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The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia

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The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia VOLUME II Conventional Balance, Asymmetric Forces, and US Forces AUTHORS Anthony H. Cordesman and Ashley Hess A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy JUNE 2013 Blank The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia VOLUME II Conventional Balance, Asymmetric Forces, and US Forces AUTHORS Anthony H. Cordesman and Ashley Hess A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy June 2013 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS—50th Anniversary Year For 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars are developing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in April 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2013 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data CIP information available on request. ISBN: 978-1-4422-2517-6 (pb); 978-1-4422-2518-3 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... VIII THE “CONVENTIONAL” WARFARE BALANCE ............................................................................................ VIII THE ASYMMETRIC OR IRREGULAR WARFARE BALANCE .............................................................................. XII US FORCES IN THE ROK AND PACIFIC ................................................................................................... XIV IV. THE “CONVENTIONAL” MILITARY BALANCE IN THE KOREAS AND NORTHEAST ASIA ............................................................................................................... 1 DETERRENCE, RESTRAINT, AND LEVELS OF CONFLICT ................................................................................ 1 A Clash or Conflict between the DPRK and ROK ........................................................................ 2 THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL ACTORS .......................................................................................................... 3 LEVELS OF “CONVENTIONAL” CONFLICT ................................................................................................... 7 Open-Ended Scenarios and Escalation Ladders ........................................................................ 7 Comparing Total “Conventional” Orders of Battle with Possible Combat Scenarios ............... 9 TOTAL MANPOWER ............................................................................................................................. 11 ARMY AND LAND FORCES .................................................................................................................... 17 NAVAL AND MARINE FORCES ............................................................................................................... 28 AIR AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES, AND DPRK ARTILLERY, MRLS, ROCKETS, AND MISSILES ......................... 40 Fixed Wing Aircraft ..................................................................................................................... 40 Rotary Wing Aircraft ................................................................................................................... 40 Surface-to-Air Missiles and Anti-Aircraft Guns ......................................................................... 41 Conventional Artillery and Surface-to-Surface Rockets and Missiles as a Counterbalance to Limits in Airpower ...................................................................................................................... 41 30 HQ-6D Red Leader ............................................................................................................... 51 PARAMILITARY FORCES ........................................................................................................................ 56 DPRK ............................................................................................................................................... 59 Leadership and Command and Control ................................................................................... 59 Force Size and Structure ........................................................................................................... 61 Potential Invasion Scenarios and Capacities .......................................................................... 68 Military Personnel ...................................................................................................................... 70 ROK ................................................................................................................................................. 79 Responsibilities and Doctrine ................................................................................................... 81 Indigenous Equipment Development ....................................................................................... 81 UNCERTAIN PATTERNS OF CONFLICT AND ESCALATION ............................................................................ 82 Cheonan ..................................................................................................................................... 82 Yeonpyeong ................................................................................................................................ 85 Political Fallout ........................................................................................................................... 87 Additional Issues and Scenarios .............................................................................................. 88 US .................................................................................................................................................... 90 CHINA ............................................................................................................................................... 91 The 2013 Chinese Defense White Paper ................................................................................. 92 China’s Improving Conventional Capabilities .......................................................................... 94 Ground Forces ........................................................................................................................... 95 Air and Air Defense Forces ....................................................................................................... 99 Naval Forces ............................................................................................................................ 103 JAPAN .............................................................................................................................................. 118 Japanese Security Policies ...................................................................................................... 119 The 2012 Japanese Defense White Paper ............................................................................ 119 iv Anthony H. Cordesman and Ashley Hess RUSSIA ........................................................................................................................................... 124 V. KOREAN SPECIAL, ASYMMETRIC, AND PARAMILITARY FORCES ........... 128 PARAMILITARY, POLICE, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND SPECIAL FORCES ...................................................... 128 DPRK ........................................................................................................................................ 129 ROK .......................................................................................................................................... 137 COUNTERTERRORISM, TERRORISM, AND LOW-LEVEL ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ......................................... 138 DPRK ........................................................................................................................................ 138 ROK .......................................................................................................................................... 141 DPRK DRUG AND WEAPONS SALES AND OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ....................................................
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