familiarity)

( 1: mitigation, 2: normal level, & 3: super-human) (1:established, 2:experimental):

It is the year 2035. Medical science has advanced significantly, and for example the neural basis of emotional states is now known. Implanting microchips that improve brain functions is an everyday procedure // is a new and promising procedure. These microchips can be used to treat, for example, depression or Parkinson’s disease, and the results are much better // have so far been much better with fewer side effects than those obtained with traditional long-term medication.

Alex is a 35-year old office worker. He suffers from recurring but short periods of anxiety.

His doctor recommends implanting a microchip in his brain that would mitigate his anxieties

// return the function of his emotional system to the level of a healthy adult // give him complete control over his emotional state.

Alex decides to follow the recommendation of his doctor.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 59

Appendix E. Full recruitment and process descriptions.

Study 1

In total, one hundred and fifty six participants were recruited via invitations posted on various

Finnish online discussion forums (open to the general public), as well as university student email lists (N = 156, 67 female, 78 male, Mean age = 33, SD = 12.16, Range = 18-66). Open discussion forums were targeted to obtain a sample more representative of the general population than merely students. People were invited to fill in an online questionnaire taking about 30 minutes of their time and given the chance to participate in a movie ticket raffle for

5 movie tickets (approximately 5 x 10e).

Study 1 had a 1x3 between-subjects design. Each participant read one of three vignettes, in which a person is given the chance to go under surgery to get a brain implant that would either 1) cure his early stage dementia (alleviating an ailment); 2) restore his memory capacity to the level of his youth (optimal human level), or 3) give him the ability to perfectly remember everything he has read, heard or otherwise experienced (superhuman enhancement). Participants were randomized into one of the three conditions.

Study 2

In total, 491 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk) to complete an online survey prepared with Qualtrics. After removing outliers and improper responses, the final sample size was 435 (273 female, Mean age = 33.4, SD = 9.9, Range = 18-70). All participants were US residents and were given US $1.2 as compensation.

Study 2 had a 3x2 between-subjects design. Like in Study 1, the outcome was either 1) alleviation of an ailment, 2) good level of performance or 3) superhuman. The second factor

(level of familiarity) had two levels, describing the implant technology as either 1) NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 60 experimental (i.e. the technology was in an experimental stage), or 2) established (i.e. the technology was well established and in common use). The vignettes were modified versions of the vignette used in Study 1. The participants first responded to the covariate measures, then read one of the stories (randomized) and gave responses to each of the DVs, then read the second story and responded to each of the DVs.

Study 3

We ran study 3 in a laboratory. In total, 198 participants were recruited from a lobby of the main library of University of Helsinki (122 female, 76 male, Mean age = 29.51, SD = 9.43,

Range = 18-71). Participants approached a research assistant, who sat with a sign saying

“participate in a psychological study”. They signed an informed consent form, after which they were directed to our laboratory where they completed a computer-administered experiment. Participants were compensated 3€ for participation. This sample of participants also provided responses to another study, results of which will be reported elsewhere.

Study 3 had a 3x2 between-subjects design. Like in previous studies, participants read a short, futuristic story about a person diagnosed with early-phase memory disorder. In this study, we varied the method of enhancement so that half of the participants read a story about the memory enhancement happening through surgically implanting a microchip, and half of the participants read a story about the memory enhancement happening through nano-robots that the person could swallow in the form of a pill. Like in previous studies, the outcome was either 1) normal, 2) youth-level, or 3) superhuman memory.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 61

Study 4

We ran study 4 in laboratory. In total 213 participants were recruited from a lobby of the main library of University of Helsinki (120 female, 93 male, Mean age = 32.68, SD = 12.00, Range

= 18-72). Participants approached a research assistant, who sat with an sign saying

“participate in a psychological study”. They signed an informed consent form, after which they were directed to our laboratory where they completed a computer-administered experiment. Participants were compensated 7€ for participation. This sample of participants also provided responses to two other studies, results of which will be reported elsewhere.

Study 4 had a 3x2 between-subjects design. Like in previous studies, participants read a short, futuristic story about a person diagnosed with early-phase memory disorder. In this study, we varied the method of enhancement so that half of the participants read a story about the memory enhancement happening through surgically implanting a microchip, and half of the participants read a story about the memory enhancement happening through medication.

Like in previous studies, the outcome was either 1) normal, 2) youth-level, or 3) superhuman memory.

