World War II

Intelligence activities in the during the Japanese occupation

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INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

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DOCUMENTARY APPEl\TDICES VOLUME II, INTELLIGENCE SERIES

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. SECTION, GENERAL STAF~

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION ..

DOCUMENT ARYAPPENDICES (II) VOLUME II, INTELLIGENCE SERIES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST .COMMAND

Tokyo, Japan 10 June 1948

Each Master Volume of the General Intelligence Series is followed by a companion piece, containing selected documents, either in wartime originals, when available, or in facsimile. ( Since the series is primarily designed for use at Service Schools, ail effort has been made to place at the student's disposal the type of intimate detailed and pertinent source material that usually remains buried in archives and files. The purpose is to present the subject not only as to "when," in . historical chronology, but also as to "how," in practical, war-tested operations. All inclosed documents are declassified to " Restricted," regardless of current classification at date of publication.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

PAUL J. MUELLER Major General, GSC Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL :

C.A. WILLOUGHBY Major . General, GSC AC of S, G-2

THE INTELLIGENCE SERIES

G-2 USAFFE-SWPA-AFPAC-FEC-SCAP

Volumes I to IX

A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units I The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines

II Intelligence Activities in the PhiHppines: Japanese Occupati~n III Operations of the Military Intelligence Section, GHQ, SWPA IV Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau; .GHQ, SWPA

V Operations of the Allied Translator & Interpreter Section, GHQ, SWPA VI Operations of the Allied Geographical Section, GHQ, SWPA VII· Operations of the Technical Intelligence Unit in the SWPA / \~ VIII Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA

IX Operations of the Civil Intelligenc~ Section, SCAP

Command: Intelligence Units-War Period Maj General S. B. Akin (Cent. B.) ; Air Vice-Marshal J. E. Hewitt (D.I.-AAF) ;. Brigadier K. A. Wills A. I. F. (AlB) ; Brig J. D. Rogers A. I. F. (DMI-AGF) ; Brig General C. Whitney (PRS); Brig General E. R. Thorpe (CIC); Brig General C. Clarke (MID) ; Brig General J. J. Twitty (JICPOA) ; Gol W. V. Jardine-Blake A. I. F. (AGS) ; Capt R. B. M. Long R. A. N. F. (D. N. I. Mel~ourne) ; Col C. G. Roberts A. I. F. (AlB); Capt A. H. McCollum USN (D. N. I. Seventh Fleet) ; Comdr G. B. Salm (Dir NEFIS); Col S. H. Spoor (Dir NEFIS); Col S. F. Mashbir (ATIS) ; Cot Van S. Merle-Smith (G-2); ColH. V. White (,G-2 Sixth Army) ; Col G. A. A. Jones (G'--2 Eighth Army) ; Col B. Cain (A-2 FEAF) ;' Lt Col N. B •. Sauve (TIC).

Editor-in-Chief:

Major General Charles A. ~iIIoughby, GSC

Executive Editors:

Col F. H. Wilson; Lt Col N. W. Willis; Capt A. W~ Grey

Associate Editors. Research. Production. 1/ Col R. L. Ring-; Col S. M. Mellnik; Lt Col M. K. Schiffman; Lt Col W. H. Brown; Lt Col A. W. Ind; Maj E. A. Williams ;Maj A. Chrietzberg; Capt S. Stern; Capt H. W. Keyser; Capt E. K. EIlsworth; Capt E. B. Ryckaert; Lt Y. G. Kanegai; Lt L. J. Larkin; Lt R. G. Bonus; Lt R. A. Patterson; MjSgt W. M. Tracy; . TjSgt S. C. Reed; TjSgt H. Y. Uno; TjSgt J. R. Elder; Sgt H. E. Ryder; Miss B. E. White; Miss F. R •. Gossin; Miss M. A. Tonougar; Miss R. A. Ketchum; Miss M. A. Moore; Miss M. I. Taylor; Mr. R. Takeuchi; Mr. S. Wada.

In addit~on to Volumes I-IX listed above, there are one or ~ore companion volumes for each main subject, entitled "Documentary Appendices," which contain war-time documents, orders, plans, reports, etc., illustrating operational procedures.

Officers and men in responsible positions will be listed, with their activities, in appropriate paragraphs within the volume.

The basic manuscript for Vol_ II,. "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation," was prepal'ed by Maj E. A. Williams. Subsequent edit, expansion and revision: Maj General C .. A. Willoughby; T ISgt J. R. Elder (WAC) and Miss J. Corrigan, G-2. SCAP. CONTENTS

I Guerrilla Activities and Cash Expenditures, 1942-45; Funds'Avai1able to Agents and Guerrilla Leaders, 1942-45 11 Consolidated Monthly Total of Messages Received, Nov 42 - Jan 45 ~III Monthly Totals of Messages Sent by Agents and Commanders, 1942·.. ·45 IV Calendar of Submarine Shipments to Philippine Guerrillas and Agents, Dec 42 - Dec 44 V Approximate Tonnages Delivered by Submarine to Guerrillas, 1943-44 VI Directive to V-illamor (Planet) Party; 27 Dec 42 VII Directive to Parsens (Fifty) Party; 13 Feb 43 VIII Directive to Crespo (Peleven) Party (with Copy of Manifest , . of Cargo Taken with the Party); 12 Apr 43 IX Directive to Hamner (Tenwest) Party; 23 May 43 X Communications for Philippine Penetration,.. Mar 43 .( 'XI PRSlntelligence Plan; 24 Jun 43 f !--"'"y---' XII PRS Memo to C of S, .reSubmarines 2 Ju143 XIII Philippine Intelligence Plan (FRS); 25 Aug 43' nv Development of Cont.act with American POW in Japanese Camps (Rosenquist Mission); 11 Dec 43 XV G... 2 Staff Study:, Phil Islands Sit; 25' Feb 44 XVI Intelligence Requirements Plan for M:Lndanao; 2 May 44 XVII G-2 Information Bu.lletin No. 12, Report on Conditions in .th~ Philippine Islands, Jun 43 XVIII Intell Opns or Col. N.L. Manzano; 12 Dec 44 XIX History of the Military Intelligence Service, USAFFE, Jun 42 - Mar 45 XX Personal Narrative of Major Emigdio C. Cruz, Jan 43·· Feb 44 XX~ Philippine Monthly Combined Situation Report; 1944* XXII Philippine :[slands Weekly Summary of Enemy Intelligence; 1944* XXIII Philippine Islands Daily Summary of Enemy Intelligence; ·,1944* XXIV Daily Philippine Message Sheet; 1944-45* xxv Extracts from ATIS'Publications dealing with Japanese In­ telligence and Counterintelligence XXVI Extracts from ATIS Current 1ranslation No. 149; 6 Feb 45 XXVII Example of Intelligence and Opns by Guerr:illas . XXVIII AlB Directive, 6 July 1942** . , XXIX operational and Logistics Plan for Penetration of P.I. by AlB Parties, 10 Apr 43** xxx Summary of Organization and Operations of ECLGA, 15 May 45**

Philippines Intelligence Gtiide ••••••••••••• o ••• (backcover)

* Original documents, drawn from period covered by 'dates shown. ** Appendices XXVIII - XXX, inclusive, do not fall in chrono- . logical order within the. List of Documentary Appendices be­ cause they were selecte~ after the other doc~entary append­ ices had been mimeographed. \ NOTE: -.First thirteen documents of Documentary Appendices are bound in Master Vol~e; the remaining seventeen are bound in Doc­ umentary Appendices Volume. 14 APPENDIX XIV

DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACT VvITH AMERICAN POW

IN JAPANESE CAMPS 11 December 1943

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Summary .... ~ " • ,. •• ., •••• " o.••••••••• ". " • ,. ••••• ,. • ,. " ,. ••••• ~ •• it •• ,. •• It • 1

G-2 Staff Study ,. •••. ,...... ,. io •• .. , •• ,. ,. •••••• ,. • • • • • • • •.• 2

Memo to AC of S, 0-2, from Lt. Col. S. M. Mellnik ,...... 7

Plate, "Davao Penal Colony and Possible Escape Routes lt Letter of instruction to Lt. Col. Englehart at Cabanatuan ...... 9 Appendix XIV

---SUMlVU"RY

Development of contacts with :Amerioan POW in Japanese Camps.'

3E8TION I: Gcnf,ral Background;, 1. Lt. ,Col. Mellnikt s work with MIS-X .. Washington, D. C. 2. Possibility of making contact "vi th POW in and .

SECTION II: Detailed study of Mindanao POW Situation. 1. _ POW camp t, organization, work activities., extent of' Jap survcillancre. 2. ProKimiti of guerrilla organization, intelligenco activity of this unit, tacticbl and intelligence possibilitiE:s of this unit; possible aid to POW., 3. - Conclusions: Desirable to send MI,s.X officer to guerrillEl unit to assi,stPOW and coord"inate intelli..: gence. 4. Recommendations in detail to carry out_pars. 3.,

SECTION III: Detailed Study of Lu~on POW Situ6tion. 1. POW camp, organization, work activities, channels of communioDtion to Manila. ,int811igence possibilities., 2. 0onclusions: Desirable to contact POW for morElle and intelligence reasons. 3. Rcc:omm8ndatfon: That PRS of AlB contact POW.

APPENDIX , itA" .. Memo to AC of S. G-2 from Lt ,• .col. Mellnik. ltB:tt _ Me.p showing the POW comp in Mindanao. ItC,Ii _ Letter of instruction to' Lt. Ool.. Englehart af Cabanatuan.

-,,1 - 11 December 1943

STAF? STUDY FOR CHIEF OF STAFF.

SUBJECT: Development of contact with American POW in Japanese oamps'.

SEGTION I: GENERAL BACKGHOUND

.. 1. A meniorandum to A. c. of s., G-2 was recently received from Lt. col. Mellnik in regard to contacting Amerioan POW in Japanese camps (APpendix ItA")", The problem involved, the benefits to be gained, and the known desire of the c-in-o to aid these prisoners, has led t9 a G-2 staff ,study of his memo and recommendations •.

2. Briefly. Lt. Col. Mellnik. in his MIS-X work in washington, D.C., was impressed with the value of MIS-X activities in European POW camps. The extent to which the camps were organized, the valuable in­ formation seoured, the escape assistance provided, and the high morale effeot on POW as a result of direot contact with their o~ forces. When he queried MIS-X as to its POW in the Swp, they replied the:re was none; that they had not been able to start work in this area, bu~ desired

to present the.features of MIS-X to GHQf SW'P t particularly the work it was doing in POW camps in Europe. He talked over the possiblity of aiding POW in P.I. with MIS-X. one MIS ... X offioer, who was orde+,ed to duty here, was tentativelY slated for POW activity, w4en and it authoriz.,.. ed~ This was Lt. Rosenquist, MIS-X. on duty with 5th AAF in Briab&ne.

3. Lt~ col. Mellnik contends thiit the problem of aiding the prisoners is one of making and maintaining contact with theml one camp is at Davao penal colony in Mindanao, easily accessible to guerrilla units, and lightly guarded. To this camp, the assiBtan~e can be substantial. The second camp is at Cabanatuan~ in Luzon~This ar~a is highly organized py the enemy. Contact wit.h this camp, while difficult. will pay dividends, as the camp acts as a pool of POW labor, which covers important Luzpn m.il. i t.c..ry inst~-llL t.ioIJ.:J. .

SEOTION II: Detailed study' of Davao penal colony POW camp

1. a. This camp is located 52 1m! northeast of l)avao t and about 12 km from Davao Gulf, There is one second-class road to it from D~vao;. with numerous bridges. The camp is in the center of a jungle, a~d was' originally built to house Filipino convicts with 20 year sentences. The camp is the shape of a rectangle, one by two miles in dimension. (see Plate 25).

b. It contains 2000 Amerioan POW, of who~ 600 are offipers. About 100'0 go to irvork each day in the colony grounds. The camp also serves as a labor pool for· outside work details for the Japs. Tp.ese inolude 1) 20 men in the motor repair and truok drivers' ppol in Daveo City. 2) 30 men making salt on Davao Gulf. 3) 100 men on a Japanese abaca plantation. 4) Variable number stevedoring in the;Davao dook area.

The 100Q' who work in the Qamp itself are divided into about 50 groups of various sizes, from 150 repairing the road to Daveo. to . ' three or four doing Jap K.F. £. .( 1) The main Americ€4n hospl.tal is at the Davao Penal Colony. :flOW siek on -outside work details 'are brough;t in to this oamp. At in ... frequent intervals, outside work detaiilaJ; are rotated. The oamp i~ org .... anized wit.h an· Arnsr.ioan camp Headquarters t whose main duty is to fill the labor requisitions each day. The camp Hq. normally assigns individ-uals to speciiic work details. Freedom of movement ~dthin the oamp compQuD.d· is . not restricted.. Visit ing is frequent between hospital and camp .

.. 2 - (2) Interior work details are scattered throughout the oolony.· The Jape make no pretenoe of guarding the prisoners ~ The duty of the sentry is to supervise and direot the work. :such work detai~s as loggirig, firewood gathering and d;aco stripping,. are all in the jungl.e. under such circumstanoes, it is impossible for the sentry to exeroisemuch surveillance. He merely counts'noses at noen and prior to retu:rn to c~mp. The orchard and coffee picking details had nO'sentries, as thos$ detail$ were composed of old and sic'k off icers, too weak. to do much wor~, much less escape (MCCbY & Mellnik escaped from the coffee detail). All POW are brought back to the prison compound at 6 p.m. each day •. Th~ compound is surrounded by barbed wire,. with tall sentry towers placeQ at intervals •.

(3) The Jap garrison is not over 250.. This incluc;1es mess and administrative personnelt outpost guards (Japs worried about gUE;3rrillas), work detail guards, and an interior guard of the camp. There are seldom more than 50 sentries available to guard the 50 different 'work details •.

2. a. 30 km north of ~he POW cp,mp in the jungle is a COITJlllUUi ty 01' 5000 who evacuated Davao ~ity when the Japs invaded Mindanao. TO protect themselves Cigainst Jap interference. they organized ~ guerrilla unit under M'djor Laureta. Major Laureta was a Philippine. oonstabulary officer, and for two yeCirs pr~or to the war, was traffio control offioer of Mindanao. At the outbreak of war he was in oommand of a P.O. battalion in Davao city. When Mindanao surrendered, he evacuated to the hills with part of his unit. This served as a nucleus for his present organization. It now numbers 1000 men and 150 rifles. 1-18 exercises absolut.e powers in nisarea. IS extremelyloYfll and has effectively prevented Jap inter­ ferenoe. with oommunity life in the area.

b. (1) Major Laureta's illlit is composed of men, natives of Davao Oity, Betwee~ 16 and 25 years of age. He has established contaots in Davao city, has procured Jap passes for his men, and in April 1943,. was quite active in getting information out of Davao which would keep him abreast of Jap activities effecting his areCi. His southern outpost at Lungagog, is 12 bn from the POW camp at the colony. The 12 kID in between is guerrilla territory - guerrilla patrols use it, the Japs stay in tneir outpost at Anabogan. Laureta IS Hec .. dqu&rters is at Kapungagan, on tile Libuganon R~ver. .

(2) In the past ifBW months he has established 'weekly OOllrJ..er contact with col. Fertig'S Headquarters, had had his unit.' inducted into the loth Nrilitary District, and is now a member of u.,s. forces in Mindanao. Travel time from MCJ.jor Laureta to col. Fertig'S HeadqUarters is. about 7 days by courier. (3) About 10 of Laureta's men are former inmates of the Davao penal colony. with Col. Fertig flre the two Filipinos who ussisted col. Mellnik's party in its escape. TWO Americans who escaped at the same time c;;.re now unit commanders in the AgusLin province.

3. a. col. Fertig has been quite busy in other areas in the p~st years, and has not had a competent officer to send to LauretCi to EJ.ssist in organization and intelligence. considering the distance involved, and the locat~on of Lauretats unit (it could not tactic[,~llyassist Fertig 'in occidental Misamis·, Lanao or the Aguan) this organization is the last organized guerrilla unit to get attention from the loth MD.

b. (1) It seems apparent that a force of 1000 rifles (which could be developed under Laureta) would be a distinct asset to us in the event of our landing in Mindanao. The unit is 3 days maroh from Davao city, and in a direotion unprotected by tne Jnps (jungle): (2) This unit, so intimately familiar wit.h Daveo city, ·oan likewise be utilized for intelligence purposes far'beyond its present undirected scope of activities. Directed sabotage activity could easily be affected. .

- 3 '- (3) Its proxim.ity· to: the POW camp and direct oommunication with the loth MD,· makes it the logical point of contact with the POW, and the place from which 6ctive assistance to POW may be initiated.

4.,.· o. considering Major Laureta "s organization with a view to its suitability as a focal point for aid to American POW in pavao penal colony, the following is a discuasion o~ what can be done!

(1) photographic evidence of conditions in the camp. col. Mellnik states that it is possible to get an~th·ing into. the camp which can be carried.

( (2) PGsi'~ive assistance to Po:.7 in the shape of vi-tamin pills. A and B-1 particularly.. Moil and news bulletins -I/vill follow,. r.phe morale effect of contact with their own foroes will· be greater than any materi~l benefits.

(3) Data for the state Department re additional violations of the Geneva Convention rules.. nata_'for the war DepElrtment re casualties, etc., as so rpany have died, and more will di~, with no record .. of date of : death or circurnstanoes.

(4) Establishment of an intelligence system within the 'camp (there are sufficient offioers there). The pm~ outside work details Yv"ill be a fruitful source of information. This should result in aocurate intelligence of enemy aotivities in all areas in which POVi labor is used.

~~ Laureta'S intelligenc.e system at present is directed towards 100al security. This is due to lack of experience in relative value of information and iack of contact with agencies who could use ~h8 informa­ ~onp rather than the lack of effort· on his part. The foot that ~ny of his men were residents of Davao, w~th friends· and relatives there, mpkes his unit invaluable from an intelligenoe viev~·-point. This means an intell~ igence Qoverage of the key city of Davao. Laureta's intelligence traini~g is limited. He will need a directing h8nd.

o. That his force of 1000 men has been kept intact of 18 months and his civil community enthusiastioally supporting him, is good evidence of hsureta's organizational ability and honesty. His force, if equipped would be a valuable asset in.&ttacking the enemy from the rear in con­ junction with our own forces. HiS men, famil:har~vith the area, could likewise assist us by sabotaging bridges, power plants and railroads in conjunction with our o~n operations. His position on the Libuganon is impregnable.. JlUlgle trails only lead i.nto it. His area is well patrolled, and enemy intelligenoe is extremely l~ited.

5. a. The possib1ities·inherent in operoting in Major Laure~afs area: aId to POV~. intelligence in D8vao, orga'nization for active support of oUr' own troops t requires that an officer be sent into that are,-<._ MIS-4 at V'frBabiyt;gton in conjunotion with Lt. col!' rvrellnik. tentatlvely selected' Lt. Rosenquist.. He has been in MIS-X for' over a 'year? .ha§ served in 7 the Natignal Guard (Fi.eld Artillery) for ten years prior to that as a 1st Sgtt: ~Mellnik thinks Rosenquist can do the job. Rosenquist is no~~-. on duty at the 5th Air Force :hn Brisbane, on MIS-X vvork, and is will:bug to take over the job.

b. The officers to direct establ,ishment of POW intelligence system iii the. camp f;lr6 Lt. Col. Memory Ouin, 200th Cll. (NG). and Lt • col. GeH! stubbs, CAO·. They are both trustworthy, active, intelligent., and the'lr morale is high. There is on file at G-2 a re&ent letter to Lt. Col! stubbs from his mother. This letter will establish the authenticity of Qui" conataot,,,

.£. The possib~lity of &iding the escape of PO\~' was oonsidered .• From all ·reports. the POW are .too vleak to engage in a mass escape, While the escape of smaller units may invite drastic retaliation.

- 4 - 6. 8. Recommend that 1st Lt. H. A. Rosenquist, MIS-.'X, be authoriz.ed to prooeed to Mindana'o, P.I~t and that Col. Fertig be directed to make arrangements for his trip'to Major Laureta's headquqrters.

(1) That Lt. Rosenq,uist will wqrk under a-2, GHQ. (2) That he be authorized to procure supplies from SVVP or MIS ... X agencies (vitamins. etc.) for this mission.,.

b. His pr~mary mission:

(1) Make contact with POW at the Davao penal Colony. (2) Furnish them suoh assistance in meaicines and vitamins, mail, news bulletin~, as transports facilities. may permit. -(3) Investigate the possibility of assisting the ~$cape of" selected pow. (4) Direct the establishment of an inte~ligenoe system withip the camp and act as an outlet for it. (5) Broaden the scope of Major Laureta}s intelligence network to include coverage of military installations in Davao City. ~ (6) Investigate, and report to GHQ. what Laureta's unit, properly equipped: could do to: a) Assist the Amerioan landings thru direct attack and sabotage of Jap installations in Davao. b) prevent the massacre of American POW in the Davao pen~l Oolony in the event of tJur tlanding in Mindanao. (7) Recommend to this Headquarters minimum supplies needed to aceomplish b(6), (a), and (b).

~~ His secondary mission will be:

(1) To act as col. Fertig's liasion officer to Major Laureta. (2) Direct the procurment of such intelligence as the loth MD may d~sire.

SECTION III: Detailed study cabanatuan POW camp.

, f I., cabanatuan is in the province of NUeve Ecija. in . It is cibout 100 krn north of Manila. The POW camp- is located 9 km east of the town of cabanataan. It is in the center of a rice growing area.

8. Thle POW aamp oonsists of a hospital area and the camp com­ pound proper. Latest reports indioate a minimum of 6000 American POW at this can~ about 1000 officers and 5000 enlisted men. The camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence.. High sentry towers are located at .. trategic poin~s f and the approaches to the camp are quitt'll

b. The JUP guard consists of about 250 reservists, with about one year-of training. This unit furnished the guards for outside work details. interior guard, administration and supply and the routine police duties of the camp.

c. The interior administration of the POW camp is handled by an AIIleriC3n camp Headquarters. This Headqu&rters coordinates roll calls, admissions to the hospital area, keeps records and initiate's sanitary­ precautions. Its chief duty is to provide work details as called for by the Ja:ps~ The camp serves as a labor pool from which the Jape draw asoc9asion demands. As of oct. 1942. the Japs had POW working parties in Bateau, oorregidor I Nichols' F'ield, clark Field, Ft. MCKinley, Nielson ' airport, dock area in Manila and a motor poo! in Manila. As'members of these working parties get sick, or the job is completed, the POW are re­ turned to cabanatuan. At infrequent inter:vals these working details ure rotated. The POW' cannot make use of what they see,

5 d. Work details in and around the, carrrp proper consists of routine police, reparinr; buildings and roads, and gathering firevTOod. The fire­ wood detail of about 100 men goes out each day into the v,roods. This detail is the camps only daily contact with the outside world. At noon­ time several caramettas arrive at the scene of the woodcutting with items of food to sell~' The Japs permit this sale - profiting thereby. Those caramettas proved to be reliable channels of communication with Manila, Another channel was the American truck driver who took the Jap truck into Manila each week .. 2. a. Corrununication from the POW camp at Cabanatuan to Manila is already In effect. Col. Watrous, Medical Corps, a former physicio,n in N[anila has a reliable channel. Maj. CavcGder, formerly managor of the Hanila Hotel, also has one. These channels are througL to their friends in Manila; and are being used to supply currency and mail into the camp. Letters from internees in Santo Tomas were not infrequent. No attempt had been made by the POW as of Oct. 1942, to use these channels for mili­ tary intelligence, as there was no defivite outlet for it in Manila, and the need for currency was great~ The channels were used by those who had personal friends in Manila or the civilian internment camp"

, E.~ rrhe possibility of POW securing information of military value in Luzon appears excellent. The widely scattered working parties in im­ portant military areas cannot avoid seeing what is going OfL This course of information should prove more teliable than the .inf.req1J.6r1t: Fil:~pino verbal reports which too often are colored. The state of mi,nd of civil­ ians, the supplies available to theEl and the conduct. of t:1,,; J'lf;S j.n the area, will give us an indication of the civil support to be Ctpected in tho event of invasion. c. (1) It appears that aside from assistance to POW at Cabanat­ uanJ which in view of the location of tho camp will be J_imited to letters and news bulletins, contact with the POVlT will develop a prolific source of military intelligence in the most important island in the philippines. There are about 1000 officers in this camp. Selected ones could be in­ structed to establish an intelligence agency to question returning members of outside work details, Gvaluate the information and, as occasion permits, expend the scope of intelligence activities.

(2) The officers known to bo in this camp, and with whom con­ tact should be made are: Lt. Col. E CarJ_ Englehart, CAC (formerly with r~2, Hq. Philippine Dept.); Lt. Col. Saint, Corps of Engineers; Lt. Col. Watrous, Med. Corps; and lEaj. Howard Cavender. These officers arc healthy with high morale, and have numerous contacts with the camp. G-2 has a letter ,to Maj. Erven Somerville (POW at Cabanatuan) from his wifo. This letter will establish the authenticity of our contact;

(3) To take advantage of the intelligence facilities available in the POW camp will require a channel of communication from GRQ to the camp_ The agency at present operating in Luzon is the Philippine Regional Section of AlB. The nature and extent of its activities need not be com­ mented on here. The initial contact will take time; subseql.1<:::mt contacts with the POW will be simplified, as the POW havo a direct channel to l1mila.

3. ~o Recommend that the P.R.S. of A.I.B. establish a channel of communication between G-2, GHQ, and tho POW· at the Cabanatuan Camp. Tho first letter to go in will contain:

(1) A letter for Maj. Somerville at Cabanatuan to establish the authenticity of the contact o

(2) A letter of instruction, ro establishmont of a POW intelligence system 'within the camp addressod to Lt. Col. E. Carl Englehart and Lt. Col. Saint, Corps of Engineers. (See Appendix C).

(3) A late news summary of world events.

C.A.W.

- 6 - 4 December 191+3 :MEv.[ORiiNDUM:

TO .A~ -:J. of S." G... 2. OHQ.t S.• W.P.A ....

1. In conversat~on with MIS-X at washingon f D.C., I found this section extremely active in assisting American POW in enemy hands. Among their. many activities w:e~e: briefing air crews in escape.prooed.tu--e; methods of oomr1l1mica:ting with our forces in the event of capture; es­ tablishment ofesoape and intelligence c'hannels. The activities of MIS-X has resulted in the planned escape of several hundred American poviJ, a continuous flow of military intelligence from the enenJY area, and a highly organized POW unit in each of the enemy POW camps.

2. The 8,000 American POW n~w concentrated in the :Philippines have had no'contact with American forces since their surrender. conditions in theS€ camps are deplorable, morale is extremely low, guerrilla units are active in all areas, and no action haa been initiated to prevent the massacre of these POWS in the event our forces land in the camp areas.

30 The two main concentration areas for American POWs are oabanatuan (6000) in the province of and the Davao penal colony (2000) t with about 15 smaller gl"OUPS on working parties nearby.

a o The cabanatuan camp, located in the middle of Luzon, can be oontacted through agents in Manila or guerrilla unitl;s operating in the area", The camp sends out working parties e-ach day, members of which are permitted to buy items from tn-e local people. The assistance to thi~ camp will be limited to easily concealed mail,; news bUlletins, currency, . (:atc.. The effect on the morale of the POWs as a result of contact with their own forces will be very greaf. The camp should be directed to QD- 'ganize an intelligence system. The numerous working parties returning to cabanatuan would be interrogated anR a prolific source of accurate information within ttle occupied area thus made available. There are at least 500 officers in this camp, freedom of movement within the camp area is not restricted. and the carr.p can develop its own intelligence network throughout the working party areas of Luzon.

NO attempt was made to obtain intelligence or interrogate in­ coming working parties ·vib.i le I was in this camp.. This was due to our inability to send it out. We were able to keep n constant flow of messages to and from Manila; messages from internees at ,santo Tomas univ~rsity were frequent. TO assist this a amp , and to obtain information from it, will :t"equire that an agency of GHQ contaat the camp i teeif through ahannels . which already exist in Am. officers to be contact'ed at cabanatuan are: Maj. Larry Bosworth, CAO; Maj. R.D. Glassburn, CAC; Lt. col. saint, C.E.; Lt • .c01. E- oarl Englehart (former member of 0-2, H

~ ... (1) The camp at the Davao penal colony presents a much easi.er problem. It is 52 km northeast of Davao, .12 kIn from the coast, and in the center of the jungle. About 30 krn north of the colony there is-a 'community'of oivilians who had evacuated from Davao vvhen the Japs invaded that city. This community has organized a guerrilla unit under Maj. Laureta, a Constabulary officer who commanded an Infantry Battalion during the Jap invasion •. The gue:r;trilla unit was oIlganiz·ed to prevent Jap interference with the life of the community, and has succeeded to such an extent.· that the. Japs leave them s~verely alone. The unit

- 7 - consists of 150 rifles and 1000 men. They are extremely loyal and well organized. Travel ttroe from col. Fertig t. Maj. Laureta is about 14 days. Maje Laureta's unit is too far away to actively assist col. Fertig in the north.

(2) There are 2000 POW in the oolony_ About 800 go out to work each day. The American eamp Headquarter.s ass igns themem­ bers to specifio work details. The POW work in the rice fields, oro~s and in the jungle logging. There are few Japguards, as the hazards of the jungle 'and physical weakness of the POW are deterrents to escape. contaot with the POW is a simple matter. There are about 600 officers in this camp.

(3) In Maj. Lauretats organization there are at least ten men who were formerly civil prisoners in the colony. The two Filipinos who assisted our party to esoape are in Mindanao and avail­ able. When our party spent ten days with Maj ~ Laureta, he indioa ted a strong desire to puthimsel£ and his unit under u.s. control. He is at present in contact with col. Fertig's Headquarters and with civil prisenersin the colonY.

He had already established numerous contaots with civilians in Daveo city, had ob~ained several Jap passes to go into the city,' and was collecting such intelligenoe as would enable him to keep abreast of Jap ao·tivities affeoting his area. He ha~.Q.o radio transmitter or recei~er. Lauretatsoutpos~ is 12 km from the penal.'o61ol1Y.

4. a~ Assistance to the POW at the colony oan be more substantial than at cabanatuan. rt is easy to bring in relatively bulky objeots into the camp. Vitamins, A a.nd Bl partieu.lsrly, mail, news bulletins can be taken in. A oamera oan be introduced' and photographic evidenoe of oonditions in camp secured. The range of aotivities bnd assi~tanee will be xnuited by transport faoilities and the ingenuity of .the person conoerned.

b •. (1) Intelligenoe of enemy activities, installations, condi­ tions in Davao and the surrounding area oan be seoured by an organized group within the oamp.- as the oamp furnishes the poll of truok drivers and motor repair men for the Jap motor pool in Daveo. other working . d~~ails will oover different areas.

-5. Reoommend that an officer be sent to Maj. Lqureta to do the follow'ing:

a. Make contact with the POW at the Dc;Lvao'penal colony. 'b. FUrnish them such assist~nce in medicines &nd'vitamins, mail, news bulletins, as tranAport facilities may permit. c. Direct the establisbment of an intelligence syste~ within the oamp and aot as an outlet for it. d. Broaden the soope of ~j. Lauretats intelligence network. e. For-mulate a plan of aotion for Maj. L~rureta' s unit tQj 1) Assist the Ameriean landings through attaok and sabotage of Jap installations in navao. 2) prevent the massacre of ~nerioan POW in the Daveo penal colony in the event 0 f American landings in Mindanao. 3) secure such arma, munitions and sabotage material as will enable it to fulfill its mission.

6. officers to be oontaoted at the penal colony are: Lt. Col. M, cain, CAe; Lt. col. G.H. stubbs. CAe; Lt. Comdr. Smith, USN, and Lt. col. ,Nelson, rnf.

s . M. MELLNIK Lt. Col., CAC

.. B .... PLATE 25 " " '" " " SOHOL. tEIU NEGROS MINDANAO 10TH MILITARY 01 STRICT

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS WAIIII'JAO SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA c:J ,.. ,,''" , , Military Intellige nce Seecian CAUOI .,.A'. \ General Staff • \ APPENDIX "8" • j SURI8AO DAVAO PENAL COLONY AND HQ .I OTH !'IlIa POSSI8LE ESCAPE ROUTE 11"'1001 .... LIN'O\ ... \ OR \ \ 10 ~ 0 10 20 30 '-. A~' '' l ..,. nDEl MIS AIIII ' I \ 11111111111 I 1 \ SCALE IN MILES \ I L' GA M lin 1110 n ~IMI"U IIII • • TUG . .. IIU AM BA Y _.-._. - PROVINCIAL 80UNDARIES ILlCIt.,. - \ "'" I I,S L " 1ST EI 2 NO CLASS ROADS .. ' . y "- tIALAV',\"'_ 1 MAIN TRAILS • ZAM B O" N G" , ..• ) , --:;.'- ----J • • u N ... •••.•••• ' . GUERRILLA COURtER ROUTE , .. 'If .: ------AL[N:tr.. • ____ • BETWEEN 10 TH "'D HQ AND '...... (.. , ... MAJOR LAURETA'S FORCES " ... H A 0 '1 -'CO " POITf LA

",

I LL A N ... • 0

• • Y OAYAO PENAL KASAl"",,,. , , • "'AOAHOY• " • '0 IIOLUAH - p (] ·.,oIf • . . 0 ...... 0 IU Lf '.' \ 0

O a

APf. .. " ' UITI N 0 '" \ o':i Q, I • III'IIC A,;";>(·~~·UA'AH 0 ~ i? ~ y • J 0 l • () 1 • I 'C:;; BLAH I 0 '<:? - I

i)SA"ANGAHI IULUT (] V 10

I '" " '" ". ,\

SUBJEJT: Mili tary Intelligence~ o " . T Lt. Col. E. Carol Englehart, CAO, ana.: Lt. Col .. Seint.,O'E, Po~V Camp. Cabanatuan.·

1 •• It is directed that you establish an intelligence system within the ~OW c~p to procure and evaluate info~~ation on:

~. Enemy activities throughout Luzon, to include: l) Corregidor 2) Bateau 3) Clark Field 4·) Nichols Field 5) Ft. .MoKinley . 6) Manila 7) Nielson airport

~. Conditions among civilians in populated areas to include: 1) status of food B.nd othersttpplies ayailable to ciYilians. 2) Their attitude towards the enemy. 3) Degree of cooperation to be' expected When U.S. forces arrive •

.2,- Condi tions existing in the POW camp to include:'

1) Violations 'of Geneva Convention rules.~ 2) . Roster of prisoners f aliva and dead. 3) Physical conditibn of !OW.

~-. The Jap administrative and guard unit tc include.

f) Number, state of trnm.'ing, unit and. ·of.fiaers •. 2) Attitude towards POW, with trend, if anY. 3) Attitude towardS the war.

c •A. WILLOUGHBY. Brig. General, U~ S. Army, A. ~ of S., G- 2 •

... 9 -

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

MILITARY INTELLISENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF G.2 INFORMATION BULLETIN

G~2 STAFF STUDY OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SITUATION

NO.: DATE: w. D. INDEX: 25 February 1944

r~. t~ M § t! fl ~t ftn rJ ~ ~\g ~~ ~~ B. ~ fil

G",,2 .sT~lFF STUDY OF PHILIP!'INF ISL\l\1DS SITUJ.TION

25 Febrw~ry 1944 ..

CONTFNTS

SJ'CTION I: General S1 tuation. 1. Growth of GUerrilla Forces in the PI ------1 2, Situation in Luzon ------1 3. Si tua ~ion in the Vis3yas Isl'lnds -- --- ...... ---- -1 4~ 31 tua tion ~n Mind.nnao· -- ~ ------' - 2 ~I Notes of Guerrilla Tactics ~. Possible Guerrilla Efforts in: 1) Luzon and Visayas Islands 2) Mindana 0'

SECTION II: Delailed Discussion of Mindanao~ 1. Strene;th of Guerrilla Forces ----- .... - ...... ------3 2. possible Jap Course of Ac:i;ion ------,- --- 4 3. Extent of Guerrilla Action Supporting our Efforts --- 4- .§-... Intelllgenoe J2.. Sabot3.,~e ~. Combat Units .9:,- Post Oocupation Lctivity 4. Guerrilla OrS:-lniza tion and Grow~th ---- .. ------:5 ~. Weakness and st::'en.csth .:£.. Lack of Traine'1 (j,!: fleers c. Fxtent of Civ11:L3n Support K~ Civil Government .§:.. Jap' ,Oceupa tion Fk'licy - Results f.... GHQ, -P'~licy tow8rcls FQ1~eeS in the PI - Results - 5, Conclusions re ~f.inl'1n9.o ------.6 £.. Mindn.neco 3. st3.ble unit of US tl.rmy; ':lc-tivi tely supportecl by the recple; c1ifficul t i.f noe if:'l­ J:ossible to neutralize, l'4.ckini~ tr.'3.ined officers, ,'3.nd can assist our forces. E.. Th3t positive direction of intell:J.;:-;Ence and combat units must new be t3.ken ove.~' b:.r JaQ,:. Re eommenc.a ti ons: ------... -- ,~, - - -- 7 a. That qualified officers b6 sent in 'io;o l:he area • .£~ Rank, experience, and Juties of su.ch officers ..

SECTION III: Direo.tion of PI Activities. 1. Present agencies eoneerned',dvith the PI ------8 ~,. Extent of Ijroblems - acceleration of,~i.:"li3d eff'oJ":ts - -i 8 3,. Need for GHQ, actl;on ------~.------8 4, Conclusd.n~s - ... - ~ ------.. --- -9 .§;~ Extent of PI ac~ivities have reached a staS€ wLere i3enera1 staff sections r.l.ust study prob1er.l.,!t £~ Key personnel must be sent in 6 months before ttDu day_ Planning must start. 9 m,~nths before .. 5. Redcl1'JTlenda tions: PI, acti vi ties be assi.;ned to ~, staff sections - ... -- ~ ., ------9

SECTION Dr: Inclosures,. 1. Gt..1..erri11a Or~3.nizations, Mindanao. 15 February 1944 .• 2. G'lerrilla Dispositions Visayas & Minc1anao t 15 Feb. 194.4. 3. Enemy DIspositions Visayn & Mindanan, 15 February 1944!·· 4. Summnry Enemy ;~etivi ty in PI 15 Janunry-15 Febrl?-nry 1944.

-1- 25 .Fe~uary 1944;.

SUBJECT: G~2 Staff study of the Eh11~ppine Islands Situat~on.

TO Chief of Staff.

SECT ION I:; General' Si tua tion in the P I~ .

1. Guerrilla organizations were initially formed. by, Filipino's as a. police farce to .check the wave of lawlessness foilowing the breakdown ofci-v:il police due to J'ap occupatian~ (This applies to rural areas onlY·1I) The gperrilla organizations were in reality local community police units. With the passing of time~ and some 'co-prosperity. edu.cation, these police units took on the added responsibility of'pro- tecting the communities from the Jap. .

2. G~errilla organizations were supported. by the communities which they protected. Facilities of the towns. such as power plants, maphine shops. eooonut 'oil plants, and distillation.units, were made ~vai~able to the guerrilla. forces. A.s a result, ooconut oil \vas produced, tp run diesel engines in launches ~~d cooonut mi!k was distilled for the alcohol to run the few motor vehiclea available. In the mor~ populated ateaS, cUv.il administrators were established.. As the luneria:ana n-hohad flot surrender~d came downc from the hills, they developed command uni tf:i to unify larger ar§as. 4S' a.·.result. inter",ooI!munity trade and l;i.aiSon. Were established, and the defense became an area. one instead of local. Plans were made to ino.rease the production of ~oodt supply of:ficera were appointed t to proc.ure itt and a currene.,y was ,established to purenase it. Theaivil administration', working with guerrilla authorities. is., now firmly establtshed. Gradually island areas became unified. an~ were re~ cognieed as Military Districts (~ea divisions of the Philippine Ar}rlY with v~hich Filipinos were famil iar)c: . Distrlc,t commanders were "re­ aogniaedlf by GHQ., and the Philippine Regional Section of l~ .. ·I.· BIl .was as ..... tablished to ooordinate the activities in the islands.•

3. The strength of guerrilla or·gnnizations at preaent v.aries in different islands. Generally speaking, they are strongest. in· the islands which haVe the poorest· road system~ The strength depends' pretty muoh on the extent of Japanese penetrationa. :FlP activity is centered, in the more highly devel,c:',Pon and productive' islands. In assessing guerrilla strength it is important to note the extent of ci'Wilian support. Filipinos at present are more p:ro..Junericr.an than l~erican thenlS?l veSlf Reasons for this attitude would fill a book., and very from their liking. of i),JIleriean movies to Jap prohibition on wearing wlli te collars and ties ..

4. LUZON.: 0 rganized gue:rr,i11a activity here on a large scale is . negligible •. Recent reliable information shown i!he ezistance of numerous:: anti... jap. u.ni tat actively supported by the 'CiTil populace., but as yet unorganiz.ed. The excellent system of l!oads permits the Japs to police all areas and to deny the guerrillas the use of toad producing areas. It will be impossible to organize a combat unit in Luzon. Intelligence ~etiviti~s only are carried 'on there.. These activities· are incre.:.aing in scope and should be encouraged. Wi th an extremely loyal civil populace, ready to do anythingwi:thin reason to harm and e~el the ·,enemy. It is p'osa1ble to establish inte~ligence ulli ts: in Luzon to a poin:t wh~re vmcrould get daily reports o£ enemy tl"oOP t ship and planes. .strengths and movements within 24 hours.. (In some. se,ctioha of Luzon this is possible noVl.. ) plan$:; hhould be made 'now to ¢overall important .Jap tacilitles in Luzon with an intellig,ence network. Not beoau·se of ita immediata-waluEa, liuit for future employment •. J Preparations or sabotage activities i81: a :fIe~.ture of Lu~n ; activity tobe encouraged... 'rhe ~lum.e of shipping in Manila Bayprovides'an excellent t~get.i When active operations: are conducted .in LUzon,; controlled sabotage ac,tivi ties will do muoh to hi~der enemy movements., A sabotage organi~t·ion ... acting in oon­ junCItlon with 9urovm forces,· could., on or prior to "D" ~e.y", inmobilize a oonsiderable pcirtion of the enemy aj:r~ atr;ength apd 11l0tor transport facilities. , "

5.;1 The V~sayan Islands of ,. ,., Negros; Boho~,,. ~e¥te and S$.mar are 1.fnc1er vaJrious, stages of guerrilla eontrol.; GllEiU'rilla. strength va;ries fr?1Jl 300 in Mindoreo to 14,000 in PW1ay~ The J:'a.ps EU'e mo~t active in pan~; Negrosl and Oabu, the ri

6:. ~,,,, MINDi:..NkO.I.· This Island 'is (lCfeal !dor guerrilla org,n.nization. The siza of the island, pLus the l:imi tedl. nwnber- of erOS$ island ;:coo:dS,t the mountainous: no. ~Q of the ter:rrainy and ~he large· number of inland agriQUlturul. commwntjes" pro~ide guerrilla Jlnita with foam, protection' end maneUver l!OOm" rap's now Oc.c.upy in ·.for~ the oitia$ of Dovao·, . Coto.bato, zomhoangaand Cagayant with sma11ejr units (,100..800) in other crommunities.. (/uiisdde of Dnowao :mropel1t ta.p p:~e..tration.$ Em!6 possible only in torc-a. J"ap fOl!'~ .in Mindanao total, about'12,000 melle ,.

'0;. The guerllilla- organization here has; about 20,00:" -men,: o£ whom half are. anned. The island is dividem ~hto division and. regimental areas.. Abou t 10C. l~eri(ta.ns hold key positions and. run the extensive %OOio ne~. The erying neadL in MinQloono is Ivneriean e.anlaat oiffic.era•. The 100 J~eJrl.c:o.na there are mostly enlisted~ men of the Air Oo:a-ps,. Infantry and Na-v-y, who waIte able to avoid aapture.. Their experience and vision is Imi ted. Their primary PUJIpOS&. is 'to wait the war out as. oom.tortablY as, ppssib1e·Ji . their morale p:r.teaiudes any a.g~easive activity. In ~hor1t, they are tired.:. have been on the defenm too long, and ara in nee.di. of ass;iatance it the late.nt power of the guer:nilla: unital is to De . .:fully devEillopedi..

e. The nuclei of o:omlo.~t gpoups aJlready exis,t. Divisional, regimenta.l ana battalion ~eas are reeogrliZted. and {uu;reptedie 13oWlda.ries hetween un.its arEa definite, Units have definite mission~ Oommanders are known ·to ea

e., Notes on guerrillG.s t.

(1) Hnit5 are skilled at ambushing the enemy. They will attack a crolumn or convl"'Y9.n(1. run away , awaiting another opp·ortun1 ty. They are nr-t 3ccustomed to bcmbing or shelling. Ei:ther type of aett v'l ty· will c1isperse them.

(2) Units are extremely mobile wi thin a few d·'1Ys walking distance from source of suprly t Uni tT-Ieadquarters c~'~nsist of c~)rnpl.ander and a few messengers. To concentrs. te !J. l~lr~r::. force in?, p~lrticular area will require time to bldld up food suppliiSs in .the area.

(3) Units have mmximum fighting e:tfic:iency in thei~ own areas. (a) They know the trails like a beok - Q. force un­ fnr1iliar wi th the area will have extreme difficulty in making progress even without opposition. (15) Nearby oommunities are extremely loyal to the uni ts·. When un! ts are wi th(lrawn to the hills, the people 1'10Ve wi th them. (0) They have effectively blocked roads· and trails leading into their a~eas by burnin~ brid~est constructing road blocks and mnchinegun nests, and active patl"olling. In one Jap I)enetration from Cai'Sayan to Talakor~ wi th 800 men, a guerrilln force of 150 CI.elayed the Jap advance of 30 miles fer 8 days, inflicting \")ver a hundred cas­ ual ties. The .Japs stayed "in Tal;tkn:,s about three clays and then withdrew. Their return to Cn3ayan was harassec. every step of the way, resulting in many more c8.sulaties. Such Jap fcr8Ys do little dnD1r3-se; their oasual ties raise the m')r.~le of :the csuer:rilla nili ts, and the civilians are further convinced of the nCC.Gssi ty of supportin:s the .guerrilla forces •. suc'h de13yin1 operations are nc:,w· being aooomplished ·wi th a limited ammuni tirmsupply. 30 cal. rifles, n few machine ,'Sunlp, ·and no trench I'!1ortars. l1'1zookas or l'1nd mines.

(~) The len/~thy coastlines of all the isl3:nds makes inter-isl'tnG. tr9.fflc quite secure, The Jap· patrol bo,'} ts cannot stop all the native banc·3.s usin;s the inl3l1d scas, ClS' o.istances ar.:: short mnough to be eovered in a "few hours of darkness_ The ove~vhelming loyalty of the Filipino people assures assistance and shelter to Filipinos Qnd Americ.nD.s.

7., Summary of expected minimum guerrilla effort in support of our ovvn forces. ::tBsumin.?, adequate plannin,~, continuation of present supply facilities ancl a I:1Cre directive control over guerrilla nctivi ties in the P~I. than is being exercised by the Philip}::ine Regional Section of A,I.B.

a.. LUZON and VISJ:\.YAN ISL\NDS:

(1) Prcmpt anc1. nccurate intelligence of all enemy activi ties on a vdde scale prior to and after operations in the area are started.

(2) "Planned sabotage of Jap airfields, motor and rail t'ransport, coordinated with our own effort.

(.3). Nuclei of crmbat or,ganizations n0W in being, which enn 15e recrui tec1, officereCl and equippec1 by our forces after oocupntion to 3.ugment our comb':1t 'stren~th.

-4- b.' MINDAN:\.O:

(1) C('rn.p1ete intElli'Sence oovera·'Se of enemy urdits and militsry installations such 3S s.irfields. d~)cks, landing be3ches; etc.

(2) Planned s'}bot9.ge of Japs airf:\.elds t .. motor transports and shippin(5, to be occrclin'1tel with our ftD" day effort.

(3) Combat units to secure 8nll guard a beachhead prior to our landing .,'

(4) C'"'ntinue ccnstructicn of airfields now underwqy, seize enemy emergency landin3 fiel(l.s.

(5) Combat uni ts to Qelay enemy advance a:sainst our beae.l1- heads thru destruc·:tion of brid'ses, minini~ of roads, road blocks and delaying actions.

(6) Followin?; oecupation of Mindanao: (a) Organized combat unts to be reeruited to full strength, equippecl with arms, 0fficered by our forces. to be used f~,r further operations, ".. t lt~'ast 2'{\ 000 men arc now organized into loose orsanizations c T~.eir usc will permit us to recluoe 0ur L of C ·,so.rrisons, take care of isol~l teet J!1p untts hiding in the ffi'Jun taiBs, and spearhead an qttack to the north.

