Antlraasrn without Races 49

recurring tensions in this policy area.6 Others have explored the relationship between immigration, race, dtbmship, and nation from various theoretical pe~speaives.~There have also been studies of immigrant integration,8 thh Far ANTIRACISMWLTHOUT RACES Right,9 urban politics and ghettoes.'0 immigrant social movements," Islam in Politics and Policy in a "Color-Blind" State France,Iz and racism and antiracism.'3 Without doubt, this research has contributed greatly to OUI understanding of what may be called the politics of identity in France. Yet, when it comes to Erik Bleich 1 the question of nmm, it is apparent that Mavlly all of these studies share a Middlebury College common set of assumptions. Most take for granted that racism and immigra- tion are intimately intertwined, or that immigration policy is the prinaple form of raasm in France." Because immigrants and foreigners are deemed the targets of raasm, few scholars take seriously the analytical category of "race." Even using the word "tace" in France often makes people shudder; this effect has carried over into the world of scientific enquiry and has eliminated most efforts to use the term (or even the term "ethniciy")as a variable in studying ince the end of the Second World War, millions of immigrants have atrived racism. Moreover, this "race-neutral" or "color-blind" approach to the world is Son French shores.' Although such an influx of foreigners has not been frequently presented as deeply embedded in French political dture since at unusual in French history,' the origin of the postwar migrants was of a differ- least the Revolution, except of course dudng the catastrophic Yichy era." ent character than that of previous eras. Prior to World War 11, the vast major- Although it would seem as if every conceivable topic relaring to immi- ity of immigrants to France came from within Europe. Since 1945, however, an gration politics has been explored in depth, this very set of assumptions has important percentage of -ants have come from non-European sources. generated several blind spots. Because of the presumption that immigrants Whether from former colonies in Nolth Africa, Southeast Asia, or sub-Saharan and foreigners are the targets of radsm, little effort has been made to explore Africa, from overseas departments and territories, or from countries such as the French state's color-blind approach. Is the state eruly race and color blind? Turkey or Sri Imka, recent immigration has ueated a new ethnic and cultural In which policy areas? What framework does France use for analyzing ethnic pluralism in France. At the end of the 1990s, the visibly nonwhite population dilemmas, if not race? Moreover, since color blindness is often seen to date of Ftance totals approximately five percent of aU French ~esidents.~WWith mil- back to the Revolution, there have been few attempts to analyze the hiiori- lions of ethnic-minority citizens addenizens, the new France wears a sub- cal use of race in France over the past two hundred years. Most studies give stantially different face from that of the prbvar era. only a brief synopsis of France's history with minorities, stressing the influ- Although some might claim that the color of the sew immigrants is of lit- ence of assimilationism, while avoiding altogethex the question of race.I6 tle import, the presence of ethnic minorities has contributed one facet to the Finally, the prevailing assumption that the French state is race-neutral means recent soul-searching about French national identity.' Qwstions have been that the relationship between principles and domestic antiracism institutions ' raised about the ability and willingness of African and Asian immigrants to has not been examined in depth. In other words, how have colorbkind prin- integrate successfully into French society. Concerns about headscarves and aples affected the French state's approach to Sphting racism? Sqxisingly, female drcumcision captured both headlines and the public imagination as there have been no independent scholarly studies of the development of the the far-right and anti-immigrant National Front (FN) gathered electoral two central French laws against racism, the foundational law of 1972 and the strength. Womes about North African immigrants, their French-born chil- Gayssot law of 1990." dren, and Islamic fundamentalism seem inwitable when bombs explode in This article therefore seeks to problematize the core assumptions that ani- Paris trains or when cars are set ablaze in regional aties. mate the study of immigation and racism in France and to fill some of the A large literature has sprung up in the past decade that attempts to come resultant lacunae by closely examiniq the development of the antiracism to terms with various aspects of the "ethnic dilemma^"^ posed by postwar laws of 1972 and 1990.1 begin by sketching the dimensions of the color-blind immigration Several prominent scholars have conducted indepth studies of or race-neutral model as it currently operates in France. It is necessary here to the history of immigration in France, often stressing the continuities and stress not only its significant differences from the race- and ethniclty-con- sdous models that predominate in the United States and that operate to a FremhPoliW, Cnltvn & S&@ Val. 18, No. 3, Fdl20W lesser extent in Britain and the Netherlands, but also to note the lirmted use Erik BleicfI

the French slate does make of the term race and of the category of ethnicity. commonplace. In an effort to spark a debate about the different approaches, I This descriptive process helps raise the question of the origins and durability therefore conclude by assessing some of the tradeoffs inherent in the color- of the color-blind modeL The second section follow by examining the re- blind model of antiracism. tionship between race and the French state and society since the eighteenth century. This overview cannot pretend to be exhaustive; nevertheless, the evi- dence dearly show that France has not always been raceneutral. Race has The "Color-Blhd"State been used at various times in France in a variety of waysboth malicious and benign. That the present French state is color-blind was therefore not prede- The French state steadfastly refuses to employ the termnrac@when addreg termined by the weight of history. societal problems assodated with ethnic pl~~akm."T2xeofficial model is rqce- If French history offered a number of "repertoires of race" at the onset of neutral in two respects. First, it is all but taboo to Wgetpolides or to undertake postwar ethnic-minority immigration, what factors account for the predomi- research based on markers of race or ethnicity. 7here is no policy in France that nance of color-blind prindples in France's postwar antiracist institutions and is aimed at groups based on their radal composition. Moreover, issues such as for the overwhelming acceptance of the color-blind model at the end of the race-based group differentials that inspire American elites to compose a steady 1990s?Seaion three argues that the Vichy experience had a tremendous impact stream of memos, articles, and policies, fail to attract the attention of IQost on the development of the foundational antiradsm Law of 1972, while section French policymakers and intellectuals. Not only is there an absence of race- four emphasizes the influence of the National Front's rise in electoral power on directed policies in France, there is also a dearth of data about mes and ethnic the tenor of antiracism in the mid-1980s and on the Gayssot law of 1990. groups. Whereas the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands go so fra as to Although many Won account for the precise nature of these two laws, I focus collect census data on minow groups, a 1978 French law (78-17) rendered it on the role of Vichy and the rise of the Far Right as events that provoked actors illegal except under restricted circumstances to gather such &atfstla.n to seek out color-blind, race-neutral principles and that encouraged them to So deepIy entrenched is the resistanceto collecting race or ,rethnk staetics emphasize the long-standing relevance of these ideas for French public life. that the author of a recent study of i.dmwntWegration-pathbreaking in its This artide examines the laws of 1972 and 1990 in part because they have use of ethnic datanoted that her project aerated hMtyduring its prepa- been undemudied. It is indeed curious in an era of high public anxiety about ration and that Sts completion was in doubt kcawe its mathods contradicted racism that the history, development, and character of the state's principal the dominant ideology in spite of receiving the approval of the appropriate tools for fighbng racism are little understood. But, these laws deserve attention national ~ommission.~Discussing hastruggles to use ethniaty as a variable in for an additional reason: they serve as excellent sites for examining the effects her study, Michae Taalat conclude& 'We hope to have thus contributed to of race-neutral thinking on public policy. By tracing their history, it is possibIe liftin&ever so slightly, the French taboo against the use of origins in social sci- to see predsely how race-neutral thinking shaped political outcomes. In addi- ence."" Even thoughTdbalaYs work shows that the taboo is not complete, nei- tion, these laws represent institutional sites that incorporate color blindness in ther did her study mark its demise. 1998 saw the publication of a strong French state polides and that reinforce these principles in public life. If, as critique of the "sdenai6c" use of ethnic statistics as serving the Far Rightu A scholars have argued, policies create and policies that recognize race heated public debate followed over the appropriateness and metbods for das- treate race then the French state's color-blind policies may demon- sifying and categorizing idfvlduals by radal on ethnic group attributes.= strate a way to bght radsm without reifying the concept of race. In short, they Of coutse, that the French stateatroids racial categorization does not mean may exemplify an antiracism without races. that it ignores dm.Smce the 1970s. France has passed swe~alrounds of The desire to avoid treating race as a "real" sociological variable has cer- antiracism measures, induding most notably the foundational law of 1972 tainly influenced the state's antiracism institutions. But how have these insti- (72546) banning discrimination and racist acts in pzivate and public life, and tutions in turn affected the ability of the French state to fight radsm? It seems punishing perpetrators in criminal courts with stiff fmes and jail sentences. dear that there are important advantages to France's color-blind model. Nev- The 1990 Gayssot law (90-615) strengthened the penalties against racists and enheless, there are also limitations. Lf liberals in democracies such as the added to the list of crimes classified as racist. The central aim of French law, Umted States, Britain, and the Netherlands have embraced the recognition of however, has never been to foster numerical racial equality or to compensate races, they have done so because this can be a powerful tool in the struggle a class of victims defined by race. Rather, French law is designed to punish against racism. In earlier decades, there was strong opposition in each of these racist5 committing bigoted acts motivated by racist intent. countries to using race in public policy; but at the dose of the century, track- The French model is also race-neutral in a second respect. Whereas the ing, counting, and directing policies at ethnic and racial groups has become United States tends to view and address issues commonly associated with eth- Anhiacism wWwut Races

