DOCSLIB.ORG

A Proposal for Descretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Proposal for Descretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals SMU Law Review Volume 34 Issue 5 Article 4 1980 A Proposal for Descretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals Donald P. Lay Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr Recommended Citation Donald P. Lay, Comment, A Proposal for Descretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 SW L.J. 1151 (1980) https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol34/iss5/4 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. ESSAYS A PROPOSAL FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS by Donald P. Lay* p ROFESSOR Kallay has written: Whether access to appellate review can be denied or curtailed by means of a dismissal should test ultimately on the difference between appeals as of right and discretionary appeals. Ifaparty can perfect an appeal as a matter of right, he should necessarilybe entitled to the bene- fits of the entire deliberativeprocessoffered by theforum to which he has taken his appeal' No one should seriously challenge Kallay's observations. Federal liti- gants in both civil and criminal cases have been given the right of appel- late review in the courts of appeals since the Act of 1891 creating the federal courts of appeals. 2 The problem existing today is that federal courts of appeals are so inundated by the volume of appeals that appeals of right can no longer be given the full deliberative process to which they are entitled. 3 In 1960, 3,899 appeals were filed in the courts of appeals. By June 30, the end of the 1980 fiscal year, 23,200 appeals had been filed. Consider that 568% more appeals were pending in 1980 than in 1962, 158% more than in 1969, and 13% more than in 1979. This huge increase oc- curred notwithstanding that the courts terminated 401% more cases in 1980 * Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 1. Kallay, The Dismissal of Frivolous Appeals by the Cal!fornia Courts of Appeal, 54 CAL. S.B.J. 92 (1979) (emphasis added). 2. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. Litigants are currently given the right to appeal by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). This statute is the successor of Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 128, 36 Stat. 1133. 3. Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit has observed that the volume of cases has forced courts to alter their procedures for handling appeals, a development that he finds to be positive. If the enormous growth of appellate caseloads is an ill wind, it has blown considerable good. It has forced appellate courts to re-evaluate what they are doing and to think about whether and how they can do it better. No more significant re-evaluation has occurred than scrutiny of the premise that all appellate cases, regardless of differences between them, must be immu- tably accorded the full range of all appellate procedures. Courts have found the courage to look with questioning eyes at their policies on oral argument, the necessity for opinions, the content of opinions, and the contents of records. Godbold, Improvements in Appellate Procedure.- Better Use of Available Facilities, 66 A.B.A.J. 863 (1980). 1151 1152 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol, 34 than in 1962, 132% more than in 1969, and 10% more than in 1979. 4 Al- though courts of appeals have experimented with many short cuts, they continue to experience such backsliding that a projection of the appellate process in federal courts by the year 2000 is overwhelming.5 In this essay, I would like to pose the question whether the time has come for the exer- cise of discretionary jurisdiction in federal courts of appeals. The appellate process today is so delayed and time-consuming for liti- gants in the majority of the courts of appeals that the situation is scandal- ous. The total number of cases under submission for longer than three months increased from 587 to 767 cases, or nearly 31%, between June 30, 1979, and June 30, 1980. The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits accounted for more than 57% of these 767 cases. Cases under submission for longer than one year increased 23% during fiscal year 1980. The District of Co- lumbia, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits accounted for nearly 76% of this in- crease. On June 30, 1980, 18% of the District of Columbia cases under submission for more than three months had been under submission more than one year. Fifteen percent of the Seventh Circuit's and 10% of the Ninth Circuit's appeals had been under submission for more than one year. 6 Even more egregious is the fact that in some circuits an appeal takes from one to two years to be calendared for oral argument. The ominous clouds of billowing appellate dockets are no longer merely on the horizon. The tremendous increase of federal appeals has prompted various re- sponses, some more effective than others. The most palliative response Congress has made, albeit ten years late, has been to increase the number of federal judges on the courts of appeals. 7 Such a move is unwieldly and controversial to say the least. It defies the wisdom of every recent student of judicial administrationA 4. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 43 (1980). 5. Assuming the caseload continues to grow and the courts continue to dispose of cases at the same rate in the next 18 years as they have in the past 18 years, the courts of appeals, in 1998, will terminate 104,644 cases and will have 135,283 cases pending. These figures are compared to 20,887 cases terminated and 20,252 cases pending in 1980 and 4,167 cases ter- minated and 3,031 cases pending in 1962. The 1998 caseload would be a 2414% increase in cases terminated and a 4363% increase in cases pending over the figures for 1962. See id. Although this assumption may seem somewhat specious, no one doubts that there will be a large increase in filings in the next 20 years. Under the present system the courts of appeals will be unable to cope with even any realistic increase in caseload. 