(b) E'xp~nr' the pre,sent .csuerrille. civll~i:lministration to takE: iromedi8te cCintrol "f civil 3ffflirs~ thus rele-sing our fcrc'6s for taotia1 ~uties, (c) Ir:'Jneai0.tely put in to effect plans fr.r .inorsCtsed food rrcrl.uction to augmcnt cur food suprlies,

i $P.GTION .11: lSi tU0.tion in Min·~l;~ln:)o.

l .. ,. DISCUSSION:

1. In ~ddition to intelligence and s~b0ta~e activit~e,,'the guerrilla 0r~ctnizatC'-n in Mino.anl1() can be eQuipped and trained to assist our fcrces wi th comb·l.t elensnts. We anve complete freedom of action in 95% of the island. J'ap activi ties outside of c·ccupii3d c1 ties are liJ:B.ited to patrols in for~e along main highways~ These forays are

becomin,'5 more expensive to the ;rap as our SUPlilies increase II. W,he poaeibility that the Japs will send a strons force inte Mindanao to neutralize :the ~uerrilla roces (toes not exist. :However. vvith a stre.n:sth of 12.000 in Mindana0 hE; is unable to control more lIlan 5% of the territory. Tc seric'usly cllrtail~uerrilla acti vi ties will require ten times as mqny nen as he nl",w has in the area. LOi"sistica and [~uerrilla act! vi ties preclude any attemrt by the enemy to cr-'ncentrate 100, 000 men on the island. To neutralizo 'suerrilla activities will require that every town and vi11a'se be r-ocupied in fr'ree. These 'Villages ane. towns are extremely anti-Jap, anri are the centers ·'"If n;uerrilla acti vi ty. The Jap fe-rces (3.ssumin:,sthey d0 r,ccupy tlvery villa's6) will be extremely dispers€r:~., "Hi th lirEi tee', nbili ty to c'"'ncentr~te in any '"'ne particular

are3. 11 In view of the 0boV8, it is unlikely that the enemy vvi11 im.'11()1)ilize such a larise f()rc.e ':"n the isl1.n~., qnc} tt f~ll'-'ws that it is unlikely he will be 3ble t:'l ntjutraliz6 :the :':~uerrilla rr-s8.niza.tion. 'r'he Jap has been aware of the extent of the ,3uerilla or:'Snniz')tir.)n sinCe early 1943. and hns been unnble to rJ.0 much':1bout ito His '('robable Qcurse of ''lotion will be t,.., c"',ncen'1r''''te his f""rocs in key aro9.S where sU,l:I'ly wif,l be .~ 'lsy ancl rapid ecrmnunic?tion J:ossible. Dav3.o, C""'t3h-J.to, Z31nb:'" 3n!s '1 , Ca'~ayan and 8urigao are the pe'ssible c'~neentra·tion centers. ]]'J.vao be,in'?; .tl;te riohest

and mest centrally loc2,ted oi ty t will most likelY .be the main 5'ap concenlr~tic-n area, as .troops from here can mcve by ',Hl ter or mo.rching

-5- to Cctab'lt A and Ca'sayan. and by water to -Zambt)an~3a and Surigao. D:-vao city, 'with -its sUbstantial J ap populati0n, is being used as a sllI'ply bsse,. an outlet for the islands rlce, hemp and lumber. and is being aeveloped to make the Jap forces in Mindanao s'elf-sufficient.

, Acting ()n the aSSl.lmpti.':"n that ·~ur guerrilla foroes can be kept lntact, supplied and expanded. let us Bee vvhat they en.n do to assist our f~rces prior to and ~fter 0ccupati~n.

2. Intelligenoe: a. A c0mplete picture of enemy ,grcuno. uhi ts. b. D3.ta"n all his airfieldsl, indluding description.- ~l;,umbcr of planes, :ruel storqge places, repati' faoilities, ammunition dumps. c. D3ta on all shipping entering D'71.vao Gulf. d. Tr3il maps of areas we wish t~; operqte in. e. A radio ccnneoted 'ccastwatcher system cl ready in effect in Minc1fl..nao and the Visaj"an Isl~nds. f. spot reports on: all enemY:1ctivi ties in the island on short n'tice, via established radio net.

3. Sqbotage: a. All enemy air fields. It vvould be possible for 'a well planned sabotage organization to pra6ticnlly ground all enemy planes in Mindanao ont or a f€:w days before 'ltD" day. b, ~nemy shipping in Davac, Cctabato. Z811\90anga and Surigao" c. Delay the 'advance C'f enemy comin,=s to a ttaok ("ur beachhead bYJ (1) Plantin;~ land mines in the roads (the limited road net ~izes motor traffic into bottleneoks). (2) D6strnying bridges in ~dvanQe of the enemy. (These

bridcses are usually small ones over streams. ancl, oan be rebuilt in a day) II

4. Combat Units: a. Seoure such be"chhe,':l.o.s as we r.e.ed prior to our. landing. b. Seize li:shtly .gll.8.rden enemy emergency I'm ding field1g. 0" Delay enemy advanc,: against 8ur beachhead~ by means of roae:'\. blocks .':In::l del!=1yi.n.'S actions t, d. qontinue wi th presen'c constructi"'n of airfields. e·. DiverSionary attaoks on enemy concentrations coordinated with ~ur "D" day effort.,

5. Post-O$cupation Aotivity: a. Ur g3.nized combat uni ts to 'be recrui tec1 tc full strength, equipped with nrms, r-.fficered by cur fe·roes t bo be \med :for further operati ~'ns. b. The present guer:t"illa civil administration to be ex.randed .thr-ough prier appointmen~s by the hend of the CCn1IU'Jn weal th .government .•

c. Put into effect plans for increased production and dis­ tributi~n of fooo. for our forces. dIP :Mobilization of civil manpower for stevedoring, road repair, airfield c8nstruoti~n and such ether work as may be required by cur forces.

B. GUERRILLA ORG,ANIZATION OF MIND.LWt:..O.

1, Headquarters loth Mil! tary Distriot is the directing agenoy ,~ 'of U.S. Forces in Mindq-nao!, It is ec~mmanc1ed by Col.W. FertLg. Corps of Engineers, Wh0 was called to !:1ctive duty in April 1941 for the pur­ pose cf oonstruoting 9.irfields o Ahout 47 years 0la, he was ')n o.uty in Mlndanao ££It the time of the surren-ler.. He fled to the hills and later came down ,qncl. assumed tr:0rT1Band of guerrilla forces. ' He est3.blishecl eo:rt1ll!ru.i1ications with GHQ,. and has gradually extended his control over ~ll guerrilla forces in the islqnd. 2. With the 8ssist:lnee or AlB parties, he hCls established an excE:.llent c:c'nstwateher 5y.stem with a lar~e radio net. He is gr·.-:dually 6x'p~}nc1ing his intelligence system. to c:"Yver the islcn~l. Due to his pre­ ;'CcupcltiCJn with 3.c.lministr':;.tive :problems, lack of ex.eriencecl assi~tants, his O1;m inexperience, and the fatigue indUced by living under pressure, be has reached the limit of his c3kabili ties.. It must be remembered that the guerrilla movement was a spontaneous and individual affair. L:oal lead'era are still not trustful of this man who assumec.l control over uni ts which THEY ha~~ o:rganized. Co~. Fertig is not a forceful persnnali ty. His influenoB at present stems' frcmhis being the source')f all SU1~plies from the SWPA.' and that he is ~he cfficially reoognizec1 CO of the 10 M.D. His authrci ty to' commission offioers is cl(iubted, (actually he has reconunend­ eel the appointment of several iunericans as officers). His authrri ty to inc1'uct 'suerrilla uni ts into the service of the U .3. in Nebulous. .:'-ctions which he sh0ul"t take rela.ttve to cr,'Sanizati":'n, promoticm c!f officers, le~alizing~ue.rrilla tujits, pay ·laws., dis','·bility benefits. etc., are at present too numberous f0r him t" handle even if he cl.id h'1ve the auth1DDi ty te' act.

3.. "-..s the .:;uerrillq c;rganizr:ttir-ns 'srew up individually, thE:~y be,~3n to oooperate ',pi th e~ch other fer mutu31 exchange of foodstuffs and infC'r­ mation. The ass mption of c:,r:rrnand l;y Ferti3 cmne ccrisic3.erably l~ter 4- Mest' of the unite:'he h3d n"'t seen. L""c31 le~1.ers paid him lip service! only, and their cC'~per'l.'~ ion W0.S in c1 irect rr:-portion tr"' 'vi!ha t he eould dQ for 'thE, units in cbt3.i !lints sUfplies. This coope~"'Rt ien has inc·reased c'C!nsiderably 'J.s 'sre3ter amounts elf su:p:rlies were shipperi into the 8.rea. and the extent cf GHQ,' s suppc'rt cf the loth MD was n:--ticec1. In passing, the entire Philippine guerrilla mcvement is being retarded b6cause of the l3.ck of a rec83nized GHQ apPQinted oor"'mander who hela n~t been in­ v::~lved in the eJ.rly [Suerrill'1 f;'rce scr8.mble fer power.

4. Civil nuthorities in guerrilJ:a areas were deli?;hted to co- oper3 te, 3S the 3uerrillas were the s()l€ lawenfcrcement asE:ncmes. Oi viI provincial sovernors f jU.c1:-s6S f etc., ~'Vh0 held tl1,~s;;. jobs prior to the war were allovved tel ccntinue.. Those eivil officials who had cool-'crated with the Japs were liquidated by the civilians, or toc,k refu::se in J ap e·ccupied terri tory. The Japs receive Ii ttle o00IJerati·':"n from civil authorities in the occupied cities of Mindanao. Su.ch cOOI~eration is l!lerely a me!:lns . to rurvival. The pe"'ple, who sel' their properties taken over by the Japs mili tary and vl vilians; are firmly reselved to v1ai tit out, are keeping their bPl,~s sharpened, and c'-'ntinuetf"'l' maintain c'>ntaot with guerrilla f'-rces. The Jap versir-n of ~he GesXn;pp, the "Kempei" makes sporadic attempts at extermin.qtin·~ subversive activities, but nC'rmally ccncentrates on the wealthier Filirinns whose pr0perties they can appropriate. Civil administrators ,'J.n~. currency COl:1mi ttees are appointed by President Q.uez-'n. their powers are defined, an:1 their ~ctivitie.s will continue until a COT!1n10nlJve'1l th'sovernment is E'st"'1~'lishe0.. For our purposes , it C:1n be assumed that civil officil},ls will be '1v3.il·",ble to step into jobs new held by J ap :cuppets 'vvhEn Occupqti"n tak-E!s r1ace. :!be Filipino civilians 'will havetaJ.r:en C'3.re "f PUfP€t 0ffiei~;1Is prior to our9.rri v::ll.

5. In 95~ "f Mind.8ns'-, civilis.n corrr~un1ties c;~'ntinue to live unler n"'rn131 o~nc1.iti-;ns. OOf',assicnal Jap forays (about every 6 months) merely provi1je a bit of excitement to 3n otherwise placid existenee. This' state of Bff9.irs is. clue lqrgely to the fertile soil,. much cultivated l.'3.nc1, and an9.bund 'Jnt food. su ply. The island is practically self­ sufficient in all respec.ts. '~oconut oil'1nc1 distilled ccconut milk serves as fuel; ai::a.ca furnished the fi bar for weavin3 clcthes, the l':tnd will ::;row 3 c.rops i)f corn per year. Sugp,r, coffee;, and cocoa are

-7- m.mi':r'"'lll.S 3S ever.. Sele civilian Sh0J:~'\'ses are sh~es (which rural Filipin0s we~lr for ac1f',rnment) t, ID9.tches, sf"'ap anc1. merlicines., Such items Vf8re never triO plentiful in thE' rur~l distriots, and their V"'SS is n·""'t too' "~rea t a hardship. The J~ps "'ffer tht civilian a, jcb in the rice ra~8.y, an c-ppc-rtuni ty tc learn "Nippf""n-:r:~" t. a return tc the days of no toilet facilities, no m~vie rr ice crea~, no white collar j~bst and mest irnitating of all. no politic'J.l r.iseussir'ns. The Filipinos have responded ,to "co-rrosperity" in::1ucements with tongues in cheek in the

occupied areas, and irii th open rio.ieule in. unoccupiec1. areas e. The ini ti8.l Jap propo~anda effort was directed tc make the "back to the soil" m::ve­ ment palat3ble to the Filipinos. In view of the high standards of edu

6, The present pr-,licy'.)f GHQ. towards the Philippines is to supply the 3Uerrilla units with arms, m.€o.ical supplies and rac1~os. Continue the or~~anizati('n and consolic1'1ti0n (If positicms,. av(',id any a.~gressive action which will bring Jap reinff"'rcemGnts into the area, e.nd cf"ncentrate c'n developin,~ COlJ.stwatcher st'l.ti"'ns and intelli'Sence_ This peliey has encour:l~ec1. ·:suerrillq forces, ai:i.ed i.herr. and h!1s resul teet in n steble, well 0rrs!'niz6cl oi viI and mili tqry r~overrunent controllin'S 95% of the terri tory of Mind.~:m:3.':'" This ·-rg:l.nizqtir:'n h'1s the enthus"i t1stic suprcrt of the civilians in theqre':~. ,It h.~s ~lEvel0ped trqnsport f3.cilities for exchan.ge rf cV'p"JY'.odi ties f 8rran:.secl for:~he planting cf crops for :suerril1a forces t est9.blishec1. :.tn authorized system -:)f currency, set up a CC3St­ w.~-teher and intel'li:3ence syst.em, divicled the isl~lnd into re:3imental aref:lS, and in all respects~ has j,ustified the p:)licy and faith of nHQ, in the .Lmeric3.n and lc"ili:pinc pe('lple living in the area. lncle-sure No. 1 is a map of Mindanao showin:s or3 ~nizati(n, trocp disposi tir,ns, and re .... :~i:rrlental· areas cf Mind3.nao. A brealtdc-wn of ':'1.meric:ans in the are,;, is inllluded, wi th sketehes cf leadin~ oorrunanders and ste4ffs. tonsidering the' total p6rs,~'.nnel ,)f the guerrilla uni ts t the Plc'st strikin·s feature of the set up is the extremely small number cf experienced American officers. ..It is u 1iribute to the foreign pc·licy of America, that the Filipine,s pec'ple have rallie~1 around the few iJEericans t:) such an extent.

The situation in Mindana:::- at present is such that heelthy ,L' ..m8ricans vdth t3Uerrilla forces do NOT want to be ev~cuatedf and a reoent evacuee, having had his appendix rerm.'vecl" has 2sked to be returned to the area.

C. CONCLUSIONS:

1. From the abr:vG c1iscllssic,n. aertain c .... 'nc lusi'-"ns can be cJ.ra'!wiJ!l about Mino.anao: extent of its possible assistance to our i;var effe-rt, and the need f'!r '1ctive ctireeticn "f guerrilla activi t~es by GHQ..

a. The loth Mi Ii tary District in Mind'~lnao is a stable, well 0r:.ssnizeo. wetl run unit i'"'·f the U.S. Amy. b. The possibi Ii ty of ilts neutralizatic!l by the enemy prior to ·:ur invGsir"ln is reIi l 0te. c. The extent'C)f civilian SUTPc-rt r:f-suerrilla units, quite siz63ble :It present, \~.ri 1.1 incrc'""se in sc~re '3.S our fe-rces approach the Philip~in€ Islands.

-8- d. Thst the lqtent power of 'SUer rilla and oivili·'.ln units in the oro? if pr'::perly directed, will do muoh to assist 0ur landings. sa va us th~us}nds of Ii ves, snd months of time.. e.' That intelligent planning and direction will shorten the peried of oonfusicn following cooupati!")n, establish ·civil government prcmptly,'permit . cur mobilizaticn of civil manpower for military use, and make ,the transi ticn frC'm Jap C'ocupation to ..::.merioan oocupation as rapid and as painless as possible. f. ' That available American personnel h'3.ve reaohed 'the limit of their c:apabili ties.· This is due not of inefficienoy, . but to lack of trained staff and or:mbat '-'ffioers,

. 2. To exploit the latent power (\f Mindanao will require intelli'~ent direotion of the intelli.gence and taotioal \'.n1 ts of the ~uerrilla f:lrees, In view of the lack 0f trained pers,'"'nnel in the area tit is believed impractical to maintain such direction by reP.1r,to oontr0l fr0In the g'lfPA .. The pers0nnel avai19ble in Mindana0 arc unable to dC"· more than keep the sta tus quo. Clonsic1ering the vast amount of work yet to be d()n0 in the area, trainins and ('r.gt1nizin~ nnlte, buildin1 up food suy;p1ies, rrerar­ InR unit a.ispositicns ttJ assist ... ,ur ferces, o-'opdinating intelli~ence a'~enciest rlannin::s' f':'r eVE.ntual ex:r~ansi-;n c·f civil 30vernments, it is evi~ent thl1t the available Americ3n pers,:--,nnel in Mind1nao 9re tel) few and inexperienoed t'! hrlndle the job.

D • REC·Or.'MFNDATIOm •

1. This discussion 1e'3.(ls tc an, obvious reec1'lTlendation: that qualified l:loeriaan st3.ff and acmbat cffice-rs be sent into the are 3,. A limited nur.1ber initially to make a survey of material and personnel needs, Th€y will undoubtedly reccmmend further additi0ns.~ Speeific­ aaly; the fcllcwin:-s personnel should now be sent in:

a~· 1:.. senier officer, rank of C:;lonel or Brigadier General, to take c:JIrmancl of all U.S. Forces in the Philippines, He should be physically active;-res,-urceful.with sound jud-g:lent (see "2" belcw for 8:111plification). " b. An officer. ,::srade of Lt. C~10nel or Colonel, as operations off!eer. Ho shJuld have'had staff "training if not experience. c. An office~, grade r)f Captain or Majer, trainec1 in intelli- 5,ence work, to develpp ana. c'oordinate G-2 activities in the PI .. c1. An '~fficer, grade sf Captain or Major, Si.gnal Corps. with radio experience, t~ advise on all WE. tters pertainins to radi') traffio (presant personnel in Mindanao handli~g' radios are EM from PT boats, B-17s and FiliI,in'·'s) .. '6. t,n officer t grade of Captain or Major, with Australian "coTf'mando" trninin"S, to investi.gtlte use t~ which sabote.~e m9.terial c:an 'I5e used, train C':'P."mando uni ts,~o. rec('rn.mend type of equipment to be sent in. f. Five'('fficers (1 for eqeh division area), rank of C3pt2in or Major, Infrm t:rY, with cCIT.Bat trq~-nin'S if n"t experienoe, to inveE:1ti­ g ...st e the neea.s of divisi-ns, assist in p1annin~ defense C'f thc)se areas, rs

2. At first sight it: does no1; aple'3.r re3.s:::mable cr necessary to send in an officer seni8r to Col. Fertig. However, the prompt unifieati .. '':-In of guerilla: elements in the PI requires an unbiassed GHQ. appointee:. 11. Col. Fertig has. attained his posi ti:)n as CO lOth NlD in competition with other guerrilla leaders. Prior to st8bili~ation of the Mili tary Districts, he had 3.ttem:-J;:ted to extend his oontr~'l to other are8.S outside of Mindanao. This m~ve has caused oonsiderable resentment among the other islnnd le8.ders, th~ resentment resulting in their taking a suspioious viev~oint of all FertiG's ~ctivities. As the bulk or supplies are at ;present:?;oing to Colellel F€rtLs'S arefl, they feel their suspicions are well founded.

-~- b,! ~he '~reatest unifyin;~ element in the PI at 1 resent is Gen .. Macl:.. rthur. His influences exceeds that of all othe:ns. incluc1in:~ President . GHQ, visitors to the areas so far have been transient 0bservers with specific: missiC'ns e. A GH~ appoin teetc take cl('rrmand of all ?;uerrilla uni ts would be welcomed by all factions beoause it i;yould indicate:- (1) Increnseo. interest by Gen. MacArthur in c~uer]!'illa f:;rces. (2) Irr}7'inenc8::"f mere conc'rete support. (3) An arbiter vii th GHQ, au thority t,., settle disJutes and rnake aecisions n,::,t c(',lored by pers';nal aT!J.bi tirus cr prior ev:nmi tments. U~.) li.n end t;,-, thee ~fusi0n r6sul tin~ from misinterpreted rediD mess3.;~es from GHQ, to lIID C';'T£landers. (5) A more realistic GHQ policy t0warc1s the PI fnrces. based c'n s'Jun(l. unbiased rec8!tfP"cendq ti0ns of a kn"'wn and trusted c rrmandcr.

~;. Col. Feriir:s is an excellent administrqtor but has little if any tqcticBl experience, While qtr:lctical ccmmander is necessary in Mindanao, it is much 1Tt0re imp:)rta:ht to have a GHQ, representative to cDmmand all U.S. F-::'rces in the PI, as Mindanao is :Jnly one part of the PI picture. c. Tho::--fficer sent into the area must be physically :1ctive, as he will need to 'tr'3.vel ccnsidernbly. He should have had ccnsider2ble mili tary ex:perience -in the field to enable him to make sound military rec2mrnenda tiens based on resources ~1.nd terrain. 'VIThile prevL:.us eJq;erience with Filipinos and the Philippines is desir'2ble, it is not absc,lutely essential. The importan t essenti&l is that GHQ, hr1.ve c:::nfic.lence in his jud~;ment, His observaticns, in'We~tigat:i.ons and reocmmendations will

SFQTION:Ill: Direction of PI ActivitiesL

11.. DISCUSS:t,ON.

1.0 Stiengthening our forces in the PI with additional office per­ sonnel and supplies will be a 'sreat step fr-,rward in putting the PI f()rees en a workin~ basis. The result of ac1cl,i ti -'nal "fficers will be·tr.0re de­ fini te military re.commendatir-'ns, rW"re specific intelli'sence dat~. and requests for a c~efiniti,~n of p()licy on numerous civil affair~.

2. a. The af~E.ncy ch'1rged.w:iththe conductor affairs in the PI is the philiPI'ine Re.'~i~lnal Section of A.I.B~ It W:1S established ori,~inally to ma'intain radie tr8.ffic with guerrilla units. Prior to that time the initial 0rg'1nizati"n'w8.s develoJ:ec1. by 0.... 2 with p~.J.icy deci$i"'ns by the C-in-O: the?;rouncl ~Nork fer current ,activities wtlS l·qid under a plan "Signal Cornnur:ications required fer Philippine Operatic'ns" Which covered intelli[sence ~:mc. co astwatchers; supply of radios arYl th€ org~:mization of rasignal company to handle the "traffic. As ~ommunicaticn f ~'lcili ties in­ creased, it was found possible to send in E?'upplies. The Navy was interest.!:." ed in coastwatcher stat ions t 'so it proviaed operr:ltional subs to take radios, ~O':lstwatcher parties, and arms into the? rea, Sevrer:;ll parties have already been sent in; the volurn.e of supplies haa steo.dily in~reased, our information on internal conditions has likewise increQs~d~ and has disolosed an extleedingly favorable st8.te :~:t o.ffai~s.

b. PRS nOw has the duty of ac~visin;s the C-in-C in 3uerrilla matters f arrangin'S for supplies to bceshipped t~, the islans~?, establish­ ing ooastwatahers stations, sending intellfgence parties' into the area, &:nd: interpretin!s fer the O.. i:p.QC the guerrilla messa;ges fc~r GHQ,. G-2 cc- ordinntas messaL;es and o0mments, and publishes a J:!1Dnthly 0-2,,0-3 Situation Report and Estimate. f~r limited staff eiraulation. Extraets

-lO~ of these reports reach O.P.D.i, War Department. ~lhen guerrilla activities were a mystery, and the guerrilla .agencies were getting started, the .FRS was adequate to handle the problems •. The PI situation has changed considerably~(or rather our knowle~ of it has become greater}. It is a situation where 16,000,00.0 lle01;Jle are anxioulsy awaiting our return;. where anti-Jap organizations exist allover the country seeking fot means to help us; where civil governments, loyal to the U. S.·, function and defy the invader. .That is the situation confront .. ing GHq •. The problem is how to capitalize on the manpower, loyalty and available remOlU'ces in th~ PI t) the end that oW qonquest of the islands will cost us the least in man pOv'ler and time. The P I problem has out­ gcorm the exploratory stage. It is now an operational and intelligence problem. A,.,. list of things which :'=1 forces can do is contained in E?ection 1, para •. ·2 of this study, under the headings of Intelligence, Sabotage, comb21t Ul'lits, and post occupation activity... It is firmly believed that these activities represent a IvlINIMIJM of what we can expe"t. if aggressive and intelligent direction is given ~I affairs. c. ·'Rn:.:nvn united Nations strength and current operations point to an accelerated allied advance into the Fl •. It is believed that plan ... ning for FI activities should be taken over by General staff Sections.

3. a. Activities with resgect to PI affairs fall under the. general he~ding of: (1) p::cocUreltlent •. evaluation. analysis and compilation of intelligence, both operational and ciVil. (2) 'l'actical organization and training of guerri,lla units. (3) llanning for specific use of guerrilla forces. (4) Flanning for conquct of civil affairs,to include governments fiilance, civil econOI11Y, propoganda and Q,uislings. (5) Supply of, and communication with, guerrilla forces. b. Dltelligence activities under 3.ati (1) above, is at present a FRS affair coordinated with G-2~ . There was a small PI section of G-2, recently enlarged to Cope with increased volUl11e of intelligence coming in. '1111e 'extent and value of this intelligence is constantly increasing. This activity should be a G... 2 function, with PRS the collecting agency. c~ organization and training activities under 3.A.(2) above is at present, charged to 00 staff' seotion. The limited number of trained officers in the II precludes any ~uch activity. Guerrillas do not }cno'N hoyv to use new weaj)ons such as bazooka guns J land and tank mines (ideal weapons in guerrilla areas). The ease with which Filipinos can travel throughtout the area should be capitalized by training natives in sabotage activity and crumnando, work. The training of these troops for specific. tasks oannot be over emphasized" This activity should be charged to G-3" e. Civil affairs activitie~ under 3,a.(4) above are handle~ by the O-in-c, in'conjunction with the Philippine Commonwealth government in Washington, D.C ... The numel'ous eivil problems attending our occupation will require that a competent person or group, familiar vvith PI goverDEi ment affairs, be present to plan for and advise the C-in~C in these matters •. fit supply ot guerrillas under 3.a, (5) above is now handled by PRS. This agency had developed an e~cellent supply syst~n to the PI. The volume of supplies is j.ncreasing; the faeilities for such supplies will likewise increase •. The type of supplies (at present combat qnd morale) will require study tt) fit i:e in with the plallning. PllS should (1Qn~ tinue to handle this phase of the work.

-11- H. CONCLUSIONS'.

1'. The extent of PI 3.ctivi ties has reached a stage where general staff sections must study the problem Wit~l a vievl to: a. outlining sta.ff procedure to De followed in handing FI affairs:; h. Assigning definite resp-onsibili ties to general staff section •. c. Establishing a "Philippine Island General Affairs Section" to study, plan for and ad~vise the c:"'1n-c on civil affairs. 2. Jro take advantage of the E'tssistance which the orgai.lized forces in the PI can give us, our key persomlel must be sent in at least 6 months prior to our attack., r:lanning must start at least nine (9) months prior to attack day.

c ~ HE CO l\:iIiJINDATTONS.

1. That a "Phili1=,pine Island General Affairs Seetionlf be establish­ ed under the Chief of staff, with the mission of studying and planning for conduct of civil affairs to include : a. Government" finance, eccnon:ry, propaganda. b. Iv~obilization of civil economy" "1:;0 assist our effort. Since the G-2 will be involved in the analyses of II intelligence. this section should 1l18.intain close liaison with G-2.

2. That intelligence matters be aSSigned to G-2, che.rged 1lvith the dispatch of missions, planning, procuring, evaluation. analyzing and cQ~oiling PI intelligence.

3, That organization and training of F'I units be assigned to G-3, wi th the mission of preparing II forces to sup;Jort our effort~

)-J.. That supply matters be assigned to G-4t with PRS as its operat­ ing agency (in view of its success and experiynce in sUP.i.)lying guerrillas to date) ..

5. That C~Thnunications be assigned to the Chief Signal Officer.

c. A. NILLOUGHBY t Brigadier General. u.s. Army, A. c. ofS., G-2~

- 12 _. ANALYSIS of STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT loth MILITARY DISTRICT (See Map Attoched)

SUMMARY (taken f~o1n available figures, and does not include the Command) : .

U.S. Personnel Total Personnel Total Arms

Mil Dist Hq 37 105th Division 2 3500 2100 106th Division 5 3000 1500 lo8th Division 4 6000 L~ooo l09th Division 7 3000 1600 lloth Division Z1. 4000 3000 . TOTAL 82 19500 12200 NOTE: Commander Parsons states that Col, Fertig told him that as of 5 December 1943 the total guerrilla personnel on Mindanao were 28.400 and the total arms registered l6.ooo. The distribution of the difference between above"totals is not known.

u.s. personnel knovm to be on Mindanao "Wi th guerrillas • (' Q • 82 Total of these knovm to have been holding commission

before surrender • , • • .. • • • • • • 'f • to t • • • • ,. 10 Total of these known to now be holding guerrilla commissions, or appointed to commissions AUS since surrender • • •• • . . • • • • . • • • • . 51

Total known personnel shown on map and listed as key personnel (incl Filipinos) ••.•.•••• , 32 Total of these knovm to have held commissions. prior to surrender (incl Filipinos) .•• & •••••••• 18

DATA ON KNOWN MIND..t..NAO GUERRILLA LEhDFRS ~.* (See Map Attached)

GRINSTEAD. Lt. Col. James • .ADS: >.'< 40-45 years, us Army Reserve in PI. Brought to PI by Gen. Wood in 1926 as 'one of several hand picked yowl€; officers to strengthen the,.l?lid.l;11'­ pine Constabulary. Was sent to Mindanao as a Lieut. PC and aocording to Doctor HAYD~T did a good job suppressing the Mora outlaws there. He rose to a Captain and was Provinoial Inspector ror Lanao, left the Constabul­ ary in 1936-37 and conducted a personal business on Mindanao. loined .the guerrillas in early 1943, placed in commend of the guerrilla lo6th Division in December 1943. Dr, IffiYDEN considers him very ~Qpable.

MORTERA, Lt. Col .. Ciriaco, PA; Graduated PC Acaderay 1917 and was active in combating the Mindanao guerrillas afterwards~ Was deputy governor of t in 1938 was stationed in·Cotabato as Major and was on Oabu with General CHENOWYTH before surrender of the USAFFE forces. Was CO of the (guerrilla) lo6th Infantry in in 19h2 anl' later beCB"Ip.e CO of the (guerr­ illa) 105th Division, Zamboanga dnd. Misamis Oocidental. Is reported to be trusted by FERTlG .. and holds his ovm.wi.tll the other Ainerican Division aommanders:... 6n Mindanao. Personally known to :pr. HAYDEN who considers him able and complet€ly reliable.

"- 13 - SUAREZ, Lt. Col. Alejandro, Fj~; Well eduoated Constabulary offioer with a year in the University of Michigan. Served many years in the southern islands and earned for himself a reputation as a determined and fearless officer. Left the Sulu where he had been station commander and deputy governor of Siasi, in 1938. Was Brovinaial 60mmander of Province when the war broke out and was sent shortly after toSulu as provinoial Governor to streng:then the position there. He fought the Japanese on and then escaped to Cotabato and fought ~ith the USAFFE forces until surr­ ender. Escaped from the 3aps and teturned to Sulu to organize the guerrillas there~ Well known to Dt. HliYDEN. who speaks highly of his ability. HEDGES. Lt. Col. Oharles, AUS: American gold mining engineer in Philippines for several years, was eomuissioned on Mindanao in April 1942 and performed duty as CO 1~tor Transport, 81st Division in Lanao. Went to hills after surrender, joined Fertig early in the guerrilla movement and was appointed CO of the guerrilla lo~th Division in Lanao in 1943. FERTIG states he is an exoellent worker and has demonstrated his leadership apility. KUDER states he is an exoellent field commander.

CUBU~ING, Major: * Was among original guerrilla leaders in Lanao, oommanding the 120th (guerrilla) Regt north of Iligon. Present duty not reported, possibly G-2 lo8th Division.

K1~LJ10, Ilffa jor Busran: * Moro Datu, 'aotive in organ~z~ng the Bolo Bn on Mindanao before surrender of the USJ~FFE forees and in persuading the Moros of LanEto to resist the. Jap-'!lnese. Was host'11e to the guerrillas originally but joined forces with the lo8th (guerrilla) Divisio(l early in 1943

MINDALLNO! Capt. Manalao! * Moro Datm in Lanao t c6 l27th (guerrilla) Regt in southeastern Laneo., Reported to be one of most brilliant and ruthless I'f.lOros in dealing with the Japanese. Former school teacher.

BJi GUINDAAL I , Ma j or Anonngo ~ ::~ Ahother oolorful Moro Daty in Lanao. CO l29th (guerrilla)aegt, north­ easterrlLanao.

L.IF OFFICERS, Capt 0 Ie .. 1~. STEELE, Lts. Rr BLOlj,- and GILLOR: With the i.l.IF in Singapore, taken prisoner at surrend.er, moved to Kuohirig early 1943 and later to Sandakan in North Borneo, escaped from Sandakan in June 1943 and arrived at Tawi Tawi in j~ugust or September 1943 where they assisted the Sulu guerrillas until leaving for Mindanao in November 1943. On Mindanao they assisted the l09th (guerrilla) Division in suo­ cessful attacks on Japanese patrols landing along the north coast of Lanoo in January 1944. Col. FERTIG values their services.

McGEE, Lt. 001. Frank. 11U3: Retired Major, Cavalry, i~merioan resident in PI, plantation ·ovmer from the Mati, Davao area. Was interned by the Japanese and esoaped in early 1943. went to Cotabato, joined the guerrillas there and was made CO of the lo6th (guerrilla) Division when it was formed in Cotabate in Dece 1943 .•

-.14 - PhGE, Major Herbert. PC: 4.5 ... 50 ye8.rs~old time Oonstabulary officer. In 1938 was a Major $tat ioned in Zamboanga as Provost for southern Mindana

FERTIG. Col. Wendell W•• AUS: Mining engineer before'war_oonne~ted 'With Maabate;Consolidated Gold, went to :Manila 1941 on construotion work for the US Lrmy Engineers. ~J!as on and later sent to Mindanao to replace Major Eads of General Sharpefs. command. Escaped to the hills at time of surrender coming out late in 1942 to coordinate the guerrilla bands on Mindanao. Well liked by the people for organizing peace and supplies on the island.' Does most of" work without staff, for want of capable assistance.

MoCLISH, Lt. 001. Ernest E.! LUS: Formerly and officer· in the 6lst Infantry and statiJned at ~he Malabang airfield. Was in after surrender and went to NE Mindanao early in 1943 to oommend guerrilla forces there. Is an active figure in local social aotivities and popular with the Filipinos. Combat duties reported to be left· largely to Major CHILDRESS. There is some indication McOLISH is not always discreet or taotful in his dealings.

CHILDRESS t Me j or elyd e. lJ.US: Former Lieut., 61st Infantry. 1:.fter surrender he joined the guerrillas at Sindangan, Zamboanga, iIl 1943 he,"moved to the lloth (guerrilla) Division area and is now Chief of Steff of the'~ii"Vision. He is reported to be a hrless fighter, well liked by-.the people ,and oommands the loyalty of his men. '

DONGL.LLO. Capt II : It is believed he has had trining in the L.rrrry or Constabulary and saw some action before. surrender. Was with iU3BO'1'T at Balingasag, , when IlBBOTT started organizing the gue-rrillas there. Later McCLISH moved him to Gingoog to strengthen the guerrilln organization there, is hard. hitting, tough. able and well liked. Evacuees report that he, is one of the most reliable of Filipinos under combat conditions. l~BOTT. Oapt. Clyde: * Formerly PFC, Hq and Hq Sqdn, 19th Bomb Group, now Executive Offioer of the lloth '(gu$rrilla) Infantry, Balingasag. LffiBOTT was one of the prime movers of the guerrilla movement in Misamis Oriental. li!vacuees hEld a good deal of r~spect for him and indicated he does a good job with the training he has.

M.LRS.H1~LL! CaRt. Paul: * Formerly a Sergeant, 60th Coast j~rt illery, on Bate.au and Corregidor, taken prisoner, moved to Davao and esoaped from the Davao Penal, Oolony in .i~pril 1943. Was G-2 lloth (guerrilla) Division, later CO l14th (guerrilla) Regt, Surigao. i"ble but lacks training.

)9PIEL\~LN, .. Lt. Robert: * Formerly EM, Hq Det USliFFE. taken prisoner time of surrender t moved to Davao and escaped from Davao Penal Colony J~pril 1943. Served with G-3 (114th guerrilla) Regt, Surigao and later as A. C. of' S .. ,',-G.~31 110'th (guerrilla) Divisigtl. No "training. H!PE ,_ capit. Leo:- *. _ _ Fili!'J1imOt former-EM, saw acti9ri- on Luzon during the campaign. escaped to Mindanao and joined the gtt~rr.rrla6 in Misamis occidental. Not trained for intelligence work but worked self up from the bottom t now acting as A.C. of S., G-2 for the Headquarters.

BOWlER, Lt. Col. 'Robert IT no A.US: 35-40 years, regular Ar~ officer., was a.t Daveo ~wi th th~ 38th Division, escaped to the hills after surrender. Took command of the 109th (guerrilla) Division early 1943, named. by FERTIG to assume :command lOth MD should anything happen to him, 'Was appointed CO "A" Corps (conSisting l05th, l06th, and lo8th Divisions) early January 1944 with Headq~arters in vicinity of tala, Lanao. IS reported to be a quiet- and not particularly good mixer.

PENDl"TUN, ~qr salapida.: ,,~ Cotabato Mora Datu, graduate of College. of Law, Univera1py of p~ilippines, held a reserve TAo commission and called to ac tive duty before war, promoted to 1st Lt. b~fore surrender, organized a~d acted as commander oftthe Moro Bn of cotabato. After surrender waG one o~ first guerrilla leaders in the Cotabato-upper B~kidnon area, was reluctant to join lOth MD forces, later was under BOWLER command and then moved to Cotabato as commander of the Northern Cntabato area 106th (guerrilla) Division. Dr. RAYnEN states he is intelligent, has displayed unusual initiative and energy and is one of the most prom­ ising young Moros.

UDTOG! De tu Ma talam:- Illiterate Cotabato Moro, brother-in-law to PENDATUN, Ollie ofth.e·~most powerful'Moros in southeastern cotabato._ His men were a portion of the Bolo Bn under General vachon and saw action in the Dig~s-Dacao front before surrender of the USAFFE forces, The Bn has been reor- ganized as part of ·the guerrilla forces. ,-,~

DlSA.NGALAN, De tu: Similar background to UDTOG and PENDATUN, probably attached to PENDATUN'e unit.

I.JlSJ~Gt Lt •. salvador:. * Nothing known of his abilities, serving as ABet Adjutant General, the, 10th MD Adjlltant being removed.

DIVA. Pacifico. PI",:: * present grade unknown, formerly Lt. in QND, 1940; now believed acting as A.. C. of· S., G-4, lOth MD.

Jill ONDINE , Ma j or : ~~ No information available, possibly A. C. of S., G-3, loth Nill, held post in 1943 until september, at least.

GARCIA,Lt ec Patriciano: * Apparently had experience in G-1 office work before surrender and ,!as known to be acting as ~.C. of S.t 10th AID before the Hq moved from Mieamis occidental in June 1943.

EVJ~NS, Me j or cr-ame s, AUS, MC: American Army surgeon, went tn PI late in 1943 wi th Major Smith. NoW Signal oUi~er andE .. surgeon at CF of CO loth MD.

YOUNG l. l.t. Robert H. , l.l.US: Filipino, 24 years, saw action as a Lt. in P0 on Luzon! in the philip­ pines oampaign, joined guerrillas on after surrender and oeme to. Australia in 1942 asspeciol messenger to Gen. Macl",RTHUR. He returned as second in command capt" Hamners party.

';-*This list i8 not inclusive.__ covering only leaders which ha.ve· ... been reper ted to ~a,t'e. * Commissions not eonf irmed by SWPA, etc. - 16 - PLATE 26 , , , , '" " • " " e 0 H 0 L

NEGROS I 109th DIVISION: MINDANAO Lt. Col. James Grinstead, CO 10TH MILlT1RY DISTRICT Leading figures: None reported , Total U.s. persolUlel: 1 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS Total Div. Strength ),000 .. " MU JAO SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA Total Div. Arms 1,600 9 U TUA N Military Int~ lli ge nce Section BAY General Staff a"·""", • • lOth MILITARY DISTRICT HEADQUARTE2lS: GUERRillA QIlGANIZATIONS SUR 1 • IS FEBRjY 1944 Col. Wendell W. Fertig, AUS, CO (CF on Agusan) Lt. Col. Robert V. Bawler, cis in oharge Hq. G-l: Lt. Patriciano Garcia (?) 10 5 o 20 30 G-2 : Capt. Leo Hipe (with Col. FerlJ.g) 11111111111 1d° G-): /oBjor Arondine (1) SCALE IN MILES G-4: Diva (temporarily on Agusan ·./Fertig) AG: Lt. Lasang (with Fertig), probably temporarily •

_. - . _. - PR VINCIAL BOUNDARIES • 10Sth DIVISION: IS a 2 NO CLASS ROADS Lt. Col. Ciriaco Martera, FA, CO MA N TRAILS • Z • N • Leading £igures: None 10~TH DIVISION Total U.S. personnel: (1) , Total Di v. Strengtil CP of CO lOth MILITARY .IlI$TRICT: Total Div. Arms CO" Col. Wendell W. Fertig, 1 AUS, CO , ______"':::;5 111" ..... 1 Staff: SULU CO}4{ANl): G-l: None (see. lOth MIl Hq.) I LLAN A G-2: capt. Leo Hipe Lt. Col. Alejandro Suarez, PA G-3: None (see loth lID Hq.) • A , Lt. Robert H. Young, AIlS G-4: Pacifico Diva (!lank unknor.n). PA AG: Lt. Salvador Iasang Total U.S. personnel: looth DIVISION: Sig 0: )ajor J_s Evans, r.:; Total Area Strength I OLO NG Total Amencan personnei with Staff: J6 , Total Area Arms Lt. Col. Charles Hedg~, AUS, CO (Mostly code personnel ~nd safehand messengers) ,

Leading figures: (1) For security reason,,/ the Hq was split, /oBjor eur_ng Col. Fertig with a skel~ton _taft on the Agusan .. Ji>.j or Busron Wac and Lt. Col. Bowler with the main staff in Hljor Anonngo Banguidaoli Lanao. 106TH Captain llanalao M!.ndalaoo D4 VAO I UL ' officers 3 AIF COT A Total U.S. perscmnel: 4 Total Allstralian 6 00 Total Di v. Strength 6,000 ilOth DIVISION: " Total Div. Arms 4,000 APt: L ".UIlI o \ I' Lt. Col. McClish, ADS, CO

~,~t." UAYAN J 106th. DIVISION: .....KAI'! I Leaditl8 figures: • Major Clyde Idr.... , AUS • Lt. Col. Frank MCGee, AUS, CO Captain Dongal 0, FA • I Ikjor LallI'eta, PC Leading figures; captain Clyde Abbott /oBjor Herbert Page Captain Paul sball .. Major Salapida PendatUlll Lt. Robert Spi lman Dater Dil.angalan Total U.s. personnel: 27 Datel' Mltalam ~dtog Total Div. Strength 4,000 Total personnel: u.s. 5 L~ ~SAAAMGA H I Total Div. ~ 3,000 Total Div. St,'ength ),000 ULUT ~ V ID. Total Div. Arms 1,500 , '" '" '" " '" '" .

PLATE 27 ,,, ,. ". " " . SUMMARY OF OISPOSITIONS OF P. I . GUERRILLA FORCES:

loUI0 .. , MINO(IfIO • MA"INDUQUI ... TOTAL. UNKNOWN • 0' LITTLE. TAGTICAL USE • '. .. P~LAWA" a NlARIY ISLAMOS 1,000 PIUtA'f' AIIO ROItkOH. 13,800 ", ...... T. 100 • SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS 8,000 "'CllIU...... &,000 a 4,000 MINDANAO L£VT! 2,800 SAIl"" 2,000 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS MINDANAO SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA ... 1 lHOWN II,BOO Milituv In'e:i1ige:nn Seuion AOO'L. "I:PO"TIO ',~OO 21,000 Ge.lcr~: St~ff SULU ."OHIP!LAGO •• 500 TOTAL APP"OX . 6ft,000 GUERRILLA DISPOSITIONS 15 FE8RUARY 1944

11;'­ ~.. COMPOSITION Of! '0"(.£5 : • APPROX.TOTAL .RMEO , .. COMIAT FORCES 35,000 * UNARMED COMIAT PERSONNEL ADMINlsn:ATIV£ PERSONNEl. TOTAl. ~ • NOTE : * BASED ON FRAGMENTARY REPORT\..

900 •

II II 'I

Ii 'c , , -'"......

• ,"' It ~ I>

..... ,."" '~O...... aJll!" <

" '~ " ••• u IT'" -", -... . l' ... ,~.:;::> , ,"""," , ...... j); '/ •" 3, 00 0, ,,-• • , , , • ~D

• U l. \I oo.,~ , .. • , ' "" tlf'" t:1." G 0

.• ,

PLATE 28

.• " 1 T F ( CURRENT MINDANAO DISPOSITIONS ~ ,: .. II GOIIIPARED TO 15 JANUARY : " I \ 15 FEB. 15 JAN. \ ~-. .- I TAWI T.I AREA 100 100 , '" .tOt..O AltO 100 100 ~- \~ ( , ZA.aANU M!. 100 100 ...... ~ MISAM.I AMA ..,., 700 I ILIIAN - ...LA ...... A 100 .00 .+ QAeAYAH ARlA _.fOO 1,700 SOUTl-£RN LUZON, VISAYAS .UR'IAO AUA 1,.00 1,100 a II "'00. A"IA 100 100 r MINDANAO OAVAO ARIA 1,000 1,000 - , ooT,. ....TO ..... ',000 ',000 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ...LAN .... ARIA 100 SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA 11,100 U,TOO Milif.ary l""t:liaenn St-ction • G«lItf.l: Suff NOTE : " . ENEMY DISPOSITIONS '~~V ~~""\\. "''''''&01 TOTALI 00 NOT I.CWDI TIllOOItS REPORTED y' 15 FEBRUARY 1144 ftA"'''' T""OUIM , I . .., 'J • • .. " c:JD._,,/~ r"--:.-:.• ~""•.",, I ~ . I • ) '\.v?