nic pluralism through the prism of race, France frequently employs an alter- age native French to occupy publicly kanced housing.3s Instead of targeting native lens. The problem of immigrant integration in France dictates that beneiits at ethnic groups, French policies are intended to prevent the dangers more attention be paid to social divides associated with culture, class, geogra- of ghett~ization?~As Patrick WeU explains, "between quotas and ghettos, the phy, and citizenship status rather than race. Naturally, tensions between public powers very clearly chose quotas."37 immigrants and native French often manifest themselves in terms of skin color.'6 Arabs, Muslims, beum, and Romanies elicit the lowest levels of sympa- thy in French surveys on Although the motive for disliking these Race from the Ancien RPgime to 1945 groups may be (real or perceived) differences in culture, individuals in these categories are also targeted for disuimination, harassment, or violence simply At the turning of the millennium, France maintains a strong allergy to accept- based on their appearance. In othet words, the state may know no races, but ing race as a memgful social category. Mainstream politicians, intellectuals, the public can and does identify people by their group spec^ atttibutes. media elites, and most citizens shun the term. Immigrant integration and anti- Formal poliaes, however, count only foreign reSidentbsubdWided by racism have become the two dominant frames for understanding the ethnic country of ongin--rather than racial or ethnic minorities (such as Afro-Amer- diiemmas that other countries interpret in terms of "race." Leading scholars, icans or Latinas) when calculating social mobility and acculturation." Since policymakers, and aaivists often argue that France simply cannot think in immigrants rather than races or ethnic groups are the salient out-group, the tenns of racial groups because of its Revolutionary and Republican principles. French state emphasizes the acquisition of French citizenship as the mcial Authors highlight the continuity between the egalitarianism of previous cen- step to attaining equalitywithinthe nation.= Once a citizen, all categorization turies and today's politics, often summarizing French history in terms of a tra- by the previous nationality ceases; citizens are regarded as equal, irrespective of dition of individual assimilation. They regard the Revolution as instituting a origin, race, ethnicity, or reljgion. French institutions therefore typically focus logic of equality before the law with no intermediate corporate bodies mud- on immigrant problems of poor housing, low skills, and educational~culties dying the connection between individual and state. This logic is seen to apply as problems potentially faced by all residents. As one Cabinet Minister declared especially to groups based on ethnic, racial, or religious markers, following the at the end of the 1980s, "integration policies for inmigrants and their children intellectual tone set during the Revolution by the Comte de Clermont Ton- (populotim issues de ifimmigration)have to be seen as part of a global policy n&e, who declared: "One must refuse everything to the Jews as a natim and undertaken by the government with respect to disadvantaged group^."^ grant everything to Jews as individual^."^^ In spite of the powerful rhetodc, French authorities have occasionally tar- There is a tendency, however, to oversimplify and to overstate the legacy geted policies at groups of French citizens or residents de6ned by ethnic chai- of the Revolution and the complementary measures undertaken by subse- acteristics. The goal of such poliaes, however, is never to reify or to entrench quent Republican governments. It sometimes seems as if the price to pay for a ethnic identities or to promote ethnic politics. Rather, it is to integrate immi- nearly unanimous disavowal of race is a case of dective memory, "trumpet- grants into French ~aiety.~'The Sodat Action Fund (FAS),= for example, allo- ing" as Adrian Favell has put it, "the grand moments of modem French self- cates monies to intercultural studies and to programs focused on groups such as definition in 1789 (the universal declaration of the rights of man), 180[4] (the North Africans, West Africans, and Southeast Asians. The FAS may even supply Code Civil), 1870 (the Franco-Prussian war), 1905 (the separation of church funding to a group of Algerians for an ethnic festival. Yet, state officialswould and state ...) ; and forgetting the rest."39Moteover, the principles embodied by argue that the money is allocated to a local assodation for its went, not to a this selective memory are implied to have been embraced virtually without minority group seeking to promote its community's identity." In practice, the interruption since the fall of the Bastillefo funding may also help promote an ethnic identity and (perhaps more impor- In fact, France's historical pas de deux with race has yet to be fully tantly) it may serve to placate and to co-opt a potentially active ethnic organi- explored. Even so, a cursory overview of the pre-1945 centuries shows a com- zation. Nevertheless, as Yasemin Soysal argues, wen "these 'multicuituralisf plex relationship between the two. It is undoubtedly true that individual egal- tendencies in policy remain within the bounds of 'republican citizenship,' itarianism "sans distinaion de race" has long been an important strand of deemphaslzing collective incorporation and reifying mndividual members hi^."^ French public thought. One may even argue that it predates the Revolution. When France does flirt with redistributive measures based on ethniaty, it For example, an ancien dgime "freedom principle" dictated that (wth Lirmts does so in ways diametrically opposed to the logic of public policies in the and exceptions) slaves could not be held on metropolitan French soiL4' More- United States. France maintains informal (but wdely recognized) quotas in over, as Patrick Weil and John Crowley polnt out, the French crown expanded public housing. These quotas, however, are not set-asides for disadvantaged prior to the Revolution by integrating new territories and peoples through rel- ethnic groups. Rather they lirmt immigrants' access to buildings and encour- atively easy access to nati~nality.~~ Erik Bleicb I Anbimdrm with out^ French history has not been uniquely color-blind or assimilationist, how* judgments about the superiority of white Frenchmen to other "less fortunate" ever. Analysts, in an effort to explain current color-blind policies by reference or "less worthy" races, ethnic, or religious groups. Yet, even within French his- to a strong historical tradition, frequently overlook or soft-pedal race-con- tory, constructing racial and ethnic categories was not always a strategy for sdous elements of French history. It is therefore woah pausing to examine the aiding and abetting racist policies or worldviews. Group recognition has also more race-consdous episodes in that history-not to suggest that they pre- J, been employed in the senice of scientific enquiry and as part of what many dominate, but merely to demonstrate that they provide alternative historical would argue is an egalitarian project. raw material for fashioning present-day policies. Only by highlighting the p Although he clearly favored environmental over hereditary explanations, complexity of the French expeience with race-~d therefore demonstrating Emile Durkheim devoted a chapter of Suicide to the potential explanatory vari- able of race. For the purposes of his study (and with caveats about the term's that history did not dictate modem polides--can we raise the question of ' E. what factors influenced recent political choices. 8 usefulness) Durkheim identified racial differences within the European conti- nent, stating: "let us agree that there are certain great types in Europe the most Often owrlooked in discussions of race and racism in France is the 4 nation's long experience with its colonies. Although there was no mass slavery general characteristics of which can be roughly distinguished and among in metropolitan France, the same was not true in the French Ca~ibbean.~~Even whom the peoples are distributed, and agree to give them the name of the initial liberation of the slaves in 1794 did not immediately fonow the Dec- ~aces."'~Durkheim never asserted his belief in the existence of races; nor did laration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789. As Laurent Dubois he concur with the conclusions of his professional rival Enrico Morselli that demonstrates, it resulted in part from the Revolutionary plindples of equality, race determines suicide rates. Nevertheless, his work demonstrated that, in but also in large part from the forceful actions by the slaves thernsebes and pursuit of academic enlightenment, the categorization of peoples could be from the Republic's strategic needs to use (freed) slaves to fight its enemies in used in nonracist ways. the Westem hemisphere." Moreover, under Napoleon, slavery was reinstated Beyond social scientilic enquiry, there are examples of the positive valua- in the Caribbean, lasting almost another hdf-c~turyuntil it was abolished tion of racial or ethnic groups and their cultures within the broader bounds of once and for hll by the Second Republic in 1848. the French nation. Born in Paris in the 1930s, the negritude movement rallied Colonialism in Africa varied from the Caribbean verslon as it also varied Africans such as Leopold Sedar Senghor, the future president of Senegal, within the continent itself. It is dear that neither the asshihtionist mission around the accomplishments of black cult~re.~'Influenced by the Harlem civilarrice doctrine nor the consideration of Algeria as an integral part of met- Renaissance in the 1920s and culminating in the campaigns for colonial inde- ropolitan France dictated equality between white French colonists and native . pendence in the 1950s and 1960s, the negritude movement helped crystallize Africans. As Alice Conklip dadfies in her study of West Africa, "to the extent a consciousness among members of a racial group. In so doing, negritude writ- that racism is defined as the perception that certain groups ... were fundamen- ers and thinkers within France successfully claimed a group-based identity for tally different from and inferior to white Europeans, then French offtaaldom progressive purposes. was guilty of thinking in radalwd categories and implementing oppressive Not only minorities, but also whites in France have at times sung the measures thtoughout the life of the Third Republi~."