6. Id at 52-54. 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 11 1978). 8. Justice Frankfurter once wrote: The consequences that [the expanding federal caseload] entails for the whole federal judicial system . cannot be met by a steady increase in the number of federal judges. The function and role of the federal courts and the nature of their judicial process involve impalpable factors, subtle but far- reaching, which cannot be satisfied by enlarging the judicial plant. .In the farthest reaches of the problem a steady increase in judges does not alleviate; in my judgment, it is bound to depreciate the quality of the federal judiciary and thereby adversely to affect the whole system. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,concur- ring). Robert Bork, Solicitor General of the United States, has written that a large number of judges on a court "damage[s] collegiality, lessen[s] esprit, and diminish[es] the possibility 19811 DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 11531 During Congress's extended delay, the courts of appeals, by necessity, have created their own innovations to cope with the ever increasing vol- ume of appeals. The latest experiment has been the Second Circuit's Civil Appeal Mediation Plan, which fosters attempts to settle cases before the appeal process takes place. This process is time consuming, and it is not the most convenient tool for circuits that have broad geographic areas such as the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Furthermore, the program's effective- ness is hard to measure because it is difficult to assess how many cases that are settled would have been settled without the program's special efforts. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has experimented with arguments without briefs or written opinions. Another long-needed innovation every court of appeals has found necessary is the lessening of the number of full-length opinions. The most universally adopted innovation has been the screening of cases either for limitation of the time for oral argument or for complete elimina- tion of argument. Various summary techniques have been developed for deciding cases screened for no argument. Central court staffs have been enlarged to work principally on these cases. In many courts of appeals, staff memoranda, written by first-year law clerks, are utilized as the court opinion in no-argument and even some argument cases. Many circuits, including my own I am embarrassed to add, decide no-argument cases without a collegial conference of the three judges meeting together and exchanging possible divergent views. Due to the geographic spread of the Eighth Circuit judges' home bases, the "conference" is, through necessity, by United States mail. In this situation, the danger of one-judge opinions becomes significant. 9 The concept of screening is a good one; courts of appeals should not of interaction throughout the judicial corps." Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 234 (1976). Embracing this same idea, Judge Friendly indicated that nine is the maximum number of active judges that can sit on a court without losing the attributes of a small, intimate body. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 44-46 (1973). In 1964 the Judicial Conference of the United States resolved: "[N]ine is the maximum number of active judgeship positions which can be allotted to a court of appeals without impairing the efficiency of its operation and its unity as a judicial institu- tion." REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (1964).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Supreme Court of the United States ______
    NO. 19-__ In the Supreme Court of the United States ________________ COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Petitioner, v. MICHEAL BACA, POLLY BACA, AND ROBERT NEMANICH, Respondents. ________________ On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ________________ PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ________________ PHILIP J. WEISER GRANT T. SULLIVAN Attorney General Assistant Solicitor General ERIC R. OLSON LEEANN MORRILL Solicitor General First Assistant Attorney Counsel of Record General Office of the Colorado Attorney General 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, Colorado 80203 [email protected] (720) 508-6000 Counsel for Petitioner QUESTIONS PRESENTED Like most States, Colorado requires its presidential electors to follow the will of its voters when casting their Electoral College ballots for President. In the 2016 Electoral College, one of Colorado’s electors violated Colorado law by attempting to cast his presidential ballot for a candidate other than the one he pledged to vote for. Colorado removed him as an elector, declined to accept his ballot, and replaced him with an alternate elector who properly cast her ballot for the winner of the State’s popular vote, consistent with Colorado law. The removed elector later sued Colorado for nominal damages. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a presidential elector who is prevented by their appointing State from casting an Electoral College ballot that violates state law lacks standing to sue their appointing State because they hold no constitutionally protected right to exercise discretion. 2. Does Article II or the Twelfth Amendment forbid a State from requiring its presidential electors to follow the State’s popular vote when casting their Electoral College ballots.