Studies 5A and 5B

We ran study 5 in laboratory. In total 263 participants were recruited from a lobby of the main library of University of Helsinki (149 female, 114 male, Mean age = 30.15, SD = 9.94, Range

= 18-66). These demographics are based on the sample before applying a filter excluding 11 participants based on two attention checks (“Please answer 2”). Participants approached a research assistant, who sat with a sign saying “participate in a psychological study”. They signed an informed consent form, after which they were directed to our laboratory where they NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 62 completed a computer-administered experiment. Participants were compensated 3€ for participation. This sample of participants also provided responses to another study, results of which will be reported elsewhere.

Study 5 consisted of two experiments with a 3x2 between-subjects design. Participants read two short, futuristic stories in a randomized order. The stories were about a person diagnosed with A) slow cognitive processes and B) recurring periods of anxiety getting a neural implant to help with his symptoms. Like in previous studies, the outcome was either 1) alleviation of an ailment, 2) good level of performance or 3) superhuman ability (A: level of a typical, adequately performing adult / level of a typical, well performing adult / super-human level; B: mitigate anxieties / return the function of emotional system to the level of a healthy adult / give complete control over his emotional state). The second factor (level of familiarity) had two levels, describing the implant technology as either 1) experimental (i.e. the technology was in an experimental stage), or 2) established (i.e. the technology was well established and in common use). The vignettes were modified versions of the vignette used in

Study 1. The participants first responded to the covariate measures, then read one of the stories (randomized) and gave responses to each of the DVs, then read the second story and responded to each of the DVs.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 63

Appendix F. Science Fiction Hobbyism Scale Items

1. For me, science fiction is an interesting topic

2. I have spent a lot of time on SF movies, literature, games, TV shows and/or comics

3. I tend to notice scientific or technological inaccuracies in movies and books

4. I consider myself a big science fiction fan

5. I have actively participated in conventions and gatherings related to science fiction

6. I am active in an organization, club or society related to SF

7. I try to keep up to date on technological and scientific advances

8. Fiction set in the future is often more interesting than other kinds of fiction

9. Transhumanism is a familiar topic to me

10. I often think about things related to artificial intelligence

11. I spend a lot of time finding out more about space and space technology

12. I often think about what machines are going to be like in the future

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 64

Appendix G. ANCOVA results for Studies 1-5

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 65

Table G1. ANCOVA results for Studies 1-5, main results of covariates only.

Study Covariate Dependent variable

Study 1 Moral Acceptance Unfairness Dehumanization

(N=156) B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I -0.15 [-0.34:0.03] 0.286* [0.03:0.53] 0.12 [-0.06:0.32]

MFQ-B -0.29** [-0.45:-0.12] 0.279* [0.05:0.49] 0.37*** [0.20:0.54]

SFH 0.27*** [0.15:0.39] -0.27** [-0.43:-0.11] -0.06 [-0.19:0.06]

Study 2 Moral Acceptance Unfairness Dehumanization

(N=435) B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I 0.22** [0.22:0.09] 0.00 [0.00:-0.15] -0.30*** [-0.30:-0.42]

MFQ-B -0.13** [-0.13:-0.22] 0.11 [0.11:-0.00] 0.13** [0.13:0.045]

SFH 0.28*** [0.28:0.21] -0.16** [-0.16:-0.26] -0.09* [-0.09:-0.17]

Study 3 Moral Acceptance Unfairness Dehumanization

(N=198) B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I 0.04 [0.04:-0.15] -0.00 [-0.00:-0.24] -0.06 [-0.06:-0.24]

MFQ-B -0.29*** [-0.29:-0.45] 0.14 [0.14:-0.04] 0.27*** [0.27:0.13]

SFH 0.16** [0.16:0.05] -0.05 [-0.05:-0.19] -0.05 [-0.05:-0.16]

SDS -0.14** [-0.14:-0.25] 0.10 [0.10:-0.03] 0.14** [0.14:0.03]

Study 4 Moral Acceptance Unfairness Dehumanization

(N=213) B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I 0.13 [0.13:-0.15] -0.42* [-0.42:-0.78] -0.30* [-0.30:-0.55]

MFQ-B 0.13 [0.13:-0.14] -0.43* [-0.43:-0.79] -0.30* [-0.30:-0.55]

SFH 0.11 [0.11:-0.17] -0.43* [-0.43:-0.79] -0.29* [-0.29:-0.55]