,

,. J ~ J - ...... II D "':'(,,~-

-

0, . , • 'v •

. ~

I APPENDIX XVI

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PLAN FOR MINDANAO 2 May 1944

Page

Pl~n •••••••...••.• f ...... -...... , ...... , iI ••••••• , • • 1 Plate, HPattern of Ehemy Ground Dispositions, 15 April 1944 H

Table, '~onth1y Reports of Enemy Ground Strength, April 1943 - March 1944" . l~ppcndix XVI

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PLAN FOR MINDJ~AO 2 May 1944

1. Ke:? Enertiy I..roas on Mindanao: .Recent Allied landings in N'W NeW Guinea have placed Mindanao in the fore in th~ Japan~se NEI-P I­ palau defence line. Main canters of interest on Mindanao whose devolopr,1ont are now being pushed by the Japanese are Davao Gulf,

Sarangani Bay J Ill:ana Bay fr::>IJ cotabato to Malabang, cagayan-Bukidnont ZaLlboanga city and the road net connecting th~se areas. (see Tncl.l) a. Da.vao Gulf Al:.ea: This area is thfi l~ost il~lportant to the 12panese~ being a forward naval base and a rapidly developing air c6nt(;r. RecGnt intelligence indicates that this is ;0 be one of the Dain posts in the Jap defence systorJ.. Airfield activity extends along the NT: coast ·.)f Daveo Gulf' from Hij:J in tho north to Mal'illag in the s,outh and on sarnal Island. Defenses and installations are being deve­ loped as rapidly as availablo labor vlill pernit. E- cagayan-Bukidnon Area; This appears to be the second dost ~~portant base on Mindanao. The airfields are being developed in thG Cagayan area and south to the Bukidnon Valley. Labor is being conscript­ ed for developl:1ent of these and other installations. ,'£'. cotabf.to"'Malabang Area: The i.l:1por-;an~e 8£ this area and the act i vi ty nO'vii going on there is not clear t howev6r at least two airfields are being developed and troop strength has been increased since Jannury 1944 • .£. Bay Lrea: Intelligence indicates that this is beconing an irJportant link in the Mindanao de£ense systetJ. It appears tha t tVlO airfields are be ins developed in the north end of the bay t with nore possible. Shipping has increased sharply within the past two 88nths and ene::1Y patrols have Qeen carrying out reconnaissance in the sarangani Islands t possibly vii th the thought of developing forward defense installati:)ns there. !!...' zanb::x1.nga City: This ar6:J. is of int6rest to the Japanese Llostly for pr~tection of shipping enrJute t~ Davao. !. Internal C01]},;lUl1ications.l. . The key areas, Davao. sarangani Bay, cotabnt0 and Cagayan. are ~onnectcd by a road net (See Incl. 1) of great strategic inp8rtance. At IJrescnt the road frOlJ.·Cagayan to DavaJ is Jpened though apparently not for heavy MT traffic. Lctivity on other sections of the net is uncertain. 2. current Intelligonce Cover aBo of the abov~_K~Areas: contact \7i th the Mindanao guerrillas 'V'!8.S established in January 1943 und has been r;lU.intuincd since. When contact was first est[~blished. Fertig's COl11l:1ond covcr8d NW Mindanao. Since that tir.1C the cO:.r:..1a.nd has been extended und c'Jl1s01id

- 1 ~ NO maps or information on enemy installations, etc •• are ,available from these areas. N0 recent information has been received concerning enemy activity except in most general terms. No indentifieations have been received and only scattered general information has been avail­ able. There are no radios and very likely no intelligence personnel in any o£ the Cotabato Valley or Koronadal V~lley areas. d. sarangani Bay. outside of shipping reports and possibly conflicting reports of airfield activity on the. north coast of the baYt little information has been received from this area., Other intelli­ gence indicat€$ that some importance is attached to the area by the Japanese. however. The radio station at the mouth of the Bay is pri­ marily a coastwatcher station and is at best too far from Jap activity to report operational information. e. Zatnboanga City. strength reports have been fairly regu-. larly rec~ived together with a picture of Japanese aotivity, 3. Conclusions · a. Reports of enemy strength and activity which could be observed by moderately trained personnel have been inadequate parti­ cularly in Davao, ootabato-Malabang and along the road net. ~. Reports of strategic capabilities, intentions·and activi­ ties have been totally inadequate and particularly so in the area in­ dicated in Ha." above. ~. -Although contacts 'exist within most occupied areas, only one identification and few captured documents have been received. ~. The existing guerrilla com~unication net does not ade­ quately cover the key areas, Malabang-ootabato t Sarangani Bay, Davao and the road net. This pI'obably indicates that few, it any, suitable intelligence agents are opel'f:l'ting in these areas. e. Not only is enemy intelligence coverage inadequate and slo'Jv in areas in which the enemy has most interest but the. radio net from the point of providing max1mwn assistance for potential Allied activity is totally inedequat6. 4. Recommendations: a. That intelligence personnel be sent into Mindanao oon­ sisting of: (1) ·An intelligence officer for the CO. loth MD, to dir.ect , intelligence activities, (2) Intelligence parties, equipped with radios to cOVer the areas'~ (a) Along SW Davao Gulf, Malalag to Davao Oity - four parties_ (b) Area Malabang to cotabato ... three parties. (c) Buayan in Sarangani Bay - one party. (d) Cotabato to Kabacan - two parties. (e) Kabacan to Malaybalay - t.wo parties. E- That PRS procure and equip suoh personnel and sent them in at the first opportunity, . c. That such personnel be instructed to cover specific areas and develop the following: (1) Enemy units, (2) Enemy air strength, activity and development. (3) Enemy dispbsitions, defenses anci installations. (4) An intelligence system prepared to report enemy movement along road nets.

C. A. ·WJLLOUGHBY. Brigadier General, U.S. ArmY, A.C. of S •• G-2. 2 Incls: Incl. 1 .,.. Mindanao Enemy Ground Dispositions. 15 Apr It4, with over­ lay showing current guerrilla communications. Incl. 2 - Monthly reports Mindanao Enemy Ground strength, April 1943 .- March 1944,. h~=-~~ __~ __~~~~ __~ _____ P_L_A_TE 29 .,' .'

"',,""" ' E A , .:>. 0 MINDANAO ~ J>.. Mllimry Intc:lIl~ence Se(;tion s\) GEXERAL lI£ADOLARTERS " ,.. , .... " l'NITED STATES AR;"IY FORCES, PAClf'JC \ -, • •• CA~IOUI"- t, ...' PATTERN OF ENEMY - GROUND DISPOSITIONS

15 APRIL 1944

o MILES

.- RADIO STATIONS

" •• MORO GULF

,• •

:~f<·~'f MOIVTHLY REPORTS Nlj:IDAlrAo E~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA MILITARY INTELUGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF G·2 INFORMATION BULLETIN REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

No: 12 DATE: w. D. INDEX: JUNE 1943

GENERAL. HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC fuqEA Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

20 August 1943.

The attached report is based on information obtained from various sources within the Phili:Jpine Islands while on trip to that territory between the dates 5th March and 8th July 1943. The writer travelled extensively within the 10th Military District~ visit­ ing practically all units; also to a more limited extent within the 9th Military District.

C. PARSONS,

Lieut. COlnmander, U.S~N.R. GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF G-2 INFORMATION BULLETIN REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

NO: DATE:

w.O. INDEX: JUNE 1943

CONTENTS Page Nos. 1. General Information*------1 2 2. Military Prisoners of War ---- 2 3 3. Civilian Internees------3 4 4. Fin~ncial Situation*------4 5 5. Political Situation*------5 8 6. Economic Situati"on, Enemy-Occupied Areas - 8 9 7. Economic Situation, Unoccupied Area, Guerrilla Dist.* ------10 12 8. Morale of the People------12 14 9. Coast Watcher Stations ------15 16 10. Propaganda* ------16 18 11. Penetration Parties ------18 20 12. Supplies to Guerrillas ------20 24 13. The Enemy*~ ------24 29 14. Commando Training** ------29 15. Americans in "Free TT Areas** ------30 16. Bomb Objectives ------30 31 17. Manila Intelligence Group ------31 - 32

Guerrilla Organizations in 1'. I. : 18. First District**------19. Second District** ---- 20. Third District** ------21. Fourth District** ------22. Fifth District**- ---- 23. Sixth District**------24. Seventh District**------25. Eighth District** ------26. Ninth District**------27. Tenth District**------28. Recommendatinos ------33

Incls.

, 'A T T -Enemy Dis})osi tions , 'B T T - Guerrilla Disposi tions TT "C - Guerrilla Communication Net Work.

* Condensed in this version. ** Omitted in this version. REPORT ON CONDITIONS IN .THEPHILIP:t>INE ISLANDS AS OF JUNE 1943

(NOTE: This repo-rt is based on information o1;)tained from various sources within the Philippine Islandswhi~e o~ trip to that terri­ tory between the date:s 5 March and 8 .;r\lly 194~. Agents were used freely to obtain '·information from', with;i.n:'occupied. areas,. and es­ pecially in M~nila wherE;7 valuable docume~tary' and verbal-, informa-. tion was sE?cuio'e'd as to the econom:1c,. finail;cia~/ pol~tical, and gel'l:"" eral conditions within the enemy-controlled·'p'Q.ppet national govern­ ment:' The writer' travelled 'extensively within the ::tGth Milit~ry . Distr~ct, visiting practically all Ulffts; also to a mo:re' limited extent within th& 9th ·Military Districto )' .' "'.. ~ 1. General Information: _ Between the period June 1942, to which date first-hand information from within the P~ilippines was reported by the writer, to June 194.3, a number'ofchang~~ ha.ve ta.ken J>lacewithin the Is­ lands., The enemy has continued to. dominate the general'situation in occupie'd areas, and has utilized the minimum number' of soldiers and kempei police to accomp}_:.sl'fth~ desired results. '. In the out­ lying districts, the centers held' by the enemy, generally speaking, are limited to c6,pitals of province's anq the larger cities. The hinterland in ail sectors, e'xcept around Central LUZion!J are not patrolled or bothered by the enemy -- it is in those '!freen sectors· that the guerrilla movements have been usually started, and where the strongholds of the guerrilla~ continue to be located., * , '* * * '* '* * ~. * Atrocity stories in th,e Philippines in the occupied areas seem to be "outU for 'the q.uratio~.· The ene'my is noW treat­ ing the c,ivil population with a greater degree of co'urtesy than 'during the first few months of occupation. The kempei (m~litary police) soldiers are being gradually ~~placed by Fiiipino' police­ men, a.hd as the reorganized Philippine Gonstabularly soldiers are trained and sent to the various provinc!al units td,take over the maintenance of 'law and order, treatment of the civil population, . may be expected to be even better. The t.errorizing methods use,d ' by the Japanese during the early days of occupa.tion have been di~'" pensed with almost entirely -- suc.h as the looters cage, hanging looters in conspicuous places in the towns, execution of looters and other severe methods of punishment, probably thought necessary by the conquerors in the beginning to keEip in line the overwhelming s1:lp~r.iori ty of numbers in the civil populatj.on compared to the, in­ vading force (and the occupational force) of enemy'soldifJ'rs. Re­ ports, are heard from all districts that the remaining force O.f· . 'soldiers and soldier policemen (Japanese) have been instructed -y:o treat It?cals with courtesy and friendship,.and not to require the bowing to sentries (previouslY'punished,by slapping when ove:rlo

1 - pr~sent -.. regardless. ·:(if!'··:tlia :if;a6t "that ,.this ,,'situation 'is :,exactly wh~t the enemy desires. t:". >'" .,:;; ,.... /,.

*, ,.~ .. ,%~ .. " ',*1' .'.:' o:'~;:.;') :,:, .. ~,.',.': .... *, ; ;\;:*;. ':}~-',i:' '>~~/::"'.'* ,:-. 7:-, 2. »ri~o·n~'t:~l oi:.Wa:~·";(Mifit·~tY.rs <> ,t';" ·;·\~f:: .... :,: ,,<~ :;.::' :":', ". , .:. :.: ,F~~~pi~o. p(~~~~q,~~:r~ ;q'f !watfL)~~~~;~ac~~,~.~P.Y·.al;~ b~5~~n. raw, le~sed Jrqm, ,the .pr,iso!l "o,*.mp.s.,.. ,T:h~y ~(~~,r1·~lease·.~ g~~d,*ally ,uP9n 'a ' pa+o~ee' system~ ,wb(;)r,e, the!~prfs.oner. 'vq1:ird.~·obts::Lnt.he back.ing of ,two gu4ra~~,ors ·,to\varran:t .. g~,9.d be··4~i'Yi~r': ~f ··;:t~ije pl,"!sonet: ~ anci.' that ,h~ ,.' wou;ld !l.Ot·l!eavuerto' 'Prince$a,Palaw.a.rn ·Corregido:r.' .der~~ses .be;~g·repa:y-ed . usin~g some 200 A~e.rioan, p,r.isone~s; railroad'b,r'idges ,on·~uzo!f,. ':, .. ,' general road ,;r.epai~s, ',ands:t.ev?dpr:l~g ,~or~ in' 'Man:i)a;; "li~spi ta;l, . ; ; '. " work at, Bil.:Lbid;.and a: ·.few :det,~?hr4~r~t~cfo1ng gerier.~Ire,p~i.r :'~1dX;'l:t ~:. Ceptr~al. Luzori.,'.· ..T·~e: :-.rpai~ Ipr~sori ci~.m9~~ located a,~9abanatpan.; . ,:,'. wh~re th~ pf:isonpopulat~~q~ris,' e.~t/J.,r.1i3.t$·d ~t.)3.roun49,.QOO;a:~dthQ .' ,. other main' pris~n'c~rnp ,is:·,at·'t,h~'·DG:vf-).6··~.e~1~l. O'olonYt .. som~·.l? ;k~l~.. . meters north "of the 'ci'GY "of' DaVao.~ 'where . somE!. 2,.000 pr1sonei's are . confined., .,' About:. the middle.of 1942~ all. sorvi.ce prisoners of the rank or equlvalent rank of" Colonol or above in' all services i;"J'ere sep.t to Fo~rm6sa.or ·to Japa'h. '.

. :,;' Condft~ons·in. both't'he general 'prison camps are de- : ' < • p19rable 41 The' mortality rate ,has been :exoeptionally high. 'At '.' ,Os.'Pa,natuan,· over' '50%' of the prisone:rsfroni Ba.taan· :have .: already dl'ed,' oveI""2·'%·of,·thepris6riers'rrom~Corregiddr have died, or'an ~'Verage' .. of over,; '40%mo:rtalit~ . amongst 'Amerio:an s-ervicemen on Ll.izon:'t'o date.' ~h~sedeaths have' 1:)'ee'11: :caused by malaria, >dys'enterY.f':oori~beri 'find':': other diet~a.ry :def'leieneydis€iaSeS ..;...; most .0'£. which· could\'have~be~en:·-"t· aVQ ided:hadthe enemy: bee'n humane and· supplied 'the'; camp 'hesp!t~f with" niedJ.cine~to·,cure; ana .combat.the diseases, ·'a:na·glv~ha·.'~a:ti·iori;·< of to'od which Would 'have permitted the . prisoners to mai':rital.fl,·:l{j'neir .' , health,' botJi' a\raiJ~abl~ in: su'b'stairtial:' qU.antitias'tO' the' enemjfJ' '·.It,·:~,· is coriserva;t1:vely e'stimated' by ':the'prisoners -thems·elves~ tht:1.t~n:less" somethipg is::''d6ne soon t6 impro:v.e :conditi'ons "as to medioal··supplies' an¢! a'dequate food rations,'· onily the 'stur'C1iest pril~oner's will' be '. " alive ··at . the end of: another eighteen' -months. The" food being·:> 'g,iven .' the', prisoners is' a.bout·' 90% boiled,; polished rice'.. • a mess kit full,·' t~ee :.time·s·· ·da.ily. ,',T·o this:·basie·ration is added 'an', -insig.n.if·:Lcant"~ . allowance offish~ ·meat;· pot.l1t:rY,·and vegetables:.; , A 'rnedtcal' ·'Oflo;o" riper' from, withii+ the Cabanatu?:*{·b'!irrip· ;advised that 'the .. si'buation . coV_ld be'remediedby supply'irig. ,t'he'camp withsubstantial'qnanti.ty of'vitamins (espeoially. "Btl),' and·1'unds· with which ·to purchase ;from ': the ·e~emy.... controlled 'canteen: 'i~sid~. the ..c~mp· article~r ot £,~od," ·so a.s· 'to be '-'able to" 'augmen.t thEf presently' inadequate·'ration-:.(this is .~., pernlitt'ed only'; B:t, 'Cabanatuan -~ at Dava6':prist>nsrs -'are: not' permo::t ... ted 'to pur'ctlase' from, wf~hin' or" tram ou~'side:sbh;t.ce s},~·;· 5trohg .' .:' representations' "should; bemadethroiigh 'di~1.6inatic, tdhai'ineJ.s to the

··,2 .. , enemy go~ernment ·.to try t.e impro.ve' the condi~ions of the prisoners~ in order to stop the continued .wholesaleslaughter o-f our captured men through .~tarvation and.lackef medical care ~. The statement herein to the .eff'ec-t;,that the diet 'oftpe priaoners is deficient and inad~quate ~~. 'maintai~ life for a~ .period. of tim: h~~ been completely conf~~med not only from med~cal of"f~cers Wl. th~n the Cabanatuan camp, but also from eight officers recently escape4 from the Dav:ao Penal ,Colo:t;ly. The .situation is very serious ~ In thi.s connection, steps have 'already peen taken, at the orders of General MacArthur, to assist the prisoners' thl,."ough means 'available within the 'Islands at the present time. It is not' unlikely that'quitesubstantial assistance may be afforded the' ,prisoners, but this should not cause strenuous' 'efforts to be re­ laxed to secure improvement of their conditions through diplomatic representations. . At Davao Camp conditions are somewhat better than at . Cabanatuan --. this. due more to the initiative of the prisoners than to a more liberal attitude of the enemy towards the' prisoner·s. In Davao, the prisoners are sent out daily on wprk details (officers. are used. as day laborers). to / ga.tl}er . ffrevJood" logging, farm pro"; jects" etc '~, and while on th:} se details t~e prisoners have found ways and means through their oWn initiative (and oftentimes a.t great risk) to provide themselves with additional food" ·At both the Cabanatuan and Davao camps, infraction of rules and regUlations is met with the most severe punishment. An attempt to escape at Cabanatuan resulted in the cruel torture of three high""ranking America.n officers for a period of three days in plain view of the prison population and then in their final execu- . tion by bayoneting. ,An officer WaS shot to death by a 'sentry When seen catching a small parcel of tobacco or food thr~wnto him over the 'fence by a well-meaning native from outside'. A young naval ' officer was beheaded when a note he smuggled out 6f the camp to' a native rriend in a. nearby. town was intercepted .by an enemy agent , --in the note he indicated that he 'would attempt to escape at the first opportunity. There are many similar storie s of mistrea~ment and cruelties c . ' It is interesting to note that at Davao, where condi,­ tions ar'e admitte:dly better t~an at the Luzon, camp, as of ' April 4th more than 800 of the prisoners Were hospital patients and only 1,000 were certified as able to go on the out side detai.1s • At . Caba~atuan, it is estimated that of the 9,000 prisoners, not ~,dOO could be certified as ~eing able to do p'hysic-al labor. \

3.. 'Oivilian Internees: While a long way from being satisfactory, t'he lot of the civilian internees is considerably better than that of military. ' . priso;ners. At first, there VJere several internment camps in the different places of the Islands, but gradually they have been eli­ minE.ted by the transfer of the internees to Dave.o and to Manila and Bagnio. At. present,there are only two main internmen~ 'camps-- the largest being at grounds of Santo Tomas University, Manila, where, . there are spme 6$ 000 internees, (Americal?-, British, and other Allied nationals, including women and children); Davao , with about. 2.;000 internees; and· possibly a third small camp still at Baguio, w.i th about ~50 internees. (Note that rep.orts have' been re-ceiyed to the effect ,that the internees frol1l Manila were sent to Los Banos from. Santo Tomas. early June 1943, but this has not yet beenconf:'irmeq..) ,At the two main camps,the living conditronswerenot bad. Personal comforts, were not lavish, but 'beds were availabie as well (.as JIlattresses and ,mosquito nets (the inte1rnees t own equipment, ,of course ). Conditions were very crowded ~. families could. not live

/ .... J - tog~ther',;.' ei{c e' i'~bod ':has lb.~:~n>in~~egu~~~ ;o~hE:3le "toe (:.:t,.n~.~rp~~{'s h~v:~., had ·to,··de.pend.upon tba': :~.amw.:::ra:~;L()~ .. ~~on~".".i .. For.tV;n~~e,lY;:;~h~.;¢ivi.':"··! lians ha~e' ,~een ~etmitte,~~:.to. ::r~~~~v~ jp~;?~ls.,::r.rpm·(.·~r~:~~d~ d1i'{)~~q,~ .... th~ camPI :·:4nd;.·th~s: ha.ab.e~n pqsst-bly\t.~e .. pnly rea$·9~ J..nt~rf.lees ,hav~ not ~uff~~ed.the.~same.:f~t$.':~~~:h~ l!lil:t~~t~l?ri~R~~t~~·'·· ~'t)~~ii;tla,: r the J,.nte·tneas· are allow~d ··7Q,· q.~nt.avp~, per;·Q.~y, for;' '.lJ.~ing'· ••. ' ou~.. of' which 22 centa vps ; are: .·c;le

- 4 ~ Pf3r 100 dollars U·.S. currency), due, to' the ri13k run by the~ parties

to the exchange (death, if caught),. ' ,," ,.,...... J . 'In the ttrree" areas, ernergency currency authorized be­ fore the 'southern provinces fell into 'the hands of the enemy still has a rather'widespread circulation., In the recognized guerrilla' districts, new issue of emergency Clirrency i~ the basis of circula­ tion, . and the public' has confidence in thisc.currency as demonstrated. by its widespread ci.rculation. The loth Mil~tary Dist:rict currency for Mindanao is accepted' at full value in the, ad.joining districts. In the un:recognized dist'ricts, nearly every barrio has printed emergency currency {usually in small change)" using as security a supplJ7i of20-peso "bomoE,3rs" in provincial eme,rgency currency, which bec'3.use of the high denomination is worthless for ordinary circula­ tiOll within the barrios~ It is planned by the various barrios to redeem thenbarrio" currency at the and ot the emergency. This type of currency is n,ot given widespread oirculation ~ .... the bills from one barrio being valueless, in other barrios,~ * * * * * * * * * Within the ttfreetfareas, when the guerrilla currency first Was placed ~n circula.. t..~on, there were black market exchange rates -- generally against the new currency. As r~cognition has come to the districts, (loth Military District 'particularly), the guerrilla currency has risen in value and may generally be con­ sidered as almost.on a par with the Ppilippine Government cur­ rency. Practically ,no U:)S. currency is encountered in the free areas, but it may readily be converted into, eith~r Philippine curren.cy or emergency currency, at better than par, in sm:all amounts~ No coins may be found in circulation either in the free or in the occupied areasv They have disappeared from use com­ ple"t61yc It is reported that the enemy has exported all coins cap­ turBd or gathered after th,e surrender for use as metal in ,Japan, and thus only a limited amount of coins may be expected to be plaeed in circulation ag~in When normal conditions return to 'the country.

* * * *' * ( , It is;6stimated that the Japanese militaryorgani'zatioll has put into circulation throughout the occupied areas more than': '100 million peso's .-- and it has been ,estimated that about 12 mil­ lion pesos in Japanese military currency is being added to that amount monthly. It is not be-yond imagination t'o con~ider that by the time normal conditions are restored"there maY'be iricirctila­ tion in the occupied areas a much larger ,amount ot.Japanesecur­ rency than original Philippine Government 0urrency'before the war ,in the entire archipelago. , , . . It may be of interest to note that in the ufree"areas practic~lly no Japanese military curre.ncy may be found. Thatwhich may have gotten into the' area in the earlier days has' all been- sent into the occupied areas in exchange for pm-cha'ses or by the guer­ rilla units for intelligence work behind the enemy lines. '. It is considereQvaluele~s.

5. Political Situations * * * * * * * *. The people in the Philippines today wish several things very-badly'-- first of all, redemption from the' Japanese by General MacArthur, and the return tonorma.l conditions that,existedbefore

... 5 - th~, ,ytar.,t ;th~p' tAey:" pope ,t~ be, indemnified for their losses direotly an¢! indirectly caused by 'the\lIJar'; they hope i'or'a,hd halfWay, , eXfle~t) sub(stan~.i~+, aS~,i~ta,~ce from the United States in, the' ,r~habi­ litationof,the c,ountry' afte.r the' 'Ul1aP:;and they' expect liberal con­ ce~sio-ns,. and ge~erous trade 'relatione fromand,wlth ·the United St.~tesfin',qr.d~r·. to bring ,about a'·f'astrecovery. ',:If'it ,is t,o',be the policy 'of' the "United States to grant 'anY-of tne items mentioned as copne,~teclw~tpthe ;wishes of the Fl+ipino' people, ~ it would be much better, to' emphasize" such facts rather than to mention the. promise of'" the. grant of independence • It, oonversely would not be advi,sable'" to mentipp by rad.io newscasts that the, granting of ind.ependence ' woV1d ,b~" dropp~d ~d would not: be considered,. ,This would give the epf)my 'ample ammunition in support of, the 'promised: grant, of inde­ pepd.enc$ to th~ Ph~lippines d'uring the' ourrent year' by the enemy t,bfough cl~imirig ,bad fai*,h'of" 'the' ,~nited St~tes to. the Filipino pe?ple., " , , The Philippines ';pol'itical structure arter, re~urn of' th~ country to its forme'r status~ after the war 'will hays suffered copsiderable changes. The voter will not follow the former leaders' as' blindly as he did before. The guerrilla groups have definite id~as as tothep61itica1.1eader.s who have remained within ocou­ pi~d territorie's and have' 'cooperated with the enemy t The gueri-" ri,.las will have ',quite tin:influence on the election of local. "and, ; ... national leaders after the' War ...... and for that reason a number. 'or' th~ puppet officials "(and they inolude practic~ily all of t,he, f.~¢~ ... 'port8:nt politic'o'l leaders) will 16se their popularity and, t.he~r politIcal 'po~i tions • ~ Guerr 1'11a ,lea.ders ":ill come: forward ~fter, the war and 'be ,elected to representative posts .in the National Government--"this is inevitable, as, thes~· guerrilla leaders ha:v~ already done much' to establish themselves in the political favor, of the potentIal voters. " ' , . , " , , Although the p~pularity of ,President. ,Quezon has suf- fered considerably'since ,his ,departure,: he is still the real leader of the ,'peo.ple ,'and all will' Undoubto;dly rally around' his ba,nner again,upon his: return from the United states-, especially if he re­ turns to the' country with an open mino. 'and with a .willingness (to support those deserving men who have done such good work out in the unoccupied areas w:Li;"h the guerr ilIa groups, and with the knowledge that some of the puppet leaders wi11 have to,go by the bo~rds. The na~e of, General. Manuel Roxas is fpr,ernost in the minds of the people today as ,their next :President ,and leader, due to' hisv~artime acti­ 'vities a.nd refusal to cpoperate,JV:ith the ,enemy 'since' his surrender'. He would paturally receive tha ~,:f?~pport of .the g'uerrillaf!' because· off, his :'~er.v~ce, as, a: :soldier 'a*~ .his subsequ~nt rerusal :to accept a pOpt in ;the, enemyts, puppet government', ,; , ',:' ,: '" ~:':'" ,At t~e pres'ant tim~, there is no pol~tical' si.tuation in th'fJ' J apane se-.occupieq ,areas comparable to th~ de'mOcT$.tic· form or " Government in existenc's before the war. All po+i~ica.l· partie,s have be~n .."di:s,olved,\ and all ,officers, arE9 serving' as :a 'r~s~lt; of appoint­ mept by.'~he~Japanese fo'rces,.,. No elections have been.'hel

... 6 .,. original positions., These men arE;3,tobe trusted and may be con­ sidered to be completely Ipyaltb the Allied Cause. The men in the secpn!i category are those who' fox: reasons -of personal gain, because, of weakness, or due to being disg:runtled at the lack of a quicker return to the Philippines on the part of American Forces -- or a number of similar excuses --: have overplayed their part in cooperat­ ing with the enemy. These men 1'eel sincerely that they are pro- / Filiptno first of all; secondly, possibly, they prefer Americanism and,the return to tlfe normal conditions as experienced under American guidance than to Japanism and the type of life that they feel they would have to live should Japan be the ultimate victor in the Far Eastern war. They excuse their outward cooperation with the enemy and their,rather outspoken ~peeches against America and the Americans 'on the ground that they are pl"o-Filipinos, and that the Philippines as an indepehdent country -- promised both by, the enemy and by the United States --will not require them to be openly pro-American or pro-Japanese. It is certain that upon a re­ versalof conditions, and upon arrival of American troops to. t;he areas where theY,now hold forth, their ?-ttitude will reverse as quickly as the situation, and you. will ftnd them willing to damn the enemy they are noVll' prais :lng. ' We have ~een this happen once already -~ where in December several of the Filipino leade~s made impressive speeches oval' the radio and published' in the 'press arti­ cles praising the Allied efforts, and pledging their loyalty to that side;, and 'when in' the hands of the enemy, these saine m~n noW make the same speeches almost word for word in behalf of, the other side! True,. some of this may have been dicta ted or even forcGd upon them by the enemy; but, in general, it is known that for the reasons first stated above when outlining the type falling into the seco:pd category, these men have voltmtarily taken the attitude' as expressed most appropriately in their speeches. The ih~rd cate­ gory includes those officials and citizens who have openly and voluntarily cooperated with the enemy. Thi$ individu.al has no hidden excuse for his activities, although most of tbem to save their lives will allege coercion, force, or any number of reasons for having cooperated with the enemy. In this category fall es­ pecially those officials who did not'hold important posts 'in the national o'r municipal governments before arrival of the enemy; and who have come forward now as leaders under the Japanese control. Not only politicians have placed themselves in this category -- a number of Filipino businessmen, church leaders, professional men, ·milit'ary men, and similar types have lent th~ir efforts whole- heartedly . to the enemy. ' , Names that fall definitelY,wlthiIl, each of' the three, categories, to include officials leading the National Government, have been comp'iled and will be submitted as an extiibit to this re"!' port ,. The officials in the occupied areaS in the province.s are being investigated, anp eventually names and classificat~ons will be prepared and submitted. Careful observat.ion is maintained at , the National capitol so as to' be ina position'tt? change classifi­ cations quickly of any official -- and for t-he protection of any of the offic ials' known to be trust\vorthy. Upon the approach of .Allied troops to the-- Philippines' --upon the fall of the first Allied bomb on enemy installations, \ there is sure tO'be an uprising in the occ~pied areas against pup":' pet officials. Even at present the puppet officials fear for thE3ir lives as a result of cont~nued threat~, which they receive· :(rom anonymous and guerrilla sources._ . , , In this 90nnection, it may be recommendable to arrange thro\J.gh one of. the Manila Intelligence Nets a plan for the evacua­ tion and p!,ote'ctionof the loyal puppet offic ials and of ~he ir '

.. 7 - families when there is a move to be made towards tJle Philippihes which"m~ght res·tJ.lt, in 'mqb.rule. flaring .'up:. As mentioned, some' officials are sincerely loyal,. :oan: be' of' ,,?-se at the present time, : and should be protected' if 'at all pOssible 'to",do so. t ."' *; '* * * *.: :, * * '* * 6., Economic 8ituation (09cupied Area.s): " Ip the occupied areas, the. ene~y', . al~hough ha.ving been~ able to solve a few of his economic headaches' encountered from the date pf his· arrival, into·the .' variov:s. areas', still finds ple,nty t() cause him worry. " " ".. . In ~a,nila and Central Luzon, :whe~e;, th,e 'major economic , and industrial. endeavor ~as bee~conce,ntrated/ by the enemy through . th~ Economic Corps, a· pla.n. o~ .cha,nging from non-esse,ntials to basic fopdstuff and ar.ticles required. (~r desired) .by the enemy,for-ex­ port to ,Japan has been followed religiously, and with'~ c~rtain de­ gree.of success. The enemy upon 'p.rriva~ at Manila immed.i'ately t~ok over all industrial plants; in the .. city, and gradually has place'd all in operatIon under Japanese management, using Filipino 'or neu-.' tral staff and laborers~ . Payment to! the native stafr and laborers has been set at figures consid.erably lower than those paid during normal times. All coconut oil plants in Manila are working at 'full capacity, producing fromcopra'(which ispurchasec, through the 'Japanese contro:).led purchasing agency from nearby :'province.s' 'at 7.00" pesos per hundred kilos delivered·to fact9ry) coconut oil, lard, oleomargarine, s0ap, edible oil, and ather products.' Twoot the. three rope facto~ies are running at full capacity, produc·'ing. rop"e from Davao hemp (received regularly from Davao by enemy. tre,ns~' ports). Cigarette factories, brcwerio/?, match factories ,are' in full operation. The, spinning and vJeaviJ:ig p1f.3.nt of, the Nat~onal Developme{l,t Company is, expected to start operating shortly, us~ng, cotton prod)Jc'ed in Ta1"1ac. Other smaller'industries have, b,oenre-, established to the' fullest e~te.nt, possible. ·AII of them are com­ pletely controlled 'by the enemy,unit,s -- .eithe~ civil or; military~ The small portion ,of the products, of the factories .. which the enemy permit to remain .in the Isl~nds is again control.. led by the enemy's distributing 'organization, made up principally of Japanese merchants. who, have previously done' busineE?s ·.in Manila­ and other' parts of the ,Islands --bazaars" soft d!ink par~ors'"etc.,

- I The Japan~ se merc~nts t asso~:iatiol1 act as distributors of , the, . arti~les ration~d to, tps ,public,.. ~nd sell' to t~e Pl1:1y ~!ade ,o~t­ lets permitted to 'F.ilipinos and' neutrals, the ,r~tail trade under, the sari... sari system, The products of the faqt'oriep in F.aanila are not all tvrned ove~: to t~e' distributilig organization fqr sale wi th­ in the Philippines. , Only a. sm£;11 port{onof the production is ' marketed in the country, a~d, that portion i,s ra.tioned ·strictly.· . TQe bulk of the 'production ·is exported to Japan -~ 'espec:'ial1y. soap, lard,:oleom~rgarine" cqconutoil ,(two. shiplnents. also wer.i~:'~o· " Germany by' ~~rilc~r), 'I;'ope, beer,' mai;.ches.,- .an:<1 cigarettes., .. ' , The enemy believes that this system has do~e'mnch " toward .re'.. establishing pommerce in .th~ occupied. ~r~as, but the.. , Filipinos do not like the monop'oly:at .a119 They find-traqe' re:­ striction-s on all ,sides·, and ,while ,they ¢1.are not compl~tn or re­ q'4est,.!'~ change in c.opqitions --t,he:trmemory is st'l.11 trash 9f t,he _ terrorism·' spread by the 'enemy in the e.arly days of ~hE3 conquest, '. thr,ough -severe punisJuuent for the slightest. infracti,onof rules· ...... ,they would welcome with open arms th~ return to C'Ohditions enjoyed' by them Under the form'of'commerciat'adrriinistration of pre~war . days.· The "F,ilipino bu~inessman realizes that, :lliidel:' the present' form of, commercial set-un he c,ah neilerbe:'more ·than a Vitorker for " the enemy - .. .sari .... sari ,stor,eke·epe~r.~, ,farmers',' a'~a, .la.b9"rers:.· This does not fit 'in, with the ideals that'have been instilled in him through .forty~odd years of ~xistence under the: American'Flag. , ' In' the occupied areas outside the commercial ce11ters of Manila, Cebu, D?ya,o, and , the economic situation is basically'that of controllingthe'production Qf farm 'products and the changing. over of production' tt) articles r~quired to feed the population and to export to Japan. ' For instance, sugar has prac­ tically gone out of existence. A few fields weere, allowed to ratoon (regrowth without planting), and a few of the centrals had a very restr,icted grind:i.ng season during~ the 19{+2~43, crop year. It is ' estima.ted that.for the next cropjrear practica,lly' no centrifugal sugar yvill be .produced. Generally, the fields previously planted! , to sugar c~ne have been planted 1'1i th TaiWan or upland rice and cot­ ton., As ,a result, the agricultural areas of Central Luzon and of Negros.·havesupplied the enemy government with~a sufficiency of r:·!..c8 to. handle the feeding of the people in the occupied' areas, al1d it .is bel~eved a surplus has been produced, as there is evi­ dence of a c~,rtain amount having been exported from the Philip­ pines. Cotton' planting has met with a. certain amount of sUCcess in the CE?ntral Lll,ZOn region, and with fail.ure in 'Panay and Negros. In the $outh, guerrilla acti:rities have interfered with the pro­ duction;of agricultural products, and the small amount of cotton planted and harvested is believed not to have been of much im­ portance. The enemy, however, was able to secure a harvest of nearly a quarter millio,ntons from Luzon iNhere the occupied areas in Central Luzorrare more in enemy hands, and with but little guer­ rilla interference. This cotton production, except for a small amount· turned: over to the National Development Company for spinning and weaving at Manila, has been exported to Japan. Of the various areas planted to cotton, Tar1ac gave the best production; and while the ,tonnage per acre is 'less 'than that of cotton-producing coun­ tries,and while this agricultural effort may not be of commercial vallie in normal times ~ undoubtedly the enemy has been able. to bene­ fit from an economic 'standpoint, 'and stands to benefit in the future until he is driven from the Islands. , Life in the city of Nanila, and other occupied met.ro- politan areas, is div.ided into trJo .classes under the pr'esent condi­ tions. The people who are employed seem to have ample .funds' to' take .careof their living, and a surplus with which· to frequent places of amuse'ment; people 'ii'lho are not employed and. who have no means or securing funds from those who are more fortunate (and there is a substantial percentage of such people) are objects of charitY.and have a very difficult time making both ends meet. -Thus' you ,have prosperity and practically starvation going hand ih'hand •. You have .inflation and Japanese military money being spent like water (~ue principally to lack of confidence in its ultimate worth when the enemy is pl,lshed but), along with a decided shortage', of· funds on the part of the unemployed, and consequent miseryo The' only saving factor in these areas is the rationing of basic com­ r,nodities-- rice, sugar, salt, etc~ - .. to the public at low· .. , prices through the Kalibapi, which gives the poorer classes a cha.nce to get thei,r requirements at prices they can afford to pay when they are able to get money. , In the occupied' areas, . agricultural products may be sold only through the Government monopoly and1at prices fixed by the Japanese militaryadministration~ ,

7 .•. · Economic Situation (UnocGupied Areas';" Guerrilla Districts): The foregoing has been intended to cover the economic situation in lthe area~ occupied, and Under tho control of the enemy. ,In the ttfree _t or unoccupied areas where t,he enemy has been

-9 - restricted (e~ther b:{,his'owp,d$,sire or, :t:rro~gh,pre,ss~e.r,of,the different~ 'guerri;t.la~oups) to: a few .main cities :( this,' refers principa.lly"to~ the, Visay"as , ~nd 'PJIinda,;gao, 'altl:l6ugh~~~r~., are a, fe~:, areas, on Luzon 'which 'eouid"be ,il'icluo.ed". such'as,So~,sog6n, I10008., ' Norte', and th,eregioll' just"'south ;of J\parI~T) ,)the e,conomic situe--' ' tion has proven to be quite, dl£terent. :'~ , ,',' ._

In the unoccupied areas., > the" inha,bitant·s. have come, ba.~~ to their farms and, have. dedi'cateq the.Ir efforts to ,'pl?oduc~ng bas,iq' ,commodities and, in producing or a.ssist~ng ,in,tne' pr6ductiQnof, " articles tor,~hefe'edirig'otthemselves~ of the "guerr'illas, ,a~da surplus, for lise in ,trB;qi'rig "with n.earby ,pr:ov:illoe~' for such :items as may not be available at home. As :are~ul t of this :general policy which has been' fO,s-teredG1upc'e'ssfully pythe ':guerrilla comma.,ndert?, .' the people find th~t theyoan ,enjoy, a: remarkably, .. plea~a~t "a'nd ,normal e~istence', and ,do not miss to' a great 'extent items 'of' daIly life wl+ich had been considered ases'sentials i:n ~th~ pa.~t. ~ice,~ corn, or camotes" (sweet potatoe,s) is the basic food for ,the peo,ple .--'. depending upon the areaslnost suited to grow the product. Coco-. nutls are'. usually avialt;iblein Unlilhi'~ed quantities, ,fr'ojn which home ... s:i;de tndustries have made, aVf.i'ilable a handy, supply ,of' oil for cooking and lighting their lamps,! the grated coconut for food", for feeding animals, phells for charcoal; coconut tu~a has bee~ found an easy source for production of alcohol (straight disti:]-la";' t~onin crude stills gives 'a tell percent re~overy, of alcohol f'r?m "" tuba); hemp has given tJ}read for cloth; coconut ,shells also 'make;, ' f:Lne . 'buttons; sea shells gj;ve ,lime; -,sea w~tet condens.ed in the sUn gives a supply of' salt,;, bananas and CI~saba ',roots dried al'id powdered., make good flour' (cakes and bread, made fron1the flour of these, pJ,.ants can oompare very' ravor'ably wi~,h t~10S~ proq1)cec\from whe~t ' flour); condensed pineapple and otoor frul,tjuices rich in f~uit, sugar make fine- syruP. which is ,use~~ j.n 1ieu of sugar ;,s~o~s a.r~ , m~de' from hemp for uppers' and oJ.d a.utomob.1,le tires for~so10s; 'Wiater. and wind pO'lJlier are.~tilized 'nqw: .t~." a" great extent :for: :"~upplying . power to run rice mills, battery-cJ~argillgplfints. ,There are"many" other substitutions and utilj:zatibl~ too ,numer,ous to put, in a. r~port. ' ," " , , Taxes~in the'free, area.s:::ar~ ,'being colleo:t~dby' th~;~iv.:Ll Government wherever economio conditions will p'e.rmit., As'theemer'" g~ncy currency is placed more and more, in circjllEition, i.t wil1'be, , still easier to place taxes on the varipu$ eJ:?torprisQs, lal~4, CTPPS, etc .. , from which to derive an income, sut'ficie~t to covel"',' cost of, ' c;LYil administration. In som!? of' the unreoognized, are'as, guerril... l~s, in cooperation with municipal and provincial governments" h~ve, placed.a nVictoryl. tax of twenty centavos per adult 'per "ijlon~h, from which funds will be sec\.U"ed, to' maintain, these guerrilla organi~, z~tions. ' This' wiUbe diecont:t~ued"uponreeognition, and flnancia.,l,:' b~cking for the guerrilla troops by the United States Military , Sarvice. ", ' " Prices' of' various commodities have been held doWn ',:t';o ,a If,.1vel comparable to that of pre-war 'days " "This is' ,almost, a'\..1tomatlc, s~nce 'each individual farmer produces practic'ally all of "Lh[3 art,i~ c~es required for himself, his family 'ann retain~rs oreinplC'ye~sJ ' and the surplus production of' his farm is used more .to bFlr't'Pf ror " items' not produced by him ~, .. ;. not with the 'idea that he mf1Y~ heed the items'" but that t6 secure them h:ls'l~f,~, at home will:' "pe , )nore comfortable. For instance, he may ,exQhange rfc~,',fQr" sugar~ shoes; or cloth. Commerce between the'different" districts 'is encouraged,' l by the guerrilla unite, and oarefullt,'contr,olied ,to ,see' :~p.~t no. " aQuae of the plan may occur' and '~hat 'prices andval1ie~L',rnay :be, kept"· within.:r',easonable limits'. ' In"Ne.grO$"there ,~s quite ~la~ge. amou1,1t of sugar still on hand from' 'pre";'war 'production, ' : A, s~bstantial '

'. 10 '. percentage 9rth~s ,sug~is~oc-a:!i,e, * * * * * '* * ' -* ' The enemy upon arrival in the I~lands did' nothing to preserve the, v.arious "mining un~ is in working . condition. ,'The, gold mines were "stripped of power plants, small macl?-inery, pump~, spare parts, fuel" lubricatfngoil, ,~h:tch,resulted in t~e, pract,~cal ,~ , abandoriment of the mines. ',.As ,a result of, no powe!', the undet'ground pumping units stopped, and 'theinines, in most cases rlood~d., " This flooding, of t4.~, underground wor.kings wil~ ,mean the disinte:gration ' , of the; s'~;f'ts and :~minil1g,: equipment, so that upon reope:ni,ng, of' the r,nines, a major' effort and' considerable investment will be reqUired.

' .. 11';' This,haa, be,en ,trti.~, ifqt o;ilr: i ~;~. t~e "lar,ger: ~l:rii~g districts, ot, Baguio, but als~ '~!l,~h~ Camfir:~nes 'and ;in~ 'MasJ'-at~""Theenemy on the other ha,nd ha.s snow-b' a keen interc:ist 'in the' 'base' metal ,mines and ,'" iInJnediat~iy: ~.tarte'd "~h inve:stigationfor 'shipping ,out the base, metal ores .on hang 'at the 'invasion and in' 'contiriuitig in,oper,atlon the haft'e metalmin(ls.': ',':;' . ,,':' ,"- 'c,', ' , ," At 'pres~rit,~:the 'a'ne'my' isopera:tirig the copper mines at Mangcayan', a.nd Lepa.nto ~'e:~iotiilg som~ ~·,"500'·,lab6rers.A copper co,pcentrate fa p~oduced'ands'h~ppedrE1gularly to J'apan. The, enemy . is also operating the San Maur.ic*o' mii~s', on a:, 'small scale and' chposing only "the copper. 'be.a~~ng :ore.,: ,(He is' also' operating ,the P!t;il:-ippine Iron Mines, :a.nd is 'ta;ki~g "'stE!PS t'o 'reopen the iron mine a:t,: '. He' is operat'ing' the marig~,ri.ese mines 'oil,Busuanga r$~anc;\" and a small' m~nganese _m:ine 'at 'Gui'ndulI11an, Bohol.,' ! " The enemY has shipped from the 'Philippines the m;i.ned mapganese ore 'at ~us~nga Islarid,slso that which was stored at Map.ilaand Oabu awaiting shipment, and a portioR of the ore'.stored at Ooron, Siquijorj also the 'chronle ore mined and' awa.itingshi-pment at Acoje" Masinloo and at Cebu"Clty.' The enemy has not taken steps to operate the min~a at ,AC}oj,e~ Ma$inloc, -opol (chrome mine), Siq.uijor" Iron Mine, ,nor ,a~y" ot the' other base -metal mines in th~, dut~ying districts '1 The" ~aill re~sonror nqt b~if:tg ,able to undertake thesQ proj,e,ct,s has 'been' the 'interrere~ceftomthe guerril- launits. ' , " ,,',. " ' 'In' addition ~o the mining ventUre's fromwhic:l:i ~ _st~ady supply'of coppe:t~ concer.ttrates~n9-' iron ore are being 'shipped to' ' Japan" ,the E)nerrr.r has coll~c,ted all c6ins available' iri:theIslands and has ship~~d, 'Gh~m,t'o Jap~n, pre~umably fo~ t~~ir US~ ~s',;metal~ -,' Hf;il! has recovered al~o s~veralmill~onpesoa, l.n sllver currency duinped into the ocean near Cotr9gidorbefore the fall"C?fthe .. , ,fortress. ,Early ~ter, tl;lef'all ~r Manila~' the'copper'centavo could he\ soltl' to , the, Japs ~or .El;s ;high as 'three

and that' they too have:haditQ., sacrifice :fPT the war: effort t It· was'of utmost interest· for 'them, to ' hear' that the Americans noVI' find, a shortage of transp6rtat~on·:·f.a6ilities, :of sug~~,rubber, meat; canried goods, coffee, ~t~id, manyotber.· items whiyh haye gone in nor­ mal times to make up ~he, living, requir€?ments of the '. average Ameri­ can.' Locals in the Philippines began to realize for ,the first time that they have plenty of sugar, plenty of good coffee, plenty of, meat, poultry~ fish, eggs;fruit,s.ahd vegetables tn abundance. They were' even amused to. hear that there Was a shortage of fuel for heating the/ houses in' the Eastern States, an¢! a control of woolen clothing.' Here they have perpetualsummer-- and the mat­ ter of clothing is' one of" d.e'c~nQY and: not one of personel com- . fort. The ,natives had, a decided boost in their' :·morale upon get­ ting information that the JlmeJ'icans have had to. sacrifice, and are still. having to ~ac:rifice .fo:.~ the war E;jffort, and . instead o.f· being .' downhearted over the news of the retu.rntof'ormer times being de..,. , layed for a long~r, ,tim0 tha~ they led themselves to, e:;~pect, in the~r natural optimism, and wishful thinking; they a.re actu\111y planning.' now for a' iif'e to take them through, the. next two or three years ~ and find that. since they have actually gotten down, to the. t.af~k,'., the outlook is not' a bad one c They realize that they have already lived over eighteen menths, under wartime. cenditions, which in the beginning were rather stringent due to the uncertai.nty of condi'" . tions, but which during the past eight or ten months have more, or . le'S5 become routine, and with but little warlike activity to upset their daily . life • 'The guerrillas also,genera;I.ly. ,speaking" are doing, a.goed job in the free areas to re-establish a normal type " of livinge Where ·they have dedicated ·thoir organfza"liion m,o~e to the establisbInent of law and order, and have restrict?,d .theirwar, aotivitie~ tostrictly'guerrilla tactics, they haye had.r~markable. success.' in keeping the enemy close to the centers originally','" chosen for their conceptration, 'and retaliation oncivil.popv.~a;;" " " tiona for offensive" actitrities of the guerrillas has been se.ldom •. , The morale of the American' ahd Allied Eu;ropean citi­ zens in the hands of the enemy is also high,' .in spi~e' of·' their . life

in concentratiencamps, or 'at home under 8. parolee pass 0 This, is surprising as' a year ago there was a marked 'tendency'towards de­ terioration of morale. In' short; it may be said today that the morale. of the Americans and their associates in the camps is about the same as it was a yea.r: ago:.. They have had to . undergo the hard­ ship of\living in restriction to. the internment camp grounds at Santo Tomas (Manila) anq. to the Cireas formerly used as internment camps~ They have been very crowded, and have had a ration of food which has been very mo.ncr~enous. The food value of the' ration, how­ ever, has been life sustaining, ahd the internees have been permit­ ted to ~eceive pac!{ages of food and other items from source~'outsidG the .camp, and only a few have. not been able to rnak~ arrangements to rece~ve food,·£unds and supplies from friends in the city -- all of . which has. made i tpossible for most of the internees' ·to arrange, ,their daily living according to a very workable sched\lle, _and.'to ~ supply themselves with items ·of foodstuff and. S,om,etimes luxuries to augment the tiresome diet given within'the camp itself"There is, however, ~n ind~catio~ of'deteri9ration ef this hig~ morale (bickerings amongst, the internees and the magnification of their problems), but even. this will probabl,y 11-01:: be felt .for some· time . nqw that a re,cent change of site of, the internment camp ,ha~ been reporte~, RY ,t~".J.~p?-ne.se',~",ATl!: t~he.: ~llew:sd.te :'at'Los l3anos,, (or at CanluQ~rl~, ~-:'I'~S' ·'ye.t' confir!U8.t~on: o~, ·the :'a;c'tual' 'new" ~oc~tion h~s nqt be'en:' ~ad:e'~ . t~ere, will be,',ple·nt:tof;· spacei'whlch, wi'll undoubted~ 1y, pert;li~ 'f~mili~s tQ",l~v~' togeth~r~ 'and ;will",: perlri1~t oi7 much, more privacy:' th~n; that :whiopwasavailable :when living ,'together' in large dormitories at:Santo Tomas., TO"counteraet'theadvan,tages'of the new site;''J~6wever,wi~1 ,ente~ .a:'num.beror.",di~adva:ntages, 'sllc,ha,s distance from 'Manila V'J"~,ich ,will po'ssibly 'pre~ventthe regula;r- re'" c~ption 'of, a~ticles trqm.,outside.soti~cest"and: 10$sof: '90ntact with, homes bya number of the internt?,eswhoo'onti1;lue', to maintain homes in M~nila 'in charge of loyal servants ·to: :send -~!l food daily, han:d1e th~ lauhdry 'of'. c~othing, etc,." ·~nd at ,'mailY whe~re ;t~' wife. a.nd ch~ldren ar7 l~Vl.ng unq.er parolee pas~es, whi~;,t,he Jlusband ~~s been oonfin~d at, the Camp .Theeedis-advantage'~~, w~;'l ,be overc'~me even~ually,;~ hpwever, ~lldth~ advantages' of 'li~ing~','~ts~ ca.mp:~.in the prov~nces w~11 certainly 'prove more healthful and' ~f.f'o~d a more . normal type :,Qf living to the, ,internees than that 'att'l;ie University of Santo To'mas campus and collegfi).buildings. 'r~cirale, of the, Amerioan prisoners 'of war is ·bad. '~hey h~ve seen 'so muoh of we.r before the tall of ,their units, and then they have seen their comrades dying by the',hundreds, so that to"" , dt;LY they ar,e in poor mental condition. Their poor physical condi~ tion goep"'a long way toaf'fect ,their Qutlo0k: and their morale~ , They have given 'Up hope of being save.d:, . and "mariyof them Jl.o~kror~ w~d to deatp.b:( otie':Jf the disea,ses: prevalent in the two ' 9amps ~~ malariEi, dysentery" scuryy, bqri-berii: and, other, diet,ary deficiency diseases. This is a very unfort.1..1118,te condition, a.nd 'upon ~uthor~ty of General MacArthui', recently steps ha.ve' be'en, tak€n to supply~the p1;~soners secretly VJith food, ,funds and medic:alsuppl:tes'. What Ga.P be done immediately will, depend ,upon What,; security for the a~<:l sept the canips may be' had, and wh:tit ,enemy ,retaliation if' d:l.ac6ver.ed, i~: .. , brought upon' the ,pri6o:~ers (Jr, ,the agent's' of the 'Manila Il1t~1~lge~~~ group. If' rio difficulties are, encountered at the oamp,th~re 1's no doubt 'a good supply of: funds may be,'fUrl1ished th~ pr~~o~eI"s~ ,',' and as they ar~ permitte9 to purchase .foodstUffand'arti~les:rrom the prison, canteen, ~heir personal, conditions may' be i-mpl:-qtred , sv.bsequentlY.Medical 'supplies,' principally quinine' and, vi~l~mi,n c¢ncentrate~,,,,',lQay"be ~muggled into tlie ·ca.m~ at Oaba;natuan' e.~dlat Davao ,in sue}:!' amount p, :aa may.,,:OO :pwchased on t,he local' markets-.... which 'will 'be: ~y:~~',limited.P:la.ns' have 'been ,made ~nd supplie.~ put­ lined for,.J\e:J.:p;lng,"the' pri'soner,s in the 'future to·s. greater and, .. r~ally hEilpful e;tent. Actually getting tunds and supplies 'to" the , prisonersW'ith,in', i{he two prison camps, will 'not pres~rit m~ny 4i:f- " fioulties. At. Manila, ,the agents of the' Manila Intelligence. groups. have \Jeen 'aqle",tq :.get inside' the camp almost at any time' 'desi,to~d ;..­ and, at Dav&Q work parties 'of prisoners ·may, .. be eontac-ced byagents~ , The dif'f'iciilty'will be in' keeping the fact from !the knowlE3dge, , o~ , the enemy. He~vier purchases from the prisoli:'canteen; existence of medical stlpplies, and betterment in the Clondition ·ot the"', , prisoners, may bring about an investigation arid' a di'scovery '.df the, supplies and funds havil1g been sent into' the Camps. ':[lhe enemy Imay ,

close his \eyes and be, inwardly thankful that one of, h:ls pr~b~~tIiS I , may have been solved for, hil1l- and onthe,6ther hand, he may>'be resentful pf t'be 'improved 'C0nditions~· and ,mete ou~ a,'retaliation, or at least make it ,morediff-ictllt to,~ g'et in Buppli

funds will be made., and the result:s obser.ved.• ' , :," <,' " . . .; '" . 9. Coastwtitcher'Stations,:s", ',,' ,',' ' , " ,; ", ", " In 't~loth 'Mi.litary D.;Lstrict," (Mi'ndan~o and:. Sulu): -radio ~ ,,' ' ..