    [Show full text]
  • Individual Access to Constitutional Justice
    Strasbourg, 27 January 2011 CDL-AD(2010)039rev. Study N° 538 / 2009 Or. Engl. EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) STUDY ON INDIVIDUAL ACCESS TO CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 85th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 December 2010) on the basis of comments by Mr Gagik HARUTYUNYAN (Member, Armenia) Ms Angelika NUSSBERGER (Substitute Member, Germany) Mr Peter PACZOLAY (Member, Hungary) This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy. http://www.venice.coe.int CDL-AD(2010)039 - 2 - Table of contents INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................6 GENERAL REMARKS....................................................................................................6 I. ACCESS TO CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW ...............................................................15 I.1. TYPES OF ACCESS .................................................................................................17 I.1.1. Indirect access...................................................................................................17 I.1.2. Direct access.....................................................................................................20 I.2. THE ACTS UNDER REVIEW ......................................................................................28 I.3. PROTECTED RIGHTS ..............................................................................................29 PARTIAL CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTER
    [Show full text]
  • Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
    TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Table of Contents SECTION ONE. (c) Where to File. GENERAL PROVISIONS (d) Order of the Court. Rule 1. Scope of Rules; Local Rules of Courts of Rule 5. Fees in Civil Cases Appeals Rule 6. Representation by Counsel 1.1. Scope. 6.1. Lead Counsel 1.2. Local Rules (a) For Appellant. (a) Promulgation. (b) For a Party Other Than Appellant. (b) Copies. (c) How to Designate. (c) Party's Noncompliance. 6.2. Appearance of Other Attorneys Rule 2. Suspension of Rules 6.3. To Whom Communications Sent Rule 3. Definitions; Uniform Terminology 6.4. Nonrepresentation Notice 3.1. Definitions (a) In General. (b) Appointed Counsel. 3.2. Uniform Terminology in Criminal Cases 6.5. Withdrawal (a) Contents of Motion. Rule 4. Time and Notice Provisions (b) Delivery to Party. (c) If Motion Granted. 4.1. Computing Time (d) Exception for Substitution of (a) In General. Counsel. (b) Clerk's Office Closed or Inaccessible. 6.6. Agreements of Parties or Counsel 4.2. No Notice of Trial Court’s Judgment Rule 7. Substituting Parties in Civil Case (a) Additional Time to File Documents. 7.1. Parties Who Are Not Public Officers (1) In general. (a) Death of a Party. (2) Exception for restricted appeal. (1) Civil Cases. (b) Procedure to Gain Additional Time. (2) Criminal Cases. (c) The Court’s Order. (b) Substitution for Other Reasons. 4.3. Periods Affected by Modified 7.2. Public Officers Judgment in Civil Case (a) Automatic Substitution of Officer. (a) During Plenary-Power Period. (b) Abatement. (b) After Plenary Power Expires.
    [Show full text]
  • A Report on the California Appellate System J
    Hastings Law Journal Volume 45 | Issue 3 Article 2 1-1994 A Report on the California Appellate System J. Clark Kelso Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 Hastings L.J. 433 (1994). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol45/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Report on the California Appellate Systemt by J. CLARK KELSO* Introduction Although the right to appeal is not recognized as one of our fun- damental rights of due process or equal protection, the ability to ap- peal an adverse decision would nevertheless appear to be one of the most cherished indicia of civilized government.' We learn at a very early age that one way to avoid having our toys taken away by an older sibling or playmate is to protest this unfair treatment to the nearest authority figure-usually a parent. And if relief is not granted by one parent, we seek help from the other parent. The underlying sentiment that there is (or must be) a higher au- thority which may be consulted to correct injustice has been ingrained in formal, governmental dispute-resolution systems throughout re- corded history. The right of appeal has been a component of govern- f The first draft of this Article was sent out to more than 125 reviewers, including all appellate judges in California.
