Democracy and Human Rights in Cambodia

Democracy and Human Rights in Cambodia By Michael Vickery and Ramses Amer Phnom Penh, Penang, Stockholm 1996 [*additional comment and footnotes from 2011-2012 is enclosed in asterisks and brackets*] [*NB: This is a report commissioned in 1995 by SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency). The background was that “Sweden has entered into a long-term development cooperation with Cambodia. During 1995/96 a country strategy for the development cooperation during a three-year period beginning in January 1997 will be formulated. SIDA will produce background material in various fields in order to present a country overview, an analysis of results and a proposal for the continued cooperation with Cambodia.” As stated in the Terms of Reference, the part of Ramses Amer and Michael Vickery in the country overview was “Analysis of the democratization process, human rights situation and judicial system in Cambodia.” Our text was to be limited to 50 pages, with additional appendices where we considered them necessary. Given Sweden‟s solid reputation as a flourishing social emocracy, we expected from SIDA a sympathetic understanding for the problems of post-revolutionary Cambodia, in particular for the PRK (Peoples‟s Republic of Kampuchea,1979-1989) and the succeeding SOC (State of Cambodia, 1989-1993), and a critical understanding of the changes, often negative, brought about after 1993 by UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) and the rapid shift into an extreme free-market society. Instead, we were faced with considerable hostility in the section of SIDA concerned, and among a coterie of Swedish academics (not Cambodia specialists) to whom our report was sent for comment. Indeed, they exhibited the attitudes I have attacked as a special Vietnam Syndrome in my writing on that subject (http://michaelvickery.org/vickery2010kicking.pdf. As a result of this hostility, SIDA organized a seminar in Stockholm on 29 April 1996 for the purpose of confrontation with our report; and a response to that seminar written by Michael Vickery is attached.*] What follows here was written by Michael Vickery, but Ramses Amer shared equally in the research and dicussion leading to our written report*] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. The Democratization Process Government and politics In discussing democracy and human rights in Cambodia the traumatic history of the last 25 years and Cambodia's political culture must be kept constantly in mind. The situation today resembles that in the former Soviet Bloc countries, but is more violent, more the result of foreign imposition, with less economic resilience, and in a culture where equality before the law was not widely recognized at any time in the past. Although Cambodia's first constitution and multi-party elections were in the 1940s and 1950s, by 1955 a single-party dictatorship had been installed by King, then Prince, Sihanouk and democratic forms were either suppressed or ignored until 1993. In the UN-supervised election in May of that year twenty parties competed, but only four won seats in the National Assembly, and only two, FUNCINPEC with 58 and the CPP with 51, had significant strength. The result has been a grand coalition of all, leaving no party in opposition. FUNCINPEC is the royalist party headed by Prince Norodom Ranariddh, son of King Sihanouk, and the CPP is the former ruling party of the pre-election State of Cambodia (SOC), from 1979 to 1989 the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). They are respectively First and Second Prime Minister. Other ministries, as well as provincial governorships are shared almost equally, with a few posts given to the third party, BLDP, which has ten seats. Politics since the election has been characterized by tension and factional power manoeuvres. In June 1993 disgruntled CPP members who had not been chosen by their party for the National Assembly tried to take three eastern provinces out of the state in a secession coup. A year later the same two leaders were caught planning a coup against the government. In December 1995 Prince Norodom Sirivudh, half-brother of the King, former Foreign Minister and Secretary- General of FUNCINPEC was charged with planning the assassination of Hun Sen and exiled to France. Sam Rainsy, a FUNCINPEC member of the Assembly, who had been the first post-1993 Finance Minister, was so active in criticism of the government and his own party that he was expelled from the party, and then from the Assembly. Throughout these two years King Sihanouk has intrigued to increase the limited power allowed him by the constitution, and to that effect tried to negotiate reconciliation with the Partie of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK or 'Khmer Rouge'), including their entry into the Assembly. In July 1994 the PDK was outlawed, a move strongly opposed by Sihanouk, Rainsy and Sirivudh. In 1997 an election is planned to choose leaders