... 14 .. [ watcher stations have been ins.talled to cover. the Davao Gulf, the Surigaci Straits, t~he north coast of Mi:nd~nao from l'fbrthern Zamboanga eastwar¢l to Gingoog Bay, and on the ~outh' coast of Mindanao, at· Lebak (south of Ootabato), :L~banga.n (Illana Bay)" Margosatubig,. ". Malangas and Kabasalan.. These stations, tog$ther wit4 rather ex ... · ':' . tensive.lan.dline telephone' and telegraph stations within the dis- " trioit net,work" all flash news' of ~ship 'and plane movements -'quickly" . to the net control statfon at the headquarters of the Distr'ic.t. ' " 'rhe tlashes are s,ent to' GHQ, SWPA, as quickly as' pos-· sible. in order ,th~t ,·the. information may be in the hands of any· sub­ marine commander patrolling ,tbe ..J?hilippine' wat'ers' in time to be of . .. - USe. , In· addition to the relay of the information to SViPA an arrangement is now under trial with ~he.commande~ of one submarine, whic~ inv~lves the broadcasting of t~e daily flashes direet to tpe submarine on-a prearranged schedule, USing a cypher of dou.ble transpositiqn,.s. This, if successf~ll~ could' be extended to cover all submar.ihe.$ sent to -ehisarea' for patrol duty ~ The hco~:.dcast of f'lashe s to the submarine d.irect is done in addition to the usual transmission-of the inf0rmat:l.on to SVlPA. . Aside from the V'Jatcher' net established in the 'loth . Military District, it isu.ncerstood that. flashes on ship and: ?-ir- , plane movements are being sent.regularly·from statioLs'establ:tshed in the 6th and 7th Milita.ry Districts (Pana,y a.nd'Negros), and that an efficient watcher station net is also: in operation ln these districts. ' ' An interesting angle to the establishment of watcher nets has been the .fortunate sinking of a number of enemy vessels' in the areas; once or twice in sight of the watcher station; which has all been~ stimulant for the mo):'ale 0'£' the people, and t6tha definite encouragement of the work at the watcher stations. People living in the nf~een areas know now th~t the 7Pqi:;Lippines ' have not, been abandoned by A,mer~ca -- they have seen res1):lts or submarine activity in their qountry. . Stations should be, establIshed as soon as equipment· is made available, at the follO,w"ing· points not now being . covered: , . . a) On the 'north end of Samar Island' to cover the San Bernardino Straits. . . , b) to cover movement of vessels eastward ·of.the Islands which do not come through the Island passages. c) Northern Mindoro to cover the Manila Bay en- . trance and the Verde Island Passage.. , .. d) Western to cover vessels that may be taking the China Sea route -- usually from Takao to French Indo-' China or Malayao ' . e) Eastern central Mindanao for the same purp~se' "as indicated in Itb. n .' ~ These stations could' be ~q1.lipped' with the same type of. radio equipment supplie~ heretofore .... - low-powered, comparative­ ly short-ranged, battery set.s -- to operate. through control sta... · " tions at, one or more of the Military Dist.ricts. It is recomrnended that all sets, operate on the same frequency for uniformity, so as to simplify the monitoring by the control station -- that the con:" trol station be supplied', with a separate set for use only in moni .... toring, day and night, fl~shes from watcher stations (as compared with the present arrangement of wor~ing all statIons within the District at a schaduledt.ime twice daily) -. and that an arrange ... m(3nt be worked out along ;the .I.ines of that noV! being tested, .of· ~. broadcasting the information to the submarines which might,be ori patrol within the Philippines, and simultaneously to t~e '$WPA, ..

-,15 .. .or that the ce~tre.:t stat~oJil' atter(.,r.ec~iyi~g .flasp~~. a~c1giv:ing them ca,r.eful evaluat.ioJl (n~ces~a.ryi \beoahs'e, watGhe~·,s:tatJion.s ·:repor.tlfifJ..!.lY : craft, ',such·: as small s~;;tpoa~s,. whi~h fo~uldobyi94~.ly' i?e,'of n9:,··:. , i~ttere~t to theN~vy) ~', be p'e:r:~tte.Ci: .. t~:,: r~p6rt ~, d~;rec,~ly :to. ,the: Nava~ . radio.' et'ation in t.he ~rea qontt~o.llipg th~'submarin~s ·:i.n :~pilippine<. wa.ters (sending' duplicate messages" simu~:f,~ne.ous+y..! ~toGHQ::~'~r .desired) so' as· to' aSSUre .quickest possoible. traJ;lsnd.. ssion.' ~:ci';'the" su:brnarines;'" ~der ~ither. of these arr~ng~~.nts it' is:hO'nc~j.V'abl~that valUable combat ,informatio~ could: .. be. 'in' the., .hand.;!:. of'i'\ih,e patrol vessels with­ i~'a few -hours of transmission rr~rn the .. watphEir stat:i.on~ Thes~ ", a~rangemen:ts would require the delivery to,' ·the, I$:ian4s, pi about ei,ght or ten radios for ndditional Watcher ~t~t~6hs, and one' high ... powered radio trarismit:te:;," and·:r~cei~tto b.e'-'iristalled at the control station of the Dirtl'ict a'~he' teleradi.os.. p~evio~sly supplied h~ve been found very w,ell suit.ed £or~the wprk 'outl~ned for them. , Tltey are portable and may 'be movedtr,om plao~t,q place" frequent;J.y , tQ avoid' detection by the enemy; :and 'bhe.y have been found to be ef­ f:i,cient and. flexible to chan$ing' cQna~tions of. d:itferent Ipoations .• Tltey should continue to bee'q~lpped ,wi~h motor, ·bfittery.... charging s~ts, as motorfuelofs6me kind or other is' usually qbtainable i~ the areas. where,the sets may wo:rk.' As a safety measure, however, i~ would be well to s'tJ,pplt·a: hanQ. charger, or wind cha:rger, with e~ch set if obtainable«. A comple-t.e set of ·spare. parts, including c~stals, shOUld be sent with each set. Especially required' .. amongst th~ spa..7'e par'fls, are, power vibrat

10 • ·Prop~ganda!·' .'. .' , . , . ...'. .' . '. .'....' . 'With the knowledge ~~hat.·the F:t:liP'~~o._"p~:ople~· 'with'but: '.. :. few exeeptiQns, i;o. qo~~h the. ~nogQup~q '~nd, oo~'Up.i.t?c;l .areaSt ~y 'be.' . counted on tor their pro-Allied loyalty' for' an iijde~lni.t.e·p'eriod ' o~~'time, it makesth~.probl~m .of.·.b*6~dc'ast;!'lg ,raA~o, pf-opaganda 'a . s~mpler:matter than if it. were necessary to'cortv:;'hce·the .poople . that a.lliance agaip·with America" is ,·bette~" than anything they . could e~pect shOUld they be lured over to the side of . the .,enemy .,~hr~~h h~s very interesting and admittedly:effic~eny'~adio propaganda. The enemy,. has used every possible angle ~o, l.lrie the Filipino people ;up ro~l'Asia tor the' Asiat~cs~ tt "Philippines for the Filipinos" n. ' "qreaterCo~Prosperity.Sphere.·' an4 'fo on. Th,e Filipino people have listened with an Asiatic poker ... raced solemnity to.the gla.mour of·the J~pan~se radio .broa~cast,s."'~ Qut'.tocounter this;' they have seen' mQre ,t.angipl~ evidence agains~ such propaganda olo.$or. tp hom~., . They have seen their industry taken over by the Japanese business~ m~n,their. r.lag take.n down and replaced .with the 'Japanese flag,' they have felt t.he pinch ora "simple" life as p.1uggod by the. Japan- 6tj39 propaganda to be the. prdp~:r:way to live asan··A.~.ie.tic in Asis; The propaganda .vrill.... no.t:r~a.c.h :the.; in~~:s of the IPilipi:b~: people, even if the -war and the tlaid,t is .del~jted .f.9r. seve~o.l. yeflr~s •.... '. . . . i . The, av~r9.$e .. F,llAp~no .. qi~ize.l1 is de.finit.ely.'·co:rcerned ove~ the pro'misi)p~ independeq96.to. the co:untrypy: the' -qn~ted States as '~mphasized -Cno. muqh on' the"Sap: ll'rancisoo :radi.o :,br6a.~cas.ts / He is, ·~rr,aid that ·:he· independence wi~;1'depriv~ him. Pt:. that purt of his former lif:ewhioh has been ,connected:~s~:~coni.fbr.ta·!)~~y and~ pros­ perously ·wjjjh the .:qn;ited S.tJ.~~S .:, .:,Hs· d~e!3·"nQ.t w,ant .t:) '10b8 'co~taot . with . th~ c:ountry whos,e n~;ne, ha~ ;peGp ,'syn6nyinOll~" ~p. ~).t~:?l:.i'~ippipe~· : with hea},:G11,education,:.comi~brtabl,e ·.~ivi~g. aP9· f~(~,edom i·r.o~Tfl int·e~.;. nal ,t;roub:J"es, and .from·lnterna:t;"ional·.dif:rj;c.:ultie.s.~·our.i.ng th~;·:paE!_t .'. four decades.' ' ,. " '," "1 ,., ..' , , "" "..

.• 16 - It' isbeli~vedt'hat radio propaganda at thepr~,sent time should: be directed to the"Fllipino:s with' tb,~ knowledge of their basic 10yalty - .. 'somewhat the same as if the propaganda we~e being directed' to Amerieano.omestio audiences --,and ,let'them know~ , here that they' are not being ,forgott,en by t.he Uni~~d states, that the return 'of UoS. armedforc'es ,t,o' the Islands to evict the Japan'" ese is inevitable (although ,it maybe delayed for a ,longer 'time than the' Fil~piriO's in,·their ,impatience may ,desire), and tl:3.t upon the return o'r the tormer government tel the' Islands, everything possible wIll bed-one to bring about arehabilitat~on of the in-' dustry . and busine,ss of the country;, and. the re-esta.blishment of ttnormal~t conditions to the "satisfaction of the Filipino people. " Due to the da.ngerof focusing attenti.o~ 'too much on' the guerrilla'efforts, which might bring about increased pressu;re on the part of the enemy for their elimination, it" is b6l~"eved that no mention of their continued resistance ,nor of their efforts . should be made. The guerrilla un:tts,' are following strict.Iy guerril­ la tactics at the present time, with t~e. idea that iftl,ley continue,

to do so, the enemy vIill not bothertnuQh with re-inforcements of ! their tr60ps in the centers ,w:.thin th.~ guerrilla cqntroJ.le.d ter­ ritories. Areas lightly held may' be easier \taken whej:1 the time comes for 'the guerrilla 'units to act offensively in 6;J6rdindtio~ with any activity in the ,;,direction of the, :Philippines en 'the, part, of General MacArthur~sr()rces.,Propagandato help the guerrillas may at present be more of a detriment than helpo , . Printed propaganda directed to the Filipino people would, be of definite assistance throughout the, Islan.ds. '.rhis could'be sent~ to' district commanders itl, the Islands 'with supply , shipments, who would arrange for circulation throughout the areas, both occupied and unoccupied. It VJouldhelp in keeping ,to a high point the morale of the guerrillas, and of the people of the Islands. Such propaganda should be carefully prepared and litho~, graphed in good quality work so that its' having been' prepared: i'n, America will not be doubted - ... thus it would serve us a message ' from the American people to the Filipino people. The subjects~ most likely to help at the prese,nt time would include short mes­ sages to the, Filipino people indicating a positiv~ plan tO,return to the Islands to evict the enen;ly; asking, for the patience and' continued loyalty of the people in waiting for the return to pre- 'War ""conditions; reference to the plan (if, there is one). for the. ' rehabilitation of the Islands; messages from General MacArthur to bolster the morale of the Filipino people; messagesf'rom Pres:ident Quezot;L' and President Roosevelt, impressing on the F~lipino people, the' plan for return to the Islands of the Commonwealth Government, and of the plans to re.. establish the economic structure afthe Is­ lands after the war; messages pointing out the 'acts of the enemy wi~hin the country which' are detrimental to the interests of the Filipino people -- such, as ,commercial monopolies by the Japanese, taking down of the Filipinq flag, the implanting of Japanism, ' , wherever possible to the de'stru~tion of Filipinism, etc. Pamphlets containing messages to the people, containing neWs of Allied victories,,. ,Wit.hpictUres, and carefully distributed through theintelligence'~ agents, of the various districts; both in­ side the oocupied areas a~nd. th~oughbut, the free area.s, would be helpful to. the guerrilla'movement, without necessarily bringing down retaliation or,c-ampa:lgn to eliminate the guerrilla forces -­ this, of cours,e, with the understanding that th~ pr6pagandad~es not mention the'gue:trillaforces. It, f)hould,'contain messages, or achievements in other ,theaters to indicate to the Filipino' people the strength of the Allied forces and assurance of, ultimate victory~

, "Presetitradio pr~p?lga~da "has "an excellent coverage 'in I

- 17 ... the "rree'n ate;;', and';almos~"np ,.a.ov~,rage ,lwithi,n ,:th~. occ~pied a:reas. The enemy has; taken ,every ',PQs;sible ,.m~ans..:.t,Q."preyeD:t' ,tl!.e liste,tling to, i"oreign .newscasts within, ,t.he 'occ\ipie'C1,,:ai"~,ffs. ",First.,: he/ 'pei~':.' ,,': : ' mitted the use of shortwav:e,r~y'eJve'+st.,~tt,~r::':~:t-oliibiting ,"the "u$e--: 9£ outside' antennas ~- ,thi:hking tpat :,wi~,h, :~he,:r¢Jllqv~~ br"'the:,ichltside " , aerials, 'foreign broadcasts qould,-not, be",ll~~d.",::,ltWtas£oUrid that: not much 'difficulty was e:x:per~enc~d 'in.getting' the' b:rotidoasts"''!'1~th, no aerial .. - a.nd surely: with an"i~s~d~ 'a~rial,·stiungUnd(h·',;tpe house to' avoid detection;" thebrQadcasts,fr¢m the .more:P9y~ar~ul statiqhs came 'in -as' well 'as wi.ththe. outside wiring. 'Nex·t',¢'ame an order not, to listen to ,thefore1g,n ~tatio:ri~,; .' ~it!:l;,i penalty of' death if oaught., ThetLeame the order"in, JanuaT'w~1943, t"hat:"a~l: "

sets must 'beregistere,d: and sent, into I ,the J_apa'ne·s·€)~'(t~~reall for re­ oonditioning to prevent li:s:tening to: ,shortV,la;ve ' stations. : In the meantime, the Japanese ,milita.ry r purposes'of cQPying), ' f;l.nd ··post it on bulletin boarCls and, £0r circula'Lioll to the Qutlying districts. Tne news ,is wel:L accepted,' and the aqt of circulating " the ci..u-rent ,news.. thr.oughout 1;. he· are'as is a fine mora.le-bui:J..ding' effort. . " , ' ' : ;f " *' * " *,., , * * * ,*"" * 'A 'p,l~n mig~t be workabl~ eV'entual1yfo:r reachi~g, the. , occupied areas-'throu,gh the installation of, a -povlerful loug\tJave, ' b~oadcasting' station somewhere in a. Secure; place. within t.ho .IDler.., :, r~lla-aontrolled areas, ,for re,-broadcasting, on longW'ave the U~S'. I • snortwave 'programs,,: and for .broadoastihg lo~al news items. :This.is r~commended for immediate consiCl-eraticrn only $0 far as, the'in~tallf;­ tion of the equipment' -is, concerned; but' no;t; ~p~",aotual. \lS,~ un~il"., :.'. such time as it, may be 'advisable' ~o ,reaoh::t~~:.-:pe.6pla·\',ri·~hi~ t.,ll€?;',', ,,-: oCdupied areas ',to' build up s'upportror, ~xpee:ted. All:1;ed;<1.c,t;iYitle,s.,;. in the country. ,.A pr.emature ",usa .0;' t,~e:~ta.f.~:on.vv.6uld. probaqlY,.' '. caUse the enemy to take .. su~ce;Sf?+ul:. steps "tq'~ell:l!!i~ate ;it ;:',', ': ):.

• • ~~. '; • • _,' .,. ~ J. • • .":-. I ...

11. Penetration"Parties: ' .. ,,< ,:- ,"'0;' ,. " ,':,,' " .:,',',': ~.,;, Thsse, p~ties~ as, euch~ ,~e/ndt',requi;red' nor' rec9mmertded .-rot- the milita.ry'districts in: the";V'isayas· a:hd'Minda,nao;~' These

..... lS,.- districts are. ,now1Netr)n. the"hands of the gu~rrillauni:ts, and.iri most cases" 'CP'W{ll'unication'~l:}~:ts. hqve, been ,establ'ished,tq ",assure se'-, cure, cbmmunications·from., within ,the ,distrlcts:o» , Reliable ,and tho­ rough inteiligenceinfo:~ina£ionmay :be,supplied, ,as desired. - In 'each of'the. Military 'Districts'''a1r,eady recogniz,ed, and ,in each of the·other d:istrictsas .soon:as repognized, it might be helpful and ,;very: de.sirable f'ormor.~lerbuilrling effect as, well as forC,loser contact with GHQ,.to send, an, O;ffic,~rto act as obse,rver for GHQ and liaison with )th~ guer:vil~a leader of the district. An , observer could b~,of much 'help to the guerrilla leader in assisting him to unify and 'keep unified,th~ various troops within the dis­ trict, as experience has shown that the obS,~rver (being tangible evidence of interest in the guerrilla movement on the 'part of General MacArthur) has been able to build mqrale in all parts of the distr:lct visited, both among themili:t-ary and civil papula\... tiona. The observer's value is' 'more for "lfving evidence'" of ' American interest in the Islands, than poss'ibly his own efforts. His presence does much' towardallaylng fears of the peopJ,ethat they may have been abandoh$d' by General MacArthur 's forces,' and strengthens their c0rl:tinued patience for 'the return 'of ,what they refer to' as' the "aid." !t is proba'Qly a'mistake to send into the Military Districts ·untra-ineCl Filipino enlisted men from SWP,,1., of the :type sent to' date. Their 'effect on the morale of the 10c8.1 guerrilla troops is damagihg~' They return to the Phrd,ppi.nes with stories' of lUXUrious treatment ,in SWPA,' good pay and usually dis­ pJ:ay a comparatively sub~,tantialaniounty of money. The men are well; equ~pped with shoes, 'goodc16thihg, modern equipment ... - items far from'being obtainable by the guerrIllas,. even'b~tter than guer... r,illa field officers possess ·'-all of which ,adds up to create a feeling of discontentment amongst the guerrillas. Were there a need for, this type of personnel, the sending of them might, be justi­ fied, but in the various milit~ry districts there' is' a surplus of manpower ava~lable, including professional and technical m,en. As a matter of flict, it 'might be well to consider 'on the part'of GHQ the possibilities of securing from 'the Philippines trained person... nel for any of the departments of the services' in the SWPA 'which might be;; lacking in specialists ...... such as radio ope~a.tors ,doctors, '. mechanics, surgeons, chemists, ~adio 'technicians,' rnerqhant marine ' officers and ,similar types, of which there is a surplus available in ~ll of the free ar6'as~ Needless to se:y, these men would be very glad to. 'volunteer for serv~ce in the SWPA. ' .. tJp to this point, ,the remarks have been directed against purely penetration parties being' sent,' to Military Districts already organized' and recognized (or totqese districts as soon as they - have been recognized). There, might in time be a decided advantage, however, to have such parties 'sent to areas near or on the Island of Luzon and not for ~he purpose of cont'acting' guerrilla groups. ,These penetration parties could be organized for the collection of in­ telligence information, and for potential assistance in 'unifying any friendly groups encountered or developed in theareas~ Gre'at care should be taken in training,equipping,~ and selecting" mon to make up the parties. To be taken into consideratio'n is that the ,~en could not keep thE?ir identity ~w~~hh;eld :rrom the people in th~ area (§ven if they were natives o:f',ihe place) nor that they had come' rromoutside. ,This being 'true,:there i p no advantage in se­ leot,~~g"m,en tQ illakf.;}; up'penetration parties espe'cially for' the~r abi1 it.y to .. land and ~tt~,mpt to. pose as 'inhabitants of lho' site s,Qleote,d. In fa~t,-. they~ould,be ate. distinct disaCl.'Vant,ljlge, as guerrilla' groups throughout'Luzon, either'legitimate or outlaws, are ,~o, afrft,id of:J'ift,h'ColumIl:Lstsa,nd espionage agents', '(Filipinos) bein~ USE3.;¢r t(),,~. great e.xtent J?y the enemy ~o track -down and uncover these ,groups',:,tha,t they:wouJd' 'treat with 'cons1.derablG suspicion any . '... .:' '··r· ." .~' . '. ~,. '. ; .,

,- 19 'I'" n~wr~ce; ::in "t'h~~~~~j ~,~~d',:.thi~~'~~e'~:tment m:t'ght'~ea'S ily, r.e sul~, in, . los's of, life:.. , 'On ,the ot'her"'harid,,:tt a;ri,lme~ric:~HiQr:,Americans~' could be included 'in ,the ·pa.r~;e'st;:·t,heY'eb1.!1d~e: e:x~ect:ed"''to' ,be lQokec;l;': upon with less SllSP:tlumnists". 'pr, ,~nemy a,gep.t·s~", b~t" th~~': fit3k:.'\!ouid, be: far less' th~n" t{.lat w·hich a 'Filiplnofrom ,t;)'ut:?ld~, w(;nild,i!-~; , ·Engli'sh is' spoken ,'.

sufficiently thrQughout the, ls:lan~$; 1 SIO.·'t:l:l~~ ltno~vled'ge pi. the. language is not peoessary·., , ,',' , ~. '.. :,.. ", . '",' ,"" ' . "A penetration :party :tof th~ barren, f:lorth'Vle,~t .. coastor , Mindoro might be ·-feasible.·· An .a1:.:ter9-a.te'~ite ~oulq ',p'e o~ the ~outh­ etn part of BondocPeninsula.' A 'party: at: either pC these pla.c~s c~uld, when' acquainted with the, people" in "the di~;t:rict,' 'and when' the friendship of the native populatioijmay~ave beeninvestiga.ted and found secure, develQpa' group'·of . agents. from,t.he' locals to send ipto theoocupied areas for the .purpp,se ot, securing information, . apd for the qelivery,of cyphere'd messages,to the intel1igenc~ . " group now furtctioning within the city' of Mani;ta. Members of the pfi.rty Wduld"·def~tiite}y not oe" able to get ,into occupied cities such a~ Manila wi thcut unclue ·risk of ,de t~c~ion, whe':r:-eas t;.gentS dev!elC?P~,d.

amongst residents in the ar'e,a (sPGcosst'ul1yexpe~io:q.oed ,in the ' . J tp.1'ee recognized military.,dis,tricts) c01l1d do so. xr the da~er, or r~th~r tire clelay, in,'developm.e~t :of,s,~cu.re,agen~sfromvvit,hin tpe'sites' makes this p~~an undesira.bl~, it woul.dnotbe di.ffic\l~t".', to arrange ,that· agents' from: wi thi:n the,occ1lpi(;)d, arec;.s (men aJ,.- ,:',. raaQ.y known to be'oompletely 'trll.st;worthy. alld loyal:) 'b~ J3<7n~ 'to ~ct;', as' cquriers for· ,the ·penetration:par.ty,." ', .... '; .. '., ... ;"'.', ,.'.' " ", ,'.: . . \ " , : Penetration,parties' sh~',1ld take' a. . mir;J.ir~um .of: eq~ip~nt. Perso~1- effects' cc:nild, be! ·limited;tO'·\·Sl: 90.upl~:; ~t~, chlb.:1g~:E?':' or ~l

.. '20:,,",'" require~ents . of.. -the &ls.tricts'.·.· Assuming.·:f.'ive,'districts ,to be .s~p~ plied ip the Visayas' and Mindanao,' 'this would· mean- a shipment to- . eac};( district; onIya.:t .fr'omtour'to sbt' ;rntinth. intervals. . , .' It 'is believed ;thaf- 'se'rious 'consideration Should· be given tp'th,e de~iv~:r~'6f supplie~,to the lOth Military District' in larger ~ount·s for' use inthat',district and for delivel:'y to the adjacent districts. 'S'ecure . and ade'quate, landing facilities ,are . available in this distrj.ct· for rece.ivingsay'up to 200 ton;:;; ul1-'­

loading and' dispersal' of':shipnient to' be done ill: ,one night oJ It is not certain tha.t other districts are' so fortunately equipped" If' not, supplies for those' district,'s could also be p.andled satis­ factorily through the lOth Military 'District. There is constant sailboat traffic' between the districts, 'and as yet no difficulty" has been experienced 'in' sending supplies from one, district to the other. In case of any' plans in the future to send supplies.by air, the loth Military-District might again be a suggested supply base for adjacent distric·ts, duetb its large areas of unoccupied territory,and isolated areas 'with 'airfie~ds which could' handle the largest planes with no exp~cted interfor-ence on the part of the .,enemy (at least for the first few shipments) ~ The 10th Military District is the nearest to ·the SWPA airports. Aside from the·rolltine shipment of supplies to the units in the Visz;yasan.d Mindanao, and' for penetration parties around Central Luzon, the shipment of supplies to units located in Northern Luzon should be considered. It is understood that the submarines operating the nearest to that area work out of' Pearl , Harbor. . There are many' secure s1tes in Northern Luzon for the, land~ ing of ~upplies', and in cooperation with the guerrilla un1 ts and .through th~ir communication system, a rendezvous for t~e submarine could be worked out, andplans.dev:elopedfor the delivery of funds, supplies and ammunition,. iflonglines already suocessfully being handled in the South. An~ e'arly consideration of an init;ial shi.p­ m~nt to Northern Luzon is highly recommended. . As Governor Roque. Ablan is understood to bEr' active in the guerrilla actiyities in 110cQS Norte, a site within his province -- possibly: Bangt\ed. Bay -- would probably otfer satisfactory landing facilities. The west coast of Luzon (south or BanguedBay). would not be recommend~ble during the next four months· due to the ·s'outhwe,st monsoon~ . In... ves.tigation'may disclose 'also 'that a site' on thH 'barren and almost un:i;nhabited east coast of Northern Luzon would be accessible to. the guerrilla units under MajorPraeger. If 'air t~ansport to the Philippines' is not practicable, it is recommended that an extra trip of 'a submarine be made after a patrol now and then to bring up a larger amount of suppl~es to' the- guerrilla districts. A suggestion along the following ·lines' might meet with acceptance of the 'Navyi 'A submarine returning ..:from patrol would go to a northeastern Aystralian port (Darwin, for in­ st~nce) where' a shipme'nt 'of say thirty or forty tons of supplies (full .capacity of the' vessel) w9uld be ready for loading, also the required a~ount of fu~l oil and provisions: for the trip. The, sup­ plies ~~ cargowou;td,·:~e'load~dandthe. vessel dis~atche,d ,as ~oon as poss~ble for the ·tJ;'~P to M~ndanao. The only ,1If'~shtt to l?e ca~­ ried on the su.brnar:tne would be those in the tubes, leaving the:., torpedo rooms freE( for lQading cargo. The' cargo would be delivered to the site,' ch~sen~ and the vessel would return to its ba~e in Australia in the' usual manner for' maintenance' and fitting-o'IJ.t for its next patrol.. It is calculated ·that trJ.s woul'd probably not add three weeks' to routine patrol. . , In" se.nding .. s'upplies to the recognized district~,' unless the}\ravyreq1iir~s that the shipment be accompanied by 'som~o'ne to arrangecontac:t'and'.del:i,very of the suppli~s at., destination, it .. .. . ;' . ,. .. : ....

.... 21 - , would be .ane.a.sy.ma"tter .(~s~1?-m~ng the ,c9n~inuanceofpresent cQndi... .:tiona. ,in.-the· vaT,lolls ,a:reas.t·;·t~·:,1artd,:the·'stipplies 'Eitsafe, arid' .sequre. contact· p'oint~ 'wi,thoti,t~ .reqU;~r:tn.g'::cU?Y.Qne t9 ac6'0m~any;t'he. 'supplie,s;~ .: . Sho':lld tne ·NavY".¢1~s.i.re'a, re~:r:e.'~e~ta,~~ye·.El.bdard' :to: ttlake' ,'arrangements at de~:tination, .thi,tf ¢6uld' be '~anq;led ~by a.n or~~ceror enlisted . : mat:l (pne ind:i.v~.di.lal·only) ~~o ~~6~la"knq'W" enc,ugh· '(if .local ct>ndi~iC?ns at the, des'ignated 4i$ohargEf ':PQint··t~O:,'go:ashorein. 'a>s'mal1, ,boa't, '·to ': arrange 'for landing·,ra.cj.lit·~~·s·.·NosteYe~o~C?s t'o"'uilload the .,8Up- . .plies ,~e re'quire,d, :as in each .·~etiV~ry 'hei;eto£or~ , t~e "personnel ,on. t~e deliveril'lg vessel 'has' handled'.th~· ~ischarge';:entirely ,'and has be'enable to discharge' the, e~tireshipment in a matter of ·a'bout .a half' hour. " I~ eeon of, tl.'ie '~istriats 'in the Visayas and ,Minda.nao,. there; a:r~ areas h¢ld complete;I.y in friendly . hands, 'isolated from e~emy ,pressUre or pa~rols,and .w.here·the '$ubmarine 'could even- sur­ face and discharge' oargo at :'midday' with h6 great risk. With the ~ perfection of a rapid:. communication 'of'messages to submarine's;(as i~dioated .under subje'6:t bfnwa.tcher· stattonsll) additional s6cu.:rity would be -given to. submarines thr'ough'mak'ing available means to' advise the vessel quickly of any change in' -ehe security of; an area de.signated for the discharge ~of supplies •. Present commllpicat-ion . 'facilities between' the', various.distriets and the SWPA give :limited protection to thesect1!':i:.~Y 0'£ -the' 'vessel, , but-·' a delay is e:4cperienced in getting advice to vesse.l: ('usua11:,,: t\VO days) Which may, be too late. to prote·c.tagaip.st a 'changed c',. emergency runds~. Th~ mon~y ~hould b~ :.;Tapanese 'mil:itary currency in denominations ot saytrom 'five, centavos ·to·~rive 'peso~ (~o\1p.t.er .. " ,: reited . e~re.hCY) p Philippihe GO'Y'ernm$litctU-rency, .ih' sinalt d~nomi.. · nations, say not. over bills of' ten pesos' or u.s ~/bills . inlfl.Jfge '

.... 22 - denominatipnsto,be:usedto ,pu:r~hase" currenoY,circulated in occu'"

pied areas.. . , . .:,:': >. " I,' .:' ,.' ':'.. '" . ;. ~n addition to the mon,ey(which is required, for \lse for intelligence. purposes within the occupied, ~easby a.gents ·of the , gu~rrilla, organizations) ,when f$~nding suppli~s to t,h~: recognized districts; a, supply of linen ~ag"bond paper, ,and i~s' of vGU'ious colors· should .be included. ·On.the basis' of· actual ~nd expect~d added circu~ation of notesmonthly"within, the, loth Military DIs" trict, some 30,000 sheets, of' paP,er.. (about' 12 X 14), 25 ll?s of .' black,aril 10 Ibseach of r~d, green,. b,lue and flake. white inks' are required monthly to takecareof'the .. p~i~til:1g of the required notes. The currency printed runs l'rom fiye' centavos to twenty peso bills.,Ars>coirunendable al:ternativQ would'be. to lithograph the gU8N rilla e~e:rgency currency in SWPA, fo~lowing identical wording and" . signatures presently used.'. The. advantages of this plan are 'many'-... less ;3pace required.· for shipmel'it ,compared .wi th paper and ink, well lithographed bills would be more difficult to. counterfeit, morale... ' building effect and added confidence which th~·people'would have in a well designed set of currency (riot possib~e now by guerrilla units due· to l.imitod. and crude faciliti/3s.) . . d) Radio equipment: Each shipment~ of supp~ies should contain several teleredlos. or dry-ceIl-powered sets for use within the .network of the gUGr:::-illa. districts, and for.the,instal- " lation of additi0!1al watcher. ?tations.· These sets' should be equip· ped with crystalf:> of the same frequency as those furnished with the, radIOS: :first .sent, in order to permit ·stEi.ndardizatio-n •. In addition' . to the radios for making he\v in$.tallations, .there should be sent spare parts for the radios previously sent, and parts of a general natur.e ,for the sets built originally in the districts 6 . .' .... e}Sabotage material'and other items for' sub- versive activities within the ehe'tny'slines (incendiarY'pencils and charges, timepombs and any ,o~het articles) could be developed f9r . this type of work. It would not 'be at all difficult to carry. ou~ subversive activities within the enemy ... occupied. areas through t:qe . use of atfoents and contact men ·alre.ady in service .v~hE?n the appro- . priate tl.mearrives for this type ,of work. 'rhe results undoubtedly not only would be damaging to the enemy, but would be morale-build­ ing for the .guerrilla.s./· They would take pleasure in "being able to' hurt the enemy, andhlnder his w·arlike activities, and economic ef­ forts, without' meeting him in open warfare, and where only a few·. men could do lots' of damage. . . , .. ", . . f)' Morale-building supplies: This' type of sup­ plies should not be overlooked. - There should be' included cigaret- , tes, late American magazines, propaganda leaflets, a few late 'moving picture films especially newsreels (several ·projectors of 'the com- . mercial type are available in the,lOth Military District under guer.r. rilla cOhtr91), kha};i cloth" needles, thread and buttons, shoes, socks, undervvear, sundry toilet articles, su.ch as to<;>th paste, razor blades, books, gan;tes, athletic equipment, tooth brushes, combs and such similar items ...;- these articles are unavailable in the·Philip­ pin8s, and their receipt by the gue!'rilla units w'ill undoubtedly do much to keep the morale of the troops at a . high level~A small amount of wheat flour for.communion wafers and of masS wine might, be sent at intervals for the Irish (Columban) and American (Jesuit) priests, of whom some thirty-five or forty are located at parishes. withi:n the guerrilla-controlled areas' of Mindanao, .. and vrho are co-· operating with the guerrillas.to the fullest extent. (The wo:r-k of these priests rorthe guerrilla. movement in Mindanao cannot be : praised too highly. /The superior of the Jesuit priests is actively engaged ~n working at the l09thDiv. Hee,dquarters in developing pro~ jocts'·for,·the· substit13ltion of.'articles available locally for arti­ cles previously:- imported, -"j"',' he has done a fine j9b. on working out a method· of. using cinchona 'bark. concentrate for thG' treatment of . ". malaria. In the other dist,ricts ,are l3.1$o. a number of priests who:, . have always ,shown a keen interes~; in helping the, g~errillas, and in .... protecting' them from th{3~'nemY.:irimany cases.,) . 'C': ; . . g) Such sundry supplies as may be" requisitioned . from'tittle ,to .:timeby t:he·guettilla·,le~de.ts If, ,'0:. ,;' . : .," :;' .• , It is estimated that a typical shipment of say up to . ei'ght tons'."a:bo'ard ~ subIl1ari·ne'.on :t'egu~ar:·;pat.rol"w~llld p~st 'be'di- vided50%,: ammun±tio,t), . 20% ,m~:di6al~and. de~t!11,supplies', ,:lO% tnQ.t?-ey, . paper and, ix.Ik, ,5%: sabotage pateri,al, .. ~;t, :ra~i~i~e . brought ·t?n,- ~ special tr-ip .ot asublliar1~e, .ix: should, be, made' 'Up 0.£ 35% ammunition,- 20% medical and' dent~l:'.e~pp~i~s, .~.s% money.""l?aper.. a11rd ink1 ' 10% each ot. radio equipment, ,$flbotag~ m~~eriB;l,: end, :'.' morale'-building and sundry-supplies .... ?: :.... : '__ ' .,: ,.~. ',' .. '. .' Supply of tires for' the limited, 'number .:or .. ~ruc.k~· in. , oper,ation . seems to be a.dequate fol,". t.he ,pre.sent .:-- :a~ .w~il as an un­ limi:tedsupply .of eooonutoil· for use: in .diese~' engine~t and motor. fuel ,alcohol made 'from the direct dif?t~l,l$t'iollor .tuba· .{sap 'frQm.':' '. the" coconut tree) 1 and' of other prod\1.ct~ su.oh .~~ ,O',amotes,: corp.,.. ' ': casab~, etc. In the 10th MilitarY DistrlQt, -some.12.5gallo~~ of motor alcohol are. p~oducaddaily:,: ,There, is' ~till a limited amount' ot ga~oline, keras.ena. and die's~lf'\l~l on hand with~n thea:reas,· .. but these' articles· ax-a closely ratl.oned·.and .pI?ly used where a, SUQstl- tt;i.te fuel will not serve. • .' ;. " ., .', . '. _. ~here is ampl~1 supp1.:r o£ food in all guerrilla areas. None.' ne~d be s~lil'f;, • .... .~ .',' . ..,. . .' " .' IJ~ ".:' The "Enemy: ...... ' . , . '. The ene'my.organ~zation within t'he' Philippi~es'ls' headed bY' General Tanaka, who repl,a.cedGeneral Homma, and who maintains . office and.residenoe. in .the palace C:L the U.S. Hi~h Commissioner :at Manil~; next in :rank to him,' is' General Commander of Greater Manila, General Watt, ·w-nQ. h~s. offices in: the Department of Interior ·~u.ild-.. : i;qg, ~nd who residee.inthe·.~ome of Presid~nt Quezon -on·the . '.":: ....1,.: Boulevard~ Tlle. admiral incharg~of the naval unit·s has ,his of~ices itl .the. old offices of Admiral Hart in the Marsman Building in the''':''~ Port Are~.. He lives ·in the: hom~orMr. J.B. Findlay on 'the Boule-' v~rd, Colonel Ohta heads the ~ilitary police (Kempei-Tai}" ,His . office and place of imprisonment for military suspects and prisoners are a.t -Fort Sa~tiago. . He iiv~s" in the home of· Mr. H.. Marsman i~ : P~s.ay.: ·At thE:} head. of .the 'civilian ecqnomic corps, made up of a . group. of civilian experts. sent to the Philippines with the .re·sponsi;'" bl,lityand task. of developing t~e ind;ue,tries and ,agriculture. of 'the Islands to cohform to. the r~quirements of the Co-Pros~erity.Sphere, . is Mr. 'Shozo Murata. He has'offices in the Wilson Building, and· lives in the ,house of Mr. M. J. Oesorio,' on Dewey_Boulevard •..

• I .' . Themi11tarY.9rganization· in'th$ islands is made up of from torty·to fifty thousand soldiers; of which the bulk is sta­ tioneq, in., a~d around Manila. ' Between Fort MCKinley and Camp Murphy :t.her~ are at-'ound' ten thousand' men, wd.th about five thousand' mor.e/· soatt~red'~between ~he airfiel«;ls and within, the (}ity of. Manila' pro~ . pe~;.Th$re a~e' some' tell thousan~ men spread' throughout the pro- . vin~~s: ot.L1.izori, including a fair-'sized, detaohment at Cor:regidox. B~a..ch, f'orti~icati9ns bave been' added (the' batteries· of .. coast artiil.... ·· le,ry-.. pieCE?s. damaged during the bombardment of COrl"egidor' are ap- . pa;rently C?t. no' int~rest ·to the· -enemy, and apparently no attempt is being made,·toplace them back. in operation) .Th'e . unda.maged artil­ lery is reportedly being kept in. orde,r for use. ~t is estimated ;, that some, ten .thotlsand men ~re di6tribute~ throughout the Visayan : provincC?s, and abo:ut/a like' number in Mind~oJ of' which the ':. " la,rgest garrison i~f maintained at J)avao. - " , . It; seems to be the policy of th~ enemy to consider thtf>:" Ph;ilippines as a' cPQlplete' ~~dselr"eu.ff'ieient gar.ris~.nt. calculated:.~' .. on th~ . numbef of men. now on duty in the' .~slancls. 'ThJ..salso seems . to, 'bathe ca.se so· far, as air fjtr'ength' .is' concerned,artl11ery pieces ,. Ertc,.·; as there 'have be~:tl; no additions to the' strength of . Il\en or material since the" fo:l1 or ·the VisaYanI~+ands •. · -.- Shift of ' strehgth ·has b'e~n made: .trom 1iime to time ,to ·oa.mpaign aga.inst guer­ r:tll:a, units. '~n ,districts where the g\lerril.1a$h~ve been 'agressive - ... fo~ ihstance, 'Panay:p4ringtbe, ~all.an~ ·v~interof'].. 94?, Norther.n t.uzon;. e.ar-ly this ~e~, .. and mC):re ~~~entlr. .~9~b.u~,. At. present, there is an added interest of the' enemy in Mindanao, and pressure is be ... ing increased at varibus points. All of this activity,' however: is being handled py the permanent enemy garrison 'originallw, assigned to 'the Philipp'ines, and no ,fresh troops from outside are reported to have arrived. , j:.n additiqn to the regular ga.rrison of enemy'troops, there are, b~fng added every six weeks some 500 Filipinos ,to the Bureau of Constabulary. These men" are . mostly paroled pri'son~rs' of war, ,and are trained for;the Constabulary under Japanese in­ structors. They are estimated to number about 3,000 at :th6 pres­ enttime~: These men are added to the various J'apanese garrisons and a percentage' of them is added to raiding parties. They' ap~ parent~y a:re, 'not, all armed, and ,a 'number of deserters have joined the guerrillas from time to ,time., It is believed by the guerrilla leaders that upon an at tackagaii1stthe enemy by U~S. or guerrilla armed forces, where the attack looks as if'it might be successful, the Constabulary men (with but few exceptions) may be expected to turn'onthe Japanese. , ' , The enemy is using airfields at, ,Aparr'i or SO!Ile other Northern ,Luzon point, Clark Field, Nichols and Nielsen 8:t Manila, Iloilo, Oebu, T~cloban,' Cagayan, Zambdanga, Legaspi and ,Davao. A, constant stream of medium bomber airplanes are ferried through the Philippines,to an/ outside, sC:,lthern base 0 . Over th~ Eukidnon Valley daily, are counteq. from five -La twenty-five 'planes daily goi.ng/ southward tOWards Davao" There is almost no traffic northward., These are in most part twin-motored planes, although a few si,ngle­ motored,planes ~re ~ometimes included. . The pr~ncipal air bases in the Islands are located at Clark Field, N:l;,cholsField and Nielsen Airport • Many improvements, have been made at the old fields. ,At Nichols, the old ,runways have been considerably extended, and new ones added. The ruriwaysnow radiate from a It;rge. center rotunda in a star... like form. These, runways are 'now all made of co'ncrete'. At Nielsen Field, the main runway has been extended beyond the road which originally connected the McKinley road 'with the Spanish) Hespital, and the 'road has been closed. The main· and cross runways here have also been concreted., Clark Fie,ld has been improved somewhat in the same manne,r as Nichols Field, and it is at Clark Field that the enemy has his main fighting force. There are three important landing fields now being prepared -- one at'Lipa, ', another at Santa Rosa; , and one. near ,'Puerto, Princesa on Palawan.' Most of the laborerswork-, ing at these fie.lds are Amerioan prisoners of war, estimated at about ;1,500~, . .' _. ': ' . It is estimated that the enemy does not maintain more than 120 airplanes of' all types' in the fhilippinese. At Nichols Field, there are about forty planes, mostly med::'um bombers; at l:\1'ielsen there are abcuttwenty, 'mostly observation and' training plane,s. Nielsen 'is also used as a terminal for the transports whieh ply between Formosa and the Philippines and from Manila ~outhward, handling passenger traffic mostly. At Clark Field (their mqst important base) are'fighter planes and a few small - b0111be~s ;..- about fifty' in all., There are tw'e1veZero ;fighters de­ tailed at Clark arnohgst the other types of fighter plane s. ' There are also a few planes distributed throughout· the Islands, usually, tvvo or three at e~ch of the provincial fields. ' Near or surrounding the main airfields are anti--aircraft batteries which are open and clearly visible. These batteries are of but secondary, impor,tance and are mostly captured' America.n guns without Sights and manned by 'Filipino 0:fficers and soldiers, under Japanese commanders. The Japanase main anti-aircraft 'batt~ries,: of which ~}:lere, are. a substantial ,number" are hidden, 'Well camouflage-d, and located. at site$ somewhat farther from the fields. These are manned by Japanese ~'oldi"ers and officers. .