SDS 0.11 [0.11:-0.15] -0.42* [-0.42:-0.79] -0.29* [-0.29:-0.54]

Study 5A Moral Acceptance Unfairness Dehumanization

(N=252) B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I -0.20 [-0.20:-0.43] 0.24 [0.24:-0.02] -0.01 [-0.01:-0.19] NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 66

MFQ-B -0.23* [-0.23:-0.42] 0.22 [0.22:-0.00] 0.26*** [0.26:0.12]

SFH 0.30*** [0.30:0.17] -0.25** [-0.25:-0.41] 0.02 [0.02:-0.08]

SDS -0.23*** [-0.23:-0.36] 0.18* [0.18:0.03] 0.13** [0.13:0.03]

Study 5B Moral Acceptance Unfairness Dehumanization

(N=252) B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I 0.01 [0.01:-0.19] -0.10 [-0.10:-0.34] -0.19* [-0.19:-0.35]

MFQ-B -0.26** [-0.26:-0.44] 0.32** [0.32:0.12] 0.26*** [0.26:0.12]

SFH 0.08 [0.08:-0.04] -0.00 [-0.00:-0.15] 0.08 [0.08:-0.01]

SDS -0.22*** [-0.22:-0.34] 0.13 [0.13:-0.00] 0.08 [0.081:-0.01]

Note: MFQ-I = individualizing orientation, MFQ-B = binding orientation, SFH = science fiction hobbyism, SDS

= sexual disgust sensitivity. Highlighted cells indicate significant slopes for the covariate. * = significant at .05 alpha level, ** = significant at .01 alpha level, *** = significant at .001 alpha level. This table reports the main effects of covariates from full factorial ANCOVAs conducted separately on each of the studies. Studies 5A and 5B had the same sample of participants.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 67

Appendix H. ANCOVA results for each study.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 68

Table H1. ANCOVA results for Study 1. N = 156.

Dependent variable

Moral Approval Unfairness Dehumanization

Covariate Enhancement B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I Alleviating -0.31 [-0.69:0.07] 0.229 [-0.26:0.72] 0.51 [-0.10:1.13]

Optimal 0.13 [-0.19:0.47] 0.068 [-0.35:0.49] 0.07 [-0.45:0.60]

Superhuman -0.30* [-0.60:-0.00] 0.499* [0.11:0.88] 0.11 [-0.37:0.59]

MFQ-B Alleviating -0.40** [-0.68:-0.12] 0.246 [-0.12:0.61] 0.69** [0.24:1.13]

Optimal 0.073 [-0.21:0.35] 0.075 [-0.3:0.44] 0.43 [-0.01:0.87]

Superhuman -0.54*** [-0.84:-0.24] 0.545** [0.15:0.94] 0.64** [0.17:1.11]

SFH Alleviating 0.061 [-0.12:0.25] -0.061 [-0.31:0.19] -0.06 [-0.38:0.26]

Optimal 0.37** [0.11:0.62] -0.412* [-0.75:-0.07] 0.15 [-0.28:0.58]

Superhuman 0.43*** [0.24:0.63] -0.412** [-0.67:-0.15] -0.28 [-0.61:0.05]

Note: MFQ-I = individualizing orientation, MFQ-B = binding orientation, SFH = science fiction hobbyism. highlighted cells indicate significant slopes for the covariate. * = significant at .05 alpha level, ** = significant at .01 alpha level, *** = significant at .001 alpha level.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 69

Table H2. ANCOVA results for Study 2. N = 435.

Dependent Variable

Moral Approval Unfairness Dehumanization

Covariate Familiarity Enhancement B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I Established Alleviating 0.38* [0.01:0.7] -0.36 [-0.82:0.10] -0.28 [-0.60:0.02]

Optimal 0.26 [-0.04:0.58] -0.04 [-0.44:0.34] -0.49*** [-0.75:-0.22]

Superhuman 0.14 [-0.15:0.45] 0.22 [-0.15:0.60] -0.01 [-0.27:0.24]

Experimental Alleviating 0.013 [-0.32:0.35] -0.04 [-0.46:0.38] -0.34* [-0.63:-0.05]

Optimal 0.32* [0.01:0.64] 0.20 [-0.18:0.60] -0.39* [-0.65:-0.12]

Superhuman 0.24 [-0.05:0.54] -0.05 [-0.42:0.32] -0.22 [-0.47:0.02]

