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Adriano Picoli Florianópolis 2018 Adriano Picoli LINGUAGEM UNIVERSAL E UNIVERSALIDADE DA LÍNGUA: DOIS MODOS DE DAR-SE DE SENTIDO Tese submetida ao Programa de Pós- graduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina como requisito parcial para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Filosofia. Área de Concentração: Ontologia. Linha de Pesquisa: Ontologia e Método. Orientador: Prof. Celso Reni Braida, Dr. Florianópolis 2018 Dedicatória Dedico este trabalho a uma das poucas pessoas que desde a primeira conversa nunca deixou de acreditar em meus esforços; estando presente nos momentos de desmate do terreno, de preparação do solo, do plantio, de cuidados na fase de crescimento, poda, amadurecimento e colheita, e, mesmo assim, sempre me possibilitou a liberdade de escolha do caminho a ser seguido, às vezes deixando-me atômico com a numerosa quantidade de vias, ao meu orientador: Celso Reni Braida. AGRADECIMENTOS Agradeço à CAPES e aos seus servidores pela concessão de recursos públicos na forma de 43 meses de bolsa de doutorado, sem a qual esta investigação não teria sido executada. A todos os servidores e professores do Departamento de Filosofia e da UFSC que de uma forma ou de outra colaboraram para a viabilização desta oportunidade de financiamento, em particular, à Ângela, à Irma e à Jacinta pela sempre gentil atenção à resolução das questões burocráticas. Aos membros da banca de qualificação e de defesa: Prof. Dr. Roberto Wu e Prof. Dr. Nazareno Eduardo de Almeida, os quais com suas observações e críticas possibilitaram-me a realização de muitos cortes, ganho de clareza, correções e reforços a minha interpretação. Ao Prof. Dr. Evandro Oliveira de Brito por ter aceitado participar da banca de defesa e pelas questões e sugestões. Ao Prof. Dr. Cláudio Reichert do Nascimento e à Profa. Dra. Claudia Pellegrini Drucker por terem aceitado as suplências da banca. Aos meus pais pela essencial contribuição financeira nos períodos difíceis da graduação e enquanto eu estava sem bolsa no início do doutorado. Ao meu orientador Celso R. Braida por ter-me guiado por mais esta etapa da vida acadêmica. É impossível, poderia ser dito, que através de uma conceitografia se possa fazer progredir a ciência, pois a invenção da primeira já pressupõe a realização desta última. Com a língua também se dá a mesma dificuldade aparente. Com efeito, supõe-se que ela tenha tornado possível o desenvolvimento da razão; mas como poderia o homem ter criado a língua sem a razão? Para descobrir as leis da natureza há que se utilizar instrumentos físicos; mas estes apenas podem ser produzidos mediante uma tecnologia avançada que, por sua vez, se apóia sobre o conhecimento das leis da natureza. Em todos esses casos o círculo se resolve da mesma maneira: um progresso em física resulta num progresso em tecnologia, e esta torna possível a construção de novos instrumentos mediante os quais a física por sua vez progride. A aplicação ao nosso caso é evidente.1 Mas a teoria da filosofia é ela própria um problema para a filosofia; e não apenas um possível problema, mas um problema inevitável, um que mais cedo ou mais tarde ela será obrigada a levantar.2 1 FREGE, LFL, p. 65. FBB, p. 75. “Unmöglich, sagt man, kann durch eine Begriffsschrift die Wissenschaft gefördert werden; denn die Erfindung der ersteren setzt die Vollendung der letzteren schon voraus. Ganz dieselbe Scheinschwierigkeit erhebt sich schon bei der Sprache. Diese sol die Entwicklung der Vernunft möglich gemacht haben; aber wie konnte der Mensch die Sprache schaffen ohne Vernunft? Zur Erforschung der Naturgesetze dienen die physikalischen Apparate; diese können nur durch eine fortgeschrittene Technik hervorgebracht werden, welche wieder auf der Kenntnis der Naturgesetze fußt. Der Kreis löst sich in allen Fällen auf dieselbe Weise. Ein Fortschritt in der Physik hat einen solchen in der Technik zur Folge, und dieser macht es möglich, neue Apparate zu bauen, mittels deren wieder die Physik gefördert wird. Die Anwendung auf unseren Fall ergibt sich von selbst.” 2 COLLINGWOOD, R. G. An Essay On Philosophical Method, p. 2. Tradução minha. “But the theory of philosophy is itself a problem for philosophy; and not only a possible problem, but an inevitable problem, one which sooner or later it is bound to raise.” RESUMO O ponto de partida desta investigação filosófica é a insatisfação gerada pela unificação de língua e linguagem de fórmulas através do uso do conceito de linguagem como medium universal por Jaakko Hintikka (a partir de “Frege’s hidden semantics”, de 1979) e por Martin Kusch (Linguagem como cálculo versus linguagem como meio universal, de 1989) para subsumir as distintas concepções filosóficas de linguagens desenvolvidas tanto por Frege (Conceitografia, de 1879) quanto por Gadamer (Verdade e Método, de 1960) sob a alegação principal da inefabilidade da semântica, esta pensada como impossibilidade de uma semântica completa. Analisamos os respectivos conceitos de linguagens defendidos nessas concepções, o da linguagem de fórmulas como linguagem universal a partir de Frege, e o da língua como medium universal da