-"'25 -. Obs~rva.tion, ang :pa't!rol p~ane~,t:r.6m. ten. t.o. f,:if't~~n, ~.ly, fl'qIIi L.u2lQn"ba:S~6. ~e,gularlyeverygay, .e.:spe,c~,a~~Y.;d~ing._ ~he;.~a..;r~y:' mQ,rning-hoUl"s.'.; They:are apparently pat~oll.il)g,. the ,oo~s~a~. wa~rs:,. along the west coast· of·.Luz.,onand·to a

i" " 'In Manila, the p.ti~liC utiI:ttie:fwer'e "not destroyed b~~.',' lqre falling into the han~s, of the-'~ne~. ,'They have been c6ntlnn,ethewar began, has been.eompletedto 'a . limited:., d~gree (not c,om.:)letely successful), and which has resulted in an ' added:supply of a: limited amount-of current to augment the supply from· the Meralr,;o copra-·meal burning plant, and thehydro~e;leqtriq" unit' at Botocan near 'Pagsanjan. :The .ga.s supply for dom~stic use: ,in Manila has, bee:Q; maintained through the, 'Useo! ooeonu~ :oila~" a, fuel. Electric "and g:as-·rate's.have; be.enincl".eased:· ~J15%, •. ,::";,:' , ;In. CE;'bu,. the electric, cu.rrent for the city is s,uppl:~~d, t~6m the, .cement plant'·at,-Nag.a.', _<. All' highways are ·ba.ck, iILconclition, with all bl"idge,~ " h~vj.ng been repaired (mostly usirtg Amer1can prisone:r laborer,s) "on the Island of Luzon.' The Manila Railway: lines have, a.ll. be~n p~:t: badk '!'ncondition ,and trains are, maintaining through sclJ6dules ,,~, " from>the former'. northern' 'terminal at Sa.n Fer-nando" ; to.': ',.: Leg~spi,,'with another line to Cabanatuan in us,a again •. ,Tha .. .rail~ wtli1ip.e,-on Panay is 'back ,in service.from,Iloilo' to Capia.: ' ' '. ,The:inter-:-'island .steamer s,e'rvice,nas. been' re­ established with the use of. a number of vessels salvaged ~ ':t4e enemy'after :th~,rall'of Corregidor :and, placed in regular service ~twe.en,Manilaa.nd,·the" outlying provinces.' Incidentally,,' a few of them have·~een sunk by, Ainerican' submarines recently.' Certain other inter-i-sland v:essels,':of' a "larger tom+age, have been re-· ' floated 'arid' sen.t, out, to: B'orne.o and Formosa, Seven' :tugboats have ~en captured:,' or' s8:lvaged,' by: the' 'enemy 'and are in Use· out' of' ' " ~nila. '. ' , The:~:only' oce,an-going·ve'ssel known to hav~ beenre~ '. floa'ted,· or' saiva;ge: att~mpted'" was ,the tlD,on JOSe" which was . , r~filoa.ted and ,towed to Manila,e ' ·Apparently,- it ·wasfound· t·oof.ar.", :,. dqlmaged 'to'; J;-epaf:ri. and plaoe'in'operation as it wa's taken out to '. , th~ 'Oeach near Paranaque, and'~'permitted t,o sink -in.the sand. '., , ':'" '., Earnshaws 'DOCks in ·the port area oiManila: has been rebuilt and is·, used for dook:!ng the'vesaels-in inter... island, servic'e. Engineer Island ,has not 'beetf',rebul1t.· . .' , .'Woode·n veS'sels 'from l.OO-end200· feet long 'are., being· - . :', . built in Manila:' a.nd·'at ,Malabon.;,·Ithas also been.,reported that, construction ,·of,$imilar type fir' of ·vessels cis being'undertaken all' . The slipwaYs in Manila· 'which are used for the construction of the smaller wooden bpatsare ldcated.:, batwcsn,:the .Ayala Br1dge ~rid:,the' Es~ero de la. QUInta. -- :slipwa.ys formerlY,ovmed 'by Chinese, ~nd" use, in building an¢l." ~ervicirig ve;:;selsof the"·fishing flee:ts . which operated 'out of -Manila:~','The .. oldslipwa.y,s -in. Malabon ana, on" ,the Vitascanal "are. used·for:the,_constru,ctipnof the larger type wooden hoats, . At t'he Manila., and ; Malabon 'slipways ,th$re wer~ under construction 'dur"ing. themont,h ,pf,Ap;ril,1943 not le$6 tha:n fifteen wooden vessels. . ' Since' theopenipg .of Manila Bay af't~r the fall of,' Corregidor in May 1942 ana,-untilthemorith of. August of the same yea'!), the average ,arriv~ of .Japan~se vessels in Manila Bajr"" Was around 140 per month. "From September 1942 uJ.:,ltil, the early part of Ja~ua~y 19L,.3, the average Wa$ reduced to not over 70 yesselsper ' month. Then fro~ ..Ja~uaryto the elld of April, the movement in­ ,creas~d again. to an average of around 160 per month. These vessels _Gonsis~ed -mostly o~ tran'sport and cargo ships, 'with,'an occasional. appeal'"anc~ .of a cr'f:liser and a few destroyers •. Convoys of "from 'ten t,o' fifteen ships were sometimes formed outside the ·breakwater in 'Manila •.' Their escorts musthe.ve been waiting for them outside 'of. Corregidol"(probably He.milo Cove,), ,as the. convoys left Manila with­ out escorts. Oonvoys sailin£?: £or' the, sou'~1;l~rn theaters· of war apparently:take "the San Bernctrd~nQ StrE+~ts -passage , ,The appearanc~' of several hospital ships in the harbor at Manila at almost regular'·~l1terve.J.. s creates a suspicion that they may be used'for (~ther purpos,Asthan that indicated. It is a known fact that a h,osp:-tal ship Was USed On a regular run from Co'tabato to Davao. during ,the month of May .19L~3" transporting full cargos of rice. . " The cargo movement 'in the. harbor at Manila has ,been mostly, op.tW~d. . The usual .cargo has been .Sugar, rice, lard, soap, salt, ,and Scrap iron.' Coconut oil to ,the, toial amount of some 70,000 tons has been shipped on tankers up tdthe end of April· 1943~, Of -interest is ·that' on two of the tankers lo;ading .cocomit oil outward, German volunteers" or refugees were sent away , . and .the presumption Was that these t~nkers'Wer,e destined for Germany'. The enemy -is having a fair amount of success in ad­ ministering the civil affairs of the cccupied areas through the formation and functioning under puppet offiCials of the Kapisa~ . nan Paglilingkcd Sa Bagong ~ilipinas, . or the so~,c~lled' neighbor­ hood associations. Those neighborhcqd ~ssociations established by the en?myin the OCCUpied areas;: for the purposE') 'cf control.and disc.ipline of the. civilian populace have proven most effective. Briefly, the system invclves 'the appointment of heads of. small. grqups of residents (llsually ten families is the smallest group), wqo are responsible .fOr the behavioUr of the people within the group. 'The smaller groups' are parts' cf larger grOl:lps~ A censUs of all' people within a certain group is filed with the. military police, and no person may en~er or leave 'the ,group area without proper permit from the prcper officials. Thus, the enemy.is able to control or rather to prevent the , infiltration of guerrilla, ago'rits. into the occupied areas. Group leaders know that if ~n un­ l~rtodpersQn is found living within his group, he, and possibly all 'menibers of the group, may be subjected to . severe punishment ... - and,there have been cases of wholesale execution of all membera of a group in retaliation for the acts of' one member. . ,An example of 'tih(3efficiency of the neighborhood asso- 'cia.tion id~a will indicai:,e,the'difficulties of outside intelligence' agents functioning within theenemy-controllod area.s. It' was de­ sired. to send a test telegram over the Japanese-controlled .pOstal- 'telegraph system to an agent' in ~JIanila from C!agayan. The wording of messages permitt~d, and the' manner" in' Ylhich cenE?orship is handled seemed to make" possible an easy means of communication between agents at different enemy-occupied cities through a plain la,nguage cOde.'Howe-ver, messagesfiled'must be signed and address given of t.he sendeI', which makes necessary the sender be bona fide member of a, 'neighborhood group_ Consequently,_ guerrilla -ag$nt.s smp.ggled into atQwn for brief p~riods co\iJ.d not f1.1ea 'me s sa.ge with a fict;i.tiolls name as· sende,r~:·. A:reply."to· 'a .'m~ssage o!, messages receive~ for

- "27 .. deli\ie'rY w±thi~ ·the. ,town must bear ,the name and address, of a person lipte'd as liviIlg ,wi~hinthe .area~'ancl~¢Jrlsequent'~y a rmE?mb~r' of one of! theneighborhoo~,·groups. ,Of, c~urse, reliable 'agents ,r~siding within the "communities have, beend~ve;l.opedand.pl~ns.ate .under 'way for oommunicating' with 'sirni;l.a:r~gentsin, other areas; 'blit "the'~ plan could not' be worked with guerrilla agents working from o1;lt side the oities. ' , ,:' '.' "I • Inc,identally, therea~e, a su.ftiaient~:Umber of pro- ' Japanese civilians living within ~he,o,a,~upied' area~ 't? require ut­ mOpt caution', ~o be used by anyone: Who may act a.s agentf'or the gu~rrillas. Risk of' detection i~ great. ," ..... ' , In the. early part of ~December 1942, the Military Ad.;. mipi$tra.tion ca~led' together the 'heads of' the .vario,u$· :political: ' part,ies in ,the Islands, who were'told! that the, Commander-in-Ohief de~~reid the volUntary dissolution C?t \all .pol! tical- part~es" . and the fotmation of a single party for the' 'Nationa.l' Service .of the New Ph~lippines. The party Was formed and now is ~now.n ,as the Kalibapi. The Director.. General ofth~ association Was made, an ex-ofticio me~ber of' the Executive Commission and ne:x:t in r'ailk only. to; the Chip.irman. Hon. Be!lignoAqui~oJprobably the most,'cooperat~veor the puppet officials with, the Japanese, ~aS appo1.ntedD1rector­ Ge+leral. "As Assistant D;irector-General, and at the same time' Chief ot! Propaganda, the famous Mr.' 'Benigno Ramos of 'Sakdal fame (who ha$ led s.everal movements' against law and order in in ',' the pa.st) was .chosen. The other merlLbers 9f the' board of directors ar~ ~tty. Pio Duran1 Chief of General Aff.air,s, Hon. Jose Laurel', Jr~, 'Director of Provincial alld" Municipal ·,Adm1.nistration, Hon~' Dominador Tan~ Director of' Research and Planning, ,Hon. Al,fonsQ Mepdoz, : Di:reotor of Luzon" Hon. Osca.rLede~Hna" Director of the, Vi~ayas, Hon. Jaun Alanao, Dire¢tor of' Mindanao, and Mr.' Arsenio ~~, Secretary-Treasurer. ' All are with the rank and salary ot' Fifst-Claas Bureau Direotors. ",', " , : The membership, in, the Kalipapiis supposed to be vO~-qhtary, but no goyernment employee, even the day ~aborers, may Qo~lect pay without exhibiting, his memberahip~card. Rice,and ,other r~~ioped~ coinmoditie's are sold at' government prlces only to, holders. of': Ka:;Libapi', membership cards. Any~ne dealing' y~~t'h the go'vernm6nt ' in: any waywhateve~, especia~ly pedple app~y.ing tor licenses, or' c~~¢,essions, are require,d to 'produce membership oardsbefore" action is: taken on .their applications; , " " " , , The Board of Dfreotors cif the Kalibapi. has, been con- du~ting sp'eech-making ~tottt-s ~to the principal' towns ,of Luzon :t;Qr the purpose of' preach,ing orienta,lism,'" hatred ''£b1' thing s Anglo-Saxon, an

- 28 .. the enemy" are now dq\lb·tfulof~p.y.:,benefitsthey may have expected to deriw '_fromtheir,',cObP~rat:toli'liyith. .. the~hemy. They ar'e de­ firiitelynot 'pappy 'ill, their 'posit,iQns and,~:r:e fear-rulof :what the future may bring them.. " , . . ~,probrem. requiring, careful.\hought and s£?lution is that of what' attitude to take' with·, reference to theUSAFFE Fili­ pino officers and men who have up~n releas~ from priSOl'lCampS accepted .. posts in the Bureau o.f;Constabulary, and who have while on du~y with the' Japanese military forc~s within the Islands con­ ducted. V'larfareonthe guerrilla units. -,-.: res1Jlting in :the death of a number' of the unsurrendered USAFFE offi6ers and,men. They'have, to a l~mi ted extent; ,been used .by the. J apal1e se as ·underc'over age.nt~' and, spie,S to hunt" out and :guide the Japanese forces to the hide- . outsofthe,guprrillas (especiallyin"tu~ol1) and have been used as p-atr~ls,to )lGld' plac'ss taken from . the gu8I,'rillas. ' From talks with soldiers of the Constabulary Who have deserted 'and. escaped from. their posts"w~th th~ Japanese 'and who' 'have joinE,ld the guerrillas, the following has'been ascertained: " or the Filipinos :in the GO!.l,staDu:J.ary" the majority, in fact, practically all, are there~gain~t their convictions, and would prefer to be with tbe guerrillas '. 'This \class of soldier plans to t:urn ag9.insthis .. J&panese comrades when the 'opportunity arises (that ,is~ when the Americal1 troops return to the Islands). A small minorl.ty of the m~n are'sincerely cooperating with the enemy, and may be considerE)d as "Quislings" in the full sense of the word. ' These men are. the ones Who act as spies'on the guerrillas (also upon the othe·r men with~n the Gonstabulary organi­ zation, makiriK it difficult for the loyal ,soldiers to discuss their ideas, amongst themselves), and w:ho are the. most outstanding in , their efforts when campaigning with the J apane se, soldiers against. the guorrillas. . . . ' How to determinovlho is Or who is not pro-enemy in 11i5 inclinations and efforts against the ,troops still offering , resistance to :the enemy .is a problem of major proportion~

14. Commando Traini~g: * * * ~~ 7f- * ~- * ,* * * 15.· Americans in Free Areas: * * * * *. *. ~f * * * * 16. 'Bomb Objective,s: '. . Ha\[ing in'mind the ra~her comprehensive directives on nbomb objectivesll for Philippine tal';'gets, as gotten out byA-2 in Washington, the follOWing information has been compile,d and re­ corde,d to be used to correct' or augment· these direc,£ives:' , ". In Manila, all of· the Port Area remains destroyed as it~was at.the end of enemy.'bombing during December 1941,and the "scorched earthlt destruction by the USAFFE, troops when abandoning· Manila,.. except for Earnshaws 'Docks which .has been rebuilt and is being "used ~ for the repair and maintenance of vessels of the re­ establishedintor-islahd fleet. 'rhepiers (1,3',5, ~nd7) were, never destroyed to such an. Gxtent that they could not be used. They are' all now -in full: use. . 'Ailcoqonut oil factories are working at full capac:Lty. Meralco- ,electric' plani! is still supplying current to the city for domestic and· commercial 'use~, CaliraY,a :hydrq-electric pro~ect has. been brought ~nto .limi"ted. :pr~~uction of c~Jent for Manl.la. Bo~ocan hydro-electrJ.c plant l.,f:) l.n .full operatl.on•

-~9 - All rope "'f.actOl"les "in' Manila a:t'Ef: running._" . .T~e· .shopa-.. -ahdfrouiid-hou.se.'of' .;Manilaa?:i:lroad·:apmp~ny' hEtve been completely repaired and are1 ,in: use. for the."main.tenan~e.· al}d ope,ration of the railroad. '. ' .... ' .

i . .'On ~uzon, all railroad' and' highway :l:>rid~esp~ye been r~paired ~ ,.' Traffic on' all railway liriesand' highwaysh~sbe'en re"'; e~tab11shed •. , . ..-,' -- .. . . ~" '. .'. 'Sugar' centrals' :are:·ndt·being used and' their.destruc:" t~Qn w6uldordinarily not 'beof det;rimsntto ',the enemy. Distil,,:, l~ri~s at the centralsarepto·duoing alcohol .tor .motor fuel and would, make excellent t·argets~· " ; " " '. Clark Field, . Nichols ·'Fieldand Nielsen. 'Airport ';have . ~en repa.ired, improved considerably, and·-the runways .all con·" clj-eted. These are the·principal air. .. bases in the ~$la~ds •. New f+eldsare being builtin Lipa1 Batangas;Santa Rosa, BulaQ~n;.;'a~d p",erto Princesa,· Palawan. " ...... Iron mines being:worked.·by,-the enemy. and 'from which shipments are' being, made . regularly·, to Japan.,are lpcatep, at Jese F,nigiban, Camarines, and Balanaean, Marinduque. Manganese mine s are' operated at GuindulInan, Eohol. and at several sitea ',on Busua~ga Island. " ...., . . The Lepanto Copper mines .at Manc~yan are being operated at f'ull capacity, uSing 2,500 laborers. 4 ,new pier has been: . erected at Tagudin from wh~~ch oopper conoentr.ates . aTe; s~ipped re~+arly. ' The Insular Lumber Compan}r plant at,Fabrica, O~iental Negros, is reported :(but.' not confirmed) as being o,perated ,?y the enenw apd shipments of lumber are made regularly •. Logs are ship­ ped .from the Bas;i.lSo11 Lumber Company, located on. the-northern .end of Basile.n 'lsland, Zamboanga Province; and.,.fl'om·D:tngalan:'Bay, on the central eastern coast of Luzon. . . . The 'large oil s·toragete:nk located at Rio, Guinobatant rvlf3,sbate, and Y~hich Was captured together. with a large amount 'o~ diesel fuel' upon the fall of IvIasbat~"into enemy hand's, :has:be.eh> '.: dismantled and taken to ~anila -- possibly for erection at Manila, but more likely for export to' Japan and 'reereation- there_, The oil storage tank$ at Iloilo, located on the north b~nks of the Iloilo River (near the mouth) were all left iptaet and fe 11 into enemy hands (score.hed earth destruction failed, reportedly due to enemy action 'in outflanking the group sent to setorf the dynamite plaoed under the tanks) and are being used by the enemy to full adva.ntage. Also the tank installation located at Jordan, on the west central ooast or , is still int.act with a modern concrete pier and pumping ··installation •. '·: Storage .fao.ilities for· some 3,000,000 gallons are available at this ins-tallation. '. . At CebU, although a large portion of the business section at Port ArE;la Was destroyed by retiring USAFFE troops, the' piers were not: 'bUfnedor destroyed. They-fell. into enemy hands . and are' being ·used regularly for the storage and shipment' of articl

:;.. 30 - suggested ,that a quest~onnaire~esubmitted by Air Intelligence,', outlining the type pf,info:rmatioh,de~ired and ,information of' a specific nature concernl.rig'pomb objectives aiready, reported ,or on which a report iSdesire'(l. ,SUdh 'a Cluestionn~ire would guide the intelligence units in outlining,work~for,thelr agents along lines which ~vouldg~ve the mos't'ialuable results. The intellige,nce agents are ,noW' .~ocated within ~·p.erriy.... 6ccupi~d territory in most" parts of the Philippines., They are particularly active in Manila, Iloilo.Ci'tJ, Negros, Cagayan of Misamis Oriental, Davao City, and in .: ' ' , ,

17. Manila Intelligence Group:,' Shbrtly,after:Ma;nila,fell'into the ,hands of the ,ene,my,' a group of interested reserve officers of the Philippine·Army banded together under are~erve'officer'ofthe u.s. Navy for the purpose of, collecting iriformationfrom within the occup.ied areas, of Manila and Luzon,.and forthepurppse'of getting this informa­ tioh into the hands of the armed forces at Ba taa~ and Corregidor. It was found not practicable to senq. t-hi~ information-to the,armed forces.'·However, the groupqontinued tpfunction with the idea that sooner or later the 'in,fnrmation (verb~land documentary) could be transmitted ~Cl officia.1~ ol.;:tside ,the occupied area,st" , , A menber of the group succeeded in leaving the area . and was able" to place' at the 'disposal of the headquarters, of the Army and ':Navy suchipformation and documents accumulated '\..1.p to and including the month of June 1942. " All work.o! the group' has been on a voluntary basis, and the men in the group have', run, risks in order to keep posted ' on the activities of the enemy within the national capita~) and especially with reference,to t~e inner feelings of the .puppet officials so that their ,loyalty may be checked and kept as a matter of record for use upon return to the American forces tp the Phi~ippine s ~ . , The group is maae up of 'influential men of various nationalitie'$ -- 'headed at present' bye. Filipino Major of, FA Reserves, who was' an elected senatQr at the outbreak, of- the ,war, and il1cludes' a Spanish: capitalist, ,8. Swiss busines's leader, and' a few influential Filipino citizens'from'the,Spanish and Filipino Manila community. Also in the prov:i,nces near Manila Is a' group 'of unsurrendered American servicemen who have not been a.ble'to func­ tion with the intelligence group,bt,it who have been kept in contact and helped from time to time against the future when these men may be ~ble:t0 render help when a change in conditions may be expected., , , , ". The intelligence group has been recently.con'Jiac.ted ' from Mindariao,' the chief of which has made the trip by sailboat to 'bring latest information, and to outline the functions of the' group for the futttre.' , Much of the information contained ~n. this report has come froln the group.' Pending 'further instructions, the gro-up '~i]ill: continue to function in the collection: of Informa.tion, and in a~dition to which it will immediately start work~ng along the 'following line s: ' a) Steps,will'be taken immediately tosacure' large sums of Japanese militarycurrency from a se.cure source, for' use' in" the irnproyement of conditIons of' internees and prisoners 'of war' on LUzon -- in return fo~ 1vhich the group will on behalf of the U.S. Government .delive'!: an' 0 bligation to pay the" donor$ after the War ,ip U.8. dollars/at. aJ:'l exchange rate now ruling in the 'islands ' o:f- t\i1fO peso,S Japanese military hotes per one dollar U.S. currency~; Funds, real~:z~d. f~om ,this, plan 'will, be smuggled into the prison ,eal1Jf) ,and'~nt,o. the internment' a'amp; will, be used for the pUrchase, of much needi3~ me'ci1.cal' su,ppliei:i, -vitamin concentrates,

' .. 31,- and other'i,tems requir,ed~ bY,the'"I?~,~~or;t.ers.lflp.~,;" ~~t~r;n~es,;'aI?4,to~, ,;' the furthering,of',the work ,of ,t,he",inte.11igGn¢~f',grpuli. ,:':,,'t,:,!~: .,;.,,(:;,,: r". ':,' ,b~ The, group ha~' i~stal,l~d ,~',)",adio \ rtece ive,!":, " .. in the"oity" of: Mahila" and a.it.'range~'nts.' h8.ve ;'OO'$x.1'm,aliewi~n the, 'l command.er, of the loth ,'Milj.tary;Distri9~, ,to br'6,ad~aj3t, message,s' " ::, , from time to,:: ,time and as', re.qu~r~d,'; ~;i~g'acyph~fa1read~ 'A"€i~iyer~d"! tq the· gro'up, Thi~,.will m~e-pof$·$;,i.ble thel'ttaXlS'IDtssio:~.of ':furt.her. orders to the group.', '. >:<;: .' ~ '. ," ',,',: " .;" .•.. '" ..:;: .-':~' ,! "':, ' . oJ: D.ue·'·to.the,danger·,ot de~edtion or.. :r:adib ,':. transmitting apparatus in the city of' M~niia or~ in: ':its "neat-bY"" ;" d:istricts J steps have been taken to install a radiostatio:q of' 'the:' pqrtable type, in an isolated pos!tion on .the B.ondoG, Peni,n$ula: .or ; " in ' 1?r'ovinc,e • '.' These sites wou~d be' a~ilable to .runners : from Manila withi~ a matter of two days. 'hil~. not'ideai~y effi­ cient, such·aplan would.be more secur~ an4 woul~ present 'fewer d:tffictilties of"detectioh tha.n if located within the are'a, of the , n~t.ln: this connection, it slfould be recorded her~'t,bat, orl.e~ of . the'mostaotive of the gl;(>Up.s, ,agents WaS ca.ught, 'togcthE;lr .with , some of his 'helpe-rs,whi'le, trying to establish ,a shortwave radio' station near ·Manila •. 'Th:Ls, was discover.ed' thr(:>1.~ghthe enemYts· . espionage' system ()f· agents.. He wa.~ impl:'isoned at F¢l.. ·t Sa'ntiago in' July 1942,· under s.e,ntence ..of three years at ha.rd .labor •. His: h~lper$ are 'presumed to. ha:v~. ,been executed. ",he' imprisonment' of tijis metnberof t·he ,.gr.ouP\' did 'not r~sult in the disolosure (jf the., existence of the .groU:95 'nor. or:,the.rlatneSo~· any of ,'t~ memb~:rs . still functi'oning •. It did, however, .impreSt3 . upon the group,the .. , ilppor.tan6e of·, secUrity, and of, 1?!l9, riec~s sity toopserve the 'ut'most c~:utionand se:crecy in: i,ts aetivitie;s ,." . " . '" . :: _ ,: ~ d) . ,The' gro;up "thr~ugh 6rie. of' 'its' ttne'utraltt :member$' .: e~pects' to'purchase .shc::r,t·~y.a s:a~~bo~'t, w~ th .~u,xil~ary ,~otor:;. '.to - _; .' bt? licensed under the Japa.ne'p..e _,b\lre~u for:·'.t,he·,:purposeof 'of.!! :,shore ,:', f·~Shing.~his 'Vesselw~ll:be base,d '~'le,ar,L'qc~ria' (~qiJ.th~~n·'~po.rt·," . '. ,: conneoted to Manila by rail and' easily accessil~le 'forSr;'llding .; " '.' .- : .. runners', "etc ~ r and cart be ',US6o. to delj.ver, me ssag~~ to· th~ r'adie): ; : outpost expected to be . installed at -Sorsogon' or Bond~c:,'" ot ,for numerous ·other purposes --' including ,contaets With: ,s:ubma~ine~s:·t,o" '" deliv~rdocuments, reports, c'te., and to rece.iv~L,stip:ptie,s.,·:;'~':;:· :-: . . . , ,e). To place ,moreoperatives within·'the 'ej~emy~.', , controlled civil government, so as' to be battor, abler' '~o :aeou~e~ , ,:' information as to .the aotivities of. the, 'enemy. and: tb Jte,ep"clOsel:-' 'iri' touch ,with the activities 01' the'puppet or:ficla.1$~~·' ",: ".:' '. ,

'.. .:: ~ : •• '. ~ ..', • • ',' • I J '. • -. I • • • ~ :' .; • ,2S. ~·R€icomme·ndationsf' . .,,", .. ~ , " ~' " : " ,'In .conqlusion, the! rollpw.:\.ng .rpcQmmendati'(,~s are made = ~ " . ','; .' ,,,:' 1.,' Continue sending' supplies ·to the. Mili~aX"y , D~st~icts, ; 'in . increasingly 'lar,ge~mount's,' . a.nd . more, orten~ .:'.,,' , . ' " .. ' '2~. Ar.rang~" for establish~ngwatcher stations on ".,: Bondoc Peninsula" .'San Be'rnardino"Str~it.s:, Mindch~o1, ,and .other. ;'" ' ,,:';' .~: strategic:' points.. ,If po's sible ; "a" centrally. located !7Qdio, 's~ation .. sKlould 'be' established in ~southarn.: P~ilippine$. to receive all watcher station flashes, evaluate ~nd consolida~e'tl;l~ information roceived,.- and' transmit tho l}ows:direc~~ ~oth.e<.NaVy'Station"whfcih cQutr'ols·the pa.trols;;iI'l.the,)Islands.. ,.' :; "" " ' .. . -~": . ; J. '. Arrange ro:r~'.At£ler,~Qan seryiqem~n.; iri.:areas 'to:: sE?nd 'periodically, Via :rad:io, ;1t1fJ$.sagc·s ·tp,. ;~€)~rr.1st .. ,i?f ;~.i~. and to re'ceive.replies (this wo'nld·, have, .high , mOl"'ale~bUildinef. erf@cit).~ ,', . ,4. Repat~iatc General Ro~a,s. whon: deemed" adVisable. . -\ 5. Rocognition C?,f' .the 9th Mil~taI7 D'i~t:rict' Under

Colonel Ruperto K.Kangle.on.?!.· ':. ':" : ";','. ." ' .', .... .!. ' .. : 6. S6hd 'a:,s·hip.rnqntori'suppl.ie,~:' ti('the '9tti--- Mi;r~,,;,':: tary Distr-ict ,:(medicines·,~adi6e'qu1;pme·ri.~,:, 'a~n~s: . ~~~.f ~lnmunitibn,: ' . morale-building and general' supplies are' badly needed).. .. ,

'~- ;'32",· 7. ,RepatriatesuGh American t3erv1.cemen as are not he~ded in the areas _ .... probabiy two htirid:r4sd. ' , ,8. ~end. to Manila intelligence Net substantial supply of vitamin tabl'ets (especially "B-1",), quinine, etc .. , for, delivery to prisoners, of war and internees at Cabanatuan and Los" Banos (arrangements have at-ready 'been made to supply funds in as large amounts as possible). Send saine to lOth Military District for, prisoners of" War and internees a.t Da vao. ' . 9. Bring from PI to SWPA any needed personnel .• - such as doctors, dentists,' nurses, mechanics, radio operators, radio engineers, etc. There is a plentiful supply of this person­ nel'from the Filipino services. IO.Bring from PI any needed products which are available -- cinchona bark for quinine production, coconut oil, lumbang nuts, rubber latex, etc. Supplies of these items are plentiful.

NOTE: The above recommendations are not listed in order of any prior~ty.

G. PARSONS

- 33 ...

PLATE I

~ w ,.' 41 I ... , _.. MINDANAO , Millt;ary Inll: JjGmc~ Setlion ra:SUC\L HE.>\OQlARTf...RS I t SITED S"'AT'E::. AR\I'r' ""ORt. S, PACII ( • • I: ENEMY DISPOSITIONS Ii 15 AUGUST 1943 iI' 'I >"~ ,.,. UTE .. ES "f " , LE ~ END ~I PROYINCIAL BOUNDARIES -- MILITARY DISTRICT BOUNDARIES _ 1ST a 2ND CLASS ROADS 1ST a 2ND CLASS ROADS UNDER i CONSTRUCTION UNKNOWN • WHETHER COMPLETED ~ .- - • "I N.B. ENEMY DISPOSiTiONS INDICATED DO NOT INCLUqE JAP CONTROLLED PHILIPPINE ~ , CONSTABULARY IN VICINITY INCLUSION OF TH~ LATTER WOULD INCREASE " ESTI MfES BY 25%_ " •. ~ N .. .~ • - '"~. ~~ - -~ -- •• • - G (I L F ~ ~ - •. , ,. • t " • • , . -- •

Ul ...-- s.a...... ~ .

• I~ "

'" ,. 127" ______'0 ~ lC 014" -J ~ _,_' •

PLATE 2

." .. 7 LEGEND Northern Luzon CD r~ \ o Local net choMels I \ !!J!~~g"l. contoct O ~ith KAZ'1oarwin) • .. SOUTt-ERN LUZON.a VISAYAS MINDANAO N GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

MlUur( tnu:I1iI~"CI: 5«t.ion Geller .. ! Staff' PHlUPPINE DISTRICTS COMMUNICATION NET 15 August 1943 • •

• - LUZON: 1. WWAL Maj Proegar. northern Luzon. PANAY: 2. NCL COl. PlIOI",6th MD NCS ond contact with ,,. • KAZINCL is MID lor inteMsland traffic). (;I*tOWl' \ 3. GTI Aomblon Intel Center. 4. UME Pucio PI Co05twotcher. 5- RGE Mosbate. 6. W88 For standby use . 7. uax Near NeLl handles loco I traffic. .. • 8 KRC 66th inf . 9 . KTO 64th nf. • ,1-' 10. KML 61st DiY NCL. 11. CTON COnf ....' . (~) 12. KAM 65th Inf. (COptu,.d~) \ 13. ZEO 63rd Inf. ~:

II 1 14. CRX Cobu( ~'.d). • 15- NCS CObu(Maj. Cushing?! NEGROS: 16 . OKZ Abcede and Villamor.7th MD. 17. CRX Abcede at TobnO. • •• 18 WSR Ausejo and OX stoncl)y for relay to SWPA for Col. Fertig, Southern Negros. MINQANAO : 19. ERT M··.. •.... ·~O~l Col. F.ti~ lOth MD",Olayi"ll from N CS , to Austraha 0$ WY L8. <> 20. WAB Molangas. 21 WAA Pagadlan. 22. W/JC Coburan. Oavoo Gulf Coast"atcher (wa. UU21 23 TAR MoIa~ala,. 24. SCI' Valencia Field. g,' 25. TAC Imbotug. o. ,~,. • 26. MRS Anakon(WattenJ. • , , • • 21 KLN LrQ ••t d.1 by Parsons, inst inklnd fr • ~0 Bonifocio as .tandby. .JJv , 28. TUT Panaon 1,Iond coastwateher' and \ 9th MD Contact • 29. WAM 10th MD NCS(Sacolod). • t:# 30. REG Port Lebok. I II 31. TAS Near OpOl . 32. WAL Kobo.alan. I 33 WAO ATR-4 with Hamner. I 34. WAN Inklnd fr MisCl"l'lis with lO5th DiY I 3 WAP Lala, Hq toeth Div . \ 111 5- L - .. .'IIII."nD" "' fllU 1U11ClPO II I.,"" ., ••

PLATE 3

EA 10- ;.. 0 MINDANAO ~!'l t.o. .... , .. ~ N Military Il1ttlll~rnc~ Se~tion GENERAL HEADOl'ARTERS • l!NITED STATES ARMV fORCES. PAClFlC

GUERRILLA DISPOSITIONS

7 15 August 1943 --- 1- ..-c. . 10 • " .. ,,_ 43 MILES 10th CO Col. Wendell W. Fertig 105 I) ~~~~}[NGA'':' MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL Lt. Col. Cirioco Martera IMojor- P. C.) (2) • Sir. Approx . 2500 men Arms APprox. 1200 rifles (with mise. other orms)(3)

108 COTA8ATO SECTOR CO Lt. Col . Charles H, Hedges (Commissioned in P. I. late 1941l Sir. ApproK, 2500 men Arms Approx. 1200 rifles (with misc. other arms)

MISAMIS ORIENTAL­ SECTOR Co Lt. Col. Robert V. Bowler 105:::108 (copt. Inf. 0- 294619) " , -. M () R 0 CUL Str Approx.2500 men Arms Appro•. 1200 rifles lwifh

110 • ." M ISAMIS OR-AGUSAN­ "'-'-.' - SUfllGI,q - DAVAO SECTOR "I;~'... "': ..... CO U . Col. Ernest E. McLish (Copt. Inf. 0-296967) 5tr Appro•. 2500 men Arms Appro• . 1200 rifles (with ,,' LEGEND , ..• -~ o misc. other arms) C. ... (1) regt's locally called ,-, --- PROVI BOUNDARIES " .... " . divided into 3...... , ..; ... ,,,1011 " ---- MI DISTRICT "D,... '" of approx. 800 men each. ., 0;::/'·- I .. BOUNDARIES ,.' ., , i:it"~" (2) Indic:l"" pre-war status. 1ST a 2N CLASS ROADS " WHETHER ...... omlmq per rifle is available for • on Mindanao with PmJ ION OF FORCES about 3000 rounds per ,--'L __ J ELEMENTS ONLY

~. ~. ~. ,. ,. ~ ". C,. ". • ." " •• .. ". ". ---=t· ...... ___ • --'=--_--'---.:.:--'....:.:._--=-_..::...--1

18 APPENDIX XVIII

,INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OF COL~ N. L. MANZANO 12 December 1944

Page Memo to AC of S, G-2, from Col. N. L. Ma.nzano , ...... , ...... 1

Report on Intelligence Operations •••••••••• ~...... 2

List of Intelligence Personnel in Luzon _•••••••• , •••••~...... 6 Appendix XVIII

12 December 194~"

MEMOBJUlD~I: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, S~~A.

In compliance with your request, enclosed here"\\rith reports cov"ering my experiences in intelligence operations dur- ing this war and personal observations of the Mindanao guer- ri11as.

N, L. lviAl'iJ'ZAl'ifO. ColonE::l, A.U.S.

Encls: 2 reports.

- 1 -

Intelligence Operations, Colonel ~T. L. Nanzano 12 December 1944

A. Personal Experience:

1. On or ,about Uarch 28,1941, the undersigned, ",ith lvlajor Latimer, Ord .. , second in command, let a group of volunteers from ]ataan in an attempt to land at Balayan and locate the exact posit­ ion of heavy Jap guns placed on the hills of Province opposite Corregidor. This group was to furnish firing data to our Corregidor batteries. After accomplishing this mission, we were to establish an intelligenoe net in Luzon for future opera­ tions~ We were furnished a letter signed by General ',~Tainw'right , requesting all Filipino patriots to give us assistanoe in the execution of the mission a.ssigned to us.

2. The group, sailing on a launch, was intercepted by a Jap Man-of-war (gunboat?) at night ~rhen opposi te 1Tasugbu, ]atangas, and \lTas forced to retreat to Bataan. Attempt 1tras then made to sail direct to Ivlanila. exclusively o.n intelligence mission. It was then felt that an all Filipino group 't~rould have a better chance of success. Lt. Osmundo lV1ondonedo, PA, AC., replaced Major Latimer as my assistant. Difficulty was encountered in obtaining water transportation, and before it could be made available, Bataan fell. 3. Upon mw release from the concentration camp on August 1942. I devoted my time investigation conditions in Luzon, paying special attention to the different anti-Jap Units operating in the I sland and hO~~T they could be of value in obtaining intelli­ gence coverage. BY December 1942, I came to the conclusion that an organization called "rree Philippinesft was the only one com­ posed of honest, prominent, intelligent. civic spirited I>ersons carrying out ru1ti-Jap activities ir- Luzon. I became the Military Advisor to this Ui1i t. Through it I \-ras able to advise several guerrilla groups ancL leao- them into concentrating their activi ties on intelligence operations. The "Free Philippinesn also kept me informed on the activities of officials of ,the Puppet Governn1ent.

4. On July 1943, I called Lt. ~jlondol1.edo to duty and asked him to act as IllY Executive. lr[e organizod an intelligence net, but due to limi ted funds available, \""0 ~rere not able to eX}Jand our organization as we desired.

5. At about this time. a Mr. Luzuriaga, from Negros t who

claimed to be an agent of Maj. Villamor, the11 at Negros t contacted me through a member of "Free Philippines". Our first intelligence report was sent out through him~ His promise to assist us in es­ tablishing direct contact \~ri th Sw:P ""as not f~filled. Capt Raval and Oapt. Alabastro, agents of colonel Peralta a.l~o contacted "Fre-o Philippinestt for assistance. Like most guerrilla intelligence agents '~Te found them to be very indiscreet; their identi ty and a.ctivities 'lftrere, in no time, allover Manila. Since they were already being assisted by Allderson, Ramsey and "Free Philippines" in their intelligence operations, I did not feel the necessity of getting myself connected \lid th them.

6. About thi s time. Brigadi er General Manuel Roxas approached me with the request that I undertake the coordination of all anti­ Jap activities in Luzon. I accepted with the understanding that I would concentrate my efforts on intelligence coverage. The SUL1 of ~2,OOO.OOO Jap money monthly was allotted for my activities (sufficient to buy 10 sacks of rice).

... 2 - 7. On :Hovember 1943 I ~Tas informed by General Roxas th8. t General ,Lim ",as ta1.:ing over the coordination of guerrilla a.ctivities in Luzon. General Lim instructed me to continue in cha~ge of intelligence oper­ ations~ On this month I sent my second intelligence report. to Major Phillips of l'1indoro, through Mr. Jose Ozamis, agent of Colonel Fertig and associate of General Roxas.

8. On January 1944 I 'lrTas requested by General Roxas to p~oceed to Mihdane.o, conta.ct Colonel Fertig and request him to obtain trans..... porta.tlon for me to report to Headquarters SWP.A .. I Wf:1.S provided \\Tith . a letter from Mr. O~amia to Colonel Fertig stating General Roxas f desire. Generai 1im also asked me to make the trip_ ~W mission was to acquaint the Commanding General, SWP~, of the cO~'ldi tions prevail ing in Luzon an.d , attempt to obtain assistance in our activi ties t specially means for direct cO~llunication between Luzon and GHQ~ I left Luzon on 25 Janua~J 1944 v!ith a third intelligencE) report on the Island.

9 •. Due to the means of tm,nsportation used (sailboat), inclement vreA,ther (typhol1s), and enemy ground and sea activities (ran into Japs in Siquij or, Cc.'11e.mba, e,nd Bu tue,n, 8,nd had to evade several Jap launches), I did not reach Colonel Fertig's He~dquarters until the mido~e of March 1941.~.

10. The purpose of my mission, as well as the highlights of my intelligence repo~r'ts were tr~)nsmi tted by r8,d.io to SWP.A. Hoadquarters. '.A ra.diogram from the Commanding General was received advising me the"t my services 'tITOuld be of gre?,ter value if I remained in ·the Philippines • .A second message '''CtS received from the Com.manding General, S''JP.a, on It} April 1944, expressing his desire that I direct procurement of intelli­ gence and extension of nets in Luzon. The location of my Headquarters was left to nw 4iscretion. Colonel Fertig was advised to extend to all intelligence groups in LUzon such assistance and guidal1ceE'~s he could furnish, and that all inform.ation would be trp.nsmitted through the 10th Military District 'U:iltil more direct cOIr.L1nunication could be established .. Above messages 'tI1are the last ones I received from stVP until September 1944 (six months later) 'J~'hel1 I was informed that ray return to LuzoD. was inadvisable and th~tt I W:;'l,S assigned to the 10th Milo Dist ..

11. During the la tter :part of April 1944 ,~e sent back to Luzon five agents \*Jho had arrived in Mindanao wi th me. jyIost of these men . represented guerrilas in Luzon and were returned to their respective uni ts wi th some funds and ins tructions. Lt. Flores, Head of L. O.D·.. t group in Luzon was furnished a r9.dio transmitter to be delivered to Lt. VIondonedo, rri a.ssistant. TI)\TO men. were to proceed to Ramsey's Headquarters, or..e to Anderson, &'1d one to "Free Philippinestt • Of these men, Anderson's agent arrived safely, the t'.nTO men of Ramsey's remain unaccounted for to d.g,te. the "Free Philippinesu agent "flas heard from last September and Lt. Flores was captured by the Jape and confined at Ft. Santiago. (He has been released recently and is "rorking for ¥lajor

Smi th) 4

12. In e9,rl~r May 19h1t., C~,pt. Petti tt and ~4r. Shafer, members of .dnderso~-~ r s guerrillas arrived at Headquarters, 10th Mil. Dist., also charged with the mission of obtaining assistance for their~llltt and secure direct communication with GH~. In oompliance with instructions received to assist all intelligence groups in Luzon, Colonel Fertig provided them ~ri th some funds 9.nd supplies. These titJO men attempted to retur:1 by bane a to Luzon and failed. They finally arrived at Leyte . with me by :plan.e on 6 December 1944.

- 3 - 13. From May to September 1944 I sent several messages to Headq\1arters, SvJ'PJ1. , advising the Commanding Gener~_l the.. tour diifi..... , cuI ties consis·ted primarily intli'~ lFtck of communication and offered suggestions for their solution •. ·· This' point ''''as stressed in all our reports subt.1i tted previous to that d~te.

14. In early AUgust 1944, I tnras directed by Colonel Fertig to proc0e,d to the east coast of Surigao to meet a submarine that would take me to Luzon., fue Japs occupied the coast before the submarine arrived.' I was the.n advised to proceed to Misamis Orient3.l for a possible rendezvous with a submarine.

15- The trip across j,v'ino.anao from Agusan to Misarl1is Oriental took almost one month. On September 27, 1944, I took charge of a submarine rendezvous at Alubij id, but by tlw,t tira.6.orders had already been issued 9,ssigning me to the 10th .Hil. Dist. and I had to remain.

16.' On November 1944, I was advised by Colonel Fertig to proceed to Colonel McCl ish area '\!There I would be picked up by plane coming from Leyte. r arrived by sail boat at 1sland 1J

17.' During the period of my stay in Mindanao, before my assignment to the District, I acted inforrrelly in the capacity of Inspector General of ' the 10th Mil.' Dis t., upon request of Colonel ·Fertig. On my assignment to the District t Colonel Fertig made my appoin tment as Inspecting Ge1'leral official. I have visi ted the provinces of Surigao, Agusan.' 15ukidnon, Misamis Oriental, Misamis Occidental,and Zamboanga. Of the six guer-:-­ rilla divisions of Mindanao I ha~ oocasion to observe the activities of four of them.

B. Comments:

1. A better intelligence coverage of Luzon could have been obtain­ ed had mw original request to proceed to ths SWPA Headquarters, confer with the Staff and then return to Luzon with the necessary means to operate, been approved!

2. The writer had established in Luzon an organization which was potentially capable of obtaining excellent resul ts on intelligence work. Th.e personnel selected was loyal, discreet, and t/rith adequate technic3.l' qualifice.tiol1$ for thE: mission (see inclosure),

3. All .Luzon units 't~Tere desirous of a centralized contTol. liS a matter of fact, all al2'ents' sent by the different uni ts of Luzon to Mindanao in an attempt to contact SWPA Headquarters, requested such centralization.• They would Mve been glad to submit to one leader provided he was named by GHQ. ~{ing advantage of this general desire, a Jap informer (CIOI2 - Vera Cruz), succeeded, with fake credentials, and posing as head of GHQ Intelligence Service in Luzon, in gaining a thorough knowledge of the organization, activities, and personnel of most of the underground units operating in Luzon.

4. .Al though I had been instructed to direct proourement of intelli~ . genee in Luzon, I had to remain in Mindanao for ten months unable to conduct operations effectively due to inadequate means of communication. I repeatedly requested GHQ, to provide means of transportation of personne} and supplies to Luzon, but apparently this could not be effecte~. Attempts to deliver meager supplies from the Mindanao to Luzon by bencas were complete fa.ilures; what finally arrived at Luzon took too long and were only a part of what "ras originally sent.

- 4- 5- The wrl tel' Qould have probably :teturned to Luzon by banc,?,. Some inconspicuous. full blooded Filipinos have· made the trip although oa.ny more have fallen in enemy hands. Capt •.Pettitt and Mr .. Shafer, tll10 advertureO'Us and fearless gu.errilleros. were ill Mindanao for over six months attempting to' sail forLuzon •. Even adm1-tting that I oould ha.ve made the- trip, I would have returned to Luzon empty ha.nded a.nd \\1'1 thout accomplishing any of my missions •.

6. Recent information receivedaeems to indicate that although the undersigned "'8.S unable to take personal charge of int'elligence . coverage in Luzon. the intelligence net he had esta.blished in the tclalld· is assist- . ing the persoimel designated by GHQ to carryon this important activ'i ty,. Lt_ Flores of L.O.D. J and Lt.1v1ondonedo, writer's assistant, a:te nO\'I in contact with radib stations operated by Major Smith and Capt. Anderson, respectively ..

7... Outside of the above slight contribution to the intelligence operations of the r.Ji'~, the '~ri ter regrets that due to circumstances beyond his control, inability to secure more rapid means of transporta­ tion than ban.cas, laGk of radio communication ~Ti th Luzon, his long stay in Mindanao, g,nd failure to reach the mV'Pii HeadquartETs, he was unabl e to accomplish the following missions Which he 1ntendedto carr,y out when he left Luzon last JanU8,I"J:

a. '11r!111smi t personJ.lly to the COl!lm!1.nding Genere-lo, S~fi'A' the verbal mess:1ges entrusted to him by G-ener9J. Roxas tuld General Lim.

b. Operate efficient intelligence cells in Luzono

c. Plan and exeeu. te measures for the relief of Americ.g.l1 pri soners of "ra.r in Lu~on.

s. Incidentally,. above ste.ted circumstances, also contributed materiallr to the seizure of my frunily, wife and four chidren, by the enemy and at their being kept il'!. Jap custody for severe,l months.

C. Recommendations:

1. That intelligence operatives' in Luzon contact -the persons listed in the i:nclosure and use their services to secure intelligence coverage.

l\f.. L .. IvJMTZAIIJO t Col onsl t .ti. U. S.