MFQ-B Established Alleviating -0.02 [-0.24:0.20] 0.02 [-0.25:0.30] 0.12 [-0.06:0.32]

Optimal -0.42* [-0.67:-0.17] 0.50** [0.19:0.81] 0.21 [-0.00:0.42]

Superhuman -0.17 [-0.41:0.07] 0.09 [-0.21:0.39] 0.26* [0.05:0.47]

Experimental Alleviating -0.19 [-0.40:0.01] 0.18 [-0.07:0.44] 0.01 [-0.17:0.19]

Optimal -0.04 [-0.28:0.19] -0.14 [-0.44:0.15] 0.00 [-0.20:0.21]

Superhuman -0.01 [-0.22:0.20] 0.06 [-0.20:0.33] 0.16 [-0.02:0.35]

SFH Established Alleviating 0.13 [-0.06:0.33] 0.01 [-0.24:0.26] -0.07 [-0.25:0.10]

Optimal 0.45*** [0.28:0.62] -0.29** [-0.51:-0.07] -0.20* [-0.35:-0.04]

Superhuman 0.22* [0.04:0.41] -0.12 [-0.37:0.11] 0.14 [-0.02:0.31]

Experimental Alleviating 0.46*** [0.26:0.65] -0.40** [-0.65:-0.14] -0.27** [-0.44:-0.09]

Optimal 0.13 [-0.07:0.34] -0.02 [-0.30:0.24] -0.05 [-0.24:0.13]

Superhuman 0.24* [0.05:0.43] -0.1 [-0.34:0.14] -0.07 [-0.24:0.09]

SDS Established Alleviating -0.09 [-0.24:0.04] 0.096 [-0.09:0.28] 0.17** [0.04:0.30]

Optimal -0.38*** [-0.54:-0.22] 0.322** [0.11:0.52] 0.19** [0.05:0.33]

Superhuman -0.21* [-0.38:-0.04] 0.167 [-0.04:0.38] 0.17* [0.02:0.32]

Experimental Alleviating -0.20** [-0.35:-0.06] 0.207* [0.02:0.39] 0.17** [0.04:0.29]

Optimal -0.10 [-0.26:0.05] 0.155 [-0.04:0.35] 0.03 [-0.10:0.17] NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 70

Superhuman -0.22** [-0.38:-0.06] 0.138 [-0.06:0.34] 0.12 [-0.01:0.27]

Notes: MFQ-I = individualizing orientation, MFQ-B = binding orientation, SFH = science fiction hobbyism, SDS = sexual disgust sensitivity. Highlighted cells indicate significant slopes for the covariate. * = significant at .05 alpha level,

** = significant at .01 alpha level, *** = significant at .001 alpha level.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 71

Table H3. ANCOVA results for Study 3. N = 198.

Dependent variable

Moral Approval Unfairness Dehumanization

Covariate Method Enhancement B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I Nanopills Alleviating 0.13 [-0.27:0.54] 0.10 [-0.37:0.59] 0.106 [-0.21:0.42]

Optimal -0.25 [-0.82:0.31] 0.28 [-0.38:0.95] -0.007 [-0.44:0.43]

Superhuman -0.48 [-0.99:0.03] 0.30 [-0.30:0.91] 0.12 [-0.27:0.52]

Surgery Alleviating 0.13 [-0.28:0.55] 0.00 [-0.49:0.50] 0.005 [-0.32:0.33]

Optimal 0.37 [-0.23:0.98] -0.74* [-1.46:-0.02] -0.454 [-0.92:0.01]

Superhuman 0.13 [-0.58:0.85] -0.09 [-0.94:0.74] -0.129 [-0.68:0.42]

MFQ-B Nanopills Alleviating -0.04 [-0.39:0.30] -0.01 [-0.44:0.41] 0.011 [-0.26:0.28]

Optimal -0.41* [-0.74:-0.07] 0.21 [-0.19:0.62] 0.349** [0.08:0.61]

Superhuman -0.27 [-0.67:0.12] 0.17 [-0.31:0.66] 0.323* [0.012:0.633]

Surgery Alleviating -0.66** [-1.03:-0.28] 0.42 [-0.03:0.87] 0.316* [0.025:0.607]

Optimal 0.05 [-0.38:0.49] -0.31 [-0.84:0.21] 0.107 [-0.231:0.446]

