Political Agenda Setting in Early America: The

Amanda J. Sauer

Masters of Arts Thesis

California State University San Marcos

Dr. Al-Marashi Sauer 2

Political Agenda Setting in Early America: The Barbary Wars

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ...... 3

Abstract ...... 4

Introduction ...... 5

The Concept of Political Agenda Setting ...... 7

Research Methodology ...... 9

Literature Review ...... 12

American Interaction With the Barbary States ...... 16

Political Agenda Setting Under the : the Dismissal of Public Opinion ...... 20

Political Agenda Setting Under the Jeffersonian Republicans: the Essential Role of Public

Opinion...... 32

Conclusion ...... 48

Bibliography ...... 51

Primary Sources ...... 51

Newspapers ...... 52

Secondary Sources ...... 53

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Acknowledgments

I know that without my family that I would not be here. The support that I have gotten from my husband has made a world of difference, and if you were to ask him, he would claim to be an expert on the by now.

I also want to thank my parents for all of the support. This last year, without them I do not know that I would be finishing. The days that my mom helped me edit and work through what I meant to say, even if on paper it didn’t quit come out that way. My father whose love of history encouraged me to pursue not only one degree, but two degrees in history.

I want to thank Dr. Jill Watts for always knowing that I could do it and pushing me to apply for the graduate program even when I was unsure of myself. Also for sitting me next to

Doris Morgan.

I want to thank Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi for encouraging my interesting in Middle Eastern

History and pushing me to pursue it even when others told me that I shouldn’t. I want to thank him also for guiding this thesis and supporting me at a time when I needed it the most and needed to change from the path that my thesis was going down.

I want to especially thank Dr. Kimber Quinney. Without her I would not have found my love for foreign policy and looked for the path to pull my interest in and the

Middle East together. No matter how many times I say thank you, I don’t think I can even express how much you have helped me has meant to me and helped me over all. It has made the greatest difference in my writing and my education. Thank you for pushing me and believing in me.

And lastly I want to thank Doris Morgan. Thank you for being my best friend and being there for me through all of this. Sauer 4

Abstract

This thesis explores the extent to which the first four presidents of the –

Federalists George and and the Republicans, Thomas Jefferson and

James Madison - relied on political agenda setting. The thesis demonstrates that each president used his relationship with early media to set his presidential agenda. One of the more important yet understudied examples of American foreign relations in the early Republic is the nation’s conflict with the Barbary States from 1783 to 1817. The Barbary Wars thus serve as an excellent case study for assessing political agenda setting in early America. Despite widespread agreement about the principle of popular sovereignty, early American political leaders disagreed about the role that the people should play in government after delegating their authority to their elected representatives. Although agenda setting was not recognized as a political term until the

1960’s, there is significant evidence to indicate that it was employed as early as the with regard to the Barbary States.

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Political Agenda Setting in Early America: The Barbary Wars

“As there are cases where the public opinion must be obeyed by the government; so there are cases, where not being fixed, it may be influenced by the government. This distinction, if kept in view, would prevent or decide many debates on the respect due from the government to the sentiments of the people.” —, “Public Opinion” , December 17, 1791

Introduction

Although the phrase was not used with any regularity until 1780, historians have documented that public opinion was exercised by the American Revolutionaries and by the earliest leaders of the American Republic. The proliferation of newspapers by the 1790s allowed the American public a voice that, once it had been expressed and disseminated en masse, seemed insuppressible. By the 1830s, public opinion was so evident in early American life that Alexis de Tocqueville, even in his admiration of democracy in America, identified a “tyranny of the majority.”1 Whether intended or welcomed by the Founders, public opinion came to be synonymous with American democracy. But it was not until 1780, that the concept was identified as a force of critical reason, and evidence suggests to indicate that once unleashed, public opinion was tremendously important to the early American political scene.2 One of the earliest indications of a shift in the acknowledgement of public opinion as a tool in the versus Democratic-Republican (hereafter Republican) debates was an unsigned editorial in the

National Gazette, a Republic newspaper, in which James Madison declared that “public opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free one.”3

1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Book 1, Chapter XV, Democracy in America http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/detoc/1_ch15.htm 2 Mark Schmeller, The Political Economy of Opinion: Public Credit and Concepts of Public Opinion in the Age of Federalism,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Spring, 2009): 35-61. Spoken in 1791, Madison sent in an unsigned editorial to the National Gazette that was addressing the importance on the subject of public opinion with the growing partisan contestation, with Democratic-Republicans and Federalists advancing divergent definitions of public opinion. 3 Ibid., 36. Sauer 6

But what is perhaps less appreciated is the potential that the early presidential administrations had to influence public opinion, not merely with regard to their respective

Federalist and Republican political principles and positions, but also with regard to foreign policy. This thesis explores the extent to which the first four presidents of the United States—

Federalists and John Adams and the Republicans, Thomas Jefferson and

James Madison—relied on political agenda setting.

Although the Founders would not have recognized their actions as captured by this modern concept, this thesis demonstrates that each president used his relationship with early

American media to set his presidential agenda. This constituted more than merely relaying information in an attempt to influence opinions. Political agenda setting was an even more assertive tool, used by the early presidents to set their own foreign policy agendas. This study relies on Paul Light’s definition of agenda: “The President’s agenda is perhaps best understood as a signal. It indicates what the President believes to be the most important issues facing his administration.”4 One of the more important yet understudied examples of American foreign relations in the early Republic is the nation’s conflict with the Barbary States from 1783 to 1817.

The Barbary Wars thus serve as an excellent case study for assessing political agenda setting in early America.

This study reveals that the Federalists and the Republicans had very different agendas that they were attempting to impose on the American citizens, and that those distinctions become clear with regard to the nation’s involvement with the Barbary States. The thesis begins by defining political agenda setting as a framework of analysis. It then provides a brief description of the research methodology and a review of the relevant literature. A brief historical

4 Paul Light, The President's Agenda (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1991: 2-3. Sauer 7 background of U.S. involvement with the Barbary States is followed by an assessment of political agenda setting by contrasting the Federalist and Republican policies during the Barbary

Wars.

The Concept of Political Agenda Setting

Agenda setting describes the creation of public awareness and the “ability [of the news media] to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda.”5 The concept implies that if a news item is covered frequently and prominently enough in media, the audience regard the issue as more important or vital. The agenda-setting theory was developed by Maxwell McCombs and

Donald Shaw in a study on the 1968 American presidential election.6 Whereas this theory has mostly been applied to the twentieth century and contemporary events, this study aims to apply the concept to late 18th and early United States.

The theory of agenda setting can be traced to the first chapter of Walter Lippmann's 1922 book, Public Opinion.7 Lippmann was a media theorist, journalist and political commentator of the early twentieth century. He is considered to be the first to introduce the concept of the Cold

War, he coined the term “stereotyping,” wrote for the Council on Foreign Relations an influential policy center in , served on Woodrow Wilson’s Board of Inquiry during

World War One and has been considered the Father of Modern Journalism.8 While not using the phrase itself, Lippmann wrote about the topic that would later be referred to as “agenda setting.”

Without identifying it, he argued that mass media was the principal connector between events in

5 Maxwell McCombs and Amy Reynolds, “News influence on our pictures of the world,” in Media effects: Advances in theory and research by Jennings Bryant and Dolf Zillman (Mahwah: Lawrence Elbaum Associates, 2002). 6 Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, “The agenda-setting function of mass media,” Public Opinion Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1972): 176. 7 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, 1922). 8 Nancy Snow, Information War: American Propaganda, Free Speech and Opinion Control Since 9/11 (New York: Seven Stories, 2003) 30–31. Sauer 8 the world and the images that the public held in their minds of those events.9 After Lippmann,

Bernard Cohen observed in 1963 that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about. The world will look different to different people, [...] depending on the map that is drawn for them by writers, editors, and publishers of the paper they read.”10 As early as the 1960s,

Cohen expressed the idea that the later led to the formalization of agenda-setting theory by

McCombs and Shaw.

The study of agenda setting attempts to examine how media messages are presented to a wide audience.11 Two basic assumptions underlie most research on agenda setting. First, the press and the media do not reflect reality; rather, media is used to filter and shape perceptions about the circumstances that it is reporting about. Second, strategic media concentration on only a few select issues leads the public to perceive those issues as more important than other issues that could be equally as important. One of the most critical aspects of the concept of an agenda- setting role for mass communication depends upon each time frame used to study this phenomenon. By looking at a specific time frame, agenda setting can track the development of communication and knowledge of those involved.

There are three different types of agenda setting.12 The first is public agenda setting, in which the public’s agenda (the readers or watchers of media) is the dependent variable and what happens relies solely with them (the traditional hypothesis). In other words, public agenda setting is when those that are watching or reading the media are the ones that are the deciding

9 Lippmann, 3-32. 10 Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, 1963). 11 Everett Rogers and James Dearing, “Agenda-setting research: Where has it been, where is it going?” Communication Yearbook 11(1988): 555–594. 12James W. Dearing and Everett M. Rogers. Agenda-setting (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996) 5-7. Sauer 9 factor. The public drives what is being shown or being said and can change the outcome. Often times fiction can be mixed with facts in public agenda setting. The second is media agenda setting, in which the media’s agenda (newspapers, news outlets) is treated as the dependent variable and what happens depends on the stories that they share (“agenda building”). In other words, news outlets decide specifically what they want published or broadcast and can prevent or suppress stories or information from being shared with the people. The third, policy agenda setting, is one in which elite policy makers’ agendas (governments or political groups and leaders) are treated as the dependent variable (“political agenda setting”). In other words, governments or political groups decide what is printed or suppressed to the media and how that information is actually shared with the people. This study explores the existence of political agenda setting and the extent to which the Federalists and the Republicans relied on the tactic in their respective attempts to influence public opinion with regard to U.S. involvement in the

Barbary Wars.