1 Encl.

- 5 - List of persons 't~rho hav.e assis,ted OUr unit in intelligence operations in Luzon!

Brigadier General Manuel Roms. Occe.sionally informed us on activities of the Puppet Government and its officials.

Brigadier General Vicente Lim. ·Furnished information on Officers. .

Lt. Colonel Sioeo. P.A. Chief of Staff of General 11m. s Divi:" sian in. Bataa.n.

, Ma,jor Valeriano. P4.ti. SOll of Colonel Valeriano, graduate of P.M.A., organized an intelligence cell in Maaila under the au~1ces of uFree Philippines".

Lt. Colonel Domaoal. P.O. Furnished data on the Bureau of Constabulary.

2nd Lt. Osmundo l-tlol1donedo, P.A., AC. My assistant, graduate of P.M.A. and of several Air Corps schools in the U.S. O:v.ga.nl2ied. ~ntGlligenoe e.alls all O'9'er'· Lu~o.,,--with\p€rsonnel drai',rn among P.IVl.A. graduates and scout non-cams. Has agents covering Clark Field, Aparri, Cabanatuan, Bataan, Los Banos, l~nila Piers, railroads, etc.

3rd Lt. Mondonedo t P.A. AC. Brother of above. Honor graduate of P.!vl • .ti.. class of 1941. Assisted his brother in his "I"fork.

Juan Miguel Elizalde. Furnished financial assistance to our unit.

Jose Ozamis. 'Formerly majority floor leader, Phili:ppin~ Legis- la ture. Our contact ':1ri th Colonel Fertig and IvIaj or Phillips.

Ma,j or J 0 S9 Bazon. Mane,ger of the sugar interests of Roxas y Cia (Spanish concern). personal friend of and our contact 'tfTith General Roxas. Informed us of activities of gover.rulent officials.

J. P. Reyes. Asst. Attorney General of the Phillippines. Recongnized head of ffFree Philippinesft • Kept us informsd on Governnlent affairs.

A. Bautista. Prominent la1rJYer, partner of ..~raneta and :Bautista. la\1{ firm. lVIanber of "Free Philippineslt .. Contacts Colone_i. Enriguez, Ivlarkings and Panay guerrillas.,

Rafael Roces, Jr. Businessman and newspaperman t grad~te of Notre Dame UnivEJrsi ty. '1he most active member of "Free Philip-' pines". Contacts Terry Hunters, ~nders01:l1s; Huckbalaje.;ps guerrillas.

Lorenzo Tanada. Prominent la1r~ert forme~ Asst. City Fiscal, City of ~anila, member of "Frae Philippines". Contacts agents of Negros guerrillas.

1st Sgt. Suplemento. 14th Engineers, Philippine Scouts.: Rul,1s our group of scout operatives in and around Manila (includes Nichols Field, Nielson Air Port, Ft. ~"m. McKinley) •.

Cipriano Soler. Civil Engineer fornerly ~n Batean as Asst_ Civil Engineer.

.... 6 - _§LSA~J!.azareta.. 14th Engineers, Philippine Scouts. \lvorks on Neilson Airport and lives near Ft. McKinley. Keeps us informed on activities at both places.

Gorado A., PrtJ!a-=.. Captain, Air Corps, Republic of Spain. Cousin of Colonel Manzano. Runs underground message center for us.' Jose_L. Manzano. Brother of writer, hacendero of' Balayan. Advisor t"o guerrillas, of Batangas •. Ramon 11 de Amusat2lSui. Asst. Manager HEl- .Ahorro Insular". Spaniard. Contacts American prisoners of war, Cabanatuan. Maria Martinez. A business woman, formerly amine stock broker. Con­ tacts American prisoners of war at Ft. Mills, (Maj. Lothrop, CE, seater and Baldwin). Secures reports from them on progress of fortification work. Manuel Manosa. Civil Engineer, Asst. Manager'Metropolitan Water Works. Furnishes data on utilities, railroads"etc, also on P~erican internees. Manuel Xexes Burgos.; Former Comptroller, Manila Railroad. Intelli­ gence Officer for Markings Guerrillas in Manila.

R.~on Oriole Owner of "Oriol Marble Works" •. A patriot. Contact man of Markings Guerrillas.

Mr. Dug&~.L-_ Manager of Hauserman's Mining interest. Recognized leader of American civilian internees in Luzon. Keeps us posted on developments in internees camps.

~~atas Garcia. Captain of inter-island boat. Covers shipping, dock and ship construction activities. PJIlado Gonzales. Chief engineer of ship operating under Jap control. Covers same items as above. Furnished us data on Takao port, Formosa, including information on aluminum sheet factory in that area.

Muardo Taylor. . Chief Engineer and Asst. Manager, National Develop­ ment Corp. Formerly manager-Cebu Portland Cement Factory. Brother-in-law of Colonel Manzano. Gave us data on industrial and mining products. Er.ank orClassen. Spanish-American mestizo. Radio engineer. Assisted­ in the erection of radio installations in Guam for the U. S. Navy. Now Chief Radio Engineer for Jap controlled radio power station between San Juan and Marikina. Gave us detailed data on Jap radio installations in area near Manila. scout Non-Coms. Many were used •. Al~ are willing to participate in any activity against the enemy. ,

Enclosure to "Intelligence Operations, Colonel N. L. Manzano U •

- 7 - APPENDIX XIX

HISTORY OF THE

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, USAFFE APPENDIX XI~

, HISTORY" OF ' THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, US~FE,

Little ·-is known :,6[ the brilliant achievements' and: sacri... fice~. qf the" members of the Military Inteillgence "Servicebfdthe' U~AFFE •.: ,'.Rumor,s, some authentic and some incredibla ,'of their accom­ plish.mE?pts used t.o reach; the embattled lines' of beleaguered, Ba.taan.. " The effect on civilian morale was tremendous and;kept "the home fires burning" until liberation day. An, attempt, therefo.re, is maq.e here tQj.. bring to light known facts bearing on the activitiesof the officers and enlisted' men of this serVice, in the hope that these fa,cts will do justice',', :in some degree, to the immortal feats of MIS personnel living or dead. ' The activi tie s of the Military' Int'elligence Service (MIS) may be divided into three phases: first, from the outbreak of war! in the Philippines on': (3 December1941. up ,to the sur-render of Corre""; gidor on 6 May 1942; second, the ,period.o-f'Japanese' occupation of the Philippines; and thirEi, from the landing of General'Douglas MacArthur and President Sergio~Osmena,at Leyte on ,20 October 1944 up to 15 March 1945, when the MIS e'easedfunctionin'g", .

First Fha'se of the' Intelligence Serv~

The Military Intelligence' ·Service under··the c'ommand of Brig. Gen. Simeon de Jesus:, organized ·under G-2, USAFFE; in the early part of January 1942, was the nucleu's of intelligehce opera­ tions conducted against the enemy. At the inception of th~ war, no such organization existed. Intelligence operations then' were con­ fined to the gathering' of information valuable ~o the conduct of military operations, under a central unit -~ 0-2, USAFFE. But the confusion that arose in the early stages of the'war in the'Philip­ pines localized intelligence work to units'eithev'isolated or severed from their main units. This was inevitable. Transportation was disrupted, telephone and telegraph communications, destroyed, bri<;l,ge.s .:blowrt, military supplies and equipment 'burned 'on 'the grounds of rrlllitsry exigency. Orders previously given t;,o 'all'USAFFE units: in LUZon to Iconverge on Bataan were being carried out;· ·but this vast troop movement had to be accomplished with little 'communi9ation be- tween units. ',: .. , . In January 1942, afteJ:' the ~ithdrawa:l oi troop's, to Bataap, General de Jesus was called to Corregidor fC?f a conference. What ' took place at that meeting was.the organ:l~atioh of' the MIS in Bataap, directly responsible to' Col. Charles A•. Willoughby, 0-2; tJSAFFE. , The imposing personality 'Of this' 'Amerlcan, officer., co~ined with hi~ abiding faith in the loya.lty of the Filipinb. people to: the:'pause for which the USAFFE was fighting in Bataan, w0I?- th~ respect and admirar­ tion of the officers and men in'the MIS. Hi's leadership inspired spontaneous obedience to orders; however perilous ,'.tne miss~on assign­ ed~ and his generosity in corrunending accomplishInents added .. ~ncenti va for the MIS to accomplish more and more. . ,:'. " . . As soon as it was organized, the M~S operated under in... , st··"'l.'.ctions from {G-2, USAFFE~ As its name irnpli$s, nUssion" of the MI3 -Nas to collect evaluate, and disseminate' 'I~lItary information o'o';~21ned behind the enemy lines in Bataan and other 'enemy~6ccupied ~ .' .. "'\ .

.... 1 - areas. Funds for the purpose were furnished by the Finance Officer on duty with HPD at Little Baguio, Bataan,' and Corregidor. All money received was properly accounted for by the Finance Officer assigned to the MIS. The CP of this organization was at Km. 172.5 Ma.riveles, Bataan. - In personnel, the MIS started almost f~om scra~ch. Such of the men who cho_sa not to join the 2-d Regular Division (when the 1st Provisional Brigade commanded by General de' Jes'us . was renamed a.nd given a. new:' commanding officer) remained under t'he command' of General de Jesus~ His staff was made up of officers.and men whose loyalty and devotion to duty was unquestionable ,a:nd'ga,ve credit to its organiZier~ Roster of the Military Intelligence Service ~n Bataan was as follows:

1. Brig~ Gen. Simeon de Jesus USAFFE t Cpl.' B. Seralde 43 • cpt. Ocampo It 44. Cpl. Flor, " 45. Cpl. Molina "

- 2 .... Pvt l' M<3:?Cimo Revi~.la". 'i , V.~AFEFt~ ,lulled during . . . ..,.' ':. . '.' . '," .. liberation· .47'.·. ':Mr.: Feliciano'.B~t·e "'., 'd~vLOp~:rat~ves '; Kil1.ed .by .~aps:

4Ei.". ,. I~r. Magnot Top.acio"· It, . , " . Kill€?9. by. Japs: 49.' Mr. Hiram Ramo s Ii If Mis sing 50. ,Mr,. Santo$ , ". .:' . jf , It , Kil;t;ecf' 51.. Mr',. $iit6,Dimaahq if ' tI 52 ~ Mr.'. A\lr~'", '" ,II' ft, ff s'3. Mr.: y~ceritev~rs:oz$3. ",,' 54." lvfr.' Fausto Albert 0 tr ,,' I, . '.1; 55 i· : Mr •. Quiambao" " . " " '$6 •. Mr •. Marco' .'.' f; . :, ft. '57 • i~r< .. Ruben;· Rruuirez'" " n, tI S:S.· ·Mp. Ma;uricio Guidote t.r " Kille.d:.py Japs

,: .The' selection 'of agents ~and ·qp~rativ~s. was t?,~sed pot 'only on daring,.'ini:,el1~gence, ·and"1:'esour,cefu.lness;it w'as :equally base:d , on loyalty" devotion .t.o dutY"and d~pend,ability.•. Great cq.:q.e wfJ.s ',. used in scree:..n,~nK, t~' make sure that the bes;t men were employed.·· . Civilian ,agen.t.:~ .qf the, Philippin~ Constabulary under: Mqjor ,~gust:iP. " G. Gabri.e~ ,wer.e; pro~essed : ~n.to the service; enlisted, men ;from. th.e ,': line .' and 9.,;i."vljiiaI1-: empl.oyees from the qu~r~ermaster Servipe' weJ:!(3":.i ': " . called upon to serve; and qualified civilians wer.e r,ecruit.e.ct fr0l'!l:' the. di.f~er:e~~"e.ya~uee :,camps ,s.et, .up:iu .. '~8:tap.n ~ _ ' , ,', ',:. , '. :A~~f3F.pr~B~:r" ind9,c~rination rega;rding .the . .inip~rtg.nce·' .of. their n;Uss.io~, ,ag,en~~ aYl:d 9P~rati ,!e;~ were s,ent p~t. . S.o~~', w€t:t:'c. 9,s"", pat.chad to .,~Northern ~l1d .Southern,.):Juzon, others YiI~,~e.; sent.. .to Ce:ptr~l Luzon,' .whiJ;e:t~e·, res~ '.pr;ie~:.into' ~h.;e ,enemy t sqente.r~ ;o'f .oper?-.t'iops. 4n Manil~.. Int~~ligence ,m~n.:w:ith;a ~u.dimentars kn~vJledg.Ei :0.£ combc;tt·,,·'- were, planted in the front lines.. .' " '..,'..' '~ : ' " ,~n; .~.he. e?-r1y ,part" o,f Fe~r:'~ary 'th·e. ,Japs ,o

they returned to the. CP ,at about,.,,2000 H. Immediately Capt. It' deJ eSlls rnad~\a '$ketch o! th~'. JdP ,lo.cation' a.nd wass.en~ to 'wn' with the re~; que,sf 'thq.t BB:langfl.'be $h,elled. ,Th~ "Yhol,e' nigt1.t Ba~q.n.ga was shelle9.; as reported by men from CPLR at Orion. The foll.owing mo,rni.ngGene1,"" al d~ Jesu~ rece:Lved;a telepho~18 call from' General'Willptlghby as­ serting 'that' t'~ere .wer·e no Japs i1) Balanga, but, General de Jesus ... ' assured him ,tha.:t ,.there we~e" On tpfJ~ame day, when Capt. Masca:.rd6:· and Lt, .• Mac~d.a. were in.. the vicinitypf, Pilar, Bataan (a .daily ro'u,,;,,' tin~, work of these. two . offic~rs) . tbey met Agent Santos· of the MIS coming' from the' direc~:lon of the e,nemy line ~, He reportE3Q., thClt the shelling' of Balanga ~a's , very effective ancJ. estimated that the 'Japs ' sustc;tinGd n~, fewe~.·· than, J ,000 casua+ties. He saw these casualties. moved . ii-om ,one 'place to another in. trucks,... , " ,I !. , ';," . Of: the, repor~s thp.i:- g~ve tJ~e ~ost .. :tact:Lcal value to. the , Fil.... Aiii13 ·:t'lcan ,forces on Bataan, th~ f9;llowi!:lg::may'~O mentionet;i: : 1) '.'... the~n,emy" qo'ncentr~t;lons( of men ~n9. materifJ~ in the chur9h, ,capitol;. and:': school at, Balang~, which vllere.blaste.9- by our artillery;. ,2,) .·the_'~ , , convoy" gr-}1Q,: t:r;ucks loaded·vvi~h. troops to rein:.force. the enemy' $: depletil}g'''str~ngtl1'at .Abucay, which o~r,'batterfesmerciles~ly .wiped '. out; :3 ).'·tn~ ',capture o:f .papers from '~hE? ,pocket of a dea~t·,t.Tp.pane~e,· ";', officer ," 'which', decoded and evaluated, turned out. to ·be .the QnQl11y.f s plan q£ attack .on; Butaan' and Cor~~g~qlo:r:; . 4:)·,the.size ~f th~.· forces that for.q·eci' £pe;issue on"S April194~; and 5) the proctlrement; ,of, Japane'~e":sP9J:lSOr.~.d' da~lies ~hich were distributed to the ~ea.ders' q.t;, ~ '.' ,

Corr~4.S~~qr.: '.~: ';.. 'j., ...:, '. l.' ,,',; .':" ,.'

\ '

_ "l _ ' ."J. . The hair-raising achievements of the operatives and offi­ cers of the MIS were legion, but it would be most unfair to omit the individuals who were outstanding. "Their ".feats "were ·in"scribed in the tablets of their faith in the "cause for which they were unflinching.... ly fighting. Col~ Margarito S. Torralba planned the operations of the MIS, which were carried out under the darkness of night an.d in the dayt1.me when Japs were inces santly bombing numerous ~ targets. With his impressive personality', courage, faith, and tactics, he executed his plans in the most effectiva way. Major Lamberlo T. Javalera, Chief" of the Intelligence Section, fresh from his "tour of duty with the "Manila Secret Service, performed the delicate Job of choosing and·recruiting operatives. In classifying and evaluating information ga.thered, .in directing intelligence operations in the line, and in gathering military in­ formation himself when no operatives wer"e available; Major Javalera ~stablished a claim to the unreserved confidence "of 'his sup~rior officers. At one time he had to scour the "innermost recesses of the Mariveles Mountains for the purpose of exploring whatever in­ formation the Negritos might have on enemy dispositions in the west~ ern sector. That he was able to secure valuable intelligence frQm this fierce tribe of mountaineers"was a patent proof of his tact and ability to handle men. Lt. Tomas Karingal with Sgt. Jose S. Maniquis collected tactical information from and. . The :tnteiligence they'gathered'from Japanese-infested places such as ' Bayom'bong, Solano, Payawan:, Kiangan, Pagong, Banawe, Dodd, Bontoc, Sadanga, Bangad, Lubuangan, Banat, Lagan-lIang, Bangued, and San Quintin was transmitted to Bataan Headquarters through the facili­ ties offered by Batong-Buhay Mines. These:twQ men were able to make ·9ther trips to enemy-occupied areas for yaluable information about the enemy. Lt, Melecio Custodio'daringly crossed Manila Bay' from Corregidor to Luzon via Ternate, Cavite, to gather intelligence . about the enemy situation. In addition, he procured calcium sandoz,' calcium glocunate, and hemostatic serum to be delivered to ""President Quezon in Corrogidor. Lt. Custodio was also responsible for obtain­ ing the photograph of General Artemio Ricarte which was badly needed QY General MacArthur at that time. Capt.. Dominador lIIfascardo and Lt. G. S. Maceda ,in their reliability to provide boatr:3 and boatmen when needed, were the em­ bodime ntof a: resoluto driving power. - Capt. Eugenio de Jesus;" fngineer Officer, made finished drawings of sketches of enemy in- , f3tallations before such information wa.s relayed to Colonel Willough~ py .. "" Without him, no intelligence report could have been made of ~uch hazy maps as were drawn by out' non-engineer operatives, Lt. de la Fuente dared cross enemy lines so that he might return to Manila with funds. to "procure medicine for distribution among Americans loft behind somewhere in the Montalban hills. Agent Topacio.tsfast accomplishment in capturing a document which proved ~o be the enemy's plan"for the invasion of Bataan enabled the forces" thereon to make necessary preparations to repel,the attack. Equally remarkable was the a~complishment of Mr. Santos, who, after dis­ guising himself as"a fisherman supplying. fish to the Japanese, was able to determine size and disposi tiori of enemy troops in .Balanga", . tho' 'capital of Bataan. '" : " In dispatching Atty, Feliciano; Bote "to contact all mem­ bers 'of the Executive Comrnis sion and Dt. : Victor Bue"ncamino of the NARIC, the MIS pulled a stunt of great boldness and audacity. In this plot against the unwelcome conqueror, Sgt. Singculan contribu., ted a valuable share by carrying messages between President Quezon on Corregidor,and his ,sec:retary J,orgeB. Varg~s, who w~s made Chairr man of .the Ph;Llipplne :Execut.i ve'.Commission . vvith office~'at 'Malaca:~an' Palace • .'·'" ; ,. ., .,'., <:, ", ,.:. '.-",: . :,Sgt;'"Villanuevar's. l~v~::tor,.1:1is:ailing leC\der:'i!1spire'd liim to s"ally forth, in qU,est', ofmedic~ne:fbr President 'Quezon. ,That his' president might liv,e to ~se~' the day'\lvhen'the Philippines would be :, liber~t,ed .and that' h£? niight hea~,ag9-i'n 'the' "joybells of:'frecdom ri~g't ing ~~' these we,re 'all, that :matterod to Sgt:~ Villanueva.," ' , ',' 'To thos~ 'operatives "who braved' thetightly"':guarded water~ , of Marula Bay arid 'died in the' performance of itheir duties, no other' tribute qould 1?~ the,i~s ,~h.an the applause 'and' 'aqndration of the civilized world., " " . ,.' .. . .'," '. " ...... 'Great praise goes to Lt·. Maceda, the Qhief "of ,'Supply'" for unusual zeal in procuring food and supplies in'a trulY-deficient section of,' the country. and for the equitable dis.tribution thereof to all members of the unit II Without his' aid the .. ma.n ·0£. ,the MIS could never have demonstrated their cQurage, devotion to duty, and abiding faith ... Credit is als~' 'dqe to the ,Ass'istaht 'Supply'Officer, Lt. Jos~ Tatco, who was able ~o .go Q~y~nd th~USAFFE' OPLR in quest of fJ;'esh food f~r MIS' p~~s6nl'1:~1·•. Hedeservesl..credit;, too, for id8ntifyi~g-' forest substitutes for c:i;vilizedmen t s 'vegetables, Lt. Tomas C.' Cariil~; despito the limited ~edical sup­ plies he had with him, wa.s, able to cur.e ai1m~nts of both the mili"':" taryand civilian personnel ,of this unit. On many occasi6t)s he was, forced to search the' mountain ·v&stness for medicinal :suQstltute's,~: . When medicine ',was getti!lg 'scarce ,.Lt. "M~ceda was ass~gne(l to' gather"'.: Philippinem~dicinal plants as .recommel)ded 9Y Gol. Arthur;!!:. ,.. FisChel".·.· Bark ,of di ta trees, duhat , stems 6( ,~makabuhayll. vine" and. others '.': were consequently accumulated and, stored, These duties ·of" Lt. " ., .. MacGda ~ere in addition ~o his .other ,assignmerits ablY. done, \~uch as" di$patc.h~~g operatives across Manila Bay, gathoripg ":Lnf6rmati.oTI ; ',',:: about the ene.my, and procurement of food and supplie's ffom th~" area..~·' between the two lines." . ' That the WC\r' in Ba.taan was not pn1y a war" of force Qut a ' war of nerves aS',well was understood early by·the·MIS. For this ",' purpose, a daily,' cap~iorie.d. "See' You in Manila; fI' '~8:s eqited by' Capt .~. Fred Ruiz. Castro, assisted by' Lts., Leon 'Ma.· G~errero. and Felipe . Buencamino III", ,Tl1e pape.r was designed to boost the morale; of the;, troop,s', to keep.,ever) burning the id~al$ fqr vvhich the' war was being'; fought, and to prognosticate the shape' of .life that· would sur~ly:' come if the .~e~ shirkeq their as sig!1ed, dut~es'. Psychological war- ' fare was()~ .• · ...... ,>,.,' : ': ,'". , As thedar.~ situation 'pecame 'apparent., from information" gathereq" it !was.evlde.nt .that the,:l~nerny w~s' pressiilg from all '061"- .' ners of, th~ pen~nsuia. . CQmmunica;~ion.,between Bataan ang th~o~cu~ , pied areas wa$ becomiJ?g· difficult, :'1f not impossible. In'such a " critical moment,~ Gener~l ,~e Jesus', true to the best, qualities C?f -.'a.,' "', natural leader ,called a st.aff meeting to discuss his p:foposed 'plat ," of carrying on the mission .of the MIS in tho 'event :that the Arhe:ti~ ',;. cans surrendered and we were captured. It VUlS' deGided"t6 divide "the j archipelago into three main distriqts: Luzon:, un~~r .Major:.LaIh1?erti-r ':. T. Javalera; Visayas, under Lt. Col. Margarito S. 'Torralba; and'; - Mindanao, under Major ValeriarlO Sison., "Each should bear in mind

••• ft the general began, but could not continue. < There we-re tea.rs in his eyes'~' -He, 'w'as choked with emotion~ ..' ' " ~ .::'

. ',' ~ . '. . . ,; .. :Before Bataan. fell, General 'de Jo'sus' instructed·, -Lt. " Maceda to -escape Itom Bataahand proceed at"'once to Manila.sc'·:that the intelligence work of, the MIS' could ,be' continued, in ope:rati6ri~ . Without" deiaY·Maceda.' "started tram Bq.t'aan- 10 ~Apri:l 'and :proceed<>d.' to Manila, arriving there pn 12" April., :' During the period wheh" most: ~,fIS .:{' . ,.; , i officers were still conce~trated in Capa~, , Lt. Maceda kept himself busy contacting operatives of the outfit who did not sur­ render and who were arriving in Mat:lila one,after another.,' After learning the whereabouts of a number.'of tl1ese escaped operatives, Lt? Maceda set up a preliminary organization. He indoctrinated mem~ bers with the idea that 'the service was a continuation of former activitics under General deJesu~ on Bataan' and that' it was orgaI?-- ' ized to help, directly or , indirectly,. the sacred "cause for which the United states and the Philippines were fighting. -With this end in view, all poss-ible efforts were, to be made to thwart the activities of the Japanese in the Philippines. The 6rganization would give physical and financial aid to other units in their underground op8rations against Japan. .

Second Phase of the Intelligence Work

Upon arrival-of Brig. Gen. Simeon'de Jesus in Manila sometime in A~gust 1942, Maceda immediately contacted, him and re~ ceived his approval on the preliminary organization he had set up. He further suggested, -as Chief of the Operational Section" Lt. Col. Dominador T. Mascarao, who was soon to be released from POW con- centration camp. , With the presence of Lt. Col. Mascardo in Manila on 15 November 1942, the activities of this outfit began. Moremem­ bers of the unit were selected for'thei~,loyalty, bravery, and self­ sacrifice. All me'mbers were instructed that under no circumstances should they reveal'either the existence of the organization or the identity of its members. Only in rare instances dio t~e members of this unit know each other. Few members of the organization were empowered by Lt. Col. Mascardoto take in other men to work with the outfit; and under h(;)' circumstances were the latter permitted to know of the existence of;the,outfit and the 'identity of other members. General de Jesus, more hopeful than ever for the return of the old order, issued secret instructions, among which were: 1) to carryon the missiori "of :the MIS' by underground activities., 2) to contact guerrilla leaders for professional advice, 3) to give them aid and comfort' wheriever and wherevert "an opportunity presented ito:­ self, 4) to accept employment in the Filipino-run agencies 1f such would be a mea.ns to achieve the desired end, and 5) to make all 're­ ports to a central agency controlled by General de Jesus# The c'omplete roster of the Operational Section approved and operating directly under Brig. QeP. Simeon de Jesus in Manila during the Japanese r~~e is shown on the following pages. The 'sphere of activities of this outfit was limited by lack of money ,as all expenses were met with the limi,ted personal funds of the members. However, information was steadily gather~d; and after 'radio stations on 'Luzon were in contact with GHQ in Australia, intelli.gence gathered,by,-t;,he MIS was 'relayed ,to these, stations r,or transmitta.l, to give 'information' on shipping;, troop .fI1ovements, air activity, and military installations. Samples of these daily intelligence reports are:

, '12 ;;ep 1944 - A J~p hospital ship" Siberia. ]Jfaru, $,000, tons, berthed at Pier 5/2 bringing women and chiId~n (Jap subjects) from Davao. On this date Pier 7 is full of array cargoes, and army trucks are busy carrying' out these 'cargoes to bodegas in the suburbs of' Mal1:Lia.· At Pier 5/1 an army transport, 8,500 tons, bringing troops showingsignsQf fatigue aJ.'1dwearine's s, als 0 from Davao .At 1000 H the air­ field siren, was. sounded, and all workers on ships were or- " dered to stop. At the same time, the red flag was hoisted,

.. .6 - lrrLIT_~Y I}ITELLIQENCE SERVICE OPERATIONAL .S~CTION

NAME PRESENT, GUERRILLA USAFFE . ~RESE}'IT -GUERRILLA : . fOMPO~1ENT .... REMARKS RA}m; .. RANK or·· .. ASS:IG~llENT ASS IGNME~IT GUERRILLA: I

l:~- S.imeon~ d.er.Jesus - u . ,.chief :-Regular Killed by Japs

4' .'. " Hil. Int. -Servi-ee . _2.' Marga.ritQrS~ .. Tcrralba.' Colonel Colonel u Camp Comdr. Asst Chief . Regular Cam.E Ivltrphy Mil. Int. Seniee .3 •. Lorenzo Santa· Maria Maj~r Lt-Col u t~it coqrdinator Regular Killed by Japs to other Guerillas --~~~--~~------~---r~------~------4--'------~~--~~------4~~ 4.··. Agaton Panapio Lt-Cbl Lt";"Col U .CO, . PAGD . Unit . CD ordinat or .' ... . to other'Gue'rillas t. 5. Dominador Mascardo Major Lt-Col u ·Pro'Vi no~al Com: I Chief, Operational Regular -4 Ri·za.l Provinc-e ...... " Section . ----...... ------'------+------t--~__:_.__:___t_-----;__----'=~----'";.....;;....;~~~----.-...::::..:::.=.;;;.=-.---t------f------~---..;.-~- 6..... Generosq S. N..aceda :fuIajor' Lt-C'ol' U Adm O:r.ficer Execlttive" Off1.cer Reserve G-2. . (PA) Operational Sec. ~~.~~--~~~------~4_~~~~~~~~- '7. Eugel1io de Jesus '1fajor" Lt-Col' u Asst 'Ex Offic~r . Reserve Reverted to Operational Sec. Inactive Status 8 •. Benlardo David IstLt Captain u TDY, G-2 {PA) Liaison Officer Reserve -to Majs . Galang & Ramsey . 9. ~ Mo~e:st(). Mascardo 1st Lt ·Capta~n u Opera.tive Reserve Killed by Japs

10. Jose D. Tatoo Captain Captain u .CO, 25th Co MPC Operative Reserve Pasig, Riza1 11. Juan de Jesus 2d Lt 1st Lt u Operative Reserve' Killed by Japs

12. Jaime Mascardo Captain 1st Lt u FS, FA Operative Reserve ]IrIS OPERATIONAL~SECTrON"""

: , . NfuI~ PH2SENT GUERRILLA USAFEE PRESENT GUSRRILLA COMPONENT REt!.ARKS RANK RANK or ASSIGNMENT ASS IGN1IENT GUERRILLA , '. ..

13 .. Ricardo David 1st Lt G O;!e~"'ative . In civilian life 14. Tomas Mascardo Ist.·Lt· G Operative 7 In civiUan life 15. Emiliano Mascardo 1st Lt 1st Lt U Aq" MPC I Operative Reserve - .' . 16. Andres Or~iz 1st Lt G Operative In civilian life .... " 17. Vicente Romero 1st Lt G Bu. of Science Operative 'L"1. civilian life

18.. Godolfredo Alcasid lS.t Lt 1st Lt G Bu. of Science I 'Operative Reserve ~ In civiliap. life

1,' 19. Cayetano .( . Tuazon Captain 1st Lt U AUS, Okinaw.a Oi:>erative Reserve . . 20. Fortunato OJ-iveros 1st Lt G OpeItative In civilian l;ife

~ 21. Paterno V. Oppus 1st Lt 1st Lt MPC, Operative Reserve '.,. 1st 1st Lt U Phil. Consulate Operative Reserve 22. Petroni1o'G. Dlllay .Lt Hawaii 23. Alberto Banares TjSgt liljSgt U MPC, 'Pasig, Rizal Operative Reserve 24. Fernando Angeles M/Sgt U Unknown Operative ReserVe --.- 25. Joaquin Andres M/Sgt G Operative In civilian life MIS OPERATIONAL SEpT ION

NAME PRESENT· GUERRILLA USAFFE PRl:.~ENT GUERRILLA COMPONENT REMARKS RANK RANK or :ASSIGN1vIE].'IT- ASSIGNMENT GUERRILLA

26. Jose Basilio Sgt G Operative In civilian life

27. Feliciano David Sgt G Operative In civilian life

28•. PedroD;;l.vid· 'Sgt G Ope.rativ.e In civilian life ..

.. 29 • Atty• Salvador Mascardo Civ. Operativ~ In .civili~n life " • '< ." • ..'

30~ Atty.Godoliredo Sareal Civ. Operative In civiiian l~fe . 31. Mr. Felix Angeles eiv. Operative .- In civi"lian life

32. Mr. Catalino Lozada Civ. Operative In civilian life .. ." eiv. Operative In civilian life Leon ",. 33. Mr. Clemente . In civilian life 34. Mr. Florencio Nadal Civ. Operatiye .. 35. Mr. Sergio Op~kiko Giv. Operative. In civilian- life Civ. Operative In 'civilian': life

37'! Mr.' Maximo Roque Civ • Operative: . In civilian· tife . . 38. Miss Susana Dizon Civ. Operative In civilian life indic~ti,ng darlge,r. -After ;the 'lap$e .of one~ llouF all 1j~ork on : sl)ipt:; (re$um~d, an~: a:t '1800 H ',~l ·worke;r~,:·.vv~~~ ordered to go , home", ea.rlY·. .',' .' : :' . :,. ; -:.'15 ~Sep 11944 ~ At:Pier 5/2, large tr.ansPQr~, 9,qOO tons, :unlo.aded.rifl:e bullets and antJ~aircraft. shells (loq.ded). ' :Foodstuffs B,uch 'as' blscuits andconiectioneries, 1,000 bags :ofmaii.;5~000 ca~es' 'qf medi·ca.l :supplies; a.rid 1,OOOibases of ·lOO-lb b.ombs •. Aro~ndPort Area,. ~ll, Jap. solctiers busy dig­ ging air.;..raid shelte'rs and army trucks carrying all ammuni­ .tion out side the pier premise s. . Army· ·trucks camouflaged. with grasses and leave,s of'trees, 'and hipa shack cov~red with grasses and branches of trees. Under nipa shack are anti-aircraft gunq:and long-range guns. 21 Sep 1944 -.42 Army' and Navy transports including those at the bay and piers. Three' ships on the bay are: Eikyo Maru, 9,000 tons; Resin Maru., 7,000 tons; OlymPi~ Maru., '8,000 tons, shipping cargo rice .. from Saigon.. I was on: ,board the Resin Maru at 0930 H.' Four Jap planes were maneuvering a dog-=-fight J when suddenly appeared 10 ·p1anes, which mixed in the maneuver.' People unaware· they y.7ere US and RAr planes. T1NO. Jap ·planes pl~nged into ,the sea with tails burned, after 2 minutes. ' Two US planes plunged into - the sea •. ' Formation af~er formation of US plane s and RAF planes appeared from:the north. Witnessed 2 US planes swoop down on. an 8}590~ton:freighter w;Lth .. ac.cu,J::p,cy .•.•.• Super diving of US planes caused '.10 ships to .burn, others sank' instantaneously. At 1$00 H US planes appeared again. One US'plane shot down~ At 1540 H,' 6 more ships were biq.ste~~ At; 1630 H all planes d~sappeared.. 23 Sep 1944 - Jap:soldiers cleaning debris around Port Area..: " . . 2$ Sep 1944 - Filipino laborers hired to help'clean':" debris.in Port~Area. ······.. 5:·0ct·i944 --12,OOO-ton ship at Pier 7 unloading troops. Estimated 2,000, fully equipped, entered Mahila'in four :.': armored baby tanks and 'in 10 army trucks.. Repair :onPiei.'3. started. Two AA guns, .grass camouflaged,' installed near ': . Pari an : gate. . 7 oct 1944 - At 1830 H' one' . large· -t-ransport at Pier 7, fully laden with Jap troops,. estimated to be. 6,090. Another at Pier 5 unloaded 20 heavy armored tan~s and 20 trucks. Speci?l train arrived in Manilawith'l"OOO soldiers' fully equipped, . . . ; 11 Oct 19~'4 - streetcar use~ .t9 transport cargoes' from Port "A~ea. 'at 2100 H. American prisoners and internees boarded a 9,OOO-ton.. ship (name concealed) out of br~f3l{Water. 15. Oct 194'4 - Tota;l ships in b~y, 29. When US pt·anes apPE;;ared, smoke screen ~mitted by ships to camouflage, their identity· and position. : Ten' US planes dived and' strafed the vess~ls:. Three. transports set ab+aze. Two US and two Jap plan$s downed.· • Train '916 fromrangasin~ arrived in Manila at +5.00 r;:.;. ~ith·.l,OOO soldiers in fUll pack. I., : .l6. Oct; 1944 - Two sh~ps' ~eft bay escorted by a destroy- er,.' :.Kemye ~, 9,000 tOl1:S; at ;P~er 1 •. A 10,OOO-ton trans­ port -,at Pier 7. One 8,500.:..ton transport unloaq.i.ng sugar. R~lia'ple ~nformation gatherE?d fr.orn,high officials of the' Taiw~ tJriju Kaisha. ·Ltd., 4.' company subsidi~ry;:to' theJap Mili­ tary Administration,: says ·that th;i.s ;we.ek 5'0 transports were lbade¢ with;tt.o6ps for th~: q;ef'ense of ~the' Ph.il~ppines. Re- :gard,ing 2 transports ca~rying3 ,:OOO~n:ternee.sand POW for ~T~i~lat:,l:: tr;anspotth&s ~been igentif'.ied as'. Kojurio Maru, and

- 10 .. left Manila at 1630 H on. II October 1944 •... '. ".. • :;.~~;: _~./':""~' •• ,>••. :""'.':~'\\': ,!:<': "r~' ..':< I,;!,.; ,:. .. ~.! Information submitted .. to the invasion forces included the following mil'ftat;~/ objective'S',:' vd.t'H:·'ic£lort,'! ct'aken:: t " • ',,-,

." .. "1.' 'G~sblih~;;dt.ifup~ ·a.·t;'·Pinagkaisah~ (duad'alu}>e pile of

drums) .... Direct hit. /0 • • • '.: . 2 •.. Liss.~r Pf'rfume. Faqtory u.s~d ,a~" :J.,+p~n~se; o,rdnance shop (ordne,nce shops' from NieJ.:·s6u' and. 'Nibhols Sirfields' ~transrerred to I this tactory) .... Direct hit~ ,- .".;. ". . 3... Ga,solin~ clump ,a.t South CemetefY near the ijeralco car line :... Missed.' .. .' .;" /.' '" , . 4. Dummy p1aces.ne~r ~he poblacion of Makati - In spite of report, bombed. . .; ,'... l 5. P\.ijIlIny barracks ,a,t Nielson Airfield along the south side border - Not, ·bombed .. :. ... · .:., "'c: . " .~., " .,6 •.. Emergency pier ne~r lnsul~r. Sugar Contrpl, construct- .~d; -~y .~apahe·s.e Mar'ine.$ -:·Carpet. bombings, >3 .gu6var.ra$ ,: 2 111()t9~· .. ' · launch.E)'s. '. '. . . . , '.. . '. : ,'. . 7;' Net:wo.rk. pf tuhnel.s in MSlkati and' Guad~iupE?·i·filf'ecf.· wi ttl. o.fl;'· gasoline; ~?iild: ..t oOci.stu,fls; constructe

'.' . Other objectives sUbmltt·ed. fo~ the .. inf6r~at~qilof the' .:. invasion' forces :were "as fol:Low~:' .. ;. ,.'. _. " • - •••• (. : • ..,l .,'. ". 1. Cavalry at Los Banos, , with strength of 1,000 horses, 2. Defense positions in Batangas: a, Should landing be effected at Balayan Bay, the line will be: Taal Lake - Indang - Naic. b. Should landing be effected at Batangas Bay J first line will be: Batangas - Cuenca - Taa~ Lake -' Taal. Second line will be~ Taa1 Lake - Tanawan - Lipa - Tayabas Bay. Third line will be; Laguna'Bay - Mt Makiling -'Tayaba.s. c. Mt Makiling, faCing Batangas Bay, surrounded by barbed wire and trenches constructed at the base, d. Santo Tomas as focal point wfth mobile division in reserve. e. Road under construction from santo Tomas to Tagaytay via Talisay. f. Col. Setuguchi in conmand of this sector, coordi­ nating withConunanding General of the Manila Defense Area. 3. Tank division disposed as follows: 'Lucban, Tayabas sector - 74 medium. Aritao, sector - '120 medium. 4. According to high-ranking Japanese officer, after their defeat in the Visayas, Wdndanao, and Southern Luzon, Japanese will make their last stand in the Mountain Province.

Other objectives reported by the MIS as possible spots for sabotaging weret

1. Chaco Building - Ammunition inside building.

2. Cine Oro & Tivoli - Supplies and ammunition. 3. Santa Cruz Church - Machinery and naval equipment. 4. Philippines Engineering - Engineering supplies. 5. Elizalde Building - Aromuni tion and alcohol.

- J.'.'11 '. - 6.. Letran Gollege,-,Gasoline'

7.:' Casa Manana ..: Anununit,ion and machinery. '

8. Former Custom Building ~ Anln)unition and n~val equipment.'

9.' Philippine School of ,Arts and Trade ;.' Ordnance supplies.: '

10. Cathedral'de Manila - Ammunition and macqinery"

11_' Port Area - Gasoline dump.

Third Phase of the Intelligence Work

Gathering of information for use by the invasion forces continued" bu.t after 25 December 1944 reports were no longer filed" because of the critical condit:i,.ons that prevailed in ManiJ-'a and its vicinity.~ During the liberation of the Philippines, t;he MIS gave, aid and comfort to the invasion forces whenever possible, ar;J.d by , means of propaganda work did what they could to keep the people in­ formedon the true state of affairs. ~; On 15 March 1945, ,+pon 'order: of ,Major Basilio J.Valdes, the Military Intelligence Service ceased f~nctioning.

, OJ,

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.t ";.... ,; l,: ;,. .

''''. ' - 12 - 20 APPENDIX XX

PERSONAL NAREATlVE OF MAJ. E. C. CRUZ June 1943 - February 1944 .. APPENDIX. AX: . ,

,.;.\ . ; . .' . ..: .'! :. ':t '1 :~. .', '~', .: ;; ~.. . '. . \. " Personal narrative of~Lt·." Gel'. E~gdi9'. C•. c'I:\i.~./· PA~' ~~.'> . s'ent to' Gen. vC·.·~ A. 'Willoughby,.~.)OJuly ·1.94~ ~ ,.. ,.: .. ,:':,.',: , •• . • ••• •• '.r • ~" .,,1 .. '., .'

. • ~ , ;' j.