~~In Algeria, Muslims sel- praises of ethnic cultural differences. Herman Lebovics illustrates how the dom had precisely the same rights and duties as European citizens, and even state's cultural policy in the early twentieth century was intended to produce a ' the Jewsootwithstanding the rhetom of the Comte de Clemont Tonnee-- certain image of France for its citizens. This image, principally inspired by the were not accomded full dtimship until 1870." intellectual convictions of the political Right, embraced the notion of a loyalty Nor was racial, religious, and ethnic consciousness limited to the colonies. to two pays, one regional or colonial, the other national.s2 The purpose of the Examples of racial theorizing and of radsm are well known in metropolitan project was to promote unity, but it did so by afhrming the value of the sub-cul- France from the eighteenth through the early twentieth centuries in the writ- tures that comprised the nation. Like a mosaic, France was seen as composed of ings of intellectuals and popular authors such as Georges-Louis Ledex de Buf- many parts, each different in local color, but each contributing to the beauty fon, Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau, Hippolyte Taine, Gustave Le Bon, and Ernest and the harmony of the country as a whole. Students of modern politics will Renan?' Race and ethnic thiiin the sped6c form of anti-Semitism also undoubtedly hear the echo of these ideas in present-day multicultural rhetoric. cropped up most visibly during the Dreyfus Affair and became institutional- Eventually, of course, the Right incorporated similar ideas of ethnic iden- ized in publications and social movements such as the Action Fran~aise." tification into the Vichy regime, with a much more sinister effect. The values Some modem authors have chimed that identifying an Other necessarily of ethnic pride were subsequently viewed as contributing to the Holocaust, entails the establishment of a cognitive hierarchy of g~oups.~'The examples thereby discrediting race-conscious thinking altogether among the main- given thus Iar would seem to support thv, argument, since all evoke dear stream French after the war. Memories of arbitrary arrests and deportations of Jews thoroughly delegifimiaed policies that singled out ethnic groups and aBnk%ioii, aria p5niioted fhe role of antiraast associations--such as the hence triggered the postwar revival of "traditional" color-blind principles. MRAP and the LICRAs9 among others-in leading the fight against racism. However long it took the French to come to terms with the full scope of the That a relatively young organization such as the MRAP could have such Vichy pastss3the lesson learned about race from the historical events of 1940- an important impact on national legislation is surprising. What is less surpris- 44 was a powerful one, inspiring many actors to reemphasize the importance ing is the direction m which they pushed the taw. Although officially founded of individual equality before the law in a race-neutral state. in 1949, the MRAP had its roots in resistance to the Vichy regime and was seen Of course, not everybody learned these lessons; nor did (or will) these by many as sympathetic to the French Communist Party.@As one prominent Lessons necessarily last. WeiI documents the attempts of immigration experts member notes, the founders of the MRAP (in contrast to the members of the immediately after the war to employ ethnic screening categories on potential L1CA61), 'belonged to the more popular milieus!'62 In addition, many had arrivals." The poky proposals were overmmed by the Conseil d'Etat; yet such either been deported or had family members de~oaedduring .. the war.63 In bald actions remain striking in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust. splte of the left-leanings and recent immigrant sksof many activists, the Nor, of course, did racism or popular use of mdal and ethnic categories evap- MRAP also contained high-protile 6gure.s. The committee that developed the orate after the Vichy e~perience.~~Nevertheless, it is certain that the number antidiscrimination legislative proposals, for example, consisted of several of references to race and to radal or ethnic groups within the French state was prominent members of the French legal establishment." highly cimunscdbed in the postwar era." Race thinking was never as power- Rather than responding to concern about discrimmation against post- ful an intellectual or political force in France as in the United States or in Ger- reolonial immigrant ethnic minorities, the MRAP leadership was much more many. The experience of 1940-44, however, triggered a reaffirmation of sensitive in the 1940s and early 1950s to what it perceived as a post-Vichy race-neutral French values that have been amibuted to the Revolutionary and rebii of anti-Semitic sentiments. Albert Uvy, longtime General Seaetarg of Republican eras. Reforged in the heat of Vichy, these values were to have a 1 the MRAP, has desfdbed the era until the middle of the 1950s as the period of strong impact on the direction of postwar antiradsm in France. the "aftermath of the war, where the dominant questions were neo-Naidsm, the revival of anti-Semitism abd the Cold War." As an organization, the MRAP - crystallized in the wake of local mobilization against "The New Masters," a Antiracism from 1945 to the Early 1980s film whose subject the MRAP summarized as "the Jews are once again masters of France." The MRAP also took notice of several prominent collaborationists, When France emerged from the Second World War, there were many histori- who, released from death sentences, took over editors' positions at racist cal repertoires of race from which officials, activists, and the public could draw. newspapers." Wlthin this broader context, the organization's legal committee The sigx&icance of the Vichy Lesson is not therefore in its uniform application felt that existing French law was incapable of effectively sanctioningraci~m.~ tbughout the nation. It is not the case that every French citizen had become Prior to 1972, the 1939 Marchandeau decree-law was the prindpal legal instnr- a passionate antiraast immediately following the war in fact, state officials ment used to call perpetrators of radst acts into the courts. The Marchandeau spent most of their energy between the late 1940s and the early 1970s deny- decree, however, was both narrow in scope and rarely invoked. Although this ing the very existence of racism in the Hexagon.s7The Vichy experience, how- law carried stiff penalties, MRAP lawyers catalogued only two successful pros- ever, had a tremendous impact on a relatively maU group of activists who ecutions between 1945 and 1949.67 proved to be seminal to the eventual shape of France's 1972 antiracism law. Thus, with unpunished anti-Semitism in the media and perceived lacunae The 1972 law established the bulk of France's antiracist institutions. In sharp in sanctioning mechanisms, the MRAP drafted proposals for a new law in the contrast to British legislation of the same era, the French law generated rela- early 1950s." By late 1958 the MRAP had codified its ideas into three critical tively little political controversy at the time of passage and was adopted by a element^.^ First, it proposed extending the reach of the 1939 Marchandeau unanimous vote in both the National Assembly and the Senate. Passing the decree to encompass more forms of hate speech than those already sanc- law was not, however, an easy task for its supporters. Proposals for compre- tioned. As with the Marchandeau decree, this necessitated a revision to the hensive antiracist legislation were first conceived in the 1950s by the human 1881 press law on freedom of expression. Second, the MRAP lobbied for pro- rights interest group MRARS8 Although the MRAP had to wait over a decade tection against disuimiiation in employment and in furnishing of goods and far the Government to enact its initiatives, once on the agenda, the MRAP's services.70This proposition was motivated primarily by concerns about racism formula for legislation remained largely intact and strikingly different from faced by immigrant minorities. Issues of decolonization and nonwhzte, non- that of its cross-Channel neighbor. In its final form, the French law of 1972 Christian immigration came to occupy the MRAP leadership to an inaeasing contained no race-conscious elements, established criminal penalties for dis- extent in the 1960s and 1970~;~'but at the moment when the MRAP submit- , ,

Erik Bleich Antiracism WitholURaces

..,;.I- 8. ted its legal proposais in 1959, these concerns were dearly less important to itatus ~Tminoritiesrdadveto'ilie majority. In ihe late 1970s. when &e even- the organization than was anti-Semitic hate speech. Finally, the MRAP advo- tual law was first discussed, antiradst groups such as the MRAP supported the cated a procedural change to the law that would permit antiracist assodations drive to outlaw collection of ethnic data.7gAt a time when British and Ameri- groups to participate as ''civil parties" (parties civiles) in court cases involving can antiracists were calling for more ethnic data, the French Parliament racist cdmes. Under French penal law--given certain restdcted conditions-- debated not whether to make race statistics legal or illegal, but whether to per- public intemt groups can take part in or can even take a lead in instigating mit exceptions to the ban or to outlaw collection of race data in wery dr- and arguing cases that relate to the generalized interests of their group. Becom- cumstance." At the end of the day the exceptions remained; yet no advocates ing a civil party to a c-al case can therefore place the group in a pivotal for the positive value of counting minorities could be found. When asked and powaful position within French legal institutions. about this aspect of the-French law with regard to immigrant groups in the Although it took thirteen years before the govemment enacted antiraasm 1990s, one influential French administrator rdected: legislation, when it did so in 1972 these hrndamentals of the MRAP proposals were intactn The French laws against racism made no provision for counting, What would we have to have? Legislation wh~chsays that one 1s recognized as protecting, or aiding groups defined by race or ethnicity, in spite of the con- bebg an immigrant, in order to have special nghts, if one has parents of foreign origin or has at least two grand-parents of foreign origin. That