Superhuman -0.20 [-0.66:0.24] 0.35 [-0.20:0.90] 0.285 [-0.068:0.637]

SFH Nanopills Alleviating 0.38* [0.05:0.70] -0.27 [-0.66:0.11] -0.172 [-0.426:0.083]

Optimal 0.13 [-0.17:0.44] 0.06 [-0.30:0.44] 0.049 [-0.195:0.294]

Superhuman -0.11 [-0.40:0.18] 0.01 [-0.34:0.36] 0.05 [-0.184:0.284]

Surgery Alleviating 0.20 [-0.06:0.48] -0.01 [-0.35:0.31] 0.015 [-0.203:0.233]

Optimal 0.24 [-0.02:0.52] 0.19 [-0.13:0.52] 0.016 [-0.2:0.232]

Superhuman 0.34* [0.06:0.61] -0.34* [-0.67:-0.00] -0.221* [-0.439:-0.002] NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 72

SDS Nanopills Alleviating -0.16 [-0.39:0.07] 0.13 [-0.14:0.42] 0.118 [-0.061:0.297]

Optimal -0.26 [-0.57:0.03] 0.20 [-0.16:0.57] 0.068 [-0.166:0.301]

Superhuman -0.04 [-0.35:0.27] 0.24 [-0.14:0.62] 0.114 [-0.127:0.356]

Surgery Alleviating -0.38** [-0.62:-0.13] 0.16 [-0.14:0.46] 0.331** [0.138:0.525]

Optimal -0.20 [-0.46:0.06] 0.07 [-0.25:0.40] 0.155 [-0.051:0.362]

Superhuman 0.27 [-0.01:0.56] -0.20 [-0.55:0.14] -0.161 [-0.385:0.063]

Note: MFQ-I = individualizing orientation, MFQ-B = binding orientation, SFH = science fiction hobbyism, SDS = sexual disgust sensitivity. Highlighted cells indicate significant slopes for the covariate. * = significant at .05 alpha level, ** = significant at .01 alpha level, *** = significant at .001 alpha level.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 73

Table H4. ANCOVA results for Study 4. N = 213

Dependent variable

Moral Approval Unfairness Dehumanization

Covariate Method Enhancement B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I Chip Alleviating -0.10 [-0.64:0.42] -0.22 [-0.90:0.46] -0.13 [-0.49:0.21]

Optimal -0.08 [-0.51:0.34] -0.35 [-0.91:0.19] -0.06 [-0.35:0.22]

Superhuman 0.31 [-0.11:0.73] -0.28 [-0.82:0.25] -0.20 [-0.48:0.07]

Drug Alleviating 0.06 [-0.53:0.66] -0.33 [-1.10:0.43] 0.05 [-0.34:0.45]

Optimal 0.03 [-0.61:0.67] 0.19 [-0.63:1.01] -0.09 [-0.52:0.33]

Superhuman -0.06 [-0.54:0.42] 0.28 [-0.33:0.90] -0.11 [-0.43:0.20]

MFQ-B Chip Alleviating 0.14 [-0.33:0.63] -0.32 [-0.95:0.31] -0.03 [-0.35:0.27]

Optimal -0.18 [-0.53:0.15] 0.26 [-0.17:0.71] 0.13 [-0.08:0.35]

Superhuman -0.38* [-0.73:-0.03] 0.19 [-0.25:0.65] 0.41*** [0.18:0.64]

Drug Alleviating -0.29 [-0.63:0.04] -0.01 [-0.45:0.42] 0.26* [0.04:0.48]

Optimal 0.00 [-0.39:0.39] 0.05 [-0.45:0.57] -0.01 [-0.27:0.23]

Superhuman -0.27 [-0.69:0.13] 0.53 [-0.01:1.07] 0.23 [-0.03:0.50]

SFH Chip Alleviating 0.17 [-0.09:0.44] -0.06 [-0.41:0.29] -0.09 [-0.27:0.08]

Optimal 0.21 [-0.01:0.44] -0.06 [-0.37:0.24] -0.14 [-0.29:0.01]

Superhuman 0.29* [0.01:0.56] -0.19 [-0.55:0.16] -0.07 [-0.25:0.10]

Drug Alleviating -0.03 [-0.26:0.20] 0.23 [-0.07:0.54] 0.09 [-0.05:0.25]

Optimal 0.06 [-0.25:0.37] 0.17 [-0.23:0.59] 0.03 [-0.17:0.24]