Research Methodology

The primary sources used for this study include personal letters and congressional memoranda, but the bulk of the evidence to measure the extent to which the early American presidents leveraged public opinion and practiced agenda setting toward the Barbary Coast is found in newspapers.

The personal letters of the first four presidents serve to convey their thoughts with regard to presidential agenda setting. These letters are archived and cataloged through the National

Archives under the Founders Online project.13 These letters were exchanged between presidents and their emissaries and diplomats, as well as commodores and other political actors. While the

13 http://founders.archives.gov/ Sauer 10 letters state the personal intentions of the four presidents, additional primary sources include public statements found in government documents published between 1783 and 1817.

Congressional memos were made available to citizens when posted in Philadelphia and, later, in Washington D.C. These memos include the actions agreed upon by Congress and also the minutes of the presidential meetings. For this study, government documents were accessed through the National Archives Online, Archives Online, and the Archive of

Americana at California State University San Marcos.

Although personal letters and public statements reveal the nuances of perspective with regard to presidential decision making, the primary source that is most valuable to this study is the proliferation of newspapers from 1780 to 1820. Newspapers played one of the most pivotal roles in the spread of information in the new nation and thus serve as a reliable source of evidence to demonstrate the growing legitimization of public opinion, and the particular ways in which the respective presidencies leveraged that opinion to set their policy agendas.

According to Alexis de Tocqueville, newspapers “became more necessary in proportion as men become more equal and individualism more to be feared. To suppose that they only serve to protect freedom would be to diminish their importance; they maintain civilization.”14 By

1800, literacy was widespread, reaching over ninety percent of the population in alone. Also by 1800, the gap between male and female literacy had almost disappeared.15 For many, reading became a necessity of life no matter one’s profession or one’s address. This helped information to become more widespread and it allowed more readers to directly participate in political discourse.

14 Alexis de Tocqueville, Book 2, Chapter 6 “On the Relation between Public Association and Newspapers,” Democracy in America Carol Sue Humphrey, The Press of the Young Republic, 1783-1833 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996, 136. 15 Humphrey, 135. Sauer 11

As newspapers became more widely read by more people, changes took place in the newspaper business. New jobs were created to expand newspaper staff, including the first recognizable correspondents and the appointment of editors. Newspapers also shifted their emphasis, covering a wider variety of news, and in a wide variety of national locations.

Newspapers were available from New York to South Carolina. It was often the case that a small collection of newspapers, such as The Maryland Gazette, the National Intelligencer, and the

Evening Post, would publish an article first and other newspapers like the North Carolina

Halifax, the Poughkeepsie Journal or Weekly Raleigh Register would copy the story and reprint the news article for their patrons.

For this study, newspapers were accessed in part through the California State University

San Marcos Library and also University of California Irvine Library. Many of the early republic newspapers are only available at East coast locations so online sources had to be used to access information. From there, research lead to ancestry.com and to their counterpart newspapers.com where California State University San Marcos holds a subscription. Newspapers.com owns the rights to numerous early republic newspapers ranging along the East Coast.

The research methodology for this study is shared by early American historians who rely on digital databases.16 This study used the Archive of Americana and especially the Early

American Newspapers collection hosted by Readex, to which the California State University

Library subscribes.17 No specific cities or states were picked for newspaper searches, all newspapers with information in regards to the Barbary Coast from 1784 to 1822 were considered as long as it was a United States newspaper. By searching on “Barbary” and each of the four presidents, and noting the patterns of when and how frequently the term appeared in various

16 http://wcm1.web.rice.edu/digital-early-republic.html 17 http://www.readex.com/content/americas-historical-newspapers Sauer 12 newspapers across the nation, it was possible to compare occurrence—both dates and frequency—of the various political messages in the respective newspapers in each administration over time. Archival research was the next step. By reading the various articles closely, the patterns with regard to the variation of the ways in which each presidential administration legitimized public opinion and attempted to set his foreign policy agenda with regard to the

Barbary Wars became apparent.

Literature Review

According to Carol Sue Humphrey in The Press of the Young Republic, 1783-1833, newspapers were evolving with the change in American independence. She asserts that, “By design, newspapers from the 1790's to the 1830's were primarily meant to trumpet the cause of a particular group, generally a political party.”18 With the ending of the Revolutionary War, newspaper printers believed that their weekly newspapers had been essential in the conflict and planned to continue that involvement in future politics. Humphrey's study brings new light to the idea that this time period was not the “dark ages” of journalism and news as indicated by

Frank Luther Mott, but a forerunner to a more modern journalism. She focuses on a more generalized look of the press and the importance of the newspapers that molded national political decisions and the people that were making them.

The foremost history of newspapers in the early American republic, “The Tyranny of

Printers” Newspapers Politics in the Early American Republic by Jeffrey Pasley, focuses on the political landscape of the early republic.19 Pasley’s narrative begins in the colonial period where newspaper printers had little power to express their political views in their papers. Within the

18 Humphrey, 165. 19 Jeffrey L. Pasley, “The Tyranny of Printers” Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic (Charlottesville: , 2001). Sauer 13 colonial timeframe, printers were unable to alienate subscribers or advertisers, especially if it drew negative attention from the imperial rulers. With the Revolutionary War, printers became politicized in order to gain support for or against liberation. Pasley builds on Humphrey’s idea that the early republic printers’ thought they were a driving force behind helping the Revolution and then shaping the United States.20 He also points out that the 1790s were an influential time for the American newspapers as a new generation of printers began their political discussions helping to set the agenda for later years.21 Pasley focuses on the second form of agenda setting by exploring how the media's agenda was a driving force for communicating what the people needed to know.

A third history that looks directly at the way in which the press was used during Thomas

Jefferson’s presidency was Jefferson and the Press: Crucible of Liberty, by Jerry W. Knudson.

Published in 2006, it is a newer study specifically on Jefferson.22 Knudson details the coverage of four Federalist and four Republican newspapers that were in six of the major episodes of the

Jeffersonian administration. Knudson uses the two political parties and the newspapers editors’ views of Jefferson to analyze how the Federalists controlled the government and all the related patronage positions for a dozen years in addition to controlling three-fourths of the nation's presses at the time while Jefferson campaigned for the presidency in 1800.23 As a result, the

Federalist press deplored Jefferson’s victory. They were bitter regarding his election and over the period of his presidency took their unhappiness out on Jefferson.24 While the Republican

20 Ibid, 33. 21 Ibid, 46. 22 Jerry W. Knudson, Jefferson and the Press Crucible of Liberty (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 2006). 23 Ibid, 47. 24 Ibid, 56-57. Sauer 14 newspapers celebrated the rise of the common people, the Federalists feared the victory of the

“rabble”-

They [Jeffersonians] already proclaim in their appropriate jargon, that the ‘reign of terror’ has ceased … and that the triumph of democratical and republic principles, over a tyrannical aristocracy, is commencing; in plain English, that the rabble has broken over all restraint, and are just preparing to imbrue their hands in the blood of those, who may attempt to stay their progress.25

Knudson disagrees with Mott's characterization of this partisan era as the “dark ages” of

American journalism, positing instead that these newspapers were experiencing the "birth pangs of democracy.”26 Knudson is convinced that Jefferson's suffering from unwarranted attacks in the press tested his faith in unfettered freedom.27

Two of the main scholarly works that address the impact of the Barbary Wars on the

American reading public are Robert J. Allison, The Obscured: The United States & the

Muslim World, 1776-1815, and Lawrence Peskin, Captives and Countrymen: Barbary Slavery and the American Public, 1785-1816. These two studies explore the impact of the American public on the foreign policy developing at the time. Allison’s book surveys the American literature set in Muslim North , written or published during the late 1780’s to 1820’s. He argues religion and popular culture played a major role in creating a widespread American belief that the United States could rise above the Muslim pirates. American writers constructed an

American success story with the United States pursuing and subduing “this enemy more relentlessly than the Europeans had done,”28 suggesting that Americans had “humbled the ancient enemies of Christian civilizations”29 in the Barbary Wars. While Allison never explicitly

25 Ibid, 62. 26 Ibid, 179. 27 Ibid, 165. 28 Robert J. Allison, The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 1776-1815 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) xv. 29 Ibid, 34. Sauer 15 states it, this would be an example of media agenda setting. Allison also explores an outpouring of private funds invoked to ransom captured Americans in the 1790s. The writers he examines believed that “American generosity ... became the decisive factor in freeing the captives, and indeed the decisive mark of the American people's special character.”30 One of the important factors that Allison emphasizes is the correlation between the white Americans held in captivity and the African slaves the Americans held captive.

Lawrence Peskin utilizes similar sources: captivity narratives, diplomatic correspondence, political debates, captives’ letters, newspapers, plays, and poems to blend diplomatic and cultural history. Peskin explains the rise and fall of popular interest in the

Barbary captivity narrative. He documents how the captives' plight was used by elites as a political tool in the larger struggles over the direction of United States foreign policy in the

1790s. According to Peskin, within a decade from 1800, both elites and the wider public considered the captives an embarrassment and wrote them out of the national script. Peskin believed the captivity narratives, along with the other writings on , entered into the media to create what he calls “popular Orientalism.” Peskin claims that “the United States was not much of an empire at this point,” and that by 1804 “was postcolonial yet pre-imperial.”31

One of his main arguments was that the Barbary Wars were central to the emergence of an

American national identity during the early republic. Peskin examines how the news of the captivity of American seamen spread in the 1780s and 1790s. When seized two

American merchant ships and 21 crewmembers in 1785, there was little the United States could do for the captives, and although the incident was reported in the newspapers, the American

30 Ibid, 151. 31 Lawrence Peskin, Captives and Countrymen: Barbary Slavery and the American Public, 1785-1816 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2009). Sauer 16 public hardly took notice. In 1793, the situation was different as an animated press criticized the loss of eleven ships and the enslavement of over a hundred seamen. By 1793, a more extended diplomatic organization had developed, with both ministers and consuls sending information back to the United States. According to Peskin, a more integrated news network provided a vehicle to distribute information to an eager public interested in a world beyond their own immediate community.32

The books mentioned here regard the media as an influential force, even if they do not explicitly rely on the term agenda setting as the basis for their conclusions. They do not consider the first four presidents and instead constitute a broader study of the early American newspapers.