of communes, the third level of provincial administration, for the first time in Cambodian history. The next national parliamentary election, prescribed by the constitution, is scheduled for 1998. The modalities of organization for these elections are uncertain, but it seems that in 1998 the government intends to run as a coalition. The press Since UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) arrived in 1992 there has been an explosion in newspaper publishing, although many papers have been short-lived. At present there are around 40 newspapers in Phnom Penh, and there is greater press freedom than at any time in the past, except perhaps right at the time of independence in 1953-54, and just after the overthrow of Sihanouk in 1970. Three main tendencies may be identified, pro-government, anti- government, and newspapers supportive of Sam Rainsy, which are also anti-government. Most of the new papers have been of very low quality, both in terms of writing and journalistic responsibility. This is in contrast to the relatively high quality of the few papers published ii with official support under the PRK/SOC. Many of the new newspapers have written things which would be in violation of laws in western democracies concerning libel, incitement to violence, and racism. The reaction of the authorities, which has sometimes seemed severe, must be seen against this background. In 1994-95 there have been over a dozen prosecutions of journalists and editors resulting in fines, closure, and imprisonment. The law under which they were charged was the UNTAC criminal law which has articles on libel and incitement to violence, including penal sanctions. In July 1995 a new, milder Press Law was passed, without imprisonment for press offences. Three journalists were murdered in 1994, presumably in revenge for their writings, without the guilty being punished. Non-governmental associations and civil society Approximately 80-100 domestic and 200 international NGOs exist in a state of relative disorder. A few began work in the 1980s and established a good record of worthy projects in cooperation with the government. Most were formed after 1991 along with UNTAC with foreign encouragement, or to obtain foreign salaries. All depend on foreign money, and if it were suddenly cut off, most would collapse, having done nothing to become self-sustaining. The modalities of registration of the NGOs were chaotic, there is much overlap in their activities, little coordination, and the government is concerned that many operate as semi-political bodies. An NGO statute is being drafted so that all may be registered and their activities rationalized [*Such an NGO statute, long overdue, is only now, in 2011, being finalized*]. Many of the NGOs give 'Human Rights' as their area of concern, and some regularly give courses in human rights, including in the past year much work with the police and military. Many other NGOs are 'women's organizations', and they, as a group, have come under strong criticism from an independent consultant for administrative laxity. Although the Constitution gives freedom to create associations and political parties, it is subject to a further organizational law on associations, which has not yet been promulgated. It might thus be argued that all NGOs exist outside the law. In these circumstances, the NGOs are not a firm basis for the development of civil society. There are no labor unions. The military Military personnel are not prominent in the government, except the Ministry of Defence, and they are not directly active in politics. Because of the ongoing war with the PDK, however, the military budget is inflated, the army is too large, and in the provinces where insecurity prevails (the Northwest, North, and Southwest, in particular) the military are outside the law and commit many offences against the population. They are also involved in illegal logging. Demobilization of the estimated 130,000 army has not begun, perhaps because the army resists it, but in any case there would be no employment available for demobilized soldiers. The iii inflated officer corps has been reduced, the number of generals declining from over 2000 in early 1994 to less that 200 at the end of 1995. B. The Judicial System and Rule of Law. Laws and Courts There is nearly as much confusion in the laws as in the press and the NGOs. During the 1980s the PRK/SOC developed new laws and courts largely based on Soviet practice, but also influenced by the French system which Cambodia had known before 1975. When UNTAC arrived there was much ignorance of the laws in force and functioning courts, and an attempt was made to supersede them with UNTAC law. Total change was impossible, and the courts remained much as before. PRK/SOC laws were never formally abrogated. UNTAC promulgated an electoral law and a criminal law which included penalties for press violation, and in 1993 the SOC promulgated its own Criminal Law, including organization of the court system.

Load more