Civilian Deaths in the Nato Air Campaign
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CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN SUMMARY................................................................................................................................................................2 Principal Findings...............................................................................................................................................2 International Humanitarian Law and Accountability...........................................................................................3 The Objective of This Report..............................................................................................................................4 Compiling and Evaluating the Evidence.............................................................................................................4 The Civilian Deaths ............................................................................................................................................5 The Standards Applied........................................................................................................................................6 Conclusions and Recommendations....................................................................................................................7 THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO ........................................................................................................................................9 Operation Allied Force Attacks.........................................................................................................................10 Documenting and Assessing the Civilian Toll...................................................................................................12 Civilian Deaths as a Result of Attacks ..............................................................................................................13 Countervailing Claims ......................................................................................................................................14 The Standards Applied......................................................................................................................................16 Case Studies of Civilian Deaths........................................................................................................................19 Refugees on the Djakovica-Decane Road, Kosovo......................................................................................22 Displaced Civilians in the Korisa Woods, Kosovo.......................................................................................23 Bombing of the Dubrava Penitentiary, Kosovo............................................................................................25 Serb Radio and Television Headquarters .....................................................................................................26 Cluster Bombs and Civilian Deaths.............................................................................................................27 Appendix A: Incidents Involving Civilian Deaths in Operation Allied Force..........................................................29 Appendix B: Civilian Victims of NATO Bombing During Operation Allied Force..................................................65 Appendix C: Incidents Involving Unsubstantiated Reports of Civilian Deaths ........................................................75 Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................................................78 SUMMARY Principal Findings Minimizing harm to civilians was central to governmental and public consent for NATO=s bombing campaign in the Federal Republic of YugoslaviaCan air war officially justified as humanitarian intervention. The decision to intervene was taken with the awareness that the use of force would be subjected to close scrutiny through the lens of international humanitarian lawCand in the court of public opinion. From the beginning of Operation Allied Force, NATO and allied government and military officials stressed their intent to limit civilian casualties and other harm to the civilian population. The practical fulfilment of this legal obligation and political imperative turned upon a range of decisions relating to targeting, weapons selection, and the means of attack. Despite precautions, including the use of a higher percentage of precision-guided munitions than in any other major conflict in history, civilian casualties occurred. Human Rights Watch has conducted a thorough investigation of civilian deaths as a result of NATO action. On the basis of this investigation, Human Rights Watch has found that there were ninety separate incidents involving civilian deaths during the seventy-eight day bombing campaign. Some 500 Yugoslav civilians are known to have died in these incidents. We determined the intended target in sixty-two of the ninety incidents. Military installations account for the greatest number, but nine incidents were a result of attacks on non-military targets that Human Rights Watch believes were illegitimate. (Human Rights Watch is currently preparing a separate report with a full analysis of our legal objections to the choice of certain targets.) These include the headquarters of Serb Radio and Television in Belgrade, the New Belgrade heating plant, and seven bridges that were neither on major transportation routes nor had other military functions. Thirty-three incidents occurred as a result of attacks on targets in densely populated urban areas (including six in Belgrade). Despite the exclusive use of precision-guided weapons in attacks on the capital, Belgrade experienced as many incidents involving civilian deaths as any other city. In Nis, the use of cluster bombs was a decisive factor in civilian deaths in at least three incidents. Overall, cluster bomb use by the United States and Britain can be confirmed in seven incidents throughout Yugoslavia (another five are possible but unconfirmed); some ninety to 150 civilians died from the use of these weapons. Thirty-two of the ninety incidents occurred in Kosovo, the majority on mobile targets or military forces in the field. Attacks in Kosovo overall were more deadlyCa third of the incidents account for more than half of the deaths. Seven troubling incidents were as a result of attacks on convoys or transportation links. Because pilots= ability to properly identify these mobile targets was so important to avoid civilian casualties, these civilian deaths raise the question whether the fact that pilots were flying at high altitudes may have contributed to these civilian deaths by precluding proper target identification. But insufficient evidence exists to answer that question conclusively at this point. Another factor in assessing the higher level of civilian deaths in Kosovo is the possible Yugoslav use of civilians for Ahuman shields.@ There is some evidence that Yugoslav forces used internally displaced civilians as human shields in the village of Korisa on May 13, and may thus share the blame for the eighty-seven deaths there. In an important development, sensitivity to civilian casualties led to significant changes in weapons use. Widespread reports of civilian casualties from the use of cluster bombs and international criticism of these weapons as potentially indiscriminate in effect led, according to senior U.S. Department of Defense officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch, to an unprecedented (and unannounced) U.S. executive order in the middle of May to cease their further use in the conflict. The White House issued the order only days after civilians were killed by NATO cluster bombs in the city of Nis on May 7. U.S. cluster bomb use did apparently stop at about that time, according to Human Rights Human Rights Watch 2 February 2000, Vol. 12, No. 1 (D) Watch observations, although British cluster bomb use continued. Human Rights Watch released its own report on May 11 questioning the civilian effects of cluster bombs and calling for a moratorium on their use. International Humanitarian Law and Accountability In its investigation Human Rights Watch has found no evidence of war crimes. The investigation did conclude that NATO violated international humanitarian law.1 Human Rights Watch calls on NATO governments to establish an independent and impartial commission, competent to receive confidential information, that would investigate violations of international humanitarian law and the extent of these violations, and would consider the need to alter targeting and bombing doctrine to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law. Such a commission should issue its findings publicly. Human Rights Watch also calls for NATO to alter its targeting and bombing doctrine in order to bring it into compliance with international humanitarian law. With respect to NATO violations of international humanitarian law, Human Rights Watch was concerned about a number of cases in which NATO forces: < conducted air attacks using cluster bombs near populated areas; < attacked targets of questionable military legitimacy, including Serb Radio and Television, heating plants, and bridges; < did not take adequate precautions in warning civilians of attacks; < took insufficient precautions identifying the presence of civilians when attacking convoys and mobile targets; and < caused excessive civilian casualties by not taking sufficient measures to verify that military targets did not have