By relying on these books as a foundation for further research and analysis, this study looks more in depth at the use of the early American presidents’ use of newsprint in their respective attempts to set their distinct political agendas.

American Interaction with the Barbary States

The Barbary Wars of the early 19th century were two separate wars that occurred between the

United States and the Barbary States of the —namely , , Algiers, and the Kingdom of .33 The primary opponents of the United States during the two

Barbary Wars were Tripoli (1801-1805) and Algiers (1815) of the Ottoman Empire. While the

United States did not go to war with the Kingdom of Morocco, the early American government did experience tension with their leader, Sultan Muhammad III.34

32 Ibid, vii. 33 The Barbary Coast, or Berber Coast, was the term used by Europeans from the 16th until the 19th century to refer to the collective land of the Berber people. The term "Barbary Coast" emphasizes the Berber coastal and cities throughout the middle and western coastal regions of North Africa – what is now Morocco, , , and . The English term "Barbary" (and its European varieties: Barbaria, Berbérie, etc.) referred mainly to the entire Berber lands including non-coastal regions, deep into the , as seen in European geographical and political maps published during the 17th–20th centuries. 34 Allison, 4. Sauer 17

The wars occurred at a time when the new American republic was still relatively weak and struggling for recognition by major European powers.35 The primary origin for the conflicts between the United States and the Barbary powers was with regard to the seizure of American merchant vessels and the consequent demand of a tribute – of not only money, but also guns and supplies – to be paid to the four different Barbary States.

Although the reasons for the conflict would remain more or less consistent, each of the first American presidents would find itself having to deal with the Barbary States in different ways. Given the fragility of the early nation, each of the administrations would manage its messaging to the American public about the U.S. conflict with the Barbary States differently as well.

The interactions between the United States and the Barbary States began in 1784 and continued until 1816 revolving around the issues of the seizures of American merchant vessels.

The Barbary States and the Ottoman Empire allowed Arab pirates to sail the Mediterranean and take merchant and military vessels, no matter what nations they belonged to. These pirates would take the ship's cargo for selling or trade and would also take the ship's crew and force them into slavery, or ransom the crew back to their country of origin for large amounts of money. When the United States began to send merchants ships to and the

Mediterranean, their ships were also periodically taken and American sailors were held for ransom and enslaved.

The new American government had not developed a large navy or created a huge shipping empire and many companies were still technically owned by British companies so that

35 Humphrey, 1. Sauer 18 the owners could avoid the high tariffs imposed on American exports and imports to and from

British colonies. For many citizens, the benefits of independence were not fully apparent.

Although Americans themselves had little to fear from the Barbary Coast before 1783, they were well aware of existing conflicts between the Barbary States and merchants from other nations. Tension was first caused by the first seizing of an American ship by the Kingdom of

Morocco in 1784 due to the fact that in the Sultan’s eyes the United States had ignored diplomatic overtures. This came to a peaceful conclusion when a treaty was signed between the

United States and Morocco in 1786. In 1796 a treaty was signed between the United Stated and

Tunis and a tribute was paid to the nation and direct conflict was avoided.

During the 1780s, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were two of the first Americans involved in directing foreign relations with the Barbary States. After the end of the

Revolutionary War in 1783, Adams and Jefferson were sent abroad to England and to serve as ambassadors for the new nation. Both Adams and Jefferson went to London in March of 1785 to negotiate a treaty with the Tripolian ambassador Sidi Haji Abdul Rahman Adja. At this meeting, Adams questioned why the Barbary States was trying to provoke a war with the

United States by seizing ships and crew. To this question, the Tripolian Ambassador replied:

It was written in their Koran, that all nations which had not acknowledged the Prophet were sinners, whom it was the right and duty of the faithful to plunder and enslave; and that every mussulman who was slain in this warfare was sure to go to paradise. He said, also, that the man who was the first to board a vessel had one slave over and above his share, and that when they sprang to the deck of an enemy's ship, every sailor held a dagger in each hand and a third in his mouth; which usually struck such terror into the foe that they cried out for quarter at once.36

The idea that Americans or any other nation would be taken hostage and based solely on their religious views was against the growing commentary developing in the new nation.

36 “American Peace Commissioners to ,” March 28, 1786, “Thomas Jefferson Papers,” Series 1. General Correspondence. 1651–1827, Library of Congress. LoC: March 28, 1786. Sauer 19

Jefferson wrote to Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay about the conversation.37 Jay sent the letter from Jefferson, along with his comments to Congress.38 Jefferson argued that paying a tribute to the Barbary States would be a bad idea and that it would encourage more attacks on American vessels for those in search of more money from the Americans. John

Adams wrote to Congress, but thought at the time it was better to continue to pay a tribute even if it meant more attacks since the Americans did not have a strong enough Navy to counter the seizures.

During the early 1780’s, editors used stories from London and Paris newspapers to fill their papers. News stories about conflicts between merchants and the Barbary States had been widely reprinted in American newspapers, including The Pennsylvania Packet, The Maryland

Gazette, The Independent Gazetteer, The Pennsylvania Gazette, The Salem Gazette, and The

Freeman’s Journal. Often the same article would appear across numerous newspapers with little or no editing. The articles reported the seizure of vessels and the interruption of commerce for the nations of Spain, Denmark, , and France. Many of the reprinted stories related to the issues and conflicts between the Barbary States and Spain around the Straits of Gibraltar from

1783-1785. Others covered conflicts between the merchants of Cadiz, Spain, and Barbary corsairs (pirates) in the Mediterranean. Often articles were on the second and third pages, so

Americans reading the papers would have been exposed to news about the seizure of ships, sailors, and cargo. For example, a letter from Cadiz printed in The Pennsylvania Packet in 1785 explained that “the Algerine39 corsairs still continue to impede the trade in the Mediterranean, and they are now more powerful than ever, several other Barbary States have joined their forces

37 “From Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, 23 May 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0465). 38 The Independent Gazetteer, 22 July 1786. 39 Original term used to describe Algerian's. Sauer 20 to them.”40 Articles appeared over the course of the next thirty years sharing with readers of the power that the Barbary States had on the .

Political Agenda Setting under the Federalists: The Dismissal of Public Opinion

In spite of his preoccupation with waging the Revolutionary War, Washington was obviously keen to remain apprised of the events going on around the world–to the extent that was possible, given the delay in communications. With regard to the Barbary States, Washington wrote to the

Marquis de Lafayette in 1786:

But let me ask you My Dr Marquis, in such an enlightened, in such a liberal age, how is it possible the great maritime powers of Europe should submit to pay an annual tribute to the little piratical States of Barbary. Would to Heaven we had a navy able to reform those enemies to mankind, or crush them into nonexistence.41

Lafayette responded in kind to Washington, revealing an important difference between the soon- to-become president and the secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson:

There is Between Mr jefferson [sic] and Mr Adams a diversity of Opinion Respecting the Algerines Adams thinks a peace Should Be purchased from them—Mr jefferson finds it as cheap and More Honourable to Cruize Against them—I incline to the later opinion, and think it possible to form an Alliance Betwen the United States, , Rome, Venice, Portugal and Some other powers—Each Giving a Sum of Monney Not Very large—Whereby a Common Armament May distress the Algerines into Any terms— Congress ought to Give Mr jefferson and Adams Ample powers to Stipulate in their Names for Such a Confederacy.42

While Washington did not follow along with Jefferson’s opinion of coming to conflict with the

Barbary States, he did understand why it was easier to pay tribute instead of building up a navy after it had already been disbanded by the Continental Congress.

40 The Pennsylvania Packet, 17 February 1785. 41 “From George Washington to Lafayette, 15 August 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-0200). 42 “To George Washington from Lafayette, 26 October 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-0281). Sauer 21

The early American leaders during the Second Continental Congress of 1775 began to formulate how they wanted the nation to be governed. In 1781, the Confederation Congress decided upon the Articles of Confederations.43 By 1787, the Constitution of the United States would be created and signed. Even after 1787, many citizens leaned towards having a king and did not understand the new position of president, though many hoped to elect George

Washington to this new leadership position.44

Early Americans commonly expressed the view that common people lacked the ability to be ability to be anything more than obedient voters. In 1778 the Essex Result printed “the bulk of the people … are so situated in life… that they cannot have time for, nor the means of furnishing themselves with proper information, but most be indebted to some of their fellow subjects for the communication.”45 Federalists tended to share this view, which created a close mindedness with regards to political agenda setting. For example, at the ratifying convention in

Pennsylvania in 1787, Chief Justice McKean (who would become a Federalist in the early

1790s) argued that “the dissent of a majority need not be included in the published proceedings of a legislature, since the members are from time to time responsible to their constituents.”46 The

Federalists did not use the press to push for their agenda at the beginning of the Washington period.

Washington’s next step in his political career came when he was elected unanimously by the Electoral College as the first President in 1789 and then again in 1792. John Adams received

43 “Articles of Confederation (1777),” Our Documents - National Archives. 2001. Accessed March 5, 2016. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true. 44 Robert F. Haggard, “The Nicola Affair: Lewis Nicola, George Washington, and American Military Discontent during the Revolutionary War,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society Vol. 146, no. 2, (June 1, 2002), 142. 45 Robert W. T. Martin, The Free and Open Press: The Founding of American Democratic Press Liberty, 1640-1800 (New York: New York University Press, 2001) 116. 46 Independent Gazetteer, 3 December 1787. Sauer 22 the next highest number of votes and became Vice President. John Jay was assigned Secretary of State, Alexander as Secretary of Treasury, Henry Knox as Secretary of War, and

Edmund Randolph as Attorney General. In 1790, Thomas Jefferson took over the role of

Secretary of State when John Jay became the Chief Justice of the United States. In 1795

Timothy Pickering became Secretary of State and War (1795-1796).