Superhuman -0.13 [-0.40:0.14] -0.01 [-0.37:0.34] 0.03 [-0.15:0.21]

SDS Chip Alleviating 0.04 [-0.19:0.28] -0.33* [-0.65:-0.00] -0.01 [-0.18:0.14]

Optimal -0.06 [-0.28:0.16] 0.14 [-0.16:0.44] -0.04 [-0.20:0.10]

Superhuman -0.38** [-0.63:-0.13] 0.22 [-0.11:0.56] 0.26** [0.09:0.43]

Drug Alleviating -0.28* [-0.50:-0.05] -0.03 [-0.33:0.27] 0.24** [0.08:0.39]

Optimal -0.17 [-0.45:0.11] 0.09 [-0.29:0.47] 0.09 [-0.09:0.28]

Superhuman -0.38** [-0.64:-0.12] 0.15 [-0.19:0.50] 0.13 [-0.04:0.30]

Note: MFQ-I = individualizing orientation, MFQ-B = binding orientation, SFH = science fiction hobbyism, SDS = sexual disgust sensitivity. Highlighted cells indicate significant NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 74 slopes for the covariate. * = significant at .05 alpha level, ** = significant at .01 alpha level,

*** = significant at .001 alpha level.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 75

Table H5. ANCOVA results for Study 5A. N = 252

Dependent variable

Moral Approval Unfairness Dehumanization

Covariate Familiarity Enhancement B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I Established Optimal -0.30 [-0.93:0.33] -0.02 [-0.78:0.73] -0.25 [-0.72:0.20]

Alleviating 0.17 [-0.28:0.63] -0.04 [-0.59:0.50] -0.05 [-0.38:0.28]

Superhuman -0.21 [-0.71:0.29] 0.22 [-0.38:0.82] 0.00 [-0.36:0.37]

Experimental Optimal -0.41 [-0.97:0.13] 0.36 [-0.29:1.02] 0.28 [-0.11:0.69]

Alleviating -0.32 [-0.89:0.24] 0.62 [-0.05:1.30] -0.25 [-0.67:0.15]

Superhuman -0.44 [-1.13:0.24] 0.48 [-0.33:1.30] 0.16 [-0.33:0.67]

MFQ-B Established Optimal -0.31 [-0.79:0.16] 0.64 [0.07:1.21] 0.45* [0.10:0.79]

Alleviating -0.39 [-0.91:0.12] 0.27 [-0.34:0.88] 0.22 [-0.14:0.60]

Superhuman -0.09 [-0.50:0.31] 0.07 [-0.41:0.56] 0.13 [-0.16:0.42]

Experimental Optimal -0.07 [-0.44:0.30] -0.03 [-0.47:0.41] 0.28* [0.01:0.54]

Alleviating -0.38 [-0.92:0.15] 0.27 [-0.36:0.92] 0.29 [-0.09:0.68]

Superhuman -0.39 [-0.89:0.11] 0.33 [-0.26:0.94] 0.14 [-0.22:0.50]

SFH Established Optimal 0.31 [-0.02:0.65] -0.28 [-0.68:0.12] -0.08 [-0.34:0.17]

Alleviating 0.25 [-0.01:0.52] -0.18 [-0.51:0.13] 0.09 [-0.11:0.29]

Superhuman 0.32 [-0.05:0.70] -0.63** [-1.08:-0.17] 0.01 [-0.27:0.30]

Experimental Optimal 0.18 [-0.14:0.52] -0.00 [-0.41:0.39] -0.06 [-0.31:0.19]

Alleviating 0.27 [-0.03:0.57] 0.00 [-0.36:0.37] 0.10 [-0.13:0.33]

Superhuman 0.48** [0.16:0.80] -0.56** [-0.94:-0.18] 0.01 [-0.23:0.25] NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 76

SDS Established Optimal -0.31* [-0.60:-0.01] 0.42* [0.07:0.78] 0.19 [-0.02:0.41]

Alleviating -0.27 [-0.61:0.06] 0.35 [-0.06:0.76] 0.17 [-0.07:0.42]

Superhuman -0.03 [-0.29:0.22] -0.08 [-0.38:0.22] 0.00 [-0.18:0.19]

Experimental Optimal -0.33* [-0.61:-0.05] 0.16 [-0.17:0.50] 0.22* [0.01:0.42]