'::,: . As I left the submarine bas~ ·at· Pe'rth, Aust;ralia~ b.n . boarer ·the USS Thre3her', the words of' Gehar~ MacArthur pefqre':r :L~tt Brisbane kept ringing into my e.ars. f1e' said, "Cruz, -this is a ve'ry tough job. Pers9nally, I'believe you. have nO"chance' ~6' go t~f6ugfi~. With' your, 'connection to Presiden~' Quezon you have 'become 'very well'. known.. I ,give'" you 10 percent chanc'e'td .enter Manila, out·, h9nt;?stly-', I'believeyou .have no chance ,to get out;'J' However, I had a feeling that I would succeed. So, when I· got on bo~rd the submarine and . found the seven tons of arms' and amrnunition' consigned t.o the guer-' rilla force's in Negros, I felt even more elated and e·ncourag~d. 'TheThresher w'as on its regular patrdl duty. I was' only an incidental passenger, but soon the officers made me oneo! them and the' men made me reel'at home. forhe Skipper, Commanaer Hull, even allowed· me to stay on' wat'ch onth~ tower cit night and early' ·dawn. : On the fourth day of our trip' we . gave' chase to a .Japanese convoy of three tankers and a destroyer. '. The' fourth torpedo 'hit one. of the'

tankers and we crash-divade I We stay~'d under water for .a~out eight­ een hours hearing the'explosions of. the depth charges 'and ,feeling the concussions fr.om them. . This experience 'was repeated' . several times '::a:hd by the time we reached Philipplne' waters. v~e had sunk three :other· tankers and one Japanese destroyer.. ..,. ,". .. . . , ',". " " On' July 6 ~ we received in~truction tromAustralia that, I was' to land' on the southwestern shore of the island of Negrbs~ I . asked the Skipper if the message"could'be b:roken,if .intercept~d by the enemy. He said that it· vvas 'pos sible but not very 'likely .. On the morning' of July 9, . scanning ihe"'Jester~' shot'~ of' Negros thro\lgh the periscope j the' Skipper' saw a Jap'anes'e cruiser patrolling the " very point where I was' going to land. iiie laid low and. waited until dark. At about· seven that,.evening, the coast wa.s ¢le~r,. and' I saw .... the familiar. sight of a Philippine sailb'Qat. ~ We made-contact .'vith'.·: the' guerrillas througp' a rubber boat and unloaded 'th~ B.eyeri. tons, .' o~ , a.rms and ammunition in a record tim.e of 45 minutes.' '. I·was happy when I met Major Jesus Villamor, and even more so v~hen I learned that' he was in charge of the guerrillas in. . _" that district. I felt that because. of my previous acquaintal').·ce· wit'h him, I' could have all the "necessary cooperatiort pond infornia'tipn for:.~· my trip: to Manila. In' this feeling I was later 's;adly' dis.appo'::tn~:e4·~·. ~, I stayed with his- group of guerril~a. officers and lived·.;in the ." ... , " jungles' of southern I~egros' unde,r . tne name oflvIajor Suy~an·. I w.as. ,.. . saving,t.he name Gatbiala; my alla,s:ireg=i:stered"in Australi?i, . r.pr ra,;';',:'; dio co~unicationsohly. On July l~,' ~h,e. tJ.1i~d, :day' after my. :~rri~ ,':: val, the: Japanese made a surprise' 'raid bn. the, p1.ape of mY.lan'ding~· " T·heYicapt,ured.'·;a considerable amoupt· 'of the' :'?-hd ammunitions l' '.' came· 'With; ;defiriitely verifying thed.r· suspicion' .that the ·guerrillas .. were"rece'iving "$upplies frd-tn Aus,tralia.· . Bec~use of this incide'n:t,,: I., was"ri~t' able~' to 'di.scuss· with' Major V-illa.lhorthe: details' of my, trip_ ~'. to Ma:ri~la:: until:,"ab'out a week later. During this pet~~d' of . delay:, . t '. o·ocupled·,mysell' intreati~g a.ndcur'ing the,. sick who yjere in a' verji .. miser-able: coridi tier!; inc~uding the- v1ife '0£ ,M.aj: V~ll~or h:i.nls.el~ :';who'~ wa$·; suffering- from p.dvanced anemia, secondary' to mal~ria;.· ..... '. ' ;', One' .day Maj.' Viliamor t old' me that he thought .. i t" w~s 11,01:.,',·' , . ..' . , . ., . ".' .,\ ~

" ,'~' .. ! : .:' • ., ;.",. { " o. '. • ... ~ '. ..'; ',~ safe for me to go to Manila.·tfEven among the guerrillas there are some who know your true identity,tI he continued. He further said that he was waiting for instructions from GHQ in Australia regarding my·trip. 1 had to-stand by and wait. Dl!lring this time I had. the opportunity to observe the in­ tellig~nce work he Was doing, but he never allowed me any acceS$ into his workings. In other words, although I was cordially treated, I felt like a stranger there. I.was trying to make my own plans for my trip out of the meager information.I gathered from the couriers coming in and out of the' camp. Finally, upon my "in.sistence, ·I wa~· allowed to go vvith a party going to Panay. My plan was to ask the help of Col. peralta. I was met.in·San·Dionisio, Panay, by the , agent of Maj. Villamor, a certain Lt. Yojuico who made all eff9rts to obstruct my plans of contacting' Col. Peralta. I decided there­ ,fore· to return to Negros' and engage. the help of.'Governor Alfredo ~ontelibano, who was hiding in the northern sector of the island. I even asked Maj. Villamor·to permit me togo with one of his couriers who 'was then going to see the Governor. But h.e denied this request p.nd:instructed his courier not to take me alori.g'. I therefore ap,:", pealed to Col. Abcede, who was then the District Commander of the ~egros guerrillas. Col. Abcede was very nice and kind to me. He not only gave me a guide but provided me with an escort consisting of a lieutenant and twelve enlisted men. Of these only three reached with me the hiding place of Gov. Montelibe~o at the top of Canlaon. Volcano. The whole trip took fourteen days of continuous hiking through' jungle which was infested with mosquitoes and Japan.... ase patrol parties. Gov. Montelibano welcomed me cordially and . promised to help me. He said that if I could reach the town of Cadiz on the northern shore of the island, I could very easily procure a ~ailboa.t •. He told me to stand by while he looked for decent' civi­ +ian clothes for me and the right man to guide me through the Japan­ ese-occ~pied towns of Manapla and Bacolod. I had been with Gov 41 'Montelibano five days 'when the Japanese raided us and drove us deeper into the, j\lngle.. The guer­ rillas fought the Japanese for three days and gave a good account of ~he.mselves, killing more than sixty of the enemy with three wounded on· the guerrillas·1 side.. The new arms and arnntuni tion I brought had their baptism. Through one of the guerrilla officers I learned that :tyfajor Roberto wa.s· in the neighboring hills. I decided to contact him and engage his aid fer my trip up north. By a stroke of luck, he had at that ttme a crew-ot five men from Sorsogan who had peen stranded'in Negros for several months and ltvho were desperately anx~ ~.oU:s .. to go back to theirfa.milies. In common desperation we took, the risk ahd went through the enemy cordon. After"refitting their small and ·frail' sailboat" 'We left the shores of Cadiz for Luzon • . My crew were all from Sorsogon and were completestran- . gers to ~e. They spoke nothing but Bicol, which I had to learn. , During my stay in Neg~os I learned to speak the Visayan dialect and (fouldpass as a V~.sayan, a fact which pulled me out of many tight spots whenever questioned by Visayan Japanese Constapulary soldiers. . I loaded my ship with dried and salted fish and chicken and posed as a trader, 'assuming the name of Jacinto Calderon, the . cr.1ias I used in·P~nay. Ordinarily the trip should take only seven days. . This time it took fifteen days eluding t.he Japanes.e patrol boats and stopping on several. isl'ands tc dispose' of and reple.nishmy goods. On one of these inter-island trips I was becalmed in .the .' middle of the sea and was overtaken by a Japanese patrol boat. They searched us and the boat suspiciously. They asked, me wh~re I came from. When I answered that I came from Negros, they brought out a Visayan interpreter~ This Visayan asked questions about,Major Cruz, the bandit who brought the arms to Negros. I answered in Visayan,

- 2 - sayj,.ng I.d:j;.d not know' anything ab.out· th~ oandi:tr.,and that. I was just a ~nerchal1:t,. Th~n. I .overheard the interpreter· say J .11He .is' no Taga,.. log, he ~s Vi·saY9-n.u . .', ...... Then. it ':9ccurred to me that they were:looking" fora Tagar­ log.' From then on,' I became very chatty with;my crew·:-ancl~·tried to . learn m9re .oftl1e Bicol dialect .. ·, BY' the time we', reached the isl and . of Cali:n~~?n off.;.~he shore of Sorsogon, I was'a;151e to 'pass as: a," <. ' BicolS4Q •. '.1 .paicl.off my cre¥{ in this is:land of·Calintaan:·and, tiri'; known ,to tl1em,. I ,Grossed the strait along to Sorsogon that,' $·a.me· >. ,.' night .. ~, '.. '. . , .... ' . . ''''.j:: .fait .mQre qpnfident as ,I 's~t foot on Luzon soil :·al-:;,'·~ though:J:.·~new I' was ·still several hundred miles away from my desti;'" nat~on:. ~: 1. .. a~~u~}ed the name of Emilio C.~ Conde and entered ·the town .. ,of M~t.rt9.g~: The.fi.~st thing I did was to look for Gov. Salvador . :~\ Escuderq. whq, I,. .le·a.rned, ·was the;'head of guerrilla actiyities in the , Bi~ol region.,. .rwa~ lucky ~nough· to win the services and confidence or: ? yc;>utkg .ffi{ID ,from Matnog named Arturo 'Almasan, who served" as guide , and companion, i.~all my. trips in the and Manila. I· . wen~'t() Iros,in-,,,then clim~ed the Bulusan Volcano to see Toni, the': ~on of Go v • Es.cudero •. ,~ The. oldman" Escudero, had gone to Samar to·· ' se~,.KangJ.e.on but was taken ill and later· was, capt\lred by Merritt; . a .rival guerrillero,of Kangleon. " To¢ informed,me that to enter Manila safely .. I had to have a Kalibapi n~embership and a residence certificate. With orie of: his assistants ,.,1 went down to Irosin to secur61 these· credentials., . By the· time. we. reached ·the lowland, the Japane·se."we,re raiding "the town. ,I prqc~ede.d to ,Santa Magdalena, a coastal ·t'6wn :,controlled" by ,the Japanese, TlJ~."to:wn .mayor, a.Japanese old-timer named Dalto, 'w~s quite friendly. ,After a few minutes of"'casual' cOhversation r was able to convince .him that I was an old-timer like himself •. He .. sold me. the k~libapi Pleinbership certificate and residencec~rtifica.te for two hundred Japanese pesos •. , Armed.vvith these papers, .iv~ent back to the town of Matnog, having been t old by Mayor Dai to that it was' the ~est place to' get transportation for Lucena or Manil·a. -True enough, when I got into the place, the sailboat of a Chinese merchant, Tiong Bing, was getting ready to sai.·l for Lucena, Tayabas. ·Somehow the C~inese'sensed .thatI was connected with the .underground works but a.fter ~ little persuasion he. agreed ,to take me along. '. . .':' That evening, a· group of eight men under the leadership' : of an American mestizo named Johns'oncarne over to the hous·e ,where· I· was W.'ding and demanded an explanation: of .my. presence in town. 'Be­ fore, I coul9. utter a 'Word, Johnson' accused me. of ,being a Japane$e. spy and had his men drag me towards the. shore.• ·. He: made me carry .a; ". . shovel and .sai,dthat he was going to show me how they dealt with Japan~se spies in that place. I asked to be:.take.nt·o his commanding office'r because he was making a. terrible rei.stake.: B-q.t he refused', ,:' saying tha.t p,e. was the chief and whatever ~e said. would b~ done .. "0h, God 1 Have ~ rcy on me 1" was all I exclaimed. After a. few min'""! utes r silence, with my feet getting heaVier with· every steP" 'r askeq if he ~as.:. goipg to, kill .a· Bataan' boy without even hearing what I haq to say~. The word·. Bataari wO.rked like. magic on him. He tur(led atounq and a.sk~d·· with .9\lI'pri·se,. U Are, you f:rom Bataan? I fought in Batasl1',: too," h~ ~on:t,inu~di ,itJ~thout wa-itingfor me to answer:•. He ordered' his. men tp go· h<;3.qk to the house" . and the two of lJS walked slowly· he~ hinq •. :.He. d:\.d ·mo$~-.iof, '~he talking, enthusiastically narrating his dramat;ic . esc,ape. aft~r .the $urrender of Bataan. I told 'hint that· I, : too, . escaped ,wtth e,coup).e of boys after: the surrender and' had beeri iivit:5::~ri .. S{ln~a :Iv~agq.9:len,a ever since, ·.and that 1 wa.s '.: anxious to· see my f~lY;lP M:an~l~ .. ,: v:'lh~n we arr.ived in the house,' he ·de·parted .. with J~lis, li!-en ,and. pror¢.,.sed,to ,give mea.ll the protection'needed :Lor my: trip, ....,.M~king .. i:ir~ang~plen.t with the Chif;l6se merchant to,'pick me up at. 'the neighboring barrio,. I left ~t otwe~v? at,clock that same night .. At eight 0 ',clock in the, mQr:ning, I b,Ofir.9.ed the Chine~e ~ailhoa.t,' , which was loaded with lumber" firewood, and cas'sava flouro I told , 'the Chinese to declare that I was bis ~partner ,in .case we 'were caught

by the Japanese at sea" , ' , ',< Our first stop wal? Bul~" a'Japarlese,' naval. base. ' There were no ships in view in th~ bay exv~pt for two small laupche~ and . two submarines, but there wasgons:iderable ,activity of th~se laun­ ches and motor boats~ It look;ed.t:nore like a patrol boat pooi than: a base. We were met at the pier by a Japane'se constabulary and' were subjected to a compa.ratively light inspection and questioning', Then ,everybody was told to go to $hore with an escort of twr Japanese gu,ard-s with fixed bayonets. I~ wa,s Octol:?~r 14" 1943" hut nobody knew what Wa~ going an until w~ were told: ;that it was the Inaugura­ tion of the ,Japanese Puppet Philippine Indepe.ndence. ,We were marched to the public plaza and were required to bow to every Japan­ ese· sentinel. The place was packed with men, women, and children. The atmosphere 'was tense with fear and sad foreboding. Every number in the program was applauded mechani cally, not enthusiastically'. After the program three. shouts of Banzai, led .by a man on the plat­ form, gave the sign to disperse. Then everybody was allowed free movement a~ound the town but still had to bow to every Japanese sol­ Aier he met. I was on my way to the boat when I was hailed by a man on' a bicycle, shouting at the top of his voice, HCruz'l ' Cruz 1 i am vf3ry glad to see you. When did you come? How is ev:erything with you,?" he asked excitedly. Before I could utter a word, my hands were shaken violently by my old classmate, Dr. Castro. I don',t re­ member exa'ctly how I got rid of him, but I certainly did it quickly. I lost no time in getting back to the boat and stayed tnere most of the time. I learned that there w.as a Japanese naval garrison sta­ tioned in Bulan of from 200 to 300 men under a Capt. Kuroda. : They were constructing an airfield about three miles to the south of the toWn. Thf3 next day we set sail for Lucena. We, had been sailing for t;wo d,ays and were making' good progress when we meta Japanese patrol boat, near Ta:blas Island. ,r b'l:lndled together all the personal letters, of President Quezon,:YJhich at that time 1 was trying to COIll-" mit to memory, weighted them with a small s,tone, and threw them into the sea. The Japanese boarded our ship, and all of us ~ere made to 'kneel on the outrigger of the boat. They searched the boat and 'everyone of us carefully. Then they asked whete we were going. Our pilot said Lucena and showed the ,Japanese pass for the boat. With the help of two fat hens, we were allowed ~o proceed on our way. It' was low tide when we entered Lucen~ .bay. It was nee... eBS ary ',to ride in a banca to get tQ t he shore" Wi th my basketful· of chickens" and bundles of firewood we rode upstream for two and a half hours to the shore ,a busy barrio named Cota. There was a great, de­ mand10r chicken. and firewood. Among the buyers were some Japanese soldiers •. '1 'sold my wares to the, Japanese, . In Lucena I $tay~dinthe New Banahaw Hotel, which,was located near the ~ railroad' statiqn,. The officers of the Japanese garrison, ate their mea,ls ·at that hotel.', I learned from the' m,anager of, the hot€3l that the Japanese were fond of shrtmps. Early one morning, I, went to barrio CQta and bought all the shrimps and eggs in the place and sold. them to the Japanese' soldiers, keeping ~ome of the good shrimps V'Jhi9,11 I took to the hotel with me. I had the shrimps cooked, the way the Japans$e like and asked the hotel manager to invite the officers to be ~y guests that noon. VUe had a hearty luncheon complete' with Japanese beer. ,After a,few more days of trading with the Ja.panese ,with eggs and ·:fish, .~e became quite friend­ ly and I, was invited to visit the Japanese garrison, which' I 8id~'

- 4 - The ,captain of the 'garrison, Capt. Ando, gave me a letter, of recom­ mendation when I,told, him that 'I wanted .to' ',$e11 niy : chickens '::and" eggs to :Mahila.. t, '" ,:: , .', " ,,' , , ',i, 'On :OctoO'er· 22 J l·943,,: I' boarde,d the train~ from Luc:ena'.to Manila'.,' With my basketful: of, chick~ns,',I: got.''Of.f af "the'Blumentpit " .' railroad stati'on just outside of the City ,of Manila.. 1 went dire~ctt' ly tot,he house of my' sister-in~law, Mrs It Cuyug,an, in Sampaloc', Manila.' After 'the first shockwhi'ch they felt due to my sudden,.ap--;··' pearance, mY' sister-in-law and: her husband" Judge Antonio Cuyugan',' informed ,me that my wife W6.S in ,the. city butthatv\le would have, tQ :" be .very careful, because .the Japanese' had made several ,inquiries ' about

1·'1. ,. ~ .' ""

- 5,- from manifesting their intense hatt'ed for the: Japanese and the men, working for them. Besides there were planted 'men who are apparent­ ly c?operating with ~he ,Japanese like l'irovano, JUl?-n Elizalde, Alejo Valdez, Gen. Francisco, and, many othe;r's,who were looked upon v~ith suspicion 'by sorr.e guerrilla. ,groups. He further said that he h'ad an. understanding with Gen.' Francisco that. iri case 'there would 'be con­ scription of Filipihos 'into the Japanese. A:':'J'J1Y> loyal Filipinos would 'Qe placed in key positions so that they couJ.d tu;t:'n the, whole c.on-' ' scr1pteda,rmy against the Japanese. Ge'n" Ro.x.as al~o said th'at he had connections with several guerrilla leaders sueh as Marking, San Agustin,'Ramsey, Peralta, Fertig, and others and was in constant contact with them. He could also communicate 'with Mindanao through Jose Ozamis ~ He told me that there were at that time 120,000 Japan­ ese soldiers distributed in Batangas J Cavite, Bataan, Manila, Pam.­ panga, Tarlac, and . HAll indications show that they 'will try to hold Manila,u he said ~ "Tell the President and General MacArthur that there is no doubt about the loyalty of the Filipinos including those who are holding p()sitions in the Government. It can be safely stated that 95 percent of the entire Filipino people are loyc;tl to America and the leadet'ship of Pres.' 'Quezon," , He wanted to get out of the Islands before the invasion; so he told me to request Gen. MacArthur to get him (Roxas) out one month before the expected invasion of the Islands Q I later trans"': rnitted all this to Gen. MacArthur and President Quezont> Gen~ Roxas warned'me not to stay more than five days in tho city because the Japane;se already knew aT my a.rrival in the Philippines via subma':'" rine and 'it would be only a question of days befo're they w.ould start looking for me in Manila. I told him that I had letters for him ' ' from the President but had to throw them into the sea v~ith the others,' including the le'tte'r of Vice-President Osmena to Mrs.' Osmena, when I was apprehended~ , , The next day I met Speaker Yulo, Secretary Rafael Alunan, Ramon and Amado Arraneta in Mr. Yulo f shouse. I tranSlnit ted Pres. Quezon's message and asked the ihformation which the Pr(3sident de­ sired.' All of them wanted the President to continue except Mr~ , Rafae+ Alunan, who thought the Constitution should be respected and obeyed. Mr. Yulo wanted some more advice from some older men; so he asked me to see him again the next day, which I did. My contact w~th:Mr~' Yulo was made through the help of Mr. Jose Razon, who also accompanied Gen. Roxas when I contacted him. Razon and Amado Arra­ nete picked me up in the latterts car at the Quiapo Chl..1.rch about seven Of clock in the evening. We cruised around for an hour, pass­ ipg through the Luneta and Dewey Boulevard to observe the Japanese boats in the harbor. To my great surpt'ise I saw only two tankers, o,p,ecruiser, and two destroyers. There were several launches and a, vvell.... lighted 'hospital ship. We sat' fqr a while on the rocks on the beach and observed that the boulevard y.Jas practically deserted ex­ cept for a few pedestrians, mostly Japanese soldiers and civilians, and occasional aut omobil'a s loaded lfJith Japanese. ' ' . ' The next day I met Col. Rafael Jalandoni, now Major Gen ... eral. He was w'orking as a clerk in Malacanan compiling the census. 0+ Filipino war prisoners. He, said that Capt. Pedro Molin:a,a nephew of Pres.' Quezon, Was working'vdth,him. He also said that 4~ ,000 Filipino officers and meri reached :Damp 0' Donnell (concentra­ tion camp) 'alive but 29,000 of them di'ed in the camp. He, could not tell how many more died after they v~ere sent out. 'He however as .. st;l.tedme that all' of the Bataan boys Were loyal and 'anxious and. will­ ing to 'take: up arms against theeheniy, anyt:illte des'pite thel.rharrow­ ing experien'ce. ' He was livipg miserably with .'his wi'feanci a daugh­ ter" and 'the 'fortypeso's a' mon'th he' wasrecei ving vilas' not even enough to bu.y a sack of camotes. ~. younger brother, Rafael Cruz, -who

- 6 .;. , '!.,l?c.? Razon and. Amado ;Arra.neta came- twenty minutesl.ater. , ,They' ,

we're delayed because of th<3 'bundle which Gen, Roxas 'wanted me t'o' I • take, to', the ,United states for the President. 1 found cut when I ' rea'ched"hqm9, that the bundle. comprised a. complete set of, the PhtliPr .,pin,.e! .Ga~ette, :wtli9h, contained the reports and records .of. all', :th~ ....," ' "~b¥~eaus' and de.partments of the Philippine Gover~ent, including. t~e, s'peeches o..f tl)c3,Government officials. '.' , . " ' ", . " .,' I met Speaker Yulo for the second time 'in ~he house of .... Ramon Ar~a:net:a., on the night of October' 28, 1943. : Justice Avaqce~a;, was a;1sQ of the, opinion that J'res~ Quezon should continue regargle"s? of the Q9ristitution. His opinion ~as· that the Pr:e~i~ept of ,·the.," .- ,.. Uni ted, '$tates or the Congress had' the, power to 'apP'oint' Pre~':i,dGnt ' - Quezon, to .succeed himself as anemerg~ncy r!'£3'asure ..;.- .or anyb.ody' .';, else", for that matter, in whom the President of the'UniteCi Stfltes .... had confidence in times of extreme emergency'like war. 'r,thep asked'Speaker Yulo to help me contact ·Sec. Vargas becaus~ so '~~r f',: had failed to contact him. ~ I observed·that IvIr.' Yulo was irrit.ated.' He ·told me to des:Lst !,rom seeing,''Vargas eiT-en though Pre's. QUt;z'on .". ' . ordered' me to~ee him. ,,' .. 111 forbid YOu; as head 'of tho party ,in po'we~ who 'is responsibl.,e t.o.:· the people. Tell the President th?p, l't,Bke'.' " all the responsibilities of your failure to see Varga.s. "Hehas 'he":'" come helpless in the hands of Kihara and the Japanese militarists and now he is aspiring. to be appointed as Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan. When the Japanese gathered all the Filipino leaders and told us that they 'were not interested in the Philippine Government but wanted only to drive the Americans avvay, they asked me to head the Filipino participation as' Chairman of the Executive Council, I ,refused because I 1Nas holding an elective position and did not want to compromise the people. In fact none of us wanted to have any­ thing to do with the Japanese. But when we found out that Benigno Aquino, Pio Duran, and Benigno' Ramos were aspiring to be appointed, I suggested the name of Vargas because he was only an appointed employee and did not represent and 'would not comprorrdse the people. After having been pestered and throa toned, I chose to be chief of . the Supreme Court in order to avoid any active participation in the Government. You tell theso things to the Presid,ent. Vargas allowed himself to be a helpless fool of Kihart:l, and the Japanese. When this Japanese Philippine Republic was organized, I told Vargas that he had the chance to get out and sta.y out of the Government. He how­ ever disregarded my advice but instead ho asked Kiha.ra and Tojo to make him minister to Japan." . Yulo advised me to get out of the city as soon as possi­ ble because many people already knew of rny presence in Manila, and it would only be a matter of days bofore the Japanese learned about it. In spite of these things I made other attempts to contact Mr. Vargas. Disguised as a vegetable seller, I entered the garden of Mr. Vargas to see him and let him see me. But there were Japanese soldiers in his garden, and in the house I had no chance to see him. By that time, my supply of Japanese money 'was running low; so I re-

- ? -- quested Mr. Yulo to give m.e 2,000 pesos.' He readily' consented, and the' 'money was delivered to me the next day at S~n S~bas~ian Church' by Amado and Ramon Arraneta.. Amado Arraneta. said that' he had a pass 'to' go in and out of the prison and concentra.tion camps. He said that in Mutl.tinglupa prison there were about 5,000 to'lO,OOO pri'son~rs, all Filipinos arid mostly political prisoners. 'They.were flliserably treated and' practically starved. 'The American' civilians in'Santo .Tomas University werG better off because food and money pould be smuggled in to them •. The American prisoners in 'the·Pt;rt (4.r'ea ,were in worse condition, sick a.nd emaciated boyond recognition.' tIG also informed me that the Japanese were constructing woode'n barges in Pandaca,n at the rate of seven a day and that· the ,Japanese )'Jar tanks were b'eing' ass~mbled in the warehouse of the'Mori Bicycle yo. 'at 'Santa Mesa. , The same a.fternoon, October 28, 1943, I contacted Gen~ :{Jim in the Philippine -General Hospital. He and Gen. Roxas were' the only :two who had not yet signed the oath of allegiance to t'he Japan.... ese. GenoLim succeeded in pretending to be more sick than he real­ tY 'was and was waiting for a chance to escapG and join the guerril­ las. I, I stayed in the city several more days, 'contacting some of the other men I Was told to contact. With the official Ga.zette given me by Gen. Roxas hidden in the bottom of a bamboo trunk and cov~red by box-Gs, of cigars, handbags ,and wooden shoes J I left the city' for Lucena in the train. I loft' Luceria in a small sailboat on November 8, 194J J bound for Negros. A'typhoon overtook us and we vyerestranded in the islands of Gigatangan, Leyte. Here in this ~sland I wrote my message in longhand and sent it to Col.Poralta by 'courier to be transmitted to Australia~ I arrived on the north­ e.rn tip of Negros on the night of December' 3, 194J.' From Cadiz, I ~ent another identical message, which was ral.ayed by radio through Col. Edwin Andrews to Australia. 'On February 12, "1944,' I was picked 'up by the USS Narwhal.

- 8 - 21 SI:RIAL No. COpy No.

GENERAL I-4EADQUARTERS South West Pacific Area

PI-IILIPPINE MONTI-IL Y COMBINED SITUATION REPORT

* Number and date, not reproduced, will vary from volume to volume inasmuch as actual war-time originals are utilized here. The document following this page is an original issued on the date it bears. GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTH ·WEST PACIFIC AREA

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

PHILIPPINE MONTHLY COMBINED SITUATION REPORT

NO, 16 DATE: 15 April 1944

CLASS1FICATION CHANGED-TO: By Au tho r i ty Of#$JS£,,:~.,.t:~8£ CONTENTS gi~~~ui::~ ._ ,~ I StfrJ.MARY OF ACTIVITY

1 . Orientation: Backbround of Development of Present PI Guerrilla Situation Hap Showing i.ali tary Districts and Recognized Commanding Officers 2 Summary of Enemy Ground, Air and Naval Activity 3 Summary of Activity of Friendly Forces

II ENE,IY DISPOSITIONS, GENERAL PHILIPPINES AREA Ground 4 Table: Enemy Order of Battle 5 Map Enemy Groupd Dispositions Air 6 Table: Enemy Order of Battle 7 Uap Enemy Airbases III DISPOSITIONS UINDANAO AREA

Ground 8 LIap Pattern of Enemy Ground Dispositions 9 }'1ap Guerrilla Force Dispositions Air 10 I,~ap Airfield status .

IV DISPOSITIONS VISAYAN AREA

Ground 11 Map Pattern of Enemy Ground Dispositions 12 I,.fap Guerrilla Force Dispositions Air 13 Map Airfield status V DISPOSITIONS LUZON AREA Ground 14 Hap Known Enemy DispositiullS Southern Luzon 15 Map Luzon Guerrilla Organizations VI LIISCELLANEOUS 16 S·urmnary of Political and Economic Information ORIENTATION: BACKGROUND OF DEVE10PMI~NT OF PRESENT PI GUERRILLA SITUATION

1. General Sit1J..at~9n...t

~. Guerrilla organizations were initial . armed by Filipinos as a police force to check the TNave of lawlessness folloYJing the break­ dovm of civil police due to Jap occupation. (This applies to rural areas only.) The guerrilla organizations were in reality local conmlU­ nity police 1ll1its~ Later these police units took on the added respon­ sibility of protecting the communities from the Jap. b~ Guerrilla organizations were supported by thE: comm1ll1ities which they protected. In free areas facilities of to'\J,TnS such as po'ilver plantsy machine shops, coconut oil plants and distillation units were made available to the guerrilla forces~ Coconut oil was produced to run diesel engines in launches and coconut milk was distilled for the alcohol for the few motor vehicles available. In the more populated areas , civil administrators were establ ished. As the .~Jnericans who had not surrendered came down from the hills, they developed command units to unify larger areas. As a result, inter-comrJ1.lllity trade and liaison were established, and defense became an area matter inste~ld of local. Plans were made to increase the production of food, supply officers were appointed to procure it, and a currency was (;stablished to purchase it. The civil administration, working with guerrilla authorities, is now firmly established in many areas. Gradually island areas became 1.lllified and were recognized as Military Dif3tricts (area divisions of the Philippine Army with \vhich Filipinos wero' familiar). (See following map) .£. The power of guerrilla organizations at presGnt Varl.E;S in different islands.. Generally speaking, they are strongest in the islands which have the poorest road systems. The strength depends pretty much on the extent of Japanese penetration. Jap activity is centered in the more higlliy developed and productive islands .. g. ~: Organized guerrilla activity here on a large scale is negligible. Re~ent reliable information shows the existence of numerous anti-Jap units, actively supported by the civil populace, but as yet tactically unorganized Q The excellent system of roads permits the Japs to police all areas and to deny large groups of guer­ rillas the use of food producing areas. It will be difficult to or­ ganize a combat unit in Luzon. Whil€: the populace is extre:TIloly lcyal, all activity in Luzon must be carried on' with extreme caro. Intel ... ligence and sabotage activities only will be possible. ~. Visayan I:slands: Mindoro, Panay, Negros, Cebu, Bohel, Leyte and Samar are li.11der varying stages of guerrilla central; Guer­ rilla strength varies from .300 in NTindoro to 14,000 in Fanay. The Japs are most active in Panay, Negros and Cebu, the richest and most productive islands in the group. As our forces approach the PI, the Japanese will undoubtedly intensify their efforts to reduce the combat efficiency of the guerrillas in these areas, and will meet with con­ siderable success. The activities of the guerrilla units in the Vi­ sayas will be reduced to intelligence, harassing, ambushing and sabotagee These functions the guerrillas can carry out. Japanese are ruthless in their destruction of guerrilla supporting communi tiGS in these ar60.S to Whole communities evacuate to the hills when the Japs appro2ch. In the mountains Jap patrols fi;nd the going too expensive •. It will be impossible for the Japanese to eradicate all resistance, although they can and probably will keep it disorganized. At present, ths Visayan Islands are the bases from which intelligence activities are carried on in Luzon, l. Mindanao: (1) This island is ideal for guerrilla orgQnizations~ 'rhe size of the island, the limited number of cross island roads, the mountainous nature of the.. terrain and the large number of inland agri­ cultural communities provide guerrilla units with food, protection and maneuver room. Japs now occupy in force the cities of Davao, Cotabato,

Ut,ClASSlf'1ED Zamboanga and Cagayan; with smaller units (100-800) in other communi­ ties. Outside of Davao proper, Jap penetrations are possibl~ only in force. Jap forces in Mindanao total about 22,000 men. ; (2) The guerrilla organization here has over 20,000 Plen, of whom half are armed, About 80 Americans hold key positions and run the extensive radio net. The Americans there are mostly enlisted men of the Air Corps, Infantry, and rJavy who w~;re able to avoid capture. Their experience and vision is limited. They are tired, have bGon on the defense too long, and are in DGed of assistance if the latent power of the guerrilla units is to be fully devolopod. (3) Tho nuclei of combat groups already (;xist. Divis­ ional, regimental and battalion areas are recognized and 2<.cccpted. Boundaries between units are definite. UnitE~ have definite missions.

Command8rs arc known to each other 0 Terrain stuctics arc being made. A carabao transport system has boen established to facilitate the distribution of food. All units arf"'; in radio or couri8r touch with the lOth MD Headquarters. Airfield8 aro being built. .AIl1(:rican prc;s­ tige i.s high.

2. Qh8.racteristi~f Guerrillas: ~. Units are skilled at ambushing th(~ enemy. 'They 'Nill attack a column or convoy and run away, awaiting another opportunity. They are not accustomed to bombing or shelling. Either typo of ac­ tivity will disperse them. 12. Units are extremely mobile, vdthin a few days T'alking distancE: from source of supply. Unit headquartc'rs consist of com­ mander and a few messengers. To conc8ntrate a large force in a par­ ticular area will require time to build up food supplies in the area. 09. Units have maximum fighting efficiency in th(:ir own areas. (1) They kno'w thE::, trails thoroughly. A forco unfamiliar· with the areE1 will have extreme difficu~ty in mQking progresq (;ven without opposition. (2) Nearby commlIDities are extremely loyal to tho units. When units arewithdra;wYl to the hills, the people move: v.7ith them. (3) They have effEctively cut ronds o.nd trailc\ lcc"ding into their areas by burning bridges ~ constructing roeJ.d blockr, and machine gun neEits, and active patrolling. Jap forays do little damage. Jap casualties raise tho Y,10rale of the gu(;rrill::'~ units, and the civilians arE; further convinced of the usefulneSt3 of supporting the guerrilla forces. Such dele.ying operations nr€ nOiV being (lCCOIn.­ plished with alimited ammunition supply, 30 co.l. riflot~, a few machine guns, etc. (4) The lengthy coast lines of all the isl,~!,nd8 111[I.1\:e inter-ieland traffic fairly securc. Jo.p patrol boats cannot stop all the nc"tive bancas using the inland scas, 2,6 distCll1cOG ~:.r8 short enough to be covGred in a few hours of darknoE)s. The OVCT"I,"Ihclning loyalty of the Filipino people assures assistance and shelter to Fili­ pinos and Americans. It can be stated with reasonable, c8rt::linty thc.t the mccss of Filipino people will assist our forcf:s agQinst tho Jnps. Their assistance will become evident when cllcmy forc(;s c1Y'c di;:~DCT8Cd and take to the hills. No .Jap is or will be snfc in a Filipin~ com­ munity, unless he is backed by a strong force. Individunl tTc:.ps ~ or small groups, will be unable to exist in the ro.ountains as if::; nOvI pos­ sible for them in New GuinEja, and Bougainvillc.

3. Guerrill§LQ:r.ga.nization of Mindanao: ~. Headq'l1-'3.rters loth Military District is the directing agency of U.S. Forces in Mindanao. It is C0111Ill.:'l:hdEld by Col. H. Fertig, Corps of EnginGers. At the surrender in 191,,2 he fled to the hillE: and later camG down and Qssumed command of guorrillc, forces. He ostnb ... lished commUL"1.icEltion with GHQ, and has gradually extendGd his control to cover all gu(;;rrilla forcGs in the islc.nd. 12 • With the assistance of. AIB partifis, h8 has established an excellent coastwatcher system and a large radio net. He is grad­ ually oxpanding his intelligence system to cover the islt:-lnd. It must be remembered that the guerrilla movcment was 11 spontn.neous and

- 2 - ~ individual affair. Island leaders are still not trustful of each other. Col .. Fertig's influence at present stems from his being the source of supplies from the SWPA, and that he is the officially recog­ nized CO of the 'lOth MD • .Q • Civil authorities in guerrilla areas vvere deliEshtoCl to cooperate, as the guerrillas if/ere the sole law enforcement 2cencies 0 Civil provincial governors, judges, etc., who h01d those jobs prior to the war were allev/ed to continue. Those civil officio-Is who had cooperated with the Japs werE~ liquidated by the civilians, or teok refuge in Jap occupiod territory. The Japanese receive little coop­ eration from civil authorities in the occupied cities of ~rindanao e Such cooperation is merely a means to survival. The people, who see their prcperties taken over by the ~Tap military and civi.lians, are firmly resolved to 'wait it out, arc keeping their bolos sharpcnE:d, and continue to maintain contact with guerrilla forcei3. The Jap ver­ sion of the Gestapo, the "Kempeifl , makes sporadic attempts at exter­ ~inating subversive activities, but normally concentrates on the wealthier Filipinos whose properties can be appr(priated. Civil ad~ ministrators and currency committees are appointed by President Quezon, their powers are defined, and their activities will continuo until 0. Commonwealth gover:DJnent is established. For our purposes , it can be assumed that civil officials will be availL'l..ble to step into jobs now held by puppets when re-occupation takes place. The Filipino civil­ ians will have taken care of puppet officials prior to our arrival. g. In 95% of Mindanao, civilian communities continUE' to livG under normal conditions. Occasional Jap forays (about evory 6 months) provide excitement to an otherwise placid existence. The island is practically seIf~sufficient. Coconut oil and distilled coconut milk serve as fuel; abaca furnishes the fiber for weaving cloth; the land will grow 3 crops of corn pE:r year. SugcLr, coffee, and cocoa arc cultivated. There is sufficient rice, corn and camotes (a low grade sweet potato) for the people, while pigs and chickens are as nWilE,I'OUS as ever. Sole civilian shortages are shoes (which rUT'al Filipinos wear for adornment), matches, soap and medicines. Such items were never too plentiful in the rural districts, Elnd their loss iC-3 not, too great a hardship. ~. The present policy of GHQ towards the Philippines is to supply the guerrilla units ·with arms, medical supplies and radios, have guerrillas continue the organization and consolidation of posi­ tions, avoid any aggressive action which might bring Jap reinforce­ ments into the area., and concentrate on developing coastwatcher stations and intelligence. This policy has encouraged and aided guer­ rilla forces and has resulted in a stable, organized civil government, and a military force l]IJhich has the SlJpport of the civilians in the arGa" It has developed transport facilities for exchange of coramoditi8s, arranged for the planting of crop f.; for guerrilla forces, ostablished an authorize~ system of currency, set up a coastwatcher and intGlligcnce system, divided the island into regimental are2.s, and in all respects, has justified the policy and faith of GHQ in the American and Filipino people 'living in the area. 4. Conclusions: a. From the above discussion, certain conclusicns can be drawn abo;t Mindanao: (1) . The lOth Military District in Mindanao is a stable, well organized, well run unit of th~ U.S" Army. (2) The possibility of its complete neutraliz2tion by the enemy prior to our invasion is remote. (3) The extent of civilian support of guerrilla lllits, quite sizable at present ,will increas8 in scope as our forces apprc[~ch the PhilippinEb Islands. , (4) The latent power of guerrilla and civilian units in the area will do much to assist our landings, save us thousand of lives, and months of time'. .' (5) Intelligent planning and direction will shorten the period of confusion following our occupation, establish civil G'ovcrD­ ment promptly, permit our mo15ilization of civil manpower for mllitc:ry ·use, and make the transition from Jap occupation to Lmerican occupation as rapid and as painless as possible. - 3 ... 21P1nr7 fJ • UI",... ~'I"'''U , '" 2U" e PHILIPPINE ISLANDS '"lutU"• • r L U Z 0 H GENERAL HEADQUARTERS I ST DISTRICT "LU.~ SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA • ....1 • • 'AY'''~ Military Inte1ligence Section I S&"~""."OO General Staff -----xx--- I 2 -,'UII"" •• ---xx------'I.n"o 5 M I LITARY DISTRICTS 2 NO DISTRIC ,-- ..... IIIIO"'(~ , ....UHIl.. ,I 2 -----xx--- -" \,' 3 }ARL.i e":IIAT ~. !.... ,I • If IT .. 5 TH , ... '-...... --1 iii 0 .g 3 RD DISTRICT 'i.'l:NI• ...,O I DISTRICT .. ,'I 15 APRIL 1944 3 , ,------XX--- I 4 I Comm;tndin~ officers recognized or appointed by GHQ. SWPA • I I I '~.r-, ____ D 6.h District: Col. M. Per.alu. PA I I 7·h District: Lt. Col. S. Abcede. PA Res. • I 8.h DistricT: Maj. I. Inginiero (Bohol Area Commandu) '4TH DISTRICT Lt. Col. Charles Cushing (Cebu Area Commander) 9·h District: Lt. Col. R. Kangleon. PA (Le:yte Area Commander) ... lorh District: Col. W. W. Fertig, AUS, (Mindanao) 9 TH DISTRICT Lt. Col. Alejandro StUrtZ (Sulu Area Commander)

•

• ~ - .' . - .4 -

I I

• I I • PA AW;t.H I 6;7, I ""'''AM I I ......

IIALAEIAC 0 IIII"OA""'O

10 TH DISTRICT • UNCL~SSIflEO BORNEO ,. . Aj . ,-- ." ------~

SUMMARY

l~ Luzon, Mindoro, Marinduque, : a) QagaYan: Reed 27 Mar: Only coast near San Vicente, Gonzaga & Aparri prepared w/defenses, trenches & fox holes, area restricted. b) La Union: Reed 27 Mar: Poro Pt., only, reported pre­ pared w/defense posns, trenches & foxholes along beach, area restricted.

o 0) Manila: Reed 27 Mar: Japs being trained combat, camou­ flage, day & night movements & street fighting. Reed ,16 Mar: Locations food dumps, bulk ordnance stores in Manila area. Reed 31 Mar: Hq JIF loc San Beda Col1ege~ d,)Laguna: Reed 16 Mar: Army recuperation hospital filled. e) Bat~~: 20 Feb: 50 Japs Verde Id, srel garr only Ba~ tangas prov, largest 400 at Lipa. r) TayabSJ§.! 26 Feb: Japs connecting all strong points w/ ,t:rails for supply & communication. g) Camarines Sy!:: Reed 31 Mar: Japs fr Legaspi moved Pili. 12 Feb: 5000 Japs Pili, h)j11b.aY: 21 Feb: 30,000 Japs landed fr 25 transports ,Legaspi.* 31 Mar: 200 Japs Legaspi rest moved to Pili, .

*cOM1~NTS: (lh) Report of arrival 30,000 at Legaspi is probably un­ reliable.

2. Pa1awan and Visayas: a) Panay: GAPIZ: 18 Mar: 200 Japs arr fr Jnpan. ILOILO: 25 Mar: 1000 Japs arr fr Manila. 12-16 Mar: ·700 Japs arr Iloilo City, half fr Negros. 30 Mnr: 1000 Jape arr 25 ,Mar departed for Cebu & then S.* 4 Apr: 1000 Japs arr on 1 med transport, left same night, ,'300 departed on 2 motor boats PM. b) Guimaras Id: 14 Apr: 300 Jap civilians moved to Jordan. Sml garr BUena Vista, w/patrols attempting to get rice. c) Negros: 23 Mar: Negros Or nearly cleared enemy; 12-20 in towns to control grain harvest. d) ,Qebu: 28 Mar: 2000 Japs arr for training. 2 Apr: Snl garr Japs S Cebu fr New Guinea; terror tactics & brute.. l­ ity reported. 9 Apr: 1000 Japs arr,in 3- transports for training. 2 transports left S w/poss 600~ Mil hosp filled to capacity w/dysentery cases & many priv&t5 houses conrrnandeered for segregation sick cases. Jap residents eonscripted~ 14 Apr: Transport NR 123 carr,ying troops fr Cebu to Cagayan, Mindanao.* 1 FT left ..Lilvl for Mindanao w/landing barges & a'rms. 14 Apr: 3 transports fresh troops exp fr Manila before 21 Apr" e) LeUe: .31 Mar: 250 Japs Panaon Id, burned most barrios & baneas, armed w/hvy guns, extreme crUelty to civilians" 11 Apr: Japs Limasawa, Id& Burgos. 14'Apr~ Number Japs deer to Manila .. f) Samar: 20 Mar: W coast strength Calbayog to Basey ~ 4/7000; S ooast fr Balangiga to Pambujan Sur ~ 200; N coast fr Allen to Catarman - 210; no Japs CatarmGn to Taft. 21 Mar: 150 Japs reoccupy Taft, after rice. 25 Mar: poorly clad troops looting N Samar; new troops at Catbaloga,n inel 700 Koreans" 2 Apr: Catarman-Go.lbayog road bridges under repair; stated for moving troops overland fr Catarman thru Leyte & Samar, to Luzon.* Capul Id marines under Bicol eoamand, 15 Apr: Greatly . deer garr during month. W coast garr total less than 50 all towns, N coast about 100. -,~- I - *COMMENTS: (2a) Probably same as 2000 reported arrived Cebu 28 March. (2d) Departure of troops for Cagayan believed in connection with fur­ ther activity in Agusan area. (2f) Possibly confirms map captured in Nogros i.n January showing evacU8wtion routes thru Visayas to Luzon via Samar. 3. Mindanao and Sulu: a) Tawi Tc.wi: 21 Mar: Main Jap garr (Naval) at Patkias, .8anga Sanga, 100M fr shore under coconut trees. b) Zarnboanga: 21 Mar: Pagadian, Sindangan to Oroquieta clear. 28 Mar: In N terror tactics & outrages, 200 civilians killed. 30 Mar: Japs at Dipolog w/patrols activo in area until 11 Apr. 15 Apr: No Japs Dipolog. c) Misamis Oce: 15 Apr: 2 SGs left 10 Apr w/supplies & troops; 300 remain at Misamis. d) Lanao: 16 Mar: Scattered landings N coast. 17 Liar Enemy landed Baroy in strength & advanced inland; w/drew to beach under hvy fire. 11 Apr: ~Jo Japs Lala area. 11 Apr: Japs left Kolambugan, 200 Liangan" e) Misamis Or: 21 Mar: Coast fr Initao to Opon clear, 2 Apr: Japs evac Iponan. 25 Mar: Blackout & camouflage Cagayan area, no .AA except 50 cal; pill boxe s, wire &. trenches along beach covering dock at Macabalun & Lap ... asan. 10 Apr: Cagayan wharf area closed to civilians. 12 Apr, AM: Japs landed fr SOOT ship~ t) Bukidnon: 25 Mar: Sayre Highway passable, some troops mov(;d S & few supplies brought N. Barracks & hosp Damulog; 20 trucks. 10 Apr: More troops expectEd fr Davao & 'Manila to take place of mobile unit now in Agusan. Mobile unit to go to Cagaynn for attack against S1..ulJilao area guerr~ g) Agusan: 21 Mar: 300 Japs occupy Butuan, occupy coast fr Nasipit to VI bank Agusan R" 17 Mar: Guerr defense posn capt below Amparo. 18 Marg Occupation coast appears to be f(;)1~ control rice harvest & poss advance up river later. 26 Marg Deer pressure along river. h) Davao: 25 Mar: Total strength equals 2 Divs, 1''1/2 Regts, only, combat, others 'lIDtrained or recently inducted Jap civilians.* Bayabas restricted area. 10 ;:.pr: Gel,soline, fuel oil & supplies dispersed in sml durnps along VI side of road N fr Davao & about 100M under coeonut trees fr SasaN to Lasang. Concentrations Panakan, Ilanga, Bunaw~n & Lasang;light guards. 5 Apr~ 16000 Japs, mostly good troops Davao provo S tip Talikud Id for­ tified. Road proposed fr Malalag to Booyan to follow old trail. 10 Apr! Jap launch attempted lnnding Manay but w/drew after firing 12 shells. 11 Apr~ Reinf garr along N coast road. 13 Apr: Reported Japs nervous over lack control E coast. 13 Apr: 3 I50mm Cll. guns sta Ana, same S end Talikud, Dumalag Pt & Sasa. Ano­ ther defense area around Darongj rumors same in Bayabas are.a. 1 Apr: 12 tanks Davao: 4 Sasa, 12 Talomo R Plan­ :tation, 2 Licanan field; mostly light~· i) Cotabato: 7 Apr: Garr Cotabato City incr to 3000~' 12 Apr: Sml Be post to be estab Kisante, Kidapawan.

*CO~ffiNTS: (3h) Total strength Davao not accurately known to guer­ rillas and given here only to show typical discrepancies in reports received on strengths in this area.

II AIR: 1. LUZon, Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate:' a) ,f,§"ngasinan: 29 Jan: Landing field nearly compl w/cement runways t lou W prov capitol. - 2 .;. UNClASSIFIE8 SiGB ~l UN,CLASSIFlE,n '! t 1 t .; •. ' b) Parnpanga: Reed 16 Mar: Palaeol field betw Flcridabanca & Angeles under ccnstr. c) Batangns: Reed 26 Mar: Batangas airfield brightly lit, Lipablacked out.* Reed 31 Mar; Japs clc..im Lipa lar­ gest PI airfield w/6 Ullilerground hangars for Fs. d) ~: Reed 16 Mar: Concrete runways being laid Rosario.

e) Polillo Id: Recd 16 Mar: Airfield Alabat Id fr * f) Manila: R;ed 26 Mar: Light buoys fr brenkvmter in pattern of Lun0ta light system.* Reed 27 Mar: 2nd runway Neil­ son & parking strips concreted. Reed 31 1'.'Io..r: Nichols field enlrg & 2 more runviTays added; TE Bs sta there. US insignia reported on 5 med Bs. Many air accidents due pilots in training. g) Cavite: 9 Feb: 5 navy FBs at former USN apron. REi cd 26 Mar: Lights installed 500 yds 1r coast in pattern of navy yard.* h) Camarines S~: Recd 16 Mar: Nagafield lengthened. Recd 31 Mar: Pili airfield reported being enlrg. *COIvTIlBENTS: (10) Lighting of Batangas field believed blind for activity at Lipa. (Ie) Report considered of doubtful reliability-.. (If & g) Placing of light buoys apparently to camouflage installations at Cavite and Luneta. Luneta area closed to civilians·'.

2. Palawan and Visayas: a) £ana...x: 14 Apr: Tiring airfield in opcr eondition.* b) ~egros: Airfield constr N Negros w/forced labor. * c) BohQ1: 4 Apr: Japs constr new landing field Danao, Panglao Id .• d) Leyte: 11 Apr: Ormoo field being reconditioned & enlrg. New field Burauen & clearing at Valencia, 13 km N of Ormoe; work night & day.

*CO~JllVlENTS: (20.) Construction reported in December. Located betvJeen sta Barbara and Cabat~~n, Iloilo Provinee~ No further details, but believed bomber length~ (2b) Details of construction activity not received. Note report of improvement of Fabrica Field reported last month. :3. Mindanao and Sulu: . a) Tawi Tawi:Bombing free areas continues. 10 Apr: Airfield 2 mi NE on Sanga Sanga one~third complete: I mi long, . 300 ft wide; work by Chinese coolies & native forcod labor. b} Iil: 9 Apr: Seaplanes based near Isabel&.. 13 Apr: 2 seaplanes based Port Holland. c) ~qmboanga: 6 Apr: Bombing free areas continues. d) ~: 13 Apr: Seaplanes oce use lower end Malabang Field.* e) ,MisaT(lis Or: 31 Mar-2Apr: 6/9 Bs patrolling Macajalar Bay . based Patag airfield. 4 Apr: Patag extended to W for Bs, but only 10 Fs on field; supply storage tunnels in hill to S; no revet. 9 Apr: 2 Fs Patag field. 10 Apr;g 13 planes Patag field, 6 at Lumbia, Lumbia fighter field under constr, 2· months to finish-at present rate, hideouts for 6 planes in forest, final capacity 20 planes, 110 tunnels yet, 4 barracks complete N end field. f) Bukidnon: Tankulan field being cleared. Malaybalay 2000M x 300M; revet for 24 planes in hill mv of field, no planes •. Valencia 2: Same; partially tunnelled revet into hill to l\1VJ for 50. 12 Apr: Del Monte field''l·ecent ... ly used for emerg landing. g) Agus1!U: Bombing coastal tovms late March. 13 Apr: Rizal field in condition to use.* h) Davao: B Apr: Sasa: 50 planes perm garr, cnly B field in Davaoarea in reg use.· Licanan: 1000M:x 100M,' coral but ground soft, pursuit field not complete yet. hut - 3 ... ·ga Stic)" DNCLASSIF1ElI ~. j!f' fair in use; 30 planes dispersal [troe. in coconut trees to S; no revet, uncrated planes Bun2.wan wharf for assembly • . Matina: Naval airfield under constr near 111c-ltino. R betw road & coast. Baracoton: No recent info' on condition, no planes. Tomagon~ No recent info on condition, no planes. Hijo: Grass runway, pursuit field. lVIalalag: 1000M x 100M field under constr at Mero.l. Sal:ml ~ Patrol Bs seen taking off.* 15 fields tot planned Davao area, incl Calinan, Bnyabas & Darong. 10 Apr: Usually 4 SE FPs & 1 navy FB anchored naval yard, Santa Ana. 12 Apr: No underground hangars at any Dave.o fields.* . Padada rlll1way 100M x lOOOM; 2 others proposed; strip located on Mindanao state Plantation Co. i) Cotabato: 23 Mar:' Buayan airfield again being enlrg. 7 Apr~ Airfield constr at Cotabato City not complete. 13 Apr: No airfields in upper Koronadal Valley. Buayan field 43 planes.* Dadiangas field being enlrg.

*CO~JID!!ENTS: (3d) Information reads as received. Possibly means sea­ planes light in Illana Bay off Malabang. (3g) Unconfirmed, and E;ince field in poor location in rice paddy possibly not true. (3h) Confirms report of bomber length field on Samal Island received May 1943. Re underground hangars, previously reported at Sasa. (3i) Report of 43 planes at Buayan beli6ved exaggE::rat6d. Last report in March indicated field still under construction.

PLA11E SIGHTINGS REPORTED ON MINDP:JJAO AIRFIELDS DURING MONTH

...... j •• f.u •• ., ... n ...... U ••• I .. "I.~ ...... "ttl.\.... lInt".'_," ....f.U ..... tfl'I(.,'"., ••••~~" ...."t."'"'."u.".'"." ... ""ntJ."., ..u., .. , .. ,.'...,..,..".nu'Ufffnlu .....f ...... (, ••, ...... 'ftfl".n .... ftu ..... ' ...... "n.''' ...... ".uf''"""."".. ." •.,Ultfr''''ln'" •••••. Name t Province or Id. I Sighting , ...... ,...... ,.nl ...... u.'"uu ... u...... j .."'u'"' .. '.".. ~.H" ...... " ... , .... , .... ,.",•• ft,u., .. "",,,.II.u...... ".n ...... ,l ..... ,,, ...... ,, .. 1I ...... "u, ...... " .. " ...... Of ...... ""HUIl .. " ...... " ... " ...... ", ...... n ... ' ..... H...... "", ! : vYolfe I Zamboanga ! 5 DBs & 2 FPs Patag I Misamis Or. I 2-13 Fs (total varied during

Lumbia I Misamis Or. ! 6 ~:n~::iS first report of I t planes en this field) Sasa I Davao I 50 (mostlY Bs)* Santa .Ana F Buayan I :::::ato I :3 :i& (~h:: is first report I I of planes this field. Re~ I I port rated low in reliability) ! ~ ~ i Port Holland l Basilan Id. i 2 FPs (first report this area) Isabella I Basilan Id. I 2 FPs (first report this area) Jo10 I Jolo Id. J 2 Bs, 3-5 FPs * Tawi Tawi' I Tawi Tawi I 2-5 FPs * *Only sightings so indica.ted can be considered as usual nlliaber of planes stationed in area. Other"sightings are probably transient totals. Summary totals: Fs 2-13 Bs 52 DBs 5 FPs 15-20 FBs 1 u/i ...... 49 Total 121p-140 .. 4· ...