would be an accept- temporaneous development of affirmative action in the United States and the able deklhon. Do you know what that is? That is the ordinance of 18 November budding use of race-conscious policies in countries such as Britain and the 1940 which defines the Jew according to the Vichy regime, which says that one is Netherlands. Such was the aversion to recognizing race in France that the a Jew if one has one Jewish parent or two Jewish grand-parents. It is imposible to institutionally powerful rapporteur of the law (Alain Terrenoire) submitted an unagine a French law which uses thls formulation. It would have a frightening initial draft of the legislation that ornined the word race." The report of the effect.It IS absolute evil." idw committee (comm'ssiort des lois) proposed to punish racism based on reli- gious, ethnic, or national origins, effectively rendering discrimination based on race legal. This was neither a mistake, nor an oversight. Terrenoire Antiracism from the Early 1980s to the Present explained the motive for the decision: By the early 1980s the terrain of antiracism was sh&hg significantly. The Speaking of races u always a delicate matter, for we run the risk of giving aedibd- events of May 1968 had sparked a budding activism among immgrant com- Ity lo the idea tbat there are differentdistinctions [qmlifativcs]within the human munities and the oil cnsis of 1973 led diuectiy to the elimination of the open species. That is why we must separate out the justified and necessary sfruggle and flexible immigration policies that had prevailed since the Second World agalnst racism and its msdeeds from the factual recognition of differences between people according to their origins, their religions, and the wlor of their sMn." War in the interest of economic productivity." The opening years of the new Soaalist administration of 1981 therefore coincided with-and helped con- On the morning of the National Assembly debate, however, the law com- tribute to-rismg immigrant consciousness and experimentation in government rmttee met to examine the amendments suggested by the Government, and it policies toward immigrants. Whereas the Giscard d'Estaing administration accepted the Government's advice to weave race into the law as an explicitly had sponsored a variety of illiberal policy initiatives, Mirterrand and the left Illegal ground [or disc~imination,~~"in spite of the disadvantages" as Terrenoire embarked upon a more generous path, regularizing 130,000 illegal irnm- later stated.76If it had not been for this last-minute decision, there would have grants, restricting powers of expulsion, and Wga ban on foreigners forming been no mention of the word race in lhe French law against raa~m.~ officiallyrecognized associations." The tendency to take race out of antiracism also appears clearly in the Aslde from the rising importance of immigration on the nahonal agenda, 1978 law (78-17) on information storage and freedom (informatiqur et libertc?). the early 1980s saw a burgeonmg of ldentitarian and multiculturalist tenden- Although on the surface this law appeared to have nothmg to do with aes withim the Hexagon, such as the increasing use of "intercultural" rhetoric antiracism, tucked away in the lengthy legislahon was a clause on computer- m schools." The Government also began to lend a hand to regions that were ized storage of personal information that all-but-banned race-based statistics. claiming the right to promote languages and cultures that the assimilationist The 1978 provisions outlawed computerized storage of data on racial origins Thud Republic had done its utmost to stamp out." Within this context, imml- without the express consent of theindivtdual or (in cases of public interest) of grant and antiracist groups began to daim the same "right to difference" that the state.78In practice, this has meant that no systematic data have been col- was advocated for regions. Most notably in th~sera, young French-born ati- lected on race. There are no census estunates of French citizen populations as zens with North African ancestry (known as beurs) began to organize around defined by race or ethnicity and very little data to estunate the sono-economic their ethnic identity, sponso~ga series of high profile antiraast marches in 1983, 1984 and 1985.86By the early to mid-1980s, therefore, the direction of ated significant partisan heat, with the presence of the FN shattezing the mas- antiracism was &I question. No longer as marked by the legacy of Vichy and party consensus on race policies that had prevailed durfng the 1972 vote. more foeused on issues of immigration, the pendulum of antiracism appeared The seeds of the 1990 law must be traced back to 1987, when the Com- poised to swing toward an "Americanr' model of ethnic identification and - munist Party first submitted the parliamentary proposals that were to form race- or ethnictty-conscious politics8' as national-level beur organizations the basis for the eventual law. Led by Guy Ducolonk, the Party argued that a sought to mobilize beur votes" and the FAS decision-making machinery was new law was needed given what it perceived as a rise in racism in France. reorganized to indude representatives of different ethnic communities." Along with speciftc examples of hate speech and physical attacks," it noted Yet this culture shift was not to be. The very rise of immigrant politics and the generalized anti-immigrant tenor of the mid-1980s, a fact which it the ininnsing attention to issues of racism were themselves tightly linked to undoubtedly felt was compounded by the presence of thirty-five National the growing appeal of the National Front. Achieving its first electoral successes Front members within the 1986-88 National Assembiy. Communist Party in 1983, the FN quickly became a mainstay of French public and political dis- advocates suggested two types of remedies to the problems at hand." Elm, course. Its anti-immigrant racism helped spark the emergence of SOSRacisme their bill argued for more information and publicity relating to issues of in 1984. That SOS-Racisme quickly surpassed the beurmovement in the joust racism and antiracism. Second, the bill proposed legal reforms to allow a for public attention can in part be attributed to tensions within the betamove- greater number of pnvate associations to initiate court action against perpe- ment and to SOS-Racisme's innovative publicity tactics.* But it is likely that trators of racist acts and to create stiffer penalties for crimes inspired by radst its success also depended on its appeal to a less ethnic-specific audience. motives. One of the penalties envisioned included the net to refuse certain Although SOSRausme preached the right to difference (in keeping with the civil rights to perpetrators of racist crimes. The PCPs suggested denial of civil spirit of the mid-1980s), it also enlisted the support of a wide range of minori- rights to offenders was not an unprecedented step, but merely a stronger ver- ties as well as members of the general public and especially the political com- sion of proposals made that same year by an RPR Deputy charged with pnrpar- munity. In doing so, it showed itself to be an antiraast movement operating ing a report on nevertheless it was to be the source of heated debate in a more race-neutral paradigm. during the passage of the 1990 law. The trend back towatd public sphere color blindness picked up pace in the Contrary to popular belief, the Communist bills were not the source of mid- to late 1980s. Proving adept at molding multicultural rhetoric for idam- another highly contested point of the 1990 law. The proposed revisionism ban matory purp~ses,Le Pen and the FN embraced the principle of a "right to dif- emanated not from "Stalinist" Communists (as implied by the Right in paflia- ference," provided that those who were different from "the French" practiced mentary debates)?' but rather from the governing Socialists -elves. The their diversity outside of the nation's border^.^' Reacting to the Front's elc . parliamentary Socialists' 1989 antiracist proposals were quietly appended to total sucwses, intellectuals began to argue that the discourse of difbence those of the Communists when the rapportmr drafted the official National harmed the antiraclst cause." It was feared that advocating a "right to differ- Assembly bill in 1990.98The Sotidkt Party (PS) argued that outlawing revi- ence" couId lead to a "difference of rights," an untenable position in the sionist history was menrial given the burgeoning of such theses, citing in par- Republic bequeathed by the Revolution. By the early 1990s, wen the leaders ticular National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen's 1987 statement that the of antiracism movements such as SOS-Raasme were beginning to condemn Holocaust was a mere "detail" of hist~ry.~According to the Socialists, the ' the "communlty logic" of rnulticultulalism, marking a further dedine in the Righfs 1987 law banning the apology of crimes against humanity was insuffi- rhetorical fortunes of the "right to diffem~ce."~~It was within this new con- cient to punish historical revisionism; moreover, they pointed out, France text that France enacted its second major law against racism in 1990. The would not be alone in its actions as a ban on the denial of the Holocaust had Gayssot law, as it is commonly known, had three central elements. Fust and been in place in the Federal Republic of Gennany since 1985.IW most symbolically, it punished those who deny the historical existence of the The oHaal bill of 1990-which emerged from committee deliberations Holocaust. Second, it aeated a new tool for punishmg raasts. Sublect to the and was debated in the two houses of Parliament-thus contained a package discretion of the judges, individuals found guilty of raeist aimes can be of ideas originatingin the two left parties. But many of these proposals had at stripped of certain civil rights-most provocatively the right to run for public one time or another found support among leaders on the Right,Io' and all were office. Third, and least controversially, the law of 1990 created institutional- presumed to be palatable across the political spe~tmrn.'~When they were dis- ized publicity for race policies by mandating an annual report on the struggle cussed in committee and especially in the National Assembly, however, the against racism and xenophobia. The first two elements of the law were placed three core elements of the proposals-publicity, civil rights, and reviswnism- on the agenda in direct response to the actions of the FN. Moreover, in con- were intensely contested, substantially amended. or simply excised. Although trast to the unanimous passage of the law of 1972, the 1990 legislaiion gener- it is unpossible to analyze each of these issues in depth here, it is worth exam- ining some details of the debates in order to highlight the extent to which the over the merits of such a legal provision. The progressive Hannoun report, for presence of the Natfonal Front structured the process and kept politicians' example, had recommended against banning revi~ionism.