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Russian Analytical Digest No. 246 7 February 2020 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html www.laender-analysen.de PUTIN’S POWER GAMES ■■COMMENTARY Controlled Confusion 2 By Jan Matti Dollbaum, Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen Putin’s January Games: ‘Succession of Power’ on the Horizon 3 By Maria Domańska, Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) The New Russian Government and Old Russian Problems 4 By Vladimir Gel’man, European University at St. Petersburg / University of Helsinki Planning for a (Not-So) Post-Putin Russia 6 By Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center Do Institutions Matter in Putin’s Russia? 7 By Robert Orttung, George Washington University Putin’s Plan 2.0? What Might Stand Behind Russia’s Constitutional Reform 8 By Michael Rochlitz, University of Bremen The Reality of Russia’s Constitutional Reform: Limited Institutional Change Masks a Profound Shift in Economic Policy 9 By Regina Smyth, Indiana University Waiting for Change? 11 By Andrei Yakovlev, National Research University – Higher School of Economics ■■OPINION POLL Russian Public Opinion on the Planned Amendments to the Constitution 13 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies Security Studies Eastern European Studies East European Studies The George Washington University University of Bremen ETH Zurich University of Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 246, 7 February 2020 2 COMMENTARY Controlled Confusion By Jan Matti Dollbaum, Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331 n January 15, Russian president Vladimir Putin more significant. First, allowing federal authorities to Ounexpectedly announced major constitutional exclude anyone from high state offices who, in the last changes. On the same day, Prime Minister Dmitry Med- 25 years, has held a second citizenship or a temporary vedev and his government resigned to “offer the presi- foreign residence permit potentially affects many future dent the opportunity to make the decisions he needs to candidates who have worked or studied abroad. Second, make”. Within a week, a new government headed by the the decision to give the constitution priority over inter- former chief of the federal tax service Mikhail Mishus- national law will mean that Russia will no longer feel tin was in office and parliament accepted the constitu- bound by decisions of the European Court of Human tional changes in a first reading. Rights, which so far has been a slow but authoritative It seems thus that Putin did it again: He surprised source of support for repressed activists. observers and most of the Russian elite with a move Meanwhile, the reactions of the parliamentary that is part of a yet unknown but potentially decisive opposition to these changes have been all but non-exis- plan. Consequently, the events have been described as tent. The Communist Party’s (KPRF) Valeriy Rash- a “special operation”: fast moves with as few informed kin warned of the dangers of cementing Putin’s power aides as possible—arguably Putin’s preferred mode of and abstained, as did another KPRF deputy. But most action. The timing signals Putin’s ability to maneuver simply lamented the “package voting” practice that elites and to control the agenda. Not that this was ever fused welcomed changes like the term limitation and the in doubt, but publicly visible reassurance is important alignment of the minimum wage with the subsistence to sustain his image as the ultimate arbiter and person- minimum with the unwelcomed strengthening of pres- ification of power. idential powers—and voted for the bill in the first read- The changes that the first reading of the bill intro- ing. In fact, since presidential projects are expected to duced are widely believed to lay the institutional foun- attract unanimous support, it received zero no votes. The dations for extending Putin’s de-facto rule beyond Communist’s leader Gennadiy Zyuganov even expressed 2024 when he will have to step down as president. At hope that the second reading will accommodate the first glance, commentators saw the division of powers KPRF’s suggestions, like a constitutionally enshrined increase: The president will only be allowed two terms, higher minimum wage. consecutive or not, and the parliament will have a greater Likewise, the non-parliamentary opposition rou- say in the appointment of ministers (excluding the ones tinely critiqued the initiative but at present is not coor- from the “security block”). Upon closer inspection, how- dinating any resistance, for two reasons. First, the full ever, it became clear that the measures claimed to weaken scope of changes is still unclear. Navalny, for instance, the presidential office were cosmetic, while some federal speculated that the “worst amendments” will be intro- powers were even extended and some checks and bal- duced in the second reading and called for patience until ances removed: The president can now appoint regional all planned changes are known. procurators, municipalities