Washington wrote letters to Adams, Hamilton, Madison, Jay and Robert Livingston asking his advice on how he should proceed with the public and other concerns he had with the new office.

The President of the United States wishes to avail himself of your sentiments on the following points. 1st Whether a line of conduct, equally distant from an association with all kinds of company on the one hand and from a total seclusion from Society on the other, ought to be adopted by him? and, in that case, how is it to be done? 2d What will be the least exceptionable method of bringing any system, which may be adopted on this subject, before the Public and into use?47

Washington worked towards allocating some of his time for the citizens, but knew that he needed more time for official business. Washington wanted to uphold a strong public image of the new office of president, while continuing with the diplomatic affairs that being president was requiring. Adams responded in turn to Washington:

The Vice President of the United States has the honour to present his humble opinion, on the Points proposed, for his consideration. 1. That an association with all kinds of company, and a total Seclusion from Society, are extreams, which, in the actual Circumstances of this Country, and under our form of Government, may be properly avoided. 2. The System of the President, will gradually devellope itself in practice, without any formal Communication to the Legislature, or publication from the Press. Paragraphs in the public Prints, may, however appear from time to time, without any formal Authority, that may lead and reconcile the Public Mind.48

47 “From George Washington to John Adams, 10 May 1789,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-02-02-0182). 48 “To George Washington from John Adams, 17 May 1789,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-02-02-0228 [last update: 2016-03-28]). Sauer 23

Adams did not see a need for the president to send extra information to the press. That information would make its way to the printers and then to the readers. The President and his office did not need to be directly involved.

As he prepared to become president, Washington was beginning to identify key strategies and develop the policies he had hoped to implement as part of the United States’ first official foreign diplomacy. Among his primary concerns was the fact that American sailors continued to be taken captive by . Washington in his Undelivered First Inaugural Address49 wrote how he wanted to directly deal with the Barbary States:

It might naturally be supposed that I should not silently pass by the subject of our defence. After accepting the unprovoked hostility committed against us by one of the Powers of Barbary, we are now at peace with all the nations of the globe. Separated as we are from them, by intervening , an exemption from the burden of maintaining numerous fleets and Armies must ever be considered as a singular felicity in our National lot. … As our people have a natural genius for Naval affairs & as our materials for navigation are ample … we shall possess such a nursery of Seamen & such skill in maratime operations as to enable us to create a navy.50

Washington’s plan to build up the American navy was initially rejected by Congress due to lack of funds to maintain and support an active navy. By 1794, after the capture of eleven American ships and over a hundred American citizens, public support for the creation of a navy began to appear in American newspapers after a Mr. Page of the House of Representatives published a bill in The Independent Gazetteer calling for a navy to stop Algerine vessels from taking

Americans.51 In March of 1794, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed the “Act to

49 This first speech was sent as a letter to James Madison and little of the draft was used later. This letter was presented with his papers with replies from Madison to Jared Sparks, the editor of Washington's writings after his death. 50 “Undelivered First Inaugural Address: Fragments, 30 April 1789,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-02-02-0130-0002 [last update: 2015-09-29]). 51 The Independent Gazetteer, 15 March 1794. Sauer 24 provide Naval Armament.”52 This act authorized George Washington to build or purchase six frigates, four with forty-four guns each and two with thirty six guns each. This act also specified how many crewmembers would be required and designated standards for their pay and rations.

In 1796, the construction of the frigates was under way when a peace was established that affected the ninth clause of the act. At this time all construction on the ships was halted. The ninth clause stated: “Provided always, and be it further enacted, That if a peace shall take place between the United States and the Regency of Algiers, that no farther proceeding be had under this act.”53 This meant that all previous sections would cease if the United States came to any terms with the Algiers. On 20 April 1796 Congress passed an act that allowed for three of the ships to be completed. Those ships were the United States, the Constellation, and the

Constitution. In 1798 Congress approved funding to finish the remaining three frigates: the

President, the Congress, and the Chesapeake due to possible future confrontations with France.54

Washington sent a letter to each of the leaders of the Barbary States setting forth how the

United States wanted to deal with the issues arising between the United States and Barbary.55 In the letter, Washington wrote:

I have appointed David Humphreys, one of our distinguished citizens, a Commissioner plenipotentiary, giving him full power to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with you and I pray you to give full credit to whatever shall be delivered to you on the part of the United States, by him, & particularly when he shall assure you of

52 A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774 - 1875, Statutes at Large, 3rd Congress, 1st Session (http://memory.loc.gov/cgi- bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=473) 53 A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774 - 1875, Statutes at Large, 3rd Congress, 1st Session (http://memory.loc.gov/cgi- bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=474) 54 The XYZ Affair was a political and diplomatic episode in 1797 and 1798, early in the administration of John Adams, involving a confrontation between the United States and Republican France that led to an undeclared war called the Quasi-War. 55 To read the letter follow to companion website http://asauer.csusmhistorydepartment.com/thesis/presidents/george-washington/washington-circular-to-barbary- powers/ Sauer 25

our sincere desire to be in peace and friendship with you, and your people. I pray God to give you health and happiness.56

Washington did not want to have to utilize the new navy he was creating and also did not have the ships or manpower to compete with the four different Barbary States navies.

As the United States formed the new government and George Washington’s first administration began, captives Richard O’Bryan and Isaac Stephens, taken in 1784 by Algiers, and their shipmates from the Dauphin and Maria were lost in the shuffle of the new government and offices.57 Many captives died in a plague that swept through Algiers in 1787-88, and others died of other diseases soon after. By 1792 only ten of O’Bryan’s and Stephen’s crew were left alive. Between 1790 and 1792, O’Bryan became desperate to publicize the story of his crew’s plight. He wrote a letter to President Washington and to Congress on 14 May 1790 in which he humbly thanked Congress for the help that they had provided so far, but asked for additional assistance:

....Your Most Humble Petitioners further prayes, you will consider what our Sufferings must have Been, for more then three years, in this Country, where we have Experienced Turkish severity, our crews being Employed, on the most, Laborious, work, Consumeing and declineing, under the scorching Heats, of this Climate. Far Distant from our, Families Friends, and Connections, without any prospect, of Ever seeing them more.

But now, that the new Constitution of a Futre Government is Ratafied we hope you will Honourd. Sirs, Give such powers. to youre ministers in Europe so as, finally to Extricate your unfortunate petitioners & Countrymen from thire wretched & unfortunate Lot of Slavery.58

O’Bryan sent this letter not only to the members of Congress, but also asked for David

Humphreys,59 Washington's former aide-decamp, to publish in any newspaper that he could

56 “Circular to Barbary Powers, 30 March 1795,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-17-02-0470). 57 See http://asauer.csusmhistorydepartment.com/thesis/captivity-narratives/richard-obryan/ for background on Richard O’Bryan and his crew. 58 Richard O’Bryan’s Petition to the Congress, July 12, 1790. 59 David Humphreys became the first minister appointed to a foreign country under the Constitution when he was appointed as minister to Portugal, the first neutral country that recognized the United States independence. In this position, Humphreys attempted to help negotiate the release of the American prisoners Richard O’Bryan and Sauer 26 find. Humphreys was able to have it published in two Boston papers.60 A major effect of

Humphreys’ efforts was that information about the Americans who were being taken hostage and being sold into slavery became more widely disseminated to the American public. This was the first foray by one of Washington’s allies to influence public opinion towards the Barbary States through the press.

Washington was not pleased when Humphreys also took his publicity efforts a step farther and held fundraisers to raise money for the ransom that was being requested by the

Barbary States. While he was unsuccessful in raising enough money for the release of any of the remaining prisoners, his efforts did affect how Washington felt the citizens of the United States should influence governmental affairs and foreign diplomacy. George Washington worked towards setting aside enough governmental money to save the sailors being held hostage and felt that Humphreys was undermining the new government policies. He spoke out against

Humphreys and others61 that were creating groups to raise funds for those held in captivity. In a message to Congress, Washington spoke out against “self-created societies” that were trying to dictate policy to the government.62

Finally in 1795, Algiers came to an agreement with the United States that resulted in the release of one hundred fifteen American sailors that were held in captivity. Under Article Five:

No Commander of any Cruiser belonging to this Regency shall be allowed to take any person of whatever Nation or denomination out of any Vessel belonging to the United States of in order to Examine them or under presence of making them his crew from the of Tripoli by trying to raise funds for a ransom in the courts of Portugal and later Spain. By going to other nations in an attempt to raise money, Humphreys tried to bring the concern over tribute to European countries experiencing similar issues. Prior to this, nations did not attempt to go to other countries to raise money for tribute, although they would often raise taxes on their citizens. 60 Peskin, 58. 61 Businessman Stephen Girard and others formed committees in order to raise funds to send to Algiers, along with an anonymous writer called “Benevolence” that would write to the Secretary of State Edmund Randolph that the suffering of seaman in Algiers was the topic of conversation in New England. Allison, 128. 62 James D. Richardson, Washington’s Sixth Annual Address, November 19, 1794, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1896) I:163. Sauer 27

confess any thing desired neither shall they inflict any corporal punishment or any way else molest them.63

This was vital to the release of the American sailors and was also vital for future commerce in the Mediterranean. This agreement cost the new nation over one million dollars. At this time, the total was at one-sixth of the entire United States budget.64

Washington’s approach to agenda setting (at least in public) was to adamantly reject the role of American public opinion as being in any way relevant to effective foreign policy toward

Algiers. He did not utilize the new growing media to its full potential and did not actively use it to set forth a stronger political agenda. By applying the theory of agenda setting to the nation’s first foreign policies toward the Barbary States, it is clear that Washington wanted the American readers to be excluded from forming policy and from making vital decisions about how the

United States dealt with foreign nations.

However, this did not stop members of his cabinet from publishing information about the dealings with Algiers in newspapers in hopes of promoting Washington’s foreign policy agenda.