    [Show full text]
  • 2013 Annual Convention Materials
    REDRAFTING KENTUCKY'S APPELLATE RULES: A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION CLE Credit: 1.5 Friday, June 21, 2013 10:10 a.m. - 11:25 p.m. Combs-Chandler Room Galt House Hotel Louisville, Kentucky A NOTE CONCERNING THE PROGRAM MATERIALS The materials included in this Kentucky Bar Association Continuing Legal Education handbook are intended to provide current and accurate information about the subject matter covered. No representation or warranty is made concerning the application of the legal or other principles discussed by the instructors to any specific fact situation, nor is any prediction made concerning how any particular judge or jury will interpret or apply such principles. The proper interpretation or application of the principles discussed is a matter for the considered judgment of the individual legal practitioner. The faculty and staff of this Kentucky Bar Association CLE program disclaim liability therefore. Attorneys using these materials, or information otherwise conveyed during the program, in dealing with a specific legal matter have a duty to research original and current sources of authority. Printed by: Kanet Pol & Bridges 7107 Shona Drive Cincinnati, Ohio 45237 Kentucky Bar Association TABLE OF CONTENTS The Presenters ................................................................................................................. i Draft Kentucky Appellate Rules of Procedure (KAP) ....................................................... 1 Proposed Structure of Appellate Rules ...........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • State Supreme Courts' Attempts to Remove Themselves from the Federal Habeas Exhaustion Requirement
    Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 51 Issue 2 Article 4 2000 Thanks, but No Thanks: State Supreme Courts' Attempts to Remove Themselves from the Federal Habeas Exhaustion Requirement Kirk J. Henderson Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kirk J. Henderson, Thanks, but No Thanks: State Supreme Courts' Attempts to Remove Themselves from the Federal Habeas Exhaustion Requirement, 51 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 201 (2000) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol51/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. ARTICLE THANKS, BUT No THANKS: STATE SUPREME COURTS' ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE THEMSELVES FROM THE FEDERAL HABEAS EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT t Kirk J. Henderson INTRODUCTION A state prisoner who wants to file a federal habeas corpus peti- tion must first exhaust his or her remedies in state court.' In the ab- stract, this is a simple enough concept. The details of what consti- tutes an exhausted claim, however, have been and continue to be un- clear. Prior to 1999, the federal circuits were split on whether the ex- haustion requirement obligated prisoners to file for discretionary re- view in state supreme court.2 The Supreme Court attempted to re- solve this conflict in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel by holding that discre- tionary review is required to fulfill the exhaustion requirement.
    [Show full text]
  • Misdemeanor Appeals
    MISDEMEANOR APPEALS NANCY J. KING & MICHAEL HEISE ABSTRACT Misdemeanor cases affect far more people than felony cases, outnumbering felony cases by more than three to one. Yet little empirical information exists on many aspects of misdemeanor prosecutions. This Article provides the first quantitative look at appellate review in misdemeanor cases nationwide. It uses data drawn from a random sample of direct criminal appeals decided by every state appellate court in the nation, unpublished aggregate data on misdemeanor trial court cases provided by the Court Statistics Project, and published state court statistics. We provide the first estimate of the rate of appellate review for misdemeanors, concluding that appellate courts review no more than eight in ten thousand misdemeanor convictions and disturb only one conviction or sentence out of every ten thousand misdemeanor judgments. This level of oversight is much lower than that for felony cases, for reasons we explain. To develop law and regulate error in misdemeanor cases, particularly in prosecutions for the lowest-level offenses, courts may need to provide mechanisms for judicial scrutiny outside the direct appeal process. Additional findings include new information about the rate of felony trial court review of lower court misdemeanor cases; ratios of appeals to convictions for various misdemeanor-crime categories; detailed descriptive information about misdemeanor cases that reach state appellate courts; the results of a complete statistical analysis examining which features are significantly associated with a greater or lesser likelihood of success, including crime type, claim raised, judicial-selection method, and type of representation; and the first quantitative look at how misdemeanor appeals differ from felony appeals.
    [Show full text]
  • RULES Supreme Court of the United States
    RULES OF THE Supreme Court of the United States ADOPTED APRIL 18, 2019 EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2019 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1 First Street, N. E. Washington, DC 20543 Clerk of the Court ............................... (202) 479-3011 Reporter of Decisions.......................... (202) 479-3390 Marshal of the Court........................... (202) 479-3333 Librarian................................................ (202) 479-3175 Telephone Operator ............................. (202) 479-3000 Visit the U.S. Supreme Court Website http://www.supremecourt.gov Mailing Address of the Solicitor General of the United States (see Rule 29.4) Room 5616 Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, DC 20530-0001 TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I. THE COURT Page Rule 1. Clerk ................................................................................................ 1 Rule 2. Library ............................................................................................ 1 Rule 3. Term ................................................................................................ 1 Rule 4. Sessions and Quorum ................................................................... 2 PART II. ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS Rule 5. Admission to the Bar.................................................................... 2 Rule 6. Argument Pro Hac Vice.............................................................. 3 Rule 7. Prohibition Against Practice ...................................................... 4 Rule 8. Disbarment and Disciplinary
    [Show full text]
  • The Exceptions Clause As a Structural Safeguard Tara Leigh Grove William & Mary Law School, [email protected]
    College of William & Mary Law School William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 2013 The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard Tara Leigh Grove William & Mary Law School, [email protected] Repository Citation Grove, Tara Leigh, "The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard" (2013). Faculty Publications. 1540. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1540 Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE AS A STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARD Tara Leigh Grove Scholars have long treated the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court’s central constitutional function: establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law. This Article argues that scholars have overlooked an important function of the Clause. Congress has repeatedly used its broad “exceptions power” to facilitate, not to undermine, the Supreme Court’s constitutional role. Drawing on insights from social science, this Article asserts that Congress has an incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court’s role in settling disputed federal questions. Notably, this argument has considerable historical support. When the Supreme Court’s mandatory appellate docket grew to the point that it was un- manageable for a single tribunal, Congress responded by exercising its authority under the Exceptions Clause. Congress made “exceptions” to the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction and replaced it with discretionary review via writs of certiorari—precisely so that the Court could concentrate its limited resources on resolving important federal questions.
