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Appendix: Chronological Account APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGIcaL AccOUNT Iran (1970–2018) February 1970: Iran’s ratifcation of the NPT. May 1974: Iran’s signature of the NPT’s Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. February 1979: Iranian Revolution and halt of the nuclear program. February 1984: Iran’s nuclear program revived. August 1992: Agreement with Moscow to complete Bushehr nuclear power plant. July 1996: Bill Clinton signs the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. May 1999: Iran and Saudi Arabia issue a joint statement in support of WMD-free Middle East. January 2002: Iran included in the “axis of evil” in George W. Bush’s State of the Union address. August 2002: NRCI revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities. June 2003: IAEA resolution (GOV/2003/40) about Iran’s failure “to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement.” December 2003: Iran’s signature of the Additional Protocol. May 2004: Nuclear Suppliers Group adopting a “catch-all” rule. August 2005: Election of new Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. August 2005: Iran turning down the E3 offer for a long-term agreement on fuel cycle activities. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 231 to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 M. Smetana, Nuclear Deviance, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24225-1 232 APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT September 2005: IAEA resolution (GOV/2005/77) mentioning Iran’s “non compliance.” August 2005: IAEA Board of Governors calling for the complete sus- pension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities and ratifcation and implementation of the Additional Protocol. January 2006: Iran resuming its enrichment activities and suspending the implementation of the Additional Protocol. February 2006: IAEA report (GOV/2006/14) about the “possible mili- tary dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. March 2006: IAEA Board of Governors referring Iran’s case to the UNSC (GOV/2006/14). July 2006: UNSC resolution 1696. August 2006: Iran resuming full enrichment activities at Natanz facility and inaugurating the Arak heavy-water production plant. December 2006: UNSC resolution 1737. February 2008: IAEA report (GOV/2008/4) about the “possible mili- tary dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. September 2009: G-20 Summit announcement of Iran’s second secret nuclear facility. November 2009: IAEA report (GOV/2009/82) about the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. May 2010: Debates over Iran’s nuclear program at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. April 2010: Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. June 2010: UNSC resolution 1929. August 2010: Iranian centrifuges are hit by the Stuxnet virus. November 2011: IAEA report (GOV/2011/69) about the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. June 2011: Further strengthening of the Nuclear Suppliers Group export rules. September 2012: Netanyahu UNGA “red-line” speech. June 2013: Election of new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. September 2013: President Rouhani tells UNGA that “nuclear weapons have no place” in Iran. October–November 2013: Iran-E3+3 meetings in Geneva. November 2013: Joint Plan of Action. July 2015: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 233 July 2015: UNSC resolution 2231 embracing the JCPOA deal as a “comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.” December 2015: IAEA resolution GOV/2015/68. May 2016: IAEA report (GOV/2016/23) states compliance with JCPOA obligations. July 2016: UN Secretary General’s frst biannual report to the UNSC raised concerns over reports that Iran has violated arms transfer and bal- listic missile activity restrictions. September 2016: Russia assists Iran with construction on its second nuclear power plant. January 2017: Iran conducts frst of a series of ballistic missile tests. May 2017: Trump Administration announces sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile program. October 2017: Trump Administration decertifes Iranian compliance with the JCPOA. April 2018: Netanyahu claims that Israel obtained a proof that Iran lied about never having a nuclear weapons program. May 2018: US withdrawal from the JCPOA. May 2018: Britain, France, Germany, and the EU reaffrm their commit- ment to the JCPOA. August 2018: First round of US sanctions against Iran after the withdrawal. October 2018: ICJ rules in favor of Iranian complaint against US sanctions. November 2018: Second round of US sanctions takes effect. North Korea (1985–2018) December 1985: North Korea acceding to the NPT. January 1992: South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. January 1992: North Korea implementing the IAEA safeguards. March 1993: North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT, eventually suspending this