Secretary of State Timothy Pickering began by first publishing the expenses of the Americans being held captive and what the signed treaty between the United States and Algiers stated.65

While Washington did not write any letters, letters from Pickering appeared in newspapers during Washington and Adams presidency. In The Independent Gazetteer on 24 March 1797,

Pickering has the Reports of the Secretary of the State, and the Secretary of the Treasury, relative to the present situation of affairs with the Dey and Regency of Algiers; accompanying a

Confidential Message from the President of the United States published.66 In this letter

63 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bar1795t.asp 64 Martha Elena Rojas, ““Insults Unpunished” Barbary Captives, American Slaves, and the Negotiation of Liberty.” Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 1 no.2 (2003): 165. 65 Maryland Gazette. 24 March 1796. 66 The Independent Gazetteer, 24 March 1797. Sauer 28 addressed to the President of the United States, Pickering details all of the actions taking place between the consul David Humphreys and those that he has appointed to help him garner treaties with the Barbary Coast.

When Washington was first inaugurated as president, the press glorified him as a hero of the American people. He was a man that had not used his military achievements to gain political power.67 But by the end of his first term, a group of Republican newspapers had emerged that were hostile towards his domestic and foreign policies or lack thereof. Newspapers were accusing his administration of adopting a monarchical style based on the Europeans and their aristocratic behavior as well as the economic plan set forth by . Throughout this, the press rarely attacked Washington personally, but newspapers often wrote about the events and decisions Washington made.

John Adams had long been a supporter of Washington’s politics and policies and his contributions to the development of the new nation made him a popular choice for the office of

Vice-President in the election of 1788. As Vice-President he became under the Constitution the

President pro tempore of the .68 In early 1797, George Washington left the office of President and John Adams succeeded Washington on 4 March with Thomas Jefferson as his Vice President.

Like Washington, Adams was strategic in his efforts to preclude the American public from shaping his policy toward the Barbary States and used the Sedition Acts to set a personal agenda of what he would allow American readers to know. He limited information sharing and

67 Humphreys, 17. 68 Due to a delay in the decision of the Electoral College, Adams first presided over the Senate on 21 April. Washington was officially sworn in and gave his inaugural address on 30 April. Beyond Adams' nominal position in the Senate, he was allowed a vote as tie breaker when required, but otherwise played a minor role in the politics of the early 1790s. Adams was re-elected Vice President in 1792. Washington seldom asked Adams for input on policy and legal issues during his tenure as vice president. Sauer 29 stood by the decisions to exclude the American people from any involvement in foreign policy and diplomatic relations with the Barbary States.

When Adams took office, he had considerable experience with the Barbary States. He had been assigned in 1784 as an ambassador to England along with Thomas Jefferson, David

Humphreys and Benjamin Franklin to negotiate peace treaties of amity and commerce with the principal states of Europe and the Mediterranean including the Barbary States.69 While in

Europe, the four commissioners learned that some of the European nations had made “peace” with the Barbary powers in the Mediterranean by signing treaties that required them to make annual payments of tributes to the individual regencies.70 This knowledge that the European powers which Adams favored had paid tribute worked to support his inclination that the United

States was better off paying tribute as well.

As president, Adams continued to stand behind the idea that it was easier to pay tribute instead of investing money by creating a large enough navy that would be able to stop the

Barbary pirates from seizing American ships. Like Washington, Adams believed that it was the job of elected officials to make decisions with a centralized government and the people had to have faith that the government would make those right decisions.

69 Richard B. Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004) 7 -11. 70 Any merchant vessel from any country that did not have a treaty with the Barbary States were at the mercy of the state-sponsored pirates. As early as 1784, Congress, following in the footsteps of European nations, allocated $80,000 to be used as tribute to the Barbary States. Sauer 30

While Adams was having issues with the followers of Jefferson,71 he worked towards the reinstatement of the navy for protection on the open seas.72 In 1794, with the increased of the Barbary corsairs, the Act to Provide a Naval Armament or the Naval Act of 1794 had been reactivated and established a permanent standing naval force. Continuing demands for tribute convinced President John Adams to reinstate the United States Department of the Navy in

1798.7374

Adams use of the Sedition Acts limited much of what appeared in the opposition press and therefore limited what was able to be written. During the years prior to his reelection,

Adams had a falling out over declaring war on France in 1798 and created an enemy out of

Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton was a Founding Father and the founder of the .

Hamilton had direct links to editors and newspapers and established the New York Evening Post in 1801. Hamilton helped fund editors Noah Webster and John Fenno with their Federalist newspapers, American Minerva and Gazette of the United States. Hamilton used the Gazette of the United States to speak out against Adams costing him the 1800 election against Jefferson.75

71 While president, the Federalists that supported Adams believed that the Jefferson supported Democratic- Republicans were growing critical of Adams’ Federalist policies. They considered it disloyal and feared that aliens living in the United States would sympathize with the French during a possible war between the two nations. While not directly related to Barbary, the conversations about what was going on overseas began to dwindle. The Federalists passed laws directed against Democratic-Republicans, the party typically favored by new citizens and created by Thomas Jefferson, Adams’ Vice President. The only journalists to be prosecuted under the Sedition Act were editors of Democratic-Republican newspapers. 72 The states that 13 October 1775 was the official date of the creation of the Navy when the Second Continental Congress created the . At the end of the Revolutionary War the Continental Navy was disbanded due to increased costs and lack of funds and the belief that the nation did not need a standing military. Miller, Nathan (1997). The U.S. Navy: A History (3rd ed.). Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 33-35. 73 Under the direction of President John Adams, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert wanted to build ships of the line, keep thirteen frigates, and sell off the smaller vessels. Stoddert reasoned that in the event of another war the government could purchase smaller vessels more readily than larger ones. The navy needed to have the larger vessels built before any conflict erupted because of their lengthy construction process. 74 Hester Blum. "Pirated Tars, Piratical Texts Barbary Captivity and American Sea Narratives." Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal. 1.2 (2003): 133–58. 75 Humphreys, 42-43. Sauer 31

This use of the press pushed the Federalist newspaper against one of its own leaders, effectively removing John Adams from office.

In 1801, Congress adopted the Peace Establishment Act,76 which kept the frigates, but eliminated construction of the ships and drastically reduced the officer corps. Congress passed this act providing for a naval peace establishment reducing the size and cost of a standing navy, not realizing that war with Tripoli was in the near future. Congress passed new naval legislation that provided six frigates that “‘shall be officered and manned as the President of the United

States may direct.’ ... In the event of a declaration of war on the United States by the Barbary powers, these ships were to ‘protect our commerce and chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning or destroying their ships and vessels wherever you shall find them.’”77 Adams worried about the consequences of adopting this naval legislation prior to the commencement of the new

Jeffersonian Republican administration, but reasoned that the Jeffersonians might make even deeper cuts. In one of his last duties as president, he signed the act on 3 March 1801.

Agenda setting was seen in both Washington and Adams presidential terms. While neither president actively sought to use the press to inform the public, they did not prevent surrogates, like Timothy Pickering from using the press for the purpose of agenda setting.

Washington pushed for minimal involvement by the populace and Adams followed Washington.

In contrast, the first two Jeffersonian Republican presidents engaged directly in agenda setting.

76 Congressional Order of the Establishment of a Peacetime Navy 3 March 1801, https://www.marinersmuseum.org/sites/micro/usnavy/05/05o.htm 77 Congressional Order of the Establishment of a Peacetime Navy 3 March 1801 https://www.marinersmuseum.org/sites/micro/usnavy/05/05o.htm Sauer 32

Political Agenda Setting under the Jeffersonian Republicans: The Essential Role of Public

Opinion

Founding father Roger Sherman expressed in 1787, during the deciding of the election process for the House of Representatives, the traditional view of direct involvement in the American government: “the people should have as little to do as may be about the government. They want

[i.e. lack] information and are constantly liable to be deceived.”78 To Thomas Jefferson this was one of the main reasons that he was so adamant about sharing his ideas and agenda with the

American public. Jefferson approached agenda setting differently from his predecessors. Unlike those before him, Jefferson was very straightforward about what he wanted the American people to know. He worked towards educating the American citizens through publishing in newspapers his position, opinions and recommendations on events related to the foreign affairs of the United

States. Jefferson was, “convinced that the people are the only safe depositories of their own liberty, and that they are not safe unless enlightened to a certain degree, I have looked on our present state of liberty as a short-lived possession unless the mass of the people could be informed to a certain degree.”79 Jefferson’s approach to agenda setting would follow his approach to governing: in order to secure their own liberty, the people had to be informed.