UNCLASSIfIED·, ~ ". . a

" zG ~ F n,U::ERL..L !llou.n'~ ..!N H1.0V: ? TOh'YO = iiE..j»:Jj.r'1TERS E)lcio:;ure IJo. 1 Jap recr~iv~ ~ported PHILI~PINE ISLANDS trainlIl€ ('.amp John EOJI . VIU L U Z 0 hl GENERAL HEADQUARTERS .'1- '"N SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA r: &: f' L'J:zDN: , ·", ... ..,11 :--, • ... .. Milic.1l"Y Intelligence Section ~_ll brictees C to N Luwn SIo~ n .... ~ .. oo .",..' • , ./ General Staff t;ood condition. :r'~~ ENlllL. (.ROlLI) _C'TIVITl.E..;> "'G~1I0 23 r 2° July 1)44 U"1l.V[H• IJ..J'lll. ... t ,.1l1lIU. L> For ~u.umar) ~~O . 10 _ .. ~, 113 Jul: Tomkar burned-f.ief. '> --,. , 5, fARLAi U ...,"ATUA~ I r.' ...... -100...... -- ,Ao ',- -, --too 25 JuL Havy iUF-l stored ·notu~ ". .:I. LUZON L!pDrt sabot6ged. !~i~,[ , l)oubt.fUl rapt ~:arsbal r:;;:;w;rur c"""",-"dB WlDY .. S , LUZON i~ ~,2> navy in c.l. -i.2'SJ 1... , . , T L:..cation Japs DO Remarb ~?w , t L ..GU:t..: . ILUWN ~ 26 .lUI!.: ().l.err attc;;ck 2 , 000 .!)1. 'prev~ ..... us.... y N. LEYTE ~L .Jan Fern.t.ndo I La t.!U,l'l.tinglupa PO·i/ ca.·.P • I I.iiac towhs , lJ.;. Union 1,000 I·aported. lease 60 FQ;'j 1 .a.pture DUEt , :EC'scale, f:, I"m.5 .&- a:zr!J . ..runbulEi/.) f' C6.m. :;orte I ) , 0,0 • I n-Vz.D l.:i.o ...~ LaOWlg 900 TEft 500 D• .LD ? 11 knph Ctlbayo , C&tbalo~~ 5 , 000 rrob greatly {€"nuE:rut-;d. !i.Irill...N..0 I I ;.:.amboan a ..J;l.lUboe..nga 700 1400 F'agadi (AlIlbo6.Ile,a 500 Burigao rrov :10,000 1 o " .R. ,--~-" ...- . 20 Jul : .. ..11 East &. ~,ortti' cout {:,&rri30ns , £xc.;pt i'aft ~n E. & Loaor..g in hurriea.iy I • evacuat"d by .l6.ps • PA AWAN LEYTE;

~ •• ~,hc..rl' undt.::r' constructi{.J;. at Dulog, l3()~OL , / " SORIG..o, is' Jt...l, ?O ,000 C&';anci rioe capt fr guerr. Enem...... ppiri6 E:.r ..8 6 Dlll~3 in­ land :from 'i\an&~ .

eAlA84C 10.

MINDANAO lkV•• O ~ Nc Japs rptd If coast. lS-iuF-Hi.;ii milu.;ry oj-Hellis

z..i.J1BO •.,i,'-iG".: hold import&ut coDi"~rcn( : e Li~C:.nan •../n . Jap wou..'idf,1Il u.nloadE:-d 19 Jul! 14 six-i'-,cr, guns-"-..£_· during blackout. rlported in city and t 0 2...Jnph bE:-t1cb .. s . J?' " '" ? I1.V • .o , • . -- ' ·1, BORNEO 2l Jul : 1',~alee- bE:oc.heB I ruporr,ed " , hfO,c. "lily dtft;;nd.;.d includ!.nR . el<:c'l;r .. i'icd wires. • ~;> ~'." ------I ~ \ • LASWEll

f)

G/.ID, 25 Jul, Jc rJuE:l .. Enc.loour. No . . A,1l~JJf on "N&y ~o south. PHILlF:'PINE ISLANDS . 'lJ~uru.l!• • L U Z 0 N GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ·'LA;'," 10 Jul, 14 -'UIII SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA TIE, • e .. v .... y 47 SIE, 39 Fs . Milital-Y Intelligence Section • $II~I't" .. A~1l0 General Staff • ·N4.II'~'A~ i..I.R ~IGH!'INGci 6: SHil.!.FICl.NT ·UGu,o DE,.V ELOP;...l:.NI'S 10 Jul, 3b ./E, LI"UV[H 2] - 29 July 19i.4 70 s/£, 43 Fs . ~. '/lVlllTA For SUIIIllaJ:'y lW. 10 2.5 JuI: Neilson & '. \ tJichols now joined both bei~ improved ... •• & enlarl!,ed. V.J..I..Et>.'CL .. l Jul~ 1 slEa/c io ...mGlW'T ON .P.I. FIELDS REPORTiill DURING jj£Et: "J.~" stationed since 10 - "" '. '. Jul, 1 10 Jul, 50 TIE, r Field Date :Jo 52 Fs • t T..... CLOB..Ji .....rlli.u; I LUdlN ... TIRllIGI --_. I •..nibong. 25 Jul; I\ichols 10 Jul 14 TIE. 47 ~/E • 39 Fs £j Jul, 13 Fs. D 2 Seaplanes. ';jeilson 10 Jul J6 TIE. 70 a/E, 43 ~Lipa 10 Jul 50 r/E, 52 Fo / Cataisan; 2~ Jul, 0 4 TIE. • MINDORO 4i"TE 25 Jul: 4 Fs under • repair .. DliI... G, , V&.lencia 10 Jul 1 a/E !Cataisan 25 Jul 4 T/E 27 Jul! Field !)';ins ~~"q' . .nibong 25 Jul 2 ~N.'planes .~.' , Lliproved by rolling . runW8Y with gravel I 25 Jul, 2 TIE & JO foundation .. l'Jnay S/E of whi ch 4 s.re \:F. ITi::r;ing 25 Jul 13 Fs under repair. ;~~aniurriao 25 Jul 4 Fa under repuir -& " LUI,iBI ...... - ISan Fernando <5 Jul 2 TIE , 30 alE ...• 2.0 .Tul, 1 B. •d JBW I ~i.<.L.YJ3,1....y, ilAwi-r; i18 Jul 6 FIF, 4 E ,/B

23 Jull ~J .. BuJcidnon 8000 drUlIlS ...vn Gas, lIUl'tJ.;._ ... 'O I , about 2000 81 ,Suss 16 Jul 3 4 E liB Melaybalay . ..'latina. 116 Jul 3 Rs • & Padado 2-' ;ul. 20 to 90 Bs F,- PA A WAN San Roq!J.e 22Jul 9 Bs • V.. ..l.l1!Cl ... fr"2: Luabia 2:' Jul 1 E 2CfJUJ.: "Ert"ensiv-e ./ / • improvements • LIT, ./ .- 18 Jul, 6 F/P & 1 n.~V~ ..O CITy ,..ru.....: 4 E FIB , IIIIS ..., sosa, -16· Jul,- 3 4 " V ld..'U.tir Total to Sl!. e.: 6. 78 .JO >iBs . I I J.:'otal to N oS:: :<['1, 16 .10 hU1-1J,...... j,...O ; Total to 5E &; ;j , 5 ./0 SAltl9AC 10. 8.LN RO'.JJE-aST..... M.JU3 4 !.latina , 16 Jul, 3 E Total toN&Nif , 7 ,./0 22 Jul: 9 Bs. MINDANAO --- - P .. .D• .D~. ; ~---- 25 Jul, 20 '0 9" Bs & Fa •

If.cL1....G' 5 Jul: ~oo unas­ • BORNEO sembled ale & 5000 " drums aviat~on gas unloaded at i.1ah"lt1fo;, _ 1..0 & r

i~NClASSIFlEQ

UNGLA~SIF...

.E):lclo6UTe :;:';0 . 3 PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

L U Z 0 N GENERAL HEADQUARTERS -'U,geILA&,," SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA fun", Military Intelligence Se<:tion • General Staff MEfl('J:U....\TT VESSEL. a;)i GHT .i.NCb 2] - 2~ July 1944 ~IN"",ytH • SAVTISTA For ~urnmary No . 10 • " I_AUf O"~.U"TU"'/OI • ... • Slarr.o<",,~

s.ft~""IIrIO•

16-22 July T 2)-29 July r~Y ILOILO }!;;, Revised Prelim. ,,- . -- ,-- .,' 26- 4) Jul : 10 ShlPS ? ace r 32,,)OOT css Sri. >::ib.ips -.l 'rons ahips r '['ona MO:Z:POG F ~ ; '2) 27 J-ul ; 1 ship + I . 3. 000T cae N. 2S Jul ~ 7 ships 4 7 , 600 1 500 39,DOOT ,"se S. s Or . / Dava";;'3;' 12,500 4 19,-" 00 Si:J... ~ 5 e&.iO'1'l'b 58, 000 • MINOORO ,..:-. - ," ' ota sto 27 21 , 210 l2 • / 2]- 2b Ju1: b ships , ZE:.mb "anga N,j 0 2.,000 8 12,500 11)t6~JT c;:;e ~ . ". Za.t.lbqani;a SE J2 12; ~ lO 1 2 , 000 23 Jul t 6 ships ZaInb llanga City 2 (j , ODO lO , OuOT c:,se E. ~ 23- 28 Jul , 22 ships Tot&l 76 90 •120 26 92 , 000 54. ClOOT ese N. CEBU -" CEBU aER , W' , Eoho Strait 17 bo . QQO 26 Jul ,' 5, >ihips TJ..CLOB.n1f: Cehu J.~l>r . 6 2J, JOO .5 18,.:;.>00 18,5007, ~c!J.ored' , . 26 Jul : 2- ships Camo ~s Bea 7 n .ooo 34 7" ,(,50 •d 9 . 000T oS. S . Total 13 31 , 000 • 56 153 ,150 {Y BOHOL.... --- sTIik..I -1': 23-26 JuL 6 ohips Ccl'UG6.0 CL",N , LEYTE 1 3 , OOOT cse S. 215 j-Ui ~ i'ship ca•• d.ao Chan. 5 ,500 26 Ju1 : 11 ships Tacl(,ban 3 11,')00 2 9 , 000 5 ,501l1l"- cs e ~. • • 57 I GOOT cse N' .. Total 3 11, 000 ] 11;.,500 Gi..G.:..y_ ...;.~ : P A A :6, N NECROS i SOUTHERN NEGROS, 29 Jul : 1 sh~p • Sou tl;, Coast 7 12, 000 27-26 Jul; 6 shipS 500T' o. se E. Bacojoo. 9 9 , 000 8 , OOOT cse $ ,1. ~ , 28 Jul l 1 ship Total 0, 9 , 000 7 12. 000 4 , OOOT cse NE. F.. .l~Y .KL 146 , 000 11 "00 •" iloilo _41 _..... -.- 15 .J ...... wBOJ.NC1. ~""W : LjIl""SAlAN + ',rotel 146. 000 35 .500 BALAOr.C ItI. 2J-2tf Jul: 0 ships 41 ¥ 5,500 T cse 3':i. MINOANAO LUZON 22-27 lui: 2 .ship s Tayaloas . 7,JOQT cse N. , Mompoi. F£i.:3S 7 39. 000 .. ~ . T --_.. Total 7 I 39 . 000 Z-;!BOd~GJ . sE: --4- -_... _-.. 24 JU/J i 1 ship TUT.. J.... 142 2B7 , 120 1U 3"6,150 ~ _, ___-,1. __ 1 2 , 00"T 22 Jul; 2 Ships ,l)..v• .o CULF, 80RNEO g' ,j, uOOT cse s . 25-27 Jul: 10 ships 25 Jul , 4 ships 55, 000'1' cse N. 19, OOOT es.,; S .

23 UNClASSiflUJ II CItE I

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

DAILY ~UMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE

NO: DATE: * *

* Number and date, riot reproduced, will vary from volume to volume inasmuch as actual war-time originals are utilized here. The document following this page is an original issued on the date it bears. \

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE I: MINDANAO: GROUND - AIR - NAVY II: VISAYAS: GROUND - AIR - NAVY III: LUZON: GROUND - AIR - NAVY

No. DATE 53 25 Sep/44

CONTENTS

*1. Davao Report of highway ;Jnd ferry destruction 2. Davao Occupation of DE'~vao Penal Colony by our units 30 Agusan Agusan River clear of Japs as far as Butuan 4. Bukidnon Large concentration of troops Maramag-Damalog 5. Cotabato Encounter with JapE) vicinity Sarangani Bay 6. Zamboanga Aircraft sightings over Zamboanga, Basilan Ido 7. Misamis Or Harbor report Cagayan, week ending 21 Sep 8. Surigao Report of air-naval attack on Jap convoy 9. Cebu Enemy strength Cebu City and vicinity *10. Mindoro Additional report on plane approach patterns 11. Panay Allied air attack Iloilo and Guimaras Id 120 Iloilo 54 Allied planes attack Tabuganhan Id 13., Iloilo Shipping observed anchored off Concepcion 14" Cebu Weekly report of shipping activity, Cebu Harbor *15. Cebu Report of torpedo boats, activity and armament 16. Leyte Report of torpedo boat sinkings *17. Pangasinan Report on "defenses NIN tip Lingayen Gulf 18. Tayabas Jap garrison vicinity of Baler *Significant items *****

~'t~lJlSSjW &'alP 7 i ISf Msg No. MINDANAO Ground Activity Davao~ Fer (l)-~Sep: We have stopped destruction hwy between km 43 and km 901 106 in order to use trucks abandoned by Japs. vVe occupy garrisons at Kahamayan and Anibongan railways and have destroyed Bincongan Ferr,y. COIvTIVIENT: This action is the result of the abandonment by the Japs of outlying garrisons in Davao Province and points to quick ex­ ploitation by our guerrillas. Fer (2) 24 Sep: Our troops have occupied Davao Penal Colony and will 905 utilize it for Filipino civilians who are fleeing from occupied terri­ tory. Road junction National Highway and Penal Colony Road at km 39 is an enemy bivouac areao Agent believes that complete neutralization of Linganan by repeated raids will result in enemy withdrawing S to bn 19 North road. COlVliIiJENT: Davao Penal Colony was used at first for American PiN. After American FYi vvere removed the Penal Colony was used for Filipino political prisoners~ .Ag~: Fer (3) 24 Sop: Agusan River is clear down to Butuan, Agusan. Enemy 906 is removing troops and supplies secretly by launches at night from Butuan, l\gusan. Destruction of Rizal Field, used occasionally by Bettys, and Bancasi (Butuan Cadre) Field, used by fighters, would has­ ten this evacuation. CO~i[MENT: In PI. Daily Nr 51, Item .3, an extensive comment was made on tho evacuation of tho Agusan Valley as far a.s San Mateo; since San Mateo is in the municipality of Butuanthe same comment applies. The gist of the comment is that the enemy appears to be concentrating some of his troops in NE Mindanao for an apparently expected invasion. Bukidnon: Fer (4)-'),4 Sep: Large concentration of troops between Maramag and 907 Damolog. This area vvas not raided. Between Valencia, Bukidnon, and Davao Province boundary 500 Jap casnaltios during raids. COMIVIENT ~ Indication that enemy troops from bombed areas are partly concentrated in the Maramag-Dumalog area. It must not be over­ looked however that the contral location of this area makes it suitable for the concentration of reserves for the defense of southern Mindanao, and that such copcentrations in this vicinity have been formerly re­

ported 0 . (See PI Daily Nr 50', Item 1) Cotabato: Fer (5)-24Sep: Agent reports 16th Sep encounter with Japs, vicinity 903 Sarangani Bay, .3 Japs killed for loss one our men. Captured 75 grenades, 6,000 rounds .25 calibre ammo and 100 Jap stokes-mortar shells. Air ActiVity ~boanga: Fer " (6) '" 23 Sep: Bas'ilan Id reported 2 bombers, 9 fighters bound SE i 904 4 fighters southbound, 14 fighters circling over-head, 1 bomber to SE, all hostile~ Zamboanga saw 3 fighters going N. Naval Activity ~.1isamis Or: Fer (7) 24 Sep:. -Cagayan Hbr report week ending 21 Sep: 2 MV, 2 SA, 903 5 SC, 7 small craft. COMIVlENT: Routine. ~urigaQ: Fer (8) 24 Sop: Competent American officer reports on air naval 908 attack Jap convoy 9 Sop.. 21 Jap ships believed sunk Hinatuan as counted from individual fires seen by civilians; Jap warship escort repeatedly bombedo Two Jap planes approached but fled S.. Bombing and cannon fire hearu both Nand S Hinatuan. One cargo ship beached off TidmanJl much oil and army supplies, this ship nbr'143. 8 ships partly sunk on beaches Mawesld, many new Jap graves this island and Hinatuan, Surigao. 'Civilians reported 24 ships stranded on coast near Lianga, civilian looting has been stopped, guards posted, and we have started salvage of available cargo. Jap survivors along coast and

- 1 - UNClASSIfiED J_~ 7 7 B.F ." MINDliliAO (Cont'd) Naval Activity Suriga.Q: Mawes Id picked up by launches. Some ships this convoy were evacuating large garrisons from Hinatuan and Lianga. Japs·out of Hinatuan~ left minor defenses such as brick pillboxes. No effort observed of Japs attempting salvage. COn~~NT~ This message confirms the reported evacuation of Lianga Bay and for the first time reports the evacuation of Hinatuan. The former was discussed in PI Daily Nr 49, item 6~ and the same comment would apply to the evacuation of Hinatuan. 'The gist of the comment WaS that the abandonment of this area would be, if true~ the resultant of both its exposed position and the need for redisposition that our poised threat to the south would appear to dictate.

VISAYAS Ground Activi ty Cebu: Cus (9)- 24 Sep: Additional report as of 24 Sep on enemy strength: 159 Guadalupe Elementary School, Cebu City, 200; in front of Basak Elementary School in civilian houses, 1509 Talisay Elementary School, 200; Talisay Sugar Central, 150; Lauaan Minglanilla, 150; Carear Cebu,9 100; Mactan Island, approx 1,000; Cebu City, approx 2,000; Consolacion, scattered at Tajusan and Bagacay Point, 300. A/A gun emplacement at Pooc Talisay,9 ammunition stored at Talisay Elementary School building, mines kept in Lauaan area Minglanilla. Air Activity Mindoro: Row (lO)--24~Sep: There are 3 distinct funnels for planes to and from S. 121 No.1 was described in our Nr 70. Wr 2, planes from all directions to San Jose, then abrupt left turn to 5 mi18s off Mindoro, then N to Bataan; planes from N in reverse. Nr 3, planes from S including SW avoid San Jose, enter funnel around Buyallao Id and fly straight route to Tubile, thence to destination) from N in reverse. One funnel used :3 or 4 days, then changed to another .• COMIVlENT: This message refers to the traffic pattern used by enemy aircraft in order to be recognized as friendly by the enemy. (See PI Daily Nr 30, item 15 for comment.) Naval iictivity pan§..I: Per (11) 24 Sep: Starting 0950/H, mnerican planes attacked vessels at 709 Iloilo Fort, Iloilo Strait and vicinity Guimaras Id, Tiring and Man­ durriao airfields , vicinity TigbuEln and Guimbal towns • River area Iloilo City, depot Mandurriao airfield and vessels around Bondulan Point, Gui­ maras set on fire. One u/i plane crashed aflame vicinity Tigbuan. COlVnVlENT: The above are ground observers report 0f damage caused by U.S. Navy carrier planes on 24 Sep. Iloilo: Per (12) if;Sop: 1030/H Bagongon, Tagubanhan Id bombed by 54 Allied 710 planes, A/A guns answered. North of Igbon Id 3 transports bombed and set afire. l040/H one of 4 vessels S of Jintotolo Id (Masbate) set afire, l400/H two vessels bombed and sunk, another set afire around Pan de Azucar Id. Explosion from Masbate heard. CO~WlE~~: See comment in item 11. Per (13) 24 Sep~ 1035/H 7 auxiliary cargo vessels medium load and 1 FTC 711 anchored off Concepcion. l030/H same date one medium transport light load anchored off Concepcion. COl\1l'/iENT: These vessels may be anchoring while awaiting orders as to destination or because of dislocation of dock facilities due to our recent air strikes. Cebu: Cus (14)-22 Sep: Weekly summary report of enemy vessels sighted entering 155 port of Co bu ending Thursday 21 Sep: 3 FTC, 1 FTD, 1 FU i 2 SC, 1 NN, 3 patrol crafts, 1 DD, 1 OL u/i and 20 naval landing crafts. CO~~~NT: This is a small weekly total for this important har­ bor and probably results from tho distruction of docks, etc., in our recent air strikes. - 2 - UNCLASSIfiED ,,0 VISAYAS (Cont'd) Naval Activity Cebu: Cus (15)--24 Sep: (Correction of msg 18 Sep) I'.lotorboats armament follows: 159 1 37mm AlA., 1 heavy machine gun approx 7.7~ 2 torpedo tubes, 2 depth charges chutes at stern and men with German luggers. Fuel and supply facilities taken from Liloan Cebu. 3 Queen boats and several barges hiding among mangroves near bridge Jubay Liloan. Area has 2 AlA guns, 1 machine gun. Reported Queen boats patrol up to Bagacay Point daily. Ono queen boat was observed patrolling Cebu no~th channel and shelters among mangroves in Gasaga Bay. Somo landing crafts also hiding here. One queen boat Was observed patrolling vicinity Kawit Island. Silot Bay Li10an still hiding place for landing craft and barges. COMlllJENT : See PI Daily Nr 50 ~ item 11. 1m:tg: Kan (16) 24 Sep: Reference your special Nr 10, I torpedo boat was seen hit and sunk by carrier planes at Dulag water front during bombing 12 Sep. Others might have been destroyed or sunk as they are no longer seen at base in Tacloban Port. No more floating craft seen in Tacloban Port since 15 Sep.

LUZON Ground Activi ty bnill1sin.9n: Lap (17) 24 Sop: Report as of 7 Sep, Cape Bolinao: 1 observation post 2 N of town at end of only main road and another at tip of point mv of town, tronches and dugouts from Port Picucuban to NW of to"llvnship along shoro. Trenchera Pt (low hill NE of town). Three 50 cal MGs mounted on emplace­ ments bored through hill connected with deep runways~ center MG at higher elevation than other two, barbed wires along point, NVi corner of Bolinao Elementary School is ammo dump. Santiago Id: Ammo dump at point S of barrio Lucero close to shore under coconut grove. Trenches along shore bank from Barrio Ducoy to SE of Binalbalian~ MG emplacement at some strategic points, one 50 cal at NW point of island at Picucuban Strait, between island and Bolinao. Capital and cargo vessels sometimes anchor following life buoys. SW and SE of barrio Liciente and directly S of Luna are coast arty emplacements for l55's. Along ridge on opposite side of ravine about 150 meters from right of Zag Zag road between barrio Zaragoza and Lambes are trenches and MG nest. From Agno, truck road constructed to barrio Sabangan and Kiboar. Cargo and capital (?) ships sometimes un­ load supplies at Sabangan. Barbed wires along Sabangan Pt to Kiboar. COlVIlVlENT: The preparation of dofenses in Cape Bolianao and off­ laying Santiago Id, the northwestern end of Lingayen Gulf shows the enemy's concorn and preparations for the defense of the Lingayen area .. Though the reported defenses do not appear to be anything but defensive outposts~ it must be borne in mind that they are probably in the develop-

mental stage. I Tayab.M,: Tor (18) 22Sep: Jap garrison located at Detaki 247 degrees 30 minutes true azimuth from Baler distance of 18 and one half km. Garrison lo­ cated N side of road going to Bongabong. Native huts used as quarters. IdO civilians employed daily except Sunday. Another Japgarrison at Dibucao 269 degrees tl:'UB azimuth from Baler distance 10 and one quarter km.

Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. Information contained herein will not be reproduced o~ circulated beyond the Staff Section to which it is addressed. VVhen not actually in use, this document is to be kept in a safe and is chargeable to the custody of an officer.

- 3 "'" UNCLASSIFlm UN~lA~S'flfD

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

DAILY PHILIPPINE MESSAGE SHEET

NO: DATE: * *

* Number and date, not reproduced, will vary from volume to volume inasmuch zs actual war-time originds are util:zed 'here. The document following this page is an origind issued on the date it bears.

UN CLASSifIED 1 ·.~,~ :\;t

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

DAILY PHILIPPINE MESSAGE SHEET

No. DATE 184 24 Nov 1944

MINDANAO

Fer Misamis Org 19 Nov: Two Jap ships aground on coral reef 2 miles 534 W Cubontagan, mAS (near?) Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. Troops· unloaded ..

Fer Mati g Davao~ 22 Nov: Following boundaries enclose area 1] (of?) 535 important Japsupplies. Strafing and fragmentation bombing would eliBinate total Jap material this part Davao~ Follow sides of a tri­ angle, each side 50 yards long" Base of triangle shore line. Left side from Municipal Building to schoolhouse. Radio station near school in former D0mestic Science Building.

Fer Bukidnong 21 Nov~ Reported Nips brok~ through 2nd Bn of lllth 536 (Regiment) (BQ~idnon) causing him evacuate his rear installations.

Fer Davao g 22 Nov~ Malagamot,Davao Province, filled v,lith many impor ... 540 tant untouched targets. Matina Field repaired after every bombing by Jap civilians. 14 Nov: TijijO fighters destroyed bombing Matina. Electrically controlled mines 3 meters from and parallel to N Road from Km 11 to 16.

Fer Agusan: 22 Nov g F olloil;Jing men from 13th Bomb Command, 13th Air 540 Force, bailed ~1A due fuel shortage. NO'H proceeding this headquartc;;rs. S/Sgts Leroy CARTWRIGHT, ASN 35217251. John KIRK,9 ASN 33646881. Will notify you upon their arrival.

NEGROS

Abc Negros Occ~ 19 Nov~ 20 Osc,Slrs and Zckes in Singcang, Bacolod, 398 r as of 19 Nov. 3 Sonia, 2 Lily, 1 Sally ~nd 1 Betty now being repaired at Guia Lumber Yard, Bacolod.

Abc' Negros Occ~ 22 Novg Planes from Lanog Lanog dispersed at barrio 401 Tabigue 2 KM along Provincial Road S of Saravia proper, planes towed on Provincial Road to this barrio for refueling and bombloading. 14 Tony.9 10 Zeke and 3 Sonia, total 27, at La Carlota Airfield dis­ persed in area S of and between school house and La Car10ta to San Enrique Road and under bamboo thickets at N end of rlIDway. Gasoline and oil deposit under orchard t YJn W of S end' of runwc:y. At Bacolod total 21 Oscar and Tony at Singcang under coconut trees t Km NW of Mags1.lllgay bridge. All information as of 22 Nov •.

Abc Negros Occ~ 23 Nov~ Bacolod Murcia Mill in Oco Japs making 403 bamboo rafts Each good for one soldier~ dimensions one meter wide, 2t meters long. Multiple pompoms installed at Lanog Lanog~ Naga and Tanza Airfields.

- 1 .. '*' F I it f"'i' P~I. Message Sheet 184, 24 Nov 44 (Contfd) Abc • 404 Negros Oce ~ 23 Nov~ 16 German pilots p,t headquarters Cagay.9 one Km N of Tanza proper, assigned to Tanza Airfield.

Abc Negros ~ 23 Nov~ I\'Ieasurernents of cracked up Tony~ 405 Wing span 40 feet and 3/4 inch 9 length of fuselage 29 f set, 7t inches, Jap pilot prisoner of war claims 1200 horsepower.

PANAY

Per Iloilo~ 18 Nov~ As of 1 a.m.~ Pan de Azucar Island clear. All 14 Nips boarded unknown number motor boats and proceeded SE. 18 Nov~ 11 a.m" one Allied 4 engined seaplane landed at position 11° 28' N, 123 0 14' E 1dhile 8 others same types landed above that place. Upon landing, onebanca contacted seaplane and after 30 minutes the plane took off with 8 others headed NE,

Per ~ 20 Nov~ Al1.3 'Dotor launches docked at Culasi Point, 15 Capiz, left 6 ~ 00 p ,m. "ith food supplies.

LUZON

Vol ~ 23 Nov~ Radiogram dated 21 Nov says one destroyer, 55 2 light cruisers, 1 FB armed vvi th two 75 guns and two 50 caliber guns, anchored in Santiago Cove which is point tVtTo.

Vol Manila, 23 Oct ~ Following information is from leader of Chinese 59 Unit in Manila, reliability unknown~ Results of Sept~mber bombing at Nichols Fisld runway A/A positions and trenches completely blasted, over 50 grounded planes destroyed, over l~OOO soldiers and laborers killed or wounded. In Fort McKinley all except few small barracks destroyed, large quantity ammunition , destroyed $ over 1000 persons killed or ·wounded. At Makati Airfield (?) all installations blasted ~ over 70 ·grounded planes destroyed, apj-=roxi­ mately 1000 persons killed or 'i!wunded. Engineer Island completely blasted, steel bridge erected. In port area, piers 3 and 7 completely destroyed, all except few small warehouses on piers 1 and 5 destroyed. In Manila Bay, 30 ships sunk,

10 damaged, aircraft supply ship ITvi th over ten plane s also sunk 0 Moved VTar supplie s from suburbs into central pa rt of city incl uri­ ing buildings between Tiyoli Theater and star Restaurant of Plaza

Santa Cruz, Blackout Nite Club on Alonso Street, Santa Cruz j Tung Po (repeated Pu) Aiti Club on Ongpin street, Capitol Theater. Fuel stores at Panda can and San Nicholas which were missed by Allied planes wer-e distributed to small warehouses thruout city. Arms transferred to 2 churches in Santa Cruz and Tondo. DUTing raid, American PWs Nrs 1107, 1500 and 1700 vvere shot and killed by Jap guards because they were accused of giving signals to plane s with their cigarettes, were buried by Communications Ministry which furnished this information. This mini­ stry also says that at 10.30 President LAUREL received telegram Nr 68 from Jap governrnsnt thru Jap Embassy vl!hich reading is, "2,122,936 pri­ soners surrendered in Bataan dnd Corregidor and were released in 1942. Except for approximately 5700 who are in Constabnlary, these mon are free.· Your government is hereby ordered to draft these men into military service. Heport of name sand addre S8GS ·liJil1first be submitted to Jap Army. Evaders will be treated as guerrillas. Families of de­ serters V'iill be taken as hostages, Immediate compliance is enforced. Release of above to newspapers is forbidden". Both N BndS railv1Jays nOviT used exclusively for military transport. Rice costs 3500 Jap military pesos a sack. Headquarters of Jop mili­ tary police is now in residence of President OSTJrENA. Engrotaeg Tibay and El Poagtelpo Shoe Fa ctorio s used by E n(3my for manu.facture of mili­ tary supplies" Jap capte.in ki11ed with own sword in San Pedro Makati j 17ms atta.ched to 1.351 Division. PL... 2 - ,is "B.,C i f 1 ,AI P. I. Message Sheet 184.9 24 Nov 44 (Cont'd)

LUZON

Tor Nueva Ecija~ 180ctg A-I", Results of U.S. raids on Bangad; 20 Cabanatuan Airfield for fourth tlme on 18 Oct. Slight on field, one Jap casualty and no planes destroyed on ground. Since then some fighter planes use airfield for hiding' when there is air raid.

Mil Rizal and Lag'lma: 22 Nov~ Following observations ~ MARKINGS 4 Units control Rizal and eastern Laguna through mutual agreement with

other units 0 Discipline, morale, organization good.,' Full cooperation with US policies. strength reports to be forwarded~ Estimate 10,000 trained, 10% serviceably anned. Supplies of weapons, ammunition, clothing, medicine:} emergency rations needed ~ Only s:~ v.rce now avail ... able through ANDERSON via usual channels plus 15 days mountain hand carry. Site for air drop with good security available in rear vicin­ i ty here., Please advise.

PALAWAN

Cabais Palawan, 21 Novg KENDEN (7) detachment moved overland to tip 6 of Pandanan Point. strength 40 m8n~ well armed ~ killing m tives ..

Cabais Palawan~ 22 Nov~ American fliers in my area 11. None of injured 5 requires immediate evacuation. Physical condition satisfactory. No alternate rendezvous point available due to local conditions and enemy activities, Previously selected point, 1190 3S f E, 100 26' N

(Pagdanan Point):} most socvre o

Cabais Palawan~ 22 Nov~ Name, rank, and serial number of personnel to 6 be evacuated reference your Nr 5 message dated 21 No"v are contained in messages Nr 3 dated 19 Nov in 3 parts, and Nr 4 dated 18 Nov in 2 parts,. sent from this station. Physical conditions satisfactory. Personnel assembled near rendezvous site and are alerted from dawn to dusk. Food supplies badly neoded o Request i evacuating plene bring us dire necessities such as sugar, flour, baking powder~ coffee, powdered milk, chocolate, emergency ration, and cigarettes.

MINDANAO 1/ 7/ / /, 1.1 -0, /..x;,NJr.!) Misamis Or ~ 21st Nov :,I\TJ-p strength ~ 7;;;rc? /f~,'P~~ y&V I ~ f,it)J: I' J ~~~.. " Cugman 600'yq,r;t,h/.)" J.U «J.f ~ Puerto ,;2,000 ./ ITuO'o-'~-""<""-"-" o 500 Agusan 1,000 ../' 'ALAE 700 Tagoloa.n 2,500- Bolonsiri 150 Del Mqnte 2,QQQ.~" DaYirig to Dalwangl3.n, 2 500 ¥,/ '-~~---'y/;J ) Fer ~ 21 Nov~ S~engt~M4£Y!(MalgYb.9,J.9Y7}.<:t,:r.,~_~_2.J!. .9_?g~"" . 545 t,~S7Bukidnon lJnchecked 0 Troops reported N on 14 Nov partly offset by 2,000 to Malay on 13 Nov~

CEBU

Cus Cebug 18 Nov~ B-1. Enemy movemf9nts~ 2 As of 2410/Z, 150 Japs infantry vvi th 2 machine guns moved out by trucks from Tabunok to B'L-lhisan.· Cebu City~ At OlOO/Z,9 5 carts of supplies were taken to city from Tabunok. At 0730/Z, 70 Japs engineer moved out to Pandan Naga by trucks from city. .At 2340/Z, 5 trucks fully loaded supplies left

- 3 .. UNCLASSIfiED 'dill. F ' £ ".

P. I. Message Sheet 184, 24 Nov 44 (GontVo.)

Cushing N1' 2 (Cont'd)

Tabunok bound city. 19 Nov~ At 2440/Z<; 60 Japs moved by foot bound, city from TabunoL: escorting 6 carts supplies. At OIOO/Z, another 60 Japs escorted several carts supplies from Tabul10k to citYo At 02l5/Z, 5 trucks full supplios left Lawaan bound city. 21 Nov~ BL.,.2. Maruchi Guml drydocks, San Nicolas') Cebu City ~ sup·... plying lumber for Jap Army.

NEGROS

Abc Negros ~ 18 Nov~ 13 planes 2 KlllE of fie In. on road to Murcia as 397 of 18 Nov~ 7 planes and spare parts SW of second bridge N of field as of 18th ..... (part missing)c~hours. Dumaguete, pIanos under coconut trees BE of Silliman University occupied by J"ap troops with b"u1k concentrated in area between pier and field. Col OlE back in Dumaguete IjIJith one battalion Nip soldiers from Cebu. At least.one squadron Nip planes patrol at very high altitude over airfield N Negros dailyo

Abc Negros Occ~ 23 Nov'~ L/- mobile A/A guns at Manapla Sugar Central ..

402 Correction our Nr 401 9 (see page 1) re barrio Tabiguc 2 Kms along Provincial Road SIN of Lanog Lanog Field and not S of Sarauta proper.

Abc Negros ~ 22 Nov~ Aircraft sumrm ry~ 406 B 2300/Z VLJ 9416('03 XX 15 C 2343/Z VLJ 8927503 PX 15 E 0200/Z ALa 8995000 xx 00 G 0220/Z VLT 9148821 BF 01 RGceived late from obs6rv8r 1!!lQI, 28 flights flashed to K7l ..

PANAY

Per Manila~ 21 Nov: 250 American PW sent to Corregidor on labor 19 assignment. About 500 Filipino laborers in piers and port area,? Manila,ll executod by the enemy up to 16 Oct on charges of sabotage and looting. Estimated 10,000 Nip troops moved to Antipolo in Rizal 3rd week Oct~ Heavy tank concentration finished their military training and assigned with their regula.r troops. pfjr Capiz ~ 23 Nov~ Hefer to yO'll!' Nr 4 and in addition our Nr 21 24 (seG PI -Message Shoot 183:, Page 3 ~ 23 Nov 44) ~ It mentions Loctugan Airfield: 30 meters wide by 700 meters long" Direction of runway N 14 degroes E. Clearanco approach NE trees 6 meters high and 2 houses 7 meters highG Railroad station 5 meters high all ranging 120 to 180

meters from 1lE (mel rlli'1VJay 0 Clearance SW 8.pproach, hills 100 meters high from sea level about 150 motors from S end runway to present condition of rUHvvay cove with grass -'~- to 1 foot high, depressions on

SW and eastern parts of runway 0 Type of paving~ Rock foundation

covered with sand and ea.rth binders rolled by 10 ton roller o Con­ structed in year 1937 by Bureau of Aeronautics!, Used by Army and INAEC (7) bofore war,;, Hcconditioning needs 3~OOO man hUllro. If ex- ~ tsnded to 1 Kn1 long

PCI' Iloilo ~ 18 Nov~ Tho 3 American airmen reported iJ.'1 01.1,1"' 98.3 wero 25 picked up by Catalina flying boat morning l8ths Samo fl~Ting "boat rc~ ported in om:-- NI' 14 (S08 pE,gO 2).0

1111_ [ PT DNCLASSfnEU -if ViD P. I. Message Sheet 184, 24 Nov 44 (Cont'd) -~~'SlElfJJ, -, j .. ·" Per Capiz g 23 Nov~ There are 12 American airmen and one sub crew in 26 this area, all in Libertad Pandan. None reported needing immediate evacuation because of physical condition. Sites recommended are Liber­ tad in Pandan and Caticlan in Buruanga in order of priority. Ref your Sp Nr 5.

MINDORO

Row Mindoro: 23 Nov~ One SC anchored in cove Dear Baeto Point was 233 machine gunned by Liberator this morning but was not sunk. Will advise more later.

Row Mindoro ~ 23 Nov~ Liberator bombed small launch at small Galatero . 234 (rpt Balatero) Cove yesterday morning but mis sed entirely" We finished job yesterday afternoon as it interfered with our supply ships.

LUZON

Vol Rizal~ 21 Nov~ (Message incomplete) 17 •• " •. "on Plaza Gaite filled to the roof with ammo the 0r.i0ntal Cabaret in Maypajo district all filled \id th ammo. The Chinese ani Laloma cemeteries arc gasoline dumps barrels arranged in length of

5 x 4 x 2 meters so look like tombs spread all over •.• c •

Vol Ilocos Sur~ 14 Oct~ Infonnation from captured prisoner captured 19 Ilocos Sur on Jap organization and 8quipment~ I Buntai (section), 12 men~ 1 Shotai. (platoon) has 4 Buntai or 48 men, 1 Chutai (company) has 4 Shotai or 180 men inc11Jding 4 officers and 10 noncoms.. 1 Daitai

(battalion) has 4 rifle.o 0 ... (part 'two here) .. " .mm caliber, new model short rifle machine gun and automatic rifle with tripod and 7,,7 mm cali­ bore Priso:nE~r who is new arrival from Formosa was trained in use of rifle ~ bayonet and gas mask and in grenade throwing was not trained in trench fighting or A/A dofense,.was in no manuevers. Only instructions received was to fOllbw' orders. (Message incomplete)

Vol 110cos Sur~ 20 Oet~ Fragmontary~ At Salomague Port 316 infantry 38 CNALTPP •••••••• ll, 131 Saps passed Narvacan toward S in 12 wagons 14 oct. 1,000 Jap civilian, old men,9 women, children landed Lapog 7 Oct transported S. 5 small motorboats at barrio Solotsolot, Lapog.9 used to rescue survivors of ships. (Message incomplete)

Vol La Union: 25 Oct ~ (Message incomplete) 63 Information from Jap prisoner who deserted and surrendered to our units at Bacnotah, La Union .... c." ...... whipped and given water cure when he could not drill because of blistered fc:,et, does not like the war, people in Taean imprisoned if they disouss war. In Aumari in mountains not far from town are 2 factories which produce ammunition~ riflos, tanks and trucks, in N part of Aumari 4 Kms N of center of town is airfield 2 YJ1l square at vvhich single engine fighters are stationed (will attempt to secure sketches of these installations) ..

Caban Bulacan~ 22 Nov~ Baliuag, Bulacan, Catholic ch1JTch and convent, 291 Santa Barbara elementary school (210 degrees ard 1.25 miles from the ohurch) and Sabang elementary school (/+2 degrees and 1 mile from the church) are occupied by 500 Jap military police and infantry men. RefGr to map Luzon Nr 22. Thc-ose are very prominent from the air. These soldiers are exercising strict supervision on the harvest of rice in the vicinity and our civilians and guerrillas are deprived of tho food BuppliB s • They also hnve put up a strict cordon of guards on entry towards our m01.mtains. Request that they be bombed immedi­ ately so tha t the Nips will l(;;a VG the area.

.. 5 ... 2. IIII'T $1(' C.. R.Tl II'"

Po I. Message Sheet Fr 184~ 24- Nov 44 (Contfd)

Caban Bulaean, 2.3 Nov~ At 0.300/H,.2,000 HUKBj~AJAPS, all armed, are 295 concentrating at barrio Talaksa,n!) 1 mile E of San Rafael, Bulacan .. Nips are concentrating at San Ildefonso Church, ;:;chool houses ~ and near the railroad station.. Refer to map Luzon, Nr 22 and 23. Alsoconcen­ trating in Baliuag.. All are moving towards Ackley then to our head­

quarters 0 Request that the Nips be bombed immediately and we take care of the HUKBALAJAPS ..

Caban Bulacan~ 23 Nov~ JUKBALAJ.APS and Nips are scattered among the 296 towns and barriof.\ of Bl]~acan Province to supervise and loot the rice harvest now in progress.. They have surrounded us and prevent our passage" Leaflets believed will pacify the HUKBALAJAPS. Reiterate request for dropping of leaflets and bombing of Nips in Baliuag and San Ildefonso towns" HUKBALAJAPS reinforcement coming continuously from near by towns for campaign towards our headquarters.

Mil Manila ~ ILl- Nov~ US· raid of 14 Nov on Manila destroyed the 5 following targets ~ Earnsha-J1J Dry Dock, Earnshaw Machine Shop, Earnshaw Garago.. A-2o

PANAY :, ~:

Per Manila~ 23 Nov~ 1~am8s ranking officials that stayed Manila Hote} 22 different dates this year pCI' hotel room orderlies to our agents" l·~lO SGP~ Generals YAMANJ.OT0!l IARASE (?), KIMURA, TERA.IlliOT0.9

MA1VDijOTO (lVIARUMOTO?); Colonels DJ'ANOTO, MAKINO, MURAKJUVII, NONOGAKA y SHII'!lIYASO ('?), KAJ'JIWfA(KPJ!IADA?), I\UA, SIIVIADA (SHIMAUA) ~ ICHINAGANA (ICHINOGAiNA?), ON::r,SUBO (OTSUbO?) 7 SHIFJiKA ('I), FUKNAGA (FUKUNAGA),

DAGUTCHI (DEGUC":HI?):I MATSUNAG.As BEGUCBI 9 IISDAR (IIZUYA?) ~ N1U\:AMURA 9 SHINIADA, YOSHII ~ NISHARA (NISHIE!AHA) > SHIGAKA (?), F'UYUNAGA, YANAGI,

OnEr'O'''I_,-l,0.K.. (OTr'UT7I()),.,:;, n ( 7 G01·'·". :JA DA (O'\T.1Hl." ADA?) 0 13-20 Elcpg Generals ITiiMI SHIGE:MI, PAULINO SJ11'lTOS)1 Y),NAGATA , p "D 1 (1 "fT'O 7I/f'RAO-')A (?) C I ·1· H'~yI\Tj'AViTA 1IToe'·" DEG--"tTI "Gr;-',; TSU J.1 3 \:;,A.L ,1uA h _, ) 0 one. S 1Ii. .t'l.n u , H I->.~ ~ ; U(.Jll , .l-l J.~LU1.9 YOSHIlilAZO (YOSHIvlATSU?) J' H.lU~DO ("7,), OKAMOTO J KAlv:EDA ~ IViATSUUHA ~ RPJv1ADA (?) 9 WATASE, YJ-iKIMATA (?):; JiOKI:; YUJHHI (FUJII?) J SHIRTSHI (?))1 OB.tlM (?).9 ASARA (7)3 MOSI (?)~ RAKAGUCBI (NAKAGUCHI?). 1-10 Sep~ Commanders T~ OTiJ\fI.9 HAYASHI, NOMURA, HA.8HIMOTO, NAGASE,

HIGASHI 7 SUGIYAMA, TAKAOKA ar.d IWANAKA.9 Admirals SHIGUGA (?) and 31"11'0. Mani.la guest list per our agents as of 21 Oct ~ Major General AKI­ BAMA (AKIYAMA?) and SUZUKI. Colonels Kl-Uv1ADA, KINO and SHIh,;ADiq Lt Colonels Iv1ASCOGAiji]J1 1\![1SAWA.9 NATO KAWAKITA.9 KIHINKI (?):; liJIDRMTANA (?), MIRONIYA (IVIINOMIYA?).9 YOKCE ('f).9 ONGA (ODA?) J ONISHI.9 S.AITO)1 ilEKI (AIKIOR.tiOKI?), FUKUl\iL'iRA (FUKUl\'lURA?) J DASUGUlliJA (?), HISAWA (?).9 KATO 9 KERINSUKI (?).9 MITSUI, MOTAYAVIfA (MOTOYAMA?).

CEBU

Na-;7Y Disposition Cebu Harbor and vicinity~ 19 Nov~ 2200/Z,.3 IvlV~ 200526 2 at 200 GT ea!> 1 at 80 GT~ at Mabolo Basin.. 2 VA (100 GT ea) at 1 Subang Daku Mandawe 0 "steel barge (250 length) and 3 VB (25 G'T 6a) ~

2 J\W (7 GT (:)a) at Ma.nd~i;'fe 1ffhBrf t> 1 landing barge (150! length) E of MandawG Wharf. 1 VA (600 GT) at Varadero Basin. 4 VB (25 GT E;a at Osmena 1sharf. 2 I.JV (:)0 GT eEl) between Varadero and Cal tez.. 1 IJ1V (60 GT N of C;],ltez. 6 VB (15 GT ea) at Tayud River$l Liloan.

BIJ\J1)ANAO

Nav:.v Za1:1bcanga ~ Marino cont8 ct :mines between Matanal Point, Basilan, 200804 and Cocos Island. DOYJf~ity.:e' Ie Id tmknown" Believed pro'C0ction Lamitan Harbor~ Osaka Maru in June sunk at ilTar1i hitting mine this areao

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P. I. Me ssage Sheet 184 ~ 24 Nov 44 (Cont t d)

P1-U~AY

Navy 200030 Iloilo~ 19 Nov~ 1 VA, light Ioed slow to SW. Position 110 15 f N, 1230 lIt E.

Navy Iloilo: 19 Nov~ 2 VB, light load, slow to S, position 110 26 1 N, 200255 123 0 14' E.

PALAWAN

Navy Palawan~ 3 NlV anchored, approximate position 8° 45 1 Nt 1170 49' 200441 E at 2230/Z, 19 Nov.

(Messages typed to 1600, 24 Nov 44)

Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. I:nformation contained herein will not be circulated or reproduced beyond the Staff S6-ction to which it is addressed. When not actually in use, this document is to be kept in a safe and is chargeable to the custody of an officer. See AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, and Standing Operating Procedure Instructions, 14 March 1944, reg8.rding Security Classifications.

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