decision one day before the required three-month period would pass. April 1993: IAEA Board of Governors on 1 April 1993 concluding that North Korea is in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and referring the case to the UNSC. June 1994: North Korea announces its withdrawal from the IAEA. 234 APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT October 1994: Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States. April 1996: First round of US-North Korea missile talks. May 1996: United States imposes sanctions on North Korea for missile technology-related transfers. August 1998: The Taepodong-1 rocket test-fred over Japan. September 1999: North Korea agrees to a limited moratorium on long- range missile tests. January 2002: North Korea included in the “axis of evil” in George W. Bush’s State of the Union address. October 2002: United States accuses North Korea of clandestine ura- nium enrichment program. November 2002: Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) “condemns North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons pro- gram” and suspends deliveries of heavy fuel. December 2002: North Korea “lifts the freeze on its nuclear activities” and removes the IAEA seals from nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. January 2003: North Korea withdraws from the NPT. February 2003: IAEA reports on North Korea’s non-compliance with safeguard rules and refers the case to the UNSC (GOV/2003/14). August 2003: First round of Six-Party Talks. January 2004: North Korea invites scientists from Stanford University to the Yongbyon nuclear complex. January 2005: U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice labels North Korea an “outpost of tyranny.” February 2005: North Korea announces its acquisition of nuclear weapons. September 2005: Six-Party Talks result in a joint statement committing participants to achieve “the verifable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” July 2006: North Korea conducts a series of ballistic missile tests. July 2006: UNSC resolution 1696 condemns North Korea’s ballistic missile tests. October 2006: North Korea conducts its frst nuclear weapon test. October 2006: UNSC resolution 1718 imposes limited sanctions. February 2007: Six-Party Talks result in the February 13 agreement. October 2008: George W. Bush removes North Korea from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. December 2008: Six-Party Talks end in a stalemate. APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 235 April 2009: North Korea launches the three-stage Unha-2 rocket. April 2009: UNSC Presidential statement condemns North Korea’s mis- sile test (S/PRST/2009/7). April 2009: North Korea ceases the cooperation with the IAEA that was resumed as a result of the Six-Party Talks. May 2009: North Korea conducts its second nuclear weapon test. June 2009: UNSC adopts resolution 1874 and further sanctions against North Korea. June 2009: Pyongyang announces to the fnal phase of its experimental uranium enrichment. December 2011: Kim Jong-un comes to power. December 2012: North Korea launches a satellite into space. January 2013: UNSC resolution 2087. February 2013: North Korea conducts its third nuclear weapon test. March 2013: UNSC resolution 2094. May 2015: NPT Review Conference condemning North Korea’s non-compliance (NPT/CONF.2015/50). January 2016: North Korea conducts its fourth and ffth nuclear weapon test. March 2016: UNSC adopts resolution 2270. April–June 2016: North Korea conducts a series of intermediate-range and submarine-launched ballistic missile tests. July 2016: South Korea and the United States announce the decision to deploy THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. September 2016: North Korea conducts a ffth nuclear test. November 2016: UNSC adopts resolution 2321. February–April 2017: North Korea continues with missile tests. May 2017: The THAAD missile defense system becomes operational. July 2017: Japan, South Korea and the US report North Korea tested an ICBM. August 2017: UNSC adopts resolution 2371. August 2017: Donald Trump’s “fre and fury” remarks. September 2017: North Korea claims a successful hydrogen bomb test. September 2017: UNSC resolution 2375. September 2017: Donald Trump’s “Rocket Man” speech at the UNGA. November 2017: Donald Trump designates North Korea as a state spon- sor of terrorism. December 2017: UNSC adopts resolution 2397 in response to North Korea’s ICBM test. 236 APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT January 2018: South and North Korea reestablish a hotline. April 2018: Kim Jong-un declares that he will suspend nuclear and mis- sile tests. June 2018: Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un sign joint declaration in which North Korea commits to “work toward complete denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.” August 2018: IAEA report (GOV/2018/34) states continuation of North Korea’s nuclear program as a cause
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