Thomas Jefferson’s views about American policy towards the Barbary States began to develop in the 1780s. In November 1784, after the news of interactions with the Barbary Coast, he expressed doubt that the American people would be willing to pay the required annual tribute demanded by the Barbary States. “Would it not be better to offer them an equal treaty. If they

78 Robert W.T. Martin, The Free and Open Press: The Founding of American Democratic Press Liberty, 1640-1800. (New York: New York University Press, 2001) 111. 79 Jefferson, Thomas. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Barbara B. Oberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) 448–449. Sauer 33 refuse, why not go to war with them?”80 When another American was seized a month later

Jefferson again emphasized

…[O]ur trade to Portugal, Spain, and the Mediterranean is annihilated unless we do something decisive. Tribute or war is the usual alternative of these pirates. If we yield the former, it will require sums which our people will feel. Why not begin a navy then and decide on war? We cannot begin in a better cause nor against a weaker foe.81

Jefferson was convinced this solution would be honorable, more effective, and less expensive than paying tribute to the Barbary States.82 Whereas both Washington and Adams held the position that war would cost more than the tribute being paid annually, Jefferson was not convinced. While minister to France under the Articles of Confederation, Thomas Jefferson attempted to push for peace with Mohammed V ben Othman, Dey of Algiers.83 As Ambassador to France, Jefferson believed that the only way to stop the piracy was to go to war instead of paying a high tribute, but his recommendation was not agreed upon in Congress or by George

Washington.84 Jefferson feared the new nation would be setting a bad precedent if it paid a higher ransom than the other European nations being taken hostage. Throughout his involvement with the Dey of Algiers, Jefferson worried that the corsairs might find the American hostages to be uniquely valuable and attack American merchants more frequently. Jefferson wrote to Adams detailing his concern:

Our instructions relative to the Barbary States having required us to proceed by way of negotiation to obtain their peace, it became our duty to do this to the best of our power. whatever might be our private opinions, they were to be suppressed, and the line marked out to us, was to be followed. it has been so honestly, & zealously. it was therefore never material for us to consult together on the best plan of conduct towards these states. I acknolege I very early thought it would be best to effect a peace thro’ the medium of war. Tho’ it is a question with which we have nothing to do, yet as you propose some discussion of it I shall trouble you with my reasons. of the 4. positions laid down in your

80 Jefferson to James Monroe, November 11, 1784, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 7:511. 81 Jefferson to Horatio Gates, December 13, 1784, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson., 7:571. 82 Jefferson to John Adams, Paris, July 11, 1786, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson., 10:123. 83 Dey and were honorific terms for the provincial governors of the Barbary States 84 “Thomas Jefferson’s Memorandum on a Treaty with Algiers, 10 April 1792,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-10-02-0142). Sauer 34

letter of the 3d. instant, I agree to the three first, which are in substance that the good offices of our friends cannot procure us a peace without paying it’s price, that they cannot materially lessen that price, & that paying it, we can have the peace in spight of the intrigues of our enemies. as to the 4th. that the longer the negotiation is delayed the larger will be the demand, this will depend on the intermediate captures: if they are many & rich the price may be raised; if few & poor it will be lessened. however if it is decided that we shall buy a peace, I know no reason for delaying the operation, but should rather think it ought to be hastened. but I should prefer the obtaining it by war.85

In order to assist the new American government, the Spanish diplomats had paid to keep the

Americans alive and in prison in the city of Algiers to prevent the Algerians from selling them as slaves into other North African countries. At this time in the affairs with the Barbary Coast,

Jefferson refused to reimburse the Spanish diplomats knowing that the money was needed to free all of the American captives.86

In 1786, Jefferson proposed a collective security treaty with European states as a means of deterring or defeating armed aggression by the Barbary pirates against international commerce.87 He explained that “the object of the convention shall be to compel the piratical

States to perpetual peace, without price” and “to guarantee that peace to each other.”88 Jefferson wanted the United States to form a multinational naval force with less powerful nations, including Portugal, Spain, , Denmark, and .89 Unfortunately the world political situation became unstable. Great Britain and France created strong treaties with the Barbary

States and would not have benefited from the creation of a multinational navy. Congress was also opposed to creating a multinational navy as it would have made them seem weaker in the

85 “Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 Jul. 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0722). 86 “From Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 July 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0058) 87 William Kirk Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1927) 29–33. 88 Thomas Jefferson, “Proposals for Concerted Operation among the Powers at War with the Piratical States of Barbary,” November 1786, in Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Lipscomb and Bergh, 145–46. 89 “Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 Jul. 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-01-02-0722). Sauer 35 eyes of other nations and they felt that paying tribute was easier than creating any form of a navy.

Jefferson was determined to involve the American public in decisions about foreign endeavors. The interactions with the Barbary Coast, specifically with the nation of Tripoli, altered how both the United States government and American newspapers and readers saw and dealt with these foreign countries.

Going into the 1800 election, Jefferson was organized and intended to prevail over John

Adams. Jefferson voiced opposition to Adams’s policies while Vice-President, and enjoyed popular support as a result. The Federalist candidate, John Adams, was leading a split party going into the 1800 election. When Adams dithered in decided whether to declare war on France in 1798, his indecision led to the French-Quasi War and his own party members were disappointed in his leadership. Adams used diplomatic means to end the war while his

Federalists followers preferred to have the continuance of the war.90

The 91of Tripoli, , demanded higher tribute and sent a message to the United States demanding a new treaty that favored Tripoli, and did little to benefit the United

States. The demands arrived in March 1801, just after President Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated. Jefferson had disagreed with the policy of paying tribute when he was Secretary of

State under President Washington and Vice President under John Adams. President Jefferson refused to put American trade at risk and refused to continue paying tribute to the Barbary States specifically Tripoli. He would ultimately choose instead to rely on a military response.

Jefferson’s military action against Tripoli would prove to be the first on foreign land and seas authorized by the .

90 Humphrey, 137. 91 Similar to that of a Dey also can be referred to as a Bashaw. A political leader in Tripoli. Sauer 36

In December of 1801, Congress and the House of Representatives began publishing articles keeping the American readers up to date on the growing tension and requirements of war.

In a letter written by Thomas Jefferson published in The Maryland Gazette, Jefferson explains the interactions with the Barbary States and a meeting held in the Senate as to what actions to take. The members of the House were unhappy with the state of affairs that Adams had left the nation in since he had not dealt with the demands of the pasha of Tripoli in 1800. The House agreed to send a small squadron of vessels in order to continue to defend Americans. Jefferson’s letter details the action taken by the Americans, including the taking of a Tripolitan ship, whose story had appeared in newspapers in November:92

To this state of great peace with which he have been blessed, one only exception exists. Tripoli, the least considerable of the Barbary States, had come forward with demands unfounded either in right or in compact, and had permitted itself to denounce war, on our failure to comply before a given day. The style of the demand admitted but one answer. I sent a small squadron of frigates into the Mediterranean, with assurances to that power of our sincere desire to remain in peace; but with orders to protect our commerce against the threatened attack. The measure was seasonable and salutary. The bey had already declared war in form. His cruisers were out. Two had arrived in Gibraltar. Our commerce in the Mediterranean was blockaded; and that of the Atlantic in peril. The arrival of out squadron dispelled the danger. One of the Tripolitan cruisers having fallen in with and engaged the small schooner Enterprize, commanded by lieut. Sterett, which had gone out as a tender to our large vessels, was captured, after a heavy slaughter of her men, without a loss of a single one on or part.

This letter became one of many to appear in the press over the course of Jefferson’s presidency.

A week later, the Congressional minutes were published in the newspapers by the House of

Representatives supporting President Jefferson’s actions. They fully supported his decision to secure American commerce by sending vessels to the Barbary Coast and to continue to send until the issue was resolved.93 The posted article stated:

General S. Smith said, another important member of the president’s message respected our situation with the Barbary powers. It became congress immediately to come to a

92 Maryland Gazette, 17 December 1801. 93 Maryland Gazette, 31 December 1801. Sauer 37

decision that would enable the president more efficiently to protect our trade. He [General S. Smith] therefore moved: That it is expedient that the president be authorized by law, further and more effectually to protect the commerce of the United States against the Barbary Powers.

President Jefferson and Congress told the American people exactly what they would be doing and then appointed a men to oversee that it went off as planned. By relying upon the growing circulation of newspapers among the American public, and his own convictions that the people should remain informed, Jefferson used the letter in the Maryland

Gazette as a means to set an agenda in favor of his policy. He first explained to the American people what he would be doing vis-à-vis Tripoli, and then used the Congressional minutes to push that agenda forward.

The USS Philadelphia was run aground on an uncharted reef two miles from Tripoli

Harbor on 31 October 1803.94 When news of the capture of the American crew from the

Philadelphia reached American papers in March of 1804, Jefferson and his administration had a part in shaping the news for the American reader. News was first published in The Evening Post out of New York.95 Newspapers did not focus as much on the loss of the Philadelphia, but more on how Jefferson handled the news of the capture. Because 1804 was an election year for

Jefferson, the Federalist newspapers urged that it was vital to remove Jefferson from office.

They wanted Americans to place the blame on the Jefferson administration as they believed that he lacked the courage and spirit required of a commander in chief and that it was his fault that the vessel Philadelphia had been taken.96

94 Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006) 186. 95 The Evening Post, 13 March 1804. 96 National Intelligencer, 23 March 1804. Sauer 38

In a response to the Federalist newspapers, Republicans responded with their own articles. They described Jefferson’s actions after hearing about the fate of the Philadelphia. A new headline in Republican papers stated “Millions for Defence, but not a Cent for Tribute.”

Jefferson had gone to Congress in an attempt to have more vessels built. Republicans thought

Jefferson’s actions to be evidence of his patriotism and energy towards ending the conflict with

Tripoli.97 In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson emphasized the importance of taking back control of the conflict in the Mediterranean to prevent the Americans navy from appearing weak and unable to complete the war.

This sordid disposition to throw upon the charity of others, our losses, altho losses of the same kind are daily happening to them, without their having ever sent a brief to us for relief, is a national stain, which unfortunately the nature of the case does not leave us free to wipe off by a disavowal.

Jefferson wanted to prove his strength to the other nations especially in Europe.98

When news of the Treaty ending the war between the United States and Tripoli reached

Washington in the fall of 1805, President Jefferson ordered all of the ships home with the exception of a frigate and two smaller supporting vessels.99 Jefferson had the treaty published in newspapers and shared the events that lead to the completion of the war. He stayed active in allowing the reading public to know the actions that he and Congress were taking towards the

Barbary Coast.

In 1804, during one of the blockades of Tripoli, three Tunisian ships were taken by the

United States to prevent supplies from being delivered. The Bey became infuriated and sent

97 Frank Lambert, The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005) 141. 98 “To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 27 April 1804,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/02-07-02-0126). 99 The Evening Post, 10 September 1805. Sauer 39 menacing letters to the commodore. Tunis never moved beyond the threat as the resulting conflict with Tripoli was winding to an end without Tripoli being the successor.