~'sYet, journalists attention on Issues of hate speech and away from concerns about structural had atmbuted support for outlawing rrvisionism at various times to hew- inequalities between members of different racial or ethnic groups. weights Philippe Seguin and lacques Chira~,"~and Charles Pasqua--the hard- While the publicity provisions were weakened outside of the public eye, nosed and earthy former Interior Minister-had warmed to the proposal as the proposals to deprive convicted radsts of civil rights stirred up passionate recently as the Prime Minister's April 1990 roundtable on racism.117The Right debate. The parliamentary bill proposed to enable judges-at their dishe- was clearly tom over this issue. When it came to the National Assembly debate, tion-to penalize those found gulty of racist with deprivation of the Right's point man, future WerofJustice Jacques Toubon, argued that a civil rights,lo4induding the right to vote and the right to be elected to public revisionism provision would undermine freedom of academic research and office.This provision posed a political problem for two reasons. First, it was might even give credibility to revisionist theses simply by outlawing them. argued to be an inordinate burden on the media and an insufferableattack on Nevertheless, the Right did not vote against the government's formulation of freedom of the press. Under French law, newspaper editors are automatically the revisionism article, suggestinglimits to its hostility to this provision which banned from practicing their profession if they have been deprived of their Toubon dubbed "one of the prinapal innovations of this bill."11' avil rights through a conviction. Because editors are responsible for their The mainstream Right expended tremendous energy opposing the 1990 newspaper's articles, they could-in theory-lose their professional rights if Gayssot law. It voted against the bill in spite of a clear commitment among their journalists quoted racist statements made by third parties. Although cer- party leaders to the cause of antiracism. The National Assembly debate, rife tainly not a probable outcome, this possibility prompted an outcry from with acrimony and procedural delays, dragged on until dawn.'" Deputies media organizati~ns.~"The Right &ed th~~refrain into the parliamentary from the Right drew on anti-Communist rhetoric to condemn a bill which debate, hammering the Government with claims that it was trying to "muzzle they argued originated in a Stalinist party,Iz0seemingly unaware that the law the press."I06 The Government responded by passing an amendment elimi- of 197.2-passed by a rightist Government-also hadits ongins in Communist natii the application of the civil dghts penalty to editors (therefore elimi- Party proposal^.'^' Once the bill moved to the upper house, the predomi- nating the risk that they would be banned from their jobs) and by accepting nantly rightht Senate sefused even to consider the project, repeatedly Mting an amendment of the Right that protected journalists from the same fate.Im measures in committee precluding discussion on the floor. Thzs saved to delay Second, the Right challenged the Left by arguing in the National Assem- passage of the law and sent a dear signal of the upper house's overwhelming bly that the plan to deprive convicted racists of their civil rights was a thinly disapproval of the legislation.la Why did the Right so vehemently oppose the veiled ad horninem attack onJean-Marie Le Pen.'" Le Pen himself claimed kt Gayssot law? the law as a whole targeted the FN.IW The Socialists responded-without In part, leaders on the Right objected to the speci6c provisions embodied spedfically mentioning the National Front or Le Pen-simply by stating that in the legislation. There were legitimate concerns over freedom of speech with those who made racist statements were not worthy of being elected to respect to the civil rights sanaions. Nonetheless, the Right's allergy to this bill office.110Nevertheless, it is clear that the law was crafted in the context of the seems to have been determined largely by its electoral tango with the National rise of the National Front; to plead ignorance or disinterestedness in its effects Front. During the FN's annual 1 May rally, Le Pen shone the media spotlight on the FN rang disingenuous to many on the Right. After considering the ait- at the parliamentary process by decrying its forthcoming debate of a "wicked iasms, the Government excised the ban on the right to vote. Still, by perrmt- law" that aimed to "vote the political death of patri~ts."~aThe following day ting coum to deny convicted racists the right to be elected and to hold office, the mainstream Right mounted its hearty opposition to the bill, ultimately the Left dearly sought to box in Le Pen and his associates. Futu~RPR Min~s- voting with the lone National Front Deputy against the antiracism legislation. ter of JusticeJacquesToubon interjected during the debate: "1 understand that If the Right hed volleys at the Communists and at the bill, the Left amused the Government does not want to go as far as civic death, that it prefers polit- the Right of sympathy with the National Fmnt. Minister of Justice Pime ical death. I understand that is in fact the entire goal of the maneuver.""' ArpaiUange proclaimed that "it was enough for Mr. Le Pen to say yesterday If the Gayssot law is most frequently associated with one element, it is that it [the law] was bad for you to follow suit."'u Whether or not the Right undoubtedly the provision banning revisi~nism."~The revisionism article of reacted directly to the statements of the previous day, the FN undoubtedly the 1990 law rendered it illegal to contest crimes against humanity, going influenced the mainstream Right's tactics, given that the Right was competing beyond the 1987 penalties against the apology of such ~nmes."~This step with the Far Right for anti-immigrant votes. Moreover, the entire process was raised the hackles of some historians, fearful of a measure which smacked of scrutinized by intense media coverage, with Le Pen himself casting a shadow establishing an "official hi~tory.""~in previous years, the Right was divided over the debate by his physical presence in the balcony of the National Assem- Antiracism wnhout Races

bly on the night of 2 May. Even after the initial frenzied moments following theless, it is notewoahy that although over thirty-five percent of those asked Le Pen's intervention, the Right persewred in its opposition over the follow- in 1996 expressed antipathy towards groups such as the bews, Romanies, and ing months, v-g against the final version of the law on 30 June 1990. North Africans, only eight percent expressed antipathy towards @lack) Fmch France fights racism through its laws, but it does so in a particular fashion. West Indians, while twelve percent disliked (white) Central Europqas.'*s As &th the core of the 1972 law, the 1990 Gayssot law attacked a certain kind There are ethnic or cultural out-groups in France that are the focus of antago- of racism. It strengthenedpenalties against hate speech by Far Right organiza- nism; for most people, however, they are not simply defined by skin colos. '26 tions. Although the FN provided the immediate incentives for action in the The second advantage associated wlth the color-blind state is the mitiga- late 1980s and eady 1990s, it did not mtructure French thinking about racism tion of problems of backlash. In race-conscious soaeties, policies targeted for or races. If anyWng, it retnfo~cedthe notion that identifying individuals by the narrow benefit of minority groups ox even policies that disproportionat* their group attributes and counting or tatgeting policies at races, ethnic groups, benefit minorities are often the subject of envy and hostility among the major- or identity-based communities was playing into the hands of the far right. ity population. Even isolated examples of policy abuses by minorities can Leading French antiracists have not always b%n of one mind in this condu- become embedded in the public imagination as symbolic of the acti~nsof sion. But the brief window of opportunity for a multicultural approach to "those people,' and of how the state favors protected groups over the major- problems of ethnic diversity all but dosed with the rise of the National Front ity. Whether the judgments are accurate or erroneous, the result is often bit- in the mid-1980s. Since that time, most antiradst leaders have rallied around terness. The color-blind state might not completely prevent problems of the color-blind republican flag as the most promising approach to the chal- backlash, but it may help undermine the charge that the state favors same lenges posed by the Far Right. groups over others. The color-blind state also appears to have an advantage that is specific to French politics. Antiracists have rallied around this position as the best way to Fighting Racism the French Way Kght the National Front. Policies that de-emphasize race seem to have neu- tralized much of the mileage the FN has derived from the discourse of the right This artide has attempted to illustrate the origins of French ideas about race to difference. If in the United States the Left favors multicultural policies and and to demonstrate the effects of such ideas on antiradst Wtutions. It has difference-consciousness, in France, the Left faces a different set of political argued that although the French perspective was not predetennhed by the constraints. In the present French political context, therefore, there are paw- Revolution and Republican history, those ev~uprovided resources to which erful incentives to embrace color-blind politics. Despite this, it mu6t be actors turned following crises such as Vichy and the rise of the Far Right. m- emphasized that the French state does not completely ignoxe or try to erase ing beyond the effects of race-neutal thMing on French institutions, it is also cultural differences. Its integration policies attempt to strike the delicate bal- valuable to reflect on the effects of French institutions on the country's ability ance between unity and diversity. The High Council on Integration described to Erght racism effdveIy. What are the advantages snd disadvantages to fight- the French philosophy thus: ing racism without recognizing races? Prench policymakers and opinion lead- ... It is a question of woUng the active participation of different and various ele- ers are not alone in their desire to pursue color blindness. Many people in the ments in the natlonal sodety, while at the same time accepting the matntenance 'United States-espedally on the Rightargue that race-consciousness in pub- of cultural, iocial and moral specffidtiesand taklng for granted that the whole is lic policy is