experiência hermenêutica a partir de Gadamer, explicitando como cada uma dessas perspectivas dá conta da expressabilidade de sentido. Constatamos que, para essas concepções de linguagens, o conceito de linguagem como medium universal torna-se vago para abarcá-las como um mesmo tipo, pois em ambas se separa nitidamente língua e linguagens lógicas. Em cada uma delas se busca a expressabilidade de sentido via modos distintos, na gadameriana concebendo a língua como condição indispensável do próprio plano humano, característica que se sustentaria na constante produtividade e inabarcabilidade da língua, o que a torna semanticamente inefável em seu todo, mas não parcialmente; e na concepção fregeana tanto a língua quanto a linguagem de fórmulas são concebidas como instrumentos limitados, a última apenas se caracteriza como um meio incrementável, aqui a inefabilidade da semântica se dá quando entendemos o conceito de inefabilidade da semântica como impossibilidade da autorreferência das fórmulas e também quando a compreendemos como inefabilidade conteudística devido ao caráter inexpressável em palavras de uma língua ou de outra linguagem instrumental de parte dos conteúdos com os quais lida o lógico. Como uma alternativa à submissão realizada por J. Hintikka e por Kusch, indicamos que caso quisermos encontrar um ponto de contato entre estas concepções filosóficas de linguagens temos que perceber que ambas operam com o mesmo conceito de fundo, o de sentido, e sob o pressuposto de sua expressabilidade intersubjetiva. Por mais que o viés metafísico de linguagem universal seja rechaçado por Gadamer, vimos através de Frege que uma linguagem universal como um construto humano na verdade é, em certo sentido, complementar às línguas, à proporção que uma linguagem de fórmulas apenas pode ser introduzida direta ou indiretamente a partir de uma língua, sendo aquela criada para corrigir as lacunas e limites desta para a expressão de pensamentos. Tanto as concepções fregeanas de língua e linguagem de fórmulas quanto a gadameriana de língua se sustentam na tese de que ser compreendido é ser expressável por via de uma linguagem, sendo a expressabilidade de sentido a condição mínima de uma linguagem, chegamos assim na defesa de um conceito minimal de linguagem como modo de dar-se de sentido, de doação de sentido. Palavras-chave: Língua. Linguagem. Universalidade. Expressabilidade. Sentido. ABSTRACT The point of departure for this philosophical inquiry is the dissatisfaction generated by the unification of tongue and language of formulas through the use of the concept of language as universal medium by Jaakko Hintikka (from “Frege’s hidden semantics”, of 1979) and Martin Kusch (Language as calculus vs. language as universal medium, of 1989) to subsume the different philosophical conceptions of languages developed by both Frege (Begriffsschrift, 1879) and by Gadamer (Truth and Method, 1960) under the main claim of the ineffability of semantics, this thought as the impossibility of a complete semantics. We analyze the respective concepts of languages defended in these conceptions, the language of formulas as universal language from Frege, and that of tongue as universal medium of the hermeneutic experience from Gadamer, explaining how each of these perspectives gives account of the expressibility of meaning. We find that for these conceptions of languages the concept of language as universal medium becomes vague to encompass them as one and the same type, since tongue and logical languages are clearly separated in both. In each one of them the expressibility of meaning is sought through different modes, in the Gadamerian tongue being conceived as an indispensable condition of the human plane itself, a characteristic that would be sustained in the constant productivity and inabarcability of the tongue, which makes it semantically ineffable in its entirety, but not partially; and in the Fregean conception both the tongue and the language of formulas are conceived as limited instruments, the latter is only characterized as an incremental means, here the ineffability of semantics occurs when we understand the concept of ineffability of semantics as impossibility of self-reference of formulas and also when we understand it as content ineffability due to the inexpressible character in words of a tongue or other instrumental language of part of the contents with which the logician deals. As an alternative to the submission by J. Hintikka and Kusch, we indicate that if we want to find a point of contact between these philosophical conceptions of languages we have to realize that both operate with the same background concept, meaning, and under the assumption of its intersubjective expressibility. As much as the metaphysical bias of universal language is rejected by Gadamer, we have seen through Frege that a universal language as a human construct in truth is in a sense complementary to tongues, to the extent that a language of formulas can only be introduced directly or indirectly from a tongue, the one created to correct the gaps and limits of this for the expression of thoughts.
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