After peace was finally established with Tripoli, President Jefferson assigned

Commodore John Rodgers100 to turn his attention to fixing the peace that had been established from the previous treaty in 1797. In late November 1805, the Bey of Tunis sent representatives to Washington, D.C., at the request of President Jefferson. The Bey had been threatening war and answered Jefferson’s request with an envoy with the hopes to negotiate full restitution and to barter for tribute.101 On 30 November, Sidi Soliman Mellimelli and his attendants arrived at the

Washington Navy Yard with full military honors. Mellimelli was the first Muslim envoy to enter the United States.102 Mellimelli and his attendants spent the next six months in Washington.

Jefferson would not agree to pay tribute, but agreed to host the officials and cover all expenses for the emissary during his stay. When Mellimelli first came to the United States, newspapers were filled with the conflict going on between the United States and Tunis. Editors of papers like the Maryland Gazette and the National Intelligencer listed the grievances that Tunis had toward the United States and how President Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison were working towards making a lasting peace.103

While in Washington, Mellimelli became a celebrity and was invited to numerous parties around the city. While Jefferson did not promote the visiting of Mellimelli, he did not prevent any information about his visit from being shared in newspapers.104 In a short amount of time,

Mellimelli was no longer viewed as an official envoy in Washington on a foreign mission to

100 See companion website for more information on the military campaign of the http://asauer.csusmhistorydepartment.com/thesis/military-campaigns/military-campaign-of-first-barbary-war/ 101 Ray W. Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1931) 161. 102 National Intelligencer, 2 December 1805. 103 Poughkeepsie Journal, 26 November 1805. 104 The Evening Post, 15 September 1806. Sauer 40 make peace, but as an oddity to Washington society since he and his group were the first to come to the United States. His exploits were featured throughout the society pages of

Washington papers.105 Though his main reason for visiting was to work on diplomatic exchanges with President Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison, Mellimelli became a media star bringing the public into more involved discussions. Ultimately Jefferson, Madison and Mellimelli arrived at an agreement on restitution for the captured Tunisian vessels, but still fought over the issue of tribute.106 In the end, Mellimelli attempted to appeal to the Americans’ humanity; he told Jefferson and Madison that if he failed in his mission he would be beheaded upon his return home.107 The Americans refused to yield to the idea of tribute, but in a meeting of the Cabinet it was agreed to send to Tunis gifts equivalent in cost to those sent to the United

States by the Bey.108

Mellimelli and his retinue left Washington in May 1806 and traveled up the east coast to

Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York City, and Boston.109 The newspapers, including the

Jeffersonian Republican The Maryland Gazette followed along with the ambassador and his entourage as he traveled north.110 Newspapers began focusing on what he was wearing and how he behaved and no longer were interested in political concerns. Jefferson had created a peace with the Tunisian ambassador satisfying the American people.111 Jefferson provided the

105 Margaret Bayard Smith and Gaillard Hunt The First Forty Years of Washington Society, Portrayed by the Family Letters of Mrs. Samuel Harrison Smith (Margaret Bayard) from the Collection of Her Grandson, J. Henley Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906) 403. 106 “From James Madison to , 19 May 1806,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-01-02-0460). 107“From Thomas Jefferson to United States Senate, 18 April 1806,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-3594) 108Plumer, William. William Plumer's Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States Senate, 1803- 1807. Edited by Everett Somerville Brown (New York: Macmillan, 1923) 487-88. 109 The Maryland Gazette, 29 May 1806. 110 The North-Carolina Halifax, 3 June 1806. 111 Weekly Raleigh Register Raleigh, 28 April 1806. Sauer 41

American people with a different view of how to see the new ally in Tunis instead of the view

Americans had had of Arabs from captive narratives and letters published in newspapers in previous years. The arrival of the Muslim envoy became the highlight of the social society in

1805. The ambassador sailed home from Boston in September.112 With the visiting of

Mellimelli, Americans became more aware of what actions Jefferson took in negotiations with the delegation from Tunis.

As more news was released, the conversation about the events of the war and the ending of the war continued. By agreeing to pay the ransom for the numerous Americans being held prisoners, the Jefferson administration focused on the difference between paying tribute to

Tripoli and paying ransom to Tripoli.

In the interesting report of Jefferson to the House of Representatives concerning the Mediterranean Trade, which has been already referred to, three modes of dealing with the Barbary pirates are indicated: 1. To ensure vessels and cargoes and to agree upon a fixed rate of ransom for prisoners. 2. To purchase peace. 3. To conquer a Peace; and he concludes: “It rests with Congress to decide between war, tribute, and ransom, as the means of re-establishing our Mediterranean commerce.113

While tribute was considered items ranging from money to armaments and vessels, ransom was considered monetary payment.

Beginning in 1806, President Jefferson ordered the majority of the naval fleet home.

Newspapers continued to print letters and stories related to the sailors and the treaty between the

United States and Tripoli. Republican papers praised Jefferson for going to war and winning the war against Tripoli. Not surprisingly, the Federalist newspapers criticized Jefferson’s policies and actions, specifically with regard to his handling of events vis-à-vis the Barbary Coast. The

112 Jacob Wagner to Madison, September 26, 1806, The James Madison Papers, Library of Congress. 113 Department of the State, Treaties and Conventions concluded between the United States of America and Other Powers since July 4, 1776. Containing notes, with references to negotiations preceding containing notes, with references to negotiations preceding the several treaties, to the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial Construction of them; a Chronological and an Analytical Index. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889) 1247. Sauer 42

New York Evening Post, a Federalist paper founded by Alexander Hamilton in 1801, began to publish against Jefferson’s willingness to pay tribute. They criticized Jefferson openly blaming him for:

…attempting to rais[e] taxes … under a pretence totally foreign … Behold the ludicrous farce of making a stool pigeon of the “beastly” representative of a petty Barbary power, for the purpose of decoying Congress into the grant of money which they already twice refused.114

While often policies that had been overlooked by Adams fell to Jefferson, Federalists editors saw his decision to end the war through tribute as contrary to the nation’s best interests. Though

Jefferson ended the war with Tripoli and prevented a conflict with Tunis, the Federalists continued to make claims against his ability to be a good president throughout the rest of his tenure while Republicans and Jefferson wrote about the great success they had in ending the First

Barbary War.

The presidential change to James Madison from Thomas Jefferson did not bring about many diplomatic changes. As Jefferson’s former Secretary of State and mutual party member,

Madison continued the agenda that Jefferson had established during his eight years as president.

Americans became aware of what was going on in Congress and regards to the Barbary conflict due to Thomas Jefferson, the House of Representatives, and Congress publishing reports and meeting notes in the newspapers to keep readers well-informed of the situation during that time.

James Madison took office in 1809 and served until 1817. During his term, U.S. policies began to focus on the issues between France and Great Britain and the growing tension between the United States and Great Britain. James Madison was a Jeffersonian Republican following his predecessor Thomas Jefferson. The two had been close friends and often shared similar ideologies and political ideas. Madison, like Jefferson before, disagreed about paying tribute to

114 The Evening Post, 15 September 1806. Sauer 43 the Barbary Coast along with paying tribute to Great Britain to prevent the taking of American seamen from their vessels. The United States began to develop as a world power and Madison wanted to end conflicts with the Barbary States once and for all.

James Madison was the most successful president to set an agenda in the media and be able to achieve it. Madison, like Jefferson, used the media to the administration’s advantage, and was especially effective in setting his agenda in the media. While in office, Madison used a local

Washington paper to spread his political agenda to the populace. The National Intelligencer, based in Washington D.C., became the voice of Madison’s administration, and was considered by editors to be the official opinions of the president and his cabinet.115 This newspaper actively reported on all events happening in Congress and the House of Representatives. Other newspapers nationwide reprinted the National Intelligencer articles.

Similarly to Jefferson, Madison believed that going to war in 1801 was a much better choice than paying millions of dollars in tribute to foreign nations.116 At the end of Jefferson’s presidency, the United States was still paying tribute to Algiers. Madison explained that it was wrong for Americans to continue to pay Algiers, and now as president, he had the chance to do something about it.117 In spite of his intentions, Madison inherited the setback of growing tensions with Great Britain over Jefferson’s Embargo Act signed in 1808.

In 1809 the British signed a treaty with the Barbary State of Algiers that allowed

Algerian vessels to take American vessels that would not fly or claim to be British. When

Madison first became president, he came to terms with Algiers in 1809 to prevent further seizure of ships. Great Britain continued to take ships throughout the . As the war carried

115 Humphrey, 85-86. 116 Mary A. Hackett, John Charles Anderson Stagg, and Mary Parker Johnson, eds. The Papers of James Madison (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011) 135–138. 117 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 19, 1810. Sauer 44 on, Algiers began to take American vessels again as the United States navy was preoccupied with Great Britain on American shores. The taking of American ships by the Algiers corsairs began to be overshadowed in American newspapers by the growing conflict with Great Britain.

On 17 July 1812, the Dey of Algiers refused America’s tribute and declared war on the

United States, this led to the threat of the loss of American vessels. The Dey refused to accept partial payments from the United States and refused a shipment of naval and military stores. He threatened to enslave Consul and all of the Americans who were living in Algiers.118

Lear attempted to come to terms with the Dey, though it was not to the liking of anyone. Lear was required to pay the Dey $37,750 in order to insure his family and the other American citizens could leave Algiers.119 Madison did not immediately turn to solving the pressing conflicts in the Mediterranean, as the invasion by Great Britain was already under way.

However, Madison could and did leverage the media; Lear’s letters first appeared in 1812 in

Madison’s newspaper the National Intelligencer. By using his own newspaper, Madison reminded the American people that there was still a conflict going on between the United States and the Barbary Coast, but did not let that overtake the growing issues between the United States and Great Britain.

Once the War of 1812 ended and the Treaty of Ghent was ratified on 18 February 1815, the Madison administration returned to matters in the Mediterranean, specifically in Algiers. Not more than one week following the ratification of the treaty with Great Britain, on 23 February

1815, President Madison urged Congress to declare war. Congress approved the act on 2 March

1815, and war was officially declared on 3 March with ships deployed against Algiers.