morally unjust and politically dangerous. While often criticized by enriched by thls variety, this complexity. Without denying difference, knowing the Left for promoting color blindness as a means to do away with policies how to take them into account without exalting them, a pdiq of integration accarts similarities and convergence, iq order--in equdtty of rights and obliga- that aid disadvantaged minorities, the Right also follows the more "positive" tiow0 foster solidarity between the different ethmc and cultural comoonents llne of logic laid out in French thinking. of our society and to grve everyone, whatever- his ongin, che possibility tb live in Although the advantages are difficult to measure, two common argu- this society in which he has accepted the rules and m which he becomes a con- ments for the color-Blind polity are often advanced. First, since the state and stituent element.lz7 its poliaes set the tone for public understanding of the nation, any state that recognizes race may reinforce internal ethnic divisions among its citizens. Even if the state does not try to stamp out diversity, however, it does not When the state refuses to accept race as a meaningful social vanable, therefore, go as far as the United States or even Great Britain or the Netherlands in offi- it encourages its citizens to think in color-blind terms. Is there evidence of this dally recognizing minorities or targeting policies for the11 benefit. Examining effect in France? Surveys show that in spite of color-blind antiracism laws, the these other liberal demonades and their motives for adopting race-conscious French are able to identify groups for which there is little sympathy. Nevg- polides serves to highlight some of the disadvantages to the French approach. Amiracism wfthour~aces

For exampie, although there was initial lesistance to counting and categoriz- Notes ing ethnic minorities in these counmes, attitudes shifted as progressives real- ized that race data could be employed to help underprivileged groups. In 1. For ComnrenD on and mimnce with this artide as It developed, I wddiik to France, since the state does not count people by race or ethnide, kt is iscult thank HWck Chapman, Alice Con&, Lament Dubois. Laura Frader, Qsteq Jill Parsons, and Patlick Weil. to gauge the relative wdl.being of minorities. The French state can and dws 2. Gbrd Noiael, Lc Crewt pw&: histoire de l'immipration XLXe-XXe &le @a&: undertake studies of the position of foreigners .(acategory fos w!~i~hextensive Seufl. 198%. statistics are kept), and has even conducted limited expIorations intotlxepod- 3. The i990 Lsshowed that foreign and Psiam in France rmmhed tion of immigrant children who are French ~itizens.~~Yet,ifit is ia the 2,069,890 or 3.7% ofthetotal population of 56,634,299 (see Patdck Well, LaP-e state and survey respondents admit-that there is radsrn in France, it follows et ses ibmgm: l'wmd'une pditique de I'immigration de 1938 a nm joun, 2nd ed. [park Galhard, 19951, annex VI). Because onIyuon-Erench are enumeyatd (and that members of groups iden%ed and targeted by radts will have relatively uKn only by counky of origin, not by pthnidty or race), It is Impossible to gauge less success in society than they deserve. But it is impossible to judge the pre- predsely the number of ethnic minorities in Rance. NwMw! its relatively cise contours of this problem in a color-blind state such as France. Moreover, inclusive fftlzenshipand naturan?dtionlawsand the prrience of citizensfran for- because it is impossible to isolate the dimensions of the problem, and because mer French colonies combined with the non-EWch Africans and Asians suggest group-targeted policies are judged illegitimate, it is also diffmdt to a& solu- that the vfsible minority population may be dose to five went of the total and tions to the problem and to track their effectiveness. population On d-hlp and naturalization see Rogers Brubaker, Citiundrip Natronhwd in France and &my(Cambridge, MA: Harvnsd University Press, Responding to the problem of Vichy and the National Front, French 1992); on &ens ftom the former colonies, see Herv* Domeoach and Mael experts and po1lcymakers have not only rejected categorization of minofides, Picouet, La Dimension miprahdndcc Antilks (Paris: Eco11omica. 1992). they have also focused most of their energy on the fight against hate speech 4. See therange of articles on this topic inFmch Polftia and Sodety 14.1 and 2, (win- and intentid racism, to the detdmena of issues of disaimination in jobs ter and Spdng 1996). Mk and housing and indirect radsm. Elites in France have only very -fly 5. A tam1bouow fmm Nathan GI-, EfhnicDihnms: 1964-1982 (Cambridge, HwdUnivemty Re%, 19831: begun to examine intensely these latter types of probIems. Although discrim- 6. Noirial, LC Clsusct m:hirtoin de l'immiption me-XXe sipde; We& La Fmce ination ha$ been outlawed since the Law of 1972, the law generates ~ittmUy etsrsJbutnevs: I'mntrtrm d'unepditQw de l'imm~onde 1938 d nos fours; Cather- no convictions. From 1990to 1994, there werea total offom-four convictions ine Wtol de Wenden, Les hi& et la politigw a dnquante ans d'mluhor~ for discrimiaaton, an average of just under nine per ye&1z9 Responding to (Paria hwsde la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Potttiques, 1988). a?&&&?.$ concerns about the level of discrimination and its effect on the model 7. Etienne Baabar and Immanuel Wallentan, Race, natiolr, 6k.m les iden* Fmch (~;EdltlomLa Dhuverle, 1988); BNbakr, Citizemhi~andNnUmbdinF~)~ce of integration, the High CounCil on Integration pubHshed a report in 1998 and ndennanryi Addan FaveU, Ptdlosophla ofintegmtiant Immigr@fon and the Idea af advocating a simtoverhaul in French antiracist institutions anddrawing CltlBnship In France and P&in (London: MacMiIlan, 1998); Miriam Feldblum, inspiration from the British, Dutch, and BeIgian exemplan. Although the HCI Recansmg Clbimship: ThePoliiics of NatiBnol4 Reform and Immigration In Con- did not recommend a race-consdous approach and specifically rejected qw- rempmry Frrmce (Albany: State Universitp of New Pork Ress, 1999); Alec G. Har- greaves, Jmmigratfon, 'Rean$Ethnin'w in CwtMlpomry Fmnce (London: Roud@dg.=, tas, it called for a new definition of -ation that include indirect or 1995); Rim KaJtoryano, Ia &axe, l%lkmme et hrx imnids: nhduI'idenW unintentional racism, it insisted upon extensive public debate about the prob- Paris: Armand ~~fin,1996); Maxim ~ilverm-an,Dewnm~ct& the ~:dm:Imn~igra- 'iem of dibcdmination, and it advocated a national quasi-governmental insti- don. fhism and Citlrmrhip in Mcdem Fmu(London: Routledse. 1992). tution that would play a leading role in the 6ght against Without 8. Dl&= J.apqronnk, L7dn'du et les minorites: la Prance et la G-&PB&~ facer advocating raceconscious policies, the HU has suggested taking limited steps I ' kun immiigrCr (Pal%Presres Universitaua de P~ance.1993); Dominique Schnapgtr. La P~mede t'intiamtim park Galbard, 1991); Emmanuel Todd, Le Denin des in the direction of France's more raceconsdous neighbors. irnrnigds assimifaUon ei s&&tion dam lrs dimwatiw ~~~'dmtalcs(Paris: Seuil, Itis possible for the French state to continue to 6ght racism while it avoids 1994); MiWe Tribalat, Faire Rance: une grdenqnIh mr ies irnmw et leun recognizing races. In many respects, such a color-blind approach is desirabie. ulf.ntr fParis: La Demuwte, L995). But the color-blind model also comes with costs. If these costs are seen to 9. He& Le Bras, Le DCmon des origim: dcmographie et extrhu dmite (Pa*: L'Aube, impede the effectivefight against racism, the French may eventually-if reluc- 1998); Nonna Maya and Pascal Perrineau. eds., Lc FmntNaziond a dicouwt, 2nd tantly--choose to aorporate the word race into their ethically pldsod- ed. (Pa* Presses de la Fondation Nationaie des Science Politiques. 1996); Martln Scbain. The Immigration Debate and theNatlonal Front," in John Keeier andMar- ety and their antiradsm institutions. tin Srhain, eds., Chmc's Challenge (New York: St, Mamn's Rws, 1996). 10. Loic J.D. WaCpant, "De 1'AmWpe comme utopie I'ems," in Piwe Bourdieu, ed. La Misire du monde (Paris: Seuil. 19931, pp. 169-79. David Stuart Blatt, 'Immigration Polltia and Immigrant Collective Action in take account of ethnicity, as long as they do not pigeon-hole individualsinto scan- Prance. 1968-1993" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University. 1996); Said Bwamama. ingly fixed identities and as long as they do not "dissect foreigners like strange Dix rmr de Mmdrc & Beurs: chmniqrrr d, un mouwmnt avod (Parlc Desclk de insects ..." (pp. 22832). Brouwa. 1994); Marie Poinsot, 'Competitim for Political Legitimaq at Local and 25. See especially the series of articles published in Le Monde on 6 November 1998. National Jm& among Young Nmth Afriraos in France," New Comnnutity 20, 1 26. Silverman, DecunslnrctEng the Nation: hnmigration, Rndsnt and Citizenship in Modem (1993): 79-92. France, pp. 3s. 8moEtienne, ed.. L%lam m Fnuicc (Park CMIS, 1991); Gfnes Kepel, Les brmlinus 27. Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de I'Homme, 19%. La Lutte conk de lZdmn Cpiuis: Se~il,1991); Ollvier Roy. "Islam in France: R~WREthnic Corn- le -meet In xdnophobie: udwion et dmik de I'homme (Paris: La Documentation munitp or Soclal Ghetto?" in Bernard Lewis and Dominlque S~h~ppa,eds., Mus- Rancaise, 1997), pp. 373-75.Barn are young French of North Africau origm. Umr tn Emp (Landon: hter Publlsher~~1994). pp. 54-66. 28. See Favell. Philosophies oflntegration: Immigration nnd theldeaof Citizenship in fiance Pierre-AnM Taguleff,ed., Face rar racism: les moymr d'ngir 2 vols. (Pa~is:La D6-m~- mdBritnin, pp. 72-73;Hargreaves, Immigration, 'Xace'and Ettm~cityin Contonporruj. veSe, 1991); PierrPAndre Taw&, Lu Fmdu pr&C: WU rei le racism et ses dou- Fmncc. bles (P*. LaDkouverte, 1987); Midrel Wieviorka, Lu Frmrndste (PaSeuil, 29. Bmbaker, Cifizenship and Nationhwd in France and Gnman)r:Favell, Philosophies of 190% lntexration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain; Commis- lndifative of this traod is Patrick Weil, "Immisation and the RIse of Radsm in sion de la NationalitL Ebe francais aujoud'hui et demm (Paris: La Documentahon France: The Contradictlorn in Mitterrand'r ~olldes,"French Politics and SSodety 9, 3- francaise. 1988). 4 (19911:82-100 which int~~~ets- -moblems of raom almost exclusively in termsof 30. it& In idpeponnie, L'IndMidu etles minorit&: la France et la Grmule-Betagne face li the politics of immigration. larn immim's. 0.161. Not all scholars hi^ Jwdecally em- the long-term embeddedness of lace- 31. Fonds d'~&oi~odale,Ebr n&w Nanq: Fonds dSl\ctionSodale, 1996). neutrall ty in ~rm&&lltical &tu& Most xbolanhip simply summarizes France's 32. The FAS is the principal mtnunent of the state for integrating immigrants into the histow of immlaration and culblral diffuence by beginning with the French Revo- French pol~tyand society. lutioiand emP&sizhg historical moments of assimilation and color bhdness II? a 33. Confidential interview, PaN, 17 Mar* 1997. way that gives the impreuion of strong mntinuity. 