Alleviating -0.31 [-0.66:0.03] 0.05 [-0.36:0.47] 0.19 [-0.06:0.45]

Superhuman -0.21 [-0.60:0.17] 0.36 [-0.10:0.82] -0.05 [-0.33:0.23]

Note: MFQ-I = individualizing orientation, MFQ-B = binding orientation, SFH = science fiction hobbyism, SDS = sexual disgust sensitivity. Highlighted cells indicate significant slopes for the covariate. * = significant at .05 alpha level, ** = significant at .01 alpha level,

*** = significant at .001 alpha level. Studies 5A and 5B had the same sample of participants.

NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 77

Table H6. ANCOVA results for Study 5B. N = 252.

Dependent variable

Moral Approval Unfairness Dehumanization

Covariate Familiarity Enhancement B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI

MFQ-I Established Optimal 0.08 [-0.39:0.55] -0.52 [-1.05:0.01] -0.24 [-0.57:0.08]

Alleviating -0.18 [-0.68:0.30] -0.41 [-0.97:0.14] -0.19 [-0.54:0.15]

Superhuman -0.19 [-0.70:0.31] -0.17 [-0.75:0.40] -0.17 [-0.53:0.18]

Experimental Optimal 0.21 [-0.28:0.71] 0.10 [-0.46:0.66] -0.21 [-0.56:0.13]

Alleviating -0.52 [-1.29:0.24] 0.50 [-0.36:1.37] 0.57* [0.03:1.11]

Superhuman 0.38 [-0.10:0.87] 0.28 [-0.26:0.84] -0.34 [-0.69:-0.00]

MFQ-B Established Optimal -0.22 [-0.57:0.12] 0.38 [-0.00:0.78] 0.24* [0.00:0.49]

Alleviating -0.02 [-0.51:0.45] 0.23 [-0.31:0.78] 0.08 [-0.25:0.42]

Superhuman -0.49* [-0.93:-0.06] 0.39 [-0.10:0.88] 0.22 [-0.08:0.53]

Experimental Optimal -0.22 [-0.65:0.21] 0.34 [-0.14:0.84] 0.21 [-0.09:0.51]

Alleviating -0.07 [-0.57:0.43] 0.06 [-0.51:0.64] 0.16 [-0.19:0.52]

Superhuman -0.48* [-0.91:-0.06] 0.40 [-0.08:0.89] 0.46 [0.16:0.76]

SFH Established Optimal 0.18 [-0.12:0.49] -0.07 [-0.42:0.27] 0.02 [-0.19:0.24]

Alleviating 0.23 [-0.09:0.55] -0.03 [-0.40:0.33] -0.07 [-0.30:0.15]

Superhuman -0.00 [-0.33:0.32] 0.30 [-0.07:0.67] 0.29* [0.06:0.52]

Experimental Optimal -0.01 [-0.30:0.28] 0.02 [-0.30:0.36] 0.21* [0.01:0.42]

Alleviating 0.18 [-0.14:0.51] -0.23 [-0.61:0.13] -0.14 [-0.37:0.08]

Superhuman -0.03 [-0.33:0.27] -0.00 [-0.34:0.34] 0.12 [-0.09:0.33]

SDS Established Optimal -0.14 [-0.41:0.12] 0.30 [-0.01:0.61] 0.12 [-0.07:0.32] NON-HUMAN SUPERHUMANS 78

Alleviating -0.24 [-0.55:0.06] 0.03 [-0.33:0.39] 0.08 [-0.14:0.30]

Superhuman -0.19 [-0.51:0.12] 0.10 [-0.26:0.46] -0.07 [-0.30:0.15]

Experimental Optimal -0.22 [-0.49:0.04] 0.10 [-0.21:0.41] 0.17 [-0.02:0.37]

Alleviating -0.12 [-0.49:0.25] 0.08 [-0.35:0.51] -0.03 [-0.30:0.23]

Superhuman -0.35** [-0.60:-0.09] 0.12 [-0.17:0.42] 0.08 [-0.10:0.26]

Note: MFQ-I = individualizing orientation, MFQ-B = binding orientation, SFH = science fiction hobbyism, SDS = sexual disgust sensitivity. Highlighted cells indicate significant slopes for the covariate. * = significant at .05 alpha level, ** = significant at .01 alpha level, *** = significant at .001 alpha level. Studies 5A and 5B had the same sample of participants.