118 The Maryland Gazette, 2 March 1815. 119 James Madison, Message of the President of the United States, Transmitting Copies of a Letter from Cosum General of the United States to Algiers (Washington, DC: A. and G. Way, 1812) 5-18. Sauer 45

Newspaper editors published that the day Madison brought peace with Great Britain, was the day that he started a war with Algiers.120

“We could not wish a finer school for our navy. The Tripolitan war had brought great talents to light. A war with Algiers would be productive of the same benefits,” printed in the

Enquirer and reprinted in the North-Carolina Star on 3 March 1815, showed an editor eager for the United States to enter war with Algiers.121 Newspapers became filled with the stories of the declaration of war by President Madison against Algiers and speculated on his next actions.

President Madison had so far successfully created an agenda that could end all conflicts and tribute to the Barbary Coast. Isaac Sebring printed in The Evening Post “Our Navy -- may the cannon of Independence soon proclaim to the of Algiers the watch word of our

Constitutions, ‘Millions for defence not a cent for tribute.’”122 This became the battle cry for

Americans during the conflicts between Algiers and the United States.

Madison approached Congress to approve An Act of Protection of the Commerce of the

United States against the Algerine Cruizers. With this act it allowed new mandates for ships.

Broken into four sections, the first made it lawful for ships to equip, officer, man and employ armed vessels to protect the commerce and seaman in the Atlantic , the Mediterranean and adjoining seas. The second allowed public vessels to subdue, seize, and make prize of all vessels, goods, and effects, of or belonging to the Dey of Algiers or his subject and bring them into port to be proceeded against and distributed according to law. Section three allowed private vessels special commissions to subdue, seize, take, or bring to port any vessel belonging to

Algiers. Section four stated that any Algerine vessel, goods, or effect which may be captured

120 National Intelligencer, 3 March 1815. 121 The North Carolina Star, 3 March 1815. 122 The Evening Post, 23 March 1815. Sauer 46 and brought into port by any armed vessel have all rights to all property aboard and that it would be distributed accordingly.123 These orders allowed previously passive ships be more aggressive when protecting their property, something that no president had allowed before. Also appearing in the Pennsylvania Gazette, the Department of the State’s James Monroe reported that Morocco,

Tunis, and Tripoli remained on former footing and no changes had taken place even with the declaration of war from Algiers. Madison’s administration sent his orders to the newspapers as well as to captains of vessels flying the American flag. By employing private vessels into the action, Madison created a stronger naval impact, even of ships that were not a part of the U.S.

Navy. Madison wanted to continue to protect American commerce from outside forces that would put American trade at risk. Like Jefferson, Madison put American trade at the front of his thoughts especially after the end of the War of 1812.

The editor of the Republican paper the National Intelligencer was concerned over the declaration of war and how the government and Madison would proceed. In an article published on 7 March 1815, he stated:

…the Algerine War -- It is probable that many of our readers may not bear in mind the facts on which the recent Declaration of War against Algiers is predicated. We have therefore obtained for their information the report made on the subject by Mr. Gaston of the House of Representatives, chairman of the committee to whom the bill was recommitted in secret sitting….to leave no doubt on the mind of any one hears or reads them, of the impossibility of reestablishing Peace with the Dey of Algiers, unless by coercion, except under the most base and humiliating conditions.

The editor knew that the President and the House of Representatives knew the only outcome could be war. After the War of 1812, the war between the United States and the Algiers was inevitable due to the actions of Algiers during the war. More newspapers were interested in how the United States government was going to deal with the declaration of war against Algiers and

123 Pennsylvania Gazette, 8 March 1815. Sauer 47 what actions President Madison would sanction. The American public was being told that the only way peace could ever be achieved was through violent means. American readers did not question that the only way to end the seizure of American ships was to use a strong show of force. Madison intentionally issued missives that fed into this belief.

With his declaration of war, President Madison sent out his orders to his commodores.

He had two squadrons assembled, one in New York, under the command of Commodore Stephen

Decatur, and one in Boston, under the command of Commodore . Decatur's squadron consisted of ten ships that were already supplied and his small navy force set sail for

Algiers on 20 May 1815. Decatur had been given command of the USS Guerriere.124 On

Decatur’s vessel President Madison sent along William Shaler, who had been appointed as consul general for the Barbary States, to act as joint commissioner with Commodores Decatur and Bainbridge.125 Shaler was in possession of a letter authorizing them to negotiate terms of peace with the Algerian government. Due to Decatur's successes during the War of 1812 and for his knowledge of and past experience at the Algerian port, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin

Williams Crowninshield chose him to command the lead ship in the naval squadron to Algiers.126

It was the largest American fleet ever assembled.

The was limited and lasted only a few days, from 17 June to 19

June 1815. As a consequence, Madison did not have to spend excessive funds to pay for a lengthy war. On 5 December, 1815 James Madison spoke before Congress:

Fellow Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. I have the satisfaction, on our present meeting, of being able to communicate to you, the successful

124 Spencer Tucker, : A Life Most Bold and Daring (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004) 245. 125 Gardner W. Harris, The Life and Services of Commodore William Bainbridge, United States Navy (New York: Carey Lea & Blanchard, 1837) 254. 126 See companion website for more information on the military campaign of the Second Barbary War http://asauer.csusmhistorydepartment.com/thesis/military-campaigns/military-campaign-of-second-barbary-war/ Sauer 48

termination of the war, which had been commenced against the United States by the Regency of Algiers. The Squadron in advance, on that service, under Commodore Decatur, lost not a moment after its arrival in the mediterranean, in seeking the naval force of the Enemy, then cruising in that Sea; and succeeded in capturing two of his Ships, one of them the principal Ship, commanded by the Algerine Admiral. The high Character of the American Commander was brilliantly sustained on the occasion, which brought his own Ship into close action with that of his adversary; as was the accustomed gallantry of all the officers and men actually engaged. Having prepared the way by this demonstration of American skill and prowess, he hastened to the port of Algiers, where peace was promptly yeilded to his victorious force. In the terms stipulated, the rights and honor of the United States were particularly consulted, by a perpetual relinquishment, on the part of the Dey, of all pretensions to tribute from them.127

This declaration was also published in the Republican National Intelligencer the same week. By

1816 the president had brought peace between the United States and all of the Barbary States.

Madison was able to set forth his agenda in newspapers and through his letters. Unlike the presidents before him, he was able to end all conflicts with the Barbary Coast. By the end of

Madison’s presidency interest in the Barbary Coast had dwindled.

Conclusion

Despite widespread agreement about the principle of popular sovereignty, early American political leaders disagreed about the role that the people should play in government after delegating their authority to their elected representatives. This debate was especially lively when it came to questions of foreign policy. Although agenda setting was not recognized as a political term until the 1960s, there is significant evidence to indicate that it was employed as early as the

1790s with regard to the Barbary States.

Little debate exists to counter the argument that neither George Washington nor John

Adams were interested in allowing the American public to participate in the exchanging of ideas that would influence foreign policy. Both Washington and Adams were Federalists—they

127 “From James Madison to United States Congress, 5 December 1815,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-01-02-4783). Sauer 49 supported a centralized government wherein the leaders would have the greatest say, and the people would vote into office those representatives with similar ideology in order to have their voices heard without directly playing a role in governmental affairs. Washington famously expressed this sentiment in a letter to John Jay on 15 August 1786:

Experience has taught us, that men will not adopt & carry into execution, measures the best calculated for their own good without the intervention of a coercive power. I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation, without having lodged somewhere a power which will pervade the whole Union in as energetic a manner, as the authority of the different state governments extend over the several States. To be fearful of vesting Congress, constituted as that body is, with ample authorities for national purposes, appears to me the very climax of popular absurdity and madness.128

Both Washington and Adams especially opposed the notion that “the people” had any role to play in discussing foreign affairs or foreign policy, a view that they expressed when responding to the seizure of American merchant vessels by the Barbary States between 1785 and 1815.

The evidence thus reveals that George Washington and John Adams of the Federalist party tended to share a similar approach of agenda setting towards the Barbary States. In both

Washington and Adams presidential terms, agenda setting was primarily utilized by their cabinet members. Neither president actively sought to use this means to inform and influence the public.

Washington believed in a minimal involvement by the public and Adams followed the practice set by Washington. Agenda setting was seen in both Washington and Adams presidential terms, but was utilized almost exclusively by their cabinet members, particularly Timothy Pickering.

Neither president actively sought to use this means to further his own policy vis-a-vis the public.

In contrast, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison of the Republican Party shared a much different approach to political agenda setting than their Federalist counterparts. Jefferson strongly believed that the populace should be well informed of the actions of the government,

128 “From George Washington to John Jay, 15 August 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-0199). Sauer 50 and that their being informed was essential to realizing a successful foreign policy. He utilized the media of the day, newspaper publishers, to share his political agenda. During his presidency,

Jefferson set his policy agenda by publishing letters and correspondence, and the minutes from

Congressional meetings and the House of Representatives in newspapers. These were then republished throughout the nation. He did this with the intent to inform and align the populace with the views and actions of the government, but he also did this to further his political agenda.

Madison followed Jefferson’s lead, and was even more active in relying on early

American media to make his case. Madison established the National Intelligencer as the presidential newspaper, which became a vehicle for his own editorials, Congressional Acts,

Congressional minutes and Naval actions. He was a politician’s politician in his abilities to utilize the press to persuade opinion in favor of his agenda. According to one recent assessment of his impact on American politics, “Madison succeeded as a political innovator because he was good at politics. He did what came naturally to him: agenda-setting, committee work, parliamentary maneuvering.”129 As stated earlier, Madison was able to set forth his agenda, and in so doing, unlike the presidents before him, he was able to end all conflicts with the Barbary

States. By the end of Madison’s presidency, U.S. involvement in the Barbary Coast had all but disappeared.

129 Richard Brookhiser, “James Madison: The Father of American Politics,” Wall Street Journal September 11, 2010. Sauer 51

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