34. %win Nuhoglu Soysal, Lirnia ofCituMshq: Migmk andPmblaMo~1Membership For wh01a1ly works on France that address race directly, see Etienne BaUbar and hr Europe (Chicago! University of Chicago hs,1994). p. 61. Immanuei Wallerstein, RRLY, nation, class@:lea identit& ambi@ paris: La D&cou- 35. Hargreaves. Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnidty rn Conremporary France, pp. 198-99; verte, 1988). and Sllvwan, Demmrmcting ttu Nation: Immigmtion, Rncism and Lapeyronrue, LlndiM'Mu et les minorit*: la France et lo Grande-Bretagne face li /em Citizenship in Modcm Fnmce. Most studies on closely related topics focus either on immigrk, pp. 244-45; Martin Schain. "Poliq-Making and Defining Ethnic Minon- one element of French history, such as mloniallrm or scientific radm, or they ties: The Case of Immigration inFrance," New Community 20,l (October 19931, pp. discus rbe history or presence of "racism" but not race, or they tend to focus on 61-63.Schain notes that there have also been limits placed on minorities m areas radsm within the private sphere, but not how the state has used or avoided the such as schools, summer camps and winter ski schools. subject of race. 36. It should benoted that the United States has also pedodically pursued such goals; The only published source-vay useful, but hard to 6x1- the history of the take, for example, the Starrett City housing development in Brooklyn. See Nathan 1972 law was produd by the Mouwment contre le R4ci.m~etpm I'AM'tiC enbe les Glazer, AfFmntive Discrimination: Etlmic Inequality and FubIic Policy, 2nd ed. (Cam- Peuples (MRAP), an interest group that pamctpated in the proffss. See MRAl? bridge, MA: Hamard Univenrty heu, 19871, p. &. Chmnique dn @grant mnSrnc (Psris: La Dkouverte. 1984). Mthough I am aware of 37. Weil, LnFrance etm Cbnngers: l'avenlurr d'unepolitique de /'immigration de 1938 b nos at least one book-length study in preparation on the 1990 law, to my knowledge joun, 399.Well argues, however, that allocation of poor housing stock fimt to immi- nothing comprehensi& has be& published. grants served to aeate "miaoghettoes" at the building level. Paul Pierson, 'When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change," 38. Cited m B~baker,Citizmhip and Natlonhmd inFrance and Garnumy, p. 106. Worfd Politic9 45 (lul~1993): 595-628. 39. Favell, Philosophies oflntegmb'on:lmmigmtionand the Idea of Citizenship in Fmnce and Joane Nag& "The ~outicalConsWon of Ethnidty," in Susan 0% ed., Com- Britain, p. 59. oetWveEtb~fcRelan~lt~(Orlando: Academic Press, 1986), pp. 93-111. 40. See esp. Brubaker, C~himshrpand Nationhood In Fmeand &many. hestate and its empi&es are not, of mum, immune tbcharges of racism. 41. Sue Peabody, There Are No Slaves in France" The Pol~ticalCdWe ofRace and Slavery It is illenal In France to store comvuterlzed information on race without the express in the Ancien APgime (Oxford: Oxford University keu, 1996). Peabady notes that consenrof the lndhriduals concehed or formal approval from a national ~mmis- both Britain and Holland also bad freedom principles, but that they were enforced sron. See below for further discdon of this law. much less effectively than the French pohcy. She also demonstrates that although The CNIL, or CmissionNah'onale Inpdque et Lib& the French courts were quite liberal and actioist in freelog slaves in metropolitan Tribalat, Faire Fmce: um gmn& enq& nnles immlgr* ef lem mfank, pp. 16-17. Rance, the government, fearful of nonwhite immimation. enacted illibnal oolldes LeBras, L~Dtmmdes orfgimdemosrnphie etutltme dmite. In particular, the author mmed at restncting the rights of blackr and other people of color from enter& and took issue with the WED and with their studies that employed the category remainlne" on- French---. -

43. On slavery and race iwes in the French Cadbbean, see Mi&& P&n& Citoym- Blumel, Lyon-Caen and later Paraf were not members of the Comunist Paay net6 et sufPtion mu Anbules fiancophonrs: posticcavage et aspiration dPmonatique (interview Wlth %, 19 Mar& 1997). @ads: L'Hannattan, 1997). 61. At the time, the group now knom as the LICRA was the LICA: the Lipus Inma- 44. Laurent Dubois, Les *clam de la R@ubi@c i'hismire wbWe de la~reimd- tionale Conbe I'Antishnibirnrc. pation 1789-1794 (PransL Pa* Calmarm-L&y, 1998). 62. Albert Levg "Mboire du MRAP." Papa pwmted at the La Joum6e de fiormation, 45. Alice L. Codfin, A Miion to Civiki The RcpuHjum Idea ofEmpin in Fmeand IUI8ne-Alpes, Frame 1993, p. 2. Wert Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanfor& Stanford Univenity ha1997),-p. 9. 63. Bid. 64. And16 Blumel had taka part in the Blum government of the 1930s; and Leon Lyon- 46. Charles-Robert Ageron, Hismirede l'AlgMe cpntempdraine, 8th ed. (Paris Re- Uni- both venitaires de France, 1983); Ylncent Confer, FmeandAlge?ia: ThePmblem ofcivil Cmand Robat Attuly were honomy presidents of the Cour de -tion. 65. lkq"Mboire du MRAP," pp. 3-4. One of the most prominent of these pdodials andPoliticd Reform, 1870-1920(Sgracuw .Syracuse University Press, 1966). was "Aspactr de fa Fmnce,' which played symbolically upon the initials of the 47. Tmetan Todom, On HumDiverse NadonaIism, Rncism, and rmdEroticirm in French Thght (nand. Cambridge, MM Harvard Univeafty Press, 19931, pp. 90-170. For a "Amon Frcnyafse,' and even counted the latter'f former leader, Charla Mau~, among its writen. of the racism Rance, see also Pierre-Andre Taguieff, La Force "pre-history' term in 66. MRAP, CJuonique du flclgmnt racisme, pp. 9-13. dupwusp: waisur le racisme etsa MIS(Pads: LaDeCOuwrte, 1987), pp. 12251. 67. Ibid., p. 10. 48. See Eugen Weber, Action FtqnLce: Roynlism and Rewtion in ?IventiethCenhoy France 66. (Stanford: Stdnford Universily Press. 1962). Beawe this procw tcokplace in a very youngoqjanieation, no records exist of the early proposals in the MRAP archives. 49. Taguleff, LuFme dup@u& essaiswle nacisme etses doubles. pp. 16-17. Deux 50. Emile Durkheim, Suidde:A Study inSoN,logy(trans1. New York The Free Press, 1951 69. Leon Lyon-Caen, *Le MRAP MRAPe.8 au Parlement Ropogitiom de Loi," DroU etLiM 1801284 (1959); MRAP, Chmnique duj7agant radsme, pp. 117-22, L18971). P 85. 70. Including discrimination by publlc authorities. 51. See Lilyan Kesteloot, Black Writen in French: A LWmy Hiiof Negritude (trand. 71. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974); Irving hnard Markovitz, Li~pold "Mhoifedu MRAP;" Pierre Paraf, LeRaclsme duns le mMda (Pans: Payot, 1964). bg War %@or and the Politics ofWegilPuie (London: Heinemann, 1969). 72. In the intenm, the MRAP prop& had, however, been amended and added b of 52. Eerman Cebovics, Tme Frm: The Wars ovcr Culbrral Identi@, 15'00-1945 (Uaca: wrlous paaies. For a detailed dtscussion the passage of the law see Bleleh. Cornell University Ress, 19923, p. 10. Pmbim-Sol~PoIitfa:IdPrr and Race Policies in Brltafn and Frame F.D. Djma- MRAP, du 53. See Heny Rour~o,The Vidy Symhme: History and Memory in France since 1944 tion, HamdUniversity, 1999); Chmique Flagant &e. Press. 73. No. 2357, Assemblee Nationale, 4e lcigblature, 25 mai 1972, Rapport. (trans. Cambridge: Harvard Unmity 1994). 74. Communicat~onHnithTenenoire,24 October 1999. Note that the law as formulated 54. Patti& Well, "Radsme et discrimination dans la politique frangalse de I'immigra- tion: 193845t1974.95," Vingtihne Slkle 47 (jUet+?ptembre 19951, pp. 77-102. does not explicitly protect or recognize radal or any other groups as such. 55. ResearCh comparing the use of radal or ethnic terminology by the French state 75. No. 2394, &sen&& Nationale. 4e legislature, 7 juin 1972 Rapport Supplbent%ife. before and after the Sewnd World War has, tomy imowledge. yet to beundertaken. The Committee alw, accepted several technical mgg@ons *om the Government. 76. Interview with Terrene, 5 April 1997. The Government (in the form of Mini* 56. This is not to say that references to race disapFa~edfollowing the Vichy year!.. Writes such asJean-Paul Same and Ctaude LCvi-Straw devoted attention to the of Justice bureaucrats) argued simply that race referenced "anqtomical aitala' and problems of race in the 1940s and 1950s. and two decades of decolonixation cou- was thus not the same as (and therefore would not be mvered by da- on) eth- pled with political activism by authozs such as Frana Fanm served to keep race in nidty or nationality. It also argued, intaestbgly in light of late 1WOs debates and the public eye. Nwertheless, it was after Vichy that most raceaNdws state poli- jurisprudence about antirimmigrant mdm, that purrishing ctimiminatim based des and domestic instituliom lost credibility and public sympathy. See Jean-Paul on nonmembership in a pp(as the 1972 law does) was vital and insightful. The We,"Orphke Noh," in Leopold MarSenghor, ed., Anhol@~&la wuvellepdsie Government asserted that 'pra~kmgdimiminatiw, hatred or violence ag-st people de6ned as non-French or nonwhite, for example, is as reprehensibie as that n2gm gre m&nrelgadv de langue fhqaise (Paris: Presras Unlvenitaires, 1948); Claude See Lkti-Straw, Race and History (Paris: UNESCO. 1958); Frantz Fanon, Peau noim which targets, for example, non-catholics, or non-ChWtians.* AnWm du masques Mmra (Pads: Sd,1952). Minist& de la Justice, Folder: amendments present& par le Gowemement. 77. There was also agitation in committeeand National hemb1y debate for prote&on 57. Throughout the 1960sand the early 1970s, for example, the gavemment refused to other consider antitadstl~@ation on the grounds that "it wootd be COXItraty to the goal against diXIImination against Corsicans and regional groups. A "Corsican was, See 4e aimed at-to campaign against what does not exist, in the senseof a systematic ten- dause" hawever, not added to the lam No. 2357, Ananblee Nationale, dency and an organized movementn (Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas, legislature, 25 mai 1972, Rapport, p. 14; Journal OfWel pereaftaJO1,D&ats Par- lementaires, Assembl6eNationale, 8 ruin 1972, p. 2292. interview given to the 'HbuneJuive,reported m LC Mod, 6 &February 1971). 78. It is also illegal to store data on polihcal, philosophical, 01 relipious opinim, or on 58. At the time MRAP stood for Mouwment wnbe le Racisme, I'Anti-Shidmre ctpour ia Ph. Since 1977, the acronym has stood for Mouvemcnt cantre le Rucisme ct pnrr union membership. However, churches and religious, philasophlcal, pohtical and I'AW mm les Pqla. union groups may legally keep a register of their own members. Minority groups 59. Ligue intemationale Contre le Racisme et I'AnhiPmitisme. may not legally keep records of their members, unless they obtain members' pa- mission or the permission of the state (see JO,Lols et Wets, 78-17, 7 janvier 60. There is a smd debate over whether the MRAP was itself a Communist organtsa- 1978, p. 229). Eon. Former MRAP General Secretary Albert Uvy argues that this label was attached to the MRAP for political reasons, poinhng out that MRAP Presidents 79. Internew with Palant, 10 March 1997 - ' , ,' 6 --' Erik BM I' #-$7; -4 J 98. See No. 1296, Assembl6eNatioaale, 9el€gislature, 26 avdl 1990, Rappat The Sodal- 80. See 3125. No. Assunbl& Nationale, 5e l&pislature,4 dbre1977, Rapport, pp. 25- ist Party bill was ktsubmitted in 1988 (with Geo* Sarre as ktstpatory), and 26; JO, DhtsPadementairea, Asaembl&Nationale, 6 octobre 1977,5878-79; No. then tesubmitted unaltered under the btsignature of Louis Menuaz in 1989 (-NO. 72, Seaat, leEadon. 