are subordinated to federal Second, while about 22,000 people signed a peti- and regional authorities, and the federation council can tion calling the changes a “constitutional coup”, many now dismiss federal judges at the president’s request. liberals are not exactly enthusiastic about the existing At the same time, the state council, a circle headed by super-presidential constitution and are thus unwill- the president and including representatives of the presi- ing to jump to its defense. Grigoriy Yavlinskiy of the dential administration, federal and regional government, Yabloko party suggested to lobby for liberal changes the ruling party, and the heads of state corporations instead, while Ivan Zhdanov, director of Navalny’s and banks, received constitutional status—providing Anti-Corruption Foundation, declared that the con- a potential position for Putin from which to control the stitution itself contains mechanisms that have allowed future president and prime minister. However, the spe- authorities to ignore its liberal democratic elements. cific structure of this council as well as its role remains Navalny, as usual, found the most brutal and poig- in the dark as it depends on future legislation. nant wording for this view: “The Russian Constitu- When looked at from the perspective of protest and tion is disgusting. (…) Under this constitution every- oppositional mobilization, two other changes seem yet thing has been taken away from us—from elections to RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 246, 7 February 2020 3 pensions—and they want to take even more. There’s expressed the cautious hope that Mishustin will apply no reason to protect it.” the orderly, tech-driven approach of his tax collection Instead, the government change seemed to be more reforms to government transparency and implement important for opposition actors and domestic observers, higher government investment. producing a flood of social media comments and op-eds. Taken together, these quickly administered changes Navalny, who commented on the constitutional changes raise more questions than answers, with the constitu- only reluctantly, published a 20-minute investigation tional amendments so far not prescribing a clear path into Prime Minister Mishustin’s private fortune only for post-2024 politics. It seems therefore that an inten- days after his appointment. Political scientist and lib- tion behind this maneuver was to signal security about eral analyst Kirill Rogov stressed that the changes com- who makes the next important steps—and introduce pared to the former government are smaller than they insecurity about what these steps could look like. Putin seem, with all new ministers harboring a strong diri- has thus created a state of coordinated confusion, which giste orientation, having been socialized almost exclu- helps to uphold his first-mover advantage in the ongo- sively in state service under Putin. By contrast, others ing operation ‘power preservation’. About the Author Jan Matti Dollbaum will be a post-doctoral researcher at the Research Centre for East European Studies at the Uni- versity of Bremen from March 2020. This publication was produced as part of the research project “Comparing pro- test actions in Soviet and post-Soviet spaces,” which is organized by the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen with financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation. Putin’s January Games: ‘Succession of Power’ on the Horizon By Maria Domańska, Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331 n mid-January Vladimir Putin de facto initiated the that the formal principle of separation of powers will Iprocess of institutional changes relating to the ‘suc- be ultimately breached. cession of power’ expected in 2024. The proposals for The ‘succession of power’ project will involve not constitutional amendments announced in his State of only formal, but also informal changes in the system the Nation address indicate that most likely he will of state institutions. Since it is likely that no final deci- not run again for the post of president; in fact, he may sions have been taken in the Kremlin yet, we should resign even before 2024. The new, highly ambiguous now expect a longer period of testing various solutions legal-institutional architecture serves Putin’s primary to the ‘succession’ challenge, with all options remain- goal, which is to retain decisive influence on state policy ing on the table in the foreseeable future. over the long term, independently of who will be elected The significant personnel reshuffle in the Russian the next president. government seems to be part of the same political proc- Formally, elements of checks and balances will be ess, as Putin needs effective managers to implement state introduced into the Russian political system, with some policies in a potentially turbulent ‘succession’ period. weakening of the future president’s powers in favour The choice of Mikhail Mishustin for the post of prime of parliament.
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