    [Show full text]
  • One Supreme Court and the Writ of Certiorari J
    Hastings Law Journal Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 4 1-1963 One Supreme Court and the Writ of Certiorari J. Warren Madden Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation J. Warren Madden, One Supreme Court and the Writ of Certiorari, 15 Hastings L.J. 153 (1963). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol15/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. One Supreme Court and the Writ of Certiorari By J. WARREN MADDEN* IN the establishment of the national government, the Constitution pro- vided that the legislative power should be vested in a Congress. That provision assures that all national legislation shall be the product of a single national body, deliberating as such, and that no part of the legislative power may be delegated to regional legislative bodies, legis- lating for parts of the nation. The executive power was vested in a President, and unity in that function is thus assured. But as to the third great function of government, the judicial power, the Constitution was not so specific. It vested the judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress might establish. The crea- tion of one Supreme Court was suggestive of unity, comparable to the unity of one Congress and one Executive. But the Constitution makers did not contemplate that all the judicial business of the new national government should be done by the one Supreme Court.
    [Show full text]
  • Rules of Appellate Procedure (Rap) Table of Rules
    Rules of Appellate Procedure RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE (RAP) TABLE OF RULES TITLE 1 SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF RULES Rule 1.1 Scope of Rules 1.2 Interpretation and Waiver of Rules by Court TITLE 2 WHAT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS MAY BE REVIEWED--SCOPE OF REVIEW 2.1 Methods for Seeking Review of Trial Court Decision--Generally 2.2 Decisions of the Superior Court That May Be Appealed 2.3 Decisions of the Trial Court Which May Be Reviewed by Discretionary Review 2.4 Scope of Review of a Trial Court Decision 2.5 Circumstances Which May Affect Scope of Review TITLE 3 PARTIES 3.1 Who May Seek Review 3.2 Substitution of Parties 3.3 Consolidation of Cases 3.4 Title of Case and Designation of Parties TITLE 4 WHERE TO SEEK REVIEW OF A TRIAL COURT DECISION 4.1 Review of Trial Court Decision by the Court of Appeals 4.2 Direct Review of Superior Court Decision by Supreme Court 4.3 Direct Review of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction 4.4 Transfer of Cases by Supreme Court TITLE 5 HOW AND WHEN TO INITIATE REVIEW OF TRIAL COURT DECISION: COURT OF APPEALS SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE 5.1 Review Initiated by Filing Notice of Appeal or Notice for Discretionary Review 5.2 Time Allowed To File Notice 5.3 Content of Notice--Filing 5.4 Filing and Service of Notice 5.5 Settlement Conference in Court of Appeals TITLE 6 ACCEPTANCE OF REVIEW 6.1 Appeal as a Matter of Right 6.2 Discretionary Review 6.3 Direct Review of a Final Decision of an Administrative Agency TITLE 7 AUTHORITY OF TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE COURT PENDING REVIEW 7.1 Authority of Trial Court Before Review
    [Show full text]
  • The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review Douglas E
    BYU Law Review Volume 2005 | Issue 2 Article 1 5-1-2005 The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review Douglas E. Beloof Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons Recommended Citation Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 255 (2005). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2005/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1BEL-FIN 8/9/2005 2:18:25 PM The Third Wave of Crime Victims’ Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review Douglas E. Beloof.∗ I. Introduction and Background ............................................................ 256 A. Introduction: Crime Victims’ State Constitutional Rights Are Often Illusory................................................................. 256 B. Background........................................................................... 261 II. How Victims Are Denied Standing.................................................. 273 A. Real Rights Require Standing, Adequate Remedy, and Review.................................................................................. 274 B. The Discretion Problem.......................................................
    [Show full text]