10 mnrembre 1977, Rapport; JO, Debats Parlementaim, Seaat, 1247, AfsembEe Natlonale, Be ltogislanue, 24 femia 1988, Proposition de Loi; NO. 18 novembre 19?7, pp. 2799-2801. 1004, Assanblk Nationale, 9e Egislalure, 10 novembre 1989, Proposition de Loi). 81. Cunfideritial inteyoiew. Paris. 301une 1997. 99. No. 1004, Asemblk Nationale, 9e ligblature, 10 novembte 1989, Proposition & 82 On immigrant acbvlsm, see Blatt, "Immigzation Politics and lnmigmnt ColleCtlve Lai, p, 5. Actionin Stance, 19681993." On theend of open immigration poll&, see Weil, La at sas 100. No. 1004, Arsembl6e Nationale, 9e lkg%giJlature,10 novunbre 1989, ROposition de Frame 6molgm: 1'- d'unc pOI1tique de I'irnmi@tion de 1938 li nm jam. Loi. 0.6 of in r~ -. 83. Weii, "hmigation and the Rise Raeism in France: The Contradictions Mit- 101. For example, as Wtaof Soaal Affairs in 1987, Philippe winhad himsell pro- terrand's Polidea," p. 89. pored a significant reform of the 1972 antiradsm law (laCmh, 7 Mav 1987: LibCr* 84. Franpise Hemy-Loxede, "Mtsd'immigrh et &ole fran$aise: a propos du mot en tion, 7 August 1987). d'o~drede pedagogic interculturelle,"inhb1 ma, ed, Maghrkbiins Fmncc: hi- 102. Nouvel Obsenmtcw, 10116 May 1990. grLr ou immigds? (Parls: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientiiique, 103. The mppartmfs origluai proposals called for the civil rights penalty to apply in all 19631, pp. 267-98. cases of racist dmes; the committee kited appllcarion to what it consideed the 85. William Wan, The French State and Ethnic Mmority Cultures Poliq Dimen- worst racist crimes (No. 1296, Asswnblie Nationalee 9e 16gislature, 26 avdl 1990, sions and Roblems," in Joseph R. Rudolph and Robert I. Thompson, Ethnohr- &.. Ra~oortD. m. fhe Wptmr World (Boulder: Lynne 1989). ritainl Politics, Policy and Rtenner. 104. &det&edby ~rticte42 of the French penal code. 86. See BIatt, "Immigration PoUW and Immigrant Collective Action in France, 1968 105. Such as the PHkation Nationale de la WeRangise, the Sgndicaf des Qumdi- 1993;" Bouamama, Dir ans de Marche des Beun: duonlque d'w mowement awrt6. ens Repio~ux,as well as jmmaJ&t organizations (see de Paris, 3 May 1983 was the most effective yw for themarches. As Blatt notea, by 1985 theMarcbe ~~ 1990; I& Monde, 3 May 1990; Ngaro, 3 May 1990). das hew was only a shadow of its former self. 106.10. D&ats Parlementsires, Asswnblk Nationale, 2 mi1990, p. 902. 87. RhyLweau and Catherine Wto1 de Wenden, "La Deuxibe g&&ation," Pau- 107.J0, Dcbats Pariementaires, hblkNationale, 2 mal1990. pp. 352-54. Note that vofrs 47 (1988): 61-73: Diana Pinto, 'Immlgration. L'Amblguit6 de la r@hce joumallsts would not havebeen banned from pddngtheir profepsiion in case of am€dcaine,~Po#oin 47 (1988): 93-101. deprivation of chril rights. This amendment was thezdore designed to appease the 88. Masie Poimot, 'Competition for Polltical Legitimacy at local and National levels media lobby in the face of its mobilization. amow Young North Afrim in France," New Community 20,1(1993): 79-92. 108. Frands Delattre, Philippe de Villi= and Lwis de Broissla disapproved of the law in 89. Hargreaves, Immigm%n, ~Xacc'andEthnicw 61 Contempormy Ran@, pp. 20445. part for this reason. Marie-FranceStlrbois, the sole PN deputy at the time, also used 90. Blatt, "Imrmgration Polities and Immigrant Collective Acdon in France, 1968- this argument as one of many for opposing the law (10. Debgts Parlementaires, 1993"; Poinsat, "Competition for Political Legitimacy at Local and National Levels Assemblbe Nationale, 2 mat 1990, pp. 90607, 909). among Young North Africans in France " 109. QUO& de Porls, 3 May 1990. 91. See FradW Hugh Adler, "Radsm, &@erne and the Ught in France," Modrm and 110,JO, Debab ~arlement&, Assemblk Nationale, 2 mai 1990, pp. 928-29. ConumpotWyFmna 3, 4 (1995): 439-51. 111. JO. Debats Parlementa~~es,Aufmblk Nationate. 2 mai 1990. o. 946. 92. See esp. Taguieff La Fom duprijugi: misur le racismc etses doubles. llamelaw punished those who contested the existence of cr~mhsagainst humanity 93. Harlem Dksir, "Pour I'Int*&tion: conditions et Losuuments." in Pierre-Andre committed during World War Two (namely, the Holocaust), whlch some at the Taguieff, @d.,Fmau ran'srne: les mom d%gfrparis: $ditions La D€couverte, 1991), Ume referred to as revtslonism and others ap negationism. Negationism has since pp. 106-19. become the tenn of choice in France for these mimes, dnce revisloam has ah 94. Such as the existence of a "pseudo-thesisY denying the Nazi gas chambers, cries of been applied to valid acddemlcmrk which "redced* the understanding of history. 'Arabs in theown" heard at anindwafalconflict, the attackon a symgogue in the I use revisi0nE.m instead of the French tm''n@gaUonismW to reilea popular Eng- rue Cqernic, and the murder of a young Algerian (Habib Grin@, thrown from a lish language ussge of the term and to avoid inwductioq of a neologism. uain in the south of France. See No. 762. Assemblk Nationale, 8e ligblature, 31 113.J0, hiset DeCrets, 90615,14 juillet 1990, pp. 8333-34; MininryofJustfce Circu- mai 1987. Rao~ort,OD. 5-6: No. 43. Afsemblie Nahonale, 9e l&gislature,15 juin la C3.M 990-09 P1/27-0$-90. 1988, proposlhbn deini, pp. 5-6. 114. See the lntaview with Madeleine R6Mrtoux in LibPmtim, 4 May 1990. 95. The bin alw called for two general statement3 of prindple: support fot the 1965 115. Hannoun, L'Homme m I'esphom de llam. United Natm International Convention to End W Forms of Radal Dixrimina- 116. QuaWdllm &Par&, 3 Map 1990. ma,and an enjoindu to French schools to inculcate *the respect of the mdividual 117. NarwI Obsmvatnrr. 10-16May 1990. and of his 0dgIn.s and dlffemncec." See No. 762, AssembIee Nationale, 8e legisla- 118. JO, D€batS Parlementaltes, Assemblk Nationale, 2 mi1990, p. 954. We. 31 mai 1987, Rapport, pp. 10-11; No. 43, Assemblee Nationale, 9e l&islature. 119. Many of the procedural madbloclrJ were esected by the Wational Front Deputy 15 fuin 1988, ~ropositibndiioi, pp. 10-11. (Marie-France Stirhis), though the mahoeam Right was also respoNibie for sig- 96. The Hannoun Report advocated to potential deprival of certain dvil rights-such ni6cant delays. as jury paNdpation-for persons cwvicted of racist crimes. Michel Hannoun, 120 10, DPbats Padementaiies, Assemblee Nationale, 2 mai 1990, pp. 90157; LeMonde, L'Homme enl'apimnce dc lhomme(hds: La Documentation Franvaise, 1987). 4 May 1990. 97 SeeJO, D&ats Parlementaires, AssemblieNationale, 2 ma1 1990, esp. 931. Erik El&

121. The MRAP proposals of the late 1950s were 61sl submitted in Parliament by the Communist Party in 1959. In later years, deputies from the Right also submitted similar bib on their own initiative. See Bleioh, "PrObtemSol~gPolitic.: Ideas and Face PolIdes in Britain and France," chapter 5. LESPOLITIQUES FRANCAISES 122. Under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the Senate has the power to delay government projects, but not to stop them. By igno~inggovernment bills. the Sen- DE LU'ITE CONTRE LE RACISME, DES ate sends a strong signal of dlsapproaab but as a CotKequence it foregaes any influ- ence over the law's final fom. POLITIQUES EN MUTATION 123. NmdObservatew, 10-16 Mav 1990: Le Monde, 4 May 1990. 124. J0,DCbats ~arlem&altes,bemb16e Nationale, 2 I& 1990, p. 903. 125. Commission Nationale Consultative des Dro~tsde I'Homme, 1996. La Lutte conbe 1s m&me ct la xinophobic exclusion et dmik de i'hornm, p. 373. 126. Whether offidallyrecognidng the= groups would aggravate antagonism towards them, however, remains an open questton. 127. Haut Conseil A I'lntktation. POW WI Mdle Frmqab &Inc&ation (Paris: LA DON- mentation ~ran@ise,i991),p. 18. 128. Por a summary of much of the work in this area, see Haut Conseil l'intkgrati~n, Rwmrtdu.. Haxi Conseil ir 1'IntParation- nlatifaaa disaimbdom (Pads: Haut Cod i 111nt6graaon, 1998). 129. Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Home, 1996. Ln Lutte contn le radsmeet la xinophobic exclusion et droits de i'homme, pp. 362-63. The most recent High Coundl on Integration report places the number of convldions for 1995 at 74 1 pouvait sembler evident, jusqu1A une paode tr& recente, que la formule and for 1996 at 81 (Haut Consell 6 I'int4gration, Rapport du Haut Conseil 6 l'Int+fla- Icabre du fuge Blackmun selon laquelie, s pour en finir avec le raeisme, tion relatif aux dbcrirninntions, p. 84). It Is unclear whether the &parity between nous devons d'abord prendre la race en compte s1 n'avait aucune chance de these figrues and those of prev&us yean is due to an haease in convictions or a s'acclimater en Prance. La culture politique r@publicaine, exprim& et con- different tabulahon method. Furthermore, the HCI notes that the 1995-96stadsdcs fort& par des prinapes constitutiomels fermement &non~&~,s'opposait i la a~ still maU compared to the numk of complain& of disaiminatton in France prise compte d'un crit&e de categorisation tenu pour intrinsequement and compared to the average of 2,000 convictions per year in Great Bmain. en 130.Haut Conseil a I'Int@ation, Rapport du Haat Conseil ir /'Irlt&ation refntff oux infamant et dku6 de tout contenu positif : le Qoit franqais contemponin ne discrfminntlonr. mentionne la * race n que pow en prosdire la prise en compte ; la seule race * qu'il connaisse est la race du raciste. Dans ce contexte, les nombreuses politiques de discrimination positive instituk en France depuis une vingtaine d'des se distinguent nettement de I'aflnnative action amacaine3. Approche spatialis& des handicaps sorriaux desmee 6 mieux 1utte1 contre les in&galitQ socio4conemiques, &es n'ont rien P voir, dans leu? principe comme dans Ieurs objectifs, avec une am action amacaine qui recourt P des critPres ethno-raciaux aux hns de promou- voir (entre autres) un ideal de .diversit6 2. Smnement color-blind, la discrimination positive s 6 la fran~aisen accorde divers avantages et prl?f&rences P des categories d'individus dwessur la base de crit&es exdusivement socio-&onomiques. L'instauration de zones d'edu- cation prioritaires, par exemple, se dOMe pow objectif, aux termes de la circulaire du la juillet 1981, de = contribuer h corriger l'in6galitb paf fe ren- forcement saectif de I'action Hucative n. Elle consiste, seion la loi de 1989.6 apporter - un soin pedagogique tout particulier :. am populations scdaires issues de categories sodales dffavoris&s .. Cette action speciiique se traduit par le fait que des moyens suppl